feat: add operator guide and project skills discovery MCP tools (#128) #130

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sysadmin merged 1 commits from feat/issue-128-operator-guide-skills into master 2026-07-04 00:06:05 -05:00
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@@ -18,6 +18,17 @@ behavior they rely on already exists (canonical runtime profiles, the
interactive setup menu, identity/eligibility checks, gated review/merge, and interactive setup menu, identity/eligibility checks, gated review/merge, and
audit logging). See [Related documents](#related-documents). audit logging). See [Related documents](#related-documents).
> **New session? Call the guide tools first (#128).** Before using any other
> Gitea MCP tool in a fresh session, call `mcp_get_control_plane_guide`
> (read-only): it reports the active profile, authenticated identity,
> allowed/forbidden operations, profile-aware do/don't guidance, and the
> non-negotiable rules (hard stops, fail-closed behavior, head-SHA pinning,
> merge confirmation, redaction, author/reviewer separation, profile
> switching). Then call `mcp_list_project_skills` to discover the available
> project workflows and `mcp_get_skill_guide(<name>)` for step-by-step
> instructions. This replaces long pasted operator prompts for the standard
> rules; operator prompts still control task-specific scope.
For cross-project use, copy the portable workflow skill at For cross-project use, copy the portable workflow skill at
[`../skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md`](../skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md). [`../skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md`](../skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md).
It extracts the issue-first, isolated-worktree, no-self-review, profile-safety, It extracts the issue-first, isolated-worktree, no-self-review, profile-safety,
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@@ -1503,6 +1503,444 @@ def gitea_create_issue_comment(
return result return result
# ── Operator guide / project skills (#128) ───────────────────────────────────
# Read-only capability discovery for new LLM sessions: what the active
# profile may do, how identity is verified, the non-negotiable safety rules,
# and which project workflows ("skills") exist. Nothing here mutates state or
# widens any permission — the guide describes the gates, it never bypasses
# them.
def _role_kind(allowed, forbidden) -> str:
"""Classify the active profile from its normalized operations.
'author' can create PRs / push branches; 'reviewer' can approve/merge;
'mixed' can do both (a config smell — the reviewer-deadlock invariant
forbids it in v2 configs); 'limited' can do neither.
"""
def can(op):
return gitea_config.check_operation(op, allowed, forbidden)[0]
review = can("gitea.pr.approve") or can("gitea.pr.merge")
author = can("gitea.pr.create") or can("gitea.branch.push")
if review and author:
return "mixed"
if review:
return "reviewer"
if author:
return "author"
return "limited"
_HARD_STOPS = [
"No self-review and no self-merge: the authenticated user must differ "
"from the PR author for review/approve/merge.",
"No tags or releases without an explicit operator instruction.",
"Never print token values, keychain IDs, passwords, or raw service "
"URLs in normal output.",
"No production access or production mutations.",
"No force-merge and no bypassing of merge gates; Gitea's own "
"mergeable signal is honoured, never overridden.",
"Do not rewrite the live profiles config; config changes are "
"operator-owned.",
]
_GUIDE_RULES = {
"hard_stops": _HARD_STOPS,
"fail_closed": (
"Every gate fails closed: unknown/disabled profiles, unknown "
"operations, empty allowed-operation lists, unresolved identity, "
"and unparseable config all deny the action instead of guessing. "
"Disabled profiles/services are never silently substituted."),
"head_sha_pinning": (
"Before reviewing or merging, record the PR head SHA and pass it as "
"expected_head_sha; if the head moves between review and merge, the "
"tool refuses and the review must be redone."),
"merge_confirmation": (
"gitea_merge_pr requires confirmation to equal 'MERGE PR <n>' "
"exactly (e.g. 'MERGE PR 42'); without it no API call is made. "
"Merge only when the operator has explicitly authorized it."),
"redaction": [
"Normal output contains no endpoint URLs, keychain IDs, or token "
"values; auth is reported as type/status only.",
"GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS=1 is the local admin/debug opt-in for "
"web links and endpoint names; it never reveals token values.",
"Errors are redacted before being surfaced.",
],
"separation": (
"Author, reviewer, and merger are separate identities. An author "
"profile creates branches/commits/PRs and must never "
"review/approve/merge its own work; a reviewer/merger profile "
"reviews and merges and must never create PRs or push branches "
"(reviewer-deadlock invariant). Issue discussion comments "
"(gitea.issue.comment) are gated separately from PR reviews "
"(gitea.pr.*)."),
"profile_switching": [
"The active profile comes from GITEA_MCP_PROFILE (with "
"GITEA_MCP_CONFIG pointing at the profiles config).",
"Switching profiles requires changing the launcher environment and "
"reconnecting the MCP server (operator action, e.g. /mcp); the "
"server process cannot switch identities in place.",
"After any switch, verify with gitea_whoami before doing anything "
"else.",
],
"identity_verification": [
"Call gitea_whoami with an explicit remote first; confirm the "
"authenticated username and profile match the role you were asked "
"to perform.",
"If the username, profile, or allowed operations do not match the "
"task, STOP and report instead of proceeding.",
"Runtime identity (whoami) is the source of truth; config-declared "
"roles are metadata only.",
],
}
_COMMON_WORKFLOWS = [
"issue authoring: verify identity, create/claim the issue, keep scope "
"explicit (remote/org/repo).",
"implementation: claim issue, branch from fresh master, implement only "
"the issue scope, test, open a PR referencing the issue, stop.",
"PR review: verify reviewer identity, pin the head SHA, validate "
"independently, post a verdict; never review your own work.",
"PR merge: reviewer identity + eligibility check + pinned head + "
"explicit 'MERGE PR <n>' confirmation, only with operator "
"authorization.",
]
# Skill registry (#128). status: 'available' = backed by tools in this
# server; 'designed-not-implemented' = design exists but no MCP tools yet
# (listed rather than omitted so sessions know the boundary); 'operator-only'
# = never performed by an LLM session.
_PROJECT_SKILLS = {
"gitea-issue-authoring": {
"description": "Create, view, label, claim, and close Gitea issues.",
"when_to_use": "Filing new work, updating issue state, claiming an "
"issue before implementation (gitea_mark_issue).",
"required_operations": ["gitea.read"],
"status": "available",
"notes": "Always pass remote/org/repo explicitly.",
"steps": [
"Verify identity with gitea_whoami (explicit remote).",
"Check the issue queue with gitea_list_issues.",
"Create with gitea_create_issue or claim with gitea_mark_issue "
"action='start'.",
"Keep issue bodies free of secrets, tokens, and raw service "
"URLs.",
"Release the claim (action='done') or close when finished.",
],
},
"gitea-pr-creation": {
"description": "Author a feature branch and open a pull request.",
"when_to_use": "After implementing a claimed issue on a feature "
"branch; author profiles only.",
"required_operations": ["gitea.pr.create"],
"status": "available",
"steps": [
"Branch from fresh master (git pull first).",
"Implement only the claimed issue's scope; stage files "
"explicitly.",
"Run targeted tests, the full suite, py_compile, git diff "
"--check, and a secret sweep before committing.",
"Open the PR with gitea_create_pr referencing the issue "
"('Closes #<n>').",
"Stop: do not review or merge your own PR.",
],
},
"gitea-pr-review": {
"description": "Independently review a pull request and post a "
"verdict.",
"when_to_use": "Reviewer profile asked to evaluate someone else's "
"PR.",
"required_operations": ["gitea.pr.review"],
"status": "available",
"steps": [
"Verify reviewer identity with gitea_whoami; the PR author "
"must be a different user.",
"Pin the PR head SHA (gitea_view_pr) before validating.",
"Validate independently: scope vs the linked issue, tests, "
"diff check, secret sweep.",
"Post the verdict with gitea_review_pr / "
"gitea_submit_pr_review.",
"Do not merge unless the operator explicitly authorizes it.",
],
},
"gitea-pr-merge": {
"description": "Gated merge of an approved pull request.",
"when_to_use": "Reviewer/merger profile with explicit operator "
"authorization to merge.",
"required_operations": ["gitea.pr.merge"],
"status": "available",
"steps": [
"Confirm operator authorization for this specific merge.",
"Run gitea_check_pr_eligibility action='merge' and resolve "
"every reason it reports.",
"Call gitea_merge_pr with expected_head_sha pinned and "
"confirmation 'MERGE PR <n>'.",
"Confirm linked issues auto-closed and the in-progress label "
"was released.",
],
},
"gitea-issue-comments": {
"description": "Read and post issue discussion comments (distinct "
"from PR reviews).",
"when_to_use": "Design discussions, review notes on issues, "
"decision records.",
"required_operations": ["gitea.issue.comment"],
"status": "available",
"notes": "Listing needs only gitea.read; posting needs "
"gitea.issue.comment, gated separately from gitea.pr.*.",
"steps": [
"List with gitea_list_issue_comments (explicit issue number).",
"Post with gitea_create_issue_comment; markdown body, no "
"secrets or raw URLs.",
"Never use PR review tools for issue discussion or vice "
"versa.",
],
},
"profile-switching": {
"description": "Change the active MCP identity between author and "
"reviewer profiles.",
"when_to_use": "A task requires a role the current profile "
"forbids (e.g. moving from authoring to review).",
"required_operations": [],
"status": "available",
"steps": [
"Ask the operator to update GITEA_MCP_PROFILE in the launcher "
"environment.",
"Operator reconnects the MCP server (e.g. /mcp).",
"Verify the new identity with gitea_whoami before acting.",
"If identity does not match the expected role, STOP.",
],
},
"redaction-security-review": {
"description": "Sweep changes and tool output for secrets, "
"keychain IDs, token values, and raw service URLs.",
"when_to_use": "Before every commit/PR and when reviewing any "
"diff.",
"required_operations": ["gitea.read"],
"status": "available",
"steps": [
"Run git diff --check for whitespace damage.",
"Grep the diff for token/password/secret/keychain patterns; "
"only synthetic fixtures may match.",
"Confirm normal tool output contains no endpoint URLs or "
"keychain IDs (reveal opt-in excepted).",
"Confirm no live config or private machine paths are being "
"committed.",
],
},
"jenkins-readonly": {
"description": "Read-only Jenkins CI inspection (jobs, builds, "
"logs).",
"when_to_use": "Checking CI state once Jenkins MCP tools exist.",
"required_operations": ["jenkins.read"],
"status": "designed-not-implemented",
"notes": "Design exists (issues #72/#77); no Jenkins MCP server is "
"connected yet. Report SKIPPED rather than substituting "
"shell or direct API calls.",
"steps": [
"Confirm a Jenkins MCP server is connected; if not, report "
"SKIPPED.",
"Use read-only operations only; never trigger, cancel, or "
"configure builds.",
],
},
"glitchtip-readonly": {
"description": "Read-only GlitchTip error/event inspection.",
"when_to_use": "Investigating reported errors once GlitchTip MCP "
"tools exist.",
"required_operations": ["glitchtip.read"],
"status": "designed-not-implemented",
"notes": "Design exists (issue #73); no GlitchTip MCP server is "
"connected yet. Report SKIPPED rather than substituting "
"shell or direct API calls.",
"steps": [
"Confirm a GlitchTip MCP server is connected; if not, report "
"SKIPPED.",
"Use read-only operations only; never mutate issues or "
"settings.",
],
},
"release-operator": {
"description": "Release, tag, and version workflows.",
"when_to_use": "Never by an LLM session on its own: releases and "
"tags are operator-owned.",
"required_operations": [],
"status": "operator-only",
"notes": "See the release SOP docs. Hard stop: no tags or "
"releases without an explicit operator instruction.",
"steps": [
"Stop and hand off to the operator; do not create tags or "
"releases.",
],
},
}
@mcp.tool()
def mcp_get_control_plane_guide(
remote: str = "dadeschools",
host: str | None = None,
) -> dict:
"""Structured operator guide for the current Gitea MCP session (#128).
Read-only. Call this first in a new session: it reports the active
profile, the authenticated identity (fail-soft), what this profile may
and may not do, and the non-negotiable workflow rules (hard stops,
fail-closed behavior, head-SHA pinning, merge confirmation, redaction,
author/reviewer separation, profile switching). Guidance is
profile-aware; if identity cannot be resolved it instructs the session
to STOP.
Args:
remote: Known instance — 'dadeschools' or 'prgs'.
host: Override the Gitea host.
Returns:
dict with 'read_only', 'remote', 'profile' (name, operations,
role_kind), 'identity' (username/status/instruction; 'server' only
with the reveal opt-in), 'guidance' (profile-specific), 'rules',
'workflows', and 'skills_tool'. Never secrets.
"""
h, _, _ = _resolve(remote, host, None, None)
profile = get_profile()
allowed = profile["allowed_operations"]
forbidden = profile["forbidden_operations"]
role = _role_kind(allowed, forbidden)
username = _authenticated_username(h)
identity = {
"authenticated_username": username,
"remote": remote,
"status": "verified" if username else "unresolved",
"instruction": (
"Identity verified — confirm it matches the role this task "
"requires before acting."
if username else
"STOP: the authenticated identity could not be resolved. Do "
"not perform any mutating operation; report to the operator "
"and wait."),
}
if _reveal_endpoints():
identity["server"] = h
guidance = []
if not username:
guidance.append(
"STOP: identity unresolved — no mutating operations until the "
"operator fixes credentials/profile and gitea_whoami verifies.")
if role == "author":
guidance.append(
"Author profile: creating branches, commits, issues, and PRs "
"is allowed; review, approve, and merge are forbidden for this "
"profile — never attempt them, and never review or merge your "
"own PR from any profile.")
elif role == "reviewer":
guidance.append(
"Reviewer profile: review/approve/merge may proceed ONLY after "
"gitea_check_pr_eligibility passes and the PR head SHA is "
"pinned (expected_head_sha); the PR author must be a different "
"user, and merging additionally requires explicit operator "
"authorization plus the 'MERGE PR <n>' confirmation.")
elif role == "mixed":
guidance.append(
"WARNING: this profile allows both authoring and "
"review/merge, which defeats two-party review. Treat it as "
"misconfigured: STOP and report to the operator before any "
"review or merge.")
else:
guidance.append(
"Limited profile: no authoring and no review/merge "
"operations are allowed. Read-only work only; anything else "
"fails closed.")
return {
"read_only": True,
"remote": remote,
"profile": {
"name": profile["profile_name"],
"allowed_operations": allowed,
"forbidden_operations": forbidden,
"role_kind": role,
},
"identity": identity,
"guidance": guidance,
"rules": _GUIDE_RULES,
"workflows": _COMMON_WORKFLOWS,
"skills_tool": "mcp_list_project_skills",
}
@mcp.tool()
def mcp_list_project_skills() -> dict:
"""List the project's workflow skills and when to use them (#128).
Read-only; makes no API calls. Each skill reports its name,
description, when-to-use guidance, required operations, status
('available', 'designed-not-implemented', or 'operator-only'), and
whether the current profile's operations permit it. Use
mcp_get_skill_guide(name) for the step-by-step guide.
Returns:
dict with 'read_only', 'count', and 'skills' (list). Never secrets.
"""
profile = get_profile()
allowed = profile["allowed_operations"]
forbidden = profile["forbidden_operations"]
skills = []
for name, meta in _PROJECT_SKILLS.items():
ops = meta["required_operations"]
available = all(
gitea_config.check_operation(op, allowed, forbidden)[0]
for op in ops
) if ops else True
entry = {
"name": name,
"description": meta["description"],
"when_to_use": meta["when_to_use"],
"required_operations": ops,
"status": meta["status"],
"available_to_current_profile": (
available and meta["status"] == "available"),
}
if meta.get("notes"):
entry["notes"] = meta["notes"]
skills.append(entry)
return {"read_only": True, "count": len(skills), "skills": skills}
@mcp.tool()
def mcp_get_skill_guide(skill_name: str) -> dict:
"""Step-by-step guide for one named project skill (#128).
Read-only; makes no API calls. Unknown skill names fail closed with
the list of valid names instead of guessing.
Args:
skill_name: A name from mcp_list_project_skills (case-insensitive).
Returns:
dict with 'success', 'skill' metadata, and 'steps'; on an unknown
name, 'success' False with 'reasons' and 'valid_skills'.
"""
key = (skill_name or "").strip().lower()
meta = _PROJECT_SKILLS.get(key)
if meta is None:
return {
"success": False,
"reasons": [f"unknown skill '{skill_name}' (fail closed)"],
"valid_skills": sorted(_PROJECT_SKILLS),
}
skill = {
"name": key,
"description": meta["description"],
"when_to_use": meta["when_to_use"],
"required_operations": meta["required_operations"],
"status": meta["status"],
}
if meta.get("notes"):
skill["notes"] = meta["notes"]
return {"success": True, "skill": skill, "steps": list(meta["steps"])}
@mcp.tool() @mcp.tool()
def gitea_whoami( def gitea_whoami(
remote: str = "dadeschools", remote: str = "dadeschools",
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@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
"""Tests for the operator guide / project skills MCP tools (#128).
Read-only capability-discovery tools: mcp_get_control_plane_guide,
mcp_list_project_skills, mcp_get_skill_guide. Each is tested by calling the
underlying function directly with mocked API responses.
"""
import json
import os
import sys
import unittest
from unittest.mock import patch
sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
import mcp_server # noqa: E402
from mcp_server import ( # noqa: E402
mcp_get_control_plane_guide,
mcp_list_project_skills,
mcp_get_skill_guide,
)
FAKE_AUTH = "Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"
AUTHOR_ENV = {
"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "author-test",
"GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS":
"gitea.read,gitea.repo.commit,gitea.branch.create,"
"gitea.branch.push,gitea.pr.create,gitea.pr.comment",
"GITEA_FORBIDDEN_OPERATIONS": "gitea.pr.approve,gitea.pr.merge",
}
REVIEWER_ENV = {
"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "reviewer-test",
"GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS":
"gitea.read,gitea.pr.review,gitea.pr.comment,gitea.pr.approve,"
"gitea.pr.request_changes,gitea.pr.merge",
"GITEA_FORBIDDEN_OPERATIONS": "gitea.pr.create,gitea.branch.push",
}
EXPECTED_SKILLS = [
"gitea-issue-authoring",
"gitea-pr-creation",
"gitea-pr-review",
"gitea-pr-merge",
"gitea-issue-comments",
"profile-switching",
"redaction-security-review",
"jenkins-readonly",
"glitchtip-readonly",
"release-operator",
]
class GuideTestBase(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
def tearDown(self):
mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# mcp_get_control_plane_guide
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestControlPlaneGuide(GuideTestBase):
@patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"login": "author-bot"})
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
def test_author_profile_guidance(self, _auth, _api):
with patch.dict(os.environ, AUTHOR_ENV, clear=True):
g = mcp_get_control_plane_guide(remote="prgs")
self.assertTrue(g["read_only"])
self.assertEqual(g["profile"]["role_kind"], "author")
self.assertEqual(g["identity"]["authenticated_username"], "author-bot")
self.assertEqual(g["identity"]["status"], "verified")
blob = " ".join(g["guidance"]).lower()
self.assertIn("forbidden", blob)
self.assertIn("review", blob)
@patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"login": "reviewer-bot"})
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
def test_reviewer_profile_guidance(self, _auth, _api):
with patch.dict(os.environ, REVIEWER_ENV, clear=True):
g = mcp_get_control_plane_guide(remote="prgs")
self.assertEqual(g["profile"]["role_kind"], "reviewer")
blob = " ".join(g["guidance"]).lower()
self.assertIn("eligibility", blob)
self.assertIn("pinned", blob)
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=None)
def test_unresolved_identity_instructs_stop(self, _auth):
with patch.dict(os.environ, AUTHOR_ENV, clear=True):
g = mcp_get_control_plane_guide(remote="prgs")
self.assertEqual(g["identity"]["status"], "unresolved")
self.assertIsNone(g["identity"]["authenticated_username"])
self.assertIn("STOP", g["identity"]["instruction"])
@patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"login": "author-bot"})
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
def test_guide_is_read_only(self, _auth, mock_api):
with patch.dict(os.environ, AUTHOR_ENV, clear=True):
mcp_get_control_plane_guide(remote="prgs")
for call in mock_api.call_args_list:
self.assertEqual(call[0][0], "GET")
@patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"login": "author-bot"})
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
def test_no_urls_or_keychain_ids_by_default(self, _auth, _api):
with patch.dict(os.environ, AUTHOR_ENV, clear=True):
g = mcp_get_control_plane_guide(remote="prgs")
blob = json.dumps(g)
self.assertNotIn("https://", blob)
self.assertNotIn("http://", blob)
self.assertNotIn("keychain:", blob)
self.assertNotIn(FAKE_AUTH, blob)
self.assertNotIn("server", g["identity"])
@patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"login": "author-bot"})
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
def test_reveal_opt_in_includes_server(self, _auth, _api):
env = dict(AUTHOR_ENV, GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS="1")
with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
g = mcp_get_control_plane_guide(remote="prgs")
self.assertIn("gitea.prgs.cc", g["identity"]["server"])
@patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"login": "author-bot"})
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
def test_rules_cover_required_topics(self, _auth, _api):
with patch.dict(os.environ, AUTHOR_ENV, clear=True):
g = mcp_get_control_plane_guide(remote="prgs")
rules = g["rules"]
for key in ("hard_stops", "fail_closed", "head_sha_pinning",
"merge_confirmation", "redaction", "separation",
"profile_switching", "identity_verification"):
self.assertIn(key, rules)
self.assertIn("MERGE PR", json.dumps(rules["merge_confirmation"]))
self.assertTrue(rules["hard_stops"])
def test_unknown_remote_raises(self):
with patch.dict(os.environ, AUTHOR_ENV, clear=True):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
mcp_get_control_plane_guide(remote="nope")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# mcp_list_project_skills
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestProjectSkills(GuideTestBase):
@patch("mcp_server.api_request")
def test_registry_complete_and_no_api_calls(self, mock_api):
with patch.dict(os.environ, AUTHOR_ENV, clear=True):
r = mcp_list_project_skills()
self.assertTrue(r["read_only"])
names = [s["name"] for s in r["skills"]]
for expected in EXPECTED_SKILLS:
self.assertIn(expected, names)
self.assertEqual(r["count"], len(r["skills"]))
for s in r["skills"]:
self.assertTrue(s["description"])
self.assertTrue(s["when_to_use"])
self.assertIn("required_operations", s)
self.assertIn("status", s)
self.assertIn("available_to_current_profile", s)
mock_api.assert_not_called()
def test_profile_aware_availability(self):
with patch.dict(os.environ, AUTHOR_ENV, clear=True):
r = mcp_list_project_skills()
by_name = {s["name"]: s for s in r["skills"]}
self.assertTrue(by_name["gitea-pr-creation"]["available_to_current_profile"])
self.assertFalse(by_name["gitea-pr-merge"]["available_to_current_profile"])
def test_unimplemented_services_marked(self):
with patch.dict(os.environ, AUTHOR_ENV, clear=True):
r = mcp_list_project_skills()
by_name = {s["name"]: s for s in r["skills"]}
self.assertNotEqual(by_name["jenkins-readonly"]["status"], "available")
self.assertNotEqual(by_name["glitchtip-readonly"]["status"], "available")
def test_no_urls_in_registry(self):
with patch.dict(os.environ, AUTHOR_ENV, clear=True):
r = mcp_list_project_skills()
blob = json.dumps(r)
self.assertNotIn("https://", blob)
self.assertNotIn("http://", blob)
self.assertNotIn("keychain:", blob)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# mcp_get_skill_guide
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestSkillGuide(GuideTestBase):
def test_known_skill_returns_steps(self):
with patch.dict(os.environ, REVIEWER_ENV, clear=True):
r = mcp_get_skill_guide("gitea-pr-merge")
self.assertTrue(r["success"])
self.assertEqual(r["skill"]["name"], "gitea-pr-merge")
self.assertTrue(r["steps"])
self.assertIn("MERGE PR", " ".join(r["steps"]))
def test_case_and_whitespace_normalized(self):
with patch.dict(os.environ, REVIEWER_ENV, clear=True):
r = mcp_get_skill_guide(" Gitea-PR-Merge ")
self.assertTrue(r["success"])
def test_unknown_skill_fails_closed(self):
with patch.dict(os.environ, REVIEWER_ENV, clear=True):
r = mcp_get_skill_guide("no-such-skill")
self.assertFalse(r["success"])
self.assertTrue(r["reasons"])
for expected in EXPECTED_SKILLS:
self.assertIn(expected, r["valid_skills"])
@patch("mcp_server.api_request")
def test_read_only_no_api_calls(self, mock_api):
with patch.dict(os.environ, REVIEWER_ENV, clear=True):
mcp_get_skill_guide("gitea-pr-review")
mock_api.assert_not_called()
def test_no_urls_in_skill_guides(self):
with patch.dict(os.environ, REVIEWER_ENV, clear=True):
for name in EXPECTED_SKILLS:
r = mcp_get_skill_guide(name)
blob = json.dumps(r)
self.assertNotIn("https://", blob)
self.assertNotIn("keychain:", blob)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()