Merge branch 'master' into feat/issue-642-sanctioned-restart-controls

Adds a gated `system.restart_namespace` action so operators and workers can
restart or gracefully reload MCP namespaces through an authorized, audited
path instead of manual host process killing (#630).

- webui/sanctioned_restart.py: restart/reload operation model, dry-run
  intent preview, confirmation-string enforcement, audit emission, and
  post-restart health verification. Fails closed on unknown auth, missing
  capability, or ambiguous target namespace.
- webui/console_authz.py: RBAC entries for the restart capability with
  secret redaction preserved.
- webui/gated_actions.py: registers the restart action in the gated action
  framework so it cannot be invoked without capability + confirmation.
- task_capability_map.py: capability mapping for the restart operation.
- docs/sanctioned-restart-controls.md: operator documentation for the
  sanctioned path and the explicit prohibition on pkill recovery.
- docs/webui-authz-audit.md: audit model updated for restart events.
- tests/test_webui_sanctioned_restart.py: authorized preview, unauthorized
  deny, confirmation enforcement, contamination classification, and audit
  emission coverage.

No unrestricted kill path is exposed; manual pkill remains classified as
contamination and continues to block clean claims.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

docs/sanctioned-restart-controls.md

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+# Sanctioned restart and graceful reload controls (#642)
+
+Sessions used to recover MCP connectivity by killing the host daemon
+(`pkill -f mcp_server.py`, #630). That is forbidden and stays forbidden: it
+kills every namespace on the host, contaminates whichever session survives, and
+leaves no audit trail. This document describes the sanctioned replacement,
+implemented in `webui/sanctioned_restart.py`.
+
+## What the console will and will not do
+
+The console **never** restarts anything. It authorizes an intent, records it,
+and hands off to a host supervisor. There is no code path in which the console
+sends a signal, spawns a process, or renders a kill command — a regression test
+asserts the module contains no `subprocess`, `signal`, `os.kill`, `os.system`,
+or `popen` reference, and that no returned payload contains a kill command.
+
+## Operations
+
+| Mode | Action | Minimum role | Behaviour |
+|------|--------|--------------|-----------|
+| `reload` | `system.reload_namespace` | controller | Host supervisor reloads the namespace in place, draining in-flight requests. |
+| `restart` | `system.restart_namespace` | admin | Host supervisor restarts the namespace. In-flight requests are lost. |
+
+Scope is always exactly one namespace. A fleet-wide restart is an explicit
+non-goal: `all`, `*`, `fleet`, and an empty scope are refused with
+`fleet_scope_not_permitted`, because that is precisely the blast radius the
+forbidden kill already had. An unrecognised namespace is refused rather than
+passed through to the host.
+
+## The gate sequence
+
+`assess_restart_request()` applies every gate in order and reports the first
+failure with a stable reason code:
+
+| Order | Gate | Reason code on failure |
+|-------|------|------------------------|
+| 1 | Mode is `restart` or `reload` | `unknown_mode` |
+| 2 | Scope is a single known namespace | `fleet_scope_not_permitted`, `unknown_namespace` |
+| 3 | Principal holds the required console role | `unauthorized` |
+| 4 | Confirmation phrase supplied | `confirmation_required` |
+| 5 | Confirmation names this namespace and mode | `confirmation_mismatch` |
+| 6 | Out-of-band operator authorization present | `operator_authorization_missing` |
+| 7 | Runtime is not contaminated | `contaminated_runtime` |
+| 8 | Host restart hook configured | `restart_hook_not_configured` |
+
+Passing every gate yields `host_action_required`, never "restarted".
+
+### Confirmation binds the namespace
+
+The required phrase is `"<mode> <namespace>"` — for example
+`restart gitea-author`. Binding the namespace into the phrase is the point: a
+confirmation typed for one namespace cannot be replayed against another.
+
+### Operator authorization is not self-assertable
+
+Host daemon maintenance is authorized out of band through
+`GITEA_OPERATOR_DAEMON_MAINTENANCE_AUTHORIZATION`, read from the process
+environment and nowhere else (#630; #710 finding F1). A worker session cannot
+set an environment variable for an already-running daemon, so this cannot be
+faked the way a tool argument could.
+
+### The host hook
+
+`GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK` holds an opaque reference the *host* resolves —
+a supervisor label such as a launchd job name, never a command line. With no
+hook configured the request is refused; the console does not fall back to a
+process kill. The value is read server-side and never rendered to a client.
+
+## Manual kill remains contamination
+
+`classify_restart_command()` classifies an operator-proposed recovery command.
+A manual `pkill`/`kill`/`killall` of the MCP daemon is contamination, not a
+restart: it returns `clean_claim_allowed: false` and builds a durable
+contamination marker (redacted command only, never secrets) naming
+`system.restart_namespace` as the sanctioned alternative.
+
+A live, uncleared contamination marker also blocks a restart. This is stricter
+than #630's task-scoped gate, which deliberately lets a contaminated worker keep
+commenting and handing off: restarting a contaminated runtime would launder the
+contamination rather than resolve it. Clear the marker through the reconciler
+path first.
+
+## Post-restart health verification
+
+After the host supervisor acts, `verify_post_restart_health()` decides whether
+the session may claim to be clean:
+
+| Status | Meaning | Clean claim |
+|--------|---------|-------------|
+| `clean` | Required tool callable, proven through the live client namespace | Allowed |
+| `unproven` | Reported healthy without live client-namespace evidence | Refused |
+| `unhealthy` | Probe failed | Refused |
+
+Only `probe_source=client_namespace` evidence clears a session. Static tool
+registration is not proof, and neither is an offline subprocess probe — an IDE
+client can hold a registered tool list while live calls fail with
+`client is closing: EOF` (see
+[`mcp-namespace-health.md`](mcp-namespace-health.md)).
+
+## Audit
+
+Every attempt — allowed or denied — is recorded through
+`webui.console_audit` with actor, target namespace, mode, result, and reason
+code, and is redacted before it is persisted. `system.restart_namespace` is
+break-glass, so its records are retained for 730 days. Records carry
+`process_kill_executed: false`, which is a fact about the code path rather than
+a claim: no such path exists.
+
+## Environment variables
+
+| Variable | Purpose |
+|----------|---------|
+| `GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK` | Host supervisor reference; absent means restart is refused. |
+| `GITEA_OPERATOR_DAEMON_MAINTENANCE_AUTHORIZATION` | Out-of-band operator authorization reference. |
+| `WEBUI_AUDIT_LOG` | Console audit sink; absent means records are built but not persisted. |
+
+## Non-goals
+
+* No unrestricted `kill` from the UI, in any role, in any phase.
+* No fleet-wide restart.
+* No silent auto-restart loop: every attempt is confirmed and audited.
+* This does not implement the Phase 1 health API (#634).

docs/webui-authz-audit.md

@@ -91,6 +91,8 @@ already define, and a regression test asserts each mapping matches.
 | `close_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.close` | Yes | No | No | 3 |
 | `merge_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.merge` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
 | `delete_branch` | admin | destructive | `gitea.branch.delete` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
+| `system.reload_namespace` | controller | privileged | `runtime.reload_namespace` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
+| `system.restart_namespace` | admin | destructive | `runtime.restart_namespace` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 2 |
 
 **Dual control** means the acting principal may not be the sole authority: a
 second distinct principal must confirm. **Break-glass** means the action is
@@ -102,6 +104,13 @@ honouring it.
 `delete_branch` is admin-only rather than controller because it is the one
 irreversible action in the set.
 
+`system.restart_namespace` is admin-only for the same reason: restarting a
+namespace drops every in-flight request on it. `system.reload_namespace` drains
+first, so it is privileged but not destructive. Neither action is ever executed
+by the console — both hand off to a host supervisor, and neither exposes a raw
+process kill. See
+[`sanctioned-restart-controls.md`](sanctioned-restart-controls.md) (#642).
+
 ### Authorization decision
 
 `authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=False)` returns a decision
@@ -199,8 +208,8 @@ breaking the request it describes.
 | Class | Applies to | Default |
 |-------|-----------|---------|
 | `standard` | Routine gated writes | 90 days |
-| `privileged` | `review_pr`, `close_pr`, and any unclassifiable action | 365 days |
-| `break_glass` | `merge_pr`, `delete_branch` | 730 days |
+| `privileged` | `review_pr`, `close_pr`, `system.reload_namespace`, and any unclassifiable action | 365 days |
+| `break_glass` | `merge_pr`, `delete_branch`, `system.restart_namespace` | 730 days |
 
 Each record carries its own class, day count, and computed `expires_at`, so
 retention is auditable per record rather than inferred from file age. An

docs/webui-local-dev.md

@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ status, onboarding checklist state, and the fail-closed error payloads (#635).
 | `/` | Home / operator overview |
 | `/health` | JSON liveness (`status`, `service`, `mode`, `timestamp`, `uptime_seconds`) |
 | `/api/v1/system/health` | Structured read-only system health (#634) |
-| `/system-health` | System-health dashboard — readiness, version/uptime, dependencies, MCP namespaces, stale-runtime parity (#639) |
 | `/queue` | Live PR and issue queue dashboard (#429) |
 | `/api/queue` | JSON queue export with pagination metadata |
 | `/projects` | Project registry list with status and onboarding progress (#427, #635) |
@@ -259,37 +258,6 @@ Not-yet-implemented surfaces (`/sessions`, `/inventory`, `/timeline`,
 surfaces are backed by #636). Mutating methods on stub routes still fail closed
 with `read-only-mvp`.
 
-## System-health dashboard (#639)
-
-`/system-health` renders the same snapshot the `/api/v1/system/health` API
-returns, so the page and the API can never disagree. Cards: overall readiness,
-stale-runtime parity, version and uptime, dependency probes, MCP namespaces,
-probe errors (only when present), and recovery pointers. `?deep=1` opts into
-the network probe exactly as the API does; the plain page load stays cheap.
-
-Field authority and honesty rules:
-
-* `ready` and `readiness_complete` are shown separately. A snapshot whose
-  required probes never ran is not the same as one that ran them and passed,
-  and the page never collapses the two into an unproven green.
-* A probe that did not run appears under **Not probed**, never as healthy.
-* `stale_runtime.mutation_safe` is displayed verbatim from the API. When the
-  runtime is stale, or when parity is indeterminate, the page warns and does
-  not claim mutation safety.
-* MCP namespaces are reported `unproven`: the web process runs outside the
-  IDE-managed MCP client and cannot prove that path (#543).
-
-Redaction is split by field kind. Free text — probe details, readiness and
-parity reasons, probe errors — passes through `system_health.redact`.
-Structured fields — commit SHAs, probe names, statuses, timestamps — are
-HTML-escaped only, because `redact`'s opaque-token rule matches any run of 32
-or more characters and would otherwise blank every 40-character git SHA, which
-is precisely the evidence the parity view exists to show.
-
-The dashboard is read-only: no restart, reload, or process-kill control. Those
-arrive in Phase 2 (#642). Recovery guidance points at the sanctioned client
-reconnect / operator restart path — never a manual daemon kill (#630).
-
 ## Deployment boundary (#435)
 
 MVP serves on loopback by default. Binding `0.0.0.0` or `::` is **refused**

task_capability_map.py

@@ -355,6 +355,21 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "role": "controller",
     },
 
+    # #642: sanctioned host-daemon lifecycle controls. Deliberately *not* a
+    # ``gitea.*`` operation — restarting an MCP namespace is a host action, not
+    # a Gitea API call, and no configured Gitea profile should be able to
+    # satisfy it by accident. Authority comes from the console RBAC model plus
+    # out-of-band operator authorization (#630); these entries exist so the
+    # console cannot invent an authority the capability layer never declared.
+    "restart_namespace": {
+        "permission": "runtime.restart_namespace",
+        "role": "controller",
+    },
+    "reload_namespace": {
+        "permission": "runtime.reload_namespace",
+        "role": "controller",
+    },
+
     # #601 first-class lease lifecycle — inspect/list need read; mutations gate on
     # ownership in the control-plane DB (not a separate Gitea write permission).
     "list_workflow_leases": {

tests/test_webui_sanctioned_restart.py

@@ -0,0 +1,502 @@
+"""Sanctioned restart / graceful reload control tests (#642).
+
+Acceptance criteria under test:
+
+1. The sanctioned restart path is implemented behind gates (capability,
+   confirmation, operator authorization, host hook).
+2. Manual ``pkill`` stays forbidden and is classified as contamination.
+3. Post-restart mutations require clean health/session proof.
+4. Authorized restart preview, unauthorized deny, contamination classification.
+5. No entry point exposes a raw kill.
+"""
+
+import json
+import os
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+
+import mcp_namespace_health
+import runtime_recovery_guard
+from task_capability_map import TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP
+from webui import console_audit, console_authz, gated_actions, sanctioned_restart
+
+NAMESPACE = "gitea-author"
+
+# An operator-authorized, hook-configured host. Passed explicitly so no test
+# depends on (or mutates) the real process environment.
+READY_ENV = {
+    sanctioned_restart.RESTART_HOOK_ENV: "launchd:cc.prgs.gitea-author",
+    runtime_recovery_guard.OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION_ENV: "ops-ticket-4821",
+}
+
+
+def admin(subject: str = "[email protected]") -> console_authz.Principal:
+    return console_authz.Principal(
+        subject=subject,
+        role=console_authz.ADMIN,
+        identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
+        authenticated=True,
+    )
+
+
+def viewer() -> console_authz.Principal:
+    return console_authz.Principal(
+        subject="[email protected]",
+        role=console_authz.VIEWER,
+        identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
+        authenticated=True,
+    )
+
+
+class TestCapabilityWiring(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC1: authority is declared, not invented by the console."""
+
+    def test_actions_resolve_through_the_capability_map(self):
+        for action_id in (
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE,
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
+                action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
+                self.assertIsNotNone(action)
+                self.assertIn(action.task_key, TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP)
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    action.mcp_permission,
+                    TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP[action.task_key]["permission"],
+                )
+
+    def test_restart_permission_is_not_a_gitea_operation(self):
+        """No configured Gitea profile should satisfy a host restart."""
+        permission = TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP["restart_namespace"]["permission"]
+        self.assertFalse(permission.startswith("gitea."))
+
+    def test_restart_is_destructive_dual_control_break_glass(self):
+        action = console_authz.get_action(
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(action.action_class, console_authz.CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE)
+        self.assertEqual(action.minimum_role, console_authz.ADMIN)
+        self.assertTrue(action.dual_control)
+        self.assertTrue(action.break_glass)
+        self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
+
+    def test_reload_is_privileged_but_not_destructive(self):
+        action = console_authz.get_action(
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(action.action_class, console_authz.CLASS_PRIVILEGED)
+        self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
+
+
+class TestPreview(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC4: an authorized preview renders the plan without executing it."""
+
+    def test_preview_lists_the_mutation_ledger(self):
+        preview = sanctioned_restart.build_restart_preview(
+            NAMESPACE, principal=admin(), env=READY_ENV
+        )
+        steps = [entry["step"] for entry in preview["mutation_ledger"]]
+        self.assertEqual(
+            steps, ["quiesce", "host_restart_hook", "health_recheck", "audit"]
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(preview["scope_valid"])
+        self.assertTrue(preview["post_restart_verification_required"])
+
+    def test_reload_preview_drains_instead_of_restarting(self):
+        preview = sanctioned_restart.build_restart_preview(
+            NAMESPACE, sanctioned_restart.MODE_RELOAD,
+            principal=admin(), env=READY_ENV,
+        )
+        steps = [entry["step"] for entry in preview["mutation_ledger"]]
+        self.assertIn("host_graceful_reload", steps)
+        self.assertNotIn("host_restart_hook", steps)
+
+    def test_preview_never_enables_execution(self):
+        preview = sanctioned_restart.build_restart_preview(
+            NAMESPACE, principal=admin(), env=READY_ENV
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(preview["execution_enabled"])
+        self.assertFalse(preview["authorization"]["execution_enabled"])
+
+    def test_confirmation_phrase_binds_the_namespace(self):
+        self.assertTrue(
+            sanctioned_restart.confirmation_matches(
+                NAMESPACE, sanctioned_restart.MODE_RESTART,
+                "restart gitea-author",
+            )
+        )
+        # A phrase typed for one namespace must not authorize another.
+        self.assertFalse(
+            sanctioned_restart.confirmation_matches(
+                "gitea-merger", sanctioned_restart.MODE_RESTART,
+                "restart gitea-author",
+            )
+        )
+
+
+class TestGates(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC1/AC4: every gate denies with a stable reason code."""
+
+    def _assess(self, **kwargs):
+        params = {
+            "principal": admin(),
+            "confirmation": f"restart {NAMESPACE}",
+            "env": READY_ENV,
+        }
+        params.update(kwargs)
+        namespace = params.pop("namespace", NAMESPACE)
+        mode = params.pop("mode", sanctioned_restart.MODE_RESTART)
+        return sanctioned_restart.assess_restart_request(
+            namespace, mode, **params
+        )
+
+    def test_authorized_confirmed_request_passes_every_gate(self):
+        result = self._assess()
+        self.assertTrue(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED
+        )
+
+    def test_passing_every_gate_is_not_an_execution_grant(self):
+        """An allowed request still never lets the console touch the process."""
+        result = self._assess()
+        self.assertTrue(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["execution_enabled"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["console_executes"])
+
+    def test_unauthorized_principal_is_denied(self):
+        result = self._assess(principal=viewer())
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNAUTHORIZED
+        )
+
+    def test_anonymous_principal_is_denied(self):
+        result = self._assess(principal=None)
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNAUTHORIZED
+        )
+
+    def test_missing_confirmation_is_denied(self):
+        result = self._assess(confirmation=None)
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISSING
+        )
+
+    def test_confirmation_for_another_namespace_is_denied(self):
+        result = self._assess(confirmation="restart gitea-merger")
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISMATCH
+        )
+
+    def test_missing_operator_authorization_is_denied(self):
+        env = {sanctioned_restart.RESTART_HOOK_ENV: "launchd:cc.prgs.author"}
+        result = self._assess(env=env)
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"],
+            sanctioned_restart.DENY_OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION,
+        )
+
+    def test_missing_host_hook_is_denied_without_kill_fallback(self):
+        env = {
+            runtime_recovery_guard.OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION_ENV: "ops-ticket-1",
+        }
+        result = self._assess(env=env)
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_HOOK_NOT_CONFIGURED
+        )
+
+    def test_fleet_scope_is_refused(self):
+        for scope in ("all", "*", "fleet"):
+            with self.subTest(scope=scope):
+                result = self._assess(
+                    namespace=scope, confirmation=f"restart {scope}"
+                )
+                self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_FLEET_SCOPE
+                )
+
+    def test_unknown_namespace_is_refused(self):
+        result = self._assess(
+            namespace="gitea-nope", confirmation="restart gitea-nope"
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNKNOWN_NAMESPACE
+        )
+
+    def test_unknown_mode_is_refused(self):
+        result = self._assess(mode="obliterate")
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE
+        )
+
+    def test_live_contamination_marker_blocks_restart(self):
+        marker = runtime_recovery_guard.build_contamination_record(
+            reason_class=runtime_recovery_guard.REASON_MANUAL_DAEMON_KILL,
+            command_redacted="pkill -f mcp_server.py",
+        )
+        result = self._assess(contamination_marker=marker)
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_CONTAMINATED_RUNTIME
+        )
+
+    def test_reconciler_cleared_marker_no_longer_blocks(self):
+        marker = runtime_recovery_guard.build_contamination_record(
+            reason_class=runtime_recovery_guard.REASON_MANUAL_DAEMON_KILL,
+            command_redacted="pkill -f mcp_server.py",
+        )
+        marker = dict(marker, cleared_by_reconciler=True)
+        result = self._assess(contamination_marker=marker)
+        self.assertTrue(result["allowed"])
+
+
+class TestExecutionNeverKills(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC5: no path exposes or runs a raw process kill."""
+
+    def test_authorized_execution_defers_to_the_host_supervisor(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.execute_restart(
+            NAMESPACE,
+            principal=admin(),
+            confirmation=f"restart {NAMESPACE}",
+            env=READY_ENV,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["process_kill_executed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["outcome"], sanctioned_restart.ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED
+        )
+
+    def test_denied_execution_reports_the_refusing_gate(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.execute_restart(
+            NAMESPACE, principal=viewer(), confirmation=f"restart {NAMESPACE}",
+            env=READY_ENV,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["outcome"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNAUTHORIZED
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["process_kill_executed"])
+
+    def test_module_never_spawns_a_process(self):
+        path = os.path.join(
+            os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))),
+            "webui", "sanctioned_restart.py",
+        )
+        with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            source = handle.read()
+        for forbidden in (
+            "import subprocess", "import signal", "os.kill", "os.system",
+            "popen",
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(forbidden=forbidden):
+                self.assertNotIn(forbidden, source.lower())
+
+    def test_no_surface_returns_a_kill_command(self):
+        payloads = [
+            sanctioned_restart.build_restart_preview(
+                NAMESPACE, principal=admin(), env=READY_ENV
+            ),
+            sanctioned_restart.restart_policy(),
+            sanctioned_restart.execute_restart(
+                NAMESPACE, principal=admin(),
+                confirmation=f"restart {NAMESPACE}", env=READY_ENV,
+            ),
+        ]
+        for payload in payloads:
+            rendered = json.dumps(payload, default=str).lower()
+            self.assertNotIn("kill -9", rendered)
+            self.assertNotIn("pkill -f", rendered)
+
+    def test_policy_declares_no_raw_kill_and_no_silent_restart(self):
+        policy = sanctioned_restart.restart_policy()
+        self.assertFalse(policy["raw_kill_exposed"])
+        self.assertFalse(policy["console_executes_process_kill"])
+        self.assertFalse(policy["fleet_scope_permitted"])
+        self.assertFalse(policy["silent_auto_restart_permitted"])
+        self.assertTrue(policy["audit_required"])
+
+
+class TestContaminationClassification(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC2: manual pkill is contamination, and it blocks clean claims."""
+
+    def test_manual_daemon_pkill_is_contamination(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command(
+            "pkill -f mcp_server.py"
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["contamination"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+        self.assertIsNotNone(result["contamination_marker"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["sanctioned_alternative"],
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
+        )
+
+    def test_broad_process_kill_is_contamination(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command("killall -9 Python")
+        self.assertTrue(result["contamination"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+
+    def test_marker_names_the_sanctioned_alternative(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command(
+            "pkill -f mcp_server.py"
+        )
+        marker = result["contamination_marker"]
+        self.assertIn(
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE, marker["detail"]
+        )
+
+    def test_benign_command_is_not_contamination(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command("git status")
+        self.assertFalse(result["contamination"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+
+    def test_no_command_is_not_contamination(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command(None)
+        self.assertFalse(result["contamination"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+
+
+class TestPostRestartHealth(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC3: a clean post-restart claim needs live client-namespace proof."""
+
+    def test_live_client_probe_clears_the_session(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.verify_post_restart_health(
+            NAMESPACE,
+            probe_result={"success": True},
+            probe_source=mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_CLIENT,
+            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
+            required_tool="gitea_whoami",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(result["status"], sanctioned_restart.HEALTH_CLEAN)
+        self.assertTrue(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["mutations_allowed"])
+
+    def test_offline_probe_does_not_clear_the_session(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.verify_post_restart_health(
+            NAMESPACE,
+            probe_result={"success": True},
+            probe_source=mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_OFFLINE,
+            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
+            required_tool="gitea_whoami",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["mutations_allowed"])
+
+    def test_failed_probe_is_unhealthy(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.verify_post_restart_health(
+            NAMESPACE,
+            probe_result={"success": False, "error": "client is closing: EOF"},
+            probe_source=mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_CLIENT,
+            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
+            required_tool="gitea_whoami",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(result["status"], sanctioned_restart.HEALTH_UNHEALTHY)
+        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+
+    def test_static_registration_alone_never_clears_the_session(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.verify_post_restart_health(
+            NAMESPACE,
+            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
+            required_tool="gitea_whoami",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+
+
+class TestAuditEmission(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Every restart attempt is audited with actor, target, and result."""
+
+    def _run(self, principal, sink):
+        prior = os.environ.get(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV)
+        os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = sink
+        try:
+            return sanctioned_restart.execute_restart(
+                NAMESPACE,
+                principal=principal,
+                confirmation=f"restart {NAMESPACE}",
+                env=READY_ENV,
+                request_id="req-642",
+            )
+        finally:
+            if prior is None:
+                os.environ.pop(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV, None)
+            else:
+                os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = prior
+
+    def test_allowed_attempt_is_written_with_actor_and_target(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "audit.jsonl")
+            result = self._run(admin(), sink)
+            self.assertTrue(result["audit"]["written"])
+            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                record = json.loads(handle.read().strip())
+        self.assertEqual(
+            record["action"], sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(record["target"]["namespace"], NAMESPACE)
+        self.assertEqual(record["target"]["mode"], "restart")
+        self.assertEqual(record["result"], console_audit.RESULT_ALLOWED)
+        self.assertEqual(record["actor"]["subject"], "[email protected]")
+        self.assertFalse(record["metadata"]["process_kill_executed"])
+
+    def test_denied_attempt_is_audited_too(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "audit.jsonl")
+            self._run(viewer(), sink)
+            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                record = json.loads(handle.read().strip())
+        self.assertEqual(record["result"], console_audit.RESULT_DENIED)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            record["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNAUTHORIZED
+        )
+
+    def test_restart_audit_uses_break_glass_retention(self):
+        action = console_authz.get_action(
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            console_audit.retention_class_for(action),
+            console_audit.RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS,
+        )
+
+
+class TestRegistrySurface(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC5: the console surfaces the control, still disabled, with no kill."""
+
+    def test_registry_exposes_both_actions_disabled(self):
+        registry = gated_actions.load_action_registry()
+        for action_id in (
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE,
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
+                action = registry.get(action_id)
+                self.assertIsNotNone(action)
+                self.assertFalse(action.enabled)
+
+    def test_registry_preview_names_the_namespace_target(self):
+        preview = gated_actions.preview_action(
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE, namespace=NAMESPACE
+        )
+        target = preview["mutation_ledger"][0]["target"]
+        self.assertIn(NAMESPACE, target)
+        self.assertFalse(preview["enabled"])
+
+    def test_registry_attempt_fails_closed(self):
+        result = gated_actions.attempt_action(
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE, namespace=NAMESPACE
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_webui_system_health_dashboard.py

@@ -1,345 +0,0 @@
-"""Tests for the system-health dashboard view (#639).
-
-Covers the acceptance criteria directly: the page renders the health DTO
-fields (AC1), degraded dependencies are visible (AC2), stale runtime is warned
-prominently and never rendered as mutation-safe (AC3), healthy and degraded
-fixtures both render (AC4), and the shell carries a nav entry (AC5).
-"""
-import sys
-import unittest
-from pathlib import Path
-
-sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
-
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
-
-from webui.app import create_app
-from webui.deployment_boundary import scan_text_for_client_secrets
-from webui.layout import render_page
-from webui.nav import iter_nav_items
-from webui.system_health import (
-    STATUS_DEGRADED,
-    STATUS_DOWN,
-    STATUS_OK,
-    STATUS_SKIPPED,
-    STATUS_UNPROVEN,
-    DependencyProbe,
-    StaleRuntime,
-    SystemHealthSnapshot,
-    VersionInfo,
-)
-from webui.system_health_views import render_system_health_page
-
-DASHBOARD_PATH = "/system-health"
-
-
-def _version(*, known: bool = True) -> VersionInfo:
-    return VersionInfo(
-        git_sha="1c455b6ec0f9cb761fe6248de68c17e061fb5ecd" if known else None,
-        git_describe="v0.4.1-12-g1c455b6" if known else None,
-        control_plane_schema_version=4 if known else None,
-        python_version="3.13.1",
-        known=known,
-    )
-
-
-def _parity(*, stale: bool = False, determinable: bool = True) -> StaleRuntime:
-    if stale:
-        return StaleRuntime(
-            daemon_head="aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
-            checkout_head="bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb",
-            remote_head="cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc",
-            stale=True,
-            determinable=True,
-            mutation_safe=False,
-            reasons=("runtime, checkout, and remote commits disagree",),
-        )
-    if not determinable:
-        return StaleRuntime(
-            daemon_head=None,
-            checkout_head=None,
-            remote_head=None,
-            stale=False,
-            determinable=False,
-            mutation_safe=False,
-            reasons=("local checkout HEAD could not be read",),
-        )
-    return StaleRuntime(
-        daemon_head="1c455b6ec0f9cb761fe6248de68c17e061fb5ecd",
-        checkout_head="1c455b6ec0f9cb761fe6248de68c17e061fb5ecd",
-        remote_head="1c455b6ec0f9cb761fe6248de68c17e061fb5ecd",
-        stale=False,
-        determinable=True,
-        mutation_safe=True,
-        reasons=(),
-    )
-
-
-def _snapshot(
-    *,
-    status: str = STATUS_OK,
-    ready: bool = True,
-    readiness_complete: bool = True,
-    readiness_reasons: tuple[str, ...] = (),
-    dependencies: tuple[DependencyProbe, ...] | None = None,
-    parity: StaleRuntime | None = None,
-    namespaces: tuple[dict, ...] = (),
-    probe_errors: tuple[str, ...] = (),
-    version_known: bool = True,
-) -> SystemHealthSnapshot:
-    if dependencies is None:
-        dependencies = (
-            DependencyProbe(
-                name="control_plane_db",
-                kind="sqlite",
-                status=STATUS_OK,
-                detail="schema version 4",
-                required=True,
-                latency_ms=1.25,
-                metadata={"schema_version": 4},
-            ),
-        )
-    return SystemHealthSnapshot(
-        status=status,
-        ready=ready,
-        readiness_complete=readiness_complete,
-        readiness_reasons=readiness_reasons,
-        service="mcp-control-plane-webui",
-        mode="read-only",
-        version=_version(known=version_known),
-        started_at="2026-07-23T19:50:47+00:00",
-        uptime_seconds=3661.5,
-        timestamp="2026-07-23T20:51:48+00:00",
-        deep_probes_requested=False,
-        dependencies=dependencies,
-        mcp_namespaces=namespaces,
-        stale_runtime=parity if parity is not None else _parity(),
-        probe_errors=probe_errors,
-    )
-
-
-class TestHealthyRender(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC1 / AC4 — every health DTO field reaches the page."""
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.html = render_system_health_page(_snapshot())
-
-    def test_readiness_fields_render(self):
-        self.assertIn("System health", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("Ready", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("mcp-control-plane-webui", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("read-only", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("2026-07-23T20:51:48+00:00", self.html)
-
-    def test_version_and_uptime_render(self):
-        self.assertIn("1c455b6ec0f9cb761fe6248de68c17e061fb5ecd", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("v0.4.1-12-g1c455b6", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("3.13.1", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("3661.500s", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("1.02h", self.html)
-
-    def test_dependency_row_renders_with_latency(self):
-        self.assertIn("control_plane_db", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("sqlite", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("schema version 4", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("1.2 ms", self.html)
-
-    def test_healthy_page_shows_no_stale_warning(self):
-        self.assertNotIn("Stale runtime:", self.html)
-        self.assertNotIn("Staleness", self.html)
-
-    def test_unknown_version_is_labelled_not_faked(self):
-        html = render_system_health_page(_snapshot(version_known=False))
-        self.assertIn("unknown", html)
-        self.assertIn("unresolved", html)
-
-
-class TestDegradedRender(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC2 — a degraded or unrun dependency is visible, not swallowed."""
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.deps = (
-            DependencyProbe(
-                name="control_plane_db",
-                kind="sqlite",
-                status=STATUS_OK,
-                detail="schema version 4",
-                required=True,
-                latency_ms=0.9,
-            ),
-            DependencyProbe(
-                name="repository",
-                kind="git",
-                status=STATUS_DOWN,
-                detail="repository root is not a git checkout",
-                required=True,
-                latency_ms=4.0,
-            ),
-            DependencyProbe(
-                name="gitea",
-                kind="http",
-                status=STATUS_SKIPPED,
-                detail="deep probe not requested",
-                required=False,
-            ),
-        )
-        self.html = render_system_health_page(
-            _snapshot(
-                status=STATUS_DEGRADED,
-                ready=False,
-                readiness_complete=False,
-                readiness_reasons=("required dependency 'repository' is down",),
-                dependencies=self.deps,
-            )
-        )
-
-    def test_degraded_banner_names_the_dependency(self):
-        self.assertIn("Degraded dependencies:", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("repository", self.html)
-
-    def test_not_run_probe_is_reported_separately(self):
-        self.assertIn("Not probed:", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("gitea", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("not counted", self.html)
-
-    def test_not_ready_headline_and_reason(self):
-        self.assertIn("Not ready", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("required dependency 'repository' is down", self.html)
-
-    def test_degraded_status_badge_present(self):
-        self.assertIn("badge-health-degraded", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("badge-health-down", self.html)
-
-    def test_ready_but_incomplete_is_not_shown_as_plain_ready(self):
-        html = render_system_health_page(
-            _snapshot(ready=True, readiness_complete=False)
-        )
-        self.assertIn("Ready (incomplete evidence)", html)
-
-
-class TestStaleRuntimeWarning(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC3 — staleness is prominent and never claims mutation safety."""
-
-    def test_stale_runtime_warns_and_denies_mutation_safety(self):
-        html = render_system_health_page(_snapshot(parity=_parity(stale=True)))
-        self.assertIn("Stale runtime:", html)
-        self.assertIn("do not treat this runtime as mutation-safe", html)
-        self.assertIn("<tr><th>Mutation safe</th><td>False</td></tr>", html)
-
-    def test_indeterminate_parity_is_not_reported_safe(self):
-        html = render_system_health_page(
-            _snapshot(parity=_parity(determinable=False))
-        )
-        self.assertIn("Staleness", html)
-        self.assertIn("<tr><th>Mutation safe</th><td>False</td></tr>", html)
-        self.assertIn("<tr><th>Determinable</th><td>False</td></tr>", html)
-
-    def test_healthy_parity_reports_mutation_safe_true(self):
-        html = render_system_health_page(_snapshot())
-        self.assertIn("<tr><th>Mutation safe</th><td>True</td></tr>", html)
-
-
-class TestNamespacesAndErrors(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_unproven_namespace_rows_render(self):
-        html = render_system_health_page(
-            _snapshot(
-                namespaces=(
-                    {
-                        "namespace": "gitea-author",
-                        "required_tool": "gitea_lock_issue",
-                        "status": STATUS_UNPROVEN,
-                        "ide_namespace_proven": False,
-                        "reason": "the web console cannot invoke the IDE-managed MCP client",
-                    },
-                )
-            )
-        )
-        self.assertIn("gitea-author", html)
-        self.assertIn("gitea_lock_issue", html)
-        self.assertIn("badge-health-unproven", html)
-
-    def test_no_namespaces_degrades_gracefully(self):
-        html = render_system_health_page(_snapshot(namespaces=()))
-        self.assertIn("No MCP namespaces are declared.", html)
-
-    def test_probe_errors_render_when_present(self):
-        html = render_system_health_page(
-            _snapshot(probe_errors=("probe raised: disk offline",))
-        )
-        self.assertIn("Probe errors", html)
-        self.assertIn("disk offline", html)
-
-    def test_probe_error_card_absent_when_clean(self):
-        self.assertNotIn("Probe errors", render_system_health_page(_snapshot()))
-
-
-class TestReadOnlyAndRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_no_restart_or_kill_controls(self):
-        html = render_system_health_page(_snapshot())
-        self.assertNotIn("<button", html)
-        self.assertNotIn("<form", html)
-        self.assertNotIn("pkill", html)
-        self.assertIn("read-only", html)
-
-    def test_recovery_points_at_sanctioned_path(self):
-        html = render_system_health_page(_snapshot())
-        self.assertIn("Reconnect the MCP client", html)
-        self.assertIn("Never kill the daemon process manually", html)
-
-    def test_secret_shaped_detail_is_redacted(self):
-        leaky = DependencyProbe(
-            name="gitea",
-            kind="http",
-            status=STATUS_DOWN,
-            detail="auth failed for token=ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789",
-            required=False,
-            latency_ms=12.0,
-        )
-        html = render_system_health_page(_snapshot(dependencies=(leaky,)))
-        self.assertNotIn("ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789", html)
-
-    def test_html_in_detail_is_escaped(self):
-        hostile = DependencyProbe(
-            name="repository",
-            kind="git",
-            status=STATUS_DOWN,
-            detail="<script>alert(1)</script>",
-            required=True,
-        )
-        html = render_system_health_page(_snapshot(dependencies=(hostile,)))
-        self.assertNotIn("<script>", html)
-        self.assertIn("&lt;script&gt;", html)
-
-
-class TestNavAndRoute(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC5 — the shell links the dashboard, and the route serves it."""
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def test_nav_contains_system_health(self):
-        self.assertIn(
-            (DASHBOARD_PATH, "System health"),
-            [(item.href, item.label) for item in iter_nav_items()],
-        )
-
-    def test_rendered_shell_links_dashboard(self):
-        page = render_page(title="Home", body_html="<p>x</p>")
-        self.assertIn(f'href="{DASHBOARD_PATH}"', page)
-
-    def test_route_renders_dashboard(self):
-        response = self.client.get(DASHBOARD_PATH)
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
-        self.assertIn("System health", response.text)
-        self.assertIn("Stale-runtime parity", response.text)
-
-    def test_route_is_read_only(self):
-        self.assertEqual(self.client.post(DASHBOARD_PATH).status_code, 405)
-
-    def test_live_page_leaks_no_client_secret(self):
-        findings = scan_text_for_client_secrets(self.client.get(DASHBOARD_PATH).text)
-        self.assertEqual(findings, [])
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover
-    unittest.main()

webui/app.py

@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@ from webui.system_health import (
     process_uptime,
     snapshot_to_dict as system_health_to_dict,
 )
-from webui.system_health_views import render_system_health_page
 
 _READ_ONLY_METHODS = frozenset({"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"})
 _AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS = frozenset({"/audit", "/api/audit"})
@@ -162,24 +161,6 @@ async def api_system_health(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     return JSONResponse(payload, status_code=200 if snapshot.ready else 503)
 
 
-async def system_health(request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
-    """Read-only system-health dashboard (#639).
-
-    Shares the #634 snapshot loader with the JSON API so the page can never
-    disagree with it. `?deep=1` opts into the network probe exactly as the API
-    does; the default page load stays cheap. The response is always 200: this
-    is an operator view that must render the degraded state, not withhold it.
-    """
-    deep = _truthy_flag(request.query_params.get("deep"))
-    snapshot = load_system_health(deep=deep)
-    return HTMLResponse(
-        render_page(
-            title="System health",
-            body_html=render_system_health_page(snapshot),
-        )
-    )
-
-
 async def queue(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
     snapshot = load_queue_snapshot()
     return HTMLResponse(render_page(title="Queue", body_html=render_queue_page(snapshot)))
@@ -590,7 +571,6 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
             Route("/", home, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/health", health, methods=["GET"]),
             Route(SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH, api_system_health, methods=["GET"]),
-            Route("/system-health", system_health, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/queue", queue, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/api/queue", api_queue, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/projects", projects, methods=["GET"]),

webui/console_authz.py

@@ -236,6 +236,34 @@ _ACTION_SPECS: tuple[ConsoleAction, ...] = (
         phase=3,
         summary="Remove a remote feature branch.",
     ),
+    # #642: sanctioned daemon lifecycle. These exist so operators have an
+    # audited path off `pkill -f mcp_server.py` (#630). Restart drops every
+    # in-flight request on a namespace, so it carries the same dual-control and
+    # break-glass weight as a merge; reload drains first and is privileged but
+    # not destructive. Neither ever exposes a raw kill: execution is handed to
+    # a host supervisor by ``webui.sanctioned_restart``.
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="system.reload_namespace",
+        task_key="reload_namespace",
+        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
+        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=2,
+        summary="Gracefully reload one MCP namespace via the host supervisor.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="system.restart_namespace",
+        task_key="restart_namespace",
+        action_class=CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE,
+        minimum_role=ADMIN,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=True,
+        break_glass=True,
+        phase=2,
+        summary="Restart one MCP namespace via the host supervisor.",
+    ),
 )
 
 ACTIONS: dict[str, ConsoleAction] = {a.action_id: a for a in _ACTION_SPECS}

webui/gated_actions.py

@@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ def _format_target(action_id: str, params: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
         )
     if action_id == "create_issue":
         return f"issue {params.get('title', '?')!r}"
+    if action_id in {"system.restart_namespace", "system.reload_namespace"}:
+        return f"MCP namespace {params.get('namespace', '?')!r}"
     return "unspecified"
 
 
@@ -165,6 +167,17 @@ def build_action_registry() -> ActionRegistry:
          "gitea_create_issue_comment", "Post a PR review thread comment."),
         ("close_pr", "Close PR", "close_pr", "gitea_edit_pr",
          "Close a pull request without merge."),
+        # #642: the sanctioned replacement for the forbidden manual daemon-kill
+        # recovery path (#630). The "tool" is a host supervisor hook, not an MCP
+        # call — the console never signals a process. Preview and gating live in
+        # ``webui.sanctioned_restart``; these stay disabled like every other
+        # registry entry.
+        ("system.reload_namespace", "Reload MCP namespace", "reload_namespace",
+         "host.supervisor_reload",
+         "Gracefully reload one MCP namespace via the host supervisor."),
+        ("system.restart_namespace", "Restart MCP namespace",
+         "restart_namespace", "host.supervisor_restart",
+         "Restart one MCP namespace via the host supervisor."),
     )
     actions = tuple(
         GatedAction(

webui/layout.py

@@ -236,25 +236,6 @@ def render_page(*, title: str, body_html: str, extra_head: str = "") -> str:
     .badge-in-review {{ color: #9ec8f0; border-color: #3d5f7a; }}
     .badge-duplicate {{ color: #e0c27a; border-color: #6b5730; }}
     .badge-stale {{ color: #c9b8e8; border-color: #5a4a78; }}
-    .badge-health-ok {{ color: #8fd19e; border-color: #3d6b4a; }}
-    .badge-health-degraded {{ color: #e0c27a; border-color: #6b5730; }}
-    .badge-health-down {{ color: #f0a8a8; border-color: #7a3b3b; }}
-    .badge-health-skipped {{ color: var(--muted); }}
-    .badge-health-unproven {{ color: #c9b8e8; border-color: #5a4a78; }}
-    .health-card {{
-      margin: 1.25rem 0;
-      padding: 0.85rem 1rem 1rem;
-      border: 1px solid var(--border);
-      border-radius: 8px;
-      background: var(--surface);
-    }}
-    .health-card h3 {{ margin: 0 0 0.5rem; font-size: 1.05rem; }}
-    .health-card h4 {{ margin: 1rem 0 0.35rem; font-size: 0.92rem; color: var(--muted); }}
-    .health-headline {{ color: var(--text); font-size: 1rem; margin: 0 0 0.5rem; }}
-    .health-degraded {{ border-left-color: #e0c27a; }}
-    .health-stale {{ border-left-color: #f0a8a8; }}
-    ul.reasons {{ margin: 0.35rem 0; padding-left: 1.15rem; color: var(--muted); font-size: 0.9rem; }}
-    ul.reasons li {{ margin-bottom: 0.3rem; }}
   </style>
   {extra_head}
 </head>

webui/nav.py

@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@ class NavGroup:
 NAV_GROUPS: tuple[NavGroup, ...] = (
     NavGroup("Health", (
         NavItem("/health", "Liveness"),
-        NavItem("/system-health", "System health"),
     )),
     NavGroup("Traffic", (
         NavItem("/queue", "Queue"),

webui/sanctioned_restart.py

@@ -0,0 +1,613 @@
+"""Sanctioned MCP restart and graceful reload controls (#642, Phase 2).
+
+Sessions have historically recovered MCP connectivity by killing the host
+daemon (``pkill -f mcp_server.py``, #630). That path stays forbidden: it kills
+every namespace on the host, contaminates the surviving session, and leaves no
+audit trail. This module is the sanctioned replacement.
+
+A restart is modelled as a *gated action*, never as a command:
+
+1. **Capability** — the console action resolves through ``console_authz``
+   against ``task_capability_map``, so the console cannot invent an authority
+   the MCP layer does not already define.
+2. **Preview** — :func:`build_restart_preview` renders a mutation ledger and
+   the exact confirmation phrase. It never returns a shell command.
+3. **Confirmation** — the operator echoes a phrase naming the exact namespace
+   and mode. A phrase for one namespace never authorizes another.
+4. **Operator authorization** — host daemon maintenance is authorized out of
+   band through the environment (#630, and #710 finding F1: a worker session
+   cannot set an env var for an already-running daemon, so this cannot be
+   self-asserted the way a tool argument could).
+5. **Execution** — :func:`execute_restart` never spawns a process. Once every
+   gate passes it hands the request to the configured host-managed restart
+   hook; with no hook configured it fails closed.
+6. **Health recheck** — :func:`verify_post_restart_health` requires live
+   client-namespace probe evidence before any post-restart clean claim.
+
+Manual ``pkill`` remains forbidden and is classified as contamination by
+:func:`classify_restart_command`, which blocks clean claims (#630 AC3).
+
+This module performs no I/O beyond reading its own environment configuration,
+imports no MCP client, and holds no credential.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+from typing import Any
+
+import mcp_namespace_health
+import runtime_recovery_guard
+from webui import console_audit, console_authz
+
+# --- Operations -------------------------------------------------------------
+
+MODE_RESTART = "restart"
+MODE_RELOAD = "reload"
+MODES: tuple[str, ...] = (MODE_RESTART, MODE_RELOAD)
+
+ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE = "system.restart_namespace"
+ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE = "system.reload_namespace"
+
+ACTION_FOR_MODE: dict[str, str] = {
+    MODE_RESTART: ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
+    MODE_RELOAD: ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE,
+}
+
+# Namespaces the console may target. An unlisted name fails closed rather than
+# being passed through to a host hook.
+KNOWN_NAMESPACES: tuple[str, ...] = tuple(
+    sorted(
+        set(mcp_namespace_health.DEFAULT_NAMESPACES)
+        | {"gitea-author", "gitea-reviewer", "gitea-merger",
+           "gitea-reconciler", "gitea-controller"}
+    )
+)
+
+# Scope tokens that would mean "everything at once". Explicit non-goal: the
+# console never offers a fleet-wide restart, because that is the blast radius
+# `pkill -f mcp_server.py` already had.
+_FLEET_TOKENS = frozenset({"*", "all", "fleet", "any", ""})
+
+# --- Environment configuration ----------------------------------------------
+# Read server-side only; the value is an opaque host hook reference (e.g. a
+# launchd label), never a command line, and is never rendered to a client.
+RESTART_HOOK_ENV = "GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK"
+
+# --- Reason codes -----------------------------------------------------------
+
+DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE = "unknown_mode"
+DENY_UNKNOWN_NAMESPACE = "unknown_namespace"
+DENY_FLEET_SCOPE = "fleet_scope_not_permitted"
+DENY_UNAUTHORIZED = "unauthorized"
+DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISSING = "confirmation_required"
+DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISMATCH = "confirmation_mismatch"
+DENY_OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION = "operator_authorization_missing"
+DENY_HOOK_NOT_CONFIGURED = "restart_hook_not_configured"
+DENY_CONTAMINATED_RUNTIME = "contaminated_runtime"
+
+ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED = "host_action_required"
+
+# Post-restart verification outcomes.
+HEALTH_CLEAN = "clean"
+HEALTH_UNPROVEN = "unproven"
+HEALTH_UNHEALTHY = "unhealthy"
+
+
+def _clean(value: Any) -> str:
+    return str(value or "").strip()
+
+
+# --- Mutation ledger --------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RestartLedgerEntry:
+    """One planned step, shown before anything is asked of the host."""
+
+    sequence: int
+    step: str
+    summary: str
+    executes_process_kill: bool = False
+
+
+def _mutation_ledger(namespace: str, mode: str) -> tuple[RestartLedgerEntry, ...]:
+    if mode == MODE_RELOAD:
+        middle = RestartLedgerEntry(
+            sequence=2,
+            step="host_graceful_reload",
+            summary=(
+                f"Ask the configured host supervisor to reload {namespace} "
+                "in place, draining in-flight requests. The console does not "
+                "signal the process itself."
+            ),
+        )
+    else:
+        middle = RestartLedgerEntry(
+            sequence=2,
+            step="host_restart_hook",
+            summary=(
+                f"Ask the configured host supervisor to restart {namespace}. "
+                "The console never sends a signal and never runs a kill."
+            ),
+        )
+    return (
+        RestartLedgerEntry(
+            sequence=1,
+            step="quiesce",
+            summary=(
+                f"Stop admitting new gated mutations for {namespace} and "
+                "record the intent before anything restarts."
+            ),
+        ),
+        middle,
+        RestartLedgerEntry(
+            sequence=3,
+            step="health_recheck",
+            summary=(
+                f"Re-probe {namespace} through the live client namespace and "
+                "prove the required tool is callable again."
+            ),
+        ),
+        RestartLedgerEntry(
+            sequence=4,
+            step="audit",
+            summary=(
+                "Append actor, target namespace, mode, and result to the "
+                "console audit log."
+            ),
+        ),
+    )
+
+
+# --- Confirmation -----------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def confirmation_phrase(namespace: str, mode: str) -> str:
+    """Exact phrase an operator must echo, naming the namespace and mode.
+
+    Binding the namespace into the phrase is the point: a confirmation typed
+    for ``gitea-author`` cannot be replayed against ``gitea-merger``.
+    """
+    return f"{_clean(mode)} {_clean(namespace)}"
+
+
+def confirmation_matches(
+    namespace: str, mode: str, confirmation: str | None
+) -> bool:
+    """Compare *confirmation* to the required phrase (exact, whitespace-trimmed)."""
+    return _clean(confirmation) == confirmation_phrase(namespace, mode)
+
+
+# --- Scope validation -------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _validate_scope(namespace: str, mode: str) -> tuple[str, str] | None:
+    """Return ``(reason_code, detail)`` when the scope is refused."""
+    ns = _clean(namespace)
+    md = _clean(mode)
+
+    if md not in MODES:
+        return (
+            DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE,
+            f"Mode {md!r} is not one of {', '.join(MODES)}.",
+        )
+    if ns.lower() in _FLEET_TOKENS:
+        return (
+            DENY_FLEET_SCOPE,
+            (
+                "Fleet-wide restart is an explicit non-goal: it reproduces the "
+                "blast radius of `pkill -f mcp_server.py` (#630). Restart one "
+                "namespace at a time."
+            ),
+        )
+    if ns not in KNOWN_NAMESPACES:
+        return (
+            DENY_UNKNOWN_NAMESPACE,
+            f"Namespace {ns!r} is not a known MCP namespace.",
+        )
+    return None
+
+
+# --- Host hook --------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def restart_hook(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Report the configured host-managed restart hook.
+
+    The hook is a reference the *host* resolves (a supervisor label), not a
+    command this process runs. ``configured=False`` fails restart closed.
+    """
+    source = env if env is not None else os.environ
+    reference = _clean(source.get(RESTART_HOOK_ENV))
+    return {
+        "configured": bool(reference),
+        "reference": reference or None,
+        "source": RESTART_HOOK_ENV if reference else None,
+        "self_assertable": False,
+        "console_executes_process": False,
+    }
+
+
+# --- Preview ----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def build_restart_preview(
+    namespace: str,
+    mode: str = MODE_RESTART,
+    *,
+    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
+    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Render the dry-run preview for a restart/reload request.
+
+    Read-only: no authorization is granted, no host is contacted, and the
+    result never contains a shell command.
+    """
+    ns = _clean(namespace)
+    md = _clean(mode)
+    action_id = ACTION_FOR_MODE.get(md, ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE)
+    action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
+    decision = console_authz.authorize(action_id, principal)
+    scope_error = _validate_scope(ns, md)
+    hook = restart_hook(env)
+    operator = runtime_recovery_guard.operator_authorization(env)
+
+    return {
+        "action_id": action_id,
+        "namespace": ns,
+        "mode": md,
+        "scope_valid": scope_error is None,
+        "scope_reason_code": scope_error[0] if scope_error else None,
+        "scope_detail": scope_error[1] if scope_error else None,
+        "required_role": action.minimum_role if action else None,
+        "required_permission": action.mcp_permission if action else None,
+        "action_class": action.action_class if action else None,
+        "dual_control": action.dual_control if action else True,
+        "break_glass": action.break_glass if action else True,
+        "requires_confirmation": True,
+        "confirmation_phrase": confirmation_phrase(ns, md),
+        "mutation_ledger": [asdict(entry) for entry in _mutation_ledger(ns, md)],
+        "authorization": decision.to_dict(),
+        "operator_authorization": operator,
+        "restart_hook": hook,
+        "execution_enabled": False,
+        "raw_process_kill_exposed": False,
+        "known_namespaces": list(KNOWN_NAMESPACES),
+        "post_restart_verification_required": True,
+    }
+
+
+# --- Gate -------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def assess_restart_request(
+    namespace: str,
+    mode: str = MODE_RESTART,
+    *,
+    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
+    confirmation: str | None = None,
+    contamination_marker: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Decide whether a restart request may proceed to the host hook.
+
+    Every gate must pass. The first failure wins and is reported with a stable
+    reason code; a pass never means "restarted", only "may be handed to the
+    configured host hook".
+    """
+    ns = _clean(namespace)
+    md = _clean(mode)
+    action_id = ACTION_FOR_MODE.get(md, ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE)
+    preview = build_restart_preview(ns, md, principal=principal, env=env)
+
+    def refuse(reason_code: str, detail: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "allowed": False,
+            "gates_passed": False,
+            "reason_code": reason_code,
+            "detail": detail,
+            "action_id": action_id,
+            "namespace": ns,
+            "mode": md,
+            "preview": preview,
+            "execution_enabled": False,
+        }
+
+    scope_error = _validate_scope(ns, md)
+    if scope_error is not None:
+        return refuse(*scope_error)
+
+    # Authority is checked as an authorization decision, not an execution
+    # grant. ``for_execution=True`` asks "may the console perform this write?",
+    # and the answer here is permanently no: step 2 of the ledger is a request
+    # to the host supervisor, so the console's Phase 2 execution gate is not
+    # the relevant gate. Every branch below keeps ``execution_enabled`` False
+    # and :func:`execute_restart` never touches a process.
+    decision = console_authz.authorize(action_id, principal)
+    if not decision.allowed:
+        return refuse(DENY_UNAUTHORIZED, decision.detail)
+
+    if not _clean(confirmation):
+        return refuse(
+            DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISSING,
+            (
+                "Type the confirmation phrase "
+                f"{preview['confirmation_phrase']!r} to proceed."
+            ),
+        )
+    if not confirmation_matches(ns, md, confirmation):
+        return refuse(
+            DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISMATCH,
+            (
+                "Confirmation does not name this namespace and mode; expected "
+                f"{preview['confirmation_phrase']!r}."
+            ),
+        )
+
+    operator = preview["operator_authorization"]
+    if not operator["authorized"]:
+        return refuse(
+            DENY_OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION,
+            (
+                "Host daemon maintenance requires out-of-band operator "
+                "authorization via "
+                f"{runtime_recovery_guard.OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION_ENV}."
+            ),
+        )
+
+    # #630's task-scoped gate deliberately lets a contaminated worker keep
+    # commenting and handing off. Restart is stricter and unconditional: a
+    # runtime already contaminated by a manual kill must be reconciled before
+    # it is restarted again, or the restart just launders the contamination.
+    if contamination_marker and not contamination_marker.get(
+        "cleared_by_reconciler"
+    ):
+        return refuse(
+            DENY_CONTAMINATED_RUNTIME,
+            (
+                "A live contamination marker is present; clear it through the "
+                "reconciler path before restarting."
+            ),
+        )
+
+    hook = preview["restart_hook"]
+    if not hook["configured"]:
+        return refuse(
+            DENY_HOOK_NOT_CONFIGURED,
+            (
+                "No host-managed restart hook is configured "
+                f"({RESTART_HOOK_ENV}). The console will not fall back to a "
+                "process kill."
+            ),
+        )
+
+    return {
+        "allowed": True,
+        "gates_passed": True,
+        "reason_code": ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED,
+        "detail": (
+            "Every gate passed. The restart must be performed by the "
+            "configured host supervisor; the console does not signal the "
+            "process."
+        ),
+        "action_id": action_id,
+        "namespace": ns,
+        "mode": md,
+        "preview": preview,
+        "execution_enabled": False,
+        "console_executes": False,
+        "console_active_phase": console_authz.ACTIVE_PHASE,
+    }
+
+
+# --- Execution --------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def execute_restart(
+    namespace: str,
+    mode: str = MODE_RESTART,
+    *,
+    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
+    confirmation: str | None = None,
+    contamination_marker: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+    request_id: str | None = None,
+    session_id: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Run every gate, audit the outcome, and hand off to the host.
+
+    This function never spawns a process, never sends a signal, and never
+    builds a command line. ``success`` is False in both directions: a refused
+    request is refused, and an authorized request still requires the host
+    supervisor to act.
+    """
+    assessment = assess_restart_request(
+        namespace,
+        mode,
+        principal=principal,
+        confirmation=confirmation,
+        contamination_marker=contamination_marker,
+        env=env,
+    )
+    action_id = assessment["action_id"]
+    allowed = assessment["allowed"]
+
+    audit = console_audit.record_event(
+        action_id=action_id,
+        result=(
+            console_audit.RESULT_ALLOWED if allowed
+            else console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
+        ),
+        principal=principal,
+        target={"namespace": assessment["namespace"], "mode": assessment["mode"]},
+        reason_code=assessment["reason_code"],
+        detail=assessment["detail"],
+        request_id=request_id,
+        session_id=session_id,
+        metadata={
+            "gates_passed": assessment["gates_passed"],
+            "process_kill_executed": False,
+            "post_restart_verification_required": True,
+        },
+    )
+
+    return {
+        "success": False,
+        "outcome": (
+            ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED if allowed else assessment["reason_code"]
+        ),
+        "allowed": allowed,
+        "detail": assessment["detail"],
+        "namespace": assessment["namespace"],
+        "mode": assessment["mode"],
+        "action_id": action_id,
+        "process_kill_executed": False,
+        "host_hook": assessment["preview"]["restart_hook"],
+        "next_action": (
+            "Have the host supervisor perform the restart, then call "
+            "verify_post_restart_health with live client-namespace evidence "
+            "before claiming a clean session."
+            if allowed
+            else assessment["detail"]
+        ),
+        "assessment": assessment,
+        "audit": audit,
+    }
+
+
+# --- Contamination classification -------------------------------------------
+
+
+def classify_restart_command(
+    command: str | None,
+    *,
+    mcp_pids: list[Any] | tuple[Any, ...] | None = None,
+    session_id: str | None = None,
+    remote: str | None = None,
+    role: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Classify an operator-proposed recovery command (#630 AC2).
+
+    A manual ``pkill``/``kill`` of the MCP daemon is contamination, not a
+    restart. When contaminating, a durable marker is returned so downstream
+    gated mutations and clean claims fail closed.
+    """
+    classification = runtime_recovery_guard.classify_recovery_command(
+        command, mcp_pids=mcp_pids
+    )
+    contaminating = bool(classification.get("contamination"))
+
+    marker = None
+    if contaminating:
+        marker = runtime_recovery_guard.build_contamination_record(
+            reason_class=(
+                classification.get("reason_class")
+                or runtime_recovery_guard.REASON_MANUAL_DAEMON_KILL
+            ),
+            command_redacted=classification.get("redacted_command"),
+            session_id=session_id,
+            remote=remote,
+            role=role,
+            detail=(
+                "Manual daemon kill is forbidden; use the sanctioned "
+                f"{ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE} gated action instead."
+            ),
+        )
+
+    return {
+        "contamination": contaminating,
+        "sanctioned": not contaminating and not classification.get("process_kill"),
+        "clean_claim_allowed": not contaminating,
+        "reason_class": classification.get("reason_class"),
+        "redacted_command": classification.get("redacted_command"),
+        "classification": classification,
+        "contamination_marker": marker,
+        "sanctioned_alternative": ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
+    }
+
+
+# --- Post-restart health verification ---------------------------------------
+
+
+def verify_post_restart_health(
+    namespace: str,
+    *,
+    probe_result: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    probe_source: str | None = None,
+    registered_tools: list[str] | tuple[str, ...] | None = None,
+    required_tool: str | None = None,
+    profile: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Require live proof a namespace is callable before any clean claim (AC3).
+
+    Static registration is not proof and neither is an offline subprocess
+    probe: only ``probe_source=client_namespace`` evidence can clear a
+    post-restart session for mutations.
+    """
+    ns = _clean(namespace)
+    health = mcp_namespace_health.classify_namespace_probe(
+        ns,
+        required_tool=required_tool,
+        registered_tools=registered_tools,
+        probe_result=probe_result,
+        profile=profile,
+        probe_source=probe_source,
+    )
+    healthy = bool(health.get("healthy"))
+    proven = bool(health.get("ide_namespace_proven"))
+
+    if healthy and proven:
+        status = HEALTH_CLEAN
+    elif healthy:
+        status = HEALTH_UNPROVEN
+    else:
+        status = HEALTH_UNHEALTHY
+
+    reasons = list(health.get("reasons") or [])
+    if status == HEALTH_UNPROVEN:
+        reasons.append(
+            "Namespace reported healthy without live client-namespace "
+            "evidence; a post-restart clean claim requires "
+            f"probe_source={mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_CLIENT!r}."
+        )
+
+    return {
+        "namespace": ns,
+        "status": status,
+        "healthy": healthy,
+        "ide_namespace_proven": proven,
+        "clean_claim_allowed": status == HEALTH_CLEAN,
+        "mutations_allowed": status == HEALTH_CLEAN,
+        "reasons": reasons,
+        "health": health,
+    }
+
+
+# --- Policy surface ---------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def restart_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Machine-readable description of the sanctioned restart contract."""
+    return {
+        "policy_version": 1,
+        "modes": list(MODES),
+        "actions": [ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE, ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE],
+        "known_namespaces": list(KNOWN_NAMESPACES),
+        "fleet_scope_permitted": False,
+        "console_executes_process_kill": False,
+        "raw_kill_exposed": False,
+        "requires_confirmation": True,
+        "confirmation_binds_namespace": True,
+        "operator_authorization_env": (
+            runtime_recovery_guard.OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION_ENV
+        ),
+        "restart_hook_env": RESTART_HOOK_ENV,
+        "manual_kill_classified_as": runtime_recovery_guard.CONTAMINATION_KIND,
+        "post_restart_clean_claim_requires": (
+            mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_CLIENT
+        ),
+        "audit_required": True,
+        "silent_auto_restart_permitted": False,
+    }

webui/system_health_views.py

@@ -1,307 +0,0 @@
-"""HTML views for the system-health dashboard (#639).
-
-Renders the read-only :class:`~webui.system_health.SystemHealthSnapshot`
-produced by the Phase 1 system-health API (#634). The page offers no restart,
-reload, or process-kill control: those are Phase 2 work, and manual process
-kills are the contamination path #630 exists to prevent.
-
-Every free-text field passes through :func:`webui.system_health.redact` before
-it reaches HTML, so a probe detail that captured a token or a credentialed URL
-cannot leak through the dashboard even though the API redacts it already.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import html
-
-from webui.system_health import (
-    STATUS_DEGRADED,
-    STATUS_DOWN,
-    STATUS_OK,
-    STATUS_SKIPPED,
-    STATUS_UNPROVEN,
-    DependencyProbe,
-    SystemHealthSnapshot,
-    redact,
-)
-
-_STATUS_BADGE_CLASS = {
-    STATUS_OK: "badge-health-ok",
-    STATUS_DEGRADED: "badge-health-degraded",
-    STATUS_DOWN: "badge-health-down",
-    STATUS_SKIPPED: "badge-health-skipped",
-    STATUS_UNPROVEN: "badge-health-unproven",
-}
-
-
-def _safe(value: object) -> str:
-    """Escape free text for HTML after redacting anything secret-shaped.
-
-    Use this for every value that can carry arbitrary text — probe details,
-    reasons, probe errors — because those are where a credential could ride
-    along.
-    """
-    return html.escape(redact(str(value)))
-
-
-def _esc(value: object) -> str:
-    """Escape a structured field for HTML without redacting it.
-
-    Commit SHAs, probe names, statuses, and timestamps are enumerated or
-    machine-generated, never credential-bearing. They must not go through
-    :func:`redact`: its opaque-token rule matches any 32-plus-character run,
-    so a 40-character git SHA would render as ``[redacted]`` and the parity
-    view — the one thing an operator reads this page for — would be blank.
-    """
-    return html.escape(str(value))
-
-
-def _status_badge(status: str) -> str:
-    css = _STATUS_BADGE_CLASS.get(status, "badge-health-unproven")
-    return f'<span class="badge {css}">{_esc(status)}</span>'
-
-
-def _reason_list(reasons: tuple[str, ...], *, empty: str) -> str:
-    if not reasons:
-        return f"<p class='muted'>{html.escape(empty)}</p>"
-    items = "".join(f"<li>{_safe(reason)}</li>" for reason in reasons)
-    return f"<ul class='reasons'>{items}</ul>"
-
-
-def _readiness_card(snapshot: SystemHealthSnapshot) -> str:
-    """Overall readiness.
-
-    ``ready`` and ``readiness_complete`` are shown separately on purpose: a
-    snapshot whose required probes never ran is not the same as one that ran
-    them and passed, and collapsing the two would render an unproven green.
-    """
-    if snapshot.ready and snapshot.readiness_complete:
-        headline = "Ready"
-    elif snapshot.ready:
-        headline = "Ready (incomplete evidence)"
-    else:
-        headline = "Not ready"
-
-    return (
-        "<section class='health-card'>"
-        f"<h3>Readiness {_status_badge(snapshot.status)}</h3>"
-        f"<p class='health-headline'>{html.escape(headline)}</p>"
-        "<table class='detail'>"
-        f"<tr><th>Service</th><td><code>{_esc(snapshot.service)}</code></td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Mode</th><td>{_esc(snapshot.mode)}</td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Ready</th><td>{_esc(snapshot.ready)}</td></tr>"
-        "<tr><th>Readiness evidence complete</th>"
-        f"<td>{_esc(snapshot.readiness_complete)}</td></tr>"
-        "<tr><th>Deep probes requested</th>"
-        f"<td>{_esc(snapshot.deep_probes_requested)}</td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Observed at</th><td><code>{_esc(snapshot.timestamp)}</code></td></tr>"
-        "</table>"
-        "<h4>Readiness reasons</h4>"
-        f"{_reason_list(snapshot.readiness_reasons, empty='No readiness objections recorded.')}"
-        "</section>"
-    )
-
-
-def _version_card(snapshot: SystemHealthSnapshot) -> str:
-    version = snapshot.version
-    uptime_hours = snapshot.uptime_seconds / 3600.0
-    known = (
-        "resolved"
-        if version.known
-        else "unresolved — version fields could not be read from the checkout"
-    )
-    schema = version.control_plane_schema_version
-    return (
-        "<section class='health-card'>"
-        "<h3>Version and uptime</h3>"
-        "<table class='detail'>"
-        f"<tr><th>Git SHA</th><td><code>{_esc(version.git_sha or 'unknown')}</code></td></tr>"
-        "<tr><th>Git describe</th>"
-        f"<td><code>{_esc(version.git_describe or 'unknown')}</code></td></tr>"
-        "<tr><th>Control-plane schema</th>"
-        f"<td>{_esc(schema if schema is not None else 'unknown')}</td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Python</th><td><code>{_esc(version.python_version)}</code></td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Version status</th><td>{html.escape(known)}</td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Started at</th><td><code>{_esc(snapshot.started_at)}</code></td></tr>"
-        "<tr><th>Uptime</th>"
-        f"<td>{snapshot.uptime_seconds:.3f}s ({uptime_hours:.2f}h)</td></tr>"
-        "</table>"
-        "</section>"
-    )
-
-
-def _dependency_rows(probes: tuple[DependencyProbe, ...]) -> str:
-    if not probes:
-        return "<p class='muted'>No dependency probes were reported.</p>"
-    rows = []
-    for probe in probes:
-        latency = (
-            f"{probe.latency_ms:.1f} ms" if probe.latency_ms is not None else "n/a"
-        )
-        rows.append(
-            "<tr>"
-            f"<td><code>{_esc(probe.name)}</code></td>"
-            f"<td>{_esc(probe.kind)}</td>"
-            f"<td>{_status_badge(probe.status)}</td>"
-            f"<td>{_esc('required' if probe.required else 'optional')}</td>"
-            f"<td>{html.escape(latency)}</td>"
-            f"<td>{_safe(probe.detail)}</td>"
-            "</tr>"
-        )
-    return (
-        "<table class='registry'><thead><tr>"
-        "<th>Dependency</th><th>Kind</th><th>Status</th><th>Requirement</th>"
-        "<th>Latency</th><th>Detail</th>"
-        "</tr></thead><tbody>"
-        f"{''.join(rows)}</tbody></table>"
-    )
-
-
-def _dependency_card(snapshot: SystemHealthSnapshot) -> str:
-    degraded = [probe for probe in snapshot.dependencies if probe.ran and not probe.healthy]
-    not_run = [probe for probe in snapshot.dependencies if not probe.ran]
-
-    banner = ""
-    if degraded:
-        names = ", ".join(sorted(probe.name for probe in degraded))
-        banner += (
-            "<div class='stub health-degraded'><p><strong>Degraded dependencies:</strong> "
-            f"{_esc(names)}</p></div>"
-        )
-    if not_run:
-        names = ", ".join(sorted(probe.name for probe in not_run))
-        banner += (
-            "<div class='stub'><p><strong>Not probed:</strong> "
-            f"{_esc(names)} — these contribute no evidence and are not counted "
-            "as healthy.</p></div>"
-        )
-
-    return (
-        "<section class='health-card'>"
-        "<h3>Dependencies</h3>"
-        f"{banner}"
-        f"{_dependency_rows(snapshot.dependencies)}"
-        "<p class='muted'>Details are redacted at the API boundary and again "
-        "before rendering; credentials are never displayed.</p>"
-        "</section>"
-    )
-
-
-def _namespace_card(snapshot: SystemHealthSnapshot) -> str:
-    if not snapshot.mcp_namespaces:
-        body = "<p class='muted'>No MCP namespaces are declared.</p>"
-    else:
-        rows = []
-        for entry in snapshot.mcp_namespaces:
-            rows.append(
-                "<tr>"
-                f"<td><code>{_esc(entry.get('namespace'))}</code></td>"
-                f"<td><code>{_esc(entry.get('required_tool'))}</code></td>"
-                f"<td>{_status_badge(str(entry.get('status') or STATUS_UNPROVEN))}</td>"
-                f"<td>{_esc(entry.get('ide_namespace_proven'))}</td>"
-                f"<td>{_safe(entry.get('reason'))}</td>"
-                "</tr>"
-            )
-        body = (
-            "<table class='registry'><thead><tr>"
-            "<th>Namespace</th><th>Required tool</th><th>Status</th>"
-            "<th>IDE-proven</th><th>Reason</th>"
-            "</tr></thead><tbody>"
-            f"{''.join(rows)}</tbody></table>"
-        )
-    return (
-        "<section class='health-card'>"
-        "<h3>MCP namespaces</h3>"
-        f"{body}"
-        "<p class='muted'>The web process runs outside the IDE-managed MCP "
-        "client, so namespace health is reported as unproven rather than "
-        "guessed (#543).</p>"
-        "</section>"
-    )
-
-
-def _stale_runtime_card(snapshot: SystemHealthSnapshot) -> str:
-    stale = snapshot.stale_runtime
-    if stale.stale:
-        warning = (
-            "<div class='stub health-stale'><p><strong>Stale runtime:</strong> "
-            "the running code, the checkout, and the remote-tracking commit "
-            "disagree. Capability gates may be evaluating obsolete code — "
-            "do not treat this runtime as mutation-safe.</p></div>"
-        )
-    elif not stale.determinable:
-        warning = (
-            "<div class='stub health-stale'><p><strong>Staleness "
-            "indeterminate:</strong> parity could not be proven, so this "
-            "runtime is not reported as mutation-safe.</p></div>"
-        )
-    else:
-        warning = ""
-
-    return (
-        "<section class='health-card'>"
-        "<h3>Stale-runtime parity</h3>"
-        f"{warning}"
-        "<table class='detail'>"
-        "<tr><th>Daemon head</th>"
-        f"<td><code>{_esc(stale.daemon_head or 'unknown')}</code></td></tr>"
-        "<tr><th>Checkout head</th>"
-        f"<td><code>{_esc(stale.checkout_head or 'unknown')}</code></td></tr>"
-        "<tr><th>Remote head</th>"
-        f"<td><code>{_esc(stale.remote_head or 'unknown')}</code></td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Stale</th><td>{_esc(stale.stale)}</td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Determinable</th><td>{_esc(stale.determinable)}</td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Mutation safe</th><td>{_esc(stale.mutation_safe)}</td></tr>"
-        "</table>"
-        f"{_reason_list(stale.reasons, empty='Runtime, checkout, and remote agree.')}"
-        "</section>"
-    )
-
-
-def _probe_error_card(snapshot: SystemHealthSnapshot) -> str:
-    if not snapshot.probe_errors:
-        return ""
-    return (
-        "<section class='health-card'>"
-        "<h3>Probe errors</h3>"
-        f"{_reason_list(snapshot.probe_errors, empty='')}"
-        "</section>"
-    )
-
-
-def _recovery_card() -> str:
-    """Sanctioned recovery pointers only — never a manual process kill (#630)."""
-    return (
-        "<section class='health-card'>"
-        "<h3>Recovery</h3>"
-        "<p class='muted'>This dashboard is read-only. Restart and reload "
-        "controls arrive in Phase 2 (#642); until then recovery runs through "
-        "the sanctioned client reconnect / operator restart path.</p>"
-        "<ul class='reasons'>"
-        "<li><a href='/runtime'>Runtime and session view</a> — active profile, "
-        "workflow hashes, and shell health.</li>"
-        "<li>Reconnect the MCP client from the IDE, then re-run the blocked "
-        "cycle. Never kill the daemon process manually: unmanaged kills are "
-        "recorded as runtime contamination (#630).</li>"
-        "<li>See <code>docs/webui-local-dev.md</code> for the documented "
-        "recovery sequence.</li>"
-        "</ul>"
-        "</section>"
-    )
-
-
-def render_system_health_page(snapshot: SystemHealthSnapshot) -> str:
-    """Render the full system-health dashboard body."""
-    return (
-        "<h2>System health</h2>"
-        "<p class='meta'>Read-only view of the Phase 1 system-health API "
-        "(<code>/api/v1/system/health</code>). Reload this page to refresh; "
-        "nothing here polls or mutates on your behalf.</p>"
-        f"{_readiness_card(snapshot)}"
-        f"{_stale_runtime_card(snapshot)}"
-        f"{_version_card(snapshot)}"
-        f"{_dependency_card(snapshot)}"
-        f"{_namespace_card(snapshot)}"
-        f"{_probe_error_card(snapshot)}"
-        f"{_recovery_card()}"
-    )