feat(webui): unified session/lease/lock/worktree inventory API (Closes #636)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

allocator_service.py

@@ -78,33 +78,6 @@ VALID_ROLES = frozenset(
     {ROLE_AUTHOR, ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER, ROLE_RECONCILER, ROLE_CONTROLLER}
 )
 
-# Allocation modes (#840).
-# role_scoped: only candidates whose expected role matches the caller role.
-# cross_role:  controller-owned generic queue selection — inspect full queue,
-# rank/eligibility canonically, return one selection naming the required
-# downstream role/profile. Controller routes; it does not perform mutations.
-ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED = "role_scoped"
-ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE = "cross_role"
-VALID_ALLOCATION_MODES = frozenset(
-    {ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED, ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE}
-)
-
-# Default execution-profile / MCP-namespace names for each role.
-DEFAULT_ROLE_PROFILES: dict[str, str] = {
-    ROLE_AUTHOR: "prgs-author",
-    ROLE_REVIEWER: "prgs-reviewer",
-    ROLE_MERGER: "prgs-merger",
-    ROLE_RECONCILER: "prgs-reconciler",
-    ROLE_CONTROLLER: "prgs-controller",
-}
-DEFAULT_ROLE_NAMESPACES: dict[str, str] = {
-    ROLE_AUTHOR: "gitea-author",
-    ROLE_REVIEWER: "gitea-reviewer",
-    ROLE_MERGER: "gitea-merger",
-    ROLE_RECONCILER: "gitea-reconciler",
-    ROLE_CONTROLLER: "gitea-controller",
-}
-
 # Default action matrices by role (mutation gate will re-check).
 ROLE_ACTIONS: dict[str, tuple[tuple[str, ...], tuple[str, ...]]] = {
     ROLE_AUTHOR: (
@@ -286,126 +259,6 @@ def normalize_role(role: str | None, *, profile_name: str | None = None) -> str:
     )
 
 
-def resolve_allocation_mode(
-    role: str,
-    allocation_mode: str | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    """Resolve allocation mode; controller defaults to cross_role (#840)."""
-    raw = (allocation_mode or "").strip().lower()
-    if raw:
-        if raw not in VALID_ALLOCATION_MODES:
-            raise ControlPlaneError(
-                f"unknown allocation_mode {allocation_mode!r}; expected one of "
-                f"{sorted(VALID_ALLOCATION_MODES)}"
-            )
-        return raw
-    if role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
-        return ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE
-    return ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED
-
-
-def required_profile_for_role(
-    role: str,
-    *,
-    profile_name: str | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    """Map a required role to the canonical execution profile name."""
-    role_norm = (role or "").strip().lower()
-    # Preserve remote/env prefix from the active profile when present
-    # (e.g. dadeschools-author → dadeschools-reviewer).
-    active = (profile_name or "").strip()
-    if active:
-        lower = active.lower()
-        for token in ("author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "controller"):
-            if lower.endswith(f"-{token}") or lower == token:
-                prefix = active[: -len(token)].rstrip("-")
-                if prefix:
-                    return f"{prefix}-{role_norm}"
-                return role_norm
-    return DEFAULT_ROLE_PROFILES.get(role_norm, f"prgs-{role_norm}")
-
-
-def required_namespace_for_role(
-    role: str,
-    *,
-    profile_name: str | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    """Map a required role to the canonical MCP namespace name."""
-    role_norm = (role or "").strip().lower()
-    profile = required_profile_for_role(role_norm, profile_name=profile_name)
-    # Namespace is typically gitea-<role>; keep stable mapping when profile is
-    # non-prgs (still gitea-<role> for isolation).
-    return DEFAULT_ROLE_NAMESPACES.get(role_norm, f"gitea-{role_norm}")
-
-
-def selected_action_for_candidate(c: WorkCandidate, required_role: str) -> str:
-    """Canonical next action for the selected work under *required_role*."""
-    role = (required_role or "").strip().lower()
-    if role == ROLE_AUTHOR:
-        if c.kind == "pr" and c.request_changes_current_head:
-            return "address_pr_change_requests"
-        if c.kind == "pr":
-            return "update_pr"
-        return "implement"
-    if role == ROLE_REVIEWER:
-        if c.approval_stale:
-            return "re_review"
-        return "review"
-    if role == ROLE_MERGER:
-        return "merge"
-    if role == ROLE_RECONCILER:
-        if c.approval_contaminated:
-            return "reconcile_contaminated_approval"
-        return "reconcile"
-    if role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
-        return "diagnose"
-    return "process"
-
-
-def build_selection_dict(
-    selected: WorkCandidate,
-    *,
-    active_role: str,
-    required_role: str,
-    profile_name: str | None = None,
-    allocation_mode: str,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Authoritative single selection payload for allocator results (#840)."""
-    action = selected_action_for_candidate(selected, required_role)
-    req_profile = required_profile_for_role(
-        required_role, profile_name=profile_name
-    )
-    req_ns = required_namespace_for_role(
-        required_role, profile_name=profile_name
-    )
-    return {
-        "kind": selected.kind,
-        "number": selected.number,
-        "title": selected.title,
-        "labels": list(selected.labels),
-        "head_sha": selected.head_sha,
-        "priority": selected.priority,
-        "expected_role_next": required_role,
-        "required_role": required_role,
-        "selected_action": action,
-        "action": action,
-        "required_profile": req_profile,
-        "required_namespace": req_ns,
-        "pinned": {
-            "kind": selected.kind,
-            "number": selected.number,
-            "head_sha": selected.head_sha,
-            "issue_number": selected.number if selected.kind == "issue" else None,
-            "pr_number": selected.number if selected.kind == "pr" else None,
-        },
-        "reason_selected": (
-            f"highest-priority eligible candidate under allocation_mode="
-            f"'{allocation_mode}' (active_role={active_role}, "
-            f"required_role={required_role}, action={action})"
-        ),
-    }
-
-
 def expected_role_for_candidate(c: WorkCandidate) -> str:
     """ADR §5.3 routing: which role should take this work next."""
     if c.kind == "pr":
@@ -436,7 +289,6 @@ def classify_skip(
     role: str,
     terminal_pr: int | None,
     claim_ownership: str | None = None,
-    allocation_mode: str | None = None,
 ) -> str | None:
     """Return skip reason, or None if candidate is selectable for *role*.
 
@@ -445,12 +297,7 @@ def classify_skip(
     and unknown claims are excluded so one session's in-progress task can never
     blockade the queue for a different controller; ``own`` stays selectable so
     a controller can resume its own work.
-
-    *allocation_mode* (#840): ``cross_role`` (controller default) ranks the full
-    queue and selects the highest-priority eligible item for any downstream
-    role. ``role_scoped`` retains prior role-match filtering.
     """
-    mode = resolve_allocation_mode(role, allocation_mode)
     if c.state in ("merged", "closed"):
         return f"{c.kind}#{c.number} is {c.state}; never assign"
     if c.blocked or "status:blocked" in c.labels:
@@ -475,58 +322,34 @@ def classify_skip(
     if c.kind == "pr" and not (c.head_sha or "").strip():
         return f"pr#{c.number} missing head_sha pin"
 
-    expected = expected_role_for_candidate(c)
-
     # Terminal path first: when an active terminal PR exists, only that PR
-    # is assignable for review-path roles (or for work whose expected role is
+    # (or controller diagnosis) is assignable for review-path roles.
-    # review/merge under cross_role selection).
     if terminal_pr is not None and c.kind == "pr" and c.number != terminal_pr:
-        terminal_roles = (ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER)
+        if role in (ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER):
-        if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE:
-            if expected in terminal_roles:
-                return (
-                    f"pr#{c.number} skipped: active terminal-review lock on "
-                    f"PR #{terminal_pr} must be resolved first"
-                )
-        elif role in terminal_roles:
             return (
                 f"pr#{c.number} skipped: active terminal-review lock on "
                 f"PR #{terminal_pr} must be resolved first"
             )
 
-    if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE:
+    expected = expected_role_for_candidate(c)
-        # Cross-role controller selection: eligibility only — no active-role
+    if role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
-        # match filter. The selection payload names required_role.
+        # Controller may inspect anything but only assigns diagnosis targets
-        pass
+        # when contaminated / blocked.
-    elif role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
-        # Legacy diagnosis-only controller path (role_scoped): only reconciler-
-        # needed targets. Prefer cross_role for generic queue allocation.
         if expected == ROLE_RECONCILER or c.blocked:
             return None
-        return (
+        return f"{c.kind}#{c.number} does not require controller (expected {expected})"
-            f"{c.kind}#{c.number} does not require controller "
+
-            f"(expected {expected})"
+    if role != expected:
-        )
-    elif role != expected:
         return (
             f"{c.kind}#{c.number} expects role '{expected}', active role is '{role}'"
         )
 
     # Ready-gate for issues: prefer status:ready when labels present.
-    # Applies for author-bound work in both modes (cross_role only gates
-    # author-expected issues so reconciler/reviewer PRs stay selectable).
     if c.kind == "issue" and c.labels:
-        gate_role = expected if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE else role
+        if "status:ready" not in c.labels and "status:in-progress" not in c.labels:
-        if gate_role in (ROLE_AUTHOR, ROLE_CONTROLLER):
+            # Allow unlabeled open issues; only skip explicit non-ready states.
-            if (
-                "status:ready" not in c.labels
-                and "status:in-progress" not in c.labels
-            ):
             if any(l.startswith("status:") for l in c.labels):
-                    return (
+                return f"issue#{c.number} not status:ready ({','.join(c.labels)})"
-                        f"issue#{c.number} not status:ready "
-                        f"({','.join(c.labels)})"
-                    )
     return None
 
 
@@ -678,19 +501,12 @@ def allocate_next_work(
     claims: Mapping[tuple[str, int], dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
     exclude_issue_numbers: Sequence[int] | None = None,
     expected_candidate_set_fingerprint: str | None = None,
-    allocation_mode: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
     """Select and optionally reserve the next work unit via control-plane DB.
 
     *apply=False* (default): dry-run selection only — no lease/assignment.
     *apply=True*: atomic ``assign_and_lease`` for the selected candidate.
 
-    *allocation_mode* (#840): ``cross_role`` (default for controller) inspects
-    the complete queue and returns one authoritative selection naming the
-    required downstream role/profile/action. ``role_scoped`` keeps prior
-    per-role filtering. Controller routes only — never grants author/reviewer/
-    merger/reconciler mutation rights to the controller session.
-
     *exclude_issue_numbers* (#776): numbers removed before ranking. Omitted /
     empty preserves prior behavior.
 
@@ -725,19 +541,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "substrate": "control_plane_db",
         }
 
-    try:
-        mode = resolve_allocation_mode(role_norm, allocation_mode)
-    except ControlPlaneError as exc:
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "outcome": OUTCOME_ROLE_INELIGIBLE,
-            "reasons": [str(exc)],
-            "skipped": [],
-            "assignment": None,
-            "substrate": "control_plane_db",
-            "allocation_mode": (allocation_mode or "").strip() or None,
-        }
-
     session_id = (session_id or "").strip() or f"alloc-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]}"
     try:
         db.upsert_session(
@@ -945,7 +748,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             role=role_norm,
             terminal_pr=terminal_pr,
             claim_ownership=ownership,
-            allocation_mode=mode,
         )
         if reason:
             is_claim_skip = SKIP_CLAIMED_BY_OTHER_SESSION in reason
@@ -1026,10 +828,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "outcome": outcome,
             "apply": bool(apply),
             "role": role_norm,
-            "allocation_mode": mode,
-            "routing_role": role_norm,
-            "required_role": None,
-            "selected_action": None,
             "profile_name": profile_name,
             "username": username,
             "session_id": session_id,
@@ -1042,12 +840,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
             "terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
             "assignment": None,
-            "allocation_evidence": {
-                "mode": "empty",
-                "allocation_mode": mode,
-                "lease_created": False,
-                "selection_policy": SELECTION_POLICY,
-            },
             "substrate": "control_plane_db",
             "file_lock_only": False,
             "comment_lease_only": False,
@@ -1060,37 +852,25 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "owner_session_id": owner_session_id,
             "downstream_note": (
                 "#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
-                "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents; "
+                "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
-                "controller routes only under cross_role (#840)"
             ),
         }
 
     expected_role = expected_role_for_candidate(selected)
-    # Cross-role: lease/action matrix follows the required downstream role so
+    allowed, forbidden = role_actions(role_norm)
-    # evidence names the worker that must act. Controller session still owns
+    selection = {
-    # the routing decision; mutation isolation is enforced by role gates on
+        "kind": selected.kind,
-    # mutation tools (controller profile lacks author/review/merge ops).
+        "number": selected.number,
-    lease_role = (
+        "title": selected.title,
-        expected_role if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE else role_norm
+        "labels": list(selected.labels),
-    )
+        "head_sha": selected.head_sha,
-    allowed, forbidden = role_actions(lease_role)
+        "priority": selected.priority,
-    # Controller must never receive mutation-class rights via cross-role apply.
+        "expected_role_next": expected_role,
-    if role_norm == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
+        "reason_selected": (
-        ctrl_allowed, ctrl_forbidden = role_actions(ROLE_CONTROLLER)
+            f"highest-priority candidate for role '{role_norm}' "
-        # Keep controller session capability evidence separate from lease_role.
+            f"(expected_role={expected_role})"
-        controller_allowed_actions = ctrl_allowed
+        ),
-        controller_forbidden_actions = ctrl_forbidden
+    }
-    else:
-        controller_allowed_actions = allowed
-        controller_forbidden_actions = forbidden
-
-    selection = build_selection_dict(
-        selected,
-        active_role=role_norm,
-        required_role=expected_role,
-        profile_name=profile_name,
-        allocation_mode=mode,
-    )
 
     if not apply:
         return {
@@ -1098,12 +878,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "outcome": OUTCOME_PREVIEW,
             "apply": False,
             "role": role_norm,
-            "allocation_mode": mode,
-            "routing_role": role_norm,
-            "required_role": expected_role,
-            "selected_action": selection["selected_action"],
-            "required_profile": selection["required_profile"],
-            "required_namespace": selection["required_namespace"],
             "profile_name": profile_name,
             "username": username,
             "session_id": session_id,
@@ -1119,12 +893,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
             "terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
             "assignment": None,
-            "allocation_evidence": {
-                "mode": "preview",
-                "allocation_mode": mode,
-                "lease_created": False,
-                "selection_policy": SELECTION_POLICY,
-            },
             "substrate": "control_plane_db",
             "file_lock_only": False,
             "comment_lease_only": False,
@@ -1134,12 +902,9 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "controller_excluded": list(controller_excluded),
             "exclude_issue_numbers": list(exclude_nums),
             "candidate_set_fingerprint": cas_fp,
-            "controller_allowed_actions": list(controller_allowed_actions),
-            "controller_forbidden_actions": list(controller_forbidden_actions),
             "downstream_note": (
                 "#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
-                "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents; "
+                "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
-                "controller routes only under cross_role (#840)"
             ),
         }
 
@@ -1148,7 +913,7 @@ def allocate_next_work(
     try:
         kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {
             "session_id": session_id,
-            "role": lease_role,
+            "role": role_norm,
             "remote": remote,
             "org": org,
             "repo": repo,
@@ -1227,27 +992,11 @@ def allocate_next_work(
         }
 
     # assigned
-    lease_proof = {
-        "assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
-        "lease_id": result.lease_id,
-        "expires_at": result.expires_at,
-        "expected_head_sha": result.expected_head_sha,
-        "allowed_actions": list(result.allowed_actions),
-        "forbidden_actions": list(result.forbidden_actions),
-        "lease_role": lease_role,
-        "source": "control_plane_db.assign_and_lease",
-    }
     return {
         "success": True,
         "outcome": OUTCOME_ASSIGNED,
         "apply": True,
         "role": role_norm,
-        "allocation_mode": mode,
-        "routing_role": role_norm,
-        "required_role": expected_role,
-        "selected_action": selection["selected_action"],
-        "required_profile": selection["required_profile"],
-        "required_namespace": selection["required_namespace"],
         "profile_name": profile_name,
         "username": username,
         "session_id": session_id,
@@ -1263,16 +1012,16 @@ def allocate_next_work(
         "skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
         "terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
         "assignment": result.as_dict(),
-        "lease_proof": lease_proof,
+        "lease_proof": {
-        "allocation_evidence": {
+            "assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
-            "mode": "assigned",
+            "lease_id": result.lease_id,
-            "allocation_mode": mode,
+            "expires_at": result.expires_at,
-            "lease_created": True,
+            "expected_head_sha": result.expected_head_sha,
-            "lease_role": lease_role,
+            "allowed_actions": list(result.allowed_actions),
-            "lease_proof": lease_proof,
+            "forbidden_actions": list(result.forbidden_actions),
-            "selection_policy": SELECTION_POLICY,
+            "source": "control_plane_db.assign_and_lease",
         },
-        "next_valid_command": _next_command(lease_role, selected),
+        "next_valid_command": _next_command(role_norm, selected),
         "substrate": "control_plane_db",
         "file_lock_only": False,
         "comment_lease_only": False,
@@ -1282,12 +1031,9 @@ def allocate_next_work(
         "controller_excluded": list(controller_excluded),
         "exclude_issue_numbers": list(exclude_nums),
         "candidate_set_fingerprint": cas_fp,
-        "controller_allowed_actions": list(controller_allowed_actions),
-        "controller_forbidden_actions": list(controller_forbidden_actions),
         "downstream_note": (
             "#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
-            "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents; "
+            "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
-            "controller routes only under cross_role (#840)"
         ),
     }
 

arch01_platform.py

@@ -1,892 +0,0 @@
-"""ARCH-01 Foundation Slice A — atomic platform installation + authority kernel (#822).
-
-Parents: #820, #821. **First implementation leaf of the ARCH-01 program.**
-
-This module implements the smallest executable ARCH-01 foundation:
-
-* a connection-bound authenticated actor context (``cp_actor_*`` /
-  ``cp_operation_mode`` / ``cp_context_epoch`` SQLite scalar functions that SQL
-  may *read* but can never *set* — ``[TRUSTED-SERVICE]`` authenticity);
-* an immutable authority-dominance lattice with an exact seeded tuple set
-  (``[SCHEMA]``);
-* the principal-equivalence root (a class exists *before* its first principal;
-  ``principals.current_class_id`` is ``NOT NULL``; ``[SCHEMA]``);
-* a single-transaction platform installation that seeds the initial
-  ``platform.bootstrap`` grant and an immutable ``installed`` marker, validated
-  by a fail-closed ``install_state`` ``BEFORE INSERT`` trigger (``[SCHEMA]``).
-
-Everything else in the ARCH-01/02/04 program (evidence stores, repository
-bindings, workspaces, PostgreSQL parity, full grant succession, full principal
-merge) is out of scope here and tracked in its own issue — see #822 §5/§17.
-
-**Readiness / production posture.** This subsystem is *disabled by default*.
-Nothing in the running MCP server imports or enables it. It becomes a security
-boundary only once its readiness checks (the ACs in #822) pass in the target
-environment. Instantiating :class:`PlatformKernel` creates an isolated SQLite
-database and never touches the operational control-plane store.
-
-Enforcement classification (per #820 vocabulary):
-
-* ``[TRUSTED-SERVICE]`` — actor-context authenticity: the scalar functions are
-  registered by the trusted Python process; SQL cannot define or redefine them.
-* ``[SCHEMA]`` — fail-closed aborts, the dominance/immutability/NOT-NULL-class/
-  last-active-grant invariants, enforced by CHECK/FK/trigger.
-* ``[RUNTIME-ADAPTER]`` — *none* in this slice.
-
-SQLite-first. ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE`` serializes concurrent installs and concurrent
-grant/revoke on the singleton invariant row. PostgreSQL parity is a distinct
-issue (#827); this module does **not** claim it.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import sqlite3
-import threading
-from contextlib import contextmanager
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Iterator, Optional
-
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-# Closed enumerations (#822 §4).
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-ACTOR_KINDS = ("operator", "supervisor", "service", "installer")
-OPERATION_MODES = ("normal", "install", "merge", "internal_service")
-
-# Exact seeded authority-dominance tuple set (#822 §4). This set is normative:
-# the install-state trigger rejects any missing, additional, or malformed tuple.
-DOMINANCE_TUPLES = (
-    ("platform.bootstrap", "platform.bootstrap"),
-    ("platform.bootstrap", "project.admin"),
-    ("platform.bootstrap", "supervisor.root.establish"),
-    ("supervisor.root", "supervisor.register"),
-    ("supervisor.root", "supervisor.verify"),
-    ("supervisor.root", "supervisor.recover"),
-)
-
-# The distinguished operator-key issuer seeded during install.
-DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_KIND = "operator-key"
-DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID = "platform.bootstrap.operator-key"
-
-# Structured result codes (#822 §10).
-INSTALLED = "INSTALLED"
-ALREADY_INSTALLED = "ALREADY_INSTALLED"
-INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT = "INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT"
-INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE = "INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE"
-DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH = "DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH"
-AUTHORIZATION_DENIED = "AUTHORIZATION_DENIED"
-CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST = "CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST"
-
-# Required audit events (#822 §14).
-EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED = "platform_installed"
-EVT_GRANT_CREATED = "platform_grant_created"
-EVT_GRANT_REVOKED = "platform_grant_revoked"
-EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED = "principal_registered"
-
-SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
-
-DB_PATH_ENV = "ARCH01_PLATFORM_DB"
-
-
-class PlatformKernelError(RuntimeError):
-    """Base class for structured, code-bearing kernel failures."""
-
-    def __init__(self, code: str, message: str = "") -> None:
-        super().__init__(message or code)
-        self.code = code
-
-
-class ActorContextError(PlatformKernelError):
-    """Raised when a mutation is attempted without a valid actor context."""
-
-
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-# Schema (#822 §6). Tables + fail-closed triggers.
-#
-# Every *mutating* trigger opens with the actor protocol: read the context
-# epoch, read the actor fields, and abort unless the context is present,
-# non-null, mode/kind well-formed, and epoch-consistent with the active
-# transaction. The scalar functions ``cp_*`` are registered from Python only;
-# SQL has no statement that can set them, which is the trusted-service boundary.
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-_ACTOR_KINDS_SQL = ", ".join("'%s'" % k for k in ACTOR_KINDS)
-_OP_MODES_SQL = ", ".join("'%s'" % m for m in OPERATION_MODES)
-
-# Actor-protocol predicate: TRUE when the context is INVALID and the trigger
-# must abort. ``cp_actor_context_valid()`` folds "present + non-expired +
-# live-epoch == bound-epoch" (the read/re-read epoch equality of #822 §4) into
-# one trusted-service answer; the remaining reads assert field well-formedness.
-_INVALID_ACTOR = (
-    "cp_actor_context_valid() IS NOT 1 "
-    "OR cp_context_epoch() IS NULL "
-    "OR cp_actor_principal() IS NULL "
-    "OR cp_actor_kind() NOT IN (%s) "
-    "OR cp_operation_mode() NOT IN (%s)" % (_ACTOR_KINDS_SQL, _OP_MODES_SQL)
-)
-
-_ACTOR_GUARD = (
-    "SELECT CASE WHEN (%s) "
-    "THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT') END;" % _INVALID_ACTOR
-)
-
-# require_installed: abort a privileged mutation when there is no install
-# marker and we are not currently installing (#822 §4).
-_REQUIRE_INSTALLED = (
-    "SELECT CASE WHEN ((SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state) = 0 "
-    "AND cp_operation_mode() <> 'install') "
-    "THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'NOT_INSTALLED') END;"
-)
-
-_SCHEMA_SQL = f"""
-PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON;
-
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS arch01_meta (
-    key TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-    value TEXT NOT NULL
-);
-
--- Equivalence classes are created BEFORE their first principal (#822 §4).
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS principal_equivalence_classes (
-    class_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
-    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
-);
-
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS authoritative_issuers (
-    issuer_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
-    issuer_kind TEXT NOT NULL,
-    issuer_ref TEXT NOT NULL,
-    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-    UNIQUE (issuer_kind, issuer_ref)
-);
-
--- current_class_id is NOT NULL: a principal cannot exist without a class
--- (#822 AC6). issuer_id is nullable ONLY for the installer during install
--- (#822 AC7), enforced by trg_principals_null_issuer below.
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS principals (
-    principal_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
-    actor_kind TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (actor_kind IN ({_ACTOR_KINDS_SQL})),
-    current_class_id INTEGER NOT NULL REFERENCES principal_equivalence_classes(class_id),
-    issuer_id INTEGER REFERENCES authoritative_issuers(issuer_id),
-    registered_by TEXT REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
-    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
-);
-
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS authority_dominance (
-    dominant TEXT NOT NULL,
-    subordinate TEXT NOT NULL,
-    PRIMARY KEY (dominant, subordinate)
-);
-
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS platform_bootstrap_seed (
-    seed_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (seed_id = 1),
-    installer_principal_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
-    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
-);
-
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS platform_bootstrap_grants (
-    grant_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
-    grantee_principal_id TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
-    granted_by TEXT REFERENCES principals(principal_id),
-    active INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1 CHECK (active IN (0, 1)),
-    created_at TEXT NOT NULL,
-    revoked_at TEXT
-);
-
--- Singleton row; active_count floored at 1 by CHECK so the last active grant
--- can never be revoked (#822 AC11).
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS platform_active_invariant (
-    id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1),
-    active_count INTEGER NOT NULL CHECK (active_count >= 1)
-);
-
--- The immutable install marker; inserted LAST in the install transaction.
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS install_state (
-    id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY CHECK (id = 1),
-    marker TEXT NOT NULL CHECK (marker = 'installed'),
-    installed_at TEXT NOT NULL
-);
-
--- Append-only (#822 AC14).
-CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_records (
-    audit_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
-    event TEXT NOT NULL,
-    principal_id TEXT,
-    detail TEXT,
-    created_at TEXT NOT NULL
-);
-
--- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
--- Actor protocol on every mutating trigger (#822 §4, [SCHEMA] fail-closed).
--- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_classes_actor
-BEFORE INSERT ON principal_equivalence_classes
-BEGIN
-    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_issuers_actor
-BEFORE INSERT ON authoritative_issuers
-BEGIN
-    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_actor
-BEFORE INSERT ON principals
-BEGIN
-    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_dominance_actor
-BEFORE INSERT ON authority_dominance
-BEGIN
-    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_seed_actor
-BEFORE INSERT ON platform_bootstrap_seed
-BEGIN
-    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_actor_insert
-BEFORE INSERT ON platform_bootstrap_grants
-BEGIN
-    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
-    {_REQUIRE_INSTALLED}
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_actor_update
-BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_bootstrap_grants
-BEGIN
-    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_invariant_actor_insert
-BEFORE INSERT ON platform_active_invariant
-BEGIN
-    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_invariant_actor_update
-BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_active_invariant
-BEGIN
-    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_audit_actor
-BEFORE INSERT ON audit_records
-BEGIN
-    {_ACTOR_GUARD}
-END;
-
--- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
--- NOT-NULL-issuer exception for the installer only (#822 AC7).
--- A NULL issuer_id is accepted solely for an installer principal during
--- install mode, before the marker exists; any other NULL-issuer principal is
--- rejected. install-time issuer linkage (installer -> distinguished issuer)
--- is applied by a later UPDATE, permitted while no marker exists.
--- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_null_issuer
-BEFORE INSERT ON principals
-WHEN NEW.issuer_id IS NULL
-BEGIN
-    SELECT CASE WHEN NOT (
-        NEW.actor_kind = 'installer'
-        AND cp_operation_mode() = 'install'
-        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state) = 0
-        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM principals WHERE issuer_id IS NULL) = 0
-    ) THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE') END;
-END;
-
--- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
--- Post-install immutability of the authority root (#822 §4, AC9).
--- Registration fields freeze only AFTER the marker exists, so the install
--- transaction's own installer issuer-linkage UPDATE is permitted.
--- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_frozen_update
-BEFORE UPDATE ON principals
-WHEN (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state) > 0
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL');
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_principals_frozen_delete
-BEFORE DELETE ON principals
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL');
-END;
-
--- Distinguished issuer identity is immutable once written.
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_issuers_immutable_update
-BEFORE UPDATE ON authoritative_issuers
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_ISSUER');
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_issuers_immutable_delete
-BEFORE DELETE ON authoritative_issuers
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_ISSUER');
-END;
-
--- The dominance lattice is immutable once seeded.
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_dominance_immutable_update
-BEFORE UPDATE ON authority_dominance
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE');
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_dominance_immutable_delete
-BEFORE DELETE ON authority_dominance
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE');
-END;
-
--- The bootstrap seed is immutable once written.
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_seed_immutable_update
-BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_bootstrap_seed
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_SEED');
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_seed_immutable_delete
-BEFORE DELETE ON platform_bootstrap_seed
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_SEED');
-END;
-
--- The install marker is immutable once written.
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_install_state_immutable_update
-BEFORE UPDATE ON install_state
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE');
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_install_state_immutable_delete
-BEFORE DELETE ON install_state
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE');
-END;
-
--- Grants: identity is immutable; the ONLY permitted mutation is a single
--- active 1 -> 0 revocation (#822 §4 initial-grant identity immutability +
--- grant/revoke). Reactivation and identity edits are rejected.
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_identity_frozen
-BEFORE UPDATE ON platform_bootstrap_grants
-WHEN NOT (
-    NEW.grant_id = OLD.grant_id
-    AND NEW.grantee_principal_id = OLD.grantee_principal_id
-    AND NEW.granted_by IS OLD.granted_by
-    AND NEW.created_at = OLD.created_at
-    AND OLD.active = 1
-    AND NEW.active = 0
-)
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_GRANT');
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_grants_no_delete
-BEFORE DELETE ON platform_bootstrap_grants
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_GRANT');
-END;
-
--- audit_records is append-only.
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_audit_immutable_update
-BEFORE UPDATE ON audit_records
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_AUDIT');
-END;
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_audit_immutable_delete
-BEFORE DELETE ON audit_records
-BEGIN
-    SELECT RAISE(ABORT, 'IMMUTABLE_AUDIT');
-END;
-
--- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
--- install_state BEFORE INSERT: validate the whole bootstrap atomically
--- (#822 §4, AC4). Each dominance tuple is checked individually; a missing,
--- additional, or malformed tuple -> DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH. The seed<->installer
--- link, the single active NULL-grantor installer grant, the installer's
--- non-NULL issuer, the active invariant, and "no extra principal created under
--- the NULL-issuer exception" -> INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE.
--- ------------------------------------------------------------------------- --
-
-CREATE TRIGGER IF NOT EXISTS trg_install_state_validate
-BEFORE INSERT ON install_state
-BEGIN
-    SELECT CASE WHEN NOT (
-        (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM authority_dominance) = {len(DOMINANCE_TUPLES)}
-        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='platform.bootstrap' AND subordinate='platform.bootstrap')
-        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='platform.bootstrap' AND subordinate='project.admin')
-        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='platform.bootstrap' AND subordinate='supervisor.root.establish')
-        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='supervisor.root' AND subordinate='supervisor.register')
-        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='supervisor.root' AND subordinate='supervisor.verify')
-        AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM authority_dominance WHERE dominant='supervisor.root' AND subordinate='supervisor.recover')
-    ) THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH') END;
-
-    SELECT CASE WHEN NOT (
-        (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM platform_bootstrap_seed) = 1
-        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM principals) = 1
-        AND (SELECT actor_kind FROM principals
-             WHERE principal_id = (SELECT installer_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1)
-            ) = 'installer'
-        AND (SELECT issuer_id FROM principals
-             WHERE principal_id = (SELECT installer_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1)
-            ) IS NOT NULL
-        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM platform_bootstrap_grants
-             WHERE granted_by IS NULL AND active = 1
-               AND grantee_principal_id = (SELECT installer_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1)
-            ) = 1
-        AND (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM platform_bootstrap_grants) = 1
-        AND (SELECT active_count FROM platform_active_invariant WHERE id = 1) = 1
-    ) THEN RAISE(ABORT, 'INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE') END;
-END;
-"""
-
-
-def default_db_path() -> str:
-    return os.environ.get(
-        DB_PATH_ENV,
-        os.path.expanduser("~/.cache/gitea-tools/arch01/platform.sqlite3"),
-    )
-
-
-def _utc_now_iso() -> str:
-    return datetime.now(timezone.utc).strftime("%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class OperationResult:
-    """Structured result of a kernel operation (#822 §10)."""
-
-    code: str
-    detail: str = ""
-
-    @property
-    def ok(self) -> bool:
-        return self.code in (INSTALLED, ALREADY_INSTALLED)
-
-
-@dataclass
-class _ActorContext:
-    principal: str
-    kind: str
-    mode: str
-    session: Optional[str]
-    bound_epoch: int
-    live_epoch: int
-    expired: bool = False
-
-
-class PlatformKernel:
-    """ARCH-01 authority kernel over a single SQLite connection.
-
-    The connection carries the trusted-service actor context: the ``cp_*``
-    scalar functions read the context this object holds. Only Python code here
-    can bind or clear it, so no SQL statement can assert an actor identity — the
-    trusted-service authenticity boundary of #822 §4.
-    """
-
-    def __init__(self, db_path: Optional[str] = None, *, busy_timeout_ms: int = 5000) -> None:
-        self.db_path = db_path or default_db_path()
-        if self.db_path != ":memory:":
-            parent = os.path.dirname(self.db_path)
-            if parent:
-                os.makedirs(parent, exist_ok=True)
-        self._ctx: Optional[_ActorContext] = None
-        self._epoch_seq = 0
-        self._lock = threading.Lock()
-        # check_same_thread=False is safe: every mutation path is serialized
-        # by self._lock, so the connection is never used concurrently even when
-        # callers drive the kernel from different threads (concurrency tests).
-        self._conn = sqlite3.connect(
-            self.db_path, isolation_level=None, check_same_thread=False
-        )
-        self._conn.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON")
-        self._conn.execute(f"PRAGMA busy_timeout = {int(busy_timeout_ms)}")
-        self._register_actor_functions()
-        self._migrate()
-
-    # -- trusted-service actor functions ---------------------------------- #
-
-    def _register_actor_functions(self) -> None:
-        c = self._conn
-        c.create_function("cp_actor_principal", 0, lambda: self._ctx.principal if self._ctx else None)
-        c.create_function("cp_actor_kind", 0, lambda: self._ctx.kind if self._ctx else None)
-        c.create_function("cp_operation_mode", 0, lambda: self._ctx.mode if self._ctx else None)
-        c.create_function("cp_service_session", 0, lambda: self._ctx.session if self._ctx else None)
-        c.create_function("cp_context_epoch", 0, self._fn_context_epoch)
-        # Trusted-service helper: folds present + non-expired + epoch-consistent
-        # into the read/re-read epoch equality of #822 §4.
-        c.create_function("cp_actor_context_valid", 0, self._fn_context_valid)
-
-    def _fn_context_epoch(self) -> Optional[int]:
-        if self._ctx is None or self._ctx.expired:
-            return None
-        return self._ctx.live_epoch
-
-    def _fn_context_valid(self) -> int:
-        ctx = self._ctx
-        if ctx is None or ctx.expired:
-            return 0
-        # read/re-read epoch equality: a context whose live epoch has drifted
-        # from the epoch it was bound to (a stale/replaced connection context)
-        # is not bound to the active transaction and fails closed.
-        if ctx.live_epoch != ctx.bound_epoch:
-            return 0
-        if ctx.principal is None:
-            return 0
-        if ctx.kind not in ACTOR_KINDS or ctx.mode not in OPERATION_MODES:
-            return 0
-        return 1
-
-    # -- context lifecycle ------------------------------------------------ #
-
-    @contextmanager
-    def actor_context(
-        self, principal: str, kind: str, mode: str, session: Optional[str] = None
-    ) -> Iterator[None]:
-        """Bind a trusted actor context for the duration of the block."""
-        prev = self._ctx
-        self._epoch_seq += 1
-        epoch = self._epoch_seq
-        self._ctx = _ActorContext(
-            principal=principal, kind=kind, mode=mode, session=session,
-            bound_epoch=epoch, live_epoch=epoch,
-        )
-        try:
-            yield
-        finally:
-            self._ctx = prev
-
-    def _clear_context(self) -> None:
-        self._ctx = None
-
-    # -- migration -------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-    def _migrate(self) -> None:
-        self._conn.executescript(_SCHEMA_SQL)
-        self._conn.execute(
-            "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO arch01_meta(key, value) VALUES ('schema_version', ?)",
-            (str(SCHEMA_VERSION),),
-        )
-        self._conn.execute(
-            "INSERT OR IGNORE INTO arch01_meta(key, value) VALUES "
-            "('architecture', 'ARCH-01 Slice A: atomic install + authority kernel (#822); "
-            "disabled by default until readiness checks pass')"
-        )
-
-    # -- introspection ---------------------------------------------------- #
-
-    def is_installed(self) -> bool:
-        row = self._conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM install_state").fetchone()
-        return bool(row[0])
-
-    def active_grant_count(self) -> int:
-        row = self._conn.execute(
-            "SELECT active_count FROM platform_active_invariant WHERE id = 1"
-        ).fetchone()
-        return int(row[0]) if row else 0
-
-    def audit_events(self) -> list[str]:
-        return [
-            r[0]
-            for r in self._conn.execute(
-                "SELECT event FROM audit_records ORDER BY audit_id"
-            ).fetchall()
-        ]
-
-    def close(self) -> None:
-        self._conn.close()
-
-    # -- operations ------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-    def install_platform(
-        self,
-        installer_principal_id: str = "platform.installer",
-        *,
-        session: Optional[str] = None,
-    ) -> OperationResult:
-        """Single atomic install transaction (#822 §4/§7).
-
-        ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE`` serializes concurrent installs; the loser rechecks
-        the marker and returns ``ALREADY_INSTALLED``, or — if it never acquires
-        the write lock — ``CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST``. On any stage failure
-        the whole transaction rolls back leaving no partial rows (AC3/AC5).
-        """
-        now = _utc_now_iso()
-        with self._lock:
-            try:
-                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
-                if "locked" in str(exc).lower() or "busy" in str(exc).lower():
-                    return OperationResult(CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST, str(exc))
-                raise
-            try:
-                if self.is_installed():
-                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
-                    return OperationResult(ALREADY_INSTALLED, "install marker already present")
-
-                with self.actor_context(installer_principal_id, "installer", "install", session):
-                    c = self._conn
-                    # class -> installer principal (temporary NULL issuer)
-                    cur = c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)",
-                        (now,),
-                    )
-                    class_id = cur.lastrowid
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO principals"
-                        "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, 'installer', ?, NULL, ?, ?)",
-                        (installer_principal_id, class_id, installer_principal_id, now),
-                    )
-                    # distinguished operator-key issuer
-                    cur = c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO authoritative_issuers(issuer_kind, issuer_ref, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?)",
-                        (DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_KIND, DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, now),
-                    )
-                    issuer_id = cur.lastrowid
-                    # link installer -> issuer (permitted pre-marker)
-                    c.execute(
-                        "UPDATE principals SET issuer_id = ? WHERE principal_id = ?",
-                        (issuer_id, installer_principal_id),
-                    )
-                    # dominance tuples
-                    c.executemany(
-                        "INSERT INTO authority_dominance(dominant, subordinate) VALUES (?, ?)",
-                        DOMINANCE_TUPLES,
-                    )
-                    # seed
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_seed(seed_id, installer_principal_id, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (1, ?, ?)",
-                        (installer_principal_id, now),
-                    )
-                    # initial grant (granted_by NULL, active)
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants"
-                        "(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, NULL, 1, ?)",
-                        (installer_principal_id, now),
-                    )
-                    # active invariant
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO platform_active_invariant(id, active_count) VALUES (1, 1)"
-                    )
-                    # audit rows for the security-sensitive operation
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
-                        (EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED, installer_principal_id, "installer", now),
-                    )
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
-                        (EVT_GRANT_CREATED, installer_principal_id, "initial platform.bootstrap grant", now),
-                    )
-                    # install marker LAST -> fires the whole-bootstrap validator
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO install_state(id, marker, installed_at) VALUES (1, 'installed', ?)",
-                        (now,),
-                    )
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
-                        (EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED, installer_principal_id, "platform installed", now),
-                    )
-                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
-                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, "platform installed")
-            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
-                self._safe_rollback()
-                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
-
-    def register_principal(
-        self,
-        principal_id: str,
-        actor_kind: str,
-        issuer_ref: str,
-        *,
-        actor_principal: str,
-        actor_kind_ctx: str = "operator",
-        session: Optional[str] = None,
-    ) -> OperationResult:
-        """Atomically create an equivalence class and its first principal.
-
-        The class is inserted *before* the principal, and ``current_class_id``
-        is ``NOT NULL`` (#822 AC6): a principal can never exist classless.
-        The principal references an existing issuer (non-NULL); the temporary
-        NULL-issuer exception is reserved for the installer during install
-        (AC7).
-        """
-        if actor_kind not in ACTOR_KINDS:
-            return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, f"bad actor_kind {actor_kind!r}")
-        now = _utc_now_iso()
-        with self._lock:
-            try:
-                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
-                return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, str(exc))
-            try:
-                if not self.is_installed():
-                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
-                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, "platform not installed")
-                row = self._conn.execute(
-                    "SELECT issuer_id FROM authoritative_issuers WHERE issuer_ref = ?",
-                    (issuer_ref,),
-                ).fetchone()
-                if row is None:
-                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
-                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, f"unknown issuer {issuer_ref!r}")
-                issuer_id = row[0]
-                with self.actor_context(actor_principal, actor_kind_ctx, "normal", session):
-                    cur = self._conn.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)",
-                        (now,),
-                    )
-                    class_id = cur.lastrowid
-                    self._conn.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO principals"
-                        "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)",
-                        (principal_id, actor_kind, class_id, issuer_id, actor_principal, now),
-                    )
-                    self._conn.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
-                        (EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED, principal_id, actor_kind, now),
-                    )
-                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
-                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, f"registered {principal_id}")
-            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
-                self._safe_rollback()
-                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
-
-    def grant_platform_bootstrap(
-        self,
-        grantee_principal_id: str,
-        granted_by: str,
-        *,
-        actor_kind_ctx: str = "operator",
-        session: Optional[str] = None,
-    ) -> OperationResult:
-        """Create an additional active platform.bootstrap grant.
-
-        Serialized on the singleton invariant row via ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE``.
-        """
-        now = _utc_now_iso()
-        with self._lock:
-            try:
-                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
-                return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, str(exc))
-            try:
-                if not self.is_installed():
-                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
-                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, "platform not installed")
-                with self.actor_context(granted_by, actor_kind_ctx, "normal", session):
-                    self._conn.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants"
-                        "(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, ?, 1, ?)",
-                        (grantee_principal_id, granted_by, now),
-                    )
-                    self._conn.execute(
-                        "UPDATE platform_active_invariant SET active_count = active_count + 1 WHERE id = 1"
-                    )
-                    self._conn.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
-                        (EVT_GRANT_CREATED, grantee_principal_id, f"granted_by={granted_by}", now),
-                    )
-                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
-                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, f"granted to {grantee_principal_id}")
-            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
-                self._safe_rollback()
-                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
-
-    def revoke_platform_bootstrap(
-        self,
-        grant_id: int,
-        *,
-        actor_principal: str,
-        actor_kind_ctx: str = "operator",
-        session: Optional[str] = None,
-    ) -> OperationResult:
-        """Revoke an active grant, floored so the last one can never drop.
-
-        The ``active_count >= 1`` CHECK plus ``BEGIN IMMEDIATE`` serialization
-        make two concurrent revocations unable to remove the final active grant
-        (#822 AC11): the decrement that would reach zero fails and rolls back.
-        """
-        now = _utc_now_iso()
-        with self._lock:
-            try:
-                self._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-            except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
-                return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, str(exc))
-            try:
-                if not self.is_installed():
-                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
-                    return OperationResult(INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE, "platform not installed")
-                row = self._conn.execute(
-                    "SELECT active, grantee_principal_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE grant_id = ?",
-                    (grant_id,),
-                ).fetchone()
-                if row is None or row[0] != 1:
-                    self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
-                    return OperationResult(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED, "grant absent or already inactive")
-                grantee = row[1]
-                with self.actor_context(actor_principal, actor_kind_ctx, "normal", session):
-                    # Decrement first: the CHECK floor rejects dropping below 1,
-                    # aborting the whole revoke before the grant flips inactive.
-                    self._conn.execute(
-                        "UPDATE platform_active_invariant SET active_count = active_count - 1 WHERE id = 1"
-                    )
-                    self._conn.execute(
-                        "UPDATE platform_bootstrap_grants SET active = 0, revoked_at = ? WHERE grant_id = ?",
-                        (now, grant_id),
-                    )
-                    self._conn.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, principal_id, detail, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?)",
-                        (EVT_GRANT_REVOKED, grantee, f"grant_id={grant_id}", now),
-                    )
-                self._conn.execute("COMMIT")
-                return OperationResult(INSTALLED, f"revoked grant {grant_id}")
-            except sqlite3.Error as exc:
-                self._safe_rollback()
-                return OperationResult(self._classify(exc), str(exc))
-
-    # -- helpers ---------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-    def _safe_rollback(self) -> None:
-        try:
-            self._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
-        except sqlite3.Error:
-            pass
-
-    @staticmethod
-    def _classify(exc: sqlite3.Error) -> str:
-        msg = str(exc)
-        if "INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT" in msg:
-            return INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT
-        if "DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH" in msg:
-            return DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH
-        if "active_count" in msg or "CHECK constraint failed: platform_active_invariant" in msg:
-            # last-active-grant floor tripped
-            return AUTHORIZATION_DENIED
-        if any(tag in msg for tag in (
-            "INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE", "IMMUTABLE_", "NOT_INSTALLED",
-        )):
-            return INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE
-        return INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE

docs/webui-authz-audit.md

@@ -1,295 +0,0 @@
-# Web console authorization, RBAC, redaction, and audit model (#633)
-
-**Phase 1. Read-only. This document defines the model that future console
-writes must pass through; it enables none of them.**
-
-The MVP deployment boundary ([`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md), #435)
-documents internal-only serving and states plainly that MVP authentication is
-*none* — protection comes from network placement. That is adequate while every
-route is a GET, and inadequate the moment a gated write ships. This document
-and the three modules it describes land **before** any write exists, so no
-Phase 2 action can be added without an authority to check it against.
-
-| Concern | Module |
-|---------|--------|
-| Identity, roles, authorization decision | `webui/console_authz.py` |
-| Secret redaction for every surface | `webui/console_redaction.py` |
-| Audit event schema, retention, sink | `webui/console_audit.py` |
-| Machine-readable publication | `GET /api/console/security-model` |
-
-Two invariants hold everywhere and are non-negotiable for every child of #631:
-
-1. **No secrets reach the browser.** Credentials are resolved server-side and
-   redacted before any payload, page, log line, or audit record leaves.
-2. **No ungated mutations.** Authorization is necessary but never sufficient;
-   execution stays disabled until the Phase 2 framework ships.
-
-## Identity sources
-
-The console performs *authorization*. Authentication is delegated, because a
-console that mints its own sessions is a credential store, and this one must
-not be.
-
-| Source | Mode value | Authenticated | Shared host | Phase |
-|--------|-----------|---------------|-------------|-------|
-| None | `none` (default) | No — anonymous, capped at `viewer` | No | 1 |
-| Local dev | `local-dev` / `local_dev` | Yes, **asserted not verified** | No | 1 |
-| Access proxy | `access-proxy` / `access_proxy` | Yes, asserted by trusted proxy | Yes | 2 |
-
-Selected by `WEBUI_AUTH_MODE`. An unrecognised value falls back to `none`
-rather than erroring open.
-
-**Access-proxy mode** reads the subject from the
-`Cf-Access-Authenticated-User-Email` header, set by Cloudflare Access, WARP, or
-an equivalent org portal that terminates authentication in front of the
-console. If the header is absent the request did not traverse the proxy, so the
-principal degrades to anonymous — it is never trusted by default.
-
-The **role is always server-side configuration**, never a client assertion. It
-comes from `WEBUI_ROLE_MAP`, a JSON object of subject → role:
-
-```json
-{"[email protected]": "operator", "[email protected]": "controller"}
-```
-
-An unmapped subject gets `viewer`. Malformed JSON yields an empty map, so
-everyone gets `viewer` — a parse failure loses authority rather than granting
-it.
-
-Full SSO is explicitly a non-goal of this issue.
-
-## Role matrix
-
-Four roles, ordered least to most authority. Each role inherits every lower
-role's actions; the table states the *minimum* rank required.
-
-| Role | Authority |
-|------|-----------|
-| `viewer` | Read every console view. No write, ever, in any phase. |
-| `operator` | Viewer, plus author-class work: claim, comment, open a PR. |
-| `controller` | Operator, plus reviewer/merger-class decisions on a PR. |
-| `admin` | Controller, plus destructive and policy-editing actions. |
-
-`viewer` holds the empty write set by construction, and a test asserts it stays
-empty.
-
-## Privileged actions
-
-Every console action maps to a `task_key` in `task_capability_map.py`, the same
-single source of truth `gitea_resolve_task_capability` and the MCP tool gates
-use. The console therefore cannot invent an authority the MCP layer does not
-already define, and a regression test asserts each mapping matches.
-
-| Action | Minimum role | Class | MCP permission | Confirm | Dual control | Break-glass | Phase |
-|--------|--------------|-------|----------------|---------|--------------|-------------|-------|
-| `claim_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
-| `comment_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
-| `create_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.create` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
-| `comment_pr` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.pr.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
-| `create_pr` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.pr.create` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
-| `review_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.review` | Yes | No | No | 3 |
-| `close_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.close` | Yes | No | No | 3 |
-| `merge_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.merge` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
-| `delete_branch` | admin | destructive | `gitea.branch.delete` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
-
-**Dual control** means the acting principal may not be the sole authority: a
-second distinct principal must confirm. **Break-glass** means the action is
-expected to be unavailable in normal operation and its use is retained for two
-years. Both are declared here and enforced by the Phase 2 framework; Phase 1
-records the requirement on every decision so the framework cannot ship without
-honouring it.
-
-`delete_branch` is admin-only rather than controller because it is the one
-irreversible action in the set.
-
-### Authorization decision
-
-`authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=False)` returns a decision
-record and **denies by default**. The deny reasons are closed and enumerated:
-
-| Reason code | Meaning |
-|-------------|---------|
-| `unknown_action` | No such console action is registered. |
-| `unauthenticated` | The principal is anonymous. |
-| `unknown_role` | The role is not in the matrix. |
-| `insufficient_role` | The role ranks below the action's minimum. |
-| `phase_not_active` | Execution requested for an action whose phase is not open. |
-| `allowed_preview_only` | Authorized — preview only, execution still disabled. |
-
-There is no implicit allow branch. Even the allow result reports
-`execution_enabled: false` while the console is in Phase 1, so no caller can
-read an allow as permission to mutate.
-
-## Secret redaction
-
-One pass applies to **API payloads, rendered HTML, server logs, and audit
-records** — the four surfaces where a credential could escape.
-
-Redaction reuses `gitea_audit.redact` rather than forking it: that remains the
-authority for secret-looking dict keys, `Authorization` material, and raw URLs.
-The console layer then applies its own patterns:
-
-Each rule below matches an *assignment form*: the named key, followed by `=` or
-`:`, followed by the value. The keys are listed bare rather than spelled out as
-complete assignments, because this document is itself scanned by
-`scan_for_secrets` — writing the examples in full assignment form would make the
-documentation trip the very detectors it documents.
-
-| Rule | Catches (as an assignment) |
-|------|----------------------------|
-| `credential_assignment` | `token`, `password`, `passwd`, `secret`, `api_key`, `access_key`, `client_secret`, `private_key` |
-| `credential_env_assignment` | `GITEA_TOKEN`, `GITEA_PASS`, `GITEA_PASSWORD` and suffixed variants |
-| `keychain_reference` | `keychain:` entry references |
-| `keychain_command` | macOS `security` keychain lookups (`find-generic-password`, `find-internet-password`) |
-| `private_key_block` | PEM `BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY` blocks |
-| `json_web_token` | Three-segment `eyJ...` JWTs |
-| `bearer_credential` | `Bearer` / `Basic` credentials |
-
-Assignments keep the key and replace only the value, so an operator can still
-see *what* was removed. Two behaviours are deliberate:
-
-- **Fail closed.** A value that cannot be redacted becomes `[REDACTED]`
-  outright rather than being emitted raw. Redaction never raises.
-- **Redact before persist.** `console_audit.build_event` redacts before
-  serialization, and `write_event` re-scans and **drops** any record that still
-  trips a detector. An unredacted record is never durable.
-
-`scan_for_secrets` is the assertion helper: it returns the detector names still
-matching a payload, and already-redacted hits are not findings. Tests use it to
-prove the published policy, the security-model endpoint, and this document
-itself carry no secret material.
-
-## Audit event schema
-
-`gitea_audit` records MCP-side *mutations* — which profile and Gitea user
-performed which tool call. It has no console actor, no identity source, no
-correlation identifier, and no retention class, and an authorization **denial**
-is not a mutation, so it would never appear there at all. The console record is
-additive, not a replacement: a Phase 2 action emits both, joined on
-`correlation.request_id`.
-
-Required fields, all asserted by tests so an edit cannot quietly drop one:
-
-| Field | Content |
-|-------|---------|
-| `schema_version` | Currently `1`. |
-| `event_id` | Unique per record. |
-| `timestamp` | Timezone-aware ISO-8601, UTC. |
-| `actor` | `subject`, `role`, `identity_source`, `authenticated`. |
-| `action` | Console action id. |
-| `action_class` | `gated_write`, `privileged`, `destructive`, or `unknown`. |
-| `target` | `{kind, ref}`, e.g. `{"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"}`. |
-| `result` | `allowed`, `denied`, `previewed`, `failed`, `succeeded`. |
-| `reason_code` | The authorization reason code above. |
-| `correlation` | `request_id`, `session_id`, `mcp_task`, `mcp_permission`. |
-| `retention` | `class`, `days`, `expires_at`. |
-| `redacted` | Always `true`; records are redacted at build time. |
-
-An unrecognised `result` degrades to `failed` rather than being stored
-verbatim.
-
-The sink is an append-only JSON Lines file named by
-`WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG`. It is **off by default**: with the variable unset,
-events are still built — so callers and tests exercise the schema — but nothing
-is written. Auditing never raises; a failed write returns `False` rather than
-breaking the request it describes.
-
-## Retention
-
-| Class | Applies to | Default |
-|-------|-----------|---------|
-| `standard` | Routine gated writes | 90 days |
-| `privileged` | `review_pr`, `close_pr`, and any unclassifiable action | 365 days |
-| `break_glass` | `merge_pr`, `delete_branch` | 730 days |
-
-Each record carries its own class, day count, and computed `expires_at`, so
-retention is auditable per record rather than inferred from file age. An
-**unknown action is retained as privileged, not standard** — for a safety
-control the conservative direction is to keep the record longer.
-
-Nothing in this module updates or deletes. Expiry is enforced by an
-operator-run policy against `expires_at`, never by the console silently
-rewriting its own history.
-
-## Phase 2 integration
-
-Phase 2 opens gated writes. It must reuse this model rather than introduce a
-second one. The integration points are already wired and observable:
-
-- **`GET /api/actions/{action_id}/preview`** attaches an `authorization` block
-  to the existing preview payload and records a `previewed` audit event.
-- **`POST /api/actions/{action_id}/attempt`** attaches the same block and
-  records a `denied` event. The terminal outcome is unchanged — the MVP
-  registry in `webui/gated_actions.py` still fails closed for every action — so
-  Phase 1 cannot loosen anything. Phase 2 enforces on this same decision
-  instead of adding a parallel check.
-- **`GET /api/console/security-model`** publishes the RBAC matrix, redaction
-  policy, and audit policy as JSON for operators and tests.
-
-To open Phase 2, a child issue must: raise `ACTIVE_PHASE`, implement the
-confirmation and dual-control flow the matrix already declares, emit a
-`succeeded` or `failed` record alongside the `gitea_audit` mutation record, and
-keep `viewer` unable to reach any of it. Turning on execution without the
-confirmation flow contradicts a declared requirement and is a review failure,
-not a shortcut.
-
-## Local-dev mode
-
-`WEBUI_AUTH_MODE=local-dev` reads the principal straight from the environment:
-
-| Variable | Purpose |
-|----------|---------|
-| `WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT` | Subject string; absent ⇒ anonymous |
-| `WEBUI_DEV_ROLE` | One of `viewer`, `operator`, `controller`, `admin`; unrecognised ⇒ `viewer` |
-
-**INSECURE — this mode is for loopback development only.** The subject and role
-are *asserted by the developer running the process and verified by nothing*.
-Anyone able to set an environment variable on the host is an `admin`, and
-anyone able to reach the port inherits that principal. It provides no
-authentication whatsoever; it exists so Phase 2 authorization paths can be
-exercised without standing up a proxy.
-
-Never enable local-dev mode on a non-loopback bind. Combining it with
-`WEBUI_ALLOW_PUBLIC_BIND=1` or `WEBUI_ALLOW_REMOTE_BIND=1` publishes an
-unauthenticated admin console.
-
-For anything beyond a laptop use `access-proxy` mode behind Cloudflare Access,
-WARP, or a VPN, as [`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md) requires.
-
-### Probe authentication
-
-`WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH=1` declares that non-public probes should require an
-authenticated principal. It is **opt-in**: the default is off so the MVP
-`/health` contract is unchanged.
-
-**This flag is declarative in Phase 1 and enforces nothing today.**
-`console_authz.probe_auth_required()` reports the operator's intent, and no
-route consults it — setting the variable does not currently change the
-behaviour of `/health` or any other endpoint. It is published here so the Phase
-2 action framework has a declared policy to honour rather than inventing a
-second one, exactly as `ACTIVE_PHASE` gates execution while the matrix is
-already declared. A regression test pins this "declared, not enforced" status,
-so wiring it later is a deliberate change rather than a silent one.
-
-Until Phase 2 wires it, probe protection rests on network placement alone, as
-[`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md) (#435) states.
-
-## Environment variables
-
-| Variable | Default | Purpose |
-|----------|---------|---------|
-| `WEBUI_AUTH_MODE` | `none` | Identity source selection |
-| `WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT` | unset | Local-dev subject (insecure) |
-| `WEBUI_DEV_ROLE` | `viewer` | Local-dev role (insecure) |
-| `WEBUI_ROLE_MAP` | unset | JSON subject → role map |
-| `WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH` | unset | Require auth for non-public probes |
-| `WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG` | unset | Append-only audit sink path |
-
-All are read server-side only. None is ever rendered into a page or returned by
-an API.
-
-## Non-goals
-
-- No full SSO product; authentication stays delegated to the proxy.
-- No browser-initiated merges or approvals in any phase covered here.
-- No tokens in the frontend, in browser storage, or in committed config.

docs/webui-deployment.md

@@ -7,10 +7,7 @@ only.
 ## MVP deployment model
 
 - **Default bind:** `127.0.0.1:8765` (`WEBUI_HOST` / `WEBUI_PORT`)
-- **Authentication:** none in MVP — protection comes from network placement.
+- **Authentication:** none in MVP — protection comes from network placement
-  The authorization, RBAC, redaction, and audit model that future gated writes
-  must pass through is defined in
-  [`webui-authz-audit.md`](webui-authz-audit.md) (#633).
 - **Mutations:** read-only routes; gated write actions remain disabled (#434)
 - **Secrets:** resolved server-side via `gitea_auth` / `GITEA_MCP_CONFIG`; never
   embedded in HTML, JavaScript, or browser storage

docs/webui-local-dev.md

@@ -212,6 +212,53 @@ health, workflow/schema SHA-256 hashes, and stale-runtime warnings when the
 checkout is behind merged safety-gate changes. Restart guidance links to #420;
 no tokens or MCP restart actions are exposed.
 
+## Inventory API (#636)
+
+`GET /api/v1/inventory` returns one versioned, read-only snapshot that unifies
+what the lease (#433), worktree (#432), and runtime (#430) MVP views each show
+separately, so traffic-control and recovery consumers read the same source.
+`GET /api/v1/inventory/{section}` returns a single section under the identical
+schema (`sessions`, `leases`, `locks`, `worktrees`, `namespaces`); an unknown
+section is a `404` with `error: unknown_section`. Both routes are `GET`-only.
+
+Each section carries its own `status` (`ok` / `degraded` / `unavailable`), a
+`reason` when not `ok`, and a `scan_ms`. A subsystem that cannot be read
+degrades to a reasoned section; it never raises and never emits an empty list
+that would read as "nothing is there".
+
+### Field authority
+
+Every section names where its rows came from; authorities are never blended.
+
+| Section | Authority | Source |
+|---|---|---|
+| `sessions` | `control_plane_db` | #613 control-plane DB (`mode=ro`), authoritative for exclusive ownership (#600/#601) |
+| `leases` | `control_plane_db` | #613 control-plane DB; degrades if the `work_items` table is absent |
+| `locks` | `filesystem` | durable per-issue lock files (`issue_lock_store`) |
+| `worktrees` | `filesystem` | registered git worktrees via the #432 hygiene scanner |
+| `namespaces` | `filesystem` | the active profile serving this web process (others are not enumerable) |
+
+The payload restates this map under `field_authority` for machine consumers.
+
+### Ownership safety
+
+`ownership_authority_complete` is true only when every ownership-bearing section
+(`sessions`, `leases`, `locks`) read cleanly. While it is false, nothing is
+reported as unowned and no collision is asserted from a degraded source —
+absence of evidence is reported as absence of evidence, never as free work.
+
+`collisions` surfaces detectable conflicts, each with a `kind` and `severity`:
+`lock-without-worktree`, `duplicate-live-lock`, `live-lock-dead-owner` (unexpired
+lease, dead pid — a #753 recovery candidate that would read as live to a naive
+timestamp check), `stale-lock-dead-owner`, `expired-lock-live-owner` (the
+#635/#760 daemon-pid deadlock), `concurrent-active-lease`, `active-lease-past-expiry`,
+and `orphan-lease`. Collisions are emitted only from sections that read cleanly.
+
+The control-plane DB is opened through a `mode=ro` URI so a read never creates
+or migrates it; paths are collapsed against `$HOME`, URLs lose userinfo and
+query strings, and credential-shaped values are redacted at the boundary. Lease
+steal/release and worktree deletion are Phase 2+ and have no representation here.
+
 ## Tests
 
 ```bash

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -234,25 +234,12 @@ def _effective_workspace_role() -> str:
 
 
 def _profile_role_kind(profile: dict) -> str:
-    """Resolve a profile's declared role before inferring from permissions.
+    """Resolve a profile's declared role before inferring from permissions."""
-
+    role = (profile.get("role") or profile.get("role_kind") or "").strip()
-    Declared ``role`` / ``role_kind`` always wins so a controller profile is
-    never reclassified as reconciler from permission inference (#840).
-    """
-    role = (profile.get("role") or profile.get("role_kind") or "").strip().lower()
     if role:
-        # Normalize aliases / case.
-        if "control" in role:
-            return "controller"
         return role
     profile_name = (profile.get("profile_name") or "").strip().lower()
-    for candidate in (
+    for candidate in ("reconciler", "merger", "reviewer", "author"):
-        "controller",
-        "reconciler",
-        "merger",
-        "reviewer",
-        "author",
-    ):
         if candidate in profile_name:
             return candidate
     return _role_kind(
@@ -15551,8 +15538,7 @@ def mcp_get_control_plane_guide(
     profile = get_profile()
     allowed = profile["allowed_operations"]
     forbidden = profile["forbidden_operations"]
-    # Prefer declared profile role so controller is not mislabeled reconciler (#840).
+    role = _role_kind(allowed, forbidden)
-    role = _profile_role_kind(profile)
     username = _authenticated_username(h)
 
     identity = {
@@ -15611,16 +15597,6 @@ def mcp_get_control_plane_guide(
             "user, and merging requires explicit operator authorization plus the "
             "'MERGE PR <n>' confirmation. "
             "Review and merge are separate workflow roles. A reviewer approval is not merge authorization.")
-    elif role == "controller":
-        guidance.append(
-            "Controller profile: route work via "
-            "gitea_route_task_session(task_type='process_work_queue') then "
-            "gitea_allocate_next_work (allocation_mode=cross_role by default). "
-            "The allocator returns exactly one authoritative selection with "
-            "required_role / required_profile / selected_action. Do not "
-            "implement, review, approve, or merge in this session — schedule "
-            "the matching role namespace instead. Dashboard output is "
-            "explanatory only and never replaces allocator selection.")
     elif role == "mixed":
         guidance.append(
             "WARNING: this profile allows both authoring and "
@@ -15830,8 +15806,7 @@ def gitea_whoami(
             "environment": profile.get("environment"),
             "service": profile.get("service"),
             "identity": profile.get("identity"),
-            "role": profile.get("role") or _profile_role_kind(profile),
+            "role": profile.get("role"),
-            "role_kind": _profile_role_kind(profile),
             "profile_address": profile.get("profile_path"),
             "execution_profile": profile.get("execution_profile"),
             "audit_label": profile.get("audit_label"),
@@ -20615,10 +20590,9 @@ def gitea_allocate_next_work(
     candidates_json: Any = None,
     exclude_issue_numbers: list[int] | None = None,
     expected_candidate_set_fingerprint: str | None = None,
-    allocation_mode: str | None = None,
     limit: int = 50,
 ) -> dict:
-    """Controller-owned next-work allocator using the #613 control-plane DB (#600/#840).
+    """Controller-owned next-work allocator using the #613 control-plane DB (#600).
 
     Workers must not self-select exclusive work under the standard multi-LLM
     workflow. Call this tool instead.
@@ -20628,14 +20602,6 @@ def gitea_allocate_next_work(
     ``ControlPlaneDB.assign_and_lease`` (never file locks or comment-only
     leases as the coordination source).
 
-    *allocation_mode* (#840): when the active role is controller (or mode is
-    ``cross_role``), inspect the complete queue and return exactly one
-    authoritative selection with selected item, action, required_role,
-    required_profile/namespace, pins, and allocation/lease evidence.
-    Role-scoped workers pass ``role=author|reviewer|merger|reconciler`` (or
-    omit for profile role) for single-role filtering. Controller routes only
-    and does not perform downstream mutations.
-
     Outcomes include: ``assigned_work``, ``preview``, ``wait``,
     ``blocked_by_terminal_path``, ``no_safe_work``, ``role_ineligible``,
     ``blocked_by_excluded_own_lease``, ``candidate_set_drift``.
@@ -20770,7 +20736,6 @@ def gitea_allocate_next_work(
             controller_instance_id=allocator_service.resolve_controller_instance_id(),
             exclude_issue_numbers=exclude_issue_numbers,
             expected_candidate_set_fingerprint=expected_candidate_set_fingerprint,
-            allocation_mode=allocation_mode,
         )
     except ValueError as exc:
         return {

namespace_workspace_binding.py

@@ -24,12 +24,7 @@ ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS: dict[str, str] = {
     "reconciler": RECONCILER_WORKTREE_ENV,
 }
 
-# Controller has no task worktree env — it routes only (#840).
+NON_AUTHOR_ROLES = frozenset({"reviewer", "merger", "reconciler"})
-KNOWN_ROLE_KINDS = frozenset(
-    {"author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "controller"}
-)
-
-NON_AUTHOR_ROLES = frozenset({"reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "controller"})
 
 
 def normalize_role_kind(
@@ -42,12 +37,8 @@ def normalize_role_kind(
     profile = (profile_name or "").strip().lower()
     if role == "reviewer" and "merger" in profile:
         return "merger"
-    if "controller" in profile or role == "controller":
-        return "controller"
     if role in ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS:
         return role
-    if role in KNOWN_ROLE_KINDS:
-        return role
     return "author"
 
 
@@ -89,7 +80,7 @@ def resolve_namespace_workspace(
     """
     env_map = env if env is not None else os.environ
     role = normalize_role_kind(role_kind, profile_name=profile_name)
-    role_env_key = ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS.get(role)
+    role_env_key = ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS[role]
 
     # #618: durable author resolution — no silent control/master fallback.
     if role == "author" and verify_paths:
@@ -117,17 +108,13 @@ def resolve_namespace_workspace(
             )
         return workspace, source
 
-    role_env_candidate = (
-        (_env_value(env_map, role_env_key), f"{role_env_key} environment variable", True)
-        if role_env_key
-        else (None, "no role worktree env", True)
-    )
     for candidate, source, env_sourced in (
         (worktree_path, "worktree_path argument", False),
         (worktree, "worktree argument", False),
         (_env_value(env_map, ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV),
          f"{ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV} environment variable", True),
-        role_env_candidate,
+        (_env_value(env_map, role_env_key),
+         f"{role_env_key} environment variable", True),
         (session_lease_worktree if role in {"reviewer", "merger"} else None,
          "reviewer PR lease worktree", False),
         # Author lock derivation is handled by the durable path above when
@@ -446,8 +433,7 @@ def assess_namespace_mutation_workspace(
         reasons.append(
             f"{role} mutation blocked: workspace is the stable control checkout; "
             f"create or reconnect to a session-owned worktree under branches/ "
-            f"or set {ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS.get(role, ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV)} / "
+            f"or set {ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS[role]} / {ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV}"
-            f"{ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV}"
         )
     elif (
         role in {"reviewer", "merger"}

role_session_router.py

@@ -81,12 +81,6 @@ AUTHOR_TASKS = frozenset({
     "reconcile_landed_pr",
 })
 
-CONTROLLER_TASKS = frozenset({
-    "process_work_queue",
-    "process-work-queue",
-    "cross_role_allocate",
-})
-
 RECONCILER_TASKS = frozenset({
     "cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
     # #729: delete_branch is reconciler-owned (gitea.branch.delete is granted
@@ -138,10 +132,6 @@ TASK_REQUIRED_ROLE = {
     "reconcile_close_superseded_pr": "reconciler",
     "reconcile_close_satisfied_issue": "reconciler",
     "reconcile_create_followup_issue": "reconciler",
-    # #840: controller-owned generic queue allocation / routing.
-    "process_work_queue": "controller",
-    "process-work-queue": "controller",
-    "cross_role_allocate": "controller",
 }
 
 WRONG_ROLE_REVIEWER_MSG = (
@@ -157,10 +147,6 @@ WRONG_ROLE_MERGER_MSG = (
     "Wrong role/session for merger task. Launch merger MCP namespace."
 )
 
-WRONG_ROLE_CONTROLLER_MSG = (
-    "Wrong role/session for controller task. Launch controller MCP namespace."
-)
-
 _session_last_route: dict | None = None
 
 
@@ -295,27 +281,6 @@ def route_task_session(
         _record_route(result)
         return result
 
-    if required_role == "controller":
-        result = {
-            "task_type": task_type,
-            "required_role": required_role,
-            "active_role": active_role_kind,
-            "active_profile": active_profile,
-            "route_result": ROUTE_WRONG_ROLE,
-            "downstream_allowed": False,
-            "reasons": [
-                WRONG_ROLE_CONTROLLER_MSG,
-                "Controller tasks (process_work_queue / cross-role allocate) "
-                "cannot run in author, reviewer, merger, or reconciler "
-                "worker sessions.",
-            ],
-            "message": WRONG_ROLE_CONTROLLER_MSG,
-            "runtime_switching_supported": runtime_switching_supported,
-            "profile_switch_blocked": not runtime_switching_supported,
-        }
-        _record_route(result)
-        return result
-
     if required_role == "author":
         route = ROUTE_TO_AUTHOR
         message = (

task_capability_map.py

@@ -309,10 +309,8 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.pr.create",
         "role": "author",
     },
-    # #600: workers and controller may call with gitea.read; role-scoped workers
+    # #600: controller-owned allocator — any authenticated profile may call;
-    # pass role=author|reviewer|merger|reconciler. Cross-role routing is the
+    # routing enforces role match to selected work. Uses control-plane DB (#613).
-    # controller default (#840). The canonical generic queue *task type* is
-    # process_work_queue (controller-only below).
     "allocate_next_work": {
         "permission": "gitea.read",
         "role": "author",
@@ -321,19 +319,6 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.read",
         "role": "author",
     },
-    # #840: documented generic queue task — controller routes only.
-    "process_work_queue": {
-        "permission": "gitea.read",
-        "role": "controller",
-    },
-    "process-work-queue": {
-        "permission": "gitea.read",
-        "role": "controller",
-    },
-    "cross_role_allocate": {
-        "permission": "gitea.read",
-        "role": "controller",
-    },
 
     # #601 first-class lease lifecycle — inspect/list need read; mutations gate on
     # ownership in the control-plane DB (not a separate Gitea write permission).

tests/test_arch01_platform.py

@@ -1,572 +0,0 @@
-"""Executable acceptance tests for ARCH-01 Slice A (#822).
-
-Each acceptance criterion (#822 §12) and named test (#822 §13) is exercised
-against a real SQLite database. The migration runs on a fresh DB in ``setUp``;
-the test-run output is the durable evidence the issue requires (§14).
-
-Enforcement being proven:
-
-* ``[TRUSTED-SERVICE]`` — the ``cp_*`` actor functions exist only on the
-  trusted kernel connection; a raw connection cannot satisfy the triggers.
-* ``[SCHEMA]`` — fail-closed aborts, exact dominance set, NOT-NULL class,
-  immutability, and the last-active-grant floor are enforced by
-  CHECK/FK/trigger, verified here including raw-write bypass and concurrency.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import sqlite3
-import tempfile
-import threading
-import unittest
-from concurrent.futures import ThreadPoolExecutor
-
-import arch01_platform as ap
-from arch01_platform import (
-    ALREADY_INSTALLED,
-    AUTHORIZATION_DENIED,
-    CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST,
-    DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID,
-    DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
-    DOMINANCE_TUPLES,
-    INSTALLED,
-    INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT,
-    INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE,
-    PlatformKernel,
-)
-
-INSTALLER = "platform.installer"
-
-_BOOTSTRAP_TABLES = (
-    "principal_equivalence_classes",
-    "principals",
-    "authoritative_issuers",
-    "authority_dominance",
-    "platform_bootstrap_seed",
-    "platform_bootstrap_grants",
-    "platform_active_invariant",
-    "install_state",
-)
-
-
-def _count(kernel: PlatformKernel, table: str) -> int:
-    return kernel._conn.execute(f"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM {table}").fetchone()[0]
-
-
-def _count_where(kernel: PlatformKernel, table: str, where: str) -> int:
-    return kernel._conn.execute(f"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM {table} WHERE {where}").fetchone()[0]
-
-
-def _all_bootstrap_empty(kernel: PlatformKernel) -> bool:
-    return all(_count(kernel, t) == 0 for t in _BOOTSTRAP_TABLES)
-
-
-class Arch01MemoryTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    """Single-connection behavior on an in-memory database."""
-
-    def setUp(self) -> None:
-        self.kernel = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
-
-    def tearDown(self) -> None:
-        self.kernel.close()
-
-    # -- AC1 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_install_clean(self) -> None:  # t_install_clean(+)
-        res = self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER)
-        self.assertEqual(res.code, INSTALLED)
-        self.assertTrue(self.kernel.is_installed())
-        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "install_state"), 1)
-        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.active_grant_count(), 1)
-        self.assertIn(ap.EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED, self.kernel.audit_events())
-        rows = set(
-            self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                "SELECT dominant, subordinate FROM authority_dominance"
-            ).fetchall()
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(rows, set(DOMINANCE_TUPLES))
-        issuer_ref = self.kernel._conn.execute(
-            "SELECT i.issuer_ref FROM principals p JOIN authoritative_issuers i "
-            "ON p.issuer_id = i.issuer_id WHERE p.principal_id = ?",
-            (INSTALLER,),
-        ).fetchone()
-        self.assertEqual(issuer_ref[0], DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID)
-
-    # -- AC2 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_install_twice(self) -> None:  # t_install_twice(-)
-        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        res2 = self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER)
-        self.assertEqual(res2.code, ALREADY_INSTALLED)
-        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "principals"), 1)
-        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "platform_bootstrap_grants"), 1)
-        self.assertEqual(_count(self.kernel, "install_state"), 1)
-
-    # -- AC3 / AC5 -------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_install_stage_rollback(self) -> None:  # t_install_stage_rollback
-        for stop in range(1, 9):
-            with self.subTest(stages=stop):
-                k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
-                try:
-                    self._partial_bootstrap_then_rollback(k, stop)
-                    self.assertTrue(
-                        _all_bootstrap_empty(k),
-                        f"partial rows survived rollback at stage {stop}",
-                    )
-                    self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
-                finally:
-                    k.close()
-
-    def test_no_partial_after_rollback(self) -> None:  # t_no_partial_after_rollback
-        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
-        try:
-            code = self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=DOMINANCE_TUPLES[:-1])
-            self.assertEqual(code, DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH)
-            self.assertTrue(_all_bootstrap_empty(k))
-            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
-        finally:
-            k.close()
-
-    # -- AC4 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_dominance_missing(self) -> None:  # t_dominance_missing(-)
-        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
-        try:
-            self.assertEqual(
-                self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=DOMINANCE_TUPLES[:-1]),
-                DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
-            )
-            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
-        finally:
-            k.close()
-
-    def test_dominance_extra(self) -> None:  # t_dominance_extra(-)
-        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
-        try:
-            extra = DOMINANCE_TUPLES + (("platform.bootstrap", "rogue.extra"),)
-            self.assertEqual(
-                self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=extra),
-                DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
-            )
-            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
-        finally:
-            k.close()
-
-    def test_dominance_malformed(self) -> None:  # t_dominance_malformed(-)
-        k = PlatformKernel(":memory:")
-        try:
-            malformed = DOMINANCE_TUPLES[:-1] + (("supervisor.root", "WRONG.subordinate"),)
-            self.assertEqual(
-                self._seed_bootstrap_and_mark(k, dominance=malformed),
-                DOMINANCE_SET_MISMATCH,
-            )
-            self.assertFalse(k.is_installed())
-        finally:
-            k.close()
-
-    # -- AC6 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_principal_no_class(self) -> None:  # t_principal_no_class(-)
-        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "install"):
-            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError):
-                self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO principals"
-                    "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
-                    "VALUES ('x', 'operator', NULL, NULL, NULL, '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
-                )
-
-    # -- AC7 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_noninstaller_null_issuer(self) -> None:  # t_nonobstaller_null_issuer(-)
-        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
-            cur = self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
-            )
-            class_id = cur.lastrowid
-            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
-                self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO principals"
-                    "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
-                    "VALUES ('rogue', 'operator', ?, NULL, NULL, '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')",
-                    (class_id,),
-                )
-            self.assertIn("INVALID_BOOTSTRAP_STATE", str(ctx.exception))
-
-    def test_installer_null_issuer_only_during_install(self) -> None:
-        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        with self.kernel.actor_context("i2", "installer", "install"):
-            cur = self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
-            )
-            class_id = cur.lastrowid
-            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError):
-                self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO principals"
-                    "(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
-                    "VALUES ('i2', 'installer', ?, NULL, NULL, '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')",
-                    (class_id,),
-                )
-
-    # -- AC8 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_context_missing(self) -> None:  # t_context_missing(-)
-        self.assertIsNone(self.kernel._ctx)
-        with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
-            self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
-            )
-        self.assertIn("INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT", str(ctx.exception))
-
-    def test_context_stale(self) -> None:  # t_context_stale(-)
-        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
-            self.kernel._ctx.expired = True
-            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
-                self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
-                )
-            self.assertIn("INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT", str(ctx.exception))
-
-    def test_context_epoch_shift(self) -> None:  # t_context_epoch_shift(-)
-        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
-            self.kernel._ctx.live_epoch = self.kernel._ctx.bound_epoch + 99
-            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
-                self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
-                )
-            self.assertIn("INVALID_ACTOR_CONTEXT", str(ctx.exception))
-
-    def test_bad_actor_kind_or_mode_rejected(self) -> None:
-        for kind, mode in (("intruder", "normal"), ("operator", "sabotage")):
-            with self.subTest(kind=kind, mode=mode):
-                with self.kernel.actor_context("op", kind, mode):
-                    with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError):
-                        self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                            "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) "
-                            "VALUES ('2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
-                        )
-
-    # -- AC9 -------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_bootstrap_immutable_update(self) -> None:  # t_bootstrap_immutable_{update}
-        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        cases = [
-            ("UPDATE install_state SET installed_at = 'x' WHERE id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE"),
-            ("UPDATE platform_bootstrap_seed SET created_at = 'x' WHERE seed_id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_SEED"),
-            ("UPDATE authority_dominance SET subordinate = 'x' WHERE dominant = 'supervisor.root'", "IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE"),
-            (f"UPDATE authoritative_issuers SET issuer_ref = 'x' WHERE issuer_ref = '{DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID}'", "IMMUTABLE_ISSUER"),
-            (f"UPDATE principals SET actor_kind = 'operator' WHERE principal_id = '{INSTALLER}'", "IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL"),
-        ]
-        for sql, tag in cases:
-            with self.subTest(sql=sql):
-                with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
-                    with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
-                        self.kernel._conn.execute(sql)
-                    self.assertIn(tag, str(ctx.exception))
-
-    def test_bootstrap_immutable_delete(self) -> None:  # t_bootstrap_immutable_{delete}
-        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        cases = [
-            ("DELETE FROM install_state WHERE id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_INSTALL_STATE"),
-            ("DELETE FROM platform_bootstrap_seed WHERE seed_id = 1", "IMMUTABLE_SEED"),
-            ("DELETE FROM authority_dominance", "IMMUTABLE_DOMINANCE"),
-            ("DELETE FROM authoritative_issuers", "IMMUTABLE_ISSUER"),
-            (f"DELETE FROM principals WHERE principal_id = '{INSTALLER}'", "IMMUTABLE_PRINCIPAL"),
-            ("DELETE FROM platform_bootstrap_grants", "IMMUTABLE_GRANT"),
-        ]
-        for sql, tag in cases:
-            with self.subTest(sql=sql):
-                with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
-                    with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
-                        self.kernel._conn.execute(sql)
-                    self.assertIn(tag, str(ctx.exception))
-
-    def test_grant_reactivation_rejected(self) -> None:
-        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        self.kernel.register_principal(
-            "op1", "operator", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            self.kernel.grant_platform_bootstrap("op1", INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED
-        )
-        gid = self.kernel._conn.execute(
-            "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE grantee_principal_id = 'op1'"
-        ).fetchone()[0]
-        self.assertEqual(
-            self.kernel.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER).code,
-            INSTALLED,
-        )
-        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
-            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as ctx:
-                self.kernel._conn.execute(
-                    "UPDATE platform_bootstrap_grants SET active = 1 WHERE grant_id = ?",
-                    (gid,),
-                )
-            self.assertIn("IMMUTABLE_GRANT", str(ctx.exception))
-
-    # -- AC12 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_raw_write_bypass(self) -> None:  # t_raw_write_bypass(raw-bypass)
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
-            path = os.path.join(tmp, "p.sqlite3")
-            k = PlatformKernel(path)
-            self.assertEqual(k.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-            k.close()
-            raw = sqlite3.connect(path)
-            raw.execute("PRAGMA foreign_keys = ON")
-            try:
-                with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.Error):
-                    raw.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO audit_records(event, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES ('forged', '2026-01-01T00:00:00Z')"
-                    )
-                    raw.commit()
-                with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.Error):
-                    raw.execute("UPDATE install_state SET installed_at = 'x' WHERE id = 1")
-                    raw.commit()
-                with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.Error):
-                    raw.execute("DELETE FROM platform_bootstrap_grants")
-                    raw.commit()
-            finally:
-                raw.close()
-
-    # -- AC13 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_audit_created(self) -> None:  # t_audit_created(+)
-        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        self.kernel.register_principal(
-            "op1", "operator", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            self.kernel.grant_platform_bootstrap("op1", INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED
-        )
-        gid = self.kernel._conn.execute(
-            "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE grantee_principal_id = 'op1'"
-        ).fetchone()[0]
-        self.assertEqual(
-            self.kernel.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER).code,
-            INSTALLED,
-        )
-        events = self.kernel.audit_events()
-        for evt in (
-            ap.EVT_PLATFORM_INSTALLED,
-            ap.EVT_GRANT_CREATED,
-            ap.EVT_GRANT_REVOKED,
-            ap.EVT_PRINCIPAL_REGISTERED,
-        ):
-            self.assertIn(evt, events)
-
-    # -- AC14 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_audit_immutable(self) -> None:  # t_audit_immutable(raw-bypass)
-        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        with self.kernel.actor_context("op", "operator", "normal"):
-            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as up:
-                self.kernel._conn.execute("UPDATE audit_records SET event = 'x' WHERE audit_id = 1")
-            self.assertIn("IMMUTABLE_AUDIT", str(up.exception))
-            with self.assertRaises(sqlite3.IntegrityError) as dl:
-                self.kernel._conn.execute("DELETE FROM audit_records WHERE audit_id = 1")
-            self.assertIn("IMMUTABLE_AUDIT", str(dl.exception))
-
-    # -- meta ------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_schema_meta(self) -> None:
-        rows = dict(self.kernel._conn.execute("SELECT key, value FROM arch01_meta").fetchall())
-        self.assertEqual(rows["schema_version"], str(ap.SCHEMA_VERSION))
-        self.assertIn("disabled by default", rows["architecture"])
-
-    def test_register_principal_creates_class_first(self) -> None:
-        self.assertEqual(self.kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        res = self.kernel.register_principal(
-            "svc1", "service", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(res.code, INSTALLED)
-        row = self.kernel._conn.execute(
-            "SELECT current_class_id FROM principals WHERE principal_id = 'svc1'"
-        ).fetchone()
-        self.assertIsNotNone(row[0])
-
-    # -- helpers ---------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def _partial_bootstrap_then_rollback(self, k: PlatformKernel, stop: int) -> None:
-        """Execute the first ``stop`` bootstrap statements, then ROLLBACK."""
-        now = "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"
-        k._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-        class_id = None
-        issuer_id = None
-        try:
-            with k.actor_context(INSTALLER, "installer", "install"):
-                c = k._conn
-                if stop >= 1:
-                    class_id = c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)", (now,)
-                    ).lastrowid
-                if stop >= 2:
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO principals(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
-                        "VALUES (?, 'installer', ?, NULL, ?, ?)",
-                        (INSTALLER, class_id, INSTALLER, now),
-                    )
-                if stop >= 3:
-                    issuer_id = c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO authoritative_issuers(issuer_kind, issuer_ref, created_at) VALUES ('operator-key', ?, ?)",
-                        (DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, now),
-                    ).lastrowid
-                if stop >= 4:
-                    c.execute(
-                        "UPDATE principals SET issuer_id = ? WHERE principal_id = ?",
-                        (issuer_id, INSTALLER),
-                    )
-                if stop >= 5:
-                    c.executemany(
-                        "INSERT INTO authority_dominance(dominant, subordinate) VALUES (?, ?)",
-                        DOMINANCE_TUPLES,
-                    )
-                if stop >= 6:
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_seed(seed_id, installer_principal_id, created_at) VALUES (1, ?, ?)",
-                        (INSTALLER, now),
-                    )
-                if stop >= 7:
-                    c.execute(
-                        "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) VALUES (?, NULL, 1, ?)",
-                        (INSTALLER, now),
-                    )
-                if stop >= 8:
-                    c.execute("INSERT INTO platform_active_invariant(id, active_count) VALUES (1, 1)")
-        finally:
-            k._conn.execute("ROLLBACK")
-
-    def _seed_bootstrap_and_mark(self, k: PlatformKernel, dominance) -> str:
-        """Seed a full bootstrap with a caller-supplied dominance set, then
-        attempt the marker insert. Returns the classified failure code (or
-        INSTALLED). Rolls back on failure so no partial rows remain."""
-        now = "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z"
-        k._conn.execute("BEGIN IMMEDIATE")
-        try:
-            with k.actor_context(INSTALLER, "installer", "install"):
-                c = k._conn
-                class_id = c.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO principal_equivalence_classes(created_at) VALUES (?)", (now,)
-                ).lastrowid
-                c.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO principals(principal_id, actor_kind, current_class_id, issuer_id, registered_by, created_at) "
-                    "VALUES (?, 'installer', ?, NULL, ?, ?)",
-                    (INSTALLER, class_id, INSTALLER, now),
-                )
-                issuer_id = c.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO authoritative_issuers(issuer_kind, issuer_ref, created_at) VALUES ('operator-key', ?, ?)",
-                    (DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, now),
-                ).lastrowid
-                c.execute(
-                    "UPDATE principals SET issuer_id = ? WHERE principal_id = ?",
-                    (issuer_id, INSTALLER),
-                )
-                c.executemany(
-                    "INSERT INTO authority_dominance(dominant, subordinate) VALUES (?, ?)",
-                    dominance,
-                )
-                c.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_seed(seed_id, installer_principal_id, created_at) VALUES (1, ?, ?)",
-                    (INSTALLER, now),
-                )
-                c.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO platform_bootstrap_grants(grantee_principal_id, granted_by, active, created_at) VALUES (?, NULL, 1, ?)",
-                    (INSTALLER, now),
-                )
-                c.execute("INSERT INTO platform_active_invariant(id, active_count) VALUES (1, 1)")
-                c.execute(
-                    "INSERT INTO install_state(id, marker, installed_at) VALUES (1, 'installed', ?)",
-                    (now,),
-                )
-            k._conn.execute("COMMIT")
-            return INSTALLED
-        except sqlite3.Error as exc:
-            k._safe_rollback()
-            return PlatformKernel._classify(exc)
-
-
-class Arch01ConcurrencyTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    """Concurrency invariants require file-backed DBs and independent connections."""
-
-    def setUp(self) -> None:
-        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
-        self.path = os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "p.sqlite3")
-
-    def tearDown(self) -> None:
-        self._tmp.cleanup()
-
-    # -- AC10 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_concurrent_install(self) -> None:  # t_concurrent_install(concurrency)
-        k1 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=0)
-        k2 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=0)
-        barrier = threading.Barrier(2)
-        results = {}
-
-        def _install(name, kernel):
-            barrier.wait()
-            results[name] = kernel.install_platform(INSTALLER).code
-
-        try:
-            with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as ex:
-                f1 = ex.submit(_install, "a", k1)
-                f2 = ex.submit(_install, "b", k2)
-                f1.result()
-                f2.result()
-            codes = sorted(results.values())
-            self.assertEqual(codes.count(INSTALLED), 1, f"exactly one install expected: {results}")
-            other = [c for c in results.values() if c != INSTALLED][0]
-            self.assertIn(other, (ALREADY_INSTALLED, CONCURRENT_INSTALLATION_LOST))
-            self.assertTrue(k1.is_installed())
-            self.assertEqual(_count(k1, "install_state"), 1)
-            self.assertEqual(_count(k1, "principals"), 1)
-        finally:
-            k1.close()
-            k2.close()
-
-    # -- AC11 ------------------------------------------------------------- #
-    def test_concurrent_last_grant_revoke(self) -> None:  # t_concurrent_last_grant_revoke
-        setup = PlatformKernel(self.path)
-        self.assertEqual(setup.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        setup.register_principal("op1", "operator", DISTINGUISHED_ISSUER_ID, actor_principal=INSTALLER)
-        self.assertEqual(setup.grant_platform_bootstrap("op1", INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-        self.assertEqual(setup.active_grant_count(), 2)
-        gids = [
-            r[0]
-            for r in setup._conn.execute(
-                "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE active = 1 ORDER BY grant_id"
-            ).fetchall()
-        ]
-        setup.close()
-        self.assertEqual(len(gids), 2)
-
-        k1 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=3000)
-        k2 = PlatformKernel(self.path, busy_timeout_ms=3000)
-        barrier = threading.Barrier(2)
-        results = {}
-
-        def _revoke(name, kernel, gid):
-            barrier.wait()
-            results[name] = kernel.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER).code
-
-        try:
-            with ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as ex:
-                f1 = ex.submit(_revoke, "a", k1, gids[0])
-                f2 = ex.submit(_revoke, "b", k2, gids[1])
-                f1.result()
-                f2.result()
-            codes = list(results.values())
-            self.assertEqual(codes.count(INSTALLED), 1, f"exactly one revoke should win: {results}")
-            self.assertEqual(codes.count(AUTHORIZATION_DENIED), 1, f"one revoke must be denied: {results}")
-            self.assertEqual(k1.active_grant_count(), 1)
-            self.assertEqual(_count_where(k1, "platform_bootstrap_grants", "active = 1"), 1)
-        finally:
-            k1.close()
-            k2.close()
-
-    def test_revoke_final_grant_denied(self) -> None:
-        k = PlatformKernel(self.path)
-        try:
-            self.assertEqual(k.install_platform(INSTALLER).code, INSTALLED)
-            gid = k._conn.execute(
-                "SELECT grant_id FROM platform_bootstrap_grants WHERE active = 1"
-            ).fetchone()[0]
-            res = k.revoke_platform_bootstrap(gid, actor_principal=INSTALLER)
-            self.assertEqual(res.code, AUTHORIZATION_DENIED)
-            self.assertEqual(k.active_grant_count(), 1)
-            self.assertEqual(_count_where(k, "platform_bootstrap_grants", "active = 1"), 1)
-        finally:
-            k.close()
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

tests/test_cross_role_queue_allocation.py

@@ -1,581 +0,0 @@
-"""Authoritative controller cross-role generic queue allocation (#840)."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-from unittest.mock import patch
-
-from allocator_service import (
-    ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
-    ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
-    OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
-    OUTCOME_PREVIEW,
-    OUTCOME_WAIT,
-    ROLE_AUTHOR,
-    ROLE_CONTROLLER,
-    ROLE_MERGER,
-    ROLE_RECONCILER,
-    ROLE_REVIEWER,
-    WorkCandidate,
-    allocate_next_work,
-    build_selection_dict,
-    classify_skip,
-    required_namespace_for_role,
-    required_profile_for_role,
-    resolve_allocation_mode,
-    selected_action_for_candidate,
-)
-from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB
-import role_session_router
-from role_session_router import (
-    ROUTE_ALLOWED,
-    ROUTE_AMBIGUOUS,
-    ROUTE_WRONG_ROLE,
-    route_task_session,
-)
-import namespace_workspace_binding as nwb
-import task_capability_map
-
-
-class CrossRoleAllocationModeTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_controller_defaults_to_cross_role(self) -> None:
-        self.assertEqual(
-            resolve_allocation_mode(ROLE_CONTROLLER),
-            ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
-        )
-
-    def test_worker_defaults_to_role_scoped(self) -> None:
-        for role in (ROLE_AUTHOR, ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER, ROLE_RECONCILER):
-            self.assertEqual(
-                resolve_allocation_mode(role),
-                ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
-            )
-
-    def test_explicit_modes(self) -> None:
-        self.assertEqual(
-            resolve_allocation_mode(ROLE_CONTROLLER, "role_scoped"),
-            ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            resolve_allocation_mode(ROLE_AUTHOR, "cross_role"),
-            ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
-        )
-
-
-class CrossRoleSelectionPayloadTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_selection_contains_required_fields(self) -> None:
-        c = WorkCandidate(
-            kind="issue",
-            number=840,
-            labels=("status:ready",),
-            title="cross-role",
-            priority=20,
-        )
-        sel = build_selection_dict(
-            c,
-            active_role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
-            required_role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
-            profile_name="prgs-controller",
-            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(sel["number"], 840)
-        self.assertEqual(sel["kind"], "issue")
-        self.assertEqual(sel["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
-        self.assertEqual(sel["selected_action"], "implement")
-        self.assertEqual(sel["action"], "implement")
-        self.assertEqual(sel["required_profile"], "prgs-author")
-        self.assertEqual(sel["required_namespace"], "gitea-author")
-        self.assertEqual(sel["pinned"]["number"], 840)
-        self.assertIsNone(sel["pinned"]["head_sha"])
-
-    def test_profile_prefix_preserved(self) -> None:
-        self.assertEqual(
-            required_profile_for_role(ROLE_REVIEWER, profile_name="dadeschools-controller"),
-            "dadeschools-reviewer",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            required_namespace_for_role(ROLE_MERGER),
-            "gitea-merger",
-        )
-
-    def test_selected_actions_per_role(self) -> None:
-        issue = WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=1, labels=("status:ready",))
-        pr_review = WorkCandidate(kind="pr", number=2, head_sha="a" * 40)
-        pr_rc = WorkCandidate(
-            kind="pr",
-            number=3,
-            head_sha="b" * 40,
-            request_changes_current_head=True,
-        )
-        pr_merge = WorkCandidate(
-            kind="pr",
-            number=4,
-            head_sha="c" * 40,
-            approval_on_current_head=True,
-            mergeable=True,
-        )
-        pr_recon = WorkCandidate(
-            kind="pr",
-            number=5,
-            head_sha="d" * 40,
-            approval_contaminated=True,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(selected_action_for_candidate(issue, ROLE_AUTHOR), "implement")
-        self.assertEqual(
-            selected_action_for_candidate(pr_rc, ROLE_AUTHOR),
-            "address_pr_change_requests",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            selected_action_for_candidate(pr_review, ROLE_REVIEWER), "review"
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(selected_action_for_candidate(pr_merge, ROLE_MERGER), "merge")
-        self.assertEqual(
-            selected_action_for_candidate(pr_recon, ROLE_RECONCILER),
-            "reconcile_contaminated_approval",
-        )
-
-
-class CrossRoleAllocateServiceTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self) -> None:
-        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
-        self.db = ControlPlaneDB(os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3"))
-
-    def tearDown(self) -> None:
-        self._tmp.cleanup()
-
-    def _alloc(self, **kwargs):
-        defaults = dict(
-            db=self.db,
-            session_id="ctrl-session",
-            role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
-            remote="prgs",
-            org="org",
-            repo="repo",
-            candidates=[],
-            apply=False,
-            profile_name="prgs-controller",
-            username="controller-bot",
-            controller_instance_id="ctrl-1",
-        )
-        defaults.update(kwargs)
-        return allocate_next_work(**defaults)
-
-    def test_eligible_author_work(self) -> None:
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=100,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-                title="author work",
-                priority=20,
-            ),
-        ]
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
-        self.assertTrue(res["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_PREVIEW)
-        self.assertEqual(res["allocation_mode"], ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE)
-        self.assertIsNotNone(res["selected"])
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 100)
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected_action"], "implement")
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_profile"], "prgs-author")
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_namespace"], "gitea-author")
-        self.assertIn("allocate", res["controller_allowed_actions"])
-        self.assertIn("merge", res["controller_forbidden_actions"])
-        self.assertFalse(res["allocation_evidence"]["lease_created"])
-
-    def test_eligible_reviewer_work(self) -> None:
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="pr",
-                number=200,
-                head_sha="e" * 40,
-                title="needs review",
-                priority=30,
-            ),
-        ]
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 200)
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_REVIEWER)
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected_action"], "review")
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_profile"], "prgs-reviewer")
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["pinned"]["head_sha"], "e" * 40)
-
-    def test_eligible_merger_work(self) -> None:
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="pr",
-                number=300,
-                head_sha="f" * 40,
-                approval_on_current_head=True,
-                mergeable=True,
-                priority=40,
-            ),
-        ]
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 300)
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_MERGER)
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected_action"], "merge")
-
-    def test_eligible_reconciler_work(self) -> None:
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="pr",
-                number=400,
-                head_sha="1" * 40,
-                approval_contaminated=True,
-                priority=50,
-            ),
-        ]
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 400)
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_RECONCILER)
-        self.assertIn("reconcile", res["selected_action"])
-
-    def test_no_eligible_work(self) -> None:
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=10,
-                labels=("status:blocked",),
-                blocked=True,
-                priority=99,
-            ),
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=11,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-                dependency_unmet=True,
-                dependency_reason="blocked by #10",
-                priority=98,
-            ),
-        ]
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
-        self.assertTrue(res["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_NO_SAFE)
-        self.assertIsNone(res["selected"])
-        self.assertEqual(res["allocation_mode"], ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE)
-
-    def test_leased_work_skipped(self) -> None:
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=50,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-                priority=20,
-            ),
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=51,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-                priority=10,
-            ),
-        ]
-        # Seed a foreign lease on issue 50 via assign_and_lease under another session.
-        other = allocate_next_work(
-            self.db,
-            session_id="other-worker",
-            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
-            remote="prgs",
-            org="org",
-            repo="repo",
-            candidates=cands[:1],
-            apply=True,
-            profile_name="prgs-author",
-            controller_instance_id="other-ctrl",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(other["outcome"], "assigned_work")
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
-        self.assertIsNotNone(res["selected"])
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 51)
-        self.assertTrue(any(s["number"] == 50 for s in res["skipped"]))
-        self.assertTrue(res["claims_excluded"])
-
-    def test_dependencies_skipped(self) -> None:
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=1,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-                priority=99,
-                dependency_unmet=True,
-                dependency_reason="needs #2",
-            ),
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=2,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-                priority=1,
-            ),
-        ]
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 2)
-        skipped = {s["number"]: s["reason"] for s in res["skipped"]}
-        self.assertIn(1, skipped)
-        self.assertIn("needs #2", skipped[1])
-
-    def test_pagination_limit_only_truncates_skip_report(self) -> None:
-        """Ranking uses full inventory; reporting limit is MCP-layer only.
-
-        Service ranks all candidates; prove higher-priority eligible item
-        wins even when many skipped precede it.
-        """
-        cands = []
-        for n in range(1, 30):
-            cands.append(
-                WorkCandidate(
-                    kind="issue",
-                    number=n,
-                    labels=("status:ready",),
-                    priority=100 - n,
-                    dependency_unmet=True,
-                    dependency_reason=f"dep {n}",
-                )
-            )
-        cands.append(
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=999,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-                priority=1,
-            )
-        )
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 999)
-        self.assertGreaterEqual(len(res["skipped"]), 29)
-
-    def test_role_scoped_controller_legacy_still_restricts(self) -> None:
-        """role_scoped controller only takes reconciler-needed items."""
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=1,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-                priority=50,
-            ),
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="pr",
-                number=2,
-                head_sha="a" * 40,
-                approval_contaminated=True,
-                priority=1,
-            ),
-        ]
-        res = self._alloc(
-            candidates=cands,
-            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(res["allocation_mode"], ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED)
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 2)
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_RECONCILER)
-
-    def test_cross_role_prefers_highest_priority_across_roles(self) -> None:
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=10,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-                priority=10,
-            ),
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="pr",
-                number=20,
-                head_sha="b" * 40,
-                priority=50,
-            ),
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="pr",
-                number=30,
-                head_sha="c" * 40,
-                approval_on_current_head=True,
-                mergeable=True,
-                priority=20,
-            ),
-        ]
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
-        # PR #20 highest priority → reviewer
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 20)
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_REVIEWER)
-
-    def test_apply_creates_lease_evidence_for_required_role(self) -> None:
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=777,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-                priority=20,
-            ),
-        ]
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands, apply=True)
-        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], "assigned_work")
-        self.assertTrue(res["allocation_evidence"]["lease_created"])
-        self.assertEqual(res["allocation_evidence"]["lease_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
-        proof = res["lease_proof"]
-        self.assertIsNotNone(proof["lease_id"])
-        self.assertEqual(proof["lease_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
-        self.assertIn("implement", proof["allowed_actions"])
-        # Controller isolation: controller still forbids merge/push/create_pr
-        self.assertIn("merge", res["controller_forbidden_actions"])
-        self.assertIn("push", res["controller_forbidden_actions"])
-
-    def test_metadata_consistency_role_is_controller(self) -> None:
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=1,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-            ),
-        ]
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
-        self.assertEqual(res["role"], ROLE_CONTROLLER)
-        self.assertEqual(res["routing_role"], ROLE_CONTROLLER)
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
-
-
-class ProcessWorkQueueRouterTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    def tearDown(self) -> None:
-        role_session_router.clear_route_state()
-
-    def test_process_work_queue_allowed_for_controller(self) -> None:
-        res = route_task_session(
-            "process_work_queue",
-            active_profile="prgs-controller",
-            active_role_kind="controller",
-            allowed_in_current_session=True,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(res["route_result"], ROUTE_ALLOWED)
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], "controller")
-        self.assertTrue(res["downstream_allowed"])
-
-    def test_process_work_queue_hyphen_alias(self) -> None:
-        res = route_task_session(
-            "process-work-queue",
-            active_profile="prgs-controller",
-            active_role_kind="controller",
-            allowed_in_current_session=True,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(res["route_result"], ROUTE_ALLOWED)
-
-    def test_process_work_queue_wrong_role_for_author(self) -> None:
-        res = route_task_session(
-            "process_work_queue",
-            active_profile="prgs-author",
-            active_role_kind="author",
-            allowed_in_current_session=False,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(res["route_result"], ROUTE_WRONG_ROLE)
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], "controller")
-        self.assertFalse(res["downstream_allowed"])
-
-    def test_unknown_still_ambiguous(self) -> None:
-        res = route_task_session(
-            "not_a_real_task",
-            active_profile="prgs-controller",
-            active_role_kind="controller",
-            allowed_in_current_session=False,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(res["route_result"], ROUTE_AMBIGUOUS)
-
-    def test_capability_map_process_work_queue_is_controller(self) -> None:
-        self.assertEqual(
-            task_capability_map.required_role("process_work_queue"),
-            "controller",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            task_capability_map.required_permission("process_work_queue"),
-            "gitea.read",
-        )
-
-
-class ControllerRoleMetadataTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_normalize_role_kind_controller(self) -> None:
-        self.assertEqual(
-            nwb.normalize_role_kind("controller"),
-            "controller",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            nwb.normalize_role_kind("author", profile_name="prgs-controller"),
-            "controller",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            nwb.normalize_role_kind("reconciler", profile_name="prgs-controller"),
-            "controller",
-        )
-
-    def test_profile_role_kind_prefers_declared_controller(self) -> None:
-        # Import from worktree package path via sys.path already set by pytest.
-        import gitea_mcp_server as mcp
-
-        profile = {
-            "profile_name": "prgs-controller",
-            "role": "controller",
-            "allowed_operations": [
-                "gitea.read",
-                "gitea.issue.comment",
-                "gitea.pr.close",
-            ],
-            "forbidden_operations": [
-                "gitea.pr.approve",
-                "gitea.pr.merge",
-                "gitea.pr.create",
-                "gitea.branch.push",
-            ],
-        }
-        # Declared role wins even if permissions look reconciler-like.
-        self.assertEqual(mcp._profile_role_kind(profile), "controller")
-        # Name-based fallback.
-        profile_no_role = dict(profile)
-        profile_no_role["role"] = None
-        profile_no_role["role_kind"] = None
-        self.assertEqual(mcp._profile_role_kind(profile_no_role), "controller")
-
-    def test_permission_inference_without_controller_name_stays_reconciler(self) -> None:
-        import gitea_mcp_server as mcp
-
-        # Pure permission inference still may return reconciler when no controller
-        # declaration exists — that is intentional for reconciler profiles.
-        role = mcp._role_kind(
-            ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.close", "gitea.issue.comment"],
-            ["gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge", "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"],
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(role, "reconciler")
-
-
-class DashboardRemainsExplanatoryTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_dashboard_prompt_points_at_allocator_not_self_select(self) -> None:
-        import workflow_dashboard as wd
-
-        self.assertIn("gitea_allocate_next_work", wd.PROMPT_CONTROLLER)
-        self.assertIn("process_work_queue", wd.PROMPT_CONTROLLER)
-        self.assertIn("never replaces allocator", wd.PROMPT_CONTROLLER.lower())
-        self.assertNotIn("self-select", wd.PROMPT_CONTROLLER.lower())
-
-
-class ClassifySkipCrossRoleTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_controller_cross_role_accepts_author_issue(self) -> None:
-        c = WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=1, labels=("status:ready",))
-        self.assertIsNone(
-            classify_skip(
-                c,
-                role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
-                terminal_pr=None,
-                allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
-            )
-        )
-
-    def test_legacy_controller_skips_author_issue(self) -> None:
-        c = WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=1, labels=("status:ready",))
-        reason = classify_skip(
-            c,
-            role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
-            terminal_pr=None,
-            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
-        )
-        self.assertIsNotNone(reason)
-        self.assertIn("does not require controller", reason or "")
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

tests/test_webui_console_authz_audit.py

@@ -1,703 +0,0 @@
-"""Console authorization, redaction, and audit model tests (#633).
-
-Covers each acceptance criterion and each required test named in the issue:
-
-* AC1 — RBAC matrix and privileged-action list.
-* AC2 — redaction rules, unit-tested against sample payloads.
-* AC3 — audit event schema with required fields and retention defaults.
-* AC4 — Phase 2 integration points.
-* AC5 — local-dev mode with explicit insecurity warnings.
-
-Required tests: redaction units (token, keychain, password patterns),
-default-deny for unauthenticated write stubs, and audit record creation for a
-simulated privileged preview.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import datetime
-import json
-import os
-import pathlib
-import sys
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
-
-sys.path.insert(0, str(pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]))
-
-from task_capability_map import TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP  # noqa: E402
-from webui import console_audit, console_authz  # noqa: E402
-from webui.app import create_app  # noqa: E402
-from webui.console_redaction import (  # noqa: E402
-    REDACTED,
-    redact_payload,
-    redact_text,
-    redaction_policy,
-    scan_for_secrets,
-)
-
-DOCS = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "docs"
-AUTHZ_DOC = DOCS / "webui-authz-audit.md"
-
-
-def _principal(role: str) -> console_authz.Principal:
-    return console_authz.Principal(
-        subject=f"{role}@example.com",
-        role=role,
-        identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
-        authenticated=True,
-    )
-
-
-class TestRoleMatrix(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC1 — the written RBAC matrix and privileged-action list."""
-
-    def test_roles_are_ordered_least_to_most_authority(self):
-        self.assertEqual(
-            console_authz.ROLE_ORDER,
-            ("viewer", "operator", "controller", "admin"),
-        )
-
-    def test_every_role_has_a_description(self):
-        for role in console_authz.ROLE_ORDER:
-            with self.subTest(role=role):
-                self.assertTrue(console_authz.ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS[role].strip())
-
-    def test_higher_roles_inherit_lower_role_actions(self):
-        matrix = {
-            entry["role"]: set(entry["permitted_actions"])
-            for entry in console_authz.rbac_matrix()["roles"]
-        }
-        for lower, higher in zip(
-            console_authz.ROLE_ORDER, console_authz.ROLE_ORDER[1:]
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(lower=lower, higher=higher):
-                self.assertTrue(matrix[lower].issubset(matrix[higher]))
-
-    def test_viewer_holds_no_write_action(self):
-        matrix = {
-            entry["role"]: set(entry["permitted_actions"])
-            for entry in console_authz.rbac_matrix()["roles"]
-        }
-        self.assertEqual(matrix["viewer"], set())
-
-    def test_privileged_action_list_is_non_empty_and_classified(self):
-        privileged = console_authz.privileged_actions()
-        self.assertTrue(privileged)
-        ids = {action.action_id for action in privileged}
-        # Merge and branch deletion are the canonical privileged pair.
-        self.assertIn("merge_pr", ids)
-        self.assertIn("delete_branch", ids)
-
-    def test_merge_and_delete_require_dual_control_and_break_glass(self):
-        for action_id in ("merge_pr", "delete_branch"):
-            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
-                action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
-                self.assertTrue(action.dual_control)
-                self.assertTrue(action.break_glass)
-                self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
-
-    def test_every_write_action_requires_confirmation(self):
-        for action in console_authz.ACTIONS.values():
-            with self.subTest(action=action.action_id):
-                self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
-
-    def test_delete_branch_is_admin_only(self):
-        self.assertEqual(
-            console_authz.get_action("delete_branch").minimum_role,
-            console_authz.ADMIN,
-        )
-
-    def test_actions_map_to_real_mcp_capability_vocabulary(self):
-        """The console must not invent an authority the MCP layer lacks."""
-        for action in console_authz.ACTIONS.values():
-            with self.subTest(action=action.action_id):
-                self.assertIn(action.task_key, TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP)
-                self.assertEqual(
-                    action.mcp_permission,
-                    TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP[action.task_key]["permission"],
-                )
-                self.assertEqual(
-                    action.mcp_role,
-                    TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP[action.task_key]["role"],
-                )
-
-    def test_matrix_declares_deny_by_default_and_execution_disabled(self):
-        matrix = console_authz.rbac_matrix()
-        self.assertEqual(matrix["default_decision"], "deny")
-        self.assertFalse(matrix["execution_enabled"])
-
-
-class TestAuthorizeDefaultDeny(unittest.TestCase):
-    """Fail-closed behaviour of the authorization decision."""
-
-    def test_anonymous_is_denied_every_action(self):
-        for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
-            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
-                decision = console_authz.authorize(action_id)
-                self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
-                self.assertEqual(
-                    decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED
-                )
-
-    def test_unknown_action_is_denied(self):
-        decision = console_authz.authorize(
-            "not_a_real_action", _principal("admin")
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
-        self.assertEqual(decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION)
-
-    def test_unknown_role_is_denied(self):
-        rogue = console_authz.Principal(
-            subject="[email protected]",
-            role="superuser",
-            identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
-            authenticated=True,
-        )
-        decision = console_authz.authorize("comment_issue", rogue)
-        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
-        self.assertEqual(decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE)
-
-    def test_insufficient_role_is_denied(self):
-        decision = console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("operator"))
-        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
-        self.assertEqual(
-            decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE
-        )
-
-    def test_sufficient_role_allows_preview_only(self):
-        decision = console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("controller"))
-        self.assertTrue(decision.allowed)
-        self.assertFalse(decision.execution_enabled)
-
-    def test_execution_is_refused_while_phase_is_not_active(self):
-        decision = console_authz.authorize(
-            "merge_pr", _principal("controller"), for_execution=True
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
-        self.assertEqual(
-            decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE
-        )
-
-    def test_allowed_decision_never_reports_execution_enabled(self):
-        for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
-            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
-                decision = console_authz.authorize(
-                    action_id, _principal("admin")
-                )
-                self.assertFalse(decision.execution_enabled)
-
-
-class TestIdentityResolution(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC5 — identity sources, including the insecure local-dev mode."""
-
-    def test_no_auth_mode_yields_anonymous_viewer(self):
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(env={})
-        self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
-        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
-        self.assertEqual(principal.identity_source, console_authz.IDENTITY_NONE)
-
-    def test_local_dev_mode_warns_that_identity_is_unverified(self):
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
-            env={
-                console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local-dev",
-                console_authz.DEV_SUBJECT_ENV: "[email protected]",
-                console_authz.DEV_ROLE_ENV: "admin",
-            }
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(principal.authenticated)
-        self.assertEqual(principal.role, "admin")
-        self.assertTrue(principal.warnings)
-        self.assertIn("asserted", " ".join(principal.warnings).lower())
-
-    def test_local_dev_without_subject_falls_back_to_anonymous(self):
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
-            env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local-dev"}
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
-
-    def test_local_dev_unknown_role_degrades_to_viewer(self):
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
-            env={
-                console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local_dev",
-                console_authz.DEV_SUBJECT_ENV: "[email protected]",
-                console_authz.DEV_ROLE_ENV: "root",
-            }
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
-
-    def test_access_proxy_without_header_fails_closed(self):
-        """A proxy-mode request that did not traverse the proxy is anonymous."""
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
-            headers={},
-            env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy"},
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
-
-    def test_access_proxy_role_comes_from_server_config_not_client(self):
-        env = {
-            console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy",
-            console_authz.ROLE_MAP_ENV: json.dumps(
-                {"[email protected]": "controller"}
-            ),
-        }
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
-            headers={
-                console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]",
-                "x-role": "admin",  # client-supplied role must be ignored
-            },
-            env=env,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(principal.role, "controller")
-
-    def test_access_proxy_unmapped_subject_defaults_to_viewer(self):
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
-            headers={
-                console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]"
-            },
-            env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy"},
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
-
-    def test_malformed_role_map_does_not_raise_and_denies(self):
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
-            headers={console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]"},
-            env={
-                console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy",
-                console_authz.ROLE_MAP_ENV: "{not json",
-            },
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
-
-    def test_probe_auth_is_opt_in(self):
-        self.assertFalse(console_authz.probe_auth_required(env={}))
-        self.assertTrue(
-            console_authz.probe_auth_required(
-                env={console_authz.REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV: "1"}
-            )
-        )
-
-    def test_probe_auth_is_declared_but_not_yet_enforced(self):
-        """Phase 1 declares the probe-auth policy; no route enforces it yet.
-
-        The flag exists so the Phase 2 action framework has a declared policy
-        to honour instead of inventing a second one. Pinning the current
-        not-enforced status here means wiring it later is a deliberate change
-        that updates this test and the documentation together, rather than a
-        silent behaviour shift. The documentation must say so plainly, because
-        an operator who sets the variable believing it protects a probe is
-        worse off than one who knows it does not.
-        """
-        import inspect
-
-        from webui import app as webui_app
-
-        source = inspect.getsource(webui_app)
-        self.assertNotIn(
-            "probe_auth_required",
-            source,
-            msg=(
-                "webui.app now consults probe_auth_required, so probe auth is "
-                "no longer merely declared. Update the 'Probe authentication' "
-                "section of docs/webui-authz-audit.md, which states it "
-                "enforces nothing, and replace this test with real "
-                "enforcement coverage."
-            ),
-        )
-        self.assertIn(
-            "enforces nothing today",
-            AUTHZ_DOC.read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
-        )
-
-
-class TestRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC2 — required redaction units: token, keychain, password patterns."""
-
-    def test_token_assignment_is_redacted(self):
-        out = redact_text("GITEA_TOKEN=abcd1234efgh5678ijkl")
-        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
-        self.assertNotIn("abcd1234efgh5678ijkl", out)
-
-    def test_password_assignment_is_redacted(self):
-        out = redact_text("password: hunter2supersecret")
-        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
-        self.assertNotIn("hunter2supersecret", out)
-
-    def test_keychain_reference_is_redacted(self):
-        out = redact_text("keychain:gitea-prgs-token")
-        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
-        self.assertNotIn("gitea-prgs-token", out)
-
-    def test_keychain_command_is_redacted(self):
-        out = redact_text("security find-generic-password -s gitea -w")
-        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
-        self.assertNotIn("find-generic-password -s gitea", out)
-
-    def test_bearer_credential_is_redacted(self):
-        out = redact_text("Authorization: Bearer abcdef1234567890abcdef")
-        self.assertNotIn("abcdef1234567890abcdef", out)
-
-    def test_jwt_is_redacted(self):
-        token = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxIn0.abcdefghijklmnop"
-        out = redact_text(f"session={token}")
-        self.assertNotIn(token, out)
-
-    def test_private_key_block_is_redacted(self):
-        pem = (
-            "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
-            "MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAsecretmaterial\n"
-            "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"
-        )
-        out = redact_text(pem)
-        self.assertNotIn("MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAsecretmaterial", out)
-
-    def test_api_key_assignment_is_redacted(self):
-        out = redact_text('api_key = "sk-live-9f8e7d6c5b4a3210"')
-        self.assertNotIn("sk-live-9f8e7d6c5b4a3210", out)
-
-    def test_nested_payload_is_redacted_recursively(self):
-        payload = {
-            "token": "abc123456789",
-            "nested": {"note": "password=letmein12345"},
-            "list": ["keychain:some-entry"],
-            "safe": "plain text",
-        }
-        out = redact_payload(payload)
-        self.assertEqual(out["token"], REDACTED)
-        self.assertNotIn("letmein12345", json.dumps(out))
-        self.assertNotIn("some-entry", json.dumps(out))
-        self.assertEqual(out["safe"], "plain text")
-
-    def test_scan_reports_findings_before_and_none_after(self):
-        dirty = "password: hunter2supersecret"
-        self.assertTrue(scan_for_secrets(dirty))
-        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(redact_text(dirty)), [])
-
-    def test_non_strings_pass_through_untouched(self):
-        self.assertEqual(redact_text(42), 42)
-        self.assertEqual(
-            redact_payload({"n": 1, "b": True}), {"n": 1, "b": True}
-        )
-
-    def test_policy_is_documented_and_declares_redact_before_persist(self):
-        policy = redaction_policy()
-        self.assertTrue(policy["redact_before_persist"])
-        self.assertIn("audit_records", policy["applies_to"])
-        self.assertTrue(policy["console_rules"])
-
-    def test_policy_statement_contains_no_secret_material(self):
-        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(redaction_policy()), [])
-
-
-class TestAuditSchema(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC3 — audit event schema, required fields, and retention defaults."""
-
-    def _event(self, action_id="merge_pr", **kwargs):
-        return console_audit.build_event(
-            action_id=action_id,
-            result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
-            decision=console_authz.authorize(action_id, _principal("operator")),
-            target={"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
-            request_id="req-test",
-            **kwargs,
-        )
-
-    def test_every_required_field_is_present(self):
-        event = self._event()
-        for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_FIELDS:
-            with self.subTest(field=field):
-                self.assertIn(field, event)
-
-    def test_actor_carries_who_and_how_they_were_identified(self):
-        event = self._event()
-        for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS:
-            with self.subTest(field=field):
-                self.assertIn(field, event["actor"])
-
-    def test_correlation_ids_are_present(self):
-        event = self._event()
-        for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS:
-            with self.subTest(field=field):
-                self.assertIn(field, event["correlation"])
-        self.assertEqual(event["correlation"]["request_id"], "req-test")
-        self.assertEqual(event["correlation"]["mcp_task"], "merge_pr")
-
-    def test_timestamp_is_timezone_aware_utc_iso8601(self):
-        now = datetime.datetime(
-            2026, 7, 22, 10, 16, 42, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc
-        )
-        event = self._event(now=now)
-        self.assertEqual(event["timestamp"], "2026-07-22T10:16:42+00:00")
-        parsed = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(event["timestamp"])
-        self.assertIsNotNone(parsed.tzinfo)
-
-    def test_retention_defaults_by_class(self):
-        self.assertEqual(
-            console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_STANDARD], 90
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_PRIVILEGED],
-            365,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS],
-            730,
-        )
-
-    def test_break_glass_action_retains_longest(self):
-        event = self._event("merge_pr")
-        self.assertEqual(
-            event["retention"]["class"], console_audit.RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS
-        )
-
-    def test_routine_write_uses_standard_retention(self):
-        event = self._event("comment_issue")
-        self.assertEqual(
-            event["retention"]["class"], console_audit.RETENTION_STANDARD
-        )
-
-    def test_unknown_action_retains_as_privileged_not_standard(self):
-        """Conservative direction: keep an unclassifiable record longer."""
-        self.assertEqual(
-            console_audit.retention_class_for(None),
-            console_audit.RETENTION_PRIVILEGED,
-        )
-
-    def test_retention_expiry_matches_declared_days(self):
-        now = datetime.datetime(2026, 7, 22, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)
-        event = self._event("comment_issue", now=now)
-        expires = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(
-            event["retention"]["expires_at"]
-        )
-        self.assertEqual((expires - now).days, 90)
-
-    def test_invalid_result_degrades_to_failed(self):
-        event = console_audit.build_event(action_id="merge_pr", result="banana")
-        self.assertEqual(event["result"], console_audit.RESULT_FAILED)
-
-    def test_denied_result_is_representable(self):
-        """An authorization denial has no MCP-side mutation record."""
-        self.assertIn(console_audit.RESULT_DENIED, console_audit.RESULTS)
-
-    def test_event_is_redacted_before_it_is_returned(self):
-        event = console_audit.build_event(
-            action_id="merge_pr",
-            result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
-            detail="failed with token=abcdef1234567890",
-            metadata={"password": "hunter2supersecret"},
-        )
-        serialized = json.dumps(event)
-        self.assertNotIn("abcdef1234567890", serialized)
-        self.assertNotIn("hunter2supersecret", serialized)
-        self.assertTrue(event["redacted"])
-
-    def test_audit_policy_reports_schema_and_retention(self):
-        policy = console_audit.audit_policy()
-        self.assertTrue(policy["append_only"])
-        self.assertTrue(policy["redact_before_persist"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            policy["retention_defaults_days"], console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS
-        )
-
-
-class TestAuditSink(unittest.TestCase):
-    """Append-only persistence behaviour."""
-
-    def test_write_is_a_noop_when_sink_is_unconfigured(self):
-        saved = os.environ.pop(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV, None)
-        try:
-            self.assertFalse(console_audit.audit_enabled())
-            self.assertFalse(console_audit.write_event({"schema_version": 1}))
-        finally:
-            if saved is not None:
-                os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = saved
-
-    def test_records_append_one_json_line_each(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
-            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
-            for _ in range(3):
-                event = console_audit.build_event(
-                    action_id="merge_pr", result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
-                )
-                self.assertTrue(console_audit.write_event(event, path=sink))
-            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-                lines = [json.loads(line) for line in handle if line.strip()]
-            self.assertEqual(len(lines), 3)
-            self.assertEqual(len({line["event_id"] for line in lines}), 3)
-
-    def test_a_record_that_still_carries_a_secret_is_not_persisted(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
-            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
-            leaky = {
-                "schema_version": 1,
-                "detail": "password: hunter2supersecret",
-            }
-            self.assertFalse(console_audit.write_event(leaky, path=sink))
-            self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(sink))
-
-    def test_write_never_raises_on_a_bad_path(self):
-        self.assertFalse(
-            console_audit.write_event(
-                {"schema_version": 1}, path="/nonexistent-dir/audit.jsonl"
-            )
-        )
-
-    def test_simulated_privileged_preview_creates_an_audit_record(self):
-        """Required test: audit record creation for a privileged preview."""
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
-            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
-            os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = sink
-            try:
-                decision = console_authz.authorize(
-                    "merge_pr", _principal("controller")
-                )
-                outcome = console_audit.record_event(
-                    action_id="merge_pr",
-                    result=console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED,
-                    decision=decision,
-                    target={"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
-                    request_id="req-preview",
-                )
-            finally:
-                os.environ.pop(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV, None)
-            self.assertTrue(outcome["written"])
-            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-                record = json.loads(handle.read().strip())
-            self.assertEqual(record["action"], "merge_pr")
-            self.assertEqual(record["result"], console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED)
-            self.assertEqual(record["action_class"], "privileged")
-            self.assertTrue(record["decision"]["allowed"])
-            self.assertFalse(record["decision"]["execution_enabled"])
-            self.assertEqual(record["actor"]["role"], "controller")
-
-    def test_decision_block_survives_redaction(self):
-        """Regression: naming it 'authorization' collided with a secret hint.
-
-        ``gitea_audit._SECRET_KEY_HINTS`` contains "authorization" (for the
-        HTTP header), so a block under that key was replaced wholesale by the
-        placeholder and the record lost its decision entirely.
-        """
-        event = console_audit.build_event(
-            action_id="merge_pr",
-            result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
-            decision=console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("admin")),
-        )
-        self.assertIsInstance(event["decision"], dict)
-        self.assertIn("allowed", event["decision"])
-
-
-class TestConsoleRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC4 — the wired Phase 2 integration points, still fail-closed."""
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app(bind_host="127.0.0.1"))
-
-    def test_unauthenticated_write_stub_is_denied(self):
-        """Required test: default-deny for unauthenticated write stubs."""
-        response = self.client.post(
-            "/api/actions/merge_pr/attempt", json={"pr_number": 99}
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)
-        body = response.json()
-        self.assertFalse(body["success"])
-        authorization = body["authorization"]
-        self.assertFalse(authorization["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            authorization["reason_code"], console_authz.DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(authorization["execution_enabled"])
-
-    def test_preview_reports_an_authorization_decision(self):
-        response = self.client.get("/api/actions/merge_pr/preview?pr_number=7")
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
-        authorization = response.json()["authorization"]
-        self.assertFalse(authorization["allowed"])
-        self.assertTrue(authorization["dual_control"])
-        self.assertEqual(authorization["required_role"], "controller")
-
-    def test_unknown_action_preview_still_404s(self):
-        response = self.client.get("/api/actions/no_such_action/preview")
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 404)
-
-    def test_security_model_endpoint_publishes_all_three_policies(self):
-        response = self.client.get("/api/console/security-model")
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
-        body = response.json()
-        self.assertIn("rbac", body)
-        self.assertIn("redaction", body)
-        self.assertIn("audit", body)
-        self.assertEqual(body["rbac"]["default_decision"], "deny")
-
-    def test_security_model_endpoint_leaks_no_secrets(self):
-        response = self.client.get("/api/console/security-model")
-        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(response.json()), [])
-
-    def test_security_model_rejects_writes(self):
-        response = self.client.post("/api/console/security-model", json={})
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 405)
-
-    def test_existing_read_routes_are_unaffected(self):
-        for path in ("/", "/health", "/actions", "/api/actions"):
-            with self.subTest(path=path):
-                self.assertEqual(self.client.get(path).status_code, 200)
-
-
-class TestAuthzAuditDoc(unittest.TestCase):
-    """The model must be written down, not only coded."""
-
-    @classmethod
-    def setUpClass(cls):
-        cls.text = (
-            AUTHZ_DOC.read_text(encoding="utf-8") if AUTHZ_DOC.exists() else ""
-        )
-
-    def test_doc_exists(self):
-        self.assertTrue(AUTHZ_DOC.exists(), f"missing {AUTHZ_DOC}")
-
-    def test_doc_covers_each_required_section(self):
-        for heading in (
-            "Identity sources",
-            "Role matrix",
-            "Privileged actions",
-            "Secret redaction",
-            "Audit event schema",
-            "Retention",
-            "Phase 2 integration",
-            "Local-dev mode",
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(heading=heading):
-                self.assertIn(heading, self.text)
-
-    def test_doc_names_every_role(self):
-        for role in console_authz.ROLE_ORDER:
-            with self.subTest(role=role):
-                self.assertIn(role, self.text)
-
-    def test_doc_names_every_console_action(self):
-        for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
-            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
-                self.assertIn(action_id, self.text)
-
-    def test_doc_states_retention_defaults(self):
-        for days in console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS.values():
-            with self.subTest(days=days):
-                self.assertIn(str(days), self.text)
-
-    def test_doc_warns_local_dev_is_insecure(self):
-        self.assertIn("INSECURE", self.text.upper())
-
-    def test_doc_states_default_deny(self):
-        self.assertIn("deny", self.text.lower())
-
-    def test_doc_contains_no_secret_material(self):
-        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(self.text), [])
-
-    def test_deployment_doc_links_to_the_model(self):
-        deployment = (DOCS / "webui-deployment.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-        self.assertIn("webui-authz-audit", deployment)
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover
-    unittest.main()

tests/test_webui_inventory.py

@@ -0,0 +1,468 @@
+"""Tests for the unified web-console inventory API (#636).
+
+Covers the four cases the issue names — empty, populated, partial failure, and
+the no-false-unowned invariant — plus redaction, collision detection, the
+resource-split routes, and read-only guarantees against a real control-plane
+database and real durable lock files.
+"""
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+import control_plane_db
+from webui.app import create_app
+from webui import inventory
+
+
+def _iso(dt: datetime) -> str:
+    return dt.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def _write_lock(lock_dir: str, name: str, payload: dict) -> str:
+    path = os.path.join(lock_dir, name)
+    with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        json.dump(payload, handle)
+    return path
+
+
+def _live_lock_payload(
+    *,
+    issue_number: int,
+    branch: str,
+    worktree_path: str,
+    pid: int,
+    username: str = "jcwalker3",
+    profile: str = "prgs-author",
+) -> dict:
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    future = now + timedelta(hours=2)
+    return {
+        "branch_name": branch,
+        "issue_number": issue_number,
+        "org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+        "repo": "Gitea-Tools",
+        "remote": "prgs",
+        "pid": pid,
+        "session_pid": pid,
+        "lock_generation": 1,
+        "worktree_path": worktree_path,
+        "claimant": {"username": username, "profile": profile},
+        "work_lease": {
+            "branch": branch,
+            "issue_number": issue_number,
+            "operation_type": "author_issue_work",
+            "created_at": _iso(now),
+            "expires_at": _iso(future),
+            "last_heartbeat_at": _iso(now),
+            "claimant": {"username": username, "profile": profile},
+        },
+    }
+
+
+class _FixtureMixin(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.tmp = self._tmp.name
+        self.lock_dir = os.path.join(self.tmp, "locks")
+        os.makedirs(self.lock_dir, mode=0o700)
+        self.db_path = os.path.join(self.tmp, "control_plane.db")
+        self.addCleanup(self._tmp.cleanup)
+
+    def _seed_db(self) -> control_plane_db.ControlPlaneDB:
+        db = control_plane_db.ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)
+        db.upsert_session(
+            session_id="prgs-author-1",
+            role="author",
+            profile="prgs-author",
+            namespace="gitea-author",
+            pid=os.getpid(),
+        )
+        db.upsert_work_item(
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            kind="issue",
+            number=636,
+        )
+        db.assign_and_lease(
+            session_id="prgs-author-1",
+            role="author",
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            kind="issue",
+            number=636,
+        )
+        return db
+
+
+class TestRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_redact_path_collapses_home(self):
+        home = os.path.expanduser("~")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            inventory.redact_path(f"{home}/Development/Gitea-Tools"),
+            "~/Development/Gitea-Tools",
+        )
+
+    def test_redact_url_strips_userinfo_and_query(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            inventory.redact_url("https://user:[email protected]/api?token=abc"),
+            "https://gitea.prgs.cc/api",
+        )
+
+    def test_scrub_drops_credential_keys(self):
+        scrubbed = inventory.scrub(
+            {"token": "abc123", "api_key": "k", "profile": "prgs-author"}
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(scrubbed["token"], "[redacted]")
+        self.assertEqual(scrubbed["api_key"], "[redacted]")
+        self.assertEqual(scrubbed["profile"], "prgs-author")
+
+    def test_scrub_is_recursive_and_never_raises(self):
+        class Weird:
+            def __repr__(self) -> str:
+                return "weird-obj"
+
+        out = inventory.scrub({"nested": [{"password": "p", "obj": Weird()}]})
+        self.assertEqual(out["nested"][0]["password"], "[redacted]")
+        self.assertEqual(out["nested"][0]["obj"], "weird-obj")
+
+
+class TestEmptyInventory(_FixtureMixin):
+    def test_empty_db_and_locks_degrade_without_raising(self):
+        # No DB file, no locks: sessions/leases unavailable, locks ok+empty.
+        snap = inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=self.db_path,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            load_hygiene=lambda: _StubHygiene(entries=()),
+        )
+        sessions = snap.section("sessions")
+        leases = snap.section("leases")
+        locks = snap.section("locks")
+        self.assertEqual(sessions.status, inventory.STATUS_UNAVAILABLE)
+        self.assertEqual(leases.status, inventory.STATUS_UNAVAILABLE)
+        self.assertEqual(locks.status, inventory.STATUS_OK)
+        self.assertEqual(len(locks.items), 0)
+        # Ownership authority is incomplete because the DB is missing.
+        self.assertFalse(snap.ownership_authority_complete)
+        self.assertEqual(snap.collisions, ())
+
+    def test_empty_db_present_but_unpopulated(self):
+        control_plane_db.ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)  # creates schema, no rows
+        snap = inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=self.db_path,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            load_hygiene=lambda: _StubHygiene(entries=()),
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(snap.section("sessions").status, inventory.STATUS_OK)
+        self.assertEqual(len(snap.section("sessions").items), 0)
+        self.assertEqual(snap.section("leases").status, inventory.STATUS_OK)
+        self.assertTrue(snap.ownership_authority_complete)
+
+
+class TestPopulatedInventory(_FixtureMixin):
+    def test_sections_populated_and_correlated(self):
+        self._seed_db()
+        wt = f"{self.tmp}/branches/issue-636-inventory-api"
+        _write_lock(
+            self.lock_dir,
+            "prgs-Scaled-Tech-Consulting-Gitea-Tools-636.json",
+            _live_lock_payload(
+                issue_number=636,
+                branch="feat/issue-636-inventory-api",
+                worktree_path=wt,
+                pid=os.getpid(),
+            ),
+        )
+        hygiene = _StubHygiene(
+            entries=(
+                _StubEntry(
+                    rel_path="branches/issue-636-inventory-api",
+                    branch="feat/issue-636-inventory-api",
+                    classification="active-issue",
+                ),
+            )
+        )
+        snap = inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=self.db_path,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            load_hygiene=lambda: hygiene,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(snap.ownership_authority_complete)
+        self.assertEqual(len(snap.section("sessions").items), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(len(snap.section("leases").items), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(len(snap.section("locks").items), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(len(snap.section("worktrees").items), 1)
+
+        # The lease, lock, and worktree for #636 correlate onto one row.
+        row = next(r for r in snap.correlations if r["issue_number"] == 636)
+        self.assertEqual(row["branch"], "feat/issue-636-inventory-api")
+        self.assertTrue(row["lock_live"])
+        self.assertEqual(row["worktree_classification"], "active-issue")
+        self.assertEqual(len(row["lease_ids"]), 1)
+        # No collision: live lock, live pid, matching worktree.
+        self.assertEqual(snap.collisions, ())
+
+    def test_serialized_payload_declares_field_authority(self):
+        self._seed_db()
+        snap = inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=self.db_path,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            load_hygiene=lambda: _StubHygiene(entries=()),
+        )
+        payload = inventory.snapshot_to_dict(snap)
+        self.assertEqual(payload["api_version"], "v1")
+        self.assertEqual(payload["schema_version"], 1)
+        self.assertEqual(payload["field_authority"]["sessions"], "control_plane_db")
+        self.assertEqual(payload["field_authority"]["locks"], "filesystem")
+        self.assertIn("sessions", payload["sections"])
+
+
+class TestPartialFailure(_FixtureMixin):
+    def test_worktree_scan_failure_degrades_only_that_section(self):
+        self._seed_db()
+
+        def _boom():
+            raise RuntimeError("git worktree list exploded")
+
+        snap = inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=self.db_path,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            load_hygiene=_boom,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            snap.section("worktrees").status, inventory.STATUS_UNAVAILABLE
+        )
+        self.assertIn("exploded", snap.section("worktrees").reason)
+        # DB-backed sections still healthy.
+        self.assertEqual(snap.section("sessions").status, inventory.STATUS_OK)
+        self.assertIn("worktrees", snap.degraded_sections)
+
+    def test_degraded_ownership_suppresses_unowned_claim(self):
+        # DB absent → sessions/leases unavailable → ownership incomplete even
+        # though a lock exists and could look "unclaimed" by the DB alone.
+        _write_lock(
+            self.lock_dir,
+            "prgs-Scaled-Tech-Consulting-Gitea-Tools-636.json",
+            _live_lock_payload(
+                issue_number=636,
+                branch="feat/issue-636-inventory-api",
+                worktree_path=f"{self.tmp}/wt",
+                pid=os.getpid(),
+            ),
+        )
+        snap = inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=self.db_path,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            load_hygiene=lambda: _StubHygiene(entries=()),
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(snap.ownership_authority_complete)
+        payload = inventory.snapshot_to_dict(snap)
+        self.assertIn("may be treated as unowned", payload["ownership_note"])
+
+
+class TestCollisionDetection(_FixtureMixin):
+    def test_live_lock_dead_owner_flagged(self):
+        _write_lock(
+            self.lock_dir,
+            "prgs-Scaled-Tech-Consulting-Gitea-Tools-700.json",
+            _live_lock_payload(
+                issue_number=700,
+                branch="feat/issue-700-x",
+                worktree_path=f"{self.tmp}/wt700",
+                pid=999_999_999,  # not a running pid
+            ),
+        )
+        control_plane_db.ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)  # empty but present
+        snap = inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=self.db_path,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            load_hygiene=lambda: _StubHygiene(entries=()),
+        )
+        kinds = {c.kind for c in snap.collisions}
+        self.assertIn("live-lock-dead-owner", kinds)
+        # Also lock-without-worktree, since no worktree carries the branch.
+        self.assertIn("lock-without-worktree", kinds)
+
+    def test_duplicate_live_lock_on_same_branch(self):
+        for issue in (800, 801):
+            _write_lock(
+                self.lock_dir,
+                f"prgs-Scaled-Tech-Consulting-Gitea-Tools-{issue}.json",
+                _live_lock_payload(
+                    issue_number=issue,
+                    branch="feat/issue-800-shared",
+                    worktree_path=f"{self.tmp}/wt{issue}",
+                    pid=os.getpid(),
+                ),
+            )
+        control_plane_db.ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)
+        snap = inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=self.db_path,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            load_hygiene=lambda: _StubHygiene(entries=()),
+        )
+        self.assertIn(
+            "duplicate-live-lock", {c.kind for c in snap.collisions}
+        )
+
+    def test_no_collision_when_sections_degraded(self):
+        # locks ok but worktrees unavailable → lock-without-worktree must NOT
+        # be asserted (a missing scan is not a missing worktree).
+        _write_lock(
+            self.lock_dir,
+            "prgs-Scaled-Tech-Consulting-Gitea-Tools-636.json",
+            _live_lock_payload(
+                issue_number=636,
+                branch="feat/issue-636-inventory-api",
+                worktree_path=f"{self.tmp}/wt",
+                pid=os.getpid(),
+            ),
+        )
+        control_plane_db.ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)
+
+        def _boom():
+            raise RuntimeError("scan down")
+
+        snap = inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=self.db_path,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            load_hygiene=_boom,
+        )
+        self.assertNotIn(
+            "lock-without-worktree", {c.kind for c in snap.collisions}
+        )
+
+
+class TestSectionInclude(_FixtureMixin):
+    def test_include_restricts_scanned_sections(self):
+        self._seed_db()
+        snap = inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=self.db_path,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            include=("locks",),
+        )
+        self.assertIsNotNone(snap.section("locks"))
+        self.assertIsNone(snap.section("sessions"))
+        self.assertIsNone(snap.section("worktrees"))
+
+
+class TestRoutes(_FixtureMixin):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        super().setUp()
+        # Point the loaders at the fixture DB and lock dir via env, and stub
+        # the worktree scan so the route does not shell out to git.
+        self._prev_env = {
+            "GITEA_CONTROL_PLANE_DB": os.environ.get("GITEA_CONTROL_PLANE_DB"),
+            "GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR": os.environ.get("GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR"),
+            "WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE": os.environ.get("WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE"),
+        }
+        os.environ["GITEA_CONTROL_PLANE_DB"] = self.db_path
+        os.environ["GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR"] = self.lock_dir
+        os.environ["WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE"] = "1"
+        self._seed_db()
+        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        for key, value in self._prev_env.items():
+            if value is None:
+                os.environ.pop(key, None)
+            else:
+                os.environ[key] = value
+
+    def test_inventory_route_returns_versioned_payload(self):
+        resp = self.client.get("/api/v1/inventory")
+        self.assertEqual(resp.status_code, 200)
+        body = resp.json()
+        self.assertEqual(body["api_version"], "v1")
+        self.assertIn("sessions", body["sections"])
+        self.assertIn("field_authority", body)
+
+    def test_section_route_restricts_and_labels(self):
+        resp = self.client.get("/api/v1/inventory/locks")
+        self.assertEqual(resp.status_code, 200)
+        body = resp.json()
+        self.assertEqual(body["requested_section"], "locks")
+        self.assertIn("locks", body["sections"])
+        self.assertNotIn("sessions", body["sections"])
+
+    def test_unknown_section_is_404(self):
+        resp = self.client.get("/api/v1/inventory/bogus")
+        self.assertEqual(resp.status_code, 404)
+        self.assertEqual(resp.json()["error"], "unknown_section")
+
+    def test_inventory_route_rejects_post(self):
+        resp = self.client.post("/api/v1/inventory")
+        self.assertEqual(resp.status_code, 405)
+
+
+class TestReadOnly(_FixtureMixin):
+    def test_snapshot_does_not_create_db_file(self):
+        missing = os.path.join(self.tmp, "does-not-exist.db")
+        inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=missing,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            load_hygiene=lambda: _StubHygiene(entries=()),
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(missing))
+
+    def test_readonly_connection_refuses_write(self):
+        self._seed_db()
+        conn = inventory._open_readonly(self.db_path)
+        try:
+            with self.assertRaises(Exception):
+                conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO sessions(session_id, role, started_at, "
+                    "last_heartbeat_at, status) VALUES ('x','author',"
+                    "'t','t','active')"
+                )
+                conn.commit()
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+
+
+# ── lightweight stand-ins for the #432 hygiene snapshot ──────────────────────
+
+
+class _StubEntry:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        rel_path: str,
+        branch: str | None = None,
+        classification: str = "stale-clean",
+        head_sha: str | None = "abc123",
+        dirty_tracked: int = 0,
+        dirty_untracked: bool = False,
+        detached: bool = False,
+        registered_worktree: bool = True,
+        notes: str = "",
+    ) -> None:
+        self.rel_path = rel_path
+        self.folder_name = rel_path.split("/", 1)[-1]
+        self.branch = branch
+        self.classification = classification
+        self.head_sha = head_sha
+        self.dirty_tracked = dirty_tracked
+        self.dirty_untracked = dirty_untracked
+        self.detached = detached
+        self.registered_worktree = registered_worktree
+        self.notes = notes
+
+
+class _StubHygiene:
+    def __init__(self, *, entries=(), scan_error=None) -> None:
+        self.entries = tuple(entries)
+        self.scan_error = scan_error
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

webui/app.py

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import uuid
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 
 from starlette.applications import Starlette
@@ -32,9 +31,6 @@ from final_report_validator import FINAL_REPORT_TASK_KINDS
 
 from webui.gated_actions import attempt_action, load_action_registry, preview_action
 from webui.gated_action_views import render_actions_page
-from webui import console_audit
-from webui.console_authz import authorize, rbac_matrix, resolve_principal
-from webui.console_redaction import redaction_policy
 from webui.audit_validator import audit_report, audit_to_dict
 from webui.audit_views import render_audit_page
 from webui.lease_loader import load_lease_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as lease_snapshot_to_dict
@@ -45,6 +41,11 @@ from webui.worktree_scanner import load_hygiene_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as wo
 from webui.worktree_views import render_worktrees_page
 from webui.runtime_health import load_runtime_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as runtime_snapshot_to_dict
 from webui.runtime_views import render_runtime_page
+from webui.inventory import (
+    SECTION_NAMES as _INVENTORY_SECTIONS,
+    load_inventory_snapshot,
+    snapshot_to_dict as inventory_snapshot_to_dict,
+)
 
 _READ_ONLY_METHODS = frozenset({"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"})
 _AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS = frozenset({"/audit", "/api/audit"})
@@ -280,49 +281,6 @@ async def api_actions(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     return JSONResponse(load_action_registry().to_dict())
 
 
-def _request_id() -> str:
-    return f"req-{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
-
-
-def _audit_target(action_id: str, params: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
-    """Describe the action target for the audit record (never secrets)."""
-    if "pr_number" in params:
-        return {"kind": "pr", "ref": f"#{params['pr_number']}"}
-    if "issue_number" in params:
-        return {"kind": "issue", "ref": f"#{params['issue_number']}"}
-    if "branch_name" in params:
-        return {"kind": "branch", "ref": str(params["branch_name"])}
-    return {"kind": "unspecified", "ref": action_id}
-
-
-def _authorize_request(
-    request: Request,
-    action_id: str,
-    params: dict[str, object],
-    *,
-    for_execution: bool,
-    result: str,
-) -> dict[str, object]:
-    """Resolve principal, decide, and audit. Returns the decision payload.
-
-    Phase 1 records the decision rather than enforcing it as the terminal
-    outcome: ``webui.gated_actions`` already fails closed for every action, so
-    this layer cannot loosen anything. Phase 2 enforces on this same decision.
-    """
-    principal = resolve_principal(headers=dict(request.headers))
-    decision = authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=for_execution)
-    console_audit.record_event(
-        action_id=action_id,
-        result=result,
-        decision=decision,
-        principal=principal,
-        target=_audit_target(action_id, params),
-        request_id=_request_id(),
-        detail=decision.detail,
-    )
-    return decision.to_dict()
-
-
 async def api_action_preview(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     action_id = request.path_params["action_id"]
     params = dict(request.query_params)
@@ -332,13 +290,6 @@ async def api_action_preview(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     result = preview_action(action_id, **params)
     if "error" in result:
         return JSONResponse(result, status_code=404)
-    result["authorization"] = _authorize_request(
-        request,
-        action_id,
-        params,
-        for_execution=False,
-        result=console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED,
-    )
     return JSONResponse(result)
 
 
@@ -352,29 +303,32 @@ async def api_action_attempt(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     if not isinstance(body, dict):
         body = {}
     result = attempt_action(action_id, **body)
-    authorization = _authorize_request(
-        request,
-        action_id,
-        body,
-        for_execution=True,
-        result=(
-            console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
-            if not result.get("success")
-            else console_audit.RESULT_ALLOWED
-        ),
-    )
-    result["authorization"] = authorization
     status = 403 if not result.get("success") else 200
     return JSONResponse(result, status_code=status)
 
 
-async def api_console_security_model(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
+async def api_inventory(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
-    """Read-only publication of the #633 authorization/redaction/audit model."""
+    """Unified read-only session/lease/lock/worktree inventory (#636)."""
-    return JSONResponse({
+    snapshot = load_inventory_snapshot()
-        "rbac": rbac_matrix(),
+    return JSONResponse(inventory_snapshot_to_dict(snapshot))
-        "redaction": redaction_policy(),
+
-        "audit": console_audit.audit_policy(),
+
-    })
+async def api_inventory_section(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
+    """Resource-split view: one inventory section under the shared schema."""
+    section = request.path_params["section"]
+    if section not in _INVENTORY_SECTIONS:
+        return JSONResponse(
+            {
+                "error": "unknown_section",
+                "detail": f"no inventory section named {section!r}",
+                "available": sorted(_INVENTORY_SECTIONS),
+            },
+            status_code=404,
+        )
+    snapshot = load_inventory_snapshot(include=(section,))
+    payload = inventory_snapshot_to_dict(snapshot)
+    payload["requested_section"] = section
+    return JSONResponse(payload)
 
 
 async def method_not_allowed(request: Request, _exc: Exception) -> Response:
@@ -433,9 +387,10 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
                 methods=["POST"],
             ),
             Route("/api/leases", api_leases, methods=["GET"]),
+            Route("/api/v1/inventory", api_inventory, methods=["GET"]),
             Route(
-                "/api/console/security-model",
+                "/api/v1/inventory/{section}",
-                api_console_security_model,
+                api_inventory_section,
                 methods=["GET"],
             ),
         ],

webui/console_audit.py

@@ -1,281 +0,0 @@
-"""Console audit event schema, retention, and append-only sink (#633).
-
-``gitea_audit`` records MCP-side *mutations*: which profile and Gitea user
-performed which tool call. It carries no console actor, no identity source, no
-correlation identifier, and no retention class, so it cannot answer the
-question #633 exists to answer — *who sat at the console, what did they
-attempt, and was it authorized?* An authorization denial is not a mutation and
-would never appear there at all.
-
-This module adds the console-side record. It does not replace ``gitea_audit``:
-when a Phase 2 action eventually reaches MCP, both fire, correlated by
-``correlation.request_id``.
-
-Design constraints:
-
-- **Redact before persist.** Every record passes through
-  ``webui.console_redaction.redact_payload`` before serialization, so an
-  unredacted field is never durable.
-- **Append-only.** Records are appended as JSON lines. Nothing here updates or
-  deletes; retention is metadata on each record, enforced by an operator-run
-  policy, never by silent rewriting.
-- **Never raises.** Auditing must not break the request it describes. A failed
-  write returns ``False``.
-- **Off by default.** With ``WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG`` unset, events are still
-  *built* (so callers and tests see the schema) but nothing is written.
-
-A record looks like this (synthetic values):
-
-    {"schema_version": 1, "event_id": "evt-0001",
-     "timestamp": "2026-07-22T10:16:42+00:00",
-     "actor": {"subject": "[email protected]", "role": "operator",
-               "identity_source": "access_proxy", "authenticated": true},
-     "action": "merge_pr", "action_class": "privileged",
-     "target": {"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
-     "result": "denied", "reason_code": "insufficient_role",
-     "correlation": {"request_id": "req-abc", "session_id": null,
-                     "mcp_task": "merge_pr", "mcp_permission": "gitea.pr.merge"},
-     "retention": {"class": "privileged", "days": 365,
-                   "expires_at": "2027-07-22T10:16:42+00:00"},
-     "redacted": true}
-
-Timestamps are timezone-aware ISO-8601 in UTC.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import datetime
-import json
-import os
-import uuid
-from typing import Any
-
-from webui import console_authz
-from webui.console_redaction import redact_payload, scan_for_secrets
-
-SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
-
-AUDIT_LOG_ENV = "WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG"
-
-# Result vocabulary. ``denied`` is the one ``gitea_audit`` has no equivalent
-# for: an authorization refusal never reaches the MCP layer.
-RESULT_ALLOWED = "allowed"
-RESULT_DENIED = "denied"
-RESULT_PREVIEWED = "previewed"
-RESULT_FAILED = "failed"
-RESULT_SUCCEEDED = "succeeded"
-
-RESULTS = frozenset(
-    {
-        RESULT_ALLOWED,
-        RESULT_DENIED,
-        RESULT_PREVIEWED,
-        RESULT_FAILED,
-        RESULT_SUCCEEDED,
-    }
-)
-
-# Retention classes and default lifetimes in days. Privileged and break-glass
-# records outlive routine ones because they are what an incident review needs.
-RETENTION_STANDARD = "standard"
-RETENTION_PRIVILEGED = "privileged"
-RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS = "break_glass"
-
-RETENTION_DAYS: dict[str, int] = {
-    RETENTION_STANDARD: 90,
-    RETENTION_PRIVILEGED: 365,
-    RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS: 730,
-}
-
-# Fields every record must carry. Asserted by the test suite so a future edit
-# cannot quietly drop one.
-REQUIRED_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
-    "schema_version",
-    "event_id",
-    "timestamp",
-    "actor",
-    "action",
-    "action_class",
-    "target",
-    "result",
-    "reason_code",
-    "correlation",
-    "retention",
-    "redacted",
-)
-
-REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
-    "subject",
-    "role",
-    "identity_source",
-    "authenticated",
-)
-
-REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
-    "request_id",
-    "session_id",
-    "mcp_task",
-    "mcp_permission",
-)
-
-
-def audit_log_path() -> str | None:
-    """Configured sink path, or ``None`` when console auditing is off."""
-    return (os.environ.get(AUDIT_LOG_ENV) or "").strip() or None
-
-
-def audit_enabled() -> bool:
-    return audit_log_path() is not None
-
-
-def retention_class_for(action: console_authz.ConsoleAction | None) -> str:
-    """Classify retention from the action, defaulting to the longest-lived.
-
-    An unknown action is treated as privileged rather than standard: for a
-    safety control the conservative direction is to keep the record longer.
-    """
-    if action is None:
-        return RETENTION_PRIVILEGED
-    if action.break_glass:
-        return RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS
-    if action.privileged:
-        return RETENTION_PRIVILEGED
-    return RETENTION_STANDARD
-
-
-def _retention_block(
-    retention_class: str, now: datetime.datetime
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    days = RETENTION_DAYS.get(
-        retention_class, RETENTION_DAYS[RETENTION_PRIVILEGED]
-    )
-    return {
-        "class": retention_class,
-        "days": days,
-        "expires_at": (now + datetime.timedelta(days=days)).isoformat(),
-    }
-
-
-def build_event(
-    *,
-    action_id: str,
-    result: str,
-    decision: console_authz.AuthorizationDecision | None = None,
-    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
-    target: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-    reason_code: str | None = None,
-    request_id: str | None = None,
-    session_id: str | None = None,
-    detail: str | None = None,
-    metadata: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-    now: datetime.datetime | None = None,
-    event_id: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Build one redacted, JSON-able console audit record.
-
-    Redaction runs here rather than at write time so an in-memory record handed
-    to a template or an API response is already clean.
-    """
-    ts = now or datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc)
-    action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
-    who = principal or (
-        decision.principal if decision else console_authz.ANONYMOUS
-    )
-    resolved_result = result if result in RESULTS else RESULT_FAILED
-    resolved_reason = reason_code or (
-        decision.reason_code if decision else "unspecified"
-    )
-    retention_class = retention_class_for(action)
-
-    event: dict[str, Any] = {
-        "schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
-        "event_id": event_id or f"evt-{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
-        "timestamp": ts.isoformat(),
-        "actor": who.to_dict(),
-        "action": action_id,
-        "action_class": action.action_class if action else "unknown",
-        "target": dict(target or {}),
-        "result": resolved_result,
-        "reason_code": resolved_reason,
-        "correlation": {
-            "request_id": request_id,
-            "session_id": session_id,
-            "mcp_task": action.task_key if action else None,
-            "mcp_permission": action.mcp_permission if action else None,
-        },
-        "retention": _retention_block(retention_class, ts),
-        "redacted": True,
-        "detail": detail,
-        "metadata": dict(metadata or {}),
-    }
-    if decision is not None:
-        # Deliberately *not* named "authorization": ``gitea_audit`` treats that
-        # substring as a secret key hint (it matches the HTTP Authorization
-        # header) and would replace this whole block with the placeholder.
-        event["decision"] = {
-            "allowed": decision.allowed,
-            "required_role": decision.required_role,
-            "requires_confirmation": decision.requires_confirmation,
-            "dual_control": decision.dual_control,
-            "break_glass": decision.break_glass,
-            "execution_enabled": decision.execution_enabled,
-        }
-
-    redacted = redact_payload(event)
-    if not isinstance(redacted, dict):  # pragma: no cover - defensive
-        return {"schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION, "redacted": True}
-    return redacted
-
-
-def write_event(event: dict[str, Any], path: str | None = None) -> bool:
-    """Append *event* as one JSON line. Never raises.
-
-    Returns ``True`` when a line was written, ``False`` when auditing is off or
-    the write failed. A record that still trips a secret detector is dropped
-    rather than persisted.
-    """
-    sink = path or audit_log_path()
-    if not sink:
-        return False
-    try:
-        if scan_for_secrets(event):
-            return False
-        line = json.dumps(event, default=str, sort_keys=True)
-        with open(sink, "a", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-            handle.write(line + "\n")
-        return True
-    except Exception:
-        return False
-
-
-def record_event(**kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Build and persist one record; return the record either way.
-
-    Callers get the record back so it can be surfaced in a response or a test
-    regardless of whether a sink is configured.
-    """
-    event = build_event(**kwargs)
-    written = write_event(event)
-    return {"event": event, "written": written}
-
-
-def audit_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Machine-readable audit schema and retention defaults (never secrets)."""
-    return {
-        "schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
-        "required_fields": list(REQUIRED_FIELDS),
-        "required_actor_fields": list(REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS),
-        "required_correlation_fields": list(REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS),
-        "results": sorted(RESULTS),
-        "retention_defaults_days": dict(RETENTION_DAYS),
-        "sink_env": AUDIT_LOG_ENV,
-        "enabled": audit_enabled(),
-        "append_only": True,
-        "redact_before_persist": True,
-        "timestamp_format": "ISO-8601, timezone-aware, UTC",
-        "relationship_to_mcp_audit": (
-            "webui.console_audit records console intent and authorization "
-            "outcomes; gitea_audit records MCP mutations. A Phase 2 action "
-            "emits both, correlated by correlation.request_id."
-        ),
-    }

webui/console_authz.py

@@ -1,537 +0,0 @@
-"""Console authorization and RBAC model (#633, Phase 1).
-
-The read-only MVP (#426–#436) ships with no authentication: protection comes
-from network placement alone (#435). That is adequate while every route is a
-GET, and inadequate the moment Phase 2 wires a gated write. This module is the
-authorization model those writes must go through, landed *before* any of them
-exists so no write can be added without an authority to check against.
-
-Phase 1 scope is the model itself: identity resolution, the role matrix, the
-privileged-action list, and a fail-closed :func:`authorize`. It deliberately
-does **not** enable any write. ``webui.gated_actions`` stays globally disabled,
-so an allow decision here is necessary but never sufficient.
-
-Two invariants hold for every caller:
-
-- **Default deny.** An unrecognised action, an unknown role, or an absent
-  principal denies. There is no implicit allow branch and no "unless" clause.
-- **Authorization is not execution.** :func:`authorize` returns a decision
-  record. It never calls MCP, never mutates, and never consults credentials.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
-from typing import Any
-
-from task_capability_map import required_permission, required_role
-
-# --- Roles ------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Ordered least to most authority. Higher ranks inherit every lower rank's
-# permitted actions; the matrix below is expressed as a minimum required rank.
-VIEWER = "viewer"
-OPERATOR = "operator"
-CONTROLLER = "controller"
-ADMIN = "admin"
-
-ROLE_ORDER: tuple[str, ...] = (VIEWER, OPERATOR, CONTROLLER, ADMIN)
-_ROLE_RANK: dict[str, int] = {role: idx for idx, role in enumerate(ROLE_ORDER)}
-
-ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS: dict[str, str] = {
-    VIEWER: "Read every console view. No write, ever, in any phase.",
-    OPERATOR: "Viewer, plus author-class work: claim, comment, open a PR.",
-    CONTROLLER: "Operator, plus reviewer/merger-class decisions on a PR.",
-    ADMIN: "Controller, plus destructive and policy-editing actions.",
-}
-
-# --- Identity sources -------------------------------------------------------
-IDENTITY_NONE = "none"
-IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV = "local_dev"
-IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY = "access_proxy"
-
-IDENTITY_SOURCES: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {
-    IDENTITY_NONE: {
-        "description": (
-            "No authentication configured. Every request is anonymous and "
-            "capped at viewer. This is the MVP default and the only mode "
-            "whose safety rests entirely on network placement (#435)."
-        ),
-        "authenticated": False,
-        "safe_for_shared_host": False,
-        "phase_available": 1,
-    },
-    IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV: {
-        "description": (
-            "Developer-supplied principal read from the environment. INSECURE: "
-            "the subject and role are asserted, never verified. Loopback only."
-        ),
-        "authenticated": True,
-        "safe_for_shared_host": False,
-        "phase_available": 1,
-    },
-    IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY: {
-        "description": (
-            "Subject asserted by a trusted access proxy (Cloudflare Access, "
-            "WARP, or an org VPN portal) via a verified request header. The "
-            "proxy performs authentication; the console performs authorization."
-        ),
-        "authenticated": True,
-        "safe_for_shared_host": True,
-        "phase_available": 2,
-    },
-}
-
-# Environment configuration. All are read server-side and never rendered.
-AUTH_MODE_ENV = "WEBUI_AUTH_MODE"
-DEV_SUBJECT_ENV = "WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT"
-DEV_ROLE_ENV = "WEBUI_DEV_ROLE"
-ROLE_MAP_ENV = "WEBUI_ROLE_MAP"
-REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV = "WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH"
-ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER = "cf-access-authenticated-user-email"
-
-# --- Action classes ---------------------------------------------------------
-CLASS_READ = "read"
-CLASS_WRITE = "gated_write"
-CLASS_PRIVILEGED = "privileged"
-CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE = "destructive"
-
-# --- Privileged action list -------------------------------------------------
-# ``task_key`` ties each console action back to ``task_capability_map``, so the
-# console cannot invent an authority the MCP layer does not already define.
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class ConsoleAction:
-    """One console action and the authority required to invoke it."""
-
-    action_id: str
-    task_key: str
-    action_class: str
-    minimum_role: str
-    requires_confirmation: bool
-    dual_control: bool
-    break_glass: bool
-    phase: int
-    summary: str
-
-    @property
-    def mcp_permission(self) -> str:
-        return required_permission(self.task_key)
-
-    @property
-    def mcp_role(self) -> str:
-        return required_role(self.task_key)
-
-    @property
-    def privileged(self) -> bool:
-        return self.action_class in {CLASS_PRIVILEGED, CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE}
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        data = asdict(self)
-        data["mcp_permission"] = self.mcp_permission
-        data["mcp_role"] = self.mcp_role
-        data["privileged"] = self.privileged
-        return data
-
-
-_ACTION_SPECS: tuple[ConsoleAction, ...] = (
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="claim_issue",
-        task_key="claim_issue",
-        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
-        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=2,
-        summary="Apply status:in-progress to an issue.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="comment_issue",
-        task_key="comment_issue",
-        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
-        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=2,
-        summary="Post an issue comment.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="create_issue",
-        task_key="create_issue",
-        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
-        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=2,
-        summary="Open a new tracking issue.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="comment_pr",
-        task_key="comment_pr",
-        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
-        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=2,
-        summary="Post a PR thread comment.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="create_pr",
-        task_key="create_pr",
-        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
-        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=2,
-        summary="Open a PR from a locked feature branch.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="review_pr",
-        task_key="review_pr",
-        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
-        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=3,
-        summary="Submit an approve / request-changes verdict.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="close_pr",
-        task_key="close_pr",
-        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
-        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=3,
-        summary="Close a pull request without merging.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="merge_pr",
-        task_key="merge_pr",
-        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
-        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=True,
-        break_glass=True,
-        phase=3,
-        summary="Merge an approved pull request.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="delete_branch",
-        task_key="delete_branch",
-        action_class=CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE,
-        minimum_role=ADMIN,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=True,
-        break_glass=True,
-        phase=3,
-        summary="Remove a remote feature branch.",
-    ),
-)
-
-ACTIONS: dict[str, ConsoleAction] = {a.action_id: a for a in _ACTION_SPECS}
-
-
-def privileged_actions() -> tuple[ConsoleAction, ...]:
-    """Actions requiring dual control, break-glass, or controller+ authority."""
-    return tuple(a for a in _ACTION_SPECS if a.privileged)
-
-
-def get_action(action_id: str) -> ConsoleAction | None:
-    return ACTIONS.get(action_id)
-
-
-# --- Principals -------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class Principal:
-    """Who is making a request, and how strongly that is known."""
-
-    subject: str
-    role: str
-    identity_source: str
-    authenticated: bool
-    warnings: tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
-
-    @property
-    def rank(self) -> int:
-        return _ROLE_RANK.get(self.role, -1)
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "subject": self.subject,
-            "role": self.role,
-            "identity_source": self.identity_source,
-            "authenticated": self.authenticated,
-            "warnings": list(self.warnings),
-        }
-
-
-ANONYMOUS = Principal(
-    subject="anonymous",
-    role=VIEWER,
-    identity_source=IDENTITY_NONE,
-    authenticated=False,
-    warnings=("No authentication configured; capped at viewer.",),
-)
-
-
-def auth_mode(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> str:
-    """Resolve the configured identity source, defaulting to ``none``."""
-    source = env if env is not None else os.environ
-    raw = (source.get(AUTH_MODE_ENV) or "").strip().lower().replace("-", "_")
-    if raw in IDENTITY_SOURCES:
-        return raw
-    return IDENTITY_NONE
-
-
-def _role_map(env: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, str]:
-    """Parse ``WEBUI_ROLE_MAP`` (JSON subject→role). Invalid config yields {}."""
-    raw = (env.get(ROLE_MAP_ENV) or "").strip()
-    if not raw:
-        return {}
-    try:
-        parsed = json.loads(raw)
-    except Exception:
-        return {}
-    if not isinstance(parsed, dict):
-        return {}
-    return {
-        str(k): str(v).strip().lower()
-        for k, v in parsed.items()
-        if str(v).strip().lower() in _ROLE_RANK
-    }
-
-
-def resolve_principal(
-    headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
-    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
-) -> Principal:
-    """Resolve the requesting principal. Unknown or unconfigured → anonymous.
-
-    Never raises and never trusts a client-supplied role: the role always comes
-    from server-side configuration keyed by the resolved subject.
-    """
-    source_env = dict(env) if env is not None else dict(os.environ)
-    lowered = {str(k).lower(): str(v) for k, v in (headers or {}).items()}
-    mode = auth_mode(source_env)
-
-    if mode == IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV:
-        subject = (source_env.get(DEV_SUBJECT_ENV) or "").strip()
-        if not subject:
-            return ANONYMOUS
-        role = (source_env.get(DEV_ROLE_ENV) or VIEWER).strip().lower()
-        if role not in _ROLE_RANK:
-            role = VIEWER
-        return Principal(
-            subject=subject,
-            role=role,
-            identity_source=IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV,
-            authenticated=True,
-            warnings=(
-                "local-dev identity is asserted, not verified; never use "
-                "outside loopback.",
-            ),
-        )
-
-    if mode == IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY:
-        subject = (lowered.get(ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER) or "").strip()
-        if not subject:
-            # Proxy mode with no proxy header means the request did not
-            # traverse the proxy. Fail closed rather than trust it.
-            return ANONYMOUS
-        role = _role_map(source_env).get(subject, VIEWER)
-        return Principal(
-            subject=subject,
-            role=role,
-            identity_source=IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
-            authenticated=True,
-        )
-
-    return ANONYMOUS
-
-
-def probe_auth_required(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> bool:
-    """Whether non-public probes must be authenticated. Default False.
-
-    #633 requires the console to *fail closed on missing auth for non-public
-    health probes if configured*. The default stays off so the MVP ``/health``
-    contract is unchanged; an operator opts in explicitly.
-    """
-    source = env if env is not None else os.environ
-    return (source.get(REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV) or "").strip().lower() in {
-        "1",
-        "true",
-        "yes",
-    }
-
-
-# --- Authorization ----------------------------------------------------------
-
-DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION = "unknown_action"
-DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED = "unauthenticated"
-DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE = "insufficient_role"
-DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE = "unknown_role"
-DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE = "phase_not_active"
-ALLOW_PREVIEW = "allowed_preview_only"
-
-# Phase 1 is the only active console phase. Phase 2 opens gated writes and is
-# gated on this model landing; nothing here enables it.
-ACTIVE_PHASE = 1
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class AuthorizationDecision:
-    """Result of an authorization check. Never an execution grant."""
-
-    allowed: bool
-    reason_code: str
-    detail: str
-    action_id: str
-    principal: Principal
-    required_role: str | None = None
-    action_class: str | None = None
-    requires_confirmation: bool = False
-    dual_control: bool = False
-    break_glass: bool = False
-    execution_enabled: bool = False
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "allowed": self.allowed,
-            "reason_code": self.reason_code,
-            "detail": self.detail,
-            "action_id": self.action_id,
-            "principal": self.principal.to_dict(),
-            "required_role": self.required_role,
-            "action_class": self.action_class,
-            "requires_confirmation": self.requires_confirmation,
-            "dual_control": self.dual_control,
-            "break_glass": self.break_glass,
-            "execution_enabled": self.execution_enabled,
-            "active_phase": ACTIVE_PHASE,
-        }
-
-
-def authorize(
-    action_id: str,
-    principal: Principal | None = None,
-    *,
-    for_execution: bool = False,
-) -> AuthorizationDecision:
-    """Decide whether *principal* may invoke *action_id*. Deny by default.
-
-    ``for_execution`` distinguishes a read-only preview from a real invocation.
-    Even an allowed decision reports ``execution_enabled=False`` while the
-    console is in Phase 1, so no caller can read an allow as permission to
-    mutate.
-    """
-    who = principal if principal is not None else ANONYMOUS
-    action = get_action(action_id)
-
-    if action is None:
-        return AuthorizationDecision(
-            allowed=False,
-            reason_code=DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION,
-            detail=f"No console action registered as {action_id!r}.",
-            action_id=action_id,
-            principal=who,
-        )
-
-    base: dict[str, Any] = {
-        "action_id": action_id,
-        "principal": who,
-        "required_role": action.minimum_role,
-        "action_class": action.action_class,
-        "requires_confirmation": action.requires_confirmation,
-        "dual_control": action.dual_control,
-        "break_glass": action.break_glass,
-        "execution_enabled": False,
-    }
-
-    if not who.authenticated:
-        return AuthorizationDecision(
-            allowed=False,
-            reason_code=DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED,
-            detail=(
-                "Write actions require an authenticated principal; this "
-                "request is anonymous."
-            ),
-            **base,
-        )
-
-    if who.rank < 0:
-        return AuthorizationDecision(
-            allowed=False,
-            reason_code=DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE,
-            detail=f"Role {who.role!r} is not in the console role matrix.",
-            **base,
-        )
-
-    if who.rank < _ROLE_RANK[action.minimum_role]:
-        return AuthorizationDecision(
-            allowed=False,
-            reason_code=DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE,
-            detail=(
-                f"Action {action_id!r} requires {action.minimum_role!r}; "
-                f"principal holds {who.role!r}."
-            ),
-            **base,
-        )
-
-    if for_execution and action.phase > ACTIVE_PHASE:
-        return AuthorizationDecision(
-            allowed=False,
-            reason_code=DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE,
-            detail=(
-                f"Action {action_id!r} belongs to phase {action.phase}; the "
-                f"console is in phase {ACTIVE_PHASE}. Execution is not wired."
-            ),
-            **base,
-        )
-
-    return AuthorizationDecision(
-        allowed=True,
-        reason_code=ALLOW_PREVIEW,
-        detail=(
-            "Principal holds the required role. Preview only — execution "
-            "remains disabled until the Phase 2 action framework ships."
-        ),
-        **base,
-    )
-
-
-def rbac_matrix() -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Machine-readable RBAC matrix and privileged-action list."""
-    return {
-        "model_version": 1,
-        "active_phase": ACTIVE_PHASE,
-        "roles": [
-            {
-                "role": role,
-                "rank": _ROLE_RANK[role],
-                "description": ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS[role],
-                "permitted_actions": sorted(
-                    a.action_id
-                    for a in _ACTION_SPECS
-                    if _ROLE_RANK[role] >= _ROLE_RANK[a.minimum_role]
-                ),
-            }
-            for role in ROLE_ORDER
-        ],
-        "identity_sources": IDENTITY_SOURCES,
-        "actions": [a.to_dict() for a in _ACTION_SPECS],
-        "privileged_actions": [a.action_id for a in privileged_actions()],
-        "default_decision": "deny",
-        "execution_enabled": False,
-    }

webui/console_redaction.py

@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
-"""Secret redaction policy for every console surface (#633).
-
-The MVP already redacts MCP-side mutation records through ``gitea_audit``.
-This module is the console-facing policy: one redaction pass applied to API
-payloads, rendered HTML, log lines, and audit records *before* they leave the
-server or reach persistent storage.
-
-Design constraints:
-
-- **Reuse, never fork.** ``gitea_audit.redact`` remains the authority for
-  secret-looking dict keys, ``Authorization`` material, and raw URLs. This
-  module runs that pass first and then applies console-specific patterns for
-  keychain references, key/value assignments, private-key blocks, and JWTs.
-- **Never raises.** Redaction is a safety control; a malformed payload must
-  degrade to a redacted placeholder rather than propagate an exception.
-- **Redact before persist.** ``webui.console_audit`` calls this module before
-  writing, so an unredacted record is never durable.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import re
-from typing import Any
-
-import gitea_audit
-
-REDACTED = gitea_audit.REDACTED
-
-# Console-specific patterns applied after the shared ``gitea_audit`` pass.
-# Each keeps the identifying key so an operator can still tell *what* was
-# removed, and replaces only the secret run itself.
-_KEYCHAIN_REF = re.compile(r"(?i)\bkeychain:[\w.\-/@]+")
-_KEYCHAIN_CMD = re.compile(
-    r"(?i)\bsecurity\s+find-(?:generic|internet)-password\b[^\n]*"
-)
-_ASSIGNMENT = re.compile(
-    r"(?i)\b(token|password|passwd|secret|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key|"
-    r"client[_-]?secret|private[_-]?key)\b(\s*[:=]\s*)"
-    r"(\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|\S+)"
-)
-_ENV_ASSIGNMENT = re.compile(
-    r"(?i)\b(GITEA_(?:TOKEN|PASS|PASSWORD)[A-Z0-9_]*)(\s*=\s*)"
-    r"(\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|\S+)"
-)
-_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK = re.compile(
-    r"-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----.*?-----END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----",
-    re.S,
-)
-_JWT = re.compile(
-    r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\b"
-)
-
-# Shapes that mean a payload still carries a secret. ``scan_for_secrets`` uses
-# these to assert a surface is clean.
-_DETECTORS: tuple[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]], ...] = (
-    ("keychain_reference", _KEYCHAIN_REF),
-    ("keychain_command", _KEYCHAIN_CMD),
-    ("credential_assignment", _ASSIGNMENT),
-    ("credential_env_assignment", _ENV_ASSIGNMENT),
-    ("private_key_block", _PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK),
-    ("json_web_token", _JWT),
-    ("bearer_credential", re.compile(r"(?i)\b(?:bearer|basic)\s+\S{8,}")),
-)
-
-
-def _mask_assignment(match: re.Match[str]) -> str:
-    """Keep the key and separator, replace the value."""
-    return f"{match.group(1)}{match.group(2)}{REDACTED}"
-
-
-def redact_text(text: Any) -> Any:
-    """Redact secret material from a single string.
-
-    Non-strings are returned unchanged so this is safe to map over mixed
-    payloads. Runs the shared ``gitea_audit`` pass first, then the
-    console-specific patterns.
-    """
-    if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
-        return text
-    try:
-        out = gitea_audit.redact(text)
-        if not isinstance(out, str):  # defensive; redact() returns str for str
-            return REDACTED
-        out = _PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK.sub(f"{REDACTED}_PRIVATE_KEY", out)
-        out = _ENV_ASSIGNMENT.sub(_mask_assignment, out)
-        out = _ASSIGNMENT.sub(_mask_assignment, out)
-        out = _KEYCHAIN_CMD.sub(f"{REDACTED}_KEYCHAIN_COMMAND", out)
-        out = _KEYCHAIN_REF.sub(f"{REDACTED}_KEYCHAIN_REF", out)
-        out = _JWT.sub(f"{REDACTED}_JWT", out)
-        return out
-    except Exception:
-        # Fail closed: an unredactable string is dropped rather than emitted raw.
-        return REDACTED
-
-
-def redact_payload(value: Any) -> Any:
-    """Recursively redact a JSON-able payload for any console surface.
-
-    Secret-looking dict keys are replaced wholesale by the shared
-    ``gitea_audit`` policy; every remaining string is run through
-    :func:`redact_text`.
-    """
-    try:
-        shared = gitea_audit.redact(value)
-    except Exception:
-        return REDACTED
-    return _walk(shared)
-
-
-def _walk(value: Any) -> Any:
-    if isinstance(value, dict):
-        return {k: _walk(v) for k, v in value.items()}
-    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
-        return [_walk(v) for v in value]
-    if isinstance(value, str):
-        return redact_text(value)
-    return value
-
-
-def scan_for_secrets(value: Any) -> list[str]:
-    """Return detector names that still match *value* after serialization.
-
-    Used to assert an outbound payload or rendered page is clean. An empty
-    list means no known secret shape was found. Already-redacted hits are not
-    findings.
-    """
-    if isinstance(value, str):
-        text = value
-    else:
-        try:
-            text = json.dumps(value, default=str)
-        except Exception:
-            text = str(value)
-    findings: list[str] = []
-    for name, pattern in _DETECTORS:
-        for match in pattern.finditer(text):
-            if REDACTED in match.group(0):
-                continue
-            findings.append(name)
-            break
-    return findings
-
-
-def redaction_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Machine-readable statement of the redaction rules (never secrets)."""
-    return {
-        "policy_version": 1,
-        "applies_to": [
-            "json_api_responses",
-            "rendered_html",
-            "server_logs",
-            "audit_records",
-        ],
-        "ordering": "shared gitea_audit pass, then console patterns",
-        "redact_before_persist": True,
-        "shared_rules": {
-            "source": "gitea_audit.redact",
-            "secret_key_hints": list(gitea_audit._SECRET_KEY_HINTS),
-            "secret_value_prefixes": list(gitea_audit._SECRET_VALUE_PREFIXES),
-            "urls": "credentials, secret query parameters, and real hosts redacted",
-        },
-        "console_rules": [
-            {"name": name, "pattern": pattern.pattern}
-            for name, pattern in _DETECTORS
-        ],
-        "placeholder": REDACTED,
-        "failure_mode": "fail closed — unredactable values become the placeholder",
-    }

webui/inventory.py

@@ -0,0 +1,952 @@
+"""Unified session/lease/lock/worktree inventory for the web console (#636).
+
+Leases (#433), worktrees (#432), and runtime (#430) each ship their own MVP
+view, each with its own shape and its own idea of what "owned" means. A
+traffic-control or recovery operator has to read all three and correlate them
+by hand, which is exactly the step that goes wrong under collision pressure.
+
+This module aggregates them into one versioned, read-only snapshot so the
+console, and any worker asking "what is safe to do next", read the same
+inventory from the same authority.
+
+Field authority is explicit and never blended. Every section declares where its
+rows came from:
+
+* ``control_plane_db`` — the #613 substrate: sessions, leases, assignments.
+  Authoritative for *exclusive ownership* (#600/#601).
+* ``filesystem`` — durable per-issue lock files (:mod:`issue_lock_store`) and
+  registered git worktrees. Authoritative for *what exists on this machine*.
+* ``gitea`` — remote issue/PR state, reached only through existing loaders.
+
+Safety invariants:
+
+* **Read-only.** The control-plane database is opened through a ``mode=ro``
+  URI. :class:`control_plane_db.ControlPlaneDB` creates directories and runs
+  migrations in its constructor, which an inventory read must never do, so this
+  module talks to sqlite directly rather than through that class.
+* **Fail-soft, never fail-silent.** A subsystem that cannot be read degrades to
+  a section carrying ``status`` and ``reason``. It never raises, and it never
+  produces an empty list that reads like "nothing is there".
+* **Never invent active ownership.** This is the invariant that matters most.
+  A degraded ownership source sets ``ownership_authority_complete`` false, and
+  while that flag is false no work item is reported unowned and no collision is
+  asserted. Absence of evidence is reported as absence of evidence.
+* **Redaction at the boundary.** Absolute paths are collapsed against the home
+  directory, URLs lose userinfo and query strings, and no credential-shaped
+  value is emitted. No session token exists in these sources and none is read.
+
+Phase 1 is read-only. Lease steal/release and worktree deletion are Phase 2+
+and deliberately have no representation here, not even a disabled one.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import re
+import sqlite3
+import time
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import Any, Callable
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+import control_plane_db
+import issue_lock_store
+
+SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
+API_VERSION = "v1"
+
+#: Sections whose absence would make an ownership claim unprovable. If any of
+#: these is not ``ok``, the snapshot refuses to describe anything as unowned.
+OWNERSHIP_SECTIONS = ("sessions", "leases", "locks")
+
+SECTION_NAMES = ("sessions", "leases", "locks", "worktrees", "namespaces")
+
+STATUS_OK = "ok"
+STATUS_DEGRADED = "degraded"
+STATUS_UNAVAILABLE = "unavailable"
+
+AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB = "control_plane_db"
+AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM = "filesystem"
+AUTHORITY_GITEA = "gitea"
+
+_CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(token|secret|password|passwd|api[_-]?key|authorization|bearer|credential)",
+    re.IGNORECASE,
+)
+_REDACTED = "[redacted]"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class InventorySection:
+    """One subsystem's contribution, with its authority and health."""
+
+    name: str
+    authority: str
+    status: str
+    items: tuple[dict[str, Any], ...] = ()
+    reason: str | None = None
+    scan_ms: float | None = None
+
+    @property
+    def ok(self) -> bool:
+        return self.status == STATUS_OK
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "name": self.name,
+            "authority": self.authority,
+            "status": self.status,
+            "count": len(self.items),
+            "reason": self.reason,
+            "scan_ms": self.scan_ms,
+            "items": [dict(item) for item in self.items],
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class CollisionSignal:
+    """A detected conflict between two ownership records."""
+
+    kind: str
+    message: str
+    severity: str = "warning"
+    issue_number: int | None = None
+    branch: str | None = None
+    worktree_path: str | None = None
+    session_ids: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "kind": self.kind,
+            "severity": self.severity,
+            "message": self.message,
+            "issue_number": self.issue_number,
+            "branch": self.branch,
+            "worktree_path": self.worktree_path,
+            "session_ids": list(self.session_ids),
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class InventorySnapshot:
+    """Versioned aggregate of every inventory section."""
+
+    generated_at: str
+    sections: tuple[InventorySection, ...]
+    collisions: tuple[CollisionSignal, ...] = ()
+    correlations: tuple[dict[str, Any], ...] = ()
+    schema_version: int = SCHEMA_VERSION
+    api_version: str = API_VERSION
+    scan_ms: float | None = None
+    _section_index: dict[str, InventorySection] = field(
+        default_factory=dict, repr=False, compare=False
+    )
+
+    def section(self, name: str) -> InventorySection | None:
+        return self._section_index.get(name)
+
+    @property
+    def degraded_sections(self) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+        return tuple(s.name for s in self.sections if not s.ok)
+
+    @property
+    def ownership_authority_complete(self) -> bool:
+        """True only when every ownership-bearing section read cleanly.
+
+        While this is false the snapshot must not describe any work item as
+        unowned: a lease the reader could not load is not an absent lease.
+        """
+        for name in OWNERSHIP_SECTIONS:
+            section = self._section_index.get(name)
+            if section is None or not section.ok:
+                return False
+        return True
+
+    @property
+    def status(self) -> str:
+        if all(s.ok for s in self.sections):
+            return STATUS_OK
+        return STATUS_DEGRADED
+
+
+# ── redaction ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def redact_path(path: str | None) -> str | None:
+    """Collapse an absolute path against ``$HOME`` for browser display."""
+    if not path:
+        return path
+    text = str(path)
+    home = os.path.expanduser("~")
+    if home and home != "/" and text.startswith(home):
+        return "~" + text[len(home) :]
+    return text
+
+
+def redact_url(value: str | None) -> str | None:
+    """Strip userinfo and query string from a URL."""
+    if not value:
+        return value
+    text = str(value)
+    try:
+        parsed = urlparse(text)
+    except ValueError:
+        return _REDACTED
+    if not parsed.scheme or not parsed.netloc:
+        return text
+    netloc = parsed.hostname or ""
+    if parsed.port:
+        netloc = f"{netloc}:{parsed.port}"
+    rebuilt = f"{parsed.scheme}://{netloc}{parsed.path}"
+    return rebuilt.rstrip("/") or rebuilt
+
+
+def scrub(value: Any, *, key: str | None = None) -> Any:
+    """Recursively drop credential-shaped values and redact paths/URLs.
+
+    Never raises: an unexpected object degrades to its ``repr`` rather than
+    propagating out of a read-only view.
+    """
+    if key and _CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE.search(key):
+        return _REDACTED
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        return {str(k): scrub(v, key=str(k)) for k, v in value.items()}
+    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
+        return [scrub(v, key=key) for v in value]
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        if value.startswith(("http://", "https://")):
+            return redact_url(value)
+        if value.startswith("/") or value.startswith("~"):
+            return redact_path(value)
+        return value
+    if isinstance(value, (int, float, bool)) or value is None:
+        return value
+    return repr(value)
+
+
+# ── control-plane database (read-only) ───────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _open_readonly(db_path: str) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+    """Open the control-plane DB without creating or migrating anything."""
+    conn = sqlite3.connect(f"file:{db_path}?mode=ro", uri=True, timeout=5)
+    conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+    return conn
+
+
+def _table_names(conn: sqlite3.Connection) -> set[str]:
+    rows = conn.execute(
+        "SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type = 'table'"
+    ).fetchall()
+    return {str(row[0]) for row in rows}
+
+
+def _load_cp_db_sections(
+    *,
+    db_path: str | None = None,
+    limit: int = 200,
+) -> tuple[InventorySection, InventorySection]:
+    """Return the ``sessions`` and ``leases`` sections from the #613 DB."""
+    path = (db_path or control_plane_db.default_db_path()).strip()
+
+    def _both_unavailable(reason: str) -> tuple[InventorySection, InventorySection]:
+        return (
+            InventorySection(
+                name="sessions",
+                authority=AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB,
+                status=STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
+                reason=reason,
+            ),
+            InventorySection(
+                name="leases",
+                authority=AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB,
+                status=STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
+                reason=reason,
+            ),
+        )
+
+    if not path:
+        return _both_unavailable("control-plane database path is not configured")
+    if not os.path.exists(path):
+        return _both_unavailable(
+            f"control-plane database not present at {redact_path(path)}; "
+            "no session or lease authority available"
+        )
+
+    started = time.perf_counter()
+    try:
+        conn = _open_readonly(path)
+    except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+        return _both_unavailable(f"control-plane database could not be opened: {exc}")
+
+    try:
+        tables = _table_names(conn)
+        if "sessions" not in tables or "leases" not in tables:
+            missing = sorted({"sessions", "leases"} - tables)
+            return _both_unavailable(
+                "control-plane database is missing required tables: "
+                + ", ".join(missing)
+            )
+
+        session_rows = [
+            dict(row)
+            for row in conn.execute(
+                "SELECT session_id, role, profile, namespace, pid, started_at,"
+                " last_heartbeat_at, status FROM sessions"
+                " ORDER BY last_heartbeat_at DESC LIMIT ?",
+                (max(1, int(limit)),),
+            ).fetchall()
+        ]
+
+        has_work_items = "work_items" in tables
+        if has_work_items:
+            lease_sql = (
+                "SELECT l.lease_id, l.session_id, l.role, l.phase, l.status,"
+                " l.expires_at, w.remote, w.org, w.repo, w.kind AS work_kind,"
+                " w.number AS work_number, w.state AS work_state,"
+                " s.pid AS session_pid, s.profile AS session_profile,"
+                " s.namespace AS session_namespace, s.status AS session_status"
+                " FROM leases l"
+                " JOIN work_items w ON w.work_item_id = l.work_item_id"
+                " LEFT JOIN sessions s ON s.session_id = l.session_id"
+                " ORDER BY l.expires_at DESC LIMIT ?"
+            )
+        else:
+            lease_sql = (
+                "SELECT l.lease_id, l.session_id, l.role, l.phase, l.status,"
+                " l.expires_at FROM leases l"
+                " ORDER BY l.expires_at DESC LIMIT ?"
+            )
+        lease_rows = [
+            dict(row)
+            for row in conn.execute(lease_sql, (max(1, int(limit)),)).fetchall()
+        ]
+    except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+        return _both_unavailable(f"control-plane database read failed: {exc}")
+    finally:
+        conn.close()
+
+    elapsed = (time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000.0
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+    sessions = tuple(
+        scrub(
+            {
+                "session_id": row.get("session_id"),
+                "role": row.get("role"),
+                "profile": row.get("profile"),
+                "namespace": row.get("namespace"),
+                "pid": row.get("pid"),
+                "pid_alive": issue_lock_store.is_process_alive(row.get("pid")),
+                "started_at": row.get("started_at"),
+                "last_heartbeat_at": row.get("last_heartbeat_at"),
+                "status": row.get("status"),
+            }
+        )
+        for row in session_rows
+    )
+
+    leases = tuple(
+        scrub(
+            {
+                "lease_id": row.get("lease_id"),
+                "session_id": row.get("session_id"),
+                "role": row.get("role"),
+                "phase": row.get("phase"),
+                "status": row.get("status"),
+                "expires_at": row.get("expires_at"),
+                "expired": _is_expired(row.get("expires_at"), now=now),
+                "remote": row.get("remote"),
+                "org": row.get("org"),
+                "repo": row.get("repo"),
+                "work_kind": row.get("work_kind"),
+                "work_number": row.get("work_number"),
+                "work_state": row.get("work_state"),
+                "session_pid": row.get("session_pid"),
+                "session_profile": row.get("session_profile"),
+                "session_namespace": row.get("session_namespace"),
+                "session_status": row.get("session_status"),
+            }
+        )
+        for row in lease_rows
+    )
+
+    degraded_reason = (
+        None
+        if has_work_items
+        else "work_items table absent; lease rows carry no work linkage"
+    )
+    lease_status = STATUS_OK if has_work_items else STATUS_DEGRADED
+
+    return (
+        InventorySection(
+            name="sessions",
+            authority=AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB,
+            status=STATUS_OK,
+            items=sessions,
+            scan_ms=round(elapsed, 3),
+        ),
+        InventorySection(
+            name="leases",
+            authority=AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB,
+            status=lease_status,
+            items=leases,
+            reason=degraded_reason,
+            scan_ms=round(elapsed, 3),
+        ),
+    )
+
+
+def _is_expired(expires_at: str | None, *, now: datetime) -> bool | None:
+    if not expires_at:
+        return None
+    text = str(expires_at).strip().replace("Z", "+00:00")
+    try:
+        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(text)
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        parsed = parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+    return parsed <= now
+
+
+# ── durable issue locks (filesystem) ─────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _load_locks_section(*, lock_dir: str | None = None) -> InventorySection:
+    started = time.perf_counter()
+    try:
+        paths = issue_lock_store.iter_lock_files(lock_dir)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        return InventorySection(
+            name="locks",
+            authority=AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+            status=STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
+            reason=f"issue lock directory could not be listed: {exc}",
+        )
+
+    items: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    unreadable = 0
+    for path in paths:
+        try:
+            record = issue_lock_store.read_lock_file(path)
+        except (OSError, ValueError):
+            unreadable += 1
+            continue
+        if not record:
+            unreadable += 1
+            continue
+        try:
+            freshness = issue_lock_store.assess_lock_freshness(record)
+        except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 — a read-only view never raises
+            freshness = {"status": "unknown", "live": False, "stale": False}
+        claimant = record.get("claimant") or (
+            (record.get("work_lease") or {}).get("claimant") or {}
+        )
+        items.append(
+            scrub(
+                {
+                    "issue_number": record.get("issue_number"),
+                    "branch_name": record.get("branch_name"),
+                    "remote": record.get("remote"),
+                    "org": record.get("org"),
+                    "repo": record.get("repo"),
+                    "worktree_path": record.get("worktree_path"),
+                    "pid": record.get("session_pid") or record.get("pid"),
+                    "pid_alive": issue_lock_store.is_process_alive(
+                        record.get("session_pid") or record.get("pid")
+                    ),
+                    "claimant_username": (claimant or {}).get("username"),
+                    "claimant_profile": (claimant or {}).get("profile"),
+                    "lock_generation": record.get("lock_generation"),
+                    "freshness_status": freshness.get("status"),
+                    "live": bool(freshness.get("live")),
+                    "stale": bool(freshness.get("stale")),
+                    "freshness_reason": freshness.get("reason"),
+                    "lock_path": record.get("lock_file_path") or path,
+                }
+            )
+        )
+
+    elapsed = (time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000.0
+    reason = (
+        f"{unreadable} lock file(s) were unreadable and are not represented"
+        if unreadable
+        else None
+    )
+    return InventorySection(
+        name="locks",
+        authority=AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+        status=STATUS_DEGRADED if unreadable else STATUS_OK,
+        items=tuple(items),
+        reason=reason,
+        scan_ms=round(elapsed, 3),
+    )
+
+
+# ── worktrees (filesystem, via the #432 scanner) ─────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _load_worktrees_section(
+    *, load_hygiene: Callable[[], Any] | None = None
+) -> InventorySection:
+    started = time.perf_counter()
+    try:
+        loader = load_hygiene
+        if loader is None:
+            from webui.worktree_scanner import load_hygiene_snapshot
+
+            loader = load_hygiene_snapshot
+        snapshot = loader()
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — fail soft, never fail the request
+        return InventorySection(
+            name="worktrees",
+            authority=AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+            status=STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
+            reason=f"worktree scan failed: {exc}",
+        )
+
+    items = tuple(
+        scrub(
+            {
+                "rel_path": entry.rel_path,
+                "folder_name": entry.folder_name,
+                "classification": entry.classification,
+                "branch": entry.branch,
+                "head_sha": entry.head_sha,
+                "dirty_tracked": entry.dirty_tracked,
+                "dirty_untracked": entry.dirty_untracked,
+                "detached": entry.detached,
+                "registered_worktree": entry.registered_worktree,
+                "notes": entry.notes,
+            }
+        )
+        for entry in snapshot.entries
+    )
+    scan_error = getattr(snapshot, "scan_error", None)
+    elapsed = (time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000.0
+    return InventorySection(
+        name="worktrees",
+        authority=AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+        status=STATUS_DEGRADED if scan_error else STATUS_OK,
+        items=items,
+        reason=scan_error,
+        scan_ms=round(elapsed, 3),
+    )
+
+
+# ── namespaces / capability summary ──────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _load_namespaces_section() -> InventorySection:
+    started = time.perf_counter()
+    try:
+        from gitea_auth import get_profile
+
+        profile = get_profile() or {}
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
+        return InventorySection(
+            name="namespaces",
+            authority=AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+            status=STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
+            reason=f"active profile could not be resolved: {exc}",
+        )
+
+    allowed = list(profile.get("allowed_operations") or [])
+    forbidden = list(profile.get("forbidden_operations") or [])
+    profile_name = str(profile.get("profile_name") or "")
+
+    namespace = None
+    try:
+        import role_namespace_gate
+
+        namespace = role_namespace_gate.infer_mcp_namespace(profile_name)
+    except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 — namespace inference is advisory
+        namespace = None
+
+    item = scrub(
+        {
+            "profile_name": profile_name,
+            "role": profile.get("role"),
+            "mcp_namespace": namespace,
+            "allowed_operations": sorted(allowed),
+            "forbidden_operations": sorted(forbidden),
+            "capability_summary": {
+                "can_author": "gitea.pr.create" in allowed,
+                "can_review": "gitea.pr.approve" in allowed,
+                "can_merge": "gitea.pr.merge" in allowed,
+                "can_close_pr": "gitea.pr.close" in allowed,
+            },
+            "active": True,
+        }
+    )
+    elapsed = (time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000.0
+    return InventorySection(
+        name="namespaces",
+        authority=AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+        status=STATUS_OK,
+        items=(item,),
+        reason=(
+            "only the profile serving this web process is observable; other "
+            "namespaces are not enumerable from here"
+        ),
+        scan_ms=round(elapsed, 3),
+    )
+
+
+# ── correlation and collision detection ──────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _issue_from_branch(branch: str | None) -> int | None:
+    match = re.search(r"issue-(\d+)", str(branch or ""), re.IGNORECASE)
+    return int(match.group(1)) if match else None
+
+
+def correlate(
+    *,
+    leases: InventorySection,
+    locks: InventorySection,
+    worktrees: InventorySection,
+    sessions: InventorySection,
+) -> tuple[tuple[dict[str, Any], ...], tuple[CollisionSignal, ...]]:
+    """Join lease owner ↔ lock ↔ worktree ↔ namespace where evidence allows.
+
+    Correlation rows are emitted from whatever sections did load. Collision
+    signals are only emitted from sections that are ``ok``: a conflict inferred
+    from a partially-read source would be a false accusation.
+    """
+    correlations: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    collisions: list[CollisionSignal] = []
+
+    worktree_by_branch: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {}
+    for entry in worktrees.items:
+        branch = (entry.get("branch") or "").strip()
+        if branch:
+            worktree_by_branch.setdefault(branch, entry)
+
+    session_by_id = {
+        str(s.get("session_id")): s for s in sessions.items if s.get("session_id")
+    }
+
+    # Lock-centred rows: a durable lock names an issue, a branch, and a worktree.
+    for lock in locks.items:
+        branch = (lock.get("branch_name") or "").strip()
+        worktree = worktree_by_branch.get(branch)
+        matching_leases = [
+            lease
+            for lease in leases.items
+            if lease.get("work_kind") == "issue"
+            and lease.get("work_number") == lock.get("issue_number")
+        ]
+        correlations.append(
+            {
+                "issue_number": lock.get("issue_number"),
+                "branch": branch or None,
+                "lock_live": bool(lock.get("live")),
+                "lock_claimant": lock.get("claimant_profile"),
+                "lock_pid": lock.get("pid"),
+                "lock_pid_alive": lock.get("pid_alive"),
+                "worktree_rel_path": (worktree or {}).get("rel_path"),
+                "worktree_classification": (worktree or {}).get("classification"),
+                "worktree_registered": (worktree or {}).get("registered_worktree"),
+                "lease_ids": [
+                    lease.get("lease_id")
+                    for lease in matching_leases
+                    if lease.get("lease_id")
+                ],
+                "lease_sessions": [
+                    lease.get("session_id")
+                    for lease in matching_leases
+                    if lease.get("session_id")
+                ],
+            }
+        )
+
+        if locks.ok and worktrees.ok:
+            # A claim whose lease window is still open but has no registered
+            # worktree is an anomaly regardless of whether its pid is alive; a
+            # fully time-expired lease is on its way out and is not flagged.
+            if (
+                lock.get("freshness_status") != "expired"
+                and branch
+                and worktree is None
+            ):
+                collisions.append(
+                    CollisionSignal(
+                        kind="lock-without-worktree",
+                        severity="warning",
+                        issue_number=lock.get("issue_number"),
+                        branch=branch,
+                        worktree_path=lock.get("worktree_path"),
+                        message=(
+                            f"Live lock on issue #{lock.get('issue_number')} names "
+                            f"branch {branch!r} but no registered worktree carries "
+                            "that branch (#404)"
+                        ),
+                    )
+                )
+
+        if locks.ok:
+            # A lock whose recorded pid is gone is held by nobody: a clean #753
+            # dead-session recovery candidate. Subclassify by the lease window,
+            # because the two cases need different operator urgency. When the
+            # window is still open the lock would read as live to a naive
+            # timestamp check even though the owner is dead — the more dangerous
+            # case — so it is flagged distinctly from a fully time-expired lease.
+            if lock.get("pid_alive") is False and lock.get("stale"):
+                if lock.get("freshness_status") == "expired":
+                    collisions.append(
+                        CollisionSignal(
+                            kind="stale-lock-dead-owner",
+                            severity="warning",
+                            issue_number=lock.get("issue_number"),
+                            branch=branch or None,
+                            message=(
+                                f"Lock on issue #{lock.get('issue_number')} is stale "
+                                f"and its recorded pid {lock.get('pid')} is not running "
+                                "(#753 dead-session recovery candidate)"
+                            ),
+                        )
+                    )
+                else:
+                    collisions.append(
+                        CollisionSignal(
+                            kind="live-lock-dead-owner",
+                            severity="warning",
+                            issue_number=lock.get("issue_number"),
+                            branch=branch or None,
+                            message=(
+                                f"Lock on issue #{lock.get('issue_number')} has an "
+                                "unexpired lease but its recorded pid "
+                                f"{lock.get('pid')} is not running; it would read as "
+                                "live to a timestamp check (#753 dead-session recovery "
+                                "candidate)"
+                            ),
+                        )
+                    )
+            # The #635 trap: the lease has expired but the recorded pid is a
+            # still-running daemon, so neither dead-pid reclaim nor exact-owner
+            # renewal applies. This is the collision an operator must see.
+            elif (
+                lock.get("freshness_status") == "expired"
+                and lock.get("pid_alive") is True
+            ):
+                collisions.append(
+                    CollisionSignal(
+                        kind="expired-lock-live-owner",
+                        severity="error",
+                        issue_number=lock.get("issue_number"),
+                        branch=branch or None,
+                        message=(
+                            f"Lock on issue #{lock.get('issue_number')} has an expired "
+                            f"lease but its recorded pid {lock.get('pid')} is still "
+                            "running (daemon-pid deadlock; needs an operator decision, "
+                            "#635/#760)"
+                        ),
+                    )
+                )
+
+    # Two live locks on one branch, or two active leases on one work item.
+    if locks.ok:
+        by_branch: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] = {}
+        for lock in locks.items:
+            if not lock.get("live"):
+                continue
+            branch = (lock.get("branch_name") or "").strip()
+            if branch:
+                by_branch.setdefault(branch, []).append(lock)
+        for branch, entries in sorted(by_branch.items()):
+            if len(entries) > 1:
+                collisions.append(
+                    CollisionSignal(
+                        kind="duplicate-live-lock",
+                        severity="error",
+                        branch=branch,
+                        message=(
+                            f"{len(entries)} live locks name branch {branch!r}: "
+                            "issues "
+                            + ", ".join(
+                                f"#{e.get('issue_number')}" for e in entries
+                            )
+                        ),
+                    )
+                )
+
+    if leases.ok:
+        by_work: dict[tuple[str, int], list[dict[str, Any]]] = {}
+        for lease in leases.items:
+            if str(lease.get("status") or "").lower() != "active":
+                continue
+            kind = str(lease.get("work_kind") or "").strip().lower()
+            number = lease.get("work_number")
+            if not kind or number is None:
+                continue
+            by_work.setdefault((kind, int(number)), []).append(lease)
+        for (kind, number), entries in sorted(by_work.items()):
+            sessions_held = {
+                str(e.get("session_id")) for e in entries if e.get("session_id")
+            }
+            if len(sessions_held) > 1:
+                collisions.append(
+                    CollisionSignal(
+                        kind="concurrent-active-lease",
+                        severity="error",
+                        issue_number=number if kind == "issue" else None,
+                        session_ids=tuple(sorted(sessions_held)),
+                        message=(
+                            f"{len(sessions_held)} sessions hold an active lease on "
+                            f"{kind} #{number}"
+                        ),
+                    )
+                )
+            for entry in entries:
+                if entry.get("expired") is True:
+                    collisions.append(
+                        CollisionSignal(
+                            kind="active-lease-past-expiry",
+                            severity="warning",
+                            issue_number=number if kind == "issue" else None,
+                            session_ids=(
+                                (str(entry.get("session_id")),)
+                                if entry.get("session_id")
+                                else ()
+                            ),
+                            message=(
+                                f"Lease {entry.get('lease_id')} on {kind} #{number} "
+                                "is still marked active past its expiry"
+                            ),
+                        )
+                    )
+
+    # A lease whose owning session is gone is an orphan, not free work.
+    if leases.ok and sessions.ok:
+        for lease in leases.items:
+            if str(lease.get("status") or "").lower() != "active":
+                continue
+            session_id = str(lease.get("session_id") or "")
+            if session_id and session_id not in session_by_id:
+                collisions.append(
+                    CollisionSignal(
+                        kind="orphan-lease",
+                        severity="error",
+                        session_ids=(session_id,),
+                        message=(
+                            f"Active lease {lease.get('lease_id')} names session "
+                            f"{session_id}, which has no session record"
+                        ),
+                    )
+                )
+
+    return tuple(correlations), tuple(collisions)
+
+
+# ── snapshot assembly ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def load_inventory_snapshot(
+    *,
+    db_path: str | None = None,
+    lock_dir: str | None = None,
+    load_hygiene: Callable[[], Any] | None = None,
+    include: tuple[str, ...] | None = None,
+) -> InventorySnapshot:
+    """Build the unified inventory snapshot.
+
+    Every section is loaded independently and fails soft. *include* restricts
+    the sections that are scanned; omitted sections are simply absent rather
+    than reported as empty, so a resource-split request cannot be mistaken for
+    a whole-inventory answer.
+    """
+    started = time.perf_counter()
+    wanted = tuple(include) if include else SECTION_NAMES
+
+    sections: list[InventorySection] = []
+    sessions_section: InventorySection | None = None
+    leases_section: InventorySection | None = None
+
+    if "sessions" in wanted or "leases" in wanted:
+        sessions_section, leases_section = _load_cp_db_sections(db_path=db_path)
+        if "sessions" in wanted:
+            sections.append(sessions_section)
+        if "leases" in wanted:
+            sections.append(leases_section)
+
+    locks_section = (
+        _load_locks_section(lock_dir=lock_dir)
+        if "locks" in wanted
+        else _empty_section("locks", AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM)
+    )
+    if "locks" in wanted:
+        sections.append(locks_section)
+
+    worktrees_section = (
+        _load_worktrees_section(load_hygiene=load_hygiene)
+        if "worktrees" in wanted
+        else _empty_section("worktrees", AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM)
+    )
+    if "worktrees" in wanted:
+        sections.append(worktrees_section)
+
+    if "namespaces" in wanted:
+        sections.append(_load_namespaces_section())
+
+    correlations, collisions = correlate(
+        leases=leases_section or _empty_section("leases", AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB),
+        locks=locks_section,
+        worktrees=worktrees_section,
+        sessions=sessions_section
+        or _empty_section("sessions", AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB),
+    )
+
+    elapsed = (time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000.0
+    index = {section.name: section for section in sections}
+    return InventorySnapshot(
+        generated_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+        sections=tuple(sections),
+        collisions=collisions,
+        correlations=correlations,
+        scan_ms=round(elapsed, 3),
+        _section_index=index,
+    )
+
+
+def _empty_section(name: str, authority: str) -> InventorySection:
+    """A section that was not requested — never a claim that it is empty."""
+    return InventorySection(
+        name=name,
+        authority=authority,
+        status=STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
+        reason="section not requested in this scan",
+    )
+
+
+def snapshot_to_dict(snapshot: InventorySnapshot) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Serialize the snapshot for the versioned API."""
+    return {
+        "api_version": snapshot.api_version,
+        "schema_version": snapshot.schema_version,
+        "generated_at": snapshot.generated_at,
+        "status": snapshot.status,
+        "scan_ms": snapshot.scan_ms,
+        "ownership_authority_complete": snapshot.ownership_authority_complete,
+        "ownership_note": (
+            "Every ownership source read cleanly; an item absent from leases "
+            "and locks is genuinely unclaimed."
+            if snapshot.ownership_authority_complete
+            else "One or more ownership sources are degraded; nothing in this "
+            "snapshot may be treated as unowned. Collisions are reported only "
+            "from sections that read cleanly."
+        ),
+        "degraded_sections": list(snapshot.degraded_sections),
+        "field_authority": {
+            "sessions": AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB,
+            "leases": AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB,
+            "locks": AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+            "worktrees": AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+            "namespaces": AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+        },
+        "sections": {section.name: section.to_dict() for section in snapshot.sections},
+        "correlations": [dict(row) for row in snapshot.correlations],
+        "collisions": [signal.to_dict() for signal in snapshot.collisions],
+    }

workflow_dashboard.py

@@ -65,11 +65,9 @@ PROMPT_RECONCILER = (
     "reconciliation (already-landed / post-merge cleanup). Do not approve or merge."
 )
 PROMPT_CONTROLLER = (
-    "CONTROLLER session: call gitea_route_task_session(task_type='process_work_queue') "
+    "CONTROLLER session: inspect gitea_workflow_dashboard + control-plane leases, "
-    "then gitea_allocate_next_work (cross_role default) for {remote}/{org}/{repo}; "
+    "diagnose blocked/terminal-locked items for {remote}/{org}/{repo}, and schedule "
-    "use the returned required_role/profile/action to schedule exactly one downstream "
+    "exactly one fresh role-scoped cycle. Do not implement, review, or merge in-band."
-    "role cycle. Dashboard is explanatory only and never replaces allocator selection. "
-    "Do not implement, review, approve, or merge in-band."
 )
 PROMPT_IDLE = (
     "IDLE: no safe assignable work for role '{role}' on {remote}/{org}/{repo}. "