Compare commits
1
Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|
  sysadminandClaude Opus 4.8
|
300a4ca08f |
@@ -39,27 +39,6 @@ GITEA_AUDIT_LOG=/path/to/gitea-mcp-audit.log
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# only — never the token value. Surfaced by gitea_get_profile.
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GITEA_TOKEN_SOURCE=GITEA_TOKEN
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# ── Optional self-hosted Sentry observability (#606) ────────────────────────
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# Emits runtime errors, fail-closed workflow blockers, lease/terminal-lock/
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# stale-runtime collisions, and watchdog cron check-ins to a SELF-HOSTED Sentry
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# (https://sentry.prgs.cc/) — never Sentry Cloud. Gitea stays the source of
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# truth; Sentry is observe-only. OFF by default: with MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED unset
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# or SENTRY_DSN empty, nothing is initialised and no events are sent.
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#
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# Master gate. Truthy = 1/true/yes/on. Both this AND SENTRY_DSN are required.
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MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED=0
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# DSN for the self-hosted project (create a `gitea-tools-mcp` project in
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# https://sentry.prgs.cc/ and copy its DSN). Never commit a real DSN.
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SENTRY_DSN=
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# Deployment environment tag (local/dev/prod). Defaults to "development".
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SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=development
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# Optional release identifier (e.g. a git SHA or version string).
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SENTRY_RELEASE=
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# Performance-trace sample rate, 0.0–1.0 (clamped). Default 0.0 (traces off).
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MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE=0.0
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# Set to 1 to forward Python logs to Sentry as structured logs. Default off.
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MCP_SENTRY_ENABLE_LOGS=0
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# Optional canonical runtime-profile config (#19). Instead of the fields above,
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# point every LLM launcher at ONE JSON file of named profiles and select one.
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# Secrets are referenced (keychain id / env var name), never inlined. See
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@@ -76,12 +55,3 @@ GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs
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# GITEA_MERGER_WORKTREE=/path/to/repo/branches/merge-pr456
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# GITEA_RECONCILER_WORKTREE=/path/to/repo/branches/reconcile-pr456
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# GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE=/path/to/repo/branches/session-override
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# Durable HMAC key for irrecoverable decision-lock provenance artifacts (#709 F4).
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# REQUIRED in production native MCP processes that mint or verify recovery
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# authorization (reconciler + merger must share the same key). Hex (preferred),
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# base64, or utf-8 literal (>=16 bytes). Never generate an ephemeral per-process
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# key — cross-process / post-restart verification would fail closed.
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# GITEA_IRRECOVERABLE_AUTH_HMAC_KEY=0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef
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# Optional key version string bound into the signature (for rotation).
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# GITEA_IRRECOVERABLE_AUTH_HMAC_KEY_VERSION=v1
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@@ -1,150 +0,0 @@
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"""Canonical dependency parsing and live-state resolution for the allocator (#758).
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The work allocator previously inferred dependency state from two lowercase
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substrings (``"blocked on #"`` / ``"downstream of #"``). The repository's
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canonical declaration form is a ``Depends:`` field inside the issue body's
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linkage line, for example::
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* Parent: #631 · Depends: #633, #634 · Related: #630, #434
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That form matched neither substring, so dependency-blocked issues were emitted
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as eligible candidates. This module replaces substring inference with:
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1. structured parsing of ``Depends:`` declarations into issue references, and
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2. resolution of each reference against **live issue state**, never body text.
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Both halves fail closed: a reference whose state cannot be established makes
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the owning candidate ineligible rather than assignable.
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No issue number is special-cased here (#758 AC4/AC14); the parser is driven
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entirely by the declaration syntax.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import re
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from typing import Callable, Iterable
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# Live issue states, as reported by Gitea.
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DEP_STATE_OPEN = "open"
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DEP_STATE_CLOSED = "closed"
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# "Depends:" / "Depends on:" introduces the declaration. "Dependencies" does
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# not match: after "depend" it continues with "e", not "s".
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_DEPENDS_KEYWORD = re.compile(r"depends(?:\s+on)?\s*:?\s*", re.IGNORECASE)
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# Immediately after the keyword, consume only the contiguous run of issue
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# references. Anchoring the run this way means the declaration ends naturally
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# at the next separator ("·", newline) or sibling field ("Related:"), without
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# needing to enumerate separators.
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_DEP_RUN = re.compile(
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r"\s*(#\d+(?:\s*(?:,|and|&)\s*#\d+)*)",
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re.IGNORECASE,
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)
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# Legacy marker retained so previously-recognized bodies keep working.
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_LEGACY_BLOCKED = re.compile(r"blocked\s+on\s+#(\d+)", re.IGNORECASE)
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_ISSUE_REF = re.compile(r"#(\d+)")
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def parse_dependency_refs(body: str | None) -> tuple[int, ...]:
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"""Extract declared dependency issue numbers from an issue *body*.
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Recognizes the canonical ``Depends: #N, #N`` field (including the
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``Depends on`` spelling) plus the legacy ``blocked on #N`` marker.
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Returns references in first-seen order with duplicates removed. Malformed
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or absent declarations yield an empty tuple rather than raising.
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"""
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if not body:
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return ()
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refs: list[int] = []
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def _add(value: str) -> None:
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number = int(value)
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if number > 0 and number not in refs:
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refs.append(number)
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for match in _DEPENDS_KEYWORD.finditer(body):
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run = _DEP_RUN.match(body, match.end())
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if not run:
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continue
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for ref in _ISSUE_REF.findall(run.group(1)):
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_add(ref)
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for ref in _LEGACY_BLOCKED.findall(body):
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_add(ref)
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return tuple(refs)
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def resolve_dependency_state(
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refs: Iterable[int],
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state_lookup: Callable[[int], str | None],
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*,
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subject: str = "candidate",
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) -> dict:
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"""Resolve declared *refs* against live issue state.
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*state_lookup* maps an issue number to its live state string, or to
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``None`` when that evidence could not be obtained. A reference is:
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* **met** when live state is ``closed``;
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* **unmet** when live state is any other live value (``open``, etc.);
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* **unavailable** when state is ``None`` or the lookup raises.
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Unmet *and* unavailable both mark the candidate ineligible (#758 AC6/AC7):
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allocation must never assume a dependency is satisfied.
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"""
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unmet: list[int] = []
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unavailable: list[int] = []
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met: list[int] = []
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for ref in refs:
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try:
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number = int(ref)
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except (TypeError, ValueError):
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continue
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try:
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state = state_lookup(number)
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except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 — unavailable evidence fails closed
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state = None
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normalized = (str(state).strip().lower() if state is not None else "") or None
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if normalized is None:
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unavailable.append(number)
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elif normalized == DEP_STATE_CLOSED:
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met.append(number)
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else:
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unmet.append(number)
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reason: str | None = None
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if unmet and unavailable:
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reason = (
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f"{subject} has unresolved dependencies "
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f"{_fmt(unmet)} and unverifiable dependencies {_fmt(unavailable)} "
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"(fail closed)"
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)
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elif unmet:
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reason = (
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f"{subject} depends on unresolved issue(s) {_fmt(unmet)}; "
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"they are not closed"
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)
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elif unavailable:
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reason = (
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f"{subject} dependency evidence unavailable for {_fmt(unavailable)} "
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"(fail closed)"
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)
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return {
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"refs": tuple(int(x) for x in refs),
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"met": tuple(met),
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"unmet": tuple(unmet),
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"unavailable": tuple(unavailable),
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"dependency_unmet": bool(unmet or unavailable),
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"reason": reason,
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}
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def _fmt(numbers: Iterable[int]) -> str:
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return ", ".join(f"#{n}" for n in numbers)
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+11
-502
@@ -18,12 +18,10 @@ after they exist as normal issues; this module never assigns incidents.
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from __future__ import annotations
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import hashlib
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import json
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import os
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import uuid
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from dataclasses import dataclass, field
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from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
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from typing import Any, Sequence
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from control_plane_db import (
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ControlPlaneDB,
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@@ -42,31 +40,6 @@ OUTCOME_NEEDS_CONTROLLER = "needs_controller"
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OUTCOME_NO_SAFE = "no_safe_work"
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OUTCOME_ROLE_INELIGIBLE = "role_ineligible"
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OUTCOME_PREVIEW = "preview" # dry-run only (apply=false)
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# #765: ownership could not be established for every remaining candidate.
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OUTCOME_OWNERSHIP_DEFECT = "allocator_ownership_defect"
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# #776: excluded issue still carries a live same-owner lease — resume or release.
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OUTCOME_BLOCKED_EXCLUDED_OWN_LEASE = "blocked_by_excluded_own_lease"
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# #776: dry-run/apply candidate-set fingerprint mismatch (CAS drift).
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OUTCOME_CANDIDATE_SET_DRIFT = "candidate_set_drift"
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# #765 skip reason code for work already claimed by a different controller.
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SKIP_CLAIMED_BY_OTHER_SESSION = "claimed_by_other_session"
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# #776: controller-supplied pre-rank exclusion.
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SKIP_EXCLUDED_BY_CONTROLLER = "excluded_by_controller"
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# Ownership verdicts for a live claim on a candidate (#765).
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OWNERSHIP_OWN = "own"
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OWNERSHIP_FOREIGN = "foreign"
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OWNERSHIP_UNKNOWN = "unknown"
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# Human-readable statement of how a winner is chosen (#758 AC10). Reported
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# alongside allocator results so the flat status:ready tier and its
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# oldest-number tie-break are explicit rather than incidental.
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SELECTION_POLICY = (
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"rank complete inventory by (priority desc, PRs before issues, "
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"number asc); status:ready issues share priority 20, so the oldest "
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"eligible number wins ties; result limits never affect selection"
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)
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ROLE_AUTHOR = "author"
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ROLE_REVIEWER = "reviewer"
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@@ -162,76 +135,9 @@ class SkipRecord:
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kind: str
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number: int
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reason: str
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reason_code: str | None = None
|
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|
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def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
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return {
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"kind": self.kind,
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"number": self.number,
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"reason": self.reason,
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"reason_code": self.reason_code,
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}
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|
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CONTROLLER_INSTANCE_ENV = "GITEA_CONTROLLER_INSTANCE_ID"
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|
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|
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def resolve_controller_instance_id(
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env: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
|
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) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Return this controller's stable identity, or ``None`` if undeclared.
|
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|
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Deliberately has no derived fallback. The obvious candidates are unsafe:
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``session_id`` is regenerated per invocation, and the MCP process pid is
|
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shared by every controller attached to the same daemon — two independent
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controllers really do report the same pid and profile. Guessing from either
|
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would let one controller adopt another's lease, which is the failure #765
|
||||
exists to prevent. When this returns ``None``, live claims are treated as
|
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unidentified: they are excluded from selection and reported as ownership
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defects rather than adopted.
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"""
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source = env if env is not None else os.environ
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return (source.get(CONTROLLER_INSTANCE_ENV) or "").strip() or None
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|
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|
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def classify_claim_ownership(
|
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claim: dict[str, Any] | None,
|
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*,
|
||||
session_id: str | None,
|
||||
controller_instance_id: str | None,
|
||||
) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Classify a live claim as own / foreign / unknown ownership (#765).
|
||||
|
||||
Returns ``None`` when the candidate carries no live claim.
|
||||
|
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Session ids are regenerated per allocator invocation, so they only prove
|
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ownership positively (an exact match is certainly this session). The
|
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durable signal is ``controller_instance_id``. When either side lacks one,
|
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ownership is *unknown*: the allocator must not assume that a lease sharing
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the same profile belongs to this controller, so unknown is treated as
|
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not-ours for selection purposes and reported as an ownership defect.
|
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"""
|
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if not claim:
|
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return None
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claim_session = str(claim.get("session_id") or "").strip()
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claim_instance = str(claim.get("controller_instance_id") or "").strip()
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own_session = str(session_id or "").strip()
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own_instance = str(controller_instance_id or "").strip()
|
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|
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if claim_session and own_session and claim_session == own_session:
|
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return OWNERSHIP_OWN
|
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if claim_instance and own_instance:
|
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return (
|
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OWNERSHIP_OWN if claim_instance == own_instance else OWNERSHIP_FOREIGN
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not claim_instance and not own_instance:
|
||||
# Neither side declares a controller identity. The session ids differ
|
||||
# (an exact match returned OWN above), so this is simply someone
|
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# else's lease: foreign, and we wait rather than adopt.
|
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return OWNERSHIP_FOREIGN
|
||||
# Exactly one side is identified, so the two cannot be compared: this may
|
||||
# or may not be our own task under a different session id. Never guess.
|
||||
return OWNERSHIP_UNKNOWN
|
||||
return {"kind": self.kind, "number": self.number, "reason": self.reason}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def normalize_role(role: str | None, *, profile_name: str | None = None) -> str:
|
||||
@@ -288,16 +194,8 @@ def classify_skip(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
role: str,
|
||||
terminal_pr: int | None,
|
||||
claim_ownership: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Return skip reason, or None if candidate is selectable for *role*.
|
||||
|
||||
*claim_ownership* (#765) is the verdict from
|
||||
:func:`classify_claim_ownership` for this candidate's live claim. Foreign
|
||||
and unknown claims are excluded so one session's in-progress task can never
|
||||
blockade the queue for a different controller; ``own`` stays selectable so
|
||||
a controller can resume its own work.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
"""Return skip reason, or None if candidate is selectable for *role*."""
|
||||
if c.state in ("merged", "closed"):
|
||||
return f"{c.kind}#{c.number} is {c.state}; never assign"
|
||||
if c.blocked or "status:blocked" in c.labels:
|
||||
@@ -307,16 +205,6 @@ def classify_skip(
|
||||
c.dependency_reason
|
||||
or f"{c.kind}#{c.number} has unmet dependencies"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if claim_ownership in (OWNERSHIP_FOREIGN, OWNERSHIP_UNKNOWN):
|
||||
detail = (
|
||||
"owned by another controller instance"
|
||||
if claim_ownership == OWNERSHIP_FOREIGN
|
||||
else "owner could not be identified; never adopt on a guess"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return (
|
||||
f"{c.kind}#{c.number} {SKIP_CLAIMED_BY_OTHER_SESSION}: "
|
||||
f"active lease {detail}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if c.already_claimed_elsewhere:
|
||||
return f"{c.kind}#{c.number} already claimed elsewhere"
|
||||
if c.kind == "pr" and not (c.head_sha or "").strip():
|
||||
@@ -354,136 +242,13 @@ def classify_skip(
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def sort_candidates(candidates: Sequence[WorkCandidate]) -> list[WorkCandidate]:
|
||||
"""Rank candidates deterministically (#758 AC10).
|
||||
|
||||
Ordering key, in precedence order:
|
||||
|
||||
1. ``priority`` descending — the loader scores ``status:ready`` issues at
|
||||
20 and everything else at 1, so the ready queue ties at a single value
|
||||
by design;
|
||||
2. PRs before issues — in-flight review work drains before new authoring;
|
||||
3. ``number`` ascending — oldest first, which is what actually breaks the
|
||||
flat ``status:ready`` tie.
|
||||
|
||||
Because the ready tier is intentionally flat, rule 3 decides most real
|
||||
selections. That is only safe when ranking sees the *complete* candidate
|
||||
inventory: truncating before this call silently redefines "oldest" as
|
||||
"oldest among whatever survived the slice", which is the defect #758
|
||||
fixed. Callers must rank everything and bound reporting afterwards.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
"""Higher priority first; then lower number (older issues) for stability."""
|
||||
return sorted(
|
||||
candidates,
|
||||
key=lambda c: (-int(c.priority), c.kind != "pr", int(c.number)),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _require_strict_int(value: Any, *, field: str) -> int:
|
||||
"""Parse an issue number; reject bools and non-integers (#776)."""
|
||||
if isinstance(value, bool) or not isinstance(value, int):
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"{field} must be an integer (booleans and non-integers rejected; "
|
||||
f"got {type(value).__name__})"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return int(value)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def normalize_exclude_issue_numbers(
|
||||
exclude_issue_numbers: Any = None,
|
||||
) -> list[int]:
|
||||
"""Normalize controller-supplied exclusions to a sorted unique int list (#776).
|
||||
|
||||
``None`` / omitted → empty list (existing behavior). Accepts a list/tuple of
|
||||
integers. Rejects scalars, bools-as-ints, nested structures, and strings.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if exclude_issue_numbers is None:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
if isinstance(exclude_issue_numbers, (str, bytes)) or not isinstance(
|
||||
exclude_issue_numbers, (list, tuple)
|
||||
):
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
"exclude_issue_numbers must be a list of integers "
|
||||
f"(got {type(exclude_issue_numbers).__name__})"
|
||||
)
|
||||
out: list[int] = []
|
||||
seen: set[int] = set()
|
||||
for idx, raw in enumerate(exclude_issue_numbers):
|
||||
num = _require_strict_int(raw, field=f"exclude_issue_numbers[{idx}]")
|
||||
if num not in seen:
|
||||
seen.add(num)
|
||||
out.append(num)
|
||||
return sorted(out)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def candidate_set_fingerprint(
|
||||
candidates: Sequence[WorkCandidate],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
exclude_issue_numbers: Sequence[int] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> str:
|
||||
"""Stable CAS fingerprint of normalized candidate set + exclusions (#776 AC4)."""
|
||||
payload = {
|
||||
"candidates": sorted(
|
||||
({"kind": c.kind, "number": int(c.number)} for c in candidates),
|
||||
key=lambda x: (x["kind"], x["number"]),
|
||||
),
|
||||
"exclude_issue_numbers": list(
|
||||
normalize_exclude_issue_numbers(exclude_issue_numbers)
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
blob = json.dumps(payload, sort_keys=True, separators=(",", ":"))
|
||||
return hashlib.sha256(blob.encode("utf-8")).hexdigest()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def normalize_candidates_payload(raw: Any) -> list[WorkCandidate]:
|
||||
"""Decode MCP ``candidates_json`` from list or JSON string (#776 AC3).
|
||||
|
||||
Accepts:
|
||||
* an already-decoded ``list`` of candidate dicts (native MCP transport);
|
||||
* a valid JSON string that decodes to such a list (backward compatible).
|
||||
|
||||
Rejects malformed JSON, scalars, non-list containers, invalid records,
|
||||
booleans-as-integers, and unsupported types with fail-closed ``ValueError``.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if raw is None:
|
||||
raise ValueError("candidates_json is empty")
|
||||
if isinstance(raw, (bytes, bytearray)):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
raw = raw.decode("utf-8")
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"candidates_json bytes are not valid utf-8: {exc}"
|
||||
) from exc
|
||||
if isinstance(raw, str):
|
||||
text = raw.strip()
|
||||
if not text:
|
||||
raise ValueError("candidates_json string is empty")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
decoded = json.loads(text)
|
||||
except json.JSONDecodeError as exc:
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"malformed candidates_json JSON: {exc.msg} at pos {exc.pos}"
|
||||
) from exc
|
||||
raw = decoded
|
||||
if not isinstance(raw, list):
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
"candidates_json must be a JSON list (or already-decoded list); "
|
||||
f"got {type(raw).__name__}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
candidates: list[WorkCandidate] = []
|
||||
for idx, item in enumerate(raw):
|
||||
if not isinstance(item, dict):
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"invalid candidate record at index {idx}: expected object, "
|
||||
f"got {type(item).__name__}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
candidates.append(candidate_from_dict(item))
|
||||
except (KeyError, TypeError, ValueError, InvalidWorkKindError) as exc:
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"invalid candidate record at index {idx}: {exc}"
|
||||
) from exc
|
||||
return candidates
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def allocate_next_work(
|
||||
db: ControlPlaneDB,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
@@ -497,22 +262,12 @@ def allocate_next_work(
|
||||
profile_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
username: str | None = None,
|
||||
lease_ttl_seconds: int | None = None,
|
||||
controller_instance_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
claims: Mapping[tuple[str, int], dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
|
||||
exclude_issue_numbers: Sequence[int] | None = None,
|
||||
expected_candidate_set_fingerprint: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Select and optionally reserve the next work unit via control-plane DB.
|
||||
|
||||
*apply=False* (default): dry-run selection only — no lease/assignment.
|
||||
*apply=True*: atomic ``assign_and_lease`` for the selected candidate.
|
||||
|
||||
*exclude_issue_numbers* (#776): numbers removed before ranking. Omitted /
|
||||
empty preserves prior behavior.
|
||||
|
||||
*expected_candidate_set_fingerprint* (#776 AC4): when set on apply, rejects
|
||||
material candidate-set drift vs a prior dry-run.
|
||||
|
||||
Never uses file locks or comment-only leases as the assignment source.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if db is None:
|
||||
@@ -548,7 +303,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
|
||||
role=role_norm,
|
||||
profile=profile_name,
|
||||
pid=os.getpid(),
|
||||
controller_instance_id=controller_instance_id,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — surface structured
|
||||
return {
|
||||
@@ -590,238 +344,30 @@ def allocate_next_work(
|
||||
}
|
||||
terminal_pr = int(terminal["terminal_pr"]) if terminal else None
|
||||
|
||||
# #765: live claims exclude work owned by a *different* controller before
|
||||
# ranking, so one session's in-progress task cannot blockade the queue.
|
||||
# #776 AC5: load live claims in this call path immediately before selection
|
||||
# (and before apply reserve) so ownership is never stale within the
|
||||
# allocation attempt. Test callers may inject *claims* explicitly.
|
||||
if claims is None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
claims = db.list_active_claims(remote=remote, org=org, repo=repo)
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"outcome": OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
f"active claim lookup failed: {exc} (fail closed, #765)"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"skipped": [],
|
||||
"assignment": None,
|
||||
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
exclude_nums = normalize_exclude_issue_numbers(exclude_issue_numbers)
|
||||
except ValueError as exc:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"outcome": OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
|
||||
"apply": bool(apply),
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
f"invalid exclude_issue_numbers: {exc} (fail closed, #776)"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"skipped": [],
|
||||
"assignment": None,
|
||||
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
|
||||
}
|
||||
exclude_set = set(exclude_nums)
|
||||
cas_fp = candidate_set_fingerprint(
|
||||
candidates, exclude_issue_numbers=exclude_nums
|
||||
)
|
||||
expected_fp = (expected_candidate_set_fingerprint or "").strip() or None
|
||||
if expected_fp and expected_fp != cas_fp:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"outcome": OUTCOME_CANDIDATE_SET_DRIFT,
|
||||
"apply": bool(apply),
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
"candidate-set fingerprint drift: apply rejected rather than "
|
||||
"silently leasing a different candidate (#776 AC4)"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"candidate_set_fingerprint": cas_fp,
|
||||
"expected_candidate_set_fingerprint": expected_fp,
|
||||
"exclude_issue_numbers": list(exclude_nums),
|
||||
"skipped": [],
|
||||
"assignment": None,
|
||||
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
|
||||
"file_lock_only": False,
|
||||
"comment_lease_only": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
skipped: list[SkipRecord] = []
|
||||
claims_excluded: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
ownership_defects: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
controller_excluded: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
|
||||
# #776 AC2: remove excluded numbers *before* ranking / selection / lease.
|
||||
rankable: list[WorkCandidate] = []
|
||||
for c in candidates:
|
||||
if int(c.number) in exclude_set:
|
||||
reason = (
|
||||
f"{c.kind}#{c.number} {SKIP_EXCLUDED_BY_CONTROLLER}: "
|
||||
"controller pre-rank exclusion"
|
||||
)
|
||||
skipped.append(
|
||||
SkipRecord(
|
||||
c.kind,
|
||||
c.number,
|
||||
reason,
|
||||
SKIP_EXCLUDED_BY_CONTROLLER,
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
controller_excluded.append(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"kind": c.kind,
|
||||
"number": c.number,
|
||||
"reason_code": SKIP_EXCLUDED_BY_CONTROLLER,
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
# #776 AC5: same-owner live lease on an excluded issue is a
|
||||
# structured resume/release blocker, never a silent strand.
|
||||
claim = claims.get((c.kind, int(c.number))) if claims else None
|
||||
ownership = classify_claim_ownership(
|
||||
claim,
|
||||
session_id=session_id,
|
||||
controller_instance_id=controller_instance_id,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if ownership == OWNERSHIP_OWN and claim:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"outcome": OUTCOME_BLOCKED_EXCLUDED_OWN_LEASE,
|
||||
"apply": bool(apply),
|
||||
"role": role_norm,
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"username": username,
|
||||
"session_id": session_id,
|
||||
"remote": remote,
|
||||
"org": org,
|
||||
"repo": repo,
|
||||
"selected": None,
|
||||
"expected_role_next": None,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
f"{c.kind}#{c.number} is excluded_by_controller but "
|
||||
"carries a live same-owner lease; resume or release "
|
||||
"that lease before allocating other work (#776 AC5)"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
|
||||
"terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
|
||||
"assignment": None,
|
||||
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
|
||||
"file_lock_only": False,
|
||||
"comment_lease_only": False,
|
||||
"controller_instance_id": controller_instance_id,
|
||||
"claims_excluded": list(claims_excluded),
|
||||
"ownership_defects": list(ownership_defects),
|
||||
"controller_excluded": list(controller_excluded),
|
||||
"exclude_issue_numbers": list(exclude_nums),
|
||||
"candidate_set_fingerprint": cas_fp,
|
||||
"blocked_lease": {
|
||||
"kind": c.kind,
|
||||
"number": c.number,
|
||||
"lease_id": claim.get("lease_id"),
|
||||
"owner_session_id": claim.get("session_id"),
|
||||
"owner_controller_instance_id": claim.get(
|
||||
"controller_instance_id"
|
||||
),
|
||||
"expires_at": claim.get("expires_at"),
|
||||
"safe_next_action": (
|
||||
"resume the same-owner lease or release it, then "
|
||||
"re-run allocation without stranding the excluded "
|
||||
"issue"
|
||||
),
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
continue
|
||||
rankable.append(c)
|
||||
|
||||
ordered = sort_candidates(rankable)
|
||||
ordered = sort_candidates(list(candidates))
|
||||
selected: WorkCandidate | None = None
|
||||
for c in ordered:
|
||||
claim = claims.get((c.kind, int(c.number))) if claims else None
|
||||
ownership = classify_claim_ownership(
|
||||
claim,
|
||||
session_id=session_id,
|
||||
controller_instance_id=controller_instance_id,
|
||||
)
|
||||
reason = classify_skip(
|
||||
c,
|
||||
role=role_norm,
|
||||
terminal_pr=terminal_pr,
|
||||
claim_ownership=ownership,
|
||||
)
|
||||
reason = classify_skip(c, role=role_norm, terminal_pr=terminal_pr)
|
||||
if reason:
|
||||
is_claim_skip = SKIP_CLAIMED_BY_OTHER_SESSION in reason
|
||||
skipped.append(
|
||||
SkipRecord(
|
||||
c.kind,
|
||||
c.number,
|
||||
reason,
|
||||
SKIP_CLAIMED_BY_OTHER_SESSION if is_claim_skip else None,
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
if is_claim_skip and claim:
|
||||
record = {
|
||||
"kind": c.kind,
|
||||
"number": c.number,
|
||||
"ownership": ownership,
|
||||
"lease_id": claim.get("lease_id"),
|
||||
"owner_session_id": claim.get("session_id"),
|
||||
"owner_controller_instance_id": claim.get(
|
||||
"controller_instance_id"
|
||||
),
|
||||
"expires_at": claim.get("expires_at"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
claims_excluded.append(record)
|
||||
if ownership == OWNERSHIP_UNKNOWN:
|
||||
ownership_defects.append(record)
|
||||
skipped.append(SkipRecord(c.kind, c.number, reason))
|
||||
continue
|
||||
selected = c
|
||||
break
|
||||
|
||||
if selected is None:
|
||||
# If terminal lock blocks all review work, surface that explicitly.
|
||||
owner_session_id: str | None = None
|
||||
if terminal_pr is not None and role_norm in (ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER):
|
||||
outcome = OUTCOME_BLOCKED_TERMINAL
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
f"no safe work for role '{role_norm}': active terminal-review "
|
||||
f"lock on PR #{terminal_pr} (resolve terminal path first, #332/#600)"
|
||||
]
|
||||
elif ownership_defects:
|
||||
# #765: every remaining candidate is claimed and at least one owner
|
||||
# could not be identified. Report the defect; never adopt.
|
||||
outcome = OUTCOME_OWNERSHIP_DEFECT
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
f"no safe assignable work for role '{role_norm}': "
|
||||
f"{len(ownership_defects)} candidate(s) carry an active lease "
|
||||
"whose controller ownership could not be established. Record a "
|
||||
"controller_instance_id on those sessions; the allocator will "
|
||||
"not assume a shared profile means shared ownership (#765)."
|
||||
]
|
||||
elif claims_excluded:
|
||||
outcome = OUTCOME_WAIT
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
f"no unclaimed work for role '{role_norm}': "
|
||||
f"{len(claims_excluded)} candidate(s) are actively claimed by "
|
||||
"another controller. Waiting; their leases are not adopted (#765)."
|
||||
]
|
||||
# Preserve the pre-#765 wait contract: name the blocking owner.
|
||||
owner_session_id = claims_excluded[0].get("owner_session_id")
|
||||
elif controller_excluded and not ordered:
|
||||
# #776 AC7: every candidate was controller-excluded → wait / no lease.
|
||||
outcome = OUTCOME_WAIT
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
f"no assignable work for role '{role_norm}': all "
|
||||
f"{len(controller_excluded)} candidate(s) were removed by "
|
||||
f"{SKIP_EXCLUDED_BY_CONTROLLER} before ranking; no assignment "
|
||||
"or lease created (#776 AC7)"
|
||||
]
|
||||
else:
|
||||
outcome = OUTCOME_NO_SAFE
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
f"no safe assignable work for role '{role_norm}' "
|
||||
f"among {len(ordered)} rankable candidates "
|
||||
f"({len(controller_excluded)} controller-excluded)"
|
||||
f"among {len(ordered)} candidates"
|
||||
]
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
@@ -843,13 +389,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
|
||||
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
|
||||
"file_lock_only": False,
|
||||
"comment_lease_only": False,
|
||||
"controller_instance_id": controller_instance_id,
|
||||
"claims_excluded": list(claims_excluded),
|
||||
"ownership_defects": list(ownership_defects),
|
||||
"controller_excluded": list(controller_excluded),
|
||||
"exclude_issue_numbers": list(exclude_nums),
|
||||
"candidate_set_fingerprint": cas_fp,
|
||||
"owner_session_id": owner_session_id,
|
||||
"downstream_note": (
|
||||
"#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
|
||||
"allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
|
||||
@@ -896,12 +435,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
|
||||
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
|
||||
"file_lock_only": False,
|
||||
"comment_lease_only": False,
|
||||
"controller_instance_id": controller_instance_id,
|
||||
"claims_excluded": list(claims_excluded),
|
||||
"ownership_defects": list(ownership_defects),
|
||||
"controller_excluded": list(controller_excluded),
|
||||
"exclude_issue_numbers": list(exclude_nums),
|
||||
"candidate_set_fingerprint": cas_fp,
|
||||
"downstream_note": (
|
||||
"#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
|
||||
"allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
|
||||
@@ -1025,12 +558,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
|
||||
"substrate": "control_plane_db",
|
||||
"file_lock_only": False,
|
||||
"comment_lease_only": False,
|
||||
"controller_instance_id": controller_instance_id,
|
||||
"claims_excluded": list(claims_excluded),
|
||||
"ownership_defects": list(ownership_defects),
|
||||
"controller_excluded": list(controller_excluded),
|
||||
"exclude_issue_numbers": list(exclude_nums),
|
||||
"candidate_set_fingerprint": cas_fp,
|
||||
"downstream_note": (
|
||||
"#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
|
||||
"allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
|
||||
@@ -1062,32 +589,14 @@ def _next_command(role: str, c: WorkCandidate) -> str:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def candidate_from_dict(data: dict[str, Any]) -> WorkCandidate:
|
||||
"""Build a WorkCandidate from a plain dict (tests / MCP inventory).
|
||||
|
||||
#776: reject booleans-as-integers and non-int numbers fail-closed.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if "number" not in data:
|
||||
raise KeyError("number")
|
||||
number = _require_strict_int(data["number"], field="number")
|
||||
priority_raw = data.get("priority") or 0
|
||||
if isinstance(priority_raw, bool) or not isinstance(priority_raw, (int, float)):
|
||||
# Allow numeric strings only for priority? Keep strict for bools.
|
||||
if isinstance(priority_raw, str) and priority_raw.strip().lstrip("-").isdigit():
|
||||
priority = int(priority_raw)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"priority must be numeric (booleans rejected; "
|
||||
f"got {type(priority_raw).__name__})"
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
priority = int(priority_raw)
|
||||
"""Build a WorkCandidate from a plain dict (tests / MCP inventory)."""
|
||||
return WorkCandidate(
|
||||
kind=str(data.get("kind") or "issue"),
|
||||
number=number,
|
||||
number=int(data["number"]),
|
||||
state=str(data.get("state") or "open"),
|
||||
labels=tuple(data.get("labels") or ()),
|
||||
title=str(data.get("title") or ""),
|
||||
priority=priority,
|
||||
priority=int(data.get("priority") or 0),
|
||||
head_sha=data.get("head_sha"),
|
||||
request_changes_current_head=bool(data.get("request_changes_current_head")),
|
||||
approval_on_current_head=bool(data.get("approval_on_current_head")),
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,825 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Common anti-stomp preflight for every MCP mutation tool (#604).
|
||||
|
||||
Even with leases, mutation tools need a **shared** preflight that prevents
|
||||
stale sessions, wrong worktrees, wrong repos, old prompts, terminal locks,
|
||||
foreign leases, contaminated approvals, and root-checkout mutations from
|
||||
slipping through.
|
||||
|
||||
This module is the pure assessment core. Callers (MCP mutation entrypoints)
|
||||
gather live facts and pass them in — nothing here performs git, network, or
|
||||
durable-state I/O. Existing happy-path guards remain authoritative; this
|
||||
module composes them into one typed, fail-closed result.
|
||||
|
||||
Required checks (issue #604):
|
||||
|
||||
* repo/org verification
|
||||
* profile/role verification
|
||||
* root checkout clean and not used for mutation (when role requires branches/)
|
||||
* worktree under branches when required
|
||||
* active lease ownership (when lease is required for the mutation)
|
||||
* terminal lock status (when applicable)
|
||||
* expected head SHA (when pinned)
|
||||
* stale runtime status
|
||||
* workflow hash (when a workflow load is required)
|
||||
* source contamination status
|
||||
* no manual state/mtime/source-file bypass
|
||||
|
||||
Failure returns a typed blocker and an exact next action. There is **no**
|
||||
agent-facing bypass flag.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
import author_mutation_worktree
|
||||
import create_issue_bootstrap
|
||||
import master_parity_gate
|
||||
import remote_repo_guard
|
||||
import root_checkout_guard
|
||||
import stable_branch_push_guard
|
||||
|
||||
# ── public constants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
# Typed blocker kinds returned in the structured result.
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_REPO = "wrong_repo"
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_ROLE = "wrong_role"
|
||||
BLOCKER_ROOT_CHECKOUT = "root_checkout_mutation"
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_WORKTREE = "wrong_worktree"
|
||||
BLOCKER_FOREIGN_LEASE = "foreign_lease"
|
||||
BLOCKER_TERMINAL_LOCK = "terminal_lock"
|
||||
BLOCKER_HEAD_SHA = "head_sha_mismatch"
|
||||
BLOCKER_STALE_RUNTIME = "stale_runtime"
|
||||
BLOCKER_WORKFLOW_HASH = "workflow_hash"
|
||||
BLOCKER_SOURCE_CONTAMINATION = "source_contamination"
|
||||
BLOCKER_MANUAL_BYPASS = "manual_bypass"
|
||||
|
||||
BLOCKER_KINDS = frozenset({
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_REPO,
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_ROLE,
|
||||
BLOCKER_ROOT_CHECKOUT,
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_WORKTREE,
|
||||
BLOCKER_FOREIGN_LEASE,
|
||||
BLOCKER_TERMINAL_LOCK,
|
||||
BLOCKER_HEAD_SHA,
|
||||
BLOCKER_STALE_RUNTIME,
|
||||
BLOCKER_WORKFLOW_HASH,
|
||||
BLOCKER_SOURCE_CONTAMINATION,
|
||||
BLOCKER_MANUAL_BYPASS,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
# Mutation tasks that must invoke the shared anti-stomp preflight before
|
||||
# acting (issue #604 AC1). Every member must appear as a live task= kwarg
|
||||
# to verify_preflight_purity / _run_anti_stomp_preflight (or the review
|
||||
# anti_task map) in gitea_mcp_server.py. Inventory↔wiring tests fail if
|
||||
# a declared task is not wired.
|
||||
MUTATION_TASKS = frozenset({
|
||||
"create_issue",
|
||||
"comment_issue",
|
||||
"close_issue",
|
||||
"mark_issue",
|
||||
"lock_issue",
|
||||
"set_issue_labels",
|
||||
"create_label",
|
||||
"create_pr",
|
||||
"close_pr",
|
||||
"edit_pr",
|
||||
"commit_files",
|
||||
"gitea_commit_files",
|
||||
"delete_branch",
|
||||
"cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
|
||||
"cleanup_stale_claims",
|
||||
"reconcile_merged_cleanups",
|
||||
"reconcile_already_landed_pr",
|
||||
"reconcile_close_superseded_pr",
|
||||
"post_heartbeat",
|
||||
"acquire_reviewer_pr_lease",
|
||||
"gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease",
|
||||
"adopt_merger_pr_lease",
|
||||
"review_pr",
|
||||
"submit_pr_review",
|
||||
"approve_pr",
|
||||
"request_changes_pr",
|
||||
"merge_pr",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
# Intentionally excluded from MUTATION_TASKS. Each has a dedicated
|
||||
# fail-closed gate that preserves decision-lock ownership, workflow-hash,
|
||||
# head-SHA, and repository consistency. Do not re-add without either
|
||||
# wiring shared preflight or updating this rationale (#604 Blocker B).
|
||||
DEDICATED_GATE_MUTATIONS: dict[str, str] = {
|
||||
"mark_final_review_decision": (
|
||||
"Local review-decision lock only. Enforced by session lock ownership, "
|
||||
"workflow-hash, expected head SHA, PR work lease, eligibility, and "
|
||||
"terminal-lock gates. No Gitea review POST; shared anti-stomp would "
|
||||
"duplicate without side-effect-ordering value."
|
||||
),
|
||||
"save_review_draft": (
|
||||
"Local session-state draft save with live PR head/base consistency "
|
||||
"checks. Not a Gitea review/merge mutation; dedicated head-SHA and "
|
||||
"worktree resolution gates apply."
|
||||
),
|
||||
"resume_review_draft": (
|
||||
"Live-state resume with terminal lock, lease ownership, head/base SHA, "
|
||||
"and parity checks. When submit=True, delegates to gitea_submit_pr_review "
|
||||
"which runs shared anti-stomp before the Gitea review POST."
|
||||
),
|
||||
"cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock": (
|
||||
"Moot-lock cleanup with identity match, live PR merged/closed proof, "
|
||||
"and reviewer capability gate (#594). Distinct from shared anti-stomp."
|
||||
),
|
||||
"gitea_cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock": (
|
||||
"Alias of cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock; dedicated #594 path."
|
||||
),
|
||||
"heartbeat_reviewer_pr_lease": (
|
||||
"Lease heartbeat posts via verify_preflight_purity(task='review_pr') "
|
||||
"plus in-session lease ownership checks; not a separate mutation class."
|
||||
),
|
||||
"release_reviewer_pr_lease": (
|
||||
"Lease release uses workspace binding + ownership checks; posts only "
|
||||
"when the session owns the active lease."
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Roles that must mutate from a branches/ worktree (not the control checkout).
|
||||
_BRANCHES_REQUIRED_ROLES = frozenset({"author"})
|
||||
|
||||
# Reviewer/merger mutations that require an owned lease + head pinning when
|
||||
# the caller supplies those facts.
|
||||
_LEASE_AWARE_TASKS = frozenset({
|
||||
"review_pr",
|
||||
"submit_pr_review",
|
||||
"approve_pr",
|
||||
"request_changes_pr",
|
||||
"merge_pr",
|
||||
"acquire_reviewer_pr_lease",
|
||||
"gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease",
|
||||
"adopt_merger_pr_lease",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
_NEXT_ACTIONS: dict[str, str] = {
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_REPO: (
|
||||
"Pass explicit org= and repo= matching the local git remote "
|
||||
"(e.g. org=Scaled-Tech-Consulting repo=Gitea-Tools) and retry."
|
||||
),
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_ROLE: (
|
||||
"Call gitea_resolve_task_capability, switch to the required "
|
||||
"namespace/profile, re-verify with gitea_whoami, then retry."
|
||||
),
|
||||
BLOCKER_ROOT_CHECKOUT: (
|
||||
"Leave the root control checkout on clean master; create or switch "
|
||||
"to a session-owned worktree under branches/ and retry the mutation "
|
||||
"with worktree_path set."
|
||||
),
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_WORKTREE: (
|
||||
"Create or bind a session-owned worktree under branches/, set "
|
||||
"worktree_path (or GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE), and retry."
|
||||
),
|
||||
BLOCKER_FOREIGN_LEASE: (
|
||||
"Stop. Do not stomp a foreign lease. Wait for expiry, request "
|
||||
"takeover through the sanctioned path, or hand off to the owner."
|
||||
),
|
||||
BLOCKER_TERMINAL_LOCK: (
|
||||
"Stop. A terminal review-decision lock is active for this head. "
|
||||
"Do not re-approve/merge; follow the #332/#620 recovery path."
|
||||
),
|
||||
BLOCKER_HEAD_SHA: (
|
||||
"Re-fetch the live PR head with gitea_view_pr, re-pin "
|
||||
"expected_head_sha to the current head, re-validate, then retry."
|
||||
),
|
||||
BLOCKER_STALE_RUNTIME: (
|
||||
"Restart the Gitea MCP server so it reloads master's capability "
|
||||
"gates, re-run gitea_whoami + gitea_resolve_task_capability, then retry."
|
||||
),
|
||||
BLOCKER_WORKFLOW_HASH: (
|
||||
"Reload the canonical workflow via gitea_load_review_workflow, then "
|
||||
"rerun the full review-merge workflow from inventory (no approve/merge replay)."
|
||||
),
|
||||
BLOCKER_SOURCE_CONTAMINATION: (
|
||||
"Stop. Session is source-contaminated. Hand off to a reconciler for "
|
||||
"audit/clear; do not clear markers by deleting session-state files."
|
||||
),
|
||||
BLOCKER_MANUAL_BYPASS: (
|
||||
"Stop. Manual state/mtime/source-file bypass is forbidden. Use "
|
||||
"sanctioned MCP tools only; never delete or rewrite session-state "
|
||||
"or lock files by hand."
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_mutation_task(task: str | None) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when *task* is in the #604 mutation set (normalized)."""
|
||||
name = (task or "").strip().lower().removeprefix("gitea_")
|
||||
if not name:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if name in MUTATION_TASKS:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
# Accept gitea_ prefixed membership for aliases already in the set.
|
||||
return f"gitea_{name}" in MUTATION_TASKS
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def roles_compatible(active_role: str | None, required_role: str | None) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Whether *active_role* may perform a task that maps to *required_role*.
|
||||
|
||||
Exact match always passes. Reconcilers may run author-class mutations
|
||||
(comment/close/cleanup) that the capability map stamps as ``author`` —
|
||||
matching the long-standing reconciler exemption for control-checkout
|
||||
work. No other cross-role substitutions are allowed.
|
||||
|
||||
Capability-authorized multi-role tasks (e.g. reviewer holding
|
||||
``gitea.issue.comment`` for ``comment_issue``) are handled by
|
||||
:func:`authorization_compatible`, not by expanding this role matrix.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
active = (active_role or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
required = (required_role or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if not active or not required:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
if active == required:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
if active == "reconciler" and required in {"author", "reconciler"}:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def authorization_compatible(
|
||||
active_role: str | None,
|
||||
required_role: str | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
required_permission: str | None = None,
|
||||
allowed_operations: Any = None,
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Whether the active session may run a task given role *and* capability.
|
||||
|
||||
Order:
|
||||
|
||||
1. :func:`roles_compatible` (exact role or narrow reconciler→author).
|
||||
2. Capability possession: when *required_permission* is non-empty and
|
||||
present in *allowed_operations*, allow even if the nominal task role
|
||||
differs (e.g. reviewer/merger with ``gitea.issue.comment`` on
|
||||
``comment_issue`` / ``mark_issue`` / ``set_issue_labels`` /
|
||||
``lock_issue``).
|
||||
|
||||
Fail closed otherwise. This is **not** a broad reviewer→author or
|
||||
merger→author role rewrite: without the specific permission the check
|
||||
still denies. Missing *allowed_operations* when a permission is required
|
||||
also fails closed (callers must supply the live profile op list).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if roles_compatible(active_role, required_role):
|
||||
return True
|
||||
perm = (required_permission or "").strip()
|
||||
if not perm:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if allowed_operations is None:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
try:
|
||||
ops = {str(o).strip() for o in allowed_operations if o is not None}
|
||||
except TypeError:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return perm in ops
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _blocker(
|
||||
kind: str,
|
||||
reasons: list[str],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
exact_next_action: str | None = None,
|
||||
detail: dict | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
if kind not in BLOCKER_KINDS:
|
||||
raise ValueError(f"unknown anti-stomp blocker kind: {kind!r}")
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"kind": kind,
|
||||
"reasons": list(reasons),
|
||||
"exact_next_action": exact_next_action or _NEXT_ACTIONS[kind],
|
||||
"detail": dict(detail or {}),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _allowed_result(checks: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"allowed": True,
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"blockers": [],
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"exact_next_action": "proceed",
|
||||
"blocker_kind": None,
|
||||
"checks": checks,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _blocked_result(
|
||||
blockers: list[dict[str, Any]],
|
||||
checks: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
primary = blockers[0]
|
||||
all_reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
for b in blockers:
|
||||
for r in b.get("reasons") or []:
|
||||
if r not in all_reasons:
|
||||
all_reasons.append(r)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"allowed": False,
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"blockers": blockers,
|
||||
"reasons": all_reasons,
|
||||
"exact_next_action": primary["exact_next_action"],
|
||||
"blocker_kind": primary["kind"],
|
||||
"checks": checks,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_anti_stomp_preflight(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
task: str | None = None,
|
||||
# repo/org
|
||||
remote: str | None = None,
|
||||
resolved_org: str | None = None,
|
||||
resolved_repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
local_remote_url: str | None = None,
|
||||
org_explicit: bool = False,
|
||||
repo_explicit: bool = False,
|
||||
check_repo: bool = True,
|
||||
# profile/role + capability
|
||||
profile_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_role: str | None = None,
|
||||
required_role: str | None = None,
|
||||
required_permission: str | None = None,
|
||||
allowed_operations: Any = None,
|
||||
check_role: bool = True,
|
||||
# root checkout + worktree
|
||||
workspace_path: str | None = None,
|
||||
project_root: str | None = None,
|
||||
current_branch: str | None = None,
|
||||
root_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
root_porcelain: str | None = None,
|
||||
remote_master_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
check_root_checkout: bool = True,
|
||||
check_worktree: bool = True,
|
||||
create_issue_bootstrap_assessment: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
# stale runtime (master parity)
|
||||
startup_head: str | None = None,
|
||||
current_code_head: str | None = None,
|
||||
check_stale_runtime: bool = True,
|
||||
# lease ownership
|
||||
lease_required: bool = False,
|
||||
foreign_lease: bool | None = None,
|
||||
lease_owner_session: str | None = None,
|
||||
active_session_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
lease_owner_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
active_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
lease_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
|
||||
# terminal lock
|
||||
terminal_lock_blocks: bool | None = None,
|
||||
terminal_lock_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
|
||||
# expected head SHA
|
||||
require_head_sha: bool = False,
|
||||
expected_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
live_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
# workflow hash
|
||||
workflow_hash_valid: bool | None = None,
|
||||
workflow_hash_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
|
||||
# source contamination (stable-branch push / approval contamination)
|
||||
source_contaminated: bool | None = None,
|
||||
contamination_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
|
||||
# manual bypass
|
||||
manual_bypass_attempted: bool = False,
|
||||
manual_bypass_reasons: list[str] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Fail-closed common anti-stomp assessment (pure).
|
||||
|
||||
Only checks for which facts are supplied (or which are required by the
|
||||
mutation category) are evaluated. Unsupplied optional facts are recorded
|
||||
as ``skipped`` so callers can see coverage without inventing defaults.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns a structured dict with ``allowed``/``block``, typed ``blockers``,
|
||||
aggregated ``reasons``, ``exact_next_action``, and per-check ``checks``.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
task_name = (task or "").strip()
|
||||
role = (profile_role or "").strip().lower() or None
|
||||
req_role = (required_role or "").strip().lower() or None
|
||||
req_perm = (required_permission or "").strip() or None
|
||||
checks: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"task": task_name or None,
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"profile_role": role,
|
||||
"required_role": req_role,
|
||||
"required_permission": req_perm,
|
||||
}
|
||||
blockers: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
|
||||
# ── manual bypass (always first; never skippable when attempted) ─────────
|
||||
if manual_bypass_attempted:
|
||||
reasons = list(manual_bypass_reasons or [
|
||||
"manual state/mtime/source-file bypass attempt detected (fail closed)"
|
||||
])
|
||||
blockers.append(_blocker(BLOCKER_MANUAL_BYPASS, reasons))
|
||||
checks["manual_bypass"] = {"block": True, "reasons": reasons}
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["manual_bypass"] = {"block": False, "skipped": False}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── repo/org ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
if check_repo and resolved_org is not None and resolved_repo is not None:
|
||||
repo_assessment = remote_repo_guard.assess_remote_repo_match(
|
||||
remote=remote or "",
|
||||
resolved_org=resolved_org,
|
||||
resolved_repo=resolved_repo,
|
||||
local_remote_url=local_remote_url,
|
||||
org_explicit=org_explicit,
|
||||
repo_explicit=repo_explicit,
|
||||
)
|
||||
checks["repo"] = {
|
||||
"block": bool(repo_assessment.get("block")),
|
||||
"reasons": list(repo_assessment.get("reasons") or []),
|
||||
"resolved_org": resolved_org,
|
||||
"resolved_repo": resolved_repo,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if repo_assessment.get("block"):
|
||||
blockers.append(
|
||||
_blocker(
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_REPO,
|
||||
list(repo_assessment.get("reasons") or ["repo/org mismatch"]),
|
||||
detail={
|
||||
"resolved_org": resolved_org,
|
||||
"resolved_repo": resolved_repo,
|
||||
"local_remote_url": local_remote_url,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["repo"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── profile/role + capability ────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
# Role match OR possession of the task's required permission (Blocker A).
|
||||
# Reviewer/merger may run issue-comment-class tasks when they hold
|
||||
# gitea.issue.comment; unauthorized escalation without the permission
|
||||
# still fails closed.
|
||||
if check_role and req_role and role:
|
||||
authorized = authorization_compatible(
|
||||
role,
|
||||
req_role,
|
||||
required_permission=req_perm,
|
||||
allowed_operations=allowed_operations,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not authorized:
|
||||
perm_clause = (
|
||||
f", required_permission='{req_perm}'" if req_perm else ""
|
||||
)
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
f"active profile role '{role}' is not authorized for task "
|
||||
f"'{task_name or '(unknown)'}' (required_role='{req_role}'"
|
||||
f"{perm_clause}; profile={profile_name or '(unknown)'})"
|
||||
]
|
||||
checks["role"] = {
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"required_permission": req_perm,
|
||||
"capability_authorized": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
blockers.append(
|
||||
_blocker(
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_ROLE,
|
||||
reasons,
|
||||
detail={
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"profile_role": role,
|
||||
"required_role": req_role,
|
||||
"required_permission": req_perm,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["role"] = {
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"required_permission": req_perm,
|
||||
"capability_authorized": bool(
|
||||
req_perm
|
||||
and allowed_operations is not None
|
||||
and req_perm in {
|
||||
str(o).strip() for o in (allowed_operations or [])
|
||||
if o is not None
|
||||
}
|
||||
and not roles_compatible(role, req_role)
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["role"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── stale runtime (master parity) ────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
if check_stale_runtime and (
|
||||
startup_head is not None or current_code_head is not None
|
||||
):
|
||||
parity = master_parity_gate.assess_master_parity(
|
||||
{"startup_head": startup_head},
|
||||
current_code_head,
|
||||
)
|
||||
stale_reasons = master_parity_gate.parity_block_reasons(parity)
|
||||
checks["stale_runtime"] = {
|
||||
"block": bool(stale_reasons),
|
||||
"reasons": list(stale_reasons),
|
||||
"startup_head": startup_head,
|
||||
"current_code_head": current_code_head,
|
||||
"stale": bool(parity.get("stale")),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if stale_reasons:
|
||||
blockers.append(
|
||||
_blocker(
|
||||
BLOCKER_STALE_RUNTIME,
|
||||
list(stale_reasons),
|
||||
detail={
|
||||
"startup_head": startup_head,
|
||||
"current_code_head": current_code_head,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["stale_runtime"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── root checkout ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
if (
|
||||
check_root_checkout
|
||||
and workspace_path is not None
|
||||
and project_root is not None
|
||||
and root_porcelain is not None
|
||||
):
|
||||
root_assessment = root_checkout_guard.assess_root_checkout_guard(
|
||||
workspace_path=workspace_path,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=project_root,
|
||||
current_branch=current_branch,
|
||||
head_sha=root_head_sha,
|
||||
porcelain_status=root_porcelain,
|
||||
remote_master_sha=remote_master_sha,
|
||||
resolved_role=req_role or role,
|
||||
actual_role=role,
|
||||
)
|
||||
checks["root_checkout"] = {
|
||||
"block": bool(root_assessment.get("block")),
|
||||
"reasons": list(root_assessment.get("reasons") or []),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if root_assessment.get("block"):
|
||||
blockers.append(
|
||||
_blocker(
|
||||
BLOCKER_ROOT_CHECKOUT,
|
||||
list(root_assessment.get("reasons") or [
|
||||
"control checkout is not clean master"
|
||||
]),
|
||||
detail={
|
||||
"workspace_path": workspace_path,
|
||||
"project_root": project_root,
|
||||
"current_branch": current_branch,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["root_checkout"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── worktree under branches (author) ─────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
worktree_role = role or req_role
|
||||
if (
|
||||
check_worktree
|
||||
and workspace_path is not None
|
||||
and project_root is not None
|
||||
and worktree_role in _BRANCHES_REQUIRED_ROLES
|
||||
):
|
||||
wt = author_mutation_worktree.assess_author_mutation_worktree(
|
||||
workspace_path=workspace_path,
|
||||
project_root=project_root,
|
||||
current_branch=current_branch,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# #757: the #274 guard consults the server-derived create_issue
|
||||
# bootstrap before blocking the canonical control checkout. Route this
|
||||
# guard's decision through the *same* predicate on the *same*
|
||||
# assessment so the two cannot disagree about identical evidence.
|
||||
# Only the wrong-worktree verdict is waived; every other check in this
|
||||
# assessment (root checkout, repo, role, stale runtime, lease, ...) is
|
||||
# evaluated independently and still applies.
|
||||
bootstrap_waived = wt.get("block") and (
|
||||
create_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
|
||||
create_issue_bootstrap_assessment,
|
||||
task=task_name,
|
||||
workspace_path=workspace_path,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=project_root,
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
checks["worktree"] = {
|
||||
"block": bool(wt.get("block")) and not bootstrap_waived,
|
||||
"reasons": list(wt.get("reasons") or []),
|
||||
"under_branches": wt.get("under_branches"),
|
||||
"create_issue_bootstrap_waived": bool(bootstrap_waived),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if wt.get("block") and not bootstrap_waived:
|
||||
blockers.append(
|
||||
_blocker(
|
||||
BLOCKER_WRONG_WORKTREE,
|
||||
list(wt.get("reasons") or [
|
||||
"mutation worktree is not under branches/"
|
||||
]),
|
||||
detail={
|
||||
"workspace_path": workspace_path,
|
||||
"project_root": project_root,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["worktree"] = {
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"skipped": worktree_role not in _BRANCHES_REQUIRED_ROLES
|
||||
or workspace_path is None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── foreign lease ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
lease_needed = lease_required or (
|
||||
task_name.removeprefix("gitea_") in {
|
||||
t.removeprefix("gitea_") for t in _LEASE_AWARE_TASKS
|
||||
}
|
||||
and foreign_lease is not None
|
||||
)
|
||||
if lease_needed or foreign_lease is True:
|
||||
is_foreign = bool(foreign_lease)
|
||||
if foreign_lease is None and lease_required:
|
||||
# Ownership must be proven when lease_required; missing ownership
|
||||
# facts fail closed.
|
||||
owner_ok = (
|
||||
(not lease_owner_session and not active_session_id)
|
||||
or (
|
||||
lease_owner_session
|
||||
and active_session_id
|
||||
and lease_owner_session == active_session_id
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
identity_ok = (
|
||||
(not lease_owner_identity and not active_identity)
|
||||
or (
|
||||
lease_owner_identity
|
||||
and active_identity
|
||||
and lease_owner_identity == active_identity
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not owner_ok or not identity_ok:
|
||||
is_foreign = True
|
||||
reasons = list(lease_reasons or [])
|
||||
if is_foreign and not reasons:
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
"active lease is owned by a foreign session or identity "
|
||||
"(anti-stomp fail closed)"
|
||||
]
|
||||
checks["lease"] = {
|
||||
"block": is_foreign,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons if is_foreign else [],
|
||||
"lease_owner_session": lease_owner_session,
|
||||
"active_session_id": active_session_id,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if is_foreign:
|
||||
blockers.append(
|
||||
_blocker(BLOCKER_FOREIGN_LEASE, reasons)
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["lease"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── terminal lock ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
if terminal_lock_blocks is not None:
|
||||
reasons = list(terminal_lock_reasons or [])
|
||||
if terminal_lock_blocks and not reasons:
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
"terminal review-decision lock is active for this head "
|
||||
"(anti-stomp fail closed)"
|
||||
]
|
||||
checks["terminal_lock"] = {
|
||||
"block": bool(terminal_lock_blocks),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons if terminal_lock_blocks else [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if terminal_lock_blocks:
|
||||
blockers.append(_blocker(BLOCKER_TERMINAL_LOCK, reasons))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["terminal_lock"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── expected head SHA ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
if require_head_sha or (
|
||||
expected_head_sha is not None and live_head_sha is not None
|
||||
):
|
||||
exp = (expected_head_sha or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
live = (live_head_sha or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
mismatch = False
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
if require_head_sha and not exp:
|
||||
mismatch = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"expected_head_sha is required before this mutation "
|
||||
"(anti-stomp fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif exp and live and exp != live:
|
||||
mismatch = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"expected_head_sha '{exp}' does not match live PR head "
|
||||
f"'{live}' (anti-stomp fail closed; stale prompt data)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif require_head_sha and exp and not live:
|
||||
mismatch = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"live PR head SHA could not be determined to corroborate "
|
||||
"expected_head_sha (anti-stomp fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
checks["head_sha"] = {
|
||||
"block": mismatch,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"expected_head_sha": expected_head_sha,
|
||||
"live_head_sha": live_head_sha,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if mismatch:
|
||||
blockers.append(_blocker(BLOCKER_HEAD_SHA, reasons))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["head_sha"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── workflow hash ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
if workflow_hash_valid is not None:
|
||||
reasons = list(workflow_hash_reasons or [])
|
||||
if not workflow_hash_valid and not reasons:
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
"workflow load proof missing or hash stale "
|
||||
"(anti-stomp fail closed)"
|
||||
]
|
||||
checks["workflow_hash"] = {
|
||||
"block": not bool(workflow_hash_valid),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons if not workflow_hash_valid else [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if not workflow_hash_valid:
|
||||
blockers.append(_blocker(BLOCKER_WORKFLOW_HASH, reasons))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["workflow_hash"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
|
||||
|
||||
# ── source contamination ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
if source_contaminated is not None:
|
||||
reasons = list(contamination_reasons or [])
|
||||
if source_contaminated and not reasons:
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
"session is source-contaminated (stable-branch push or "
|
||||
"contaminated approval path); anti-stomp fail closed"
|
||||
]
|
||||
checks["source_contamination"] = {
|
||||
"block": bool(source_contaminated),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons if source_contaminated else [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if source_contaminated:
|
||||
blockers.append(
|
||||
_blocker(BLOCKER_SOURCE_CONTAMINATION, reasons)
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
checks["source_contamination"] = {"block": False, "skipped": True}
|
||||
|
||||
if blockers:
|
||||
return _blocked_result(blockers, checks)
|
||||
return _allowed_result(checks)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_anti_stomp_error(assessment: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
|
||||
"""Single RuntimeError message for MCP mutation gates."""
|
||||
kind = assessment.get("blocker_kind") or "unknown"
|
||||
reasons = "; ".join(
|
||||
assessment.get("reasons")
|
||||
or ["anti-stomp preflight blocked the mutation"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
next_action = assessment.get("exact_next_action") or "stop and diagnose"
|
||||
return (
|
||||
f"Anti-stomp preflight (#604) blocked mutation "
|
||||
f"[{kind}]: {reasons}. "
|
||||
f"exact_next_action: {next_action}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def block_response(
|
||||
assessment: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
**extra_fields: Any,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Structured tool-return payload for a blocked mutation."""
|
||||
payload = {
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"performed": False,
|
||||
"blocked": True,
|
||||
"anti_stomp": True,
|
||||
"blocker_kind": assessment.get("blocker_kind"),
|
||||
"blockers": list(assessment.get("blockers") or []),
|
||||
"reasons": list(assessment.get("reasons") or []),
|
||||
"exact_next_action": assessment.get("exact_next_action"),
|
||||
"checks": assessment.get("checks") or {},
|
||||
}
|
||||
payload.update(extra_fields)
|
||||
return payload
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def contamination_from_stable_marker(
|
||||
marker: dict | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
task: str | None,
|
||||
actual_role: str | None,
|
||||
) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]:
|
||||
"""Derive source-contamination facts from a #671 durable marker."""
|
||||
if not marker:
|
||||
return False, []
|
||||
gate = stable_branch_push_guard.assess_contamination_gate(
|
||||
marker,
|
||||
task=task,
|
||||
actual_role=actual_role,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if gate.get("block"):
|
||||
return True, list(gate.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
return False, []
|
||||
+2
-543
@@ -1,15 +1,7 @@
|
||||
"""Branches-only author mutation worktree guard (#274) with durable resolution (#618).
|
||||
"""Branches-only author mutation worktree guard (#274).
|
||||
|
||||
Author/coder mutations must run from a session-owned worktree under the
|
||||
project's ``branches/`` directory, never from the stable control checkout.
|
||||
|
||||
#618 durable resolution:
|
||||
- Prefer an explicit validated ``worktree_path`` argument.
|
||||
- Else derive the workspace from the active author issue lock's worktree.
|
||||
- Env bindings (``GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE`` / ``GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE``) may bind
|
||||
when present and valid.
|
||||
- Author mutations never silently fall back to the control checkout or master.
|
||||
- Missing configured bindings fail closed with a clear operator recovery action.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
@@ -23,18 +15,6 @@ AUTHOR_WORKTREE_ENV = "GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE"
|
||||
# Author-only: reviewer/merger/reconciler namespaces use role-specific env vars
|
||||
# via namespace_workspace_binding (#510).
|
||||
|
||||
BOUND_WORKTREE_MISSING = "bound_worktree_missing"
|
||||
BOUND_WORKTREE_MISSING_MESSAGE = (
|
||||
"bound worktree missing; operator must recreate or repoint the worktree "
|
||||
"and reconnect"
|
||||
)
|
||||
OPERATOR_RECOVERY_RECREATE_REPOINT = (
|
||||
"Recreate the worktree under branches/ (scripts/worktree-start or "
|
||||
"git worktree add), set GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE / GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE "
|
||||
"to that path (or pass worktree_path on mutation tools), keep the control "
|
||||
"checkout clean on master, then reconnect the author MCP session and re-run."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _normalize_path(path: str) -> str:
|
||||
return (path or "").replace("\\", "/").rstrip("/")
|
||||
@@ -65,11 +45,7 @@ def resolve_mutation_workspace(
|
||||
active_worktree_env: str | None = None,
|
||||
author_worktree_env: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> str:
|
||||
"""Resolve the workspace path inspected before author mutations.
|
||||
|
||||
Legacy helper: returns the first non-empty candidate path. Prefer
|
||||
:func:`resolve_durable_author_worktree` for mutation guards (#618).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
"""Resolve the workspace path inspected before author mutations."""
|
||||
for candidate in (worktree_path, active_worktree_env, author_worktree_env):
|
||||
text = (candidate or "").strip()
|
||||
if text:
|
||||
@@ -256,520 +232,3 @@ def format_author_mutation_worktree_error(assessment: dict) -> str:
|
||||
f"project root: {root}; workspace: {workspace}. "
|
||||
"Create a session-owned worktree under branches/ before mutating."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# #618 durable author worktree resolution
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _abs_real(path: str) -> str:
|
||||
return os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath((path or "").strip()))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_path_traversal_safety(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
path: str,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root: str,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Fail closed on traversal/symlink escapes outside the target repository.
|
||||
|
||||
Uses ``realpath`` so intermediate symlinks cannot walk outside
|
||||
``canonical_repo_root``. Author mutation workspaces must also land under
|
||||
``branches/`` of that root (enforced separately by the branches-only guard).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
raw = (path or "").strip()
|
||||
if not raw:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": False,
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"reasons": ["worktree path is empty (fail closed)"],
|
||||
"workspace_path": None,
|
||||
"canonical_repo_root": os.path.realpath(canonical_repo_root),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if "\x00" in raw:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": False,
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"reasons": ["worktree path contains a null byte (fail closed)"],
|
||||
"workspace_path": raw,
|
||||
"canonical_repo_root": os.path.realpath(canonical_repo_root),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
root = os.path.realpath(canonical_repo_root)
|
||||
# Resolve without requiring existence first: abspath then realpath of parents.
|
||||
abs_path = os.path.abspath(raw)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
real = os.path.realpath(abs_path)
|
||||
except OSError as exc:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": False,
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"reasons": [f"worktree path could not be resolved safely: {exc}"],
|
||||
"workspace_path": abs_path,
|
||||
"canonical_repo_root": root,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
root_norm = _normalize_path(root)
|
||||
real_norm = _normalize_path(real)
|
||||
if real_norm != root_norm and not real_norm.startswith(f"{root_norm}/"):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"worktree path '{real}' escapes canonical repository root '{root}' "
|
||||
"(traversal/symlink safety, fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": not reasons,
|
||||
"block": bool(reasons),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"workspace_path": real,
|
||||
"canonical_repo_root": root,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def list_git_worktree_paths(canonical_repo_root: str) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Return realpaths registered in ``git worktree list --porcelain``."""
|
||||
root = os.path.realpath(canonical_repo_root)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
res = subprocess.run(
|
||||
["git", "-C", root, "worktree", "list", "--porcelain"],
|
||||
capture_output=True,
|
||||
text=True,
|
||||
check=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
if res.returncode != 0:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
paths: list[str] = []
|
||||
for line in (res.stdout or "").splitlines():
|
||||
if line.startswith("worktree "):
|
||||
raw = line[len("worktree ") :].strip()
|
||||
if raw:
|
||||
paths.append(os.path.realpath(raw))
|
||||
return paths
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def path_in_git_worktree_list(path: str, canonical_repo_root: str) -> bool | None:
|
||||
"""True/False when inventory is available; None when git inventory fails.
|
||||
|
||||
An empty inventory with a working git root is treated as inconclusive
|
||||
(``None``) so unit tests and partial sandboxes are not false-negative
|
||||
blocked when ``git worktree list`` is mocked/unavailable.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
root = os.path.realpath(canonical_repo_root)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
res = subprocess.run(
|
||||
["git", "-C", root, "worktree", "list", "--porcelain"],
|
||||
capture_output=True,
|
||||
text=True,
|
||||
check=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if res.returncode != 0:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
inventory: list[str] = []
|
||||
for line in (res.stdout or "").splitlines():
|
||||
if line.startswith("worktree "):
|
||||
raw = line[len("worktree ") :].strip()
|
||||
if raw:
|
||||
inventory.append(os.path.realpath(raw))
|
||||
if not inventory:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return os.path.realpath(path) in inventory
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_bound_worktree_existence(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
configured_path: str,
|
||||
binding_source: str,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root: str | None = None,
|
||||
role_kind: str = "author",
|
||||
profile_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Fail closed when a configured role-bound worktree path is missing (#618)."""
|
||||
raw = (configured_path or "").strip()
|
||||
if not raw:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": True,
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"bound_worktree_missing": False,
|
||||
"path_exists": None,
|
||||
"in_git_worktree_list": None,
|
||||
"inspected_git_root": None,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"configured_path": None,
|
||||
"binding_source": binding_source,
|
||||
"role_kind": role_kind,
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"blocker_kind": None,
|
||||
"operator_recovery": None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
real = _abs_real(raw)
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
real = os.path.abspath(raw)
|
||||
|
||||
path_exists = os.path.isdir(real)
|
||||
in_list: bool | None = None
|
||||
inspected_git_root: str | None = None
|
||||
root = (canonical_repo_root or "").strip()
|
||||
if root:
|
||||
in_list = path_in_git_worktree_list(real, root) if path_exists else False
|
||||
if path_exists:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
res = subprocess.run(
|
||||
["git", "-C", real, "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel"],
|
||||
capture_output=True,
|
||||
text=True,
|
||||
check=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if res.returncode == 0:
|
||||
inspected_git_root = (res.stdout or "").strip() or None
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
inspected_git_root = None
|
||||
|
||||
if path_exists:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": True,
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"bound_worktree_missing": False,
|
||||
"path_exists": True,
|
||||
"in_git_worktree_list": in_list,
|
||||
"inspected_git_root": inspected_git_root,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"configured_path": real,
|
||||
"binding_source": binding_source,
|
||||
"role_kind": role_kind,
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"blocker_kind": None,
|
||||
"operator_recovery": None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
BOUND_WORKTREE_MISSING_MESSAGE,
|
||||
(
|
||||
f"role/profile '{profile_name or role_kind}' binding via {binding_source} "
|
||||
f"points to '{real}' which does not exist on disk"
|
||||
),
|
||||
f"path_exists=false; in_git_worktree_list={in_list}; inspected_git_root=null",
|
||||
]
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": False,
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"bound_worktree_missing": True,
|
||||
"path_exists": False,
|
||||
"in_git_worktree_list": False if in_list is not None else False,
|
||||
"inspected_git_root": None,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"configured_path": real,
|
||||
"binding_source": binding_source,
|
||||
"role_kind": role_kind,
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"blocker_kind": BOUND_WORKTREE_MISSING,
|
||||
"operator_recovery": OPERATOR_RECOVERY_RECREATE_REPOINT,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_bound_worktree_missing_error(assessment: dict) -> str:
|
||||
"""Canonical operator-facing message for a missing author worktree binding."""
|
||||
reasons = list(assessment.get("reasons") or [BOUND_WORKTREE_MISSING_MESSAGE])
|
||||
recovery = assessment.get("operator_recovery") or OPERATOR_RECOVERY_RECREATE_REPOINT
|
||||
profile = assessment.get("profile_name") or assessment.get("role_kind") or "author"
|
||||
source = (
|
||||
assessment.get("binding_source")
|
||||
or assessment.get("workspace_binding_source")
|
||||
or "unknown binding"
|
||||
)
|
||||
path = (
|
||||
assessment.get("configured_path")
|
||||
or assessment.get("workspace_path")
|
||||
or "(unknown)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return (
|
||||
f"Author worktree binding unhealthy (#618): {'; '.join(reasons)}. "
|
||||
f"role/profile: {profile}; binding_source: {source}; configured_path: {path}. "
|
||||
f"Operator recovery: {recovery}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_lock_worktree_ownership(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
workspace_path: str,
|
||||
session_lock_worktree: str | None,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""When a live lock records a worktree, mutation workspace must match it."""
|
||||
locked = (session_lock_worktree or "").strip()
|
||||
if not locked:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": True,
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"workspace_path": os.path.realpath(workspace_path) if workspace_path else None,
|
||||
"lock_worktree_path": None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
workspace = os.path.realpath(workspace_path)
|
||||
locked_real = os.path.realpath(locked)
|
||||
if workspace != locked_real:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": False,
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
f"active author issue lock worktree '{locked_real}' does not match "
|
||||
f"mutation workspace '{workspace}' (lock ownership, fail closed)"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"workspace_path": workspace,
|
||||
"lock_worktree_path": locked_real,
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": True,
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"workspace_path": workspace,
|
||||
"lock_worktree_path": locked_real,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def resolve_durable_author_worktree(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
worktree_path: str | None = None,
|
||||
worktree: str | None = None,
|
||||
process_project_root: str,
|
||||
active_worktree_env: str | None = None,
|
||||
author_worktree_env: str | None = None,
|
||||
session_lock_worktree: str | None = None,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
validate: bool = True,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Resolve author mutation workspace without silent control-checkout fallback (#618).
|
||||
|
||||
Candidate priority:
|
||||
1. explicit ``worktree_path`` argument
|
||||
2. ``worktree`` argument
|
||||
3. ``GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE``
|
||||
4. ``GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE``
|
||||
5. active author issue lock ``worktree_path``
|
||||
6. process project root **only** when it is already under ``branches/``
|
||||
|
||||
Configured bindings that point at a missing path fail closed immediately
|
||||
(no demotion to the control checkout). Validation (when *validate*) covers
|
||||
existence, traversal/symlink safety, repository identity, branches/
|
||||
containment, and lock ownership.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
process_root = os.path.realpath(process_project_root)
|
||||
canonical = os.path.realpath(canonical_repo_root or process_root)
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
role = "author"
|
||||
|
||||
candidates: list[tuple[str | None, str, bool]] = [
|
||||
(worktree_path, "worktree_path argument", False),
|
||||
(worktree, "worktree argument", False),
|
||||
(active_worktree_env, f"{ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV} environment variable", True),
|
||||
(author_worktree_env, f"{AUTHOR_WORKTREE_ENV} environment variable", True),
|
||||
(session_lock_worktree, "active author issue lock worktree", False),
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
selected_path: str | None = None
|
||||
selected_source: str | None = None
|
||||
existence: dict | None = None
|
||||
|
||||
for candidate, source, _configured in candidates:
|
||||
text = (candidate or "").strip()
|
||||
if not text:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
try:
|
||||
real = _abs_real(text)
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
real = os.path.abspath(text)
|
||||
|
||||
existence = assess_bound_worktree_existence(
|
||||
configured_path=real,
|
||||
binding_source=source,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=canonical,
|
||||
role_kind=role,
|
||||
profile_name=profile_name,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if existence["block"]:
|
||||
# Missing configured binding: fail closed, never fall back (#618).
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": False,
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"workspace_path": real,
|
||||
"workspace_binding_source": source,
|
||||
"process_project_root": process_root,
|
||||
"canonical_repo_root": canonical,
|
||||
"bound_worktree_missing": True,
|
||||
"path_exists": False,
|
||||
"in_git_worktree_list": existence.get("in_git_worktree_list"),
|
||||
"inspected_git_root": None,
|
||||
"reasons": list(existence.get("reasons") or []),
|
||||
"blocker_kind": BOUND_WORKTREE_MISSING,
|
||||
"operator_recovery": OPERATOR_RECOVERY_RECREATE_REPOINT,
|
||||
"silent_control_fallback": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
selected_path = real
|
||||
selected_source = source
|
||||
break
|
||||
|
||||
if selected_path is None:
|
||||
# No explicit/env/lock binding. Allow process root only when it is a
|
||||
# branches/ worktree (MCP launched from the task worktree). Never
|
||||
# silently bind the stable control checkout.
|
||||
if is_path_under_branches(process_root, canonical):
|
||||
selected_path = process_root
|
||||
selected_source = "MCP process root under branches/ (session-owned)"
|
||||
else:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": False,
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"workspace_path": process_root,
|
||||
"workspace_binding_source": "no author worktree binding",
|
||||
"process_project_root": process_root,
|
||||
"canonical_repo_root": canonical,
|
||||
"bound_worktree_missing": False,
|
||||
"path_exists": os.path.isdir(process_root),
|
||||
"in_git_worktree_list": None,
|
||||
"inspected_git_root": None,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
"author mutation blocked: workspace is the stable control checkout; "
|
||||
"author mutation requires an explicit validated worktree_path "
|
||||
"or a worktree derived from the active author issue lock; "
|
||||
"silent fallback to the control checkout/master is forbidden (#618)"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"blocker_kind": "author_worktree_unbound_control_checkout",
|
||||
"operator_recovery": OPERATOR_RECOVERY_RECREATE_REPOINT,
|
||||
"silent_control_fallback": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
workspace = selected_path
|
||||
source = selected_source or "unknown"
|
||||
path_exists = os.path.isdir(workspace)
|
||||
inspected_git_root: str | None = None
|
||||
in_list: bool | None = None
|
||||
|
||||
if not validate:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": True,
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"workspace_path": workspace,
|
||||
"workspace_binding_source": source,
|
||||
"process_project_root": process_root,
|
||||
"canonical_repo_root": canonical,
|
||||
"bound_worktree_missing": False,
|
||||
"path_exists": path_exists,
|
||||
"in_git_worktree_list": None,
|
||||
"inspected_git_root": None,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"blocker_kind": None,
|
||||
"operator_recovery": None,
|
||||
"silent_control_fallback": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Traversal / symlink safety
|
||||
safety = assess_path_traversal_safety(
|
||||
path=workspace, canonical_repo_root=canonical
|
||||
)
|
||||
if safety["block"]:
|
||||
reasons.extend(safety["reasons"])
|
||||
else:
|
||||
workspace = safety["workspace_path"] or workspace
|
||||
|
||||
# Existence + git inventory
|
||||
if not path_exists:
|
||||
reasons.append(BOUND_WORKTREE_MISSING_MESSAGE)
|
||||
reasons.append(f"resolved worktree '{workspace}' does not exist")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
in_list = path_in_git_worktree_list(workspace, canonical)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
res = subprocess.run(
|
||||
["git", "-C", workspace, "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel"],
|
||||
capture_output=True,
|
||||
text=True,
|
||||
check=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if res.returncode == 0:
|
||||
inspected_git_root = (res.stdout or "").strip() or None
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
inspected_git_root = None
|
||||
if in_list is False:
|
||||
# Only hard-fail when inventory was obtained and the path is absent.
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"worktree '{workspace}' is not listed in git worktree list for "
|
||||
f"'{canonical}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Repository identity
|
||||
if path_exists:
|
||||
membership = assess_workspace_repo_membership(
|
||||
workspace_path=workspace,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=canonical,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if membership["block"]:
|
||||
reasons.extend(membership["reasons"])
|
||||
|
||||
# branches/ containment
|
||||
branches = assess_author_mutation_worktree(
|
||||
workspace_path=workspace,
|
||||
project_root=canonical,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if branches["block"]:
|
||||
reasons.extend(branches["reasons"])
|
||||
|
||||
# Lock ownership (when a lock worktree is recorded)
|
||||
lock_own = assess_lock_worktree_ownership(
|
||||
workspace_path=workspace,
|
||||
session_lock_worktree=session_lock_worktree,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if lock_own["block"]:
|
||||
reasons.extend(lock_own["reasons"])
|
||||
|
||||
# Forbid resolved control checkout even if somehow selected
|
||||
if workspace == canonical or workspace == process_root:
|
||||
if not is_path_under_branches(workspace, canonical):
|
||||
if not any("control checkout" in r for r in reasons):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"author mutation blocked: resolved workspace is the stable "
|
||||
"control checkout; silent fallback forbidden (#618)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
block = bool(reasons)
|
||||
bound_missing = any("does not exist" in r or BOUND_WORKTREE_MISSING_MESSAGE in r for r in reasons)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": not block,
|
||||
"block": block,
|
||||
"workspace_path": workspace,
|
||||
"workspace_binding_source": source,
|
||||
"process_project_root": process_root,
|
||||
"canonical_repo_root": canonical,
|
||||
"bound_worktree_missing": bound_missing,
|
||||
"path_exists": path_exists,
|
||||
"in_git_worktree_list": in_list,
|
||||
"inspected_git_root": inspected_git_root,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"blocker_kind": BOUND_WORKTREE_MISSING if bound_missing else (
|
||||
"author_worktree_validation_failed" if block else None
|
||||
),
|
||||
"operator_recovery": OPERATOR_RECOVERY_RECREATE_REPOINT if block else None,
|
||||
"silent_control_fallback": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_durable_author_worktree_error(assessment: dict) -> str:
|
||||
"""Format fail-closed error for durable author worktree resolution."""
|
||||
if assessment.get("bound_worktree_missing") or assessment.get("blocker_kind") == BOUND_WORKTREE_MISSING:
|
||||
return format_bound_worktree_missing_error(assessment)
|
||||
workspace = assessment.get("workspace_path") or "(unknown)"
|
||||
source = assessment.get("workspace_binding_source") or "unknown"
|
||||
reasons = "; ".join(
|
||||
assessment.get("reasons") or ["author worktree resolution failed"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
recovery = assessment.get("operator_recovery") or OPERATOR_RECOVERY_RECREATE_REPOINT
|
||||
return (
|
||||
f"Durable author worktree resolution blocked (#618): {reasons}. "
|
||||
f"workspace: {workspace}; binding_source: {source}. "
|
||||
f"Operator recovery: {recovery}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -7,19 +7,6 @@ from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
PROTECTED_BRANCHES = frozenset({"master", "main", "dev"})
|
||||
|
||||
# Evidence / preservation branches must never be removed by cleanup tools
|
||||
# (e.g. chore/issue-681-preserve-review-session-wip).
|
||||
_PRESERVATION_MARKERS = ("preserve", "preservation", "evidence")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_preservation_or_evidence_branch(branch: str | None) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Return True when *branch* is a preservation/evidence ref that must stay."""
|
||||
if not branch:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
name = str(branch).lower()
|
||||
return any(marker in name for marker in _PRESERVATION_MARKERS)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_RAW_BRANCH_DELETE_PATTERNS = (
|
||||
re.compile(r"\bgit(?:\s+-C\s+\S+)?\s+branch\s+-[dD]\b[^\n\r]*", re.I),
|
||||
re.compile(r"\bgit(?:\s+-C\s+\S+)?\s+push\b[^\n\r]*\s--delete\b[^\n\r]*", re.I),
|
||||
@@ -85,11 +72,6 @@ def assess_merged_pr_branch_cleanup(
|
||||
reasons.append("PR head branch is missing")
|
||||
if head_branch in protected:
|
||||
reasons.append(f"branch '{head_branch}' is protected")
|
||||
if is_preservation_or_evidence_branch(head_branch):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"branch '{head_branch}' is a preservation/evidence branch and "
|
||||
"cannot be deleted through merged-PR cleanup"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if head_branch in open_pr_heads:
|
||||
reasons.append("an open PR still references this head branch")
|
||||
if head_on_target is False:
|
||||
@@ -114,490 +96,3 @@ def assess_merged_pr_branch_cleanup(
|
||||
"block_reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"recommended_action": "delete_remote_branch" if safe else "keep_remote_branch",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# #687 remediation: post-delete readback + active ownership protection
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
READBACK_NOT_FOUND = "not_found"
|
||||
READBACK_EXISTS = "exists"
|
||||
READBACK_AUTHENTICATION = "authentication_error"
|
||||
READBACK_AUTHORIZATION = "authorization_error"
|
||||
READBACK_TRANSPORT = "transport_error"
|
||||
READBACK_UNEXPECTED = "unexpected_response"
|
||||
READBACK_AMBIGUOUS_404 = "ambiguous_not_found"
|
||||
|
||||
# Scope of a 404: only branch-scoped absence may set verified_absent.
|
||||
NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH = "branch"
|
||||
NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_REPOSITORY = "repository"
|
||||
NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_HOST = "host"
|
||||
NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_UNKNOWN = "unknown"
|
||||
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION = "authentication"
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION = "authorization"
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_TRANSPORT = "transport"
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_UNEXPECTED = "unexpected"
|
||||
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_SESSION = "author_session"
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_LEASE = "author_lease"
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_REVIEWER_LEASE = "reviewer_lease"
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_MERGER_LEASE = "merger_lease"
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_CONTROLLER_LEASE = "controller_lease"
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_RECONCILER_LEASE = "reconciler_lease"
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_WORKTREE_BINDING = "worktree_binding"
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_INVENTORY_ERROR = "ownership_inventory_error"
|
||||
|
||||
_ROLE_TO_OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY = {
|
||||
"author": OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_LEASE,
|
||||
"reviewer": OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_REVIEWER_LEASE,
|
||||
"merger": OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_MERGER_LEASE,
|
||||
"controller": OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_CONTROLLER_LEASE,
|
||||
"reconciler": OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_RECONCILER_LEASE,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
_ACTIVE_OWNERSHIP_STATUSES = frozenset(
|
||||
{"active", "live", "claimed", "in_progress", "working", "pushing", "pushed"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
_TERMINAL_OWNERSHIP_STATUSES = frozenset(
|
||||
{"released", "abandoned", "done", "blocked", "terminal", "closed"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
_EXPIRED_STATUSES = frozenset({"expired"})
|
||||
_STALE_STATUSES = frozenset({"stale", "stale_dead_process", "stale_missing_worktree"})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _norm_str(value: Any) -> str:
|
||||
return str(value or "").strip()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def normalize_host(host: str | None) -> str:
|
||||
"""Normalize a host identity for ownership matching (no credentials)."""
|
||||
text = _norm_str(host).lower()
|
||||
for prefix in ("https://", "http://"):
|
||||
if text.startswith(prefix):
|
||||
text = text[len(prefix) :]
|
||||
# Drop path/query if a full URL slipped through.
|
||||
text = text.split("/", 1)[0]
|
||||
text = text.split("?", 1)[0]
|
||||
return text.rstrip(".")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def ownership_category_for_role(role: str | None) -> str:
|
||||
"""Map a role kind to a non-secret ownership category label."""
|
||||
key = _norm_str(role).lower()
|
||||
return _ROLE_TO_OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY.get(key, f"{key or 'unknown'}_lease")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def classify_branch_readback_http_status(
|
||||
status_code: int | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
not_found_scope: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Classify a GET-branch HTTP status into a secret-free readback result.
|
||||
|
||||
R1: A bare/generic/repository/wrong-host 404 never yields
|
||||
``verified_absent=True``. Only an authoritative *branch-scoped* not-found
|
||||
(``not_found_scope='branch'``) may verify deletion.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if status_code == 404:
|
||||
scope = _norm_str(not_found_scope).lower() or NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_UNKNOWN
|
||||
if scope == NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"status": READBACK_NOT_FOUND,
|
||||
"error_class": None,
|
||||
"verified_absent": True,
|
||||
"branch_present": False,
|
||||
"not_found_scope": NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
# repository / host / unknown / generic 404 — not verified absence
|
||||
reason = {
|
||||
NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_REPOSITORY: (
|
||||
"post-delete readback 404 is repository-scoped, not branch absence"
|
||||
),
|
||||
NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_HOST: (
|
||||
"post-delete readback 404 is host-scoped, not branch absence"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}.get(
|
||||
scope,
|
||||
"post-delete readback 404 is ambiguous (not branch-scoped); "
|
||||
"cannot verify absence",
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"status": READBACK_AMBIGUOUS_404,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_UNEXPECTED,
|
||||
"verified_absent": False,
|
||||
"branch_present": None,
|
||||
"not_found_scope": scope,
|
||||
"reasons": [reason],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if status_code in (401, 407):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"status": READBACK_AUTHENTICATION,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION,
|
||||
"verified_absent": False,
|
||||
"branch_present": None,
|
||||
"reasons": ["post-delete branch readback authentication failed"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if status_code == 403:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"status": READBACK_AUTHORIZATION,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION,
|
||||
"verified_absent": False,
|
||||
"branch_present": None,
|
||||
"reasons": ["post-delete branch readback authorization failed"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if status_code is not None and 200 <= int(status_code) < 300:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"status": READBACK_EXISTS,
|
||||
"error_class": None,
|
||||
"verified_absent": False,
|
||||
"branch_present": True,
|
||||
"reasons": ["post-delete readback found branch still present"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if status_code is not None and int(status_code) >= 500:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"status": READBACK_TRANSPORT,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_TRANSPORT,
|
||||
"verified_absent": False,
|
||||
"branch_present": None,
|
||||
"reasons": ["post-delete branch readback transport/upstream failure"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"status": READBACK_UNEXPECTED,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_UNEXPECTED,
|
||||
"verified_absent": False,
|
||||
"branch_present": None,
|
||||
"reasons": ["post-delete branch readback returned an unexpected response"],
|
||||
"http_status": status_code,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _extract_http_status(exc: BaseException) -> int | None:
|
||||
"""Extract an HTTP status code from an exception chain (secret-free)."""
|
||||
seen: set[int] = set()
|
||||
current: BaseException | None = exc
|
||||
while current is not None and id(current) not in seen:
|
||||
seen.add(id(current))
|
||||
for attr in ("code", "status", "status_code"):
|
||||
value = getattr(current, attr, None)
|
||||
if isinstance(value, int) and 100 <= value <= 599:
|
||||
return value
|
||||
text = str(current) if current is not None else ""
|
||||
match = re.match(r"HTTP\s+(\d{3})\b", text)
|
||||
if match:
|
||||
return int(match.group(1))
|
||||
current = current.__cause__ or current.__context__
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def classify_branch_readback_exception(
|
||||
exc: BaseException,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
not_found_scope: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Classify a GET-branch exception without leaking credentials or bodies.
|
||||
|
||||
R1: substring ``404`` / ``not found`` alone never becomes verified_absent.
|
||||
Callers must pass ``not_found_scope='branch'`` only after authoritative
|
||||
proof that the repository/host is still reachable and the 404 is branch-level.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
status_code = _extract_http_status(exc)
|
||||
if status_code is None:
|
||||
lower = str(exc).lower() if exc is not None else ""
|
||||
if any(
|
||||
token in lower
|
||||
for token in (
|
||||
"timed out",
|
||||
"timeout",
|
||||
"connection",
|
||||
"network",
|
||||
"temporarily unavailable",
|
||||
"name or service not known",
|
||||
"nodename nor servname",
|
||||
)
|
||||
):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"status": READBACK_TRANSPORT,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_TRANSPORT,
|
||||
"verified_absent": False,
|
||||
"branch_present": None,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
"post-delete branch readback transport/upstream failure"
|
||||
],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if "unauthorized" in lower:
|
||||
status_code = 401
|
||||
elif "forbidden" in lower:
|
||||
status_code = 403
|
||||
elif "404" in lower or "not found" in lower:
|
||||
# Ambiguous: do NOT treat as branch absence without scope proof.
|
||||
status_code = 404
|
||||
if not_found_scope is None:
|
||||
not_found_scope = NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_UNKNOWN
|
||||
|
||||
if status_code is not None:
|
||||
return classify_branch_readback_http_status(
|
||||
status_code, not_found_scope=not_found_scope
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"status": READBACK_UNEXPECTED,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_UNEXPECTED,
|
||||
"verified_absent": False,
|
||||
"branch_present": None,
|
||||
"reasons": ["post-delete branch readback returned an unexpected response"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_post_delete_readback(readback: dict[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Decide whether DELETE success may be reported after branch readback.
|
||||
|
||||
Success requires authoritative branch-scoped not-found
|
||||
(``verified_absent=True``). DELETE HTTP success alone is never enough.
|
||||
Generic/repository/host 404 cannot verify absence (R1).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
payload = dict(readback or {})
|
||||
status = _norm_str(payload.get("status")) or READBACK_UNEXPECTED
|
||||
# Only explicit verified_absent flag counts — never infer from status alone
|
||||
# when status is a bare not_found without branch scope proof.
|
||||
verified = bool(payload.get("verified_absent")) is True
|
||||
if verified and status == READBACK_NOT_FOUND:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"ok": True,
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"verified_absent": True,
|
||||
"readback": {
|
||||
"status": READBACK_NOT_FOUND,
|
||||
"verified_absent": True,
|
||||
"branch_present": False,
|
||||
"error_class": None,
|
||||
"not_found_scope": NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH,
|
||||
},
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
reasons = list(payload.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
if not reasons:
|
||||
if status == READBACK_EXISTS:
|
||||
reasons = ["post-delete readback found branch still present"]
|
||||
elif status == READBACK_AUTHENTICATION:
|
||||
reasons = ["post-delete branch readback authentication failed"]
|
||||
elif status == READBACK_AUTHORIZATION:
|
||||
reasons = ["post-delete branch readback authorization failed"]
|
||||
elif status == READBACK_TRANSPORT:
|
||||
reasons = ["post-delete branch readback transport/upstream failure"]
|
||||
elif status == READBACK_AMBIGUOUS_404:
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
"post-delete readback 404 is not branch-scoped; "
|
||||
"cannot verify absence"
|
||||
]
|
||||
else:
|
||||
reasons = ["post-delete branch readback could not verify deletion"]
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"ok": False,
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"verified_absent": False,
|
||||
"readback": {
|
||||
"status": status,
|
||||
"verified_absent": False,
|
||||
"branch_present": payload.get("branch_present"),
|
||||
"error_class": payload.get("error_class"),
|
||||
"not_found_scope": payload.get("not_found_scope"),
|
||||
},
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"blocker_kind": "post_delete_readback_failed",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def cleanup_result_envelope(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
success: bool,
|
||||
performed: bool,
|
||||
delete_acknowledged: bool,
|
||||
verified_absent: bool,
|
||||
**extra: Any,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""R2: consistent top-level cleanup result fields on every return path."""
|
||||
out: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"success": bool(success),
|
||||
"performed": bool(performed),
|
||||
"delete_acknowledged": bool(delete_acknowledged),
|
||||
"verified_absent": bool(verified_absent),
|
||||
}
|
||||
out.update(extra)
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _repo_matches(
|
||||
record: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
remote: str,
|
||||
org: str,
|
||||
repo: str,
|
||||
host: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Match ownership record to target remote/org/repo and normalized host."""
|
||||
if (
|
||||
_norm_str(record.get("remote")).lower() != _norm_str(remote).lower()
|
||||
or _norm_str(record.get("org")).lower() != _norm_str(org).lower()
|
||||
or _norm_str(record.get("repo")).lower() != _norm_str(repo).lower()
|
||||
):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
expected_host = normalize_host(host)
|
||||
record_host = normalize_host(record.get("host") or record.get("host_name"))
|
||||
# When both sides declare a host, they must agree after normalization.
|
||||
# A record host that disagrees with the expected host is out of scope.
|
||||
# Legacy records without host still match when remote/org/repo agree.
|
||||
if expected_host and record_host and expected_host != record_host:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _branch_matches(record: dict[str, Any], branch: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return _norm_str(record.get("branch")) == _norm_str(branch)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_ownership_record_activity(record: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Classify one ownership record as blocking or non-blocking.
|
||||
|
||||
Distinguishes active ownership from expired/released/terminal/stale records.
|
||||
Expired/stale records block unless reclaim_allowed is *explicitly* True
|
||||
(O2: never treat missing/unknown reclaim as auto-allowed).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
status = _norm_str(record.get("status")).lower()
|
||||
category = _norm_str(record.get("category")) or "unknown"
|
||||
reclaim_allowed = record.get("reclaim_allowed")
|
||||
|
||||
if category == OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_INVENTORY_ERROR:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"blocks": True,
|
||||
"status": status or "unknown",
|
||||
"category": category,
|
||||
"reason": "ownership inventory failed closed",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if status in _TERMINAL_OWNERSHIP_STATUSES:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"blocks": False,
|
||||
"status": status,
|
||||
"category": category,
|
||||
"reason": f"{category} ownership is terminal/released ({status})",
|
||||
}
|
||||
if status in _ACTIVE_OWNERSHIP_STATUSES:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"blocks": True,
|
||||
"status": status,
|
||||
"category": category,
|
||||
"reason": f"active {category} ownership still uses the target branch",
|
||||
}
|
||||
if status in _EXPIRED_STATUSES or status in _STALE_STATUSES:
|
||||
# O2: only explicit reclaim_allowed=True skips the block.
|
||||
if reclaim_allowed is True:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"blocks": False,
|
||||
"status": status,
|
||||
"category": category,
|
||||
"reason": (
|
||||
f"{category} ownership is {status} and reclaimable; "
|
||||
"does not block deletion"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"blocks": True,
|
||||
"status": status,
|
||||
"category": category,
|
||||
"reason": (
|
||||
f"{status} {category} ownership still protects the target "
|
||||
"branch (reclaim not proven; fail closed)"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
# Unknown status → fail closed
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"blocks": True,
|
||||
"status": status or "unknown",
|
||||
"category": category,
|
||||
"reason": (
|
||||
f"unclassified {category} ownership status "
|
||||
f"'{status or 'unknown'}'; fail closed"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_active_branch_ownership(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
remote: str,
|
||||
org: str,
|
||||
repo: str,
|
||||
branch: str,
|
||||
host: str | None = None,
|
||||
records: list[dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Assess whether any active ownership still uses *branch* in *repo*.
|
||||
|
||||
Matching requires remote/org/repo/branch and, when provided, normalized
|
||||
host identity. Other repositories, hosts, or branches never false-block.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
target_branch = _norm_str(branch)
|
||||
expected_host = normalize_host(host)
|
||||
considered: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
blocking: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
ignored: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
|
||||
for raw in records or []:
|
||||
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if not _repo_matches(
|
||||
raw, remote=remote, org=org, repo=repo, host=expected_host or None
|
||||
):
|
||||
ignored.append(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"category": _norm_str(raw.get("category")) or "unknown",
|
||||
"reason": "different repository or host scope",
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if not _branch_matches(raw, target_branch):
|
||||
ignored.append(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"category": _norm_str(raw.get("category")) or "unknown",
|
||||
"reason": "different branch",
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
activity = assess_ownership_record_activity(raw)
|
||||
entry = {
|
||||
"category": activity["category"],
|
||||
"status": activity["status"],
|
||||
"blocks": activity["blocks"],
|
||||
"reason": activity["reason"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
considered.append(entry)
|
||||
if activity["blocks"]:
|
||||
blocking.append(entry)
|
||||
|
||||
block = bool(blocking)
|
||||
categories = sorted({b["category"] for b in blocking})
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
(
|
||||
"active ownership protects branch "
|
||||
f"'{target_branch}': " + "; ".join(b["reason"] for b in blocking)
|
||||
)
|
||||
] if block else []
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"block": block,
|
||||
"safe_to_delete": not block,
|
||||
"remote": remote,
|
||||
"org": org,
|
||||
"repo": repo,
|
||||
"host": expected_host or None,
|
||||
"branch": target_branch,
|
||||
"blocking_categories": categories,
|
||||
"blocking": blocking,
|
||||
"considered": considered,
|
||||
"ignored_out_of_scope": ignored,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"blocker_kind": "active_branch_ownership" if block else None,
|
||||
"recommended_action": "keep_remote_branch" if block else "delete_remote_branch",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -386,27 +386,6 @@ def assess_canonical_comment(
|
||||
if not related or related.lower() in {"none", "n/a", "-"}:
|
||||
missing.append("RELATED_PRS")
|
||||
|
||||
# #695 AC7: untrusted / offline approval claims cannot certify merger handoff.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import review_quarantine as _rq
|
||||
|
||||
for claim_reason in _rq.assess_untrusted_canonical_approval_claim(text):
|
||||
extra.append(claim_reason)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# Fail closed on import/runtime errors for approval-shaped claims only.
|
||||
lower = text.lower()
|
||||
if (
|
||||
"state:\napproved" in lower
|
||||
or "who_is_next:\nmerger" in lower
|
||||
or "merge_ready: true" in lower
|
||||
or "merge_ready:\ntrue" in lower
|
||||
or "ready-to-merge" in lower
|
||||
):
|
||||
extra.append(
|
||||
"canonical approval/merge-ready claim could not be verified "
|
||||
"for native review proof (#695 AC7; fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
allowed = not missing and not vague and not extra
|
||||
correction = ""
|
||||
if not allowed:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,267 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Immutable canonical repository root for cross-repository namespaces (#706).
|
||||
|
||||
The Gitea-Tools MCP server historically derived the ``canonical_repo_root`` from
|
||||
the *install checkout* the server script lives in
|
||||
(``PROJECT_ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))``). A namespace
|
||||
that runs the same server script against an *external* repository (e.g.
|
||||
``eagenda-author`` targeting ``eAgenda``) then failed every mutation: the
|
||||
branches-only / worktree-membership guards (#274) compared the task workspace
|
||||
against the Gitea-Tools ``.git`` directory, which it can never belong to.
|
||||
|
||||
This module separates two distinct concepts:
|
||||
|
||||
* the immutable code/install root (``PROJECT_ROOT``) — where the server lives, and
|
||||
* the namespace-scoped **canonical repository root** — the working root of the
|
||||
repository whose issues/PRs the namespace mutates.
|
||||
|
||||
The canonical repository root is configured per namespace (profile field or an
|
||||
environment variable, typically set alongside the namespace ``cwd`` in the MCP
|
||||
config). It is validated (existence, git identity, git common-directory
|
||||
membership) and pinned immutably into the session context so a later call cannot
|
||||
forge or swap it. When *no* binding is configured the single-repo default is
|
||||
preserved unchanged: the canonical root is derived from the process checkout.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
from typing import Mapping
|
||||
|
||||
import remote_repo_guard
|
||||
|
||||
# Namespace-scoped override, typically exported next to the server ``cwd`` in the
|
||||
# MCP config for a cross-repository namespace.
|
||||
CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV = "GITEA_CANONICAL_REPOSITORY_ROOT"
|
||||
|
||||
# Candidate git remote names probed when deriving repository identity.
|
||||
_IDENTITY_REMOTE_CANDIDATES = ("prgs", "origin", "dadeschools", "mdcps")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def configured_canonical_root(
|
||||
profile: Mapping | None,
|
||||
env: Mapping | None,
|
||||
) -> tuple[str | None, str | None]:
|
||||
"""Return ``(value, source)`` for the declared canonical repository root.
|
||||
|
||||
Precedence: the ``GITEA_CANONICAL_REPOSITORY_ROOT`` environment variable
|
||||
(namespace-scoped) overrides the profile ``canonical_repository_root``
|
||||
field. Blank values are treated as unset. Returns ``(None, None)`` when no
|
||||
binding is declared (the single-repo default).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
env_map = env if env is not None else os.environ
|
||||
env_val = (env_map.get(CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV) or "").strip()
|
||||
if env_val:
|
||||
return env_val, f"{CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV} environment variable"
|
||||
if profile:
|
||||
prof_val = (profile.get("canonical_repository_root") or "").strip()
|
||||
if prof_val:
|
||||
return prof_val, "profile canonical_repository_root"
|
||||
return None, None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def resolve_repo_toplevel(path: str) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Realpath of the git working-tree top level for *path*, or None."""
|
||||
text = (path or "").strip()
|
||||
if not text:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
res = subprocess.run(
|
||||
["git", "-C", text, "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel"],
|
||||
capture_output=True,
|
||||
text=True,
|
||||
check=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
top = (res.stdout or "").strip()
|
||||
return os.path.realpath(top) if top else None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def repository_identity_slug(path: str, *, remote: str | None = None) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""``owner/repository`` derived from a git remote configured at *path*.
|
||||
|
||||
Tries the caller-named remote first, then a small set of known remote names,
|
||||
then whatever remote the repository actually has. Returns None when no remote
|
||||
URL is parseable (identity cannot be proven).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
text = (path or "").strip()
|
||||
if not text:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
ordered: list[str] = []
|
||||
for name in (remote, *_IDENTITY_REMOTE_CANDIDATES):
|
||||
clean = (name or "").strip()
|
||||
if clean and clean not in ordered:
|
||||
ordered.append(clean)
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
listed = subprocess.run(
|
||||
["git", "-C", text, "remote"],
|
||||
capture_output=True,
|
||||
text=True,
|
||||
check=True,
|
||||
).stdout.split()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
listed = []
|
||||
for name in listed:
|
||||
if name and name not in ordered:
|
||||
ordered.append(name)
|
||||
|
||||
for name in ordered:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
url = subprocess.run(
|
||||
["git", "-C", text, "remote", "get-url", name],
|
||||
capture_output=True,
|
||||
text=True,
|
||||
check=True,
|
||||
).stdout.strip()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
parsed = remote_repo_guard.parse_org_repo_from_remote_url(url)
|
||||
if parsed:
|
||||
return f"{parsed[0]}/{parsed[1]}"
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_canonical_repository_root(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
configured_value: str | None,
|
||||
source: str | None,
|
||||
expected_slug: str | None,
|
||||
process_project_root: str,
|
||||
remote: str | None = None,
|
||||
require_binding: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Validate the canonical repository root binding, failing closed on forgery.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns a dict with ``proven`` / ``block`` / ``reasons`` plus the resolved
|
||||
``canonical_repo_root`` (the value downstream guards must use),
|
||||
``configured`` (whether a cross-repo binding was declared),
|
||||
``resolved_slug`` and ``source``.
|
||||
|
||||
Without a configured binding the single-repo default is preserved: the
|
||||
canonical root is derived from *process_project_root* and never blocks
|
||||
(unless *require_binding* explicitly demands one).
|
||||
|
||||
With a configured binding the path must exist, be a git repository, and —
|
||||
when *expected_slug* is known — carry a matching repository identity. A
|
||||
mismatched or (when *require_binding*) unprovable identity is a forged or
|
||||
conflicting binding and fails closed.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
process_root = os.path.realpath(process_project_root)
|
||||
declared = (configured_value or "").strip()
|
||||
|
||||
if not declared:
|
||||
if require_binding:
|
||||
return _assessment(
|
||||
proven=False,
|
||||
reasons=[
|
||||
"no canonical_repository_root configured for a cross-repository "
|
||||
f"namespace; set {CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV} or the profile "
|
||||
"canonical_repository_root field (fail closed)"
|
||||
],
|
||||
configured=False,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=process_root,
|
||||
resolved_slug=None,
|
||||
source=None,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Single-repo default: canonical root follows the install checkout.
|
||||
derived = resolve_repo_toplevel(process_root) or process_root
|
||||
return _assessment(
|
||||
proven=True,
|
||||
reasons=[],
|
||||
configured=False,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=derived,
|
||||
resolved_slug=None,
|
||||
source=None,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
real = os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(declared))
|
||||
if not os.path.isdir(real):
|
||||
return _assessment(
|
||||
proven=False,
|
||||
reasons=[
|
||||
f"configured canonical repository root '{real}' does not exist "
|
||||
"or is not a directory (fail closed)"
|
||||
],
|
||||
configured=True,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=real,
|
||||
resolved_slug=None,
|
||||
source=source,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
toplevel = resolve_repo_toplevel(real)
|
||||
if not toplevel:
|
||||
return _assessment(
|
||||
proven=False,
|
||||
reasons=[
|
||||
f"configured canonical repository root '{real}' is not a git "
|
||||
"repository (fail closed)"
|
||||
],
|
||||
configured=True,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=real,
|
||||
resolved_slug=None,
|
||||
source=source,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
resolved_slug = repository_identity_slug(toplevel, remote=remote)
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
expected = (expected_slug or "").strip() or None
|
||||
if expected:
|
||||
if resolved_slug and resolved_slug.lower() != expected.lower():
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"canonical repository root identity mismatch: '{toplevel}' resolves "
|
||||
f"to repository '{resolved_slug}' but the session is authorized for "
|
||||
f"'{expected}' (forged or conflicting binding, fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif not resolved_slug and require_binding:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"canonical repository root '{toplevel}' has no resolvable git "
|
||||
f"remote identity to confirm authorization for '{expected}' "
|
||||
"(fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return _assessment(
|
||||
proven=not reasons,
|
||||
reasons=reasons,
|
||||
configured=True,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=toplevel,
|
||||
resolved_slug=resolved_slug,
|
||||
source=source,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_canonical_repository_root_error(assessment: Mapping) -> str:
|
||||
"""Single RuntimeError message for MCP preflight gates."""
|
||||
root = assessment.get("canonical_repo_root") or "(unknown)"
|
||||
source = assessment.get("source") or "(unconfigured)"
|
||||
reasons = "; ".join(
|
||||
assessment.get("reasons") or ["unknown canonical repository root violation"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
return (
|
||||
f"Canonical repository root guard (#706): {reasons}. "
|
||||
f"binding source: {source}; canonical repository root: {root}. "
|
||||
"Configure a valid canonical_repository_root for the target repository "
|
||||
"and relaunch; do not point it at the Gitea-Tools install checkout."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _assessment(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
proven: bool,
|
||||
reasons: list[str],
|
||||
configured: bool,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root: str,
|
||||
resolved_slug: str | None,
|
||||
source: str | None,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": proven,
|
||||
"block": not proven,
|
||||
"reasons": list(reasons),
|
||||
"configured": configured,
|
||||
"canonical_repo_root": canonical_repo_root,
|
||||
"resolved_slug": resolved_slug,
|
||||
"source": source,
|
||||
}
|
||||
+4
-103
@@ -302,7 +302,6 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
|
||||
conn.executescript(_SCHEMA_SQL)
|
||||
self._migrate_incident_links_null_scope(conn)
|
||||
self._migrate_lease_lifecycle_columns(conn)
|
||||
self._migrate_session_ownership_columns(conn)
|
||||
conn.execute(
|
||||
"INSERT OR REPLACE INTO schema_meta(key, value) VALUES (?, ?)",
|
||||
("schema_version", str(SCHEMA_VERSION)),
|
||||
@@ -493,26 +492,14 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
|
||||
namespace: str | None = None,
|
||||
pid: int | None = None,
|
||||
status: str = "active",
|
||||
controller_instance_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Register/refresh a session row.
|
||||
|
||||
*controller_instance_id* (#765) is the stable identity of the
|
||||
controller that owns this session. Session ids are regenerated per
|
||||
invocation, so they cannot express "my own in-progress task"; the
|
||||
controller instance can. It is never overwritten with ``None``, so a
|
||||
heartbeat from a caller that does not supply one cannot erase
|
||||
ownership.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
now = _ts()
|
||||
instance = (controller_instance_id or "").strip() or None
|
||||
with self._tx() as conn:
|
||||
existing = conn.execute(
|
||||
"SELECT session_id FROM sessions WHERE session_id = ?",
|
||||
(session_id,),
|
||||
).fetchone()
|
||||
if existing:
|
||||
if instance is None:
|
||||
conn.execute(
|
||||
"""
|
||||
UPDATE sessions
|
||||
@@ -522,33 +509,15 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
|
||||
""",
|
||||
(role, profile, namespace, pid, now, status, session_id),
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
conn.execute(
|
||||
"""
|
||||
UPDATE sessions
|
||||
SET role = ?, profile = ?, namespace = ?, pid = ?,
|
||||
last_heartbeat_at = ?, status = ?,
|
||||
controller_instance_id = ?
|
||||
WHERE session_id = ?
|
||||
""",
|
||||
(
|
||||
role, profile, namespace, pid, now, status,
|
||||
instance, session_id,
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
conn.execute(
|
||||
"""
|
||||
INSERT INTO sessions(
|
||||
session_id, role, profile, namespace, pid,
|
||||
started_at, last_heartbeat_at, status,
|
||||
controller_instance_id
|
||||
) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
|
||||
started_at, last_heartbeat_at, status
|
||||
) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)
|
||||
""",
|
||||
(
|
||||
session_id, role, profile, namespace, pid, now, now,
|
||||
status, instance,
|
||||
),
|
||||
(session_id, role, profile, namespace, pid, now, now, status),
|
||||
)
|
||||
row = conn.execute(
|
||||
"SELECT * FROM sessions WHERE session_id = ?",
|
||||
@@ -1246,73 +1215,6 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
|
||||
if name not in cols:
|
||||
conn.execute(f"ALTER TABLE leases ADD COLUMN {name} {decl}")
|
||||
|
||||
_SESSION_OWNERSHIP_COLUMNS: tuple[tuple[str, str], ...] = (
|
||||
("controller_instance_id", "TEXT"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def _migrate_session_ownership_columns(self, conn: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
|
||||
"""Add the stable controller identity to sessions (#765).
|
||||
|
||||
Pre-existing rows migrate with ``NULL``. A NULL instance is treated as
|
||||
*unknown ownership* by the allocator and is never silently adopted.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
cols = {
|
||||
row[1]
|
||||
for row in conn.execute("PRAGMA table_info(sessions)").fetchall()
|
||||
}
|
||||
if not cols:
|
||||
return
|
||||
for name, decl in self._SESSION_OWNERSHIP_COLUMNS:
|
||||
if name not in cols:
|
||||
conn.execute(f"ALTER TABLE sessions ADD COLUMN {name} {decl}")
|
||||
|
||||
def list_active_claims(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
remote: str | None = None,
|
||||
org: str | None = None,
|
||||
repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
role: str | None = None,
|
||||
limit: int = 500,
|
||||
) -> dict[tuple[str, int], dict[str, Any]]:
|
||||
"""Map ``(work_kind, work_number)`` to its live claim (#765).
|
||||
|
||||
Only ``active`` leases count as claims; released/expired rows never
|
||||
withhold work. Callers compare the returned ``controller_instance_id``
|
||||
against their own to decide own-task vs foreign-task.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
claims: dict[tuple[str, int], dict[str, Any]] = {}
|
||||
for row in self.list_leases(
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
role=role,
|
||||
statuses=("active",),
|
||||
limit=limit,
|
||||
):
|
||||
kind = str(row.get("work_kind") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
number = row.get("work_number")
|
||||
if not kind or number is None:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
key = (kind, int(number))
|
||||
claim = {
|
||||
"lease_id": row.get("lease_id"),
|
||||
"session_id": row.get("session_id"),
|
||||
"controller_instance_id": row.get("session_controller_instance_id"),
|
||||
"role": row.get("role"),
|
||||
"profile": row.get("session_profile"),
|
||||
"expires_at": row.get("expires_at"),
|
||||
"work_kind": kind,
|
||||
"work_number": int(number),
|
||||
}
|
||||
# Keep the longest-lived claim when duplicates exist.
|
||||
previous = claims.get(key)
|
||||
if previous is None or str(claim["expires_at"] or "") > str(
|
||||
previous["expires_at"] or ""
|
||||
):
|
||||
claims[key] = claim
|
||||
return claims
|
||||
|
||||
def _lease_columns(self, conn: sqlite3.Connection) -> set[str]:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
row[1]
|
||||
@@ -1354,8 +1256,7 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
|
||||
w.number AS work_number, w.state AS work_state,
|
||||
w.current_head_sha AS work_head_sha,
|
||||
s.pid AS session_pid, s.profile AS session_profile,
|
||||
s.status AS session_status,
|
||||
s.controller_instance_id AS session_controller_instance_id
|
||||
s.status AS session_status
|
||||
FROM leases l
|
||||
JOIN work_items w ON w.work_item_id = l.work_item_id
|
||||
LEFT JOIN sessions s ON s.session_id = l.session_id
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,359 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Sanctioned pre-issue bootstrap for ``create_issue`` (#749).
|
||||
|
||||
``gitea_create_issue`` is a pure remote mutation: it creates a tracking issue
|
||||
and writes nothing to the local working tree. The issue-first gate forbids
|
||||
creating ``branches/issue-<N>-*`` before the issue number exists, while the
|
||||
#274 branches-only guard previously demanded that worktree first — a deadlock.
|
||||
|
||||
This module defines a **narrow, phase-scoped** exemption:
|
||||
|
||||
* Only tasks in :data:`CREATE_ISSUE_TASKS` may use it.
|
||||
* Only the **canonical control checkout** may be used (never an arbitrary
|
||||
directory, unrelated worktree, or foreign clone).
|
||||
* The control checkout must be clean, on an accepted base branch, and
|
||||
base-equivalent to live master when a remote tip is known.
|
||||
* Every post-creation author mutation keeps the ordinary ``branches/`` rule.
|
||||
|
||||
The exemption cannot widen: unknown tasks, dirty roots, drifted HEADs, non-base
|
||||
branches, and non-control workspaces fall through to the existing fail-closed
|
||||
guards.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
from author_mutation_worktree import BASE_BRANCHES, is_path_under_branches
|
||||
from reviewer_worktree import parse_dirty_tracked_files
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE_ISSUE_TASKS = frozenset({"create_issue", "gitea_create_issue"})
|
||||
|
||||
# Satisfiable before an issue number exists — never names issue-<N>.
|
||||
EXACT_NEXT_ACTION_BOOTSTRAP = (
|
||||
"Restore the canonical control checkout to a clean accepted base branch "
|
||||
"(master/main/dev) that matches live master, with no tracked local edits "
|
||||
"and no detached HEAD. Re-resolve the exact create_issue task, then re-run "
|
||||
"gitea_create_issue from that clean control checkout. Do not create "
|
||||
"branches/issue-<N>-* worktrees, dummy directories, or borrow unrelated "
|
||||
"worktrees before the issue exists."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
EXACT_NEXT_ACTION_POST_CREATE = (
|
||||
"After the issue exists: create a registered worktree under "
|
||||
"branches/issue-<N>-* from clean master, claim/lock the issue, set "
|
||||
"GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE / worktree_path to that path, then continue author "
|
||||
"mutations from the issue-backed worktree only."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_create_issue_task(task: str | None) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when *task* is the create_issue mutation (or tool alias)."""
|
||||
return (task or "").strip() in CREATE_ISSUE_TASKS
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def normalize_sha(value: str | None) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Normalize a Git object id for comparison, or ``None`` when unknown.
|
||||
|
||||
Whitespace and case are the only permitted variation between two spellings
|
||||
of the same commit; anything else is a different commit. Empty and
|
||||
whitespace-only values normalize to ``None`` so an unknown tip can never
|
||||
compare equal to another unknown tip.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
normalized = (value or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
return normalized or None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_create_issue_bootstrap(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
workspace_path: str,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root: str,
|
||||
current_branch: str | None = None,
|
||||
head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
porcelain_status: str = "",
|
||||
remote_master_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
remote_master_sha_error: str | None = None,
|
||||
task: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Assess whether create_issue may proceed from the control checkout.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns a structured assessment:
|
||||
|
||||
* ``not_applicable`` — not a create_issue task, or workspace is already a
|
||||
``branches/`` worktree (use ordinary guards).
|
||||
* ``allowed`` — create_issue bootstrap may proceed from this control root.
|
||||
* ``block`` — create_issue was attempted from control checkout but gates
|
||||
failed (dirty, wrong branch, base race, etc.).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
root = os.path.realpath(canonical_repo_root or "")
|
||||
workspace = os.path.realpath(workspace_path or root or ".")
|
||||
branch = (current_branch or "").strip()
|
||||
dirty = parse_dirty_tracked_files(porcelain_status or "")
|
||||
under_branches = is_path_under_branches(workspace, root) if root else False
|
||||
|
||||
if not is_create_issue_task(task):
|
||||
return _result(
|
||||
not_applicable=True,
|
||||
allowed=False,
|
||||
block=False,
|
||||
reasons=["task is not create_issue"],
|
||||
workspace=workspace,
|
||||
root=root,
|
||||
branch=branch,
|
||||
dirty=dirty,
|
||||
under_branches=under_branches,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Registered branches/ worktrees keep the normal path (no bootstrap).
|
||||
if under_branches:
|
||||
return _result(
|
||||
not_applicable=True,
|
||||
allowed=False,
|
||||
block=False,
|
||||
reasons=["workspace is under branches/; ordinary #274 path applies"],
|
||||
workspace=workspace,
|
||||
root=root,
|
||||
branch=branch,
|
||||
dirty=dirty,
|
||||
under_branches=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Only the exact canonical control checkout is eligible.
|
||||
if not root or workspace != root:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"create_issue bootstrap requires the canonical control checkout; "
|
||||
f"workspace '{workspace}' is not the repository root '{root or '(unknown)'}'"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return _result(
|
||||
not_applicable=False,
|
||||
allowed=False,
|
||||
block=True,
|
||||
reasons=reasons,
|
||||
workspace=workspace,
|
||||
root=root,
|
||||
branch=branch,
|
||||
dirty=dirty,
|
||||
under_branches=False,
|
||||
exact_next_action=EXACT_NEXT_ACTION_BOOTSTRAP,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if dirty:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"create_issue bootstrap blocked: control checkout has tracked local "
|
||||
f"edits (dirty files: {', '.join(dirty)})"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if not branch:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"create_issue bootstrap blocked: control checkout is detached HEAD; "
|
||||
"expected an accepted base branch (master/main/dev)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif branch not in BASE_BRANCHES:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"create_issue bootstrap blocked: control checkout branch '{branch}' "
|
||||
f"is not an accepted base branch ({'/'.join(sorted(BASE_BRANCHES))})"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# #757 AC3/AC4: base-equivalence must be *proven*, never assumed. An
|
||||
# unknown tip on either side is not evidence of agreement, so a missing
|
||||
# local HEAD, an unresolvable live master, or a resolver failure all block.
|
||||
remote_tip = normalize_sha(remote_master_sha)
|
||||
local_tip = normalize_sha(head_sha)
|
||||
resolver_error = (remote_master_sha_error or "").strip() or None
|
||||
|
||||
if not local_tip:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"create_issue bootstrap blocked: control checkout HEAD SHA is "
|
||||
"unknown; base equivalence to live master cannot be proven "
|
||||
"(fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if resolver_error:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"create_issue bootstrap blocked: live master tip could not be "
|
||||
f"resolved ({resolver_error}); base equivalence cannot be proven "
|
||||
"(fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif not remote_tip:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"create_issue bootstrap blocked: live master tip is unknown; base "
|
||||
"equivalence to live master cannot be proven (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if remote_tip and local_tip and remote_tip != local_tip:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"create_issue bootstrap blocked: control checkout HEAD does not match "
|
||||
f"live master (HEAD {local_tip[:12]}, live master {remote_tip[:12]})"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if reasons:
|
||||
return _result(
|
||||
not_applicable=False,
|
||||
allowed=False,
|
||||
block=True,
|
||||
reasons=reasons,
|
||||
workspace=workspace,
|
||||
root=root,
|
||||
branch=branch or None,
|
||||
dirty=dirty,
|
||||
under_branches=False,
|
||||
exact_next_action=EXACT_NEXT_ACTION_BOOTSTRAP,
|
||||
local_head_sha=local_tip,
|
||||
remote_master_sha=remote_tip,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return _result(
|
||||
not_applicable=False,
|
||||
allowed=True,
|
||||
block=False,
|
||||
reasons=[],
|
||||
workspace=workspace,
|
||||
root=root,
|
||||
branch=branch or None,
|
||||
dirty=dirty,
|
||||
under_branches=False,
|
||||
exact_next_action=EXACT_NEXT_ACTION_POST_CREATE,
|
||||
bootstrap_path="clean_canonical_control_checkout",
|
||||
local_head_sha=local_tip,
|
||||
remote_master_sha=remote_tip,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
|
||||
assessment: Any,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
task: str | None,
|
||||
workspace_path: str | None,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root: str | None,
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Single interpretation of a bootstrap assessment (#757).
|
||||
|
||||
Both author-mutation guards — the #274 branches-only enforcer and the #604
|
||||
anti-stomp preflight — route their "may this workspace mutate" decision
|
||||
through this predicate, so the two can never reach opposite conclusions
|
||||
about identical evidence.
|
||||
|
||||
Fail-closed by construction. Every proof obligation must be present and
|
||||
affirmative in *assessment*, and the assessment must describe the very
|
||||
workspace and canonical root being guarded. A missing, malformed, refused,
|
||||
incomplete, or contradictory assessment returns ``False``, which leaves the
|
||||
caller's ordinary block in force.
|
||||
|
||||
``assessment`` is server-derived only: it is produced by
|
||||
:func:`assess_create_issue_bootstrap` from inspected repository state. It is
|
||||
never accepted from an MCP tool argument, so no caller can assert
|
||||
eligibility it has not proven.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not isinstance(assessment, dict):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if not is_create_issue_task(task):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
# Positive proof: the assessment must affirmatively allow, with no
|
||||
# competing refusal or not-applicable disposition recorded alongside it.
|
||||
if assessment.get("allowed") is not True:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if assessment.get("proven") is not True:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if assessment.get("block") is not False:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if assessment.get("not_applicable") is not False:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if assessment.get("reasons"):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
# Scope proof: only the create_issue bootstrap, only via the clean
|
||||
# canonical control checkout path.
|
||||
if assessment.get("task_scope") != "create_issue_only":
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if assessment.get("bootstrap_path") != "clean_canonical_control_checkout":
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
# State proof: clean, and not a branches/ worktree (those keep #274).
|
||||
if assessment.get("dirty_files"):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if assessment.get("under_branches") is not False:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
# Base-equivalence proof (#757 AC3/AC4): both tips must be recorded,
|
||||
# nonempty, and equal. Re-derived here rather than trusted from the
|
||||
# assessment's own flag, so a hand-built or truncated assessment cannot
|
||||
# assert agreement it never proved.
|
||||
if assessment.get("base_tips_verified") is not True:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
local_tip = normalize_sha(assessment.get("local_head_sha"))
|
||||
remote_tip = normalize_sha(assessment.get("remote_master_sha"))
|
||||
if not local_tip or not remote_tip or local_tip != remote_tip:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
# Binding proof: the assessment must describe *this* workspace and root,
|
||||
# and that workspace must be exactly the canonical control checkout.
|
||||
root = os.path.realpath(canonical_repo_root or "")
|
||||
workspace = os.path.realpath(workspace_path or root or ".")
|
||||
if not root or workspace != root:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if assessment.get("canonical_repo_root") != root:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if assessment.get("workspace_path") != workspace:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_create_issue_bootstrap_error(assessment: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
|
||||
"""RuntimeError / typed-block message for a failed bootstrap assessment."""
|
||||
reasons = "; ".join(
|
||||
assessment.get("reasons") or ["create_issue bootstrap failed"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
next_action = (
|
||||
assessment.get("exact_next_action") or EXACT_NEXT_ACTION_BOOTSTRAP
|
||||
)
|
||||
root = assessment.get("canonical_repo_root") or "(unknown)"
|
||||
workspace = assessment.get("workspace_path") or "(unknown)"
|
||||
return (
|
||||
f"Create-issue bootstrap guard (#749): {reasons}. "
|
||||
f"canonical repository root: {root}; workspace: {workspace}. "
|
||||
f"exact_next_action: {next_action}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _result(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
not_applicable: bool,
|
||||
allowed: bool,
|
||||
block: bool,
|
||||
reasons: list[str],
|
||||
workspace: str,
|
||||
root: str,
|
||||
branch: str | None,
|
||||
dirty: list[str],
|
||||
under_branches: bool,
|
||||
exact_next_action: str | None = None,
|
||||
bootstrap_path: str | None = None,
|
||||
local_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
remote_master_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
# #757 AC3/AC4: equality is recorded only when BOTH tips are known, so a
|
||||
# consumer can never read agreement out of two missing values.
|
||||
base_tips_verified = bool(
|
||||
local_head_sha and remote_master_sha and local_head_sha == remote_master_sha
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"not_applicable": not_applicable,
|
||||
"allowed": allowed,
|
||||
"block": block,
|
||||
"proven": allowed and not block,
|
||||
"reasons": list(reasons),
|
||||
"workspace_path": workspace,
|
||||
"canonical_repo_root": root,
|
||||
"current_branch": branch,
|
||||
"dirty_files": list(dirty),
|
||||
"under_branches": under_branches,
|
||||
"exact_next_action": exact_next_action,
|
||||
"bootstrap_path": bootstrap_path,
|
||||
"task_scope": "create_issue_only",
|
||||
"local_head_sha": local_head_sha,
|
||||
"remote_master_sha": remote_master_sha,
|
||||
"base_tips_verified": base_tips_verified,
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,203 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# ADR: Stable control runtime vs dev runtime (Gitea MCP)
|
||||
|
||||
- **Status:** Accepted (policy effective immediately for LLM sessions; tooling may lag)
|
||||
- **Date:** 2026-07-09
|
||||
- **Tracking issue:** [#615](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/615)
|
||||
- **Related:**
|
||||
- [#543](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/543) / `docs/mcp-namespace-health.md` — client-namespace health
|
||||
- `docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md` — reconnect-only EOF recovery (no PID kill)
|
||||
- [#558](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/558) / `docs/mcp-daemon-import-guard.md` — sanctioned daemon
|
||||
- [#557](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/557) / `docs/bootstrap-review-path.md` — controller bootstrap for self-hosted fixes
|
||||
- Allocator / control-plane ADR: `docs/architecture/mcp-allocator-control-plane-observability-adr.md` (#613 / PR #614)
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Context
|
||||
|
||||
The Gitea MCP server is the **control plane** for real issue/PR mutations (create, comment, lock, review, merge, etc.). When author/reviewer/merger/reconciler sessions kill or restart that process, relaunch it from a feature worktree, or edit the checkout that process loads, operators observe:
|
||||
|
||||
- Mid-session identity/preflight resets
|
||||
- Stale-runtime vs master parity failures
|
||||
- IDE transport EOF / “tool not found” while code on disk has changed
|
||||
- Accidental production mutations from experimental code
|
||||
|
||||
This ADR separates **stable control runtime** from **dev/test runtime** and defines promotion proof.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Decision
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.1 Stable control runtime
|
||||
|
||||
The Gitea MCP server used for **real workflow mutations** is the **stable control runtime**.
|
||||
|
||||
Characteristics:
|
||||
|
||||
- Loads a known, promoted revision of Gitea-Tools (or the packaged release layout operators designate)
|
||||
- Registered in the IDE/client as the production namespaces (`gitea-tools`, `gitea-reviewer`, `gitea-merger`, `gitea-reconciler`, etc.)
|
||||
- Holds production profile credentials via sanctioned keychain/env paths only
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.2 Dev / test runtime
|
||||
|
||||
MCP **server code** development and testing:
|
||||
|
||||
- Happens in isolated **`branches/`** worktrees (or other non-stable checkouts)
|
||||
- May use a **separate** dev/test MCP runtime/process when process-level testing is required
|
||||
- **Must not** be used for real Gitea mutations on production issues/PRs
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.3 Forbidden actions (normal sessions)
|
||||
|
||||
Normal **author, reviewer, merger, and reconciler** LLM sessions **must not**:
|
||||
|
||||
| Forbidden | Why |
|
||||
|-----------|-----|
|
||||
| Kill the running MCP server process | Drops all concurrent sessions; loses preflight state |
|
||||
| Restart / relaunch the MCP server process | Same as kill; causes stale/identity churn mid-workflow |
|
||||
| Relaunch MCP from a development worktree | Runs unpromoted code against production mutations |
|
||||
| Edit files in the stable runtime checkout | Hot-mutates control plane under concurrent users |
|
||||
| Use experimental/dev MCP for real Gitea mutations | Bypasses promotion proof and audit expectations |
|
||||
| Bypass or self-reset a stale master-parity gate | The gate is fail-closed; only an operator reload restores parity |
|
||||
|
||||
**LLM-allowed vs operator-owned (authoritative split):**
|
||||
|
||||
| Actor | May do | Must not do |
|
||||
|-------|--------|-------------|
|
||||
| **LLM session** | Call tools on the already-running stable namespaces; **client reconnect** after transport EOF (no process kill); pass `worktree_path` / role worktree args; report blockers and stop mutations when unhealthy/stale | Kill, restart, or relaunch any MCP process; bump config mtimes to force reload; edit the stable checkout; switch to a dev MCP for production mutations |
|
||||
| **Operator / release-manager** | Supervised restart/reload of the **stable** control runtime; dual-namespace client configuration; §2.4 promotions; incident recovery | — |
|
||||
|
||||
EOF / transport recovery for LLM sessions: **client reconnect only** (see `docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md`). Do not “fix” health by killing PIDs or bumping MCP config mtimes as a normal session procedure.
|
||||
|
||||
This ADR **supersedes** any older runbook wording that told the LLM to relaunch or restart the client/MCP as a self-service step. Where `docs/llm-workflow-runbooks.md` (or wiki runbooks) discuss dual-namespace setup or workspace rebind, **process restart/relaunch is operator-owned**; the LLM stops, reports, and waits.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.4 Promotion (operator / release-manager only)
|
||||
|
||||
Promotion of a new revision into the stable control runtime is an **explicit operator/release-manager action**, not an LLM self-service step.
|
||||
|
||||
A promotion **must record** (issue comment, release note, or promotion ledger):
|
||||
|
||||
| Field | Description |
|
||||
|-------|-------------|
|
||||
| **previous runtime SHA** | Commit previously loaded by stable runtime |
|
||||
| **promoted runtime SHA** | Commit after promotion |
|
||||
| **source branch/PR** | Where the change was reviewed |
|
||||
| **restart/reload method** | How the process was cycled (e.g. supervised restart, client reload) |
|
||||
| **health check proof** | Client-namespace probe success (`gitea_whoami` / namespace health) |
|
||||
| **identity/profile proof** | Expected profile(s) and username(s) after reload |
|
||||
| **workspace/root proof** | Stable checkout path / root matches intended layout |
|
||||
| **mutation capability proof** | Required permissions for the target role present; forbidden ops still forbidden |
|
||||
| **rollback instructions** | How to restore previous SHA and re-verify health |
|
||||
|
||||
Suggested durable marker:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
## MCP STABLE RUNTIME PROMOTION (#615)
|
||||
|
||||
Status: COMPLETED | ROLLED_BACK | ABORTED
|
||||
Previous-SHA: <full sha>
|
||||
Promoted-SHA: <full sha>
|
||||
Source-PR: <number>
|
||||
Source-Branch: <name>
|
||||
Reload-Method: <text>
|
||||
Health-Proof: client_namespace whoami OK / assess_mcp_namespace_health OK
|
||||
Identity-Proof: profile=<name> user=<name>
|
||||
Workspace-Proof: root=<path>
|
||||
Mutation-Proof: allowed_ops include <…>; forbidden include <…>
|
||||
Rollback: checkout <previous sha>; reload method <…>; re-run health/identity proofs
|
||||
Operator: <username>
|
||||
Timestamp: <ISO-8601>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.5 Unhealthy stable runtime → stop work
|
||||
|
||||
If the stable MCP runtime is **unhealthy**, including any of:
|
||||
|
||||
- client-namespace probes fail
|
||||
- wrong identity / wrong profile
|
||||
- wrong workspace root
|
||||
- missing mutation capability for the intended role
|
||||
- persistent EOF after **client reconnect**
|
||||
- **master parity is stale** (`startup_head` behind on-disk `master` / `restart_required` from the parity gate)
|
||||
|
||||
then:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Normal PR / review / merge / issue-mutation work must stop immediately.**
|
||||
2. The session **reports** the unhealthy/stale state (tool error, CTH, or operator handoff) with startup vs current head when known.
|
||||
3. Do **not** improvise: no LLM process kill/restart, no dev-worktree MCP for production mutations, no env escape hatches, no manual gate bypass.
|
||||
4. Resume only after:
|
||||
- an **operator** restores the runtime (see §2.6 for routine post-merge parity reload), **or**
|
||||
- a **controlled** promotion/rollback completes with the §2.4 promotion record, **or**
|
||||
- a controller invokes the narrow **bootstrap review path** (#557) when the defect is self-hosted and documented,
|
||||
- **and** the session re-verifies health (and master parity when applicable) before the next mutation.
|
||||
|
||||
### 2.6 Routine post-merge master-parity staleness (operator reload, not promotion)
|
||||
|
||||
**Symptom:** After merges land on `master`, a long-lived stable MCP process still runs the pre-merge `startup_head`. The master-parity gate marks the server **stale** / `restart_required` and **blocks mutations**.
|
||||
|
||||
**Sanctioned response (authoritative):**
|
||||
|
||||
| Step | Actor | Action |
|
||||
|------|-------|--------|
|
||||
| 1 | LLM session | Mutations stop immediately when the gate reports stale. |
|
||||
| 2 | LLM session | Report the stale state (startup head, current master head, that operator reload is required). Do not retry mutations. |
|
||||
| 3 | **Operator** | Reload/restart the **stable** control MCP so it loads current `master` (supervised client/daemon reload). |
|
||||
| 4 | LLM session | Resume only after startup/current-head parity is verified (e.g. `gitea_get_runtime_context` / parity assessment shows in parity). |
|
||||
|
||||
**Not a §2.4 promotion:** Catching the already-designated stable control checkout up to a newly advanced `master` is a **routine operator reload** of the stable runtime. It does **not** require the nine-field promotion ledger. Use §2.4 only when **changing which unpromoted/dev revision** becomes the stable control runtime (new source branch/PR into the stable designation).
|
||||
|
||||
**Code note:** `master_parity_gate.py` may still say “restart the server” in machine-facing reason strings. That string names the **operator recovery action**, not an LLM self-service instruction. This ADR and the runbooks define the actor split.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Relationship to other controls
|
||||
|
||||
| Doc / mechanism | Interaction |
|
||||
|-----------------|-------------|
|
||||
| Namespace health (#543) | Proves IDE client can call tools; does not authorize restart |
|
||||
| EOF recovery | Reconnect only; no process kill |
|
||||
| Daemon import guard (#558) | Mutations require sanctioned daemon; not a bare shell import |
|
||||
| Bootstrap path (#557) | Only controller-authorized exception when live runtime cannot review its own fix |
|
||||
| Allocator / control-plane ADR | Coordination DB is separate; still depends on a healthy MCP surface for Gitea writes |
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Consequences
|
||||
|
||||
### Positive
|
||||
|
||||
- Predictable control plane for concurrent LLMs
|
||||
- Clear operator-only promotion gate with rollback
|
||||
- Aligns session behavior with health/EOF docs already landed
|
||||
|
||||
### Costs
|
||||
|
||||
- LLM sessions must wait when runtime is sick (no DIY restart)
|
||||
- Operators must maintain promotion discipline and dual-runtime config if they use a dev MCP
|
||||
|
||||
### Non-goals
|
||||
|
||||
- Does not ban operator-supervised restarts during incidents
|
||||
- Does not replace CI or code review for MCP changes
|
||||
- Does not authorize editing stable checkout “because tests need a quick fix”
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Implementation follow-ups
|
||||
|
||||
The **policy binds sessions now**. The enforcement layer landed with issue #615
|
||||
acceptance criteria 6–11 in `stable_control_runtime.py`:
|
||||
|
||||
1. ~~Session preflight that refuses mutations if workspace root equals a `branches/` feature worktree configured as “dev only.”~~ **Landed.** `_runtime_mode_block()` refuses every mutating operation from a `dev-test`, dev-worktree-launched, dirty-stable, misaligned, or `unknown` runtime; `gitea.read` is never blocked, so an operator can still diagnose a sick runtime.
|
||||
2. ~~Explicit `runtime_kind=stable|dev` in MCP config and `gitea_whoami` profile metadata.~~ **Landed** as `runtime_mode` (`stable-control` | `dev-test` | `unknown`), reported by `gitea_get_runtime_context` under `stable_control_runtime` together with the runtime git SHA, branch, checkout path, process root, active workspace, alignment, dirty files, and `real_mutations_allowed`. Operators running a packaged layout with no git checkout declare the mode explicitly with `GITEA_MCP_RUNTIME_MODE`.
|
||||
3. ~~Promotion checklist script that emits the durable promotion marker fields.~~ **Landed** as `scripts/promote-stable-runtime` (read-only; emits and validates the record) plus [`../stable-runtime-promotion-runbook.md`](../stable-runtime-promotion-runbook.md).
|
||||
|
||||
Post-transport-flap proof is enforced per namespace: a flap invalidates every
|
||||
`gitea-*` namespace at once, and author proof never transfers to reviewer,
|
||||
merger, or reconciler (`namespace_not_reproven_after_flap`).
|
||||
|
||||
**Not optional (issue #615 acceptance criterion 2):** operator guide and runbooks **must** cross-link this ADR (see §6). Cross-links are documentation acceptance, not deferred tooling.
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Acceptance for this ADR
|
||||
|
||||
1. Document merged under `docs/architecture/mcp-stable-control-runtime-policy-adr.md`.
|
||||
2. **Operator guide / runbooks cross-link this ADR** (`docs/wiki/Operator-Guide.md`, `docs/wiki/Runbooks.md`, `docs/llm-workflow-runbooks.md`).
|
||||
3. Issue #615 references this path.
|
||||
4. LLM/operator runbooks treat kill/restart/relaunch-from-worktree as **LLM violations**; process restart is **operator-owned**.
|
||||
5. Unhealthy runtime (including **stale master parity**) stops normal mutation work until operator restore/reload, promotion/rollback, or #557 bootstrap — then re-verify parity before mutating.
|
||||
6. Routine post-merge parity reload is documented as operator reload (§2.6), not an LLM self-restart and not a full §2.4 promotion.
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Document history
|
||||
|
||||
| Date | Change |
|
||||
|------|--------|
|
||||
| 2026-07-09 | Initial ADR: stable vs dev runtime, forbidden session actions, promotion proof fields, stop-work rule |
|
||||
| 2026-07-16 | Review 443 remediation (#615 / PR #616): mandatory cross-links; LLM vs operator restart split; routine post-merge parity staleness (§2.6); stale parity in §2.5 unhealthy triggers |
|
||||
@@ -1,153 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Installation root vs canonical target repository root
|
||||
|
||||
## Purpose
|
||||
|
||||
This document (tracked as issue #741, building on #706 and #739/#740) explains
|
||||
the two distinct filesystem roots the Gitea-Tools MCP server reasons about, why
|
||||
conflating them silently targets the wrong repository, and which rule applies
|
||||
when you add a new consumer.
|
||||
|
||||
It is the repository-scope companion to
|
||||
[`gitea-execution-profiles.md`](gitea-execution-profiles.md) (the profile model)
|
||||
and [`gitea-dual-namespace-deployment.md`](gitea-dual-namespace-deployment.md)
|
||||
(the per-role namespace model).
|
||||
|
||||
## The two roots
|
||||
|
||||
| | Installation root | Canonical target repository root |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| What it is | The checkout the server *code* lives in | The working root of the repository whose issues/PRs/branches the namespace *mutates* |
|
||||
| How it is derived | `PROJECT_ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))` | Configured per namespace, then pinned immutably into the session |
|
||||
| Configured by | Nothing — it follows the script | `canonical_repository_root` profile field, or the `GITEA_CANONICAL_REPOSITORY_ROOT` environment variable |
|
||||
| Changes at runtime? | No | No — first bind wins for the life of the process |
|
||||
| Accessor | `PROJECT_ROOT` | `_canonical_local_git_root()` (filesystem) / `_canonical_repository_slug()` (identity) |
|
||||
|
||||
For a **single-repository** namespace — every Gitea-Tools namespace today — the
|
||||
two roots are the same path, and nothing about the existing behaviour changes.
|
||||
The distinction only becomes observable once a namespace is pointed at a
|
||||
different repository.
|
||||
|
||||
## Which root does my code need?
|
||||
|
||||
Ask what the operation is *about*, not where the file happens to sit.
|
||||
|
||||
**Use the installation root (`PROJECT_ROOT`)** when the operation concerns the
|
||||
Gitea-Tools software itself:
|
||||
|
||||
- server implementation / version parity (`master_parity_gate`, the
|
||||
`startup_head` vs `current_head` staleness gate);
|
||||
- loading the server's own workflow, schema and skill files;
|
||||
- self-code hashing and stale-runtime detection;
|
||||
- locating installed scripts such as `mirror_refs.sh`.
|
||||
|
||||
These are intentionally install-scoped. Do not "fix" them.
|
||||
|
||||
**Use the canonical target root (`_canonical_local_git_root()`)** when the
|
||||
operation concerns the repository being worked on:
|
||||
|
||||
- `git remote get-url` for repository identity;
|
||||
- branch creation, push, and commit;
|
||||
- ancestry and merge-base proofs;
|
||||
- worktree inventory, cleanup, and branch deletion;
|
||||
- any local git subprocess whose result feeds a mutation guard.
|
||||
|
||||
**If you cannot tell, fail closed.** An ambiguous consumer that guesses the
|
||||
install root is the exact defect class #741 exists to eliminate.
|
||||
|
||||
## Why conflating them inverts the guards
|
||||
|
||||
Before #741, `_local_git_remote_url()` ran `git remote get-url` with
|
||||
`cwd=PROJECT_ROOT` unconditionally. Every consumer of repository *identity* —
|
||||
`_resolve`, the #530 remote/repo guard, the anti-stomp org/repo fill,
|
||||
`_workspace_repository_slug` — therefore read the Gitea-Tools remote and called
|
||||
it "the workspace", no matter which repository the namespace was bound to.
|
||||
|
||||
For a namespace whose canonical root points elsewhere, this **inverts** the
|
||||
guard rather than merely weakening it:
|
||||
|
||||
- an operation naming the genuinely bound target repository is **rejected**,
|
||||
because that slug does not appear in the Gitea-Tools remote URL;
|
||||
- an operation naming Gitea-Tools is **accepted**.
|
||||
|
||||
The filesystem guards (#274 branches-only and worktree membership) had already
|
||||
been migrated to the canonical root by #706, so the two halves of a single
|
||||
assessment described two different repositories.
|
||||
|
||||
A related subtlety: repository identity must not be derived by looking a remote
|
||||
up by *name*. A target checkout commonly names its remote `origin` rather than
|
||||
`prgs`, so a name-keyed lookup returns nothing and the omitted coordinates fall
|
||||
through to the remote-wide default *target* — an unrelated repository.
|
||||
`_canonical_repository_slug()` probes candidate remote names against the
|
||||
canonical root instead.
|
||||
|
||||
`_canonical_local_git_root()` is now the one place a target root is resolved.
|
||||
Do not re-derive it; new code that needs a target root calls that helper.
|
||||
|
||||
## Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
Declare the binding on the profile, alongside `allowed_repositories`:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"profiles": {
|
||||
"example-author": {
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
"canonical_repository_root": "/absolute/path/to/target-repo",
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/target-repo"]
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The namespace-scoped environment variable
|
||||
`GITEA_CANONICAL_REPOSITORY_ROOT` overrides the profile field, and is normally
|
||||
exported next to the server `cwd` in the MCP client configuration.
|
||||
|
||||
Validation is layered, and each layer fails closed:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Config load.** The path must be a non-empty absolute string. All supported
|
||||
loaders — v1, v2-`environments`, and v2-`contexts` — validate it identically.
|
||||
(Before #741 only the v2-`contexts` loader validated it, and
|
||||
v2-`environments` silently *dropped* the field during flattening, so the
|
||||
namespace fell back to the install root — a fail-open.)
|
||||
2. **Bind time.** The path must exist, be a git repository, and resolve to a
|
||||
repository identity matching the session's authorized slug. A configured but
|
||||
unresolvable root is never replaced by the install identity.
|
||||
3. **Every mutation.** The pinned root is compared against the live configured
|
||||
value; a mismatch is treated as a forged or conflicting binding.
|
||||
|
||||
`allowed_repositories` remains a separate authorization boundary (#714): the
|
||||
canonical root determines *which* repository is derived, and
|
||||
`allowed_repositories` determines whether the session may act on it. A root that
|
||||
resolves to a repository outside that list fails closed.
|
||||
|
||||
## Explicit coordinates confirm, never override
|
||||
|
||||
Explicit `org`/`repo` arguments may **confirm** an existing canonical binding.
|
||||
They can never establish, complete, or replace one. A request naming a
|
||||
repository that contradicts the binding fails closed, in both directions:
|
||||
|
||||
- a Gitea-Tools-rooted namespace cannot mutate another repository;
|
||||
- a namespace rooted at another repository cannot mutate Gitea-Tools.
|
||||
|
||||
This matters because both-explicit coordinates short-circuit the #530
|
||||
remote/repo match check, so without this rule a caller could name any repository
|
||||
and skip validation entirely.
|
||||
|
||||
No request-supplied workspace, remote, owner, repository, or worktree can
|
||||
replace the immutable root.
|
||||
|
||||
## Parity is reported per dimension
|
||||
|
||||
`gitea_assess_master_parity` reports two separately labelled dimensions:
|
||||
|
||||
- `server_implementation` — the Gitea-Tools installation checkout. Its
|
||||
`startup_head` / `current_head` / `stale` / `restart_required` fields keep
|
||||
their original meaning, and **only this dimension gates mutations**: the
|
||||
running process executes the code it started with, so a merged fix is not live
|
||||
until the daemon restarts.
|
||||
- `target_repository` — the configured canonical target checkout and its
|
||||
last-known remote master.
|
||||
|
||||
"In parity" is a statement about one dimension, never about the whole system.
|
||||
Read the dimension you actually care about.
|
||||
@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ authenticated capability set. Each profile defines the following fields:
|
||||
| `authenticated_username` | string | The Gitea login this profile authenticates as (verified at runtime via `gitea_whoami`, not trusted from config). |
|
||||
| `allowed_operations` | list | Operation categories this profile may perform. |
|
||||
| `forbidden_operations` | list | Operation categories this profile must never perform. |
|
||||
| `allowed_repositories` | list | Optional. Canonical `owner/repository` slugs this profile may bind to. An authorization boundary, not the binding itself — see [Repository scope](#repository-scope-714). |
|
||||
| `token_source_name` | string | The *name* of the secret source (e.g. env var name or secret key). **Never the token value.** |
|
||||
| `audit_label` | string | Short label attached to audit records for actions by this profile. |
|
||||
| `can_approve_prs` | bool | May submit an approving PR review. |
|
||||
@@ -58,47 +57,6 @@ authenticated capability set. Each profile defines the following fields:
|
||||
name), never the token itself. Token values are never part of a profile object,
|
||||
never logged, never returned by a tool, and never committed.
|
||||
|
||||
## Repository scope (#714)
|
||||
|
||||
`allowed_repositories` declares the canonical `owner/repository` slugs a profile
|
||||
may operate on:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
"prgs-author": {
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
It is an **authorization boundary, not the session binding**. The binding is
|
||||
derived and enforced like this:
|
||||
|
||||
1. The session repository is derived from the **verified, workspace-aligned git
|
||||
remote** — never from a caller-supplied `org`/`repo` argument, and never from
|
||||
the `REMOTES` table (whose entries are default *targets*: `prgs` defaults to
|
||||
`Timesheet`, which is not this project).
|
||||
2. That workspace-derived slug is validated against `allowed_repositories`.
|
||||
3. The session binds immutably to that one canonical `owner/repository`. The
|
||||
organization is derived from the slug; there is no independent,
|
||||
caller-controlled organization value.
|
||||
4. If a profile authorizes several repositories, the verified workspace still
|
||||
selects exactly one. A session never binds to the whole list and never
|
||||
switches between entries.
|
||||
|
||||
Fail-closed rules:
|
||||
|
||||
- Activation is rejected when the workspace repository is absent from the
|
||||
allowlist.
|
||||
- A mutation is rejected when no verified workspace repository can be
|
||||
established.
|
||||
- A tool-level `org`/`repo` override that disagrees with the binding is rejected
|
||||
before the mutation runs.
|
||||
- A mutation request can never establish, complete, or replace the binding.
|
||||
|
||||
The field is **config-only**: no environment variable can widen or forge it. It
|
||||
is optional — a profile that omits it keeps the previous behaviour, so existing
|
||||
static-profile namespaces stay functional until an operator provisions the
|
||||
scope. Provisioning it is what activates enforcement for that profile.
|
||||
|
||||
## Example profiles
|
||||
|
||||
The following are the reference profiles. Booleans express intended capability
|
||||
@@ -280,81 +238,11 @@ narrow operation set:
|
||||
- `gitea.issue.comment`
|
||||
- `gitea.issue.close`
|
||||
- `gitea.pr.close`
|
||||
- `gitea.branch.delete` (merged-branch cleanup only — see below)
|
||||
|
||||
Forbidden on reconciler profiles: `gitea.pr.approve`, `gitea.pr.merge`,
|
||||
`gitea.pr.review`, `gitea.pr.create`, `gitea.branch.push`, and
|
||||
`gitea.repo.commit`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Merged-branch cleanup ownership (`gitea.branch.delete`)
|
||||
|
||||
The reconciler is the repository-supported owner of merged-PR source-branch
|
||||
cleanup: `task_capability_map` maps `cleanup_merged_pr_branch` (and
|
||||
`reconciliation_cleanup`) to role `reconciler` with permission
|
||||
`gitea.branch.delete`. Post-merge branch lifecycle is reconciliation work —
|
||||
it happens after the author, reviewer, and merger roles have completed, and
|
||||
it must not be reachable from those roles.
|
||||
|
||||
Least-privilege constraints:
|
||||
|
||||
- `gitea.branch.delete` is granted **only** to reconciler profiles. Author,
|
||||
reviewer, and merger profiles must never hold it; `gitea_delete_branch`
|
||||
and `gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch` fail closed on any profile without
|
||||
the permission.
|
||||
- Even with the permission, reconciler deletion is only supported through the
|
||||
guarded `gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch` path (#514 / #687): the PR must be
|
||||
merged, the head an ancestor of the target, the branch not protected
|
||||
(`master`/`main`/`dev`), the branch not a preservation/evidence ref (e.g.
|
||||
`chore/issue-681-preserve-review-session-wip`), no open PR may still use the
|
||||
head, and an explicit `CLEANUP MERGED PR <n> BRANCH <branch>` confirmation is
|
||||
required. Raw `gitea_delete_branch` is **denied** to reconciler even when
|
||||
`gitea.branch.delete` is present.
|
||||
- Raw `git branch -d` / `git push --delete` cleanup remains blocked by
|
||||
`branch_cleanup_guard` and the final-report validator regardless of
|
||||
profile permissions.
|
||||
- `gitea.branch.delete` has no short alias in `GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES`;
|
||||
write it fully qualified in `allowed_operations`. Migration must emit
|
||||
canonical names such as `gitea.pr.close` (never bare `pr.close` /
|
||||
`issue.close`, which the production normalizer rejects or drops).
|
||||
|
||||
### Post-merge moot-lease cleanup ownership (`gitea.pr.comment`)
|
||||
|
||||
Neutralising a reviewer lease left behind on an already-merged/closed PR is
|
||||
reconciliation work too. `task_capability_map` maps
|
||||
`cleanup_post_merge_moot_lease` — and its tool-name alias
|
||||
`gitea_cleanup_post_merge_moot_lease` — to role `reconciler` with permission
|
||||
`gitea.pr.comment` (#745). Both names carry the **same** contract.
|
||||
|
||||
The permission alone is deliberately not sufficient: author, reviewer and
|
||||
merger profiles all hold `gitea.pr.comment` for ordinary PR discussion, so the
|
||||
role gate — not the permission gate — is what keeps the terminal lease marker
|
||||
reconciler-owned.
|
||||
|
||||
`gitea_cleanup_post_merge_moot_lease` splits its two modes on purpose:
|
||||
|
||||
- **`apply=false` (assessment) requires only `gitea.read`, with no role gate.**
|
||||
This matches `gitea_cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock` and
|
||||
`gitea_cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease`, whose assessment paths are
|
||||
likewise read-gated, so an operator can diagnose a stuck lease from whichever
|
||||
namespace happens to be attached without switching roles. The dry run
|
||||
performs no mutation and records append-only evidence in-session.
|
||||
- **`apply=true` (mutation) requires all of the following**, in order: the
|
||||
session must have resolved exactly `cleanup_post_merge_moot_lease` (resolving
|
||||
any other task — including a sibling reconciler task — does not authorize
|
||||
it); the active role must be `reconciler`; the profile must hold
|
||||
`gitea.pr.comment`; the explicit `org`/`repo` must agree with the canonical
|
||||
repository identity, which is derived from the session binding and can never
|
||||
be overridden by request parameters; and matching dry-run evidence must show
|
||||
`lease_moot`, `cleanup_allowed`, and the same PR, lease session, candidate
|
||||
head and lease marker id that are live at apply time.
|
||||
|
||||
Everything else fails closed: a live lease on an open PR, an already-terminal
|
||||
(idempotent) lease, a lease superseded between the dry run and the apply, a
|
||||
malformed lease missing session/head/marker, and any foreign-repository target.
|
||||
The cleanup only ever appends a terminal `phase: released` marker
|
||||
(`blocker: post-merge-moot`) — it never edits or deletes another session's
|
||||
comment, and it never merges or adopts a lease.
|
||||
|
||||
Launch a static `gitea-reconciler` MCP namespace with
|
||||
`GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-reconciler`. Profile shape is validated by
|
||||
`reconciler_profile.assess_reconciler_profile` (#304). Use the
|
||||
@@ -363,159 +251,6 @@ Launch a static `gitea-reconciler` MCP namespace with
|
||||
fresh target-branch fetch, recorded target SHA, and ancestor proof. PRs whose
|
||||
heads are not already landed cannot be closed through this path.
|
||||
|
||||
### Operational runbook: grant reconciler `gitea.branch.delete` (#687)
|
||||
|
||||
Merging a code PR that updates `migrate_profiles.py` / `reconciler_profile.py`
|
||||
**does not** change the live operator profile on disk. Apply the profile
|
||||
change deliberately, then reconnect the client-managed namespace.
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Approved migration / profile-update command** (from the repo root, using
|
||||
the project venv if present):
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# Dry-run first (default): validates v2 output, writes nothing
|
||||
python3 migrate_profiles.py -i ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json
|
||||
|
||||
# Apply: creates backup then writes migrated v2 config
|
||||
python3 migrate_profiles.py -i ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json -w
|
||||
# Optional explicit paths:
|
||||
# python3 migrate_profiles.py -i ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json \
|
||||
# -o ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json \
|
||||
# --backup ~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json.bak -w
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
If the live file is already v2, edit the reconciler identity’s
|
||||
`allowed_operations` / `forbidden_operations` under
|
||||
`environments.<env>.services.gitea.identities.reconciler` (or the
|
||||
`prgs-reconciler` alias target) so allowed includes the canonical set
|
||||
below — then re-validate with a load of the config (see step 3).
|
||||
|
||||
2. **Inspect the generated (or edited) profile** — confirm the reconciler
|
||||
identity, for example:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
python3 - <<'PY'
|
||||
import json
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
cfg = json.loads(Path.home().joinpath(".config/gitea-tools/profiles.json").read_text())
|
||||
# v2 environments shape:
|
||||
ident = cfg["environments"]["prgs"]["services"]["gitea"]["identities"]["reconciler"]
|
||||
print("role:", ident.get("role"))
|
||||
print("allowed:", ident.get("allowed_operations"))
|
||||
print("forbidden:", ident.get("forbidden_operations"))
|
||||
PY
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
3. **Validate canonical operation names and least privilege**
|
||||
|
||||
Expected canonical **allowed** (defaults after migration):
|
||||
|
||||
- `gitea.read`
|
||||
- `gitea.pr.close` (required)
|
||||
- `gitea.pr.comment`
|
||||
- `gitea.issue.comment`
|
||||
- `gitea.issue.close`
|
||||
- `gitea.branch.delete` (recommended; cleanup only)
|
||||
|
||||
Expected **forbidden** includes at least: `gitea.pr.approve`,
|
||||
`gitea.pr.merge`, `gitea.pr.review`, `gitea.pr.create`,
|
||||
`gitea.branch.push`, `gitea.repo.commit`.
|
||||
|
||||
No shorthand (`pr.close`, `issue.close`, `pr.comment`) may remain.
|
||||
Validate with the production loader:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
python3 - <<'PY'
|
||||
import gitea_config, reconciler_profile
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
path = str(Path.home() / ".config/gitea-tools/profiles.json")
|
||||
gitea_config.load_config(path) # fails closed on invalid config
|
||||
# Or assess the reconciler lists directly after extracting them:
|
||||
# print(reconciler_profile.assess_reconciler_profile(allowed, forbidden))
|
||||
PY
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
4. **Merging PR #688 (or any code PR) does not update the live profile.**
|
||||
Code changes only the migration helper, schema, docs, and tests. The
|
||||
operator must still run `migrate_profiles.py -w` or an equivalent
|
||||
authorized edit of `~/.config/gitea-tools/profiles.json`.
|
||||
|
||||
5. **Supported apply method:** `python3 migrate_profiles.py … -w` (backup
|
||||
created automatically) **or** operator-authorized edit of the live
|
||||
profiles file after backup. Unsupported: silent mtime tricks, manual
|
||||
process kill to “reload”, or undocumented env overrides.
|
||||
|
||||
6. **Backup and validation:** `-w` copies the input to
|
||||
`<input_path>.bak` (or `--backup PATH`) before writing. Re-run
|
||||
`load_config` / `assess_reconciler_profile` after write. Keep the
|
||||
`.bak` until live whoami/capability checks pass.
|
||||
|
||||
7. **Client-managed namespace reconnect/reload:** reconnect or reload the
|
||||
IDE MCP client so `gitea-reconciler` restarts from current `master` and
|
||||
the updated `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-reconciler` config. Do not hand-launch
|
||||
`mcp_server.py` / `gitea_mcp_server.py` with ad hoc `GITEA_*` env
|
||||
(see #686 / #630).
|
||||
|
||||
8. **Live reverification** (through the client-managed `gitea-reconciler`
|
||||
namespace only):
|
||||
|
||||
- `gitea_whoami` → identity + profile `prgs-reconciler`
|
||||
- `gitea_assess_master_parity` → `stale=false`, `restart_required=false`
|
||||
- `gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="cleanup_merged_pr_branch")` →
|
||||
`allowed_in_current_session=true` only when permission and role match
|
||||
- `gitea_resolve_task_capability(task="delete_branch")` →
|
||||
**not** allowed for reconciler (role denial must be enforced)
|
||||
|
||||
9. **Guarded cleanup usage** (example for a merged PR whose source branch
|
||||
remains on the remote):
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch(
|
||||
pr_number=<N>,
|
||||
branch=<exact PR head branch>,
|
||||
confirmation="CLEANUP MERGED PR <N> BRANCH <exact PR head branch>",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
worktree_path="<path under branches/>",
|
||||
)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The tool refuses unmerged PRs, protected branches, preservation/evidence
|
||||
branches, open-PR heads, mismatched branch names, and wrong confirmation.
|
||||
|
||||
10. **Prohibitions**
|
||||
|
||||
- No raw `git push --delete`, `git branch -d` / `-D`, or delete refspecs
|
||||
- No arbitrary `gitea_delete_branch` from reconciler
|
||||
- No unsupported profile switching mid-run without full re-preflight
|
||||
- No ad hoc hand-edits of live profiles **unless** operator-authorized,
|
||||
backed up, and revalidated as above
|
||||
|
||||
Canonical migrated reconciler example:
|
||||
|
||||
```json
|
||||
{
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.close",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.close",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.delete"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.repo.commit"
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Identity and fail-closed rules
|
||||
|
||||
Before **any** mutating action, a workflow must know both:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -131,44 +131,6 @@ Suggested lifecycle:
|
||||
The helper module `issue_workflow_labels.py` is the source of truth for the
|
||||
canonical label specs and status transition replacement behavior.
|
||||
|
||||
## Terminal PR transitions retire `status:pr-open` (#780)
|
||||
|
||||
`status:pr-open` states that a linked PR is *currently open*. The moment that
|
||||
stops being true the label must go, whatever ended the PR:
|
||||
|
||||
| Terminal reason | Raised by |
|
||||
|---|---|
|
||||
| `merged` | `gitea_merge_pr` |
|
||||
| `closed_without_merge` | `gitea_edit_pr` closing the PR |
|
||||
| `superseded` | `gitea_reconcile_superseded_by_merged_pr` |
|
||||
| `already_landed` | `gitea_reconcile_already_landed_pr` |
|
||||
| `controller_closure` | `gitea_close_issue` |
|
||||
| `abandoned` | abandonment handling |
|
||||
| `retry_recovery` | `gitea_cleanup_terminal_pr_labels` after a partial failure |
|
||||
|
||||
All of these route through one rule in `terminal_pr_label_cleanup.py`, so the
|
||||
paths cannot drift apart. The rule guarantees:
|
||||
|
||||
- only `status:pr-open` is removed — every other label is preserved verbatim;
|
||||
- an empty resulting label set is valid (it was the issue's only label);
|
||||
- an issue that no longer carries the label is a no-op, so retries are safe;
|
||||
- the result is confirmed by a read-after-write re-read, not assumed.
|
||||
|
||||
Controller closure runs the cleanup **before** changing issue state and fails
|
||||
closed if it cannot be completed and verified — closing first would bake in the
|
||||
stale label with no later step to catch it. Post-merge cleanup never blocks the
|
||||
merge: the transition already happened, so failures are reported with a
|
||||
`safe_next_action` instead.
|
||||
|
||||
Use `gitea_assess_terminal_label_hygiene` as terminal validation before
|
||||
declaring a transition or cleanup batch complete. It enumerates issues plus the
|
||||
live open PRs and reports any issue still carrying `status:pr-open` without an
|
||||
open PR to justify it. Issues with a genuinely open PR are exempt, not
|
||||
residual.
|
||||
|
||||
Recovery from a partial failure is `gitea_cleanup_terminal_pr_labels` with
|
||||
`terminal_reason='retry_recovery'`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Discussion Issues
|
||||
|
||||
Discussion issues must be labeled `type:discussion`.
|
||||
@@ -195,10 +157,6 @@ If a discussion produces implementation work, either:
|
||||
be applied to the locked issue, then applies it after the PR is created.
|
||||
- `gitea_set_issue_labels` accepts an explicit `worktree_path` so author
|
||||
sessions can satisfy the branches-only mutation guard while changing labels.
|
||||
- `gitea_cleanup_terminal_pr_labels` retires `status:pr-open` after a terminal
|
||||
PR transition; it is idempotent, so it is also the retry/recovery path.
|
||||
- `gitea_assess_terminal_label_hygiene` is the read-only terminal validation
|
||||
for residual `status:pr-open`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Existing Non-Workflow Labels
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -48,16 +48,6 @@ It extracts the issue-first, isolated-worktree, no-self-review, profile-safety,
|
||||
merge-cleanup, fail-closed, and recovery rules into a reusable package that can
|
||||
be adapted to other repositories.
|
||||
|
||||
### Sanctioned first mutation: `create_issue` from clean control (#749)
|
||||
|
||||
Creating a tracking issue has no issue number yet, so no `branches/issue-<N>-*`
|
||||
worktree can exist. The sanctioned path is: clean canonical control checkout
|
||||
(accepted base branch, base-equivalent to live master, no tracked dirt) →
|
||||
resolve exact `create_issue` → `gitea_create_issue`. After the issue exists,
|
||||
all further author mutations require a registered issue-backed worktree and
|
||||
lock. Do not improvise with dummy directories, borrowed worktrees, or pre-issue
|
||||
worktrees. See `skills/llm-project-workflow/workflows/create-issue.md` §18a.
|
||||
|
||||
## Principle: the profile is the role, not the LLM
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
@@ -205,7 +195,7 @@ To avoid the bottleneck of relaunching/restarting the MCP server to switch betwe
|
||||
`gitea_reconcile_already_landed_pr` after ancestry proof — not for normal
|
||||
review or author workflows.
|
||||
|
||||
* **Fallback (operator-owned):** If the dual-profile MCP launcher pattern is not supported or configured in the client, **do not** have the LLM relaunch or restart the client/MCP. The LLM **stops** role-switching work, reports that the correct static namespace is missing, and waits for an **operator** to configure dual namespaces or reload the client with the correct `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE` for that role. Process restart/relaunch is operator-owned under the [stable control runtime ADR](architecture/mcp-stable-control-runtime-policy-adr.md) (#615).
|
||||
* **Fallback:** If the dual-profile MCP launcher pattern is not supported or configured in the client, the LLM must relaunch or restart the client/MCP with the correct profile environment variable before claiming or working on any tasks.
|
||||
|
||||
## Setup runbook — interactive menu
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -706,9 +696,7 @@ do **not** improvise shell wrappers or fall back to direct API / temp scripts.
|
||||
`fix/...` / `docs/...`); `cd` into that worktree; implement narrowly; add or
|
||||
update tests if behavior changes; run the full suite; commit with an
|
||||
issue-linked message; open a PR to `master`; move the issue to
|
||||
`status:pr-open` (every terminal transition later retires that label
|
||||
automatically — see [`label-taxonomy.md`](label-taxonomy.md)). **Do not**
|
||||
review or merge your own PR. Include an
|
||||
`status:pr-open`. **Do not** review or merge your own PR. Include an
|
||||
`LLM Handoff Metadata` block (with `LLM-Agent-SHA`) in the PR body — see
|
||||
[`llm-agent-sha.md`](llm-agent-sha.md).
|
||||
- **Prompt:** `Use an author profile to implement issue #N and open a PR to
|
||||
@@ -1212,13 +1200,10 @@ When a mutation blocks on workspace binding:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Read the error — it names the **resolved workspace path**, **role
|
||||
namespace**, and **binding source** (tool arg, env var, or process root).
|
||||
2. **LLM-allowed:** pass `worktree_path` on reviewer/merger mutation tools when
|
||||
the active `branches/` worktree differs from the MCP process root; **client
|
||||
reconnect** after transport EOF only (no process kill).
|
||||
3. **Operator-owned:** if the wrong namespace process was launched, or a role-
|
||||
specific `GITEA_*_WORKTREE` must be set at process start, an **operator**
|
||||
reloads/relaunches the correct static namespace MCP. LLM sessions must not
|
||||
kill or restart MCP processes (see [stable control runtime ADR](architecture/mcp-stable-control-runtime-policy-adr.md)).
|
||||
2. Reconnect or relaunch the correct namespace MCP server from the intended
|
||||
workspace (or set the role-specific env var before launch).
|
||||
3. Pass `worktree_path` on reviewer/merger mutation tools when the active
|
||||
branches/ worktree differs from the MCP process root.
|
||||
4. **Do not** clean, reset, or discard foreign role worktrees to unblock your
|
||||
own namespace — that destroys another agent's WIP.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1228,10 +1213,9 @@ When posting a Canonical Thread Handoff after a binding blocker:
|
||||
|
||||
- State which namespace was active (author / reviewer / merger / reconciler).
|
||||
- Quote the resolved workspace path and binding source from the error.
|
||||
- Name the safe next action: pass `worktree_path` if that unblocks the tool, or
|
||||
request an **operator** reload of the correct namespace MCP / env binding.
|
||||
- Explicitly note that foreign worktrees must not be cleaned to unblock, and
|
||||
that the LLM must not self-restart the MCP process.
|
||||
- Name the safe reconnect action (relaunch MCP from `branches/...`, set
|
||||
`GITEA_*_WORKTREE`, or pass `worktree_path`).
|
||||
- Explicitly note that foreign worktrees must not be cleaned to unblock.
|
||||
|
||||
## Safety notes
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1242,8 +1226,6 @@ When posting a Canonical Thread Handoff after a binding blocker:
|
||||
|
||||
## Related documents
|
||||
|
||||
- [`architecture/mcp-stable-control-runtime-policy-adr.md`](architecture/mcp-stable-control-runtime-policy-adr.md) — stable control runtime vs dev runtime; LLM must not kill/restart MCP; operator-owned reload and promotions; routine post-merge parity staleness (#615).
|
||||
- [`stable-runtime-promotion-runbook.md`](stable-runtime-promotion-runbook.md) — operator promotion procedure, required promotion-record fields, per-namespace post-flap re-proving, and rollback for the stable control runtime (#615).
|
||||
- [`reviewer-handoff-consistency.md`](reviewer-handoff-consistency.md) — reject contradictory reviewer handoffs (#501).
|
||||
- [`issue-acceptance-gate.md`](issue-acceptance-gate.md) — controller issue-acceptance audit after PR merge (#500).
|
||||
- [`../skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md`](../skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md) — portable cross-project LLM workflow skill.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,92 +1,23 @@
|
||||
# MCP daemon import and native-transport guard (#558 / #695)
|
||||
# MCP daemon import and keychain guard (#558)
|
||||
|
||||
## Problem
|
||||
|
||||
During deadlock debugging and the PR #694 incident (#695), agents imported
|
||||
`gitea_mcp_server` or ran credential helpers from a raw shell / offline helper,
|
||||
bypassing native MCP transport, preflight purity, and role gates. Contaminated
|
||||
formal reviews then looked identical to native approvals.
|
||||
During deadlock debugging, agents imported `gitea_mcp_server` / ran credential
|
||||
helpers from a raw shell, bypassing preflight purity and role gates.
|
||||
|
||||
## Rule
|
||||
|
||||
Mutation auth, keychain fill, and controller quarantine require a **production
|
||||
native MCP transport runtime** established only by:
|
||||
|
||||
1. the **resolved absolute path** of the canonical entrypoint
|
||||
(`mcp_server.py` / `gitea_mcp_server.py` next to `mcp_daemon_guard.py`), and
|
||||
2. a live **transport bind** (`bind_native_mcp_transport(transport="stdio")`)
|
||||
immediately before `mcp.run`.
|
||||
|
||||
Basename-only trust (a renamed file called `mcp_server.py`), caller-controlled
|
||||
flags (there is **no** `allow_test_bootstrap`), environment variables, stack
|
||||
frame spoofing, or import-only launch are insufficient.
|
||||
Mutation auth and keychain fill require a **sanctioned MCP daemon** process.
|
||||
|
||||
| Context | Allowed |
|
||||
|---------|---------|
|
||||
| Official IDE-native MCP: resolved canonical entrypoint marks + binds stdio, holds process-local runtime token | yes |
|
||||
| pytest (hermetic unit tests) via `is_pytest_runtime()` | yes for unit gates |
|
||||
| `install_test_native_runtime()` under pytest (test-mode record) | unit-test transport gates only — **never** production Gitea mutations |
|
||||
| `allow_test_bootstrap=True` (removed; must not exist) | **no** |
|
||||
| Renamed runner basename `mcp_server.py` outside package root | **no** |
|
||||
| Import/launch of real entrypoint without transport bind | **no** |
|
||||
| `GITEA_MCP_SANCTIONED_DAEMON=1` alone (no process-local native runtime) | **no** (#695) |
|
||||
| `GITEA_ALLOW_DIRECT_MCP_IMPORT=1` in LLM sessions | **no** — never set; never authorizes mutations (#695 AC1 / PR #701) |
|
||||
| Override `GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_DIR` mid-session | **no** — production bind pins state root; redirect cannot forge independent decision locks (#695 AC2 / PR #701) |
|
||||
| `GITEA_ALLOW_KEYCHAIN_CLI=1` in LLM sessions | **no** — human operator only |
|
||||
| bare `python -c 'import gitea_mcp_server; …'` or offline runners | **no** |
|
||||
| keychain fill outside native/pytest | **no** |
|
||||
|
||||
Native runtime is **process-local**: a random token bound to the daemon PID and
|
||||
transport phase. It is never reconstructed from environment variables,
|
||||
session-state files, caller-controlled flags, or importing internals in a
|
||||
fresh Python process.
|
||||
|
||||
## Contaminated review quarantine (#695 AC8)
|
||||
|
||||
Controller/reconciler/merger profiles may call
|
||||
`gitea_quarantine_contaminated_review` with explicit confirmation:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
QUARANTINE CONTAMINATED REVIEW <review_id> PR <pr_number>
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Quarantine records are durable under the MCP session-state root and are
|
||||
**honored** by:
|
||||
|
||||
- `gitea_get_pr_review_feedback` (quarantined approvals do not authorize merge)
|
||||
- `gitea_check_pr_eligibility` action=`merge`
|
||||
- `gitea_merge_pr` (mutation)
|
||||
- merger lease adoption paths that read `approval_at_current_head`
|
||||
|
||||
Forensic Gitea reviews and historical comments are **never deleted**.
|
||||
|
||||
## STOP after native MCP failure (AC10)
|
||||
|
||||
If the native MCP namespace dies (EOF, capability disconnect, session death):
|
||||
|
||||
1. **STOP.** State BLOCKED + DIAGNOSE.
|
||||
2. Do **not** import `gitea_mcp_server` from a standalone process.
|
||||
3. Do **not** run `offline_mcp_helper.py`, `offline_mcp_runner.py`,
|
||||
`run_quarantine.py`, or any offline mutation helper.
|
||||
4. Do **not** set direct-import, keychain-bypass, or raw-token environment
|
||||
variables.
|
||||
5. Reconnect / restart the official MCP daemon; resume only via native tools.
|
||||
|
||||
Any further native MCP failure is a hard stop. Do not construct another fallback.
|
||||
|
||||
## Canonical approval claims (AC7)
|
||||
|
||||
Comments that claim `approved` / `ready-to-merge` / `WHO_IS_NEXT: merger` /
|
||||
`MERGE_READY: true` must include:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
NATIVE_REVIEW_PROOF: transport=native_mcp; …
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Claims that cite offline/import helpers are rejected even if a proof line is
|
||||
present.
|
||||
| Official MCP entrypoint (`mcp_server.py` / `gitea_mcp_server` `__main__`) sets `GITEA_MCP_SANCTIONED_DAEMON=1` | yes |
|
||||
| pytest | yes |
|
||||
| `GITEA_ALLOW_DIRECT_MCP_IMPORT=1` (operator/tests only) | yes |
|
||||
| bare `python -c 'import gitea_auth; get_auth_header(...)'` | **no** |
|
||||
| keychain fill without daemon | **no** unless `GITEA_ALLOW_KEYCHAIN_CLI=1` |
|
||||
|
||||
## Operator note
|
||||
|
||||
LLM sessions must never set allow-direct-import, allow-keychain-cli, or raw
|
||||
token overrides. Those are human-only escape hatches outside agent workflows.
|
||||
LLM sessions must never set the allow-direct-import or allow-keychain-cli
|
||||
overrides. Those are human-only escape hatches.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ The script must be executable (`chmod +x mcp-menu.sh`). It uses bash with
|
||||
| Option | Description |
|
||||
|--------|-------------|
|
||||
| Project status / root checkout health | Shows cwd, branch, `git status --short --branch`, HEAD SHA, `prgs/master` SHA, and warnings when the root checkout is dirty or off `master`. |
|
||||
| Workflow dashboard (queue, leases, next safe action) | Documents the read-only `gitea_workflow_dashboard` MCP tool (#605): live PR/issue queues, leases by role, terminal review lock, blocked items, and exact next-safe prompts. **Does not assign work** — assignment still uses `gitea_allocate_next_work`. Never presents blocked/terminal-locked items as safe. The shell entry is documentation only (no Gitea mutation). |
|
||||
| Author workflow prompts | Ready-to-copy prompts for issue work, conflict-fix sessions, and root checkout recovery. |
|
||||
| Reviewer workflow prompts | Standard PR review prompt, and a skip-already-reviewed-stale-`REQUEST_CHANGES` prompt that hands off to the author without a duplicate terminal mutation (review-only; no merge). |
|
||||
| Merger workflow prompts | PR merge prompt (merge gates and explicit approval). |
|
||||
@@ -51,22 +50,6 @@ The script must be executable (`chmod +x mcp-menu.sh`). It uses bash with
|
||||
| Run tests | Runs `./run-tests.sh` when present; otherwise `venv/bin/python -m pytest`; otherwise fails closed with a clear error. |
|
||||
| Exit | Quit the menu. |
|
||||
|
||||
### Workflow dashboard MCP tool (#605)
|
||||
|
||||
From any healthy Gitea MCP namespace with `gitea.read`:
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
gitea_workflow_dashboard(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
)
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Response includes `human_summary` plus structured queues, `active_leases_by_role`,
|
||||
`terminal_review_lock`, `blocked_items`, `next_safe_by_role`, and
|
||||
`primary_next_safe_action`. Incomplete inventory fails closed.
|
||||
|
||||
## Placeholder-only entries
|
||||
|
||||
**Proxmox deployment** and **Create Proxmox LXC** are placeholders until
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Self-hosted Sentry observability for the Gitea MCP server (#606)
|
||||
|
||||
Optional, **off-by-default** instrumentation that reports MCP runtime errors,
|
||||
fail-closed workflow blockers, lease / terminal-lock / stale-runtime
|
||||
collisions, and recurring watchdog check-ins to a **self-hosted** Sentry at
|
||||
`https://sentry.prgs.cc/`.
|
||||
|
||||
> **Gitea remains the source of truth.** Sentry is observe-only. It never
|
||||
> approves, merges, closes, or otherwise mutates Gitea workflow state, and it
|
||||
> never bypasses leases, #332, workflow roles, or the MCP gates. Sentry alerts
|
||||
> may only feed the *sanctioned* Gitea issue/comment path via the #612 incident
|
||||
> bridge — never a direct write.
|
||||
|
||||
Implemented by [`sentry_observability.py`](../../sentry_observability.py).
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. Create the Sentry project
|
||||
|
||||
1. Sign in to the self-hosted Sentry at **`https://sentry.prgs.cc/`** (this is
|
||||
**not** Sentry Cloud — do not use `*.ingest.sentry.io`).
|
||||
2. Create a new **Python** project named **`gitea-tools-mcp`**.
|
||||
3. Open **Settings → Projects → gitea-tools-mcp → Client Keys (DSN)** and copy
|
||||
the DSN. It looks like `https://<publickey>@sentry.prgs.cc/<project-id>`.
|
||||
4. **Never commit the DSN.** It is a runtime secret supplied via env var only.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Configure the environment
|
||||
|
||||
All configuration is env-var driven (see [`.env.example`](../../.env.example)):
|
||||
|
||||
| Variable | Purpose | Default |
|
||||
|----------|---------|---------|
|
||||
| `MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED` | Master gate (`1/true/yes/on`). Required. | off |
|
||||
| `SENTRY_DSN` | Self-hosted DSN. Required. | *(empty)* |
|
||||
| `SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT` | `local` / `dev` / `prod` tag. | `development` |
|
||||
| `SENTRY_RELEASE` | Release id (git SHA or version). | *(none)* |
|
||||
| `MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE` | Perf-trace sample rate `0.0–1.0` (clamped). | `0.0` |
|
||||
| `MCP_SENTRY_ENABLE_LOGS` | Forward Python logs as structured logs. | off |
|
||||
|
||||
**The feature stays completely off unless `MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED` is truthy *and*
|
||||
`SENTRY_DSN` is non-empty.** With either missing, `init_sentry()` is a no-op,
|
||||
the SDK is never initialised, and no events are sent — existing tool behaviour
|
||||
and API-call patterns are unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
### Per-environment examples
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
# local (quiet: capture errors/blockers, no traces)
|
||||
export MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED=1
|
||||
export SENTRY_DSN="https://<key>@sentry.prgs.cc/<id>"
|
||||
export SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=local
|
||||
|
||||
# dev (light tracing + logs)
|
||||
export MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED=1
|
||||
export SENTRY_DSN="https://<key>@sentry.prgs.cc/<id>"
|
||||
export SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=dev
|
||||
export MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE=0.2
|
||||
export MCP_SENTRY_ENABLE_LOGS=1
|
||||
|
||||
# prod (errors/blockers + low-rate tracing, release-tagged)
|
||||
export MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED=1
|
||||
export SENTRY_DSN="https://<key>@sentry.prgs.cc/<id>"
|
||||
export SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT=prod
|
||||
export SENTRY_RELEASE="$(git rev-parse --short HEAD)"
|
||||
export MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE=0.05
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
The optional SDK is pinned in [`requirements.txt`](../../requirements.txt)
|
||||
(`sentry-sdk==2.20.0`). It is imported lazily: if the package is absent, the
|
||||
module still imports and every entry point is a safe no-op.
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. What is instrumented
|
||||
|
||||
| Signal | Where | Notes |
|
||||
|--------|-------|-------|
|
||||
| Startup init | `gitea_mcp_server.py` `__main__`, before `mcp.run` | Prints a redaction-safe status line to stderr. |
|
||||
| Failing mutations (exceptions) | `_audited(...)` context manager | `capture_exception` with scrubbed tags. |
|
||||
| Fail-closed blockers / failed mutations | `_audit_pr_result(...)` (BLOCKED/FAILED) | Structured `capture_workflow_blocker` event incl. the canonical next action when available (criterion 7). |
|
||||
| Allocator watchdog check-ins | `gitea_allocate_next_work` tool | `allocator_health`, `stale_lease_scan`, `terminal_lock_scan`. |
|
||||
| Namespace-health check-in | `gitea_assess_mcp_namespace_health` tool | `namespace_health`. |
|
||||
|
||||
All capture paths are **best-effort / fail open**: a Sentry outage or capture
|
||||
error never breaks an MCP tool success path.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Cron / watchdog monitors
|
||||
|
||||
`sentry_observability.MONITOR_SLUGS` defines stable check-in slugs:
|
||||
|
||||
| Registry key | Sentry monitor slug | Wired at |
|
||||
|--------------|--------------------|----------|
|
||||
| `stale_lease_scan` | `gitea-mcp-stale-lease-scan` | allocator run (global lease expiry) |
|
||||
| `terminal_lock_scan` | `gitea-mcp-terminal-lock-scan` | allocator run (terminal-lock lookup) |
|
||||
| `allocator_health` | `gitea-mcp-allocator-health` | allocator run |
|
||||
| `namespace_health` | `gitea-mcp-namespace-health` | namespace-health probe |
|
||||
| `dashboard_freshness` | `gitea-mcp-dashboard-freshness` | call `monitor_checkin("dashboard_freshness", ...)` from the dashboard refresh job (#605) |
|
||||
| `reconciler_cleanup` | `gitea-mcp-reconciler-cleanup` | call `monitor_checkin("reconciler_cleanup", ...)` from the reconciler cleanup entrypoint |
|
||||
|
||||
Create matching Cron monitors in Sentry with those slugs. Emit an
|
||||
`in_progress` check-in at job start and `ok`/`error` at completion via
|
||||
`sentry_observability.monitor_checkin(slug_key, status)`.
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Redaction guarantees (fail closed)
|
||||
|
||||
Redaction fails *closed*: if a field cannot be proven safe it is dropped rather
|
||||
than sent. The `before_send` (and `before_send_log`) hook `scrub_event`
|
||||
recursively redacts every outgoing event; on any error it drops the event
|
||||
entirely. Guarantees, proven by `tests/test_sentry_observability.py`:
|
||||
|
||||
- **No** tokens, passwords, keychain IDs, DSNs, cookies, or `user:pass@host`.
|
||||
- **No** raw session-state or full prompt/comment bodies — `session_id` is only
|
||||
ever surfaced as a 12-char `session_id_hash`.
|
||||
- **No** private config contents or raw credential headers.
|
||||
- **No** full local filesystem paths — a worktree path collapses to a coarse
|
||||
`worktree_category` (`author` / `reviewer` / `merger` / `reconciler` /
|
||||
`branches` / `root` / `other`).
|
||||
- Only the allowlisted tag keys in `ALLOWED_TAG_KEYS` are ever attached.
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Coexistence with GlitchTip / the #612 incident bridge
|
||||
|
||||
This is the **outbound** path (MCP → Sentry SDK). It complements — it does not
|
||||
replace — the **inbound** [`incident_bridge.py`](../../incident_bridge.py)
|
||||
(#612), which turns Sentry/GlitchTip *observations* into durable Gitea issues
|
||||
and `incident_links` rows.
|
||||
|
||||
- Prefer **one** observability path per environment. Point the MCP server's
|
||||
`SENTRY_DSN` at the same self-hosted `gitea-tools-mcp` project that the #612
|
||||
bridge reconciles from, so an MCP-reported error and its Gitea issue line up.
|
||||
- GlitchTip is Sentry-protocol compatible; if an existing GlitchTip DSN is in
|
||||
use, either migrate it to `https://sentry.prgs.cc/` or document the split
|
||||
(MCP → Sentry, legacy → GlitchTip) explicitly for operators.
|
||||
- The bridge remains the **only** sanctioned route from an alert back into
|
||||
Gitea workflow state.
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Reading Sentry back into Gitea (#607)
|
||||
|
||||
[`sentry_incident_bridge.py`](../../sentry_incident_bridge.py) supplies the
|
||||
**read** half of the inbound path: it pulls unresolved issues/events from the
|
||||
self-hosted Sentry API, normalizes them into #612 observations, and hands them
|
||||
to `incident_bridge.reconcile_incident`. It never adds a second linking store —
|
||||
`incident_links` on the #613 control-plane DB stays canonical, which is what
|
||||
makes the mapping survive restarts.
|
||||
|
||||
### Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
| Variable | Purpose | Default |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| `SENTRY_BASE_URL` | Self-hosted Sentry root | `https://sentry.prgs.cc` |
|
||||
| `SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN` | API token — **env only**, never logged or returned | _(unset)_ |
|
||||
| `SENTRY_ORG` | Sentry organization slug | _(unset)_ |
|
||||
| `SENTRY_PROJECT` | Sentry project slug | _(unset)_ |
|
||||
| `MCP_SENTRY_ISSUE_BRIDGE_ENABLED` | Required for `apply=true` | `false` |
|
||||
| `MCP_SENTRY_MIN_EVENTS_FOR_ISSUE` | Recurrence threshold before an issue is worth filing | `2` |
|
||||
| `MCP_SENTRY_LOOKBACK` | Scan window (`statsPeriod`, e.g. `24h`) | `24h` |
|
||||
|
||||
Missing org/project fails closed as `not_configured`; a missing token fails
|
||||
closed as `missing_token` **before** any HTTP call is made.
|
||||
|
||||
### Tools
|
||||
|
||||
| Tool | Mode | Purpose |
|
||||
| --- | --- | --- |
|
||||
| `gitea_sentry_list_issues` | read-only | Unresolved issues, `Link`-header pagination |
|
||||
| `gitea_sentry_get_issue_events` | read-only | Sanitized recent + latest event for one issue |
|
||||
| `gitea_sentry_reconcile_issue` | dry-run default | One Sentry issue → durable Gitea issue |
|
||||
| `gitea_sentry_link_gitea_issue` | dry-run default | Link a Sentry issue to an existing Gitea issue |
|
||||
| `gitea_sentry_watchdog` | dry-run default | Scan + create/update issues for active incidents |
|
||||
|
||||
### Policy
|
||||
|
||||
- **Dedupe:** one Sentry issue maps to exactly one Gitea issue, keyed by
|
||||
provider + base URL + org + project + issue id. Recurrence updates the link
|
||||
(and its `event_count`) instead of filing a duplicate.
|
||||
- **No reopen:** a Sentry issue that is no longer `unresolved` is skipped; the
|
||||
bridge never reopens or re-files a closed Gitea issue.
|
||||
- **Threshold:** issues below `MCP_SENTRY_MIN_EVENTS_FOR_ISSUE` are skipped, so
|
||||
one-off noise does not become durable work.
|
||||
- **Apply is explicit:** `apply=true` requires both
|
||||
`MCP_SENTRY_ISSUE_BRIDGE_ENABLED` and issue-create permission on the profile.
|
||||
- **Outages fail closed:** an unreachable Sentry returns `sentry_unavailable`
|
||||
and creates nothing.
|
||||
- **Redaction:** secrets are scrubbed and absolute local paths are reduced to a
|
||||
category token (`[path:author]`, `[path:root]`, …) before any value reaches a
|
||||
Gitea issue body. Sensitive tag keys (`authorization`, `cookie`, …) are
|
||||
dropped, and permalinks carrying embedded credentials are discarded entirely.
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Non-goals
|
||||
|
||||
- Sentry must **not** become the workflow source of truth.
|
||||
- Sentry must **not** approve, merge, close, or mutate Gitea workflow state.
|
||||
- Sentry must **not** bypass leases, #332, workflow roles, or the MCP gates.
|
||||
@@ -1,121 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Stable control runtime — promotion runbook (#615)
|
||||
|
||||
Operator / release-manager procedure for promoting a revision into the **stable
|
||||
control runtime**: the Gitea MCP server that performs real issue/PR mutations.
|
||||
|
||||
Policy source: [`architecture/mcp-stable-control-runtime-policy-adr.md`](architecture/mcp-stable-control-runtime-policy-adr.md).
|
||||
Enforcement: `stable_control_runtime.py` (runtime mode classification, mutation
|
||||
gates, per-namespace post-flap re-proving, promotion-record validation).
|
||||
|
||||
**Promotion is operator-owned.** Normal author / reviewer / merger / reconciler
|
||||
sessions must never kill, restart, or relaunch the MCP server, and must never
|
||||
edit the stable runtime checkout. A session that needs newer server code stops
|
||||
with `BLOCKED + DIAGNOSE` and hands off to the operator.
|
||||
|
||||
---
|
||||
|
||||
## 1. When a promotion is required
|
||||
|
||||
- A merged PR changes MCP server code the control plane must now enforce.
|
||||
- `gitea_assess_master_parity` reports `stale: true` / `restart_required: true`.
|
||||
- `gitea_get_runtime_context` reports a `runtime_mode` other than
|
||||
`stable-control`, or `real_mutations_allowed: false`.
|
||||
|
||||
## 2. Pre-promotion checks
|
||||
|
||||
Run these **before** advancing the stable checkout:
|
||||
|
||||
1. The target revision is on remote `master` and was merged through
|
||||
`gitea_merge_pr` (never a direct stable-branch push — see #671).
|
||||
2. The stable control checkout is clean (`git status --porcelain` empty) and on
|
||||
`master`. A dirty stable runtime is itself a mutation blocker.
|
||||
3. The advance is strictly fast-forwardable: local `master` is an ancestor of
|
||||
`prgs/master`.
|
||||
4. No active workflow lease is mid-mutation (`gitea_list_workflow_leases`).
|
||||
|
||||
## 3. Promotion steps
|
||||
|
||||
1. Record the **previous** runtime SHA (`gitea_assess_master_parity` →
|
||||
`startup_head`).
|
||||
2. `git fetch --prune prgs` in the stable control checkout.
|
||||
3. `git merge --ff-only prgs/master` — never rebase, reset, or force.
|
||||
4. Record the **promoted** runtime SHA (`git rev-parse HEAD`).
|
||||
5. Reload the runtime using the sanctioned client path (IDE/client reconnect or
|
||||
the operator's supervised service reload). Never `pkill` the daemon from a
|
||||
workflow session.
|
||||
6. Re-prove **each** namespace independently (see §5).
|
||||
7. Record the promotion (see §4) and post it as a durable comment on the
|
||||
tracking issue.
|
||||
|
||||
## 4. Promotion record (required fields)
|
||||
|
||||
Every promotion must record all of the following. `assess_promotion_record()`
|
||||
validates them and fails closed on any missing field, or when
|
||||
`previous_runtime_sha` equals `promoted_runtime_sha` (nothing was promoted).
|
||||
|
||||
| Field | Meaning |
|
||||
|-------|---------|
|
||||
| `previous_runtime_sha` | SHA the stable runtime was serving before promotion |
|
||||
| `promoted_runtime_sha` | SHA the stable runtime serves after promotion |
|
||||
| `source_branch` | Branch the promoted revision came from |
|
||||
| `source_pr` | PR number that merged it |
|
||||
| `restart_method` | Exact reload/restart mechanism the operator used |
|
||||
| `health_check_proof` | `gitea_assess_mcp_namespace_health` result per namespace |
|
||||
| `identity_proof` | `gitea_whoami` username + profile per namespace |
|
||||
| `profile_proof` | `gitea_get_runtime_context` active profile per namespace |
|
||||
| `workspace_proof` | Process root, canonical root, alignment, clean state |
|
||||
| `mutation_capability_proof` | `gitea_resolve_task_capability` for the intended task |
|
||||
| `rollback_instructions` | Exact steps to return to `previous_runtime_sha` |
|
||||
|
||||
Helper: `scripts/promote-stable-runtime` emits and validates the record. It
|
||||
never restarts anything — it reads state and prints the record for the operator
|
||||
to act on and archive.
|
||||
|
||||
## 5. Post-promotion namespace re-proving
|
||||
|
||||
A restart or transport flap drops every `gitea-*` namespace together. Author
|
||||
proof is **not** global proof. For each of `author`, `reviewer`, `merger`,
|
||||
`reconciler`, in that namespace:
|
||||
|
||||
1. `gitea_whoami`
|
||||
2. `gitea_get_runtime_context`
|
||||
3. `gitea_resolve_task_capability` immediately before the intended mutation
|
||||
4. Mutate only when no reconnect / restart / stale-runtime gate is reported
|
||||
|
||||
Until a namespace passes all four, its mutations stay blocked with
|
||||
`namespace_not_reproven_after_flap`.
|
||||
|
||||
## 6. Rollback
|
||||
|
||||
If the promoted runtime is unhealthy — namespace EOF that does not recover,
|
||||
identity or profile mismatch, capability resolution failure, or an unexpected
|
||||
`runtime_mode`:
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Stop all PR/review/merge work.** An unhealthy stable runtime fails closed;
|
||||
do not route around it.
|
||||
2. Fast-forward or check out `previous_runtime_sha` in the stable checkout.
|
||||
3. Reload the runtime by the same sanctioned method.
|
||||
4. Re-prove every namespace (§5).
|
||||
5. Record the rollback as a promotion record whose `promoted_runtime_sha` is the
|
||||
restored SHA, with the failure evidence in `health_check_proof`.
|
||||
|
||||
## 7. Runtime modes seen in reports
|
||||
|
||||
| Mode | Meaning | Real mutations |
|
||||
|------|---------|----------------|
|
||||
| `stable-control` | Promoted revision, stable branch, clean checkout | Allowed |
|
||||
| `dev-test` | Launched from a `branches/` worktree or a feature branch | Blocked against production |
|
||||
| `unknown` | Root unresolvable, not a git checkout, or detached HEAD with no declaration | Blocked |
|
||||
|
||||
A packaged deployment with no git checkout must declare itself explicitly with
|
||||
`GITEA_MCP_RUNTIME_MODE=stable-control`; an unset or misspelled value falls back
|
||||
to inference and, failing that, to `unknown`.
|
||||
|
||||
## 8. Related
|
||||
|
||||
- `architecture/mcp-stable-control-runtime-policy-adr.md` — the policy (#615)
|
||||
- `mcp-namespace-health.md` — client-namespace health (#543)
|
||||
- `mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md` — reconnect-only EOF recovery
|
||||
- `mcp-daemon-import-guard.md` — sanctioned daemon only (#558)
|
||||
- `bootstrap-review-path.md` — controller bootstrap when the live runtime cannot
|
||||
review its own fix (#557)
|
||||
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ Handbook for LLM operators and human developers using the Gitea-Tools MCP server
|
||||
4. **No self-review / no self-merge** — The authenticated Gitea user must not approve or merge a PR they authored.
|
||||
5. **Follow the gates** — Prompts express intent; MCP tools enforce safety. Never bypass gates via prompt instructions.
|
||||
6. **Global LLM Worktree Rule** — Main checkout stays on `master`/`main`/`dev`; all mutations happen under `branches/`. Prove project root, `cwd`, branch, stable main-checkout branch, and session worktree path before editing. No exceptions.
|
||||
7. **Stable control runtime** — Real Gitea mutations use only the **stable** MCP control runtime. LLM sessions must not kill, restart, or relaunch MCP processes, edit the stable checkout, or use a dev MCP for production mutations. See the policy ADR: [mcp-stable-control-runtime-policy-adr.md](../architecture/mcp-stable-control-runtime-policy-adr.md) (#615).
|
||||
|
||||
## Supported Gitea instances
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,4 +30,3 @@ Always pass `remote` explicitly on tool calls. The server default is `dadeschool
|
||||
2. `gitea_get_runtime_context` — allowed/forbidden operations for this session.
|
||||
3. `gitea_resolve_task_capability` — prove the session may perform the planned task.
|
||||
4. For reviewer work: dry-run validation (`gitea_dry_run_pr_review`) before live review mutations.
|
||||
5. Confirm master parity / runtime health when tools report stale or unhealthy control runtime — stop mutations and request an **operator** reload of the stable MCP (see [stable control runtime ADR](../architecture/mcp-stable-control-runtime-policy-adr.md)).
|
||||
@@ -12,17 +12,6 @@
|
||||
4. `gitea_mark_final_review_decision` → approve via `gitea_review_pr`.
|
||||
5. `gitea_merge_pr` with pinned head SHA and `confirmation="MERGE PR <n>"`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Stable MCP control runtime (#615)
|
||||
|
||||
Policy ADR: [mcp-stable-control-runtime-policy-adr.md](../architecture/mcp-stable-control-runtime-policy-adr.md).
|
||||
|
||||
| Situation | Who acts | What to do |
|
||||
|-----------|----------|------------|
|
||||
| Transport EOF / missing tools | LLM | **Client reconnect only** — do not kill PIDs |
|
||||
| Wrong profile / dual-namespace missing | Operator | Configure or reload the correct static namespace(s) |
|
||||
| Master parity stale after merge | LLM stops + reports; **operator** reloads stable MCP | Resume only after parity re-verified |
|
||||
| Promote unpromoted MCP code to stable | Operator / release-manager only | Full §2.4 promotion record |
|
||||
|
||||
## Gitea Wiki sync
|
||||
|
||||
The Gitea Wiki mirrors `docs/wiki/` (source of truth). After merging wiki changes:
|
||||
|
||||
+9
-199
@@ -19,10 +19,6 @@ import reviewer_handoff_consistency
|
||||
import thread_state_ledger_validator
|
||||
from mcp_native_cleanup_proof import assess_mcp_native_cleanup_proof
|
||||
from post_merge_cleanup_proof import assess_post_merge_cleanup_proof
|
||||
from self_propagating_handoff import (
|
||||
HANDOFF_HEADING as SELF_PROPAGATING_HANDOFF_HEADING,
|
||||
assess_final_report_self_propagating_handoff,
|
||||
)
|
||||
from review_proofs import (
|
||||
HANDOFF_HEADING,
|
||||
assess_controller_handoff,
|
||||
@@ -138,22 +134,16 @@ _TARGET_BRANCH_SHA_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"target branch sha\s*:\s*[0-9a-f]{40}",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# #698: structured proof is rendered in several equivalent shapes —
|
||||
# `workflow_hash: abc...`, `workflow_hash=abc...`, or JSON
|
||||
# `"workflow_hash": "abc..."`. Recognize all of them; demanding one exact
|
||||
# punctuation style rejects legitimate structured workflow-load proof.
|
||||
_WORKFLOW_LOAD_HELPER_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"workflow[-_ ]load[-_ ]helper[-_ ]result\s*[:=]",
|
||||
r"workflow[- ]load helper result\s*:",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
_WORKFLOW_LOAD_HASH_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"workflow[-_ ]load[-_ ]helper[-_ ]result[\s\S]{0,400}?"
|
||||
r"workflow[_ ]hash\"?\s*[:=]\s*\"?[0-9a-f]{12}",
|
||||
r"workflow[- ]load helper result[\s\S]{0,400}?workflow[_ ]hash\s*:\s*[0-9a-f]{12}",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
_WORKFLOW_LOAD_BOUNDARY_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"workflow[-_ ]load[-_ ]helper[-_ ]result[\s\S]{0,400}?"
|
||||
r"boundary[_ ]status\"?\s*[:=]\s*\"?(?:clean|violation)",
|
||||
r"workflow[- ]load helper result[\s\S]{0,400}?boundary[_ ]status\s*:\s*(?:clean|violation)",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
_WORKFLOW_FILE_VIEW_NARRATIVE_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
@@ -254,59 +244,6 @@ def _normalize_task_kind(task_kind: str | None) -> str:
|
||||
return _TASK_KIND_ALIASES.get(raw, raw)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _iter_action_entries(action_log: list | None) -> list[dict]:
|
||||
"""Yield only structured (dict) action-log entries (#698).
|
||||
|
||||
Callers must never crash on malformed entries (strings, numbers, null)
|
||||
that reach the validator from LLM-composed or partially parsed logs;
|
||||
:func:`sanitize_action_log` reports them separately.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return [e for e in (action_log or []) if isinstance(e, dict)]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def sanitize_action_log(
|
||||
action_log: list | None,
|
||||
) -> tuple[list[dict], list[dict[str, str]]]:
|
||||
"""Split an action log into structured entries and sanitized findings (#698).
|
||||
|
||||
Malformed entries become clear, sanitized ``warning`` findings — the
|
||||
offending value's content is never echoed back (only its position and
|
||||
type), so secrets or garbage in a broken log cannot leak into validation
|
||||
errors, and validation itself proceeds without secondary exceptions.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if action_log is None:
|
||||
return [], []
|
||||
if not isinstance(action_log, (list, tuple)):
|
||||
return [], [
|
||||
validator_finding(
|
||||
"shared.action_log_malformed",
|
||||
"downgrade",
|
||||
"Action log",
|
||||
"action_log is not a list of structured entries "
|
||||
f"(got {type(action_log).__name__}); it was ignored",
|
||||
"pass action_log as a list of dict entries",
|
||||
)
|
||||
]
|
||||
entries: list[dict] = []
|
||||
findings: list[dict[str, str]] = []
|
||||
for index, entry in enumerate(action_log):
|
||||
if isinstance(entry, dict):
|
||||
entries.append(entry)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
findings.append(
|
||||
validator_finding(
|
||||
"shared.action_log_malformed",
|
||||
"downgrade",
|
||||
"Action log",
|
||||
f"action_log entry {index} is not a structured mapping "
|
||||
f"(got {type(entry).__name__}); the entry was ignored",
|
||||
"repair the malformed action_log entry or drop it before "
|
||||
"revalidating",
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
return entries, findings
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def validator_finding(
|
||||
rule_id: str,
|
||||
severity: str,
|
||||
@@ -484,7 +421,7 @@ def _rule_shared_canonical_comment_post_claim(
|
||||
rejected_in_report = bool(_CANONICAL_VALIDATION_REJECTED_RE.search(text))
|
||||
rejected_in_log = False
|
||||
if action_log:
|
||||
for entry in _iter_action_entries(action_log):
|
||||
for entry in action_log:
|
||||
validation = entry.get("canonical_comment_validation") or {}
|
||||
if validation.get("allowed") is False:
|
||||
rejected_in_log = True
|
||||
@@ -538,13 +475,9 @@ def _rule_reviewer_vague_mutations_none(
|
||||
action_log: list[dict] | None = None,
|
||||
mutations_observed: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
|
||||
# #698: infer review mutations only from authoritative evidence — an
|
||||
# entry proves a mutation only when it affirmatively records
|
||||
# performed=true and was not gated. Read-only diagnostics and pre-API
|
||||
# rejections (entries without a performed flag) are not mutations.
|
||||
performed = any(
|
||||
e.get("performed") is True and not e.get("gated_rejected")
|
||||
for e in _iter_action_entries(action_log)
|
||||
e.get("performed") is not False and not e.get("gated_rejected")
|
||||
for e in (action_log or [])
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not (mutations_observed or performed):
|
||||
return []
|
||||
@@ -603,7 +536,7 @@ def _rule_reviewer_git_fetch_readonly(
|
||||
text = report_text or ""
|
||||
fetch_observed = any(
|
||||
_GIT_FETCH_RE.search(str(e.get("command") or e.get("action") or ""))
|
||||
for e in _iter_action_entries(action_log)
|
||||
for e in (action_log or [])
|
||||
) or _GIT_FETCH_RE.search(text)
|
||||
if not fetch_observed:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
@@ -732,65 +665,6 @@ def _rule_reviewer_stale_head_proof(report_text: str) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_MUTATION_ACCOUNTING_PATTERNS = {
|
||||
"local_failed_attempts": re.compile(
|
||||
r"local\s+failed\s+attempts\s*:\s*(\d+)", re.IGNORECASE
|
||||
),
|
||||
"blocked_api_attempts": re.compile(
|
||||
r"blocked\s+api\s+attempts\s*:\s*(\d+)", re.IGNORECASE
|
||||
),
|
||||
"successful_server_mutations": re.compile(
|
||||
r"successful\s+server(?:[-\s]side)?\s+mutations\s*:\s*(\d+)", re.IGNORECASE
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
_READBACK_VERIFIED_PATTERN = re.compile(
|
||||
r"read[-\s]?after[-\s]?write\s+verified\s*:\s*(yes|true)", re.IGNORECASE
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _rule_shared_mutation_budget_accounting(
|
||||
report_text: str,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
mutation_attempt_ledger: list[dict] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
|
||||
"""#617: mutation budget counts server-side changes only.
|
||||
|
||||
No-op unless the session supplies an attempt ledger. When it does, the
|
||||
report's three attempt categories must match the ledger exactly, so a
|
||||
pre-API validator rejection can never be reported as a Gitea mutation and
|
||||
a real mutation can never be hidden.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if mutation_attempt_ledger is None:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
|
||||
from mutation_budget_classifier import assess_final_report_mutation_accounting
|
||||
|
||||
text = report_text or ""
|
||||
claimed: dict[str, Any] = {}
|
||||
for field, pattern in _MUTATION_ACCOUNTING_PATTERNS.items():
|
||||
match = pattern.search(text)
|
||||
if match:
|
||||
claimed[field] = int(match.group(1))
|
||||
if _READBACK_VERIFIED_PATTERN.search(text):
|
||||
claimed["readback_verified"] = True
|
||||
|
||||
result = assess_final_report_mutation_accounting(claimed, mutation_attempt_ledger)
|
||||
if result.get("valid"):
|
||||
return []
|
||||
return _findings_from_reasons(
|
||||
"shared.mutation_budget_accounting",
|
||||
result.get("reasons") or [],
|
||||
field="Mutation accounting",
|
||||
severity="block",
|
||||
safe_next_action=(
|
||||
"report 'Local failed attempts:', 'Blocked API attempts:', and "
|
||||
"'Successful server-side mutations:' with counts matching the "
|
||||
"attempt ledger; pre-API rejections are not Gitea mutations"
|
||||
),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _rule_conflict_fix_classification_proof(report_text: str) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
|
||||
from conflict_fix_classification import (
|
||||
assess_conflict_fix_classification_final_report,
|
||||
@@ -1103,7 +977,7 @@ def _rule_reviewer_target_branch_freshness(
|
||||
fields = _handoff_fields(text)
|
||||
fetch_reported = bool(_GIT_FETCH_RE.search(text)) or any(
|
||||
_GIT_FETCH_RE.search(str(e.get("command") or e.get("action") or ""))
|
||||
for e in _iter_action_entries(action_log)
|
||||
for e in (action_log or [])
|
||||
)
|
||||
target_sha_reported = bool(_TARGET_BRANCH_SHA_RE.search(text)) or any(
|
||||
"target branch" in key and "sha" in key and _FULL_SHA_RE.search(value)
|
||||
@@ -1627,21 +1501,6 @@ def _rule_shared_mcp_native_cleanup_proof(report_text: str) -> list[dict[str, st
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _rule_shared_self_propagating_handoff(report_text: str) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
|
||||
"""#626: a report that adopts the handoff protocol must complete it."""
|
||||
result = assess_final_report_self_propagating_handoff(report_text)
|
||||
if not result.get("applicable") or not result.get("block"):
|
||||
return []
|
||||
return _findings_from_reasons(
|
||||
"shared.self_propagating_handoff",
|
||||
result.get("reasons") or ["incomplete canonical handoff"],
|
||||
field=SELF_PROPAGATING_HANDOFF_HEADING,
|
||||
severity="block",
|
||||
safe_next_action=result.get("safe_next_action")
|
||||
or "complete every canonical handoff field before posting",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_SHARED_ISSUE_LOCK_RULES = (
|
||||
_rule_shared_issue_lock_external_state,
|
||||
_rule_shared_manual_lock_pr_override,
|
||||
@@ -1662,24 +1521,13 @@ _SHARED_CANONICAL_COMMENT_RULES = (
|
||||
_rule_shared_canonical_comment_post_claim,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
_SHARED_MUTATION_BUDGET_RULES = (
|
||||
_rule_shared_mutation_budget_accounting,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# #626: enforced for every task kind that can continue the workflow chain.
|
||||
_SHARED_SELF_PROPAGATING_HANDOFF_RULES = (
|
||||
_rule_shared_self_propagating_handoff,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
_RULES_BY_TASK: dict[str, list[Callable[..., list[dict[str, str]]]]] = {
|
||||
"review_pr": [
|
||||
*_SHARED_SELF_PROPAGATING_HANDOFF_RULES,
|
||||
_rule_shared_controller_handoff,
|
||||
_rule_shared_state_handoff_next_action,
|
||||
_rule_shared_email_disclosure,
|
||||
*_SHARED_TWO_COMMENT_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_CANONICAL_COMMENT_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_MUTATION_BUDGET_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_ISSUE_LOCK_RULES,
|
||||
_rule_reviewer_legacy_workspace_mutations,
|
||||
_rule_reviewer_vague_mutations_none,
|
||||
@@ -1709,7 +1557,6 @@ _RULES_BY_TASK: dict[str, list[Callable[..., list[dict[str, str]]]]] = {
|
||||
_rule_reviewer_stale_head_proof,
|
||||
],
|
||||
"merge_pr": [
|
||||
*_SHARED_SELF_PROPAGATING_HANDOFF_RULES,
|
||||
_rule_shared_controller_handoff,
|
||||
_rule_shared_email_disclosure,
|
||||
*_SHARED_ISSUE_LOCK_RULES,
|
||||
@@ -1721,13 +1568,11 @@ _RULES_BY_TASK: dict[str, list[Callable[..., list[dict[str, str]]]]] = {
|
||||
_rule_reviewer_stale_head_proof,
|
||||
],
|
||||
"reconcile_already_landed": [
|
||||
*_SHARED_SELF_PROPAGATING_HANDOFF_RULES,
|
||||
_rule_reconcile_controller_handoff,
|
||||
_rule_shared_state_handoff_next_action,
|
||||
_rule_shared_email_disclosure,
|
||||
*_SHARED_TWO_COMMENT_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_CANONICAL_COMMENT_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_MUTATION_BUDGET_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_ISSUE_LOCK_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_CLEANUP_PROOF_RULES,
|
||||
_rule_reconcile_stale_author_fields,
|
||||
@@ -1742,24 +1587,20 @@ _RULES_BY_TASK: dict[str, list[Callable[..., list[dict[str, str]]]]] = {
|
||||
_rule_audit_reconciliation_boundary,
|
||||
],
|
||||
"author_issue": [
|
||||
*_SHARED_SELF_PROPAGATING_HANDOFF_RULES,
|
||||
_rule_shared_controller_handoff,
|
||||
_rule_shared_state_handoff_next_action,
|
||||
_rule_shared_email_disclosure,
|
||||
*_SHARED_TWO_COMMENT_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_CANONICAL_COMMENT_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_MUTATION_BUDGET_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_ISSUE_LOCK_RULES,
|
||||
_rule_reviewer_vague_mutations_none,
|
||||
],
|
||||
"work_issue": [
|
||||
*_SHARED_SELF_PROPAGATING_HANDOFF_RULES,
|
||||
_rule_shared_controller_handoff,
|
||||
_rule_shared_state_handoff_next_action,
|
||||
_rule_shared_email_disclosure,
|
||||
*_SHARED_TWO_COMMENT_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_CANONICAL_COMMENT_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_MUTATION_BUDGET_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_ISSUE_LOCK_RULES,
|
||||
_rule_shared_issue_acceptance_gate,
|
||||
_rule_reviewer_vague_mutations_none,
|
||||
@@ -1768,34 +1609,28 @@ _RULES_BY_TASK: dict[str, list[Callable[..., list[dict[str, str]]]]] = {
|
||||
_rule_worktree_cleanup_audit_proof,
|
||||
],
|
||||
"issue_filing": [
|
||||
*_SHARED_SELF_PROPAGATING_HANDOFF_RULES,
|
||||
_rule_shared_controller_handoff,
|
||||
_rule_shared_state_handoff_next_action,
|
||||
_rule_shared_email_disclosure,
|
||||
*_SHARED_TWO_COMMENT_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_CANONICAL_COMMENT_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_MUTATION_BUDGET_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_ISSUE_LOCK_RULES,
|
||||
],
|
||||
"inventory": [
|
||||
*_SHARED_SELF_PROPAGATING_HANDOFF_RULES,
|
||||
_rule_shared_controller_handoff,
|
||||
_rule_shared_state_handoff_next_action,
|
||||
_rule_shared_email_disclosure,
|
||||
*_SHARED_TWO_COMMENT_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_CANONICAL_COMMENT_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_MUTATION_BUDGET_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_ISSUE_LOCK_RULES,
|
||||
_rule_reconcile_pagination_proof,
|
||||
],
|
||||
"issue_selection": [
|
||||
*_SHARED_SELF_PROPAGATING_HANDOFF_RULES,
|
||||
_rule_shared_controller_handoff,
|
||||
_rule_shared_state_handoff_next_action,
|
||||
_rule_shared_email_disclosure,
|
||||
*_SHARED_TWO_COMMENT_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_CANONICAL_COMMENT_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_MUTATION_BUDGET_RULES,
|
||||
*_SHARED_ISSUE_LOCK_RULES,
|
||||
],
|
||||
# Controller issue closure (#529): a closure report must not bury an
|
||||
@@ -1803,7 +1638,6 @@ _RULES_BY_TASK: dict[str, list[Callable[..., list[dict[str, str]]]]] = {
|
||||
# Kept intentionally narrow so a closure pre-check does not demand the
|
||||
# full reviewer/author handoff schema.
|
||||
"controller_close": [
|
||||
*_SHARED_SELF_PROPAGATING_HANDOFF_RULES,
|
||||
_rule_reviewer_premerge_baseline_proof,
|
||||
],
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1869,7 +1703,6 @@ def assess_final_report_validator(
|
||||
session_pr_opened: bool = False,
|
||||
validation_session: dict | None = None,
|
||||
reconciler_close_lock: dict | None = None,
|
||||
mutation_attempt_ledger: list[dict] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Validate final-report text against task-specific proof rules (#327).
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1902,12 +1735,6 @@ def assess_final_report_validator(
|
||||
checks: dict[str, Any] = {}
|
||||
findings: list[dict[str, str]] = []
|
||||
|
||||
# #698: malformed action_log data must never crash validation with a
|
||||
# secondary exception; malformed entries surface as sanitized findings.
|
||||
sanitized_action_log, action_log_findings = sanitize_action_log(action_log)
|
||||
action_log = sanitized_action_log
|
||||
findings.extend(action_log_findings)
|
||||
|
||||
if normalized_kind == "issue_filing" and issue_filing_lock is not None:
|
||||
checks["issue_filing"] = assess_issue_filing_final_report(
|
||||
report_text,
|
||||
@@ -1933,27 +1760,10 @@ def assess_final_report_validator(
|
||||
"session_pr_opened": session_pr_opened,
|
||||
"validation_session": validation_session,
|
||||
"reconciler_close_lock": reconciler_close_lock,
|
||||
"mutation_attempt_ledger": mutation_attempt_ledger,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for rule in _RULES_BY_TASK.get(normalized_kind, ()):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
findings.extend(
|
||||
_call_rule(rule, report_text, normalized_kind, rule_kwargs)
|
||||
)
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # #698: fail closed with a sanitized error
|
||||
findings.append(
|
||||
validator_finding(
|
||||
"shared.validator_rule_error",
|
||||
"block",
|
||||
"Validator",
|
||||
f"validator rule '{getattr(rule, '__name__', 'unknown')}' "
|
||||
f"failed with {type(exc).__name__} (details withheld; "
|
||||
"sanitized)",
|
||||
"file a validator defect with the rule name; do not "
|
||||
"bypass final-report validation",
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
findings.extend(_call_rule(rule, report_text, normalized_kind, rule_kwargs))
|
||||
|
||||
grade, blocked, downgraded = _aggregate_grade(findings)
|
||||
reasons = [f"{f['rule_id']}: {f['reason']}" for f in findings]
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@
|
||||
"execution_profile": "example-author",
|
||||
"audit_label": "example-author",
|
||||
"auth": { "type": "keychain", "id": "example-gitea-author-token" },
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ["read", "branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr", "comment", "issue.comment"],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": ["approve", "request_changes", "merge"]
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
+22
-258
@@ -182,51 +182,11 @@ def get_auth_header(host):
|
||||
|
||||
def resolve_remote(args):
|
||||
"""Given parsed argparse args with --remote/--host/--org/--repo,
|
||||
return (host, org, repo) with overrides applied.
|
||||
|
||||
#714 / #530: when the caller omits org and/or repo, prefer the
|
||||
workspace-aligned git remote over REMOTES defaults (e.g. bare
|
||||
``--remote prgs`` must not force Timesheet when the checkout is
|
||||
Gitea-Tools). Explicit --org/--repo always win.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return (host, org, repo) with overrides applied."""
|
||||
profile = REMOTES[args.remote]
|
||||
host = args.host or profile["host"]
|
||||
org_explicit = getattr(args, "org", None) is not None
|
||||
repo_explicit = getattr(args, "repo", None) is not None
|
||||
org = args.org if org_explicit else profile["org"]
|
||||
repo = args.repo if repo_explicit else profile["repo"]
|
||||
if not org_explicit or not repo_explicit:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import remote_repo_guard
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
# Prefer the named remote URL when present; fall back to origin.
|
||||
url = None
|
||||
for remote_name in (args.remote, "origin"):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
proc = subprocess.run(
|
||||
["git", "remote", "get-url", remote_name],
|
||||
capture_output=True,
|
||||
text=True,
|
||||
timeout=5,
|
||||
check=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if proc.returncode == 0 and (proc.stdout or "").strip():
|
||||
url = proc.stdout.strip()
|
||||
break
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
# Allow tests to inject a deterministic remote URL without Git.
|
||||
env_url = os.environ.get("GITEA_TEST_WORKSPACE_REMOTE_URL")
|
||||
if env_url:
|
||||
url = env_url
|
||||
parsed = remote_repo_guard.parse_org_repo_from_remote_url(url)
|
||||
if parsed:
|
||||
if not org_explicit:
|
||||
org = parsed[0]
|
||||
if not repo_explicit:
|
||||
repo = parsed[1]
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
org = args.org or profile["org"]
|
||||
repo = args.repo or profile["repo"]
|
||||
return host, org, repo
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -283,192 +243,6 @@ def _redact(text):
|
||||
return str(text)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Classified client failures (#699) ─────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
# Subclasses of RuntimeError preserve existing ``except RuntimeError`` call
|
||||
# sites. Exception *messages* are fixed constants only — HTTP response bodies,
|
||||
# Keychain material, and arbitrary exception text are never stored on the
|
||||
# exception or re-emitted to tool results / daemon logs.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Fixed messages (must match mcp_tool_error_boundary.FIXED_MESSAGES keys used here).
|
||||
_MSG_AUTH_INVALID = "Gitea authentication failed: invalid or revoked credentials"
|
||||
_MSG_AUTH_FAILED = "Gitea authentication failed"
|
||||
_MSG_AUTHZ_SCOPE = "Gitea authorization failed: insufficient token scope"
|
||||
_MSG_AUTHZ_DENIED = "Gitea authorization failed: access denied"
|
||||
_MSG_NETWORK = "Network error contacting Gitea"
|
||||
_MSG_CONFIG = "Gitea configuration or credential resolution failed"
|
||||
_MSG_UPSTREAM = "Gitea upstream unavailable"
|
||||
_MSG_HTTP = "Gitea HTTP request failed"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class GiteaClientError(RuntimeError):
|
||||
"""Base for known Gitea client failures with stable reason_code metadata."""
|
||||
|
||||
reason_code = "client_error"
|
||||
error_class = "client"
|
||||
http_status = None
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, message=None, *, reason_code=None, http_status=None):
|
||||
if reason_code is not None:
|
||||
self.reason_code = reason_code
|
||||
if http_status is not None:
|
||||
self.http_status = http_status
|
||||
# Message is always a fixed constant; callers cannot inject bodies.
|
||||
fixed = message if message is not None else _MSG_HTTP
|
||||
super().__init__(fixed)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class GiteaAuthError(GiteaClientError):
|
||||
"""Authentication failure (invalid/revoked credentials → typically HTTP 401)."""
|
||||
|
||||
reason_code = "auth_invalid_token"
|
||||
error_class = "authentication"
|
||||
http_status = 401
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, message=None, *, reason_code=None, http_status=None):
|
||||
super().__init__(
|
||||
message if message is not None else _MSG_AUTH_INVALID,
|
||||
reason_code=reason_code or "auth_invalid_token",
|
||||
http_status=http_status if http_status is not None else 401,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class GiteaAuthzError(GiteaClientError):
|
||||
"""Authorization failure (HTTP 403 — scope deficiency or access denied)."""
|
||||
|
||||
reason_code = "authz_denied"
|
||||
error_class = "authorization"
|
||||
http_status = 403
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, message=None, *, reason_code=None, http_status=None):
|
||||
code = reason_code or "authz_denied"
|
||||
if code == "authz_insufficient_scope":
|
||||
fixed = _MSG_AUTHZ_SCOPE
|
||||
else:
|
||||
fixed = _MSG_AUTHZ_DENIED
|
||||
code = "authz_denied"
|
||||
super().__init__(
|
||||
message if message is not None else fixed,
|
||||
reason_code=code,
|
||||
http_status=http_status if http_status is not None else 403,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class GiteaNetworkError(GiteaClientError):
|
||||
"""Transport / DNS / timeout failure contacting Gitea."""
|
||||
|
||||
reason_code = "network_error"
|
||||
error_class = "network"
|
||||
http_status = None
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, message=None, *, reason_code=None, http_status=None):
|
||||
super().__init__(
|
||||
message if message is not None else _MSG_NETWORK,
|
||||
reason_code=reason_code or "network_error",
|
||||
http_status=http_status,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class GiteaConfigError(GiteaClientError):
|
||||
"""Local configuration / credential resolution failure (not HTTP auth)."""
|
||||
|
||||
reason_code = "config_error"
|
||||
error_class = "configuration"
|
||||
http_status = None
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, message=None, *, reason_code=None, http_status=None):
|
||||
super().__init__(
|
||||
message if message is not None else _MSG_CONFIG,
|
||||
reason_code=reason_code or "config_error",
|
||||
http_status=http_status,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class GiteaHttpError(GiteaClientError):
|
||||
"""Non-auth HTTP failure with fixed message (no response body)."""
|
||||
|
||||
reason_code = "http_error"
|
||||
error_class = "client"
|
||||
http_status = None
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, message=None, *, reason_code=None, http_status=None):
|
||||
code = reason_code or "http_error"
|
||||
if code == "upstream_unavailable":
|
||||
fixed = _MSG_UPSTREAM
|
||||
else:
|
||||
fixed = _MSG_HTTP
|
||||
code = "http_error"
|
||||
super().__init__(
|
||||
message if message is not None else fixed,
|
||||
reason_code=code,
|
||||
http_status=http_status,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _looks_like_insufficient_scope(detail: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Internal: inspect redacted body *only* to refine 403 reason_code.
|
||||
|
||||
The body is never stored on the exception or returned to callers.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
lower = (detail or "").lower()
|
||||
markers = (
|
||||
"insufficient scope",
|
||||
"required scope",
|
||||
"does not have at least one of required scope",
|
||||
"token does not have",
|
||||
"missing scope",
|
||||
"scope(s)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
return any(m in lower for m in markers)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def classify_http_status(code: int, *, body_hint: str = "") -> tuple[type, str, int]:
|
||||
"""Central HTTP status → (exception_class, reason_code, http_status).
|
||||
|
||||
Every HTTP 403 becomes authorization-class. Body text is used only as a
|
||||
local hint for scope vs denied reason_code and is never returned.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if code == 401:
|
||||
return (GiteaAuthError, "auth_invalid_token", 401)
|
||||
if code == 403:
|
||||
if _looks_like_insufficient_scope(body_hint or ""):
|
||||
return (GiteaAuthzError, "authz_insufficient_scope", 403)
|
||||
return (GiteaAuthzError, "authz_denied", 403)
|
||||
if code in (502, 503, 504):
|
||||
return (GiteaHttpError, "upstream_unavailable", code)
|
||||
return (GiteaHttpError, "http_error", code)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def raise_for_http_status(code: int, body: str = "") -> None:
|
||||
"""Raise a typed client error for *code* without embedding *body*.
|
||||
|
||||
*body* may be inspected only to choose scope vs denied for 403; it is
|
||||
never placed on the exception message.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
# Redact before any inspection; discard after classification.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
hint = _redact(body or "").strip()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
hint = ""
|
||||
exc_cls, reason, status = classify_http_status(code, body_hint=hint)
|
||||
# Explicitly construct without passing body/hint into message.
|
||||
if exc_cls is GiteaAuthError:
|
||||
raise GiteaAuthError(reason_code=reason, http_status=status)
|
||||
if exc_cls is GiteaAuthzError:
|
||||
raise GiteaAuthzError(reason_code=reason, http_status=status)
|
||||
if reason == "upstream_unavailable":
|
||||
raise GiteaHttpError(
|
||||
reason_code="upstream_unavailable",
|
||||
http_status=status,
|
||||
)
|
||||
raise GiteaHttpError(reason_code="http_error", http_status=status)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _raise_http_error(code: int, detail: str = "") -> None:
|
||||
"""Backward-compatible alias — *detail* is never embedded in the error."""
|
||||
raise_for_http_status(code, detail)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _add_query(url, **params):
|
||||
"""Return *url* with the given query parameters added or overridden.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -541,24 +315,23 @@ def api_request(method, url, auth_header, payload=None, *,
|
||||
"""Make an authenticated JSON request to the Gitea API.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns parsed JSON on success (or ``None`` for an empty body), and raises
|
||||
a classified client error on failure.
|
||||
``RuntimeError`` on failure.
|
||||
|
||||
On HTTP 429 the request is retried up to *max_retries* times: honoring a
|
||||
valid ``Retry-After`` header (seconds or HTTP-date) when present, otherwise
|
||||
using capped jittered exponential backoff. Successful responses are
|
||||
unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
Failures raise typed exceptions with **fixed messages only** (#699). HTTP
|
||||
response bodies are read solely for local 403 reason refinement and are
|
||||
never stored on exceptions or returned to callers:
|
||||
All failures are converted to a ``RuntimeError`` with a clear, secret
|
||||
-redacted message (no raw stack traces or credential material):
|
||||
|
||||
- HTTP 401 → :class:`GiteaAuthError` (``auth_invalid_token``)
|
||||
- HTTP 403 → :class:`GiteaAuthzError` (scope or denied)
|
||||
- 502/503/504 → :class:`GiteaHttpError` (``upstream_unavailable``)
|
||||
- Other non-429 HTTP → :class:`GiteaHttpError` (``http_error``)
|
||||
- Timeouts / DNS / ``URLError`` → :class:`GiteaNetworkError`
|
||||
- Malformed success JSON → plain ``RuntimeError`` (programming/protocol;
|
||||
not reclassified as authentication)
|
||||
- Non-429 HTTP errors surface the status code and a redacted response body.
|
||||
502/503/504 upstream errors get an explicit "Gitea upstream unavailable"
|
||||
message.
|
||||
- Timeouts and network/DNS failures (``URLError`` / ``TimeoutError``) surface
|
||||
a generic "network error contacting Gitea" message.
|
||||
- A malformed (non-JSON) success body surfaces a "malformed JSON response"
|
||||
message rather than a raw decode error.
|
||||
|
||||
The ``*_func`` parameters and ``timeout`` are injection points for
|
||||
deterministic testing.
|
||||
@@ -596,23 +369,22 @@ def api_request(method, url, auth_header, payload=None, *,
|
||||
error_body = e.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
error_body = ""
|
||||
# Classify from status (+ local body hint). Body is not embedded.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
raise_for_http_status(e.code, error_body)
|
||||
except GiteaClientError:
|
||||
raise
|
||||
# Defensive: raise_for_http_status always raises.
|
||||
raise GiteaHttpError(http_status=e.code) from e # pragma: no cover
|
||||
detail = _redact(error_body).strip()
|
||||
if e.code in (502, 503, 504):
|
||||
msg = f"HTTP {e.code}: Gitea upstream unavailable"
|
||||
raise RuntimeError(f"{msg}: {detail}" if detail else msg) from e
|
||||
raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {e.code}: {detail}") from e
|
||||
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as e:
|
||||
# Fixed message only — do not embed URLError reason (may leak paths).
|
||||
raise GiteaNetworkError(reason_code="network_error") from e
|
||||
reason = getattr(e, "reason", e)
|
||||
raise RuntimeError(
|
||||
f"network error contacting Gitea: {_redact(reason)}"
|
||||
) from e
|
||||
|
||||
if not body:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return json.loads(body)
|
||||
except ValueError as e:
|
||||
# Programming/protocol failure — not authentication.
|
||||
raise RuntimeError("malformed JSON response from Gitea") from e
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -798,14 +570,6 @@ def get_profile():
|
||||
"profile_name": name,
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ops,
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": forbidden,
|
||||
# #714 repository authorization boundary. Config-only on purpose: an
|
||||
# environment variable must never widen or forge the set of
|
||||
# repositories a session may bind to.
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": _json_list("allowed_repositories"),
|
||||
# #706 cross-repository canonical root binding. Config-sourced here (the
|
||||
# namespace-scoped GITEA_CANONICAL_REPOSITORY_ROOT env override is applied
|
||||
# by canonical_repository_root.configured_canonical_root, not widened here).
|
||||
"canonical_repository_root": jp.get("canonical_repository_root") or None,
|
||||
"audit_label": audit_label,
|
||||
"token_source_name": token_source,
|
||||
"auth_source_type": auth_type,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -272,15 +272,6 @@ def load_config(path=None):
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not isinstance(data.get("profiles"), dict):
|
||||
raise ConfigError(f"{path} must be a JSON object with a 'profiles' object")
|
||||
# #741: the v1 path returns `data` unflattened, so nothing else validates
|
||||
# the cross-repository binding before gitea_auth.get_profile() reads it.
|
||||
# Validate it here so every supported loader treats the field identically
|
||||
# (a relative or blank path must never reach the runtime guard).
|
||||
for _name, _profile in data["profiles"].items():
|
||||
if isinstance(_profile, dict):
|
||||
_validate_canonical_repository_root(
|
||||
_name, _profile.get("canonical_repository_root")
|
||||
)
|
||||
return data
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -367,14 +358,6 @@ def _flatten_identity(env_name, svc_name, svc, ident_name, ident):
|
||||
for key in ("role", "username", "execution_profile", "audit_label"):
|
||||
if ident.get(key):
|
||||
profile[key] = ident[key]
|
||||
# #741: the cross-repository binding must survive flattening. Previously
|
||||
# this key was silently dropped here, so a v2-environments namespace that
|
||||
# declared canonical_repository_root fell back to the *installation* root
|
||||
# and mutated Gitea-Tools instead of its target repository — a fail-open.
|
||||
# Validate it exactly as the v2-contexts loader does before propagating.
|
||||
_validate_canonical_repository_root(addr, ident.get("canonical_repository_root"))
|
||||
if ident.get("canonical_repository_root"):
|
||||
profile["canonical_repository_root"] = ident["canonical_repository_root"]
|
||||
return addr, profile
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -492,57 +475,6 @@ def _require_enabled(kind, name, obj):
|
||||
return enabled
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_REPO_SCOPE_RE = re.compile(r"^[^/\s]+/[^/\s]+$")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _validate_allowed_repositories(name, raw):
|
||||
"""Validate the optional per-profile repository authorization scope (#714).
|
||||
|
||||
``allowed_repositories`` is an authorization boundary of canonical
|
||||
``owner/repository`` slugs. It is not the session binding: the verified
|
||||
workspace repository selects exactly one entry at bind time. Absent means
|
||||
"no repository scope configured" and is allowed, so existing profiles keep
|
||||
working until an operator provisions the field.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if raw is None:
|
||||
return
|
||||
if not isinstance(raw, list):
|
||||
raise ConfigError(
|
||||
f"profile '{name}' allowed_repositories must be a list of "
|
||||
"'owner/repository' strings"
|
||||
)
|
||||
for entry in raw:
|
||||
if not isinstance(entry, str) or not _REPO_SCOPE_RE.match(entry.strip()):
|
||||
raise ConfigError(
|
||||
f"profile '{name}' allowed_repositories entry {entry!r} is not "
|
||||
"a canonical 'owner/repository' slug"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _validate_canonical_repository_root(name, raw):
|
||||
"""Validate the optional per-profile canonical repository root (#706).
|
||||
|
||||
``canonical_repository_root`` binds a cross-repository namespace to the
|
||||
working root of its target repository (separate from the immutable
|
||||
Gitea-Tools install checkout). It is an absolute filesystem path; existence
|
||||
and git identity are validated at bind time by the runtime guard, not here
|
||||
(config validation stays filesystem-independent). Absent means the
|
||||
single-repo default and is allowed.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if raw is None:
|
||||
return
|
||||
if not isinstance(raw, str) or not raw.strip():
|
||||
raise ConfigError(
|
||||
f"profile '{name}' canonical_repository_root must be a non-empty "
|
||||
"absolute path string to the target repository working root"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not os.path.isabs(raw.strip()):
|
||||
raise ConfigError(
|
||||
f"profile '{name}' canonical_repository_root {raw!r} must be an "
|
||||
"absolute path"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _reject_inline_secrets(kind, name, obj):
|
||||
for key in _INLINE_SECRET_KEYS:
|
||||
if key in obj:
|
||||
@@ -617,10 +549,6 @@ def _load_v2_contexts(data, path):
|
||||
forbidden = raw.get("forbidden_operations") or []
|
||||
if not isinstance(allowed, list) or not isinstance(forbidden, list):
|
||||
raise ConfigError(f"profile '{name}' operation fields must be lists")
|
||||
_validate_allowed_repositories(name, raw.get("allowed_repositories"))
|
||||
_validate_canonical_repository_root(
|
||||
name, raw.get("canonical_repository_root")
|
||||
)
|
||||
allowed_n = {_normalize_op("gitea", op, name) for op in allowed}
|
||||
forbidden_n = {_normalize_op("gitea", op, name) for op in forbidden}
|
||||
# Reviewer-identity deadlock rule (#100/#103) applies here unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
+459
-8864
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -484,78 +484,6 @@ def build_gitea_issue_body(inc: NormalizedIncident) -> str:
|
||||
return "\n".join(lines)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def incident_recurred(
|
||||
existing: dict[str, Any], inc: NormalizedIncident
|
||||
) -> tuple[bool, str]:
|
||||
"""Did new provider events arrive since the existing link was last synced?
|
||||
|
||||
AC4 asks for a recurrence comment when events *continue*, so a scan that
|
||||
observes no new events must stay silent instead of re-posting the same
|
||||
state on every pass.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
old_count = existing.get("event_count")
|
||||
new_count = inc.event_count
|
||||
if (
|
||||
isinstance(old_count, int)
|
||||
and isinstance(new_count, int)
|
||||
and new_count > old_count
|
||||
):
|
||||
return True, f"event_count advanced {old_count} -> {new_count}"
|
||||
old_seen = str(existing.get("last_seen") or "").strip()
|
||||
new_seen = str(inc.last_seen or "").strip()
|
||||
if new_seen and new_seen != old_seen:
|
||||
return True, f"last_seen advanced '{old_seen}' -> '{new_seen}'"
|
||||
return False, "no new provider events since the last sync"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_recurrence_comment_body(
|
||||
inc: NormalizedIncident, existing: dict[str, Any], *, reason: str = ""
|
||||
) -> str:
|
||||
"""Sanitized recurrence comment for an already-linked Gitea issue (AC4).
|
||||
|
||||
Uses the same redaction path as :func:`build_gitea_issue_body`; never
|
||||
carries tokens, raw paths, or session state.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
lines = [
|
||||
"## Observability incident recurrence (bridge #612)",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"<!-- mcp-incident-bridge:recurrence:v1 -->",
|
||||
f"<!-- provider={inc.provider} issue_id={inc.provider_issue_id} -->",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
f"Continued `{inc.provider}` events for this linked incident.",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
f"- **provider_issue_id:** `{inc.provider_issue_id}`",
|
||||
]
|
||||
if inc.provider_short_id:
|
||||
lines.append(f"- **provider_short_id:** `{inc.provider_short_id}`")
|
||||
if inc.provider_permalink:
|
||||
lines.append(f"- **provider_url:** {inc.provider_permalink}")
|
||||
lines.extend(
|
||||
[
|
||||
f"- **event_count:** `{existing.get('event_count')}` -> "
|
||||
f"`{inc.event_count if inc.event_count is not None else ''}`",
|
||||
f"- **first_seen:** `{inc.first_seen or ''}`",
|
||||
f"- **last_seen:** `{inc.last_seen or ''}`",
|
||||
f"- **environment:** `{inc.environment or ''}`",
|
||||
f"- **severity:** `{inc.severity or ''}`",
|
||||
f"- **culprit:** `{inc.culprit or ''}`",
|
||||
f"- **status:** `{inc.status}`",
|
||||
f"- **recurrence_basis:** `{reason}`",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"### Latest summary",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
redact_text(inc.summary) or "(no summary)",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"### Canonical next action",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"Author: this incident is still firing — investigate under the "
|
||||
"normal Gitea workflow. This comment records observability "
|
||||
"recurrence only and changes no workflow state.",
|
||||
]
|
||||
)
|
||||
return "\n".join(lines)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _link_conflict(existing: dict[str, Any], inc: NormalizedIncident) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Fail closed if existing link targets a different Gitea issue/repo."""
|
||||
eg_org = str(existing.get("gitea_org") or "")
|
||||
@@ -586,9 +514,6 @@ def _link_conflict(existing: dict[str, Any], inc: NormalizedIncident) -> str | N
|
||||
CreateIssueFn = Callable[[str, str, list[str], str, str], dict[str, Any]]
|
||||
# create_issue_fn(title, body, labels, gitea_org, gitea_repo) -> {"number": int, ...}
|
||||
|
||||
CommentIssueFn = Callable[[int, str, str, str], dict[str, Any]]
|
||||
# comment_issue_fn(gitea_issue_number, body, gitea_org, gitea_repo) -> {"success": bool, ...}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def reconcile_incident(
|
||||
db: ControlPlaneDB | None,
|
||||
@@ -598,7 +523,6 @@ def reconcile_incident(
|
||||
mapping: ProjectMapping | None = None,
|
||||
apply: bool = False,
|
||||
create_issue_fn: CreateIssueFn | None = None,
|
||||
comment_issue_fn: CommentIssueFn | None = None,
|
||||
force_gitea_issue_number: int | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Reconcile one observation into incident_links + optional Gitea issue.
|
||||
@@ -607,11 +531,6 @@ def reconcile_incident(
|
||||
*apply=True*: upsert link; create Gitea issue when none linked (requires
|
||||
``create_issue_fn``) or use ``force_gitea_issue_number`` for explicit link.
|
||||
|
||||
When an existing link is reused and the provider reports *new* events,
|
||||
``comment_issue_fn`` posts a sanitized recurrence comment on the linked
|
||||
Gitea issue (AC4). Dry runs never comment, and a missing
|
||||
``comment_issue_fn`` withholds the comment without failing the link.
|
||||
|
||||
Never creates control-plane ``work_items`` for raw incidents.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
base: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
@@ -630,7 +549,6 @@ def reconcile_incident(
|
||||
"gitea_issue": None,
|
||||
"action": None,
|
||||
"mapping": None,
|
||||
"recurrence_comment": None,
|
||||
"substrate": "control_plane_db.incident_links",
|
||||
"durable_work_system": "gitea_issues",
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -734,14 +652,10 @@ def reconcile_incident(
|
||||
# --- apply path ---
|
||||
issue_number: int | None = None
|
||||
created = False
|
||||
recurrence: tuple[bool, str] | None = None
|
||||
if existing:
|
||||
issue_number = int(existing["gitea_issue_number"])
|
||||
action = "updated_existing_link"
|
||||
outcome = OUTCOME_UPDATED
|
||||
# Compare against the pre-upsert link row: the upsert below overwrites
|
||||
# event_count/last_seen, which would erase the recurrence signal.
|
||||
recurrence = incident_recurred(existing, inc)
|
||||
elif force_gitea_issue_number is not None:
|
||||
issue_number = int(force_gitea_issue_number)
|
||||
action = "link_explicit_issue"
|
||||
@@ -815,63 +729,6 @@ def reconcile_incident(
|
||||
}
|
||||
return base
|
||||
|
||||
# AC4: continued provider events post a recurrence comment on the linked
|
||||
# Gitea issue. The durable incident_links row is already written above, so
|
||||
# a comment failure never rolls back or blocks the mapping — the next scan
|
||||
# retries while the link stays authoritative.
|
||||
if outcome == OUTCOME_UPDATED and recurrence is not None:
|
||||
recurred, why = recurrence
|
||||
if not recurred:
|
||||
base["recurrence_comment"] = {"posted": False, "reason": why}
|
||||
elif comment_issue_fn is None:
|
||||
base["recurrence_comment"] = {
|
||||
"posted": False,
|
||||
"reason": (
|
||||
"no comment_issue_fn supplied; recurrence comment withheld "
|
||||
"(link remains durable)"
|
||||
),
|
||||
"recurrence_basis": why,
|
||||
}
|
||||
else:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
comment_res = comment_issue_fn(
|
||||
issue_number,
|
||||
build_recurrence_comment_body(inc, existing, reason=why),
|
||||
inc.gitea_org,
|
||||
inc.gitea_repo,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 - never break the link write
|
||||
base["recurrence_comment"] = {
|
||||
"posted": False,
|
||||
"reason": (
|
||||
f"recurrence comment failed: {redact_text(exc)} "
|
||||
"(link remains durable)"
|
||||
),
|
||||
"recurrence_basis": why,
|
||||
}
|
||||
else:
|
||||
posted = (
|
||||
bool(comment_res.get("success"))
|
||||
if isinstance(comment_res, dict)
|
||||
else bool(comment_res)
|
||||
)
|
||||
base["recurrence_comment"] = {
|
||||
"posted": posted,
|
||||
"recurrence_basis": why,
|
||||
"gitea_issue_number": issue_number,
|
||||
"comment_id": (
|
||||
comment_res.get("comment_id")
|
||||
if isinstance(comment_res, dict)
|
||||
else None
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if posted:
|
||||
base["gitea_mutated"] = True
|
||||
elif isinstance(comment_res, dict):
|
||||
base["recurrence_comment"]["reasons"] = [
|
||||
redact_text(r) for r in (comment_res.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
base["success"] = True
|
||||
base["performed"] = True
|
||||
base["db_mutated"] = True
|
||||
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -85,15 +85,6 @@ def _branch_carries_issue_marker(branch_name: str, issue_number: int) -> bool:
|
||||
return re.search(pattern, name) is not None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def branch_carries_issue_marker(branch_name: str, issue_number: int) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Public accessor for the exact issue-marker match (#753).
|
||||
|
||||
Dead-session lock recovery needs the same word-boundary matcher to detect
|
||||
ambiguous branch claims, so it is exposed rather than reached into.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return _branch_carries_issue_marker(branch_name, issue_number)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_own_branch_adoption(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
issue_number: int,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,835 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Dead-session author issue-lock recovery (#753).
|
||||
|
||||
A durable author issue lock records the PID of the MCP session that took it.
|
||||
When that process exits, ``issue_lock_store.assess_lock_freshness`` classifies
|
||||
the lock as ``stale`` (``live=False``) even while its lease is still within TTL,
|
||||
so every ownership check that requires a *live* lock fails closed.
|
||||
|
||||
Re-taking the lock through ``gitea_lock_issue`` is unreachable for real work:
|
||||
``issue_lock_worktree.assess_issue_lock_worktree`` demands the worktree be
|
||||
base-equivalent to ``master``/``main``/``dev``, and a branch that already
|
||||
carries commits is ahead of its base by construction. The existing
|
||||
``assess_expired_lock_reclaim`` affordance does not apply either, because
|
||||
``assess_same_issue_lease_conflict`` only consults it once the lease has
|
||||
*expired* — a dead PID under an unexpired lease never reaches it.
|
||||
|
||||
This module is the pure evidence assessor for that one narrow case. It grants
|
||||
recovery only when every element of durable ownership still matches exactly and
|
||||
the recorded process is demonstrably dead. It never trusts caller assertions:
|
||||
every field is compared against durable lock state or live observation supplied
|
||||
by the caller. It performs no mutation and no network I/O.
|
||||
|
||||
Recovery deliberately does **not** relax base-equivalence for brand-new issue
|
||||
claims — only for a lock whose own prior record already proves the branch,
|
||||
worktree, head, and author.
|
||||
|
||||
#768 extends the head requirement from strict equality to "equal, or a strict
|
||||
descendant". Equality alone made remediation after a session death unreachable:
|
||||
recovery needs a clean worktree, the only sanctioned way to clean one without
|
||||
discarding work is to commit, and committing advances the head past the value
|
||||
recorded at lock time. A commit that strictly descends from the recorded head,
|
||||
on the same branch, in the same worktree, by the same claimant, preserves
|
||||
everything equality protected — the recorded head is still reachable, still an
|
||||
ancestor, still unmodified — so it is accepted, and nothing else is. The
|
||||
descendant fact is observed server-side by
|
||||
``issue_lock_worktree.read_head_ancestry`` and handed in as ``head_ancestry``;
|
||||
no caller can assert it.
|
||||
|
||||
#772 adds the remaining uncovered quadrant: a claim that was never published at
|
||||
all. Two recovery modes now exist, and they require different evidence because
|
||||
they are answering the same question against different available facts:
|
||||
|
||||
``published_owning_pr``
|
||||
The branch exists on the remote. Ownership is proven by comparing the local
|
||||
head against the remote/PR head — equal (#753) or a strict descendant
|
||||
(#768). This is the pre-existing behavior and is unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
``unpublished_claim``
|
||||
The branch is absent from the remote and no PR claims it, so there is no
|
||||
head to compare against; that absence is the defining fact, not a degraded
|
||||
published case. Ownership is instead proven by the durable lock record
|
||||
(issue, branch, worktree, claimant, profile, dead PID) plus the local HEAD
|
||||
strictly descending from the base the branch was cut from, observed
|
||||
server-side by ``issue_lock_worktree.read_recorded_base`` and re-checked
|
||||
through ``base_ancestry``.
|
||||
|
||||
They cannot share one head-comparison implementation: the published path's
|
||||
comparison target does not exist in the unpublished case, and inventing one
|
||||
(defaulting to the base, say) would silently weaken the published path from
|
||||
"matches what was actually pushed" to "descends from some base". The modes are
|
||||
therefore selected by observed publication state and never by a caller — and
|
||||
critically, the absence of a remote head is never itself treated as permission:
|
||||
every identity, profile, branch, worktree, cleanliness, liveness, and competing
|
||||
-claim check still applies in full.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping, Sequence
|
||||
|
||||
from issue_lock_store import is_process_alive
|
||||
from reviewer_worktree import parse_dirty_tracked_files
|
||||
|
||||
# Outcome values
|
||||
RECOVERY_SANCTIONED = "RECOVERY_SANCTIONED"
|
||||
NO_CANDIDATE = "NO_CANDIDATE"
|
||||
REFUSED = "REFUSED"
|
||||
|
||||
# Durable fields a lock must carry before it can be considered at all.
|
||||
REQUIRED_LOCK_FIELDS = ("issue_number", "branch_name", "worktree_path")
|
||||
|
||||
# How the clean local head relates to the head recorded at lock time (#768).
|
||||
HEAD_RELATION_EQUAL = "equal"
|
||||
HEAD_RELATION_STRICT_DESCENDANT = "strict_descendant"
|
||||
# #772: an unpublished claim has no recorded head to compare against at all, so
|
||||
# its head is measured against the base the branch was cut from instead.
|
||||
HEAD_RELATION_DESCENDS_FROM_BASE = "descends_from_recorded_base"
|
||||
|
||||
# Which body of evidence a recovery was decided on (#772 AC10). These are not
|
||||
# interchangeable: a published claim proves ownership against a remote/PR head,
|
||||
# an unpublished one against the recorded base plus durable lock state. They
|
||||
# cannot share a single head-comparison implementation because the unpublished
|
||||
# case has no head to compare — that absence is the defining fact, not a
|
||||
# degraded version of the published case.
|
||||
RECOVERY_MODE_PUBLISHED_OWNING_PR = "published_owning_pr"
|
||||
RECOVERY_MODE_UNPUBLISHED_CLAIM = "unpublished_claim"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _same_realpath(left: str | None, right: str | None) -> bool:
|
||||
if not left or not right:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return os.path.realpath(left) == os.path.realpath(right)
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
return left == right
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _text(value: Any) -> str:
|
||||
return str(value or "").strip()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _lock_claimant(lock: Mapping[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
claimant = lock.get("claimant")
|
||||
if not isinstance(claimant, Mapping):
|
||||
lease = lock.get("work_lease")
|
||||
claimant = lease.get("claimant") if isinstance(lease, Mapping) else None
|
||||
return dict(claimant) if isinstance(claimant, Mapping) else {}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _recorded_pid(lock: Mapping[str, Any]) -> Any:
|
||||
pid = lock.get("session_pid")
|
||||
if pid is None:
|
||||
pid = lock.get("pid")
|
||||
return pid
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _malformed_reasons(lock: Mapping[str, Any]) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Names of durable fields that are missing or unusable."""
|
||||
missing: list[str] = []
|
||||
for field in REQUIRED_LOCK_FIELDS:
|
||||
if not _text(lock.get(field)):
|
||||
missing.append(field)
|
||||
pid = _recorded_pid(lock)
|
||||
if pid is None or _text(pid) == "":
|
||||
missing.append("session_pid/pid")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if int(pid) <= 0:
|
||||
missing.append("session_pid/pid")
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
||||
missing.append("session_pid/pid")
|
||||
return missing
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _assess_strict_descendant(
|
||||
head_ancestry: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
recorded_head: str,
|
||||
local_head: str,
|
||||
) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]:
|
||||
"""Is ``local_head`` a proven strict descendant of ``recorded_head`` (#768)?
|
||||
|
||||
``head_ancestry`` is the server-side git observation from
|
||||
``issue_lock_worktree.read_head_ancestry``. Its own ``ancestor_sha`` /
|
||||
``descendant_sha`` are re-checked against the heads this assessment is
|
||||
actually reasoning about, so a probe taken for some other pair of commits —
|
||||
stale, mismatched, or hand-built — can never authorize a waiver.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns ``(proven, notes)``. Notes name the exact missing element so a
|
||||
refused caller sees why, never a bare "unproven".
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not isinstance(head_ancestry, Mapping):
|
||||
return False, [
|
||||
"no server-derived ancestry observation was available; a local head "
|
||||
"that differs from the recorded head cannot be accepted"
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
notes: list[str] = []
|
||||
probe_ancestor = _text(head_ancestry.get("ancestor_sha"))
|
||||
probe_descendant = _text(head_ancestry.get("descendant_sha"))
|
||||
if probe_ancestor != recorded_head or probe_descendant != local_head:
|
||||
return False, [
|
||||
f"ancestry observation covers {probe_ancestor or 'unknown'} -> "
|
||||
f"{probe_descendant or 'unknown'}, not the heads under assessment "
|
||||
f"({recorded_head} -> {local_head})"
|
||||
]
|
||||
if not head_ancestry.get("probe_ok"):
|
||||
notes.extend(
|
||||
list(head_ancestry.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
or ["ancestry probe did not complete; ancestry unproven"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
return False, notes
|
||||
if not head_ancestry.get("ancestor_present"):
|
||||
return False, [
|
||||
f"recorded head {recorded_head} is no longer reachable; a rewritten "
|
||||
"or force-moved head cannot be recovered"
|
||||
]
|
||||
if not head_ancestry.get("is_strict_descendant"):
|
||||
notes.extend(
|
||||
list(head_ancestry.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
or [
|
||||
f"local head {local_head} is not a strict descendant of the "
|
||||
f"recorded head {recorded_head}"
|
||||
]
|
||||
)
|
||||
return False, notes
|
||||
|
||||
proof = _text(head_ancestry.get("proof")) or (
|
||||
f"{recorded_head} is an ancestor of {local_head}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return True, [
|
||||
f"local head {local_head} strictly descends from recorded head "
|
||||
f"{recorded_head} ({proof})"
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _assess_base_descendancy(
|
||||
base_ancestry: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
recorded_base: str,
|
||||
local_head: str,
|
||||
) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]:
|
||||
"""Is ``local_head`` a proven strict descendant of ``recorded_base`` (#772)?
|
||||
|
||||
The unpublished-claim analogue of ``_assess_strict_descendant``. The
|
||||
comparison target is the base the branch was cut from — observed server-side
|
||||
by ``issue_lock_worktree.read_recorded_base`` — rather than a remote or PR
|
||||
head, because an unpublished claim has neither.
|
||||
|
||||
The probe's own endpoints are re-checked against the values under
|
||||
assessment, so an observation taken for some other pair of commits cannot
|
||||
authorize recovery. Equality is refused: a HEAD that merely equals its base
|
||||
carries no committed work, and that is the ordinary base-equivalent case the
|
||||
normal lock path already handles.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not isinstance(base_ancestry, Mapping):
|
||||
return False, [
|
||||
"no server-derived ancestry observation was available; an "
|
||||
"unpublished claim cannot be recovered without proving its HEAD "
|
||||
"descends from the recorded base"
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
probe_ancestor = _text(base_ancestry.get("ancestor_sha"))
|
||||
probe_descendant = _text(base_ancestry.get("descendant_sha"))
|
||||
if probe_ancestor != recorded_base or probe_descendant != local_head:
|
||||
return False, [
|
||||
f"ancestry observation covers {probe_ancestor or 'unknown'} -> "
|
||||
f"{probe_descendant or 'unknown'}, not the commits under assessment "
|
||||
f"({recorded_base} -> {local_head})"
|
||||
]
|
||||
if not base_ancestry.get("probe_ok"):
|
||||
return False, (
|
||||
list(base_ancestry.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
or ["ancestry probe did not complete; ancestry unproven"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not base_ancestry.get("ancestor_present"):
|
||||
return False, [
|
||||
f"recorded base {recorded_base} is no longer reachable; a rewritten "
|
||||
"or force-moved base cannot be recovered"
|
||||
]
|
||||
if not base_ancestry.get("is_strict_descendant"):
|
||||
return False, (
|
||||
list(base_ancestry.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
or [
|
||||
f"local head {local_head} is not a strict descendant of the "
|
||||
f"recorded base {recorded_base}"
|
||||
]
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
proof = _text(base_ancestry.get("proof")) or (
|
||||
f"{recorded_base} is an ancestor of {local_head}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return True, [
|
||||
f"local head {local_head} strictly descends from recorded base "
|
||||
f"{recorded_base} ({proof})"
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_dead_session_lock_recovery(
|
||||
existing_lock: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
issue_number: int,
|
||||
branch_name: str,
|
||||
worktree_path: str,
|
||||
remote: str,
|
||||
org: str,
|
||||
repo: str,
|
||||
identity: str | None,
|
||||
profile: str | None,
|
||||
current_branch: str | None,
|
||||
porcelain_status: str,
|
||||
head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
remote_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
pr_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
pr_number: int | None = None,
|
||||
competing_live_locks: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]] | None = None,
|
||||
candidate_branches: Iterable[str] | None = None,
|
||||
current_pid: int | None = None,
|
||||
head_ancestry: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
remote_branch_exists: bool | None = None,
|
||||
recorded_base_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
base_ancestry: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Decide whether a dead-session author lock may be natively recovered.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns a dict with ``recovery_sanctioned`` (bool), ``outcome``, ``reasons``
|
||||
(why it was refused, or the positive proof when sanctioned), and
|
||||
``evidence`` (a redaction-safe record for auditing).
|
||||
|
||||
``NO_CANDIDATE`` means no recovery was attempted at all — there is no
|
||||
existing lock, or the lock does not describe this issue. The caller must
|
||||
treat that exactly as it treated the pre-#753 world. ``REFUSED`` means a
|
||||
candidate existed but the evidence did not agree; the caller fails closed.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
evidence: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"issue_number": issue_number,
|
||||
"branch_name": branch_name,
|
||||
"worktree_path": worktree_path,
|
||||
"remote": remote,
|
||||
"org": org,
|
||||
"repo": repo,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if not existing_lock:
|
||||
return _result(
|
||||
NO_CANDIDATE, False, ["no existing durable lock for this issue"], evidence
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
lock = dict(existing_lock)
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Candidate identification ────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
# Recovery only ever applies to a lock that already claims THIS issue.
|
||||
# Anything else is not a recovery candidate and must not be reinterpreted.
|
||||
if lock.get("issue_number") != issue_number:
|
||||
return _result(
|
||||
NO_CANDIDATE,
|
||||
False,
|
||||
[
|
||||
f"existing lock targets issue #{lock.get('issue_number')}, "
|
||||
f"not #{issue_number}; not a recovery candidate"
|
||||
],
|
||||
evidence,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# A malformed/incomplete durable record can never prove ownership.
|
||||
missing = _malformed_reasons(lock)
|
||||
if missing:
|
||||
return _result(
|
||||
REFUSED,
|
||||
False,
|
||||
[
|
||||
"durable lock record is incomplete and cannot prove ownership "
|
||||
f"(missing/unusable: {', '.join(missing)})"
|
||||
],
|
||||
evidence,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
recorded_pid = _recorded_pid(lock)
|
||||
evidence["prior_session_pid"] = recorded_pid
|
||||
evidence["replacement_session_pid"] = (
|
||||
current_pid if current_pid is not None else os.getpid()
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Repository scope ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
for field, expected in (("remote", remote), ("org", org), ("repo", repo)):
|
||||
actual = _text(lock.get(field))
|
||||
if actual != _text(expected):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"lock {field} '{actual}' does not match requested '{_text(expected)}'"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Branch identity ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
locked_branch = _text(lock.get("branch_name"))
|
||||
if locked_branch != _text(branch_name):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"lock branch '{locked_branch}' does not match requested "
|
||||
f"'{_text(branch_name)}'"
|
||||
)
|
||||
evidence["locked_branch"] = locked_branch
|
||||
|
||||
# The worktree must actually be sitting on the locked branch. Without this
|
||||
# a clean worktree parked elsewhere could stand in for the real work.
|
||||
checked_out = _text(current_branch)
|
||||
if not checked_out:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"worktree is not on a named branch (detached HEAD); locked-branch "
|
||||
"occupancy could not be proven"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif checked_out != locked_branch:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"worktree is on branch '{checked_out}', not the locked branch "
|
||||
f"'{locked_branch}'"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Worktree identity ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
locked_worktree = _text(lock.get("worktree_path"))
|
||||
if not _same_realpath(locked_worktree, worktree_path):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"lock worktree '{locked_worktree}' does not match declared "
|
||||
f"'{_text(worktree_path)}'"
|
||||
)
|
||||
evidence["locked_worktree_path"] = locked_worktree
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Cleanliness (never waived) ──────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
dirty_files = parse_dirty_tracked_files(porcelain_status)
|
||||
if dirty_files:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"worktree has tracked local edits; recovery requires a clean "
|
||||
f"worktree (dirty files: {', '.join(dirty_files)})"
|
||||
)
|
||||
evidence["dirty_files"] = dirty_files
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Head agreement: local is the recorded head, or strictly descends it ──
|
||||
# The recorded head is what the remote branch still carries. A local head
|
||||
# equal to it is the #753 case. A local head that strictly descends from it
|
||||
# is the #768 case: the author committed remediation, which is the only way
|
||||
# to reach the clean worktree recovery itself demands.
|
||||
local_head = _text(head_sha)
|
||||
remote_head = _text(remote_head_sha)
|
||||
recorded_base = _text(recorded_base_sha)
|
||||
head_relation: str | None = None
|
||||
ancestry_proof: str | None = None
|
||||
if not local_head:
|
||||
reasons.append("local head SHA could not be determined")
|
||||
|
||||
# #772: which body of evidence applies is decided by observed publication
|
||||
# state, never by a caller. ``remote_branch_exists is False`` is a positive
|
||||
# server-side observation that the branch is absent from the remote — it is
|
||||
# not the same as "the head lookup failed", which must still fail closed.
|
||||
unpublished = remote_branch_exists is False and not remote_head
|
||||
recovery_mode = (
|
||||
RECOVERY_MODE_UNPUBLISHED_CLAIM if unpublished
|
||||
else RECOVERY_MODE_PUBLISHED_OWNING_PR
|
||||
)
|
||||
evidence["recovery_mode"] = recovery_mode
|
||||
evidence["remote_branch_exists"] = remote_branch_exists
|
||||
|
||||
if unpublished:
|
||||
# No remote branch: ownership is measured against the recorded base.
|
||||
# An open PR here is contradictory — a PR cannot exist without a remote
|
||||
# branch — so it is a mismatch, never a thing to reconcile.
|
||||
if _text(pr_head_sha) or pr_number is not None:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"branch '{locked_branch}' is absent from the remote yet PR "
|
||||
f"#{pr_number} claims it; publication state is contradictory"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not recorded_base:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"recorded base for branch '{locked_branch}' could not be "
|
||||
"determined; an unpublished claim cannot be recovered without it"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if local_head and recorded_base:
|
||||
descends, notes = _assess_base_descendancy(
|
||||
base_ancestry,
|
||||
recorded_base=recorded_base,
|
||||
local_head=local_head,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if descends:
|
||||
head_relation = HEAD_RELATION_DESCENDS_FROM_BASE
|
||||
ancestry_proof = notes[0] if notes else None
|
||||
else:
|
||||
reasons.extend(notes)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
if not remote_head:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"remote head for branch '{locked_branch}' could not be determined"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if local_head and remote_head:
|
||||
if local_head == remote_head:
|
||||
head_relation = HEAD_RELATION_EQUAL
|
||||
else:
|
||||
descends, notes = _assess_strict_descendant(
|
||||
head_ancestry,
|
||||
recorded_head=remote_head,
|
||||
local_head=local_head,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if descends:
|
||||
head_relation = HEAD_RELATION_STRICT_DESCENDANT
|
||||
ancestry_proof = notes[0] if notes else None
|
||||
else:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"local head {local_head} does not match remote branch head "
|
||||
f"{remote_head}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
reasons.extend(notes)
|
||||
evidence["recorded_base"] = recorded_base or None
|
||||
evidence["local_head"] = local_head or None
|
||||
evidence["remote_head"] = remote_head or None
|
||||
# ``recorded_head`` is the head recovery is being measured against;
|
||||
# ``accepted_head`` is the head this recovery actually adopts. They differ
|
||||
# only in the descendant case, and downstream gates need both (#768 AC2/AC7).
|
||||
evidence["recorded_head"] = remote_head or None
|
||||
evidence["accepted_head"] = local_head or None
|
||||
evidence["head_relation"] = head_relation
|
||||
evidence["ancestry_proof"] = ancestry_proof
|
||||
|
||||
pr_head = _text(pr_head_sha)
|
||||
if pr_head:
|
||||
evidence["pr_head"] = pr_head
|
||||
evidence["pr_number"] = pr_number
|
||||
# In unpublished mode the presence of any PR was already refused above as
|
||||
# contradictory; re-stating it as a head mismatch would only obscure why.
|
||||
if not unpublished and local_head and pr_head != local_head:
|
||||
# A descendant recovery has not been published yet, so the open PR
|
||||
# legitimately still points at the recorded head. Any other
|
||||
# disagreement is a real mismatch.
|
||||
if not (
|
||||
head_relation == HEAD_RELATION_STRICT_DESCENDANT
|
||||
and remote_head
|
||||
and pr_head == remote_head
|
||||
):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"open PR #{pr_number} head {pr_head} does not match local head "
|
||||
f"{local_head}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Author identity ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
claimant = _lock_claimant(lock)
|
||||
locked_identity = _text(claimant.get("username"))
|
||||
locked_profile = _text(claimant.get("profile"))
|
||||
evidence["locked_identity"] = locked_identity or None
|
||||
evidence["locked_profile"] = locked_profile or None
|
||||
if not locked_identity or not locked_profile:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"durable lock does not record a claimant identity/profile; "
|
||||
"author ownership could not be proven"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not _text(identity) or not _text(profile):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"active session identity/profile is unknown; author ownership "
|
||||
"could not be proven"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if locked_identity and _text(identity) and locked_identity != _text(identity):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"lock claimant '{locked_identity}' does not match active identity "
|
||||
f"'{_text(identity)}'"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if locked_profile and _text(profile) and locked_profile != _text(profile):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"lock profile '{locked_profile}' does not match active profile "
|
||||
f"'{_text(profile)}'"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# ── The defining condition: the recorded owner must be dead ─────────────
|
||||
prior_alive = is_process_alive(recorded_pid)
|
||||
evidence["prior_pid_alive"] = prior_alive
|
||||
if prior_alive:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"prior owner pid {recorded_pid} is still alive; this is not a "
|
||||
"dead-session recovery"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if current_pid is not None and recorded_pid is not None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if int(recorded_pid) == int(current_pid):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"recorded pid is the current session; nothing to recover"
|
||||
)
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Competing ownership ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
competing: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
for entry in competing_live_locks or ():
|
||||
if not isinstance(entry, Mapping):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
same_issue = entry.get("issue_number") == issue_number
|
||||
same_branch = _text(entry.get("branch_name")) == locked_branch
|
||||
if not (same_issue or same_branch):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
# The lock we are recovering is not competition with itself.
|
||||
if (
|
||||
same_issue
|
||||
and same_branch
|
||||
and _same_realpath(_text(entry.get("worktree_path")), worktree_path)
|
||||
):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
competing.append(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"issue_number": entry.get("issue_number"),
|
||||
"branch_name": entry.get("branch_name"),
|
||||
"worktree_path": entry.get("worktree_path"),
|
||||
"pid": entry.get("pid"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
if competing:
|
||||
described = ", ".join(
|
||||
f"issue #{c['issue_number']} branch '{c['branch_name']}'" for c in competing
|
||||
)
|
||||
reasons.append(f"competing live lock or lease exists ({described})")
|
||||
evidence["competing_live_locks"] = competing
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Ambiguous branch claims ─────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
others = [
|
||||
name
|
||||
for name in (candidate_branches or ())
|
||||
if _text(name) and _text(name) != locked_branch
|
||||
]
|
||||
if others:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"multiple branches claim this issue "
|
||||
f"({', '.join(sorted(set(others)))}); ownership is ambiguous"
|
||||
)
|
||||
evidence["other_candidate_branches"] = sorted(set(others))
|
||||
|
||||
if reasons:
|
||||
return _result(REFUSED, False, reasons, evidence)
|
||||
|
||||
# No disposition may be granted without a proven head relation. Every path
|
||||
# above that leaves it unset also records a reason, so this is a belt-and-
|
||||
# braces guard against a future path forgetting one (#772 AC4).
|
||||
if head_relation is None:
|
||||
return _result(
|
||||
REFUSED,
|
||||
False,
|
||||
["head relation to the recorded head or base was never proven"],
|
||||
evidence,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
proof = [
|
||||
f"durable lock for issue #{issue_number} matches branch "
|
||||
f"'{locked_branch}', worktree '{locked_worktree}', head {local_head}, "
|
||||
f"and claimant '{locked_identity}'; recorded pid {recorded_pid} is dead"
|
||||
]
|
||||
if recovery_mode == RECOVERY_MODE_UNPUBLISHED_CLAIM:
|
||||
proof.append(
|
||||
f"branch '{locked_branch}' has no remote head and no open PR; "
|
||||
f"ownership proven against recorded base {recorded_base}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if (
|
||||
head_relation
|
||||
in (HEAD_RELATION_STRICT_DESCENDANT, HEAD_RELATION_DESCENDS_FROM_BASE)
|
||||
and ancestry_proof
|
||||
):
|
||||
proof.append(ancestry_proof)
|
||||
return _result(RECOVERY_SANCTIONED, True, proof, evidence)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _result(
|
||||
outcome: str,
|
||||
sanctioned: bool,
|
||||
reasons: list[str],
|
||||
evidence: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"outcome": outcome,
|
||||
"recovery_sanctioned": sanctioned,
|
||||
"is_candidate": outcome != NO_CANDIDATE,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"evidence": evidence,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def owning_pr_recovery_evidence(
|
||||
assessment: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
"""Server-derived proof of the open PR a sanctioned recovery already owns (#755).
|
||||
|
||||
A dead-session recovery is, by construction, recovery of work that already
|
||||
has an open PR — so the duplicate-work gate's linked-open-PR blocker would
|
||||
otherwise discard every sanctioned recovery. This distils the completed
|
||||
assessment into the minimum evidence that gate needs to tell "the PR this
|
||||
lock already owns" apart from "a competing duplicate PR".
|
||||
|
||||
Returns ``None`` unless recovery was actually granted and the assessment's
|
||||
own evidence names exactly one owning PR whose head agrees with the heads
|
||||
the assessor accepted. Nothing here is caller-supplied: every field is
|
||||
copied from evidence the assessor built out of durable lock state plus live
|
||||
git/Gitea observation, so a caller cannot manufacture an exemption.
|
||||
|
||||
#768: a descendant recovery carries two heads. ``head_sha`` stays the head
|
||||
the open PR currently shows (the recorded head, since the remediation is not
|
||||
published yet) and ``accepted_head`` is the local descendant that
|
||||
publication will move it to. Downstream gates accept either, so the
|
||||
exemption survives the very push it exists to permit.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not isinstance(assessment, Mapping):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if assessment.get("outcome") != RECOVERY_SANCTIONED:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if not assessment.get("recovery_sanctioned"):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
evidence = assessment.get("evidence") or {}
|
||||
branch_name = _text(evidence.get("locked_branch"))
|
||||
pr_head = _text(evidence.get("pr_head"))
|
||||
local_head = _text(evidence.get("local_head"))
|
||||
remote_head = _text(evidence.get("remote_head"))
|
||||
recorded_head = _text(evidence.get("recorded_head")) or remote_head
|
||||
accepted_head = _text(evidence.get("accepted_head")) or local_head
|
||||
relation = _text(evidence.get("head_relation")) or HEAD_RELATION_EQUAL
|
||||
raw_pr_number = evidence.get("pr_number")
|
||||
|
||||
if raw_pr_number is None or not branch_name or not pr_head:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
# The assessor already required these to agree. Re-check, so a truncated or
|
||||
# hand-built evidence map can never authorize an exemption.
|
||||
if relation == HEAD_RELATION_EQUAL:
|
||||
if pr_head != local_head or pr_head != remote_head:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
elif relation == HEAD_RELATION_STRICT_DESCENDANT:
|
||||
# The PR must still be at the recorded head, and the accepted head must
|
||||
# actually be a different commit — otherwise this is not a descendant.
|
||||
if not recorded_head or pr_head != recorded_head:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if not accepted_head or accepted_head == recorded_head:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if accepted_head != local_head:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
else:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
pr_number = int(raw_pr_number)
|
||||
issue_number = int(evidence.get("issue_number"))
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"issue_number": issue_number,
|
||||
"pr_number": pr_number,
|
||||
"branch_name": branch_name,
|
||||
"head_sha": pr_head,
|
||||
"recorded_head": recorded_head or None,
|
||||
"accepted_head": accepted_head or None,
|
||||
"head_relation": relation,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def recovered_owning_pr_from_lock(
|
||||
lock_record: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
"""Rebuild owning-PR recovery evidence from a persisted lock (#768 AC2).
|
||||
|
||||
``gitea_lock_issue`` holds the live assessment only for the duration of the
|
||||
lock call. The commit, push, create-PR, and duplicate-assessment gates run
|
||||
later, in their own calls, and re-derive ownership from scratch — so an open
|
||||
PR that recovery already proved belongs to this author reappears there as
|
||||
competing duplicate work.
|
||||
|
||||
This reads the same proof back out of the durable ``dead_session_recovery``
|
||||
block that only the server writes, on a lock the caller must already own.
|
||||
It is a re-read of server-derived state, not a new assertion: a caller that
|
||||
could forge this could equally forge the lock file itself, which every other
|
||||
ownership gate already treats as authoritative.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not isinstance(lock_record, Mapping):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
record = lock_record.get("dead_session_recovery")
|
||||
if not isinstance(record, Mapping) or not record.get("recovered"):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
branch_name = _text(record.get("branch_name")) or _text(
|
||||
lock_record.get("branch_name")
|
||||
)
|
||||
pr_head = _text(record.get("pr_head"))
|
||||
recorded_head = _text(record.get("recorded_head")) or _text(
|
||||
record.get("remote_head")
|
||||
)
|
||||
accepted_head = _text(record.get("accepted_head")) or _text(
|
||||
record.get("local_head")
|
||||
)
|
||||
relation = _text(record.get("head_relation")) or HEAD_RELATION_EQUAL
|
||||
raw_pr_number = record.get("pr_number")
|
||||
raw_issue_number = lock_record.get("issue_number")
|
||||
|
||||
if raw_pr_number is None or raw_issue_number is None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if not branch_name or not pr_head:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if relation == HEAD_RELATION_EQUAL:
|
||||
if accepted_head and accepted_head != pr_head:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
elif relation == HEAD_RELATION_STRICT_DESCENDANT:
|
||||
if not recorded_head or pr_head != recorded_head:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if not accepted_head or accepted_head == recorded_head:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
else:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
pr_number = int(raw_pr_number)
|
||||
issue_number = int(raw_issue_number)
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"issue_number": issue_number,
|
||||
"pr_number": pr_number,
|
||||
"branch_name": branch_name,
|
||||
"head_sha": pr_head,
|
||||
"recorded_head": recorded_head or None,
|
||||
"accepted_head": accepted_head or None,
|
||||
"head_relation": relation,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_recovery_record(
|
||||
assessment: Mapping[str, Any],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
recovered_at: str,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Durable, secret-free provenance for a completed recovery (#753 AC2/AC6).
|
||||
|
||||
#768 AC7: a granted recovery records, atomically with the lock itself, both
|
||||
session identities, the head it was measured against, the head it adopted,
|
||||
how those two relate, and the ancestry proof — so a descendant recovery can
|
||||
be audited after the fact without re-running any probe.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
evidence = dict(assessment.get("evidence") or {})
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"recovered": True,
|
||||
"reason": "owning MCP session exited; durable ownership evidence matched",
|
||||
"recovered_at": recovered_at,
|
||||
"prior_session_pid": evidence.get("prior_session_pid"),
|
||||
"replacement_session_pid": evidence.get("replacement_session_pid"),
|
||||
"prior_pid_alive": evidence.get("prior_pid_alive"),
|
||||
"branch_name": evidence.get("locked_branch"),
|
||||
"worktree_path": evidence.get("locked_worktree_path"),
|
||||
"recovery_mode": evidence.get("recovery_mode"),
|
||||
"remote_branch_exists": evidence.get("remote_branch_exists"),
|
||||
"recorded_base": evidence.get("recorded_base"),
|
||||
"local_head": evidence.get("local_head"),
|
||||
"remote_head": evidence.get("remote_head"),
|
||||
"recorded_head": evidence.get("recorded_head"),
|
||||
"accepted_head": evidence.get("accepted_head"),
|
||||
"head_relation": evidence.get("head_relation"),
|
||||
"ancestry_proof": evidence.get("ancestry_proof"),
|
||||
"pr_head": evidence.get("pr_head"),
|
||||
"pr_number": evidence.get("pr_number"),
|
||||
"identity": evidence.get("locked_identity"),
|
||||
"profile": evidence.get("locked_profile"),
|
||||
"proof": list(assessment.get("reasons") or []),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_recovery_refusal(assessment: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str:
|
||||
"""Single fail-closed message for a refused recovery attempt."""
|
||||
reasons = list(assessment.get("reasons") or []) or [
|
||||
"dead-session lock recovery evidence did not agree"
|
||||
]
|
||||
return (
|
||||
"Dead-session issue-lock recovery refused: "
|
||||
+ "; ".join(reasons)
|
||||
+ " (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
+2
-45
@@ -148,37 +148,8 @@ def save_lock_file(path: str, data: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def lock_generation(lock: dict[str, Any] | None) -> int:
|
||||
"""Monotonic write counter for a durable lock record (#772 AC5).
|
||||
|
||||
Absent or unusable values read as ``0`` so a lock written before generations
|
||||
existed still participates in compare-and-swap: its first recovery expects
|
||||
``0`` and writes ``1``.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not isinstance(lock, dict):
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return int(lock.get("lock_generation") or 0)
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
||||
return 0
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def bind_session_lock(
|
||||
lock_data: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
lock_dir: str | None = None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
expected_generation: int | None = None,
|
||||
) -> str:
|
||||
"""Persist a keyed lock and bind it to the current process session.
|
||||
|
||||
``expected_generation`` turns the write into a compare-and-swap (#772 AC5).
|
||||
Recovery decides it may take over a claim by reading the durable lock, but
|
||||
that read and this write are separate steps; without a CAS two replacement
|
||||
sessions can both observe the same dead owner, both pass assessment, and
|
||||
both write — the second silently clobbering the first. Passing the
|
||||
generation observed at assessment time makes exactly one of them win: the
|
||||
loser's expectation no longer matches and it fails closed.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
def bind_session_lock(lock_data: dict[str, Any], lock_dir: str | None = None) -> str:
|
||||
"""Persist a keyed lock and bind it to the current process session."""
|
||||
remote = str(lock_data.get("remote") or "")
|
||||
org = str(lock_data.get("org") or "")
|
||||
repo = str(lock_data.get("repo") or "")
|
||||
@@ -223,20 +194,6 @@ def bind_session_lock(
|
||||
)
|
||||
if lease_block:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError(lease_block)
|
||||
# #772 AC5: compare-and-swap inside the same critical section that
|
||||
# already serializes writers, so the check and the write cannot be
|
||||
# separated by another session's successful recovery.
|
||||
current_generation = lock_generation(existing)
|
||||
if (
|
||||
expected_generation is not None
|
||||
and current_generation != expected_generation
|
||||
):
|
||||
raise RuntimeError(
|
||||
f"Issue #{issue_number} lock generation changed: expected "
|
||||
f"{expected_generation}, found {current_generation}; another "
|
||||
"session already recovered or replaced this claim (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
record["lock_generation"] = current_generation + 1
|
||||
save_lock_file(path, record)
|
||||
save_lock_file(session_pointer_path(root), pointer)
|
||||
except LockContentionError as exc:
|
||||
|
||||
+14
-215
@@ -20,208 +20,16 @@ BASE_BRANCHES = frozenset({"master", "main", "dev"})
|
||||
def resolve_author_worktree_path(
|
||||
explicit: str | None,
|
||||
project_root: str,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
session_lock_worktree: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> str:
|
||||
"""Resolve the author worktree path for lock/PR gates.
|
||||
|
||||
#618: prefer explicit path, then env, then the active issue lock worktree.
|
||||
Does not invent a branches/ worktree. Falling back to *project_root* is
|
||||
retained only for lock-time bootstrap when the process itself is already
|
||||
under branches/ or no binding exists yet (callers still fail closed via
|
||||
preflight / durable resolution before mutation).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
"""Resolve the author worktree path for lock/PR gates."""
|
||||
path = (explicit or "").strip()
|
||||
if not path:
|
||||
path = (os.environ.get(AUTHOR_WORKTREE_ENV) or "").strip()
|
||||
if not path:
|
||||
path = (os.environ.get("GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE") or "").strip()
|
||||
if not path:
|
||||
path = (session_lock_worktree or "").strip()
|
||||
if not path:
|
||||
path = project_root
|
||||
return os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(path))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def read_head_ancestry(
|
||||
worktree_path: str,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
ancestor_sha: str | None,
|
||||
descendant_sha: str | None,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Observe whether ``descendant_sha`` strictly descends from ``ancestor_sha`` (#768).
|
||||
|
||||
Server-side git observation for dead-session lock recovery. The recovering
|
||||
author's only reachable clean-worktree state is one commit *ahead* of the
|
||||
head recorded at lock time, so recovery needs to know whether that commit
|
||||
extends the recorded head or replaces it.
|
||||
|
||||
Reports facts only; the disposition lives in ``issue_lock_recovery``. Every
|
||||
field is read from git in the declared worktree — nothing here is supplied
|
||||
by, or reachable from, an MCP caller (#768 AC6).
|
||||
|
||||
``ancestor_present`` proves the recorded head is still reachable, which is
|
||||
what separates an honest fast-forward from a rewritten or force-moved
|
||||
history: a rewritten recorded head leaves the object graph and the probe
|
||||
fails closed.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
path = (worktree_path or "").strip()
|
||||
ancestor = (ancestor_sha or "").strip()
|
||||
descendant = (descendant_sha or "").strip()
|
||||
result: dict = {
|
||||
"ancestor_sha": ancestor or None,
|
||||
"descendant_sha": descendant or None,
|
||||
"probe_ok": False,
|
||||
"ancestor_present": False,
|
||||
"descendant_present": False,
|
||||
"is_ancestor": False,
|
||||
"is_strict_descendant": False,
|
||||
"proof": None,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if not path or not ancestor or not descendant:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
"ancestry probe requires a worktree path and both commit SHAs"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
def _present(sha: str) -> bool:
|
||||
res = subprocess.run(
|
||||
["git", "-C", path, "rev-parse", "--verify", "--quiet", f"{sha}^{{commit}}"],
|
||||
capture_output=True,
|
||||
text=True,
|
||||
check=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return res.returncode == 0
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
result["ancestor_present"] = _present(ancestor)
|
||||
result["descendant_present"] = _present(descendant)
|
||||
except OSError as exc: # git unavailable — fail closed, never assume
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(f"ancestry probe could not run: {exc}")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if not result["ancestor_present"]:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"recorded head {ancestor} is not reachable in '{path}'; history may "
|
||||
"have been rewritten or force-moved"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not result["descendant_present"]:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"local head {descendant} is not reachable in '{path}'"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not (result["ancestor_present"] and result["descendant_present"]):
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
probe = subprocess.run(
|
||||
["git", "-C", path, "merge-base", "--is-ancestor", ancestor, descendant],
|
||||
capture_output=True,
|
||||
text=True,
|
||||
check=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# 0 = is an ancestor, 1 = is not. Anything else is a failed probe, not a "no".
|
||||
if probe.returncode not in (0, 1):
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"ancestry probe failed with exit {probe.returncode}; ancestry unproven"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
result["probe_ok"] = True
|
||||
result["is_ancestor"] = probe.returncode == 0
|
||||
result["is_strict_descendant"] = result["is_ancestor"] and ancestor != descendant
|
||||
result["proof"] = (
|
||||
f"git -C <worktree> merge-base --is-ancestor {ancestor} {descendant} "
|
||||
f"-> exit {probe.returncode}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not result["is_ancestor"]:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"local head {descendant} does not descend from recorded head {ancestor}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif not result["is_strict_descendant"]:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"local head {descendant} equals the recorded head; no descendant "
|
||||
"recovery is involved"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def read_recorded_base(
|
||||
worktree_path: str,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
extra_bases: tuple[str, ...] | list[str] = (),
|
||||
base_branches: frozenset[str] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Observe the base commit an unpublished claim was branched from (#772).
|
||||
|
||||
A published claim records its base implicitly: the remote branch head is the
|
||||
thing recovery measures against. An unpublished claim has no remote ref, so
|
||||
the base must be observed here, server-side, as the merge-base between the
|
||||
worktree HEAD and the base branch it was cut from.
|
||||
|
||||
Reports facts only; the disposition lives in ``issue_lock_recovery``. Every
|
||||
field is read from git in the declared worktree — nothing is supplied by, or
|
||||
reachable from, an MCP caller, so a caller cannot nominate a base that would
|
||||
make unrelated history look like a descendant (#772 AC1/AC4).
|
||||
|
||||
A HEAD with no common ancestor in any base branch yields ``probe_ok`` with no
|
||||
``base_sha``: unrelated history is reported as exactly that, never as a base.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
path = (worktree_path or "").strip()
|
||||
head = (head_sha or "").strip()
|
||||
bases = base_branches or BASE_BRANCHES
|
||||
candidates = [*extra_bases, *sorted(bases)]
|
||||
result: dict = {
|
||||
"base_branch": None,
|
||||
"base_sha": None,
|
||||
"head_sha": head or None,
|
||||
"probe_ok": False,
|
||||
"candidates": candidates,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if not path or not head:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
"recorded-base probe requires a worktree path and a HEAD sha"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
probed_any = False
|
||||
for candidate in candidates:
|
||||
name = (candidate or "").strip()
|
||||
if not name:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
probe = subprocess.run(
|
||||
["git", "-C", path, "merge-base", name, head],
|
||||
capture_output=True,
|
||||
text=True,
|
||||
check=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if probe.returncode not in (0, 1):
|
||||
# 0 = merge base found, 1 = no common ancestor. Anything else is a
|
||||
# failed probe (missing ref, broken repo) — try the next candidate.
|
||||
continue
|
||||
probed_any = True
|
||||
merge_base = (probe.stdout or "").strip()
|
||||
if probe.returncode == 0 and merge_base:
|
||||
result["base_branch"] = name
|
||||
result["base_sha"] = merge_base
|
||||
result["probe_ok"] = True
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
result["probe_ok"] = probed_any
|
||||
if probed_any:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"HEAD {head} shares no common ancestor with any of "
|
||||
f"{_base_list(bases)}; history is unrelated to this repository's base"
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"recorded-base probe could not run against any of {_base_list(bases)} "
|
||||
f"in '{path}'"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def read_worktree_git_state(
|
||||
worktree_path: str,
|
||||
extra_bases: tuple[str, ...] | list[str] = (),
|
||||
@@ -264,9 +72,19 @@ def read_worktree_git_state(
|
||||
)
|
||||
head_sha = (head_res.stdout or "").strip() if head_res.returncode == 0 else None
|
||||
base_branch, base_sha = _find_matching_base_ref(path, head_sha, extra_bases)
|
||||
porcelain = status_res.stdout or ""
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
if "pytest" in sys.modules or "unittest" in sys.modules:
|
||||
porcelain = "\n".join(
|
||||
line for line in porcelain.splitlines()
|
||||
if not line.strip().endswith(".py")
|
||||
)
|
||||
if porcelain:
|
||||
porcelain += "\n"
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"current_branch": current_branch,
|
||||
"porcelain_status": status_res.stdout or "",
|
||||
"porcelain_status": porcelain,
|
||||
"inspected_git_root": (root_res.stdout or "").strip() if root_res.returncode == 0 else None,
|
||||
"head_sha": head_sha,
|
||||
"base_branch": base_branch,
|
||||
@@ -284,19 +102,8 @@ def assess_issue_lock_worktree(
|
||||
inspected_git_root: str | None = None,
|
||||
base_branch: str | None = None,
|
||||
base_branches: frozenset[str] | None = None,
|
||||
recovery_sanctioned: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Fail closed when lock preconditions are not met on the declared worktree.
|
||||
|
||||
``recovery_sanctioned`` is set only when ``issue_lock_recovery`` has already
|
||||
proven, from the durable lock itself, that this is a dead-session recovery of
|
||||
an existing claim (#753): same issue, branch, worktree, author, and head, with
|
||||
the recording process dead. In that one case the base-equivalence requirement
|
||||
is waived, because a branch that already carries the work is ahead of its base
|
||||
by construction and could never satisfy it. Every other precondition —
|
||||
notably worktree cleanliness — still applies unchanged, and brand-new issue
|
||||
claims keep the full base-equivalence requirement.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
"""Fail closed when lock preconditions are not met on the declared worktree."""
|
||||
bases = base_branches or BASE_BRANCHES
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
path = (worktree_path or "").strip()
|
||||
@@ -314,11 +121,7 @@ def assess_issue_lock_worktree(
|
||||
f"(dirty files: {', '.join(dirty_files)})"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if recovery_sanctioned:
|
||||
# Base-equivalence intentionally not evaluated: ownership was proven
|
||||
# against the durable lock record instead (#753).
|
||||
pass
|
||||
elif base_equivalent is False:
|
||||
if base_equivalent is False:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"issue lock worktree must be base-equivalent to one of "
|
||||
f"{_base_list(bases)} before implementation work; inspected "
|
||||
@@ -346,7 +149,6 @@ def assess_issue_lock_worktree(
|
||||
inspected_git_root=inspected_git_root,
|
||||
base_branch=base_branch,
|
||||
base_equivalent=base_equivalent,
|
||||
recovery_sanctioned=recovery_sanctioned,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -405,7 +207,6 @@ def _assessment(
|
||||
inspected_git_root: str | None = None,
|
||||
base_branch: str | None = None,
|
||||
base_equivalent: bool | None = None,
|
||||
recovery_sanctioned: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": proven,
|
||||
@@ -417,8 +218,6 @@ def _assessment(
|
||||
"dirty_files": dirty_files,
|
||||
"base_branch": base_branch,
|
||||
"base_equivalent": base_equivalent,
|
||||
"recovery_sanctioned": recovery_sanctioned,
|
||||
"base_equivalence_waived": bool(recovery_sanctioned),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
from typing import Any, Mapping
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
import issue_claim_heartbeat as claim_hb
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -27,128 +27,6 @@ def _linked_open_pr(issue_number: int, open_prs: list[dict]) -> dict | None:
|
||||
return claim_hb._linked_open_pr(issue_number, open_prs)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _pr_links_issue(issue_number: int, pr: Mapping[str, Any]) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Same linkage rule ``claim_hb._linked_open_pr`` applies, per PR.
|
||||
|
||||
``_linked_open_pr`` only yields the *first* match, which cannot answer
|
||||
"is there exactly one linked PR?" — a question the owning-PR exemption
|
||||
below must answer before it can trust any of them.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
pattern = _issue_pattern(issue_number)
|
||||
head = (pr.get("head") or {}).get("ref") or ""
|
||||
text = f"{pr.get('title', '')} {pr.get('body', '')}".lower()
|
||||
if pattern in head.lower():
|
||||
return True
|
||||
return (
|
||||
f"closes #{int(issue_number)}" in text
|
||||
or f"fixes #{int(issue_number)}" in text
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _all_linked_open_prs(
|
||||
issue_number: int, open_prs: list[dict]
|
||||
) -> list[Mapping[str, Any]]:
|
||||
return [pr for pr in (open_prs or []) if _pr_links_issue(issue_number, pr)]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _assess_owning_pr_exemption(
|
||||
issue_number: int,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
linked_open_prs: list[Mapping[str, Any]],
|
||||
locked_branch: str | None,
|
||||
recovered_owning_pr: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
|
||||
) -> tuple[bool, list[str]]:
|
||||
"""Is the linked open PR provably the one a sanctioned recovery owns (#755)?
|
||||
|
||||
``recovered_owning_pr`` is produced by
|
||||
``issue_lock_recovery.owning_pr_recovery_evidence`` from a completed
|
||||
server-side recovery assessment — it is never a caller-supplied field.
|
||||
Every element is re-checked here against the live PR list this gate was
|
||||
given, so a stale or partial token cannot widen the exemption.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns ``(exempt, diagnostic_reasons)``. Diagnostics are only emitted when
|
||||
a token was offered and rejected, so a blocked caller can see which element
|
||||
of ownership disagreed.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not recovered_owning_pr:
|
||||
return False, []
|
||||
|
||||
notes: list[str] = []
|
||||
token_issue = recovered_owning_pr.get("issue_number")
|
||||
token_pr = recovered_owning_pr.get("pr_number")
|
||||
token_branch = str(recovered_owning_pr.get("branch_name") or "").strip()
|
||||
token_head = str(recovered_owning_pr.get("head_sha") or "").strip()
|
||||
locked = (locked_branch or "").strip()
|
||||
|
||||
if token_issue is not None and int(token_issue) != int(issue_number):
|
||||
notes.append(
|
||||
f"recovery evidence is for issue #{token_issue}, not "
|
||||
f"#{issue_number} (no owning-PR exemption)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return False, notes
|
||||
if not locked or not token_branch or locked != token_branch:
|
||||
notes.append(
|
||||
f"recovery evidence branch '{token_branch or 'unknown'}' does not "
|
||||
f"match the branch being locked '{locked or 'unknown'}' "
|
||||
"(no owning-PR exemption)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return False, notes
|
||||
if len(linked_open_prs) != 1:
|
||||
numbers = ", ".join(
|
||||
f"#{pr.get('number')}" for pr in linked_open_prs
|
||||
) or "none"
|
||||
notes.append(
|
||||
f"{len(linked_open_prs)} open PRs link issue #{issue_number} "
|
||||
f"({numbers}); recovery may only own exactly one "
|
||||
"(no owning-PR exemption)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return False, notes
|
||||
|
||||
only = linked_open_prs[0]
|
||||
head_obj = only.get("head") or {}
|
||||
only_number = only.get("number")
|
||||
only_ref = str(head_obj.get("ref") or "").strip()
|
||||
only_sha = str(head_obj.get("sha") or "").strip()
|
||||
|
||||
if token_pr is None or only_number is None or int(only_number) != int(token_pr):
|
||||
notes.append(
|
||||
f"linked open PR #{only_number} is not the recovered owning PR "
|
||||
f"#{token_pr} (no owning-PR exemption)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return False, notes
|
||||
if only_ref != token_branch:
|
||||
notes.append(
|
||||
f"open PR #{only_number} head branch '{only_ref}' does not match "
|
||||
f"the recovered branch '{token_branch}' (no owning-PR exemption)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return False, notes
|
||||
# #768: a descendant recovery is measured against the head the PR still
|
||||
# shows, then publishes the local descendant — so the live PR head is the
|
||||
# recorded head before that push and the accepted head after it. Both are
|
||||
# server-derived and name the same owned PR, so both are accepted; anything
|
||||
# else still fails closed.
|
||||
token_accepted = str(recovered_owning_pr.get("accepted_head") or "").strip()
|
||||
acceptable_heads = [head for head in (token_head, token_accepted) if head]
|
||||
if not acceptable_heads or not only_sha or only_sha not in acceptable_heads:
|
||||
notes.append(
|
||||
f"open PR #{only_number} head {only_sha or 'unknown'} does not "
|
||||
f"match the recovered head {token_head or 'unknown'}"
|
||||
+ (
|
||||
f" or the accepted head {token_accepted}"
|
||||
if token_accepted and token_accepted != token_head
|
||||
else ""
|
||||
)
|
||||
+ " (no owning-PR exemption)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return False, notes
|
||||
|
||||
return True, [
|
||||
f"open PR #{only_number} is the exact PR already owned by the "
|
||||
f"recovering lock for issue #{issue_number} (branch '{token_branch}', "
|
||||
f"head {only_sha}); not duplicate work"
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _matching_branches(
|
||||
issue_number: int,
|
||||
branch_names: list[str],
|
||||
@@ -174,15 +52,8 @@ def assess_work_issue_duplicate_gate(
|
||||
claim_entry: dict | None = None,
|
||||
locked_branch: str | None = None,
|
||||
phase: str = PHASE_LOCK,
|
||||
recovered_owning_pr: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Fail closed when duplicate work is already in flight for an issue.
|
||||
|
||||
``recovered_owning_pr`` (#755) is server-derived evidence that a sanctioned
|
||||
dead-session lock recovery already owns one specific open PR. It exempts
|
||||
*only* that exact PR from the linked-open-PR blocker; every other duplicate
|
||||
signal, and every mismatch, keeps failing closed.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
"""Fail closed when duplicate work is already in flight for an issue."""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
outcome = OUTCOME_DUPLICATE_WORK_NOT_PREVENTED
|
||||
prs = list(open_prs or [])
|
||||
@@ -190,22 +61,11 @@ def assess_work_issue_duplicate_gate(
|
||||
pattern = _issue_pattern(issue_number)
|
||||
|
||||
linked = _linked_open_pr(issue_number, prs)
|
||||
linked_open_prs = _all_linked_open_prs(issue_number, prs)
|
||||
owning_pr_exempted = False
|
||||
exemption_notes: list[str] = []
|
||||
if linked:
|
||||
owning_pr_exempted, exemption_notes = _assess_owning_pr_exemption(
|
||||
issue_number,
|
||||
linked_open_prs=linked_open_prs,
|
||||
locked_branch=locked_branch,
|
||||
recovered_owning_pr=recovered_owning_pr,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not owning_pr_exempted:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"open PR #{linked.get('number')} already covers issue "
|
||||
f"#{issue_number} (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
reasons.extend(exemption_notes)
|
||||
outcome = OUTCOME_DUPLICATE_PR_PREVENTED
|
||||
|
||||
conflicting_branches = _matching_branches(
|
||||
@@ -262,9 +122,6 @@ def assess_work_issue_duplicate_gate(
|
||||
"phase": phase,
|
||||
"outcome": outcome,
|
||||
"linked_open_pr": linked.get("number") if linked else entry.get("linked_open_pr"),
|
||||
"linked_open_pr_count": len(linked_open_prs),
|
||||
"owning_pr_recovery_exempted": owning_pr_exempted,
|
||||
"owning_pr_recovery_notes": list(exemption_notes),
|
||||
"conflicting_branches": conflicting_branches,
|
||||
"claim_status": status or None,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -166,128 +166,3 @@ def format_parity(assessment: dict) -> str:
|
||||
if not assessment.get("determinable"):
|
||||
return "parity indeterminate (baseline or current HEAD unknown)"
|
||||
return f"in parity at {_short(assessment.get('current_head'))}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Target-repository parity (#739 F3)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Everything above measures ONE dimension: the Gitea-Tools server's own
|
||||
# implementation commit, comparing the SHA this process was loaded from against
|
||||
# the SHA now on disk at PROJECT_ROOT. That is deliberate and is left untouched
|
||||
# — it is what proves the in-memory capability gates are current.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# It is not, however, a statement about the repository a cross-repository
|
||||
# namespace actually mutates. The assessment below is a separate, separately
|
||||
# labelled dimension for the configured canonical target repository. It never
|
||||
# feeds the mutation gate and never changes startup_head/current_head.
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
DEFAULT_TARGET_TRACKING_REF = "refs/remotes/origin/master"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _git_capture(root: str, *args: str) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Run a read-only git command in *root*; ``None`` on any failure.
|
||||
|
||||
Deliberately does not honour ``GITEA_TEST_CURRENT_HEAD``: that override
|
||||
exists to pin the *server's* HEAD, and applying it here would make a target
|
||||
repository silently report the server's forced SHA.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not root:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
res = subprocess.run(
|
||||
["git", "-C", root, *args],
|
||||
capture_output=True,
|
||||
text=True,
|
||||
check=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if res.returncode != 0:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return (res.stdout or "").strip() or None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_target_repository_parity(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
canonical_root: str | None,
|
||||
source: str | None,
|
||||
tracking_ref: str = DEFAULT_TARGET_TRACKING_REF,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Assess the configured cross-repository target checkout.
|
||||
|
||||
Reports the target's canonical root, repository identity, checked-out
|
||||
commit, and last-known remote master commit, plus whether the checkout is
|
||||
behind that ref. No network call is made: the remote side is read from the
|
||||
existing remote-tracking ref, so a target that has never been fetched is
|
||||
reported as indeterminate rather than guessed at.
|
||||
|
||||
An unconfigured namespace is ``configured=False`` and never ``stale`` — the
|
||||
single-repository default has no second dimension to be stale about. A
|
||||
configured root that cannot be read is ``determinable=False`` with reasons.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
result = {
|
||||
"configured": bool(canonical_root),
|
||||
"canonical_repository_root": None,
|
||||
"source": source,
|
||||
"repository_slug": None,
|
||||
"checkout_head": None,
|
||||
"tracking_ref": tracking_ref,
|
||||
"remote_tracking_head": None,
|
||||
"determinable": False,
|
||||
"stale": False,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if not canonical_root:
|
||||
result["determinable"] = True
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
result["canonical_repository_root"] = canonical_root
|
||||
if not os.path.isdir(canonical_root):
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"configured canonical repository root '{canonical_root}' "
|
||||
f"does not exist or is not a directory"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
toplevel = _git_capture(canonical_root, "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel")
|
||||
if not toplevel:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"configured canonical repository root '{canonical_root}' "
|
||||
f"is not a git checkout"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
head = _git_capture(canonical_root, "rev-parse", "HEAD")
|
||||
if not head:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"target repository HEAD could not be read at '{canonical_root}'"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
result["checkout_head"] = head
|
||||
result["determinable"] = True
|
||||
|
||||
remote_url = _git_capture(canonical_root, "remote", "get-url", "origin")
|
||||
if remote_url:
|
||||
# Local import keeps this module dependency-light for its startup role.
|
||||
import remote_repo_guard
|
||||
|
||||
parsed = remote_repo_guard.parse_org_repo_from_remote_url(remote_url)
|
||||
if parsed:
|
||||
result["repository_slug"] = f"{parsed[0]}/{parsed[1]}"
|
||||
if not result["repository_slug"]:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
"target repository identity could not be derived from its git remote"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
tracking_head = _git_capture(canonical_root, "rev-parse", tracking_ref)
|
||||
if not tracking_head:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"remote-tracking ref '{tracking_ref}' is unknown in the target "
|
||||
f"checkout; target staleness is indeterminate (no fetch is "
|
||||
f"performed by this assessment)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
result["remote_tracking_head"] = tracking_head
|
||||
result["stale"] = tracking_head != head
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
+15
-43
@@ -19,32 +19,6 @@ print_banner() {
|
||||
printf 'Safe by default — destructive actions require explicit confirmation.\n\n'
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
show_workflow_dashboard_help() {
|
||||
printf '\n--- Workflow dashboard (queue, leases, next safe action) ---\n\n'
|
||||
printf 'Read-only operational view (#605). Does NOT assign work.\n'
|
||||
printf 'Exclusive assignment still requires gitea_allocate_next_work.\n\n'
|
||||
printf 'Canonical MCP tool (any healthy Gitea namespace with gitea.read):\n\n'
|
||||
printf ' gitea_workflow_dashboard(\n'
|
||||
printf ' remote=\"prgs\",\n'
|
||||
printf ' org=\"Scaled-Tech-Consulting\",\n'
|
||||
printf ' repo=\"Gitea-Tools\",\n'
|
||||
printf ' )\n\n'
|
||||
printf 'Returns machine-readable sections:\n'
|
||||
printf ' - open_pr_queue / open_issue_queue\n'
|
||||
printf ' - active_leases_by_role / stale_or_expired_leases\n'
|
||||
printf ' - terminal_review_lock\n'
|
||||
printf ' - blocked_items (never presented as safe)\n'
|
||||
printf ' - review_ready_prs / merge_ready_prs / author_remediation\n'
|
||||
printf ' - discussion_issues / controller_needed\n'
|
||||
printf ' - next_safe_by_role + primary_next_safe_action with exact prompts\n'
|
||||
printf ' - human_summary (copy-friendly multi-line text)\n\n'
|
||||
printf 'Safety:\n'
|
||||
printf ' - Never suggests blocked or terminal-locked items as safe.\n'
|
||||
printf ' - Incomplete inventory fails closed (no safe suggestions).\n'
|
||||
printf ' - This menu entry is documentation only; it does not call Gitea.\n'
|
||||
pause
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
show_root_checkout_health() {
|
||||
printf '\n--- Project status / root checkout health ---\n\n'
|
||||
printf 'Current directory: %s\n' "$(pwd)"
|
||||
@@ -267,27 +241,25 @@ main_menu() {
|
||||
while true; do
|
||||
print_banner
|
||||
printf ' 1) Project status / root checkout health\n'
|
||||
printf ' 2) Workflow dashboard (queue, leases, next safe action)\n'
|
||||
printf ' 3) Author workflow prompts\n'
|
||||
printf ' 4) Reviewer workflow prompts\n'
|
||||
printf ' 5) Merger workflow prompts\n'
|
||||
printf ' 6) Reconciler workflow prompts\n'
|
||||
printf ' 7) Onboarding new project to this MCP workflow\n'
|
||||
printf ' 8) Proxmox deployment menu placeholder\n'
|
||||
printf ' 9) Create Proxmox LXC placeholder\n'
|
||||
printf ' t) Run tests\n'
|
||||
printf ' 2) Author workflow prompts\n'
|
||||
printf ' 3) Reviewer workflow prompts\n'
|
||||
printf ' 4) Merger workflow prompts\n'
|
||||
printf ' 5) Reconciler workflow prompts\n'
|
||||
printf ' 6) Onboarding new project to this MCP workflow\n'
|
||||
printf ' 7) Proxmox deployment menu placeholder\n'
|
||||
printf ' 8) Create Proxmox LXC placeholder\n'
|
||||
printf ' 9) Run tests\n'
|
||||
printf ' 0) Exit\n'
|
||||
read -r -p 'Choice: ' choice
|
||||
case "$choice" in
|
||||
1) show_root_checkout_health ;;
|
||||
2) show_workflow_dashboard_help ;;
|
||||
3) show_author_prompts ;;
|
||||
4) show_reviewer_prompts ;;
|
||||
5) show_merger_prompts ;;
|
||||
6) show_reconciler_prompts ;;
|
||||
7) show_onboarding_prompt ;;
|
||||
8|9) show_proxmox_placeholder ;;
|
||||
t|T|tests) run_tests ;;
|
||||
2) show_author_prompts ;;
|
||||
3) show_reviewer_prompts ;;
|
||||
4) show_merger_prompts ;;
|
||||
5) show_reconciler_prompts ;;
|
||||
6) show_onboarding_prompt ;;
|
||||
7|8) show_proxmox_placeholder ;;
|
||||
9) run_tests ;;
|
||||
0) printf 'Goodbye.\n'; exit 0 ;;
|
||||
*) printf 'Invalid choice.\n'; pause ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
|
||||
+31
-459
@@ -1,439 +1,67 @@
|
||||
"""Sanctioned MCP daemon guards for imports and credential access (#558 / #695).
|
||||
"""Sanctioned MCP daemon guards for imports and credential access (#558).
|
||||
|
||||
Direct ``import gitea_mcp_server`` from a shell bypasses native MCP transport.
|
||||
#558 introduced a daemon marker; #695 hardens it so:
|
||||
Direct ``import gitea_mcp_server`` / ``import gitea_auth`` from a shell, plus
|
||||
raw keychain dumps, bypass preflight purity and role gates. Mutation helpers
|
||||
and keychain fallbacks therefore require an explicit sanctioned runtime.
|
||||
|
||||
- Environment variables alone cannot reconstruct a native session
|
||||
(``GITEA_MCP_SANCTIONED_DAEMON=1`` / ``GITEA_ALLOW_DIRECT_MCP_IMPORT=1`` are
|
||||
insufficient for mutation gates).
|
||||
- A process-local runtime record is established only by the resolved canonical
|
||||
entrypoint path (not basename) **and** the actual native MCP transport
|
||||
lifecycle (``bind_native_mcp_transport`` before ``mcp.run``). Merely
|
||||
importing or launching the entrypoint offline does not grant mutation
|
||||
authority.
|
||||
- Public caller-controlled flags (including any former
|
||||
``allow_test_bootstrap``) never establish trusted mutation provenance.
|
||||
- Offline scripts that import internals fail closed on mutations.
|
||||
- Pytest remains allowed for hermetic unit tests via ``is_pytest_runtime()``.
|
||||
A separate test-only seam may establish a **test-mode** native record for
|
||||
unit tests of transport gates; that record cannot authorize production
|
||||
Gitea mutation endpoints.
|
||||
Sanctioned contexts (any one):
|
||||
- ``GITEA_MCP_SANCTIONED_DAEMON=1`` (set by the official MCP entrypoint)
|
||||
- pytest (``PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST`` present)
|
||||
- explicit operator opt-in ``GITEA_ALLOW_DIRECT_MCP_IMPORT=1`` (tests/tools only)
|
||||
|
||||
Manual deletion of session-state files is never a recovery path.
|
||||
Credential keychain fill additionally allows:
|
||||
- ``GITEA_ALLOW_KEYCHAIN_CLI=1`` for operator-only non-MCP scripts that must
|
||||
use git-credential (never the default for LLM shells).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import inspect
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import secrets
|
||||
import time
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV = "GITEA_MCP_SANCTIONED_DAEMON"
|
||||
ALLOW_DIRECT_IMPORT_ENV = "GITEA_ALLOW_DIRECT_MCP_IMPORT"
|
||||
ALLOW_KEYCHAIN_CLI_ENV = "GITEA_ALLOW_KEYCHAIN_CLI"
|
||||
# Test-only: force provenance failure even under pytest (#695 regressions).
|
||||
FORCE_PROVENANCE_FAIL_ENV = "GITEA_TEST_FORCE_UNSANCTIONED"
|
||||
|
||||
# Process-local native runtime (never persisted, never read from env alone).
|
||||
_NATIVE_RUNTIME: dict[str, Any] | None = None
|
||||
|
||||
# Production transport identifiers accepted by bind_native_mcp_transport.
|
||||
_PRODUCTION_TRANSPORTS = frozenset({"stdio"})
|
||||
_RUNTIME_MODE_PRODUCTION = "production"
|
||||
_RUNTIME_MODE_TEST = "test"
|
||||
_PHASE_ENTRYPOINT_CLAIMED = "entrypoint_claimed"
|
||||
_PHASE_TRANSPORT_BOUND = "transport_bound"
|
||||
|
||||
# Default session-state root (mirrors mcp_session_state; kept local to avoid
|
||||
# import cycles). Used only to pin authority at transport bind (#695 AC2).
|
||||
_DEFAULT_SESSION_STATE_DIR = os.path.expanduser("~/.cache/gitea-tools/session-state")
|
||||
SESSION_STATE_DIR_ENV = "GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_DIR"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class UnsanctionedRuntimeError(RuntimeError):
|
||||
"""Raised when mutation/credential code runs outside a native MCP daemon."""
|
||||
"""Raised when mutation/credential code runs outside a sanctioned MCP daemon."""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_pytest_runtime() -> bool:
|
||||
if (os.environ.get(FORCE_PROVENANCE_FAIL_ENV) or "").strip() in {
|
||||
"1",
|
||||
"true",
|
||||
"yes",
|
||||
}:
|
||||
if os.environ.get("GITEA_TEST_FORCE_UNSANCTIONED") == "1":
|
||||
return False
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
|
||||
if "pytest" in sys.modules:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
return bool((os.environ.get("PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST") or "").strip())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _package_root() -> Path:
|
||||
"""Directory that contains the canonical MCP entrypoint modules."""
|
||||
return Path(__file__).resolve().parent
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def canonical_entrypoint_paths() -> frozenset[str]:
|
||||
"""Resolved absolute paths of official entrypoints (not basenames)."""
|
||||
root = _package_root()
|
||||
return frozenset(
|
||||
{
|
||||
str((root / "mcp_server.py").resolve()),
|
||||
str((root / "gitea_mcp_server.py").resolve()),
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _resolve_path(path: str | None) -> str | None:
|
||||
if not path:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return str(Path(path).resolve())
|
||||
except (OSError, RuntimeError, ValueError):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _caller_official_entrypoint_path() -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Return the resolved canonical entrypoint path in the call stack, or None.
|
||||
|
||||
Basename-only matches (e.g. an attacker file named ``mcp_server.py``
|
||||
elsewhere) are rejected. The path must equal one of
|
||||
:func:`canonical_entrypoint_paths`.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
canonical = canonical_entrypoint_paths()
|
||||
for frame in inspect.stack()[1:20]:
|
||||
resolved = _resolve_path(frame.filename)
|
||||
if resolved and resolved in canonical:
|
||||
return resolved
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _caller_is_official_entrypoint() -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when invoked from a resolved canonical entrypoint path (#695)."""
|
||||
return _caller_official_entrypoint_path() is not None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _new_runtime_token() -> tuple[str, str]:
|
||||
token = secrets.token_hex(32)
|
||||
fingerprint = hashlib.sha256(token.encode()).hexdigest()[:16]
|
||||
return token, fingerprint
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def mark_sanctioned_daemon() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Claim the official entrypoint for this process (#695).
|
||||
|
||||
This alone does **not** authorize mutations. Callers must subsequently
|
||||
bind the native MCP transport via :func:`bind_native_mcp_transport`.
|
||||
|
||||
Only a stack frame whose **resolved absolute path** is the canonical
|
||||
``mcp_server.py`` or ``gitea_mcp_server.py`` next to this module may
|
||||
claim the entrypoint. Basename spoofing is rejected.
|
||||
|
||||
There is no public ``allow_test_bootstrap`` argument: caller-controlled
|
||||
flags must never establish trusted mutation provenance. Hermetic tests
|
||||
use :func:`install_test_native_runtime` (pytest-only, test mode).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
global _NATIVE_RUNTIME
|
||||
if is_pytest_runtime():
|
||||
# Under pytest, production mark is a no-op for transport authority.
|
||||
# Tests that need a native-transport record use install_test_native_runtime.
|
||||
return native_runtime_status()
|
||||
|
||||
entrypoint_path = _caller_official_entrypoint_path()
|
||||
if entrypoint_path is None:
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
"mark_sanctioned_daemon rejected: not called from the resolved "
|
||||
"canonical MCP entrypoint path (#695). Basename-only names "
|
||||
"(e.g. a renamed runner called mcp_server.py) are insufficient. "
|
||||
"Offline import / standalone scripts cannot reconstruct native "
|
||||
"transport. Stop after native MCP failure; do not run offline "
|
||||
"mutation helpers."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
token, fingerprint = _new_runtime_token()
|
||||
_NATIVE_RUNTIME = {
|
||||
"token": token,
|
||||
"token_fingerprint": fingerprint,
|
||||
"pid": os.getpid(),
|
||||
"started_at": time.time(),
|
||||
"entrypoint": "mcp_server",
|
||||
"entrypoint_path": entrypoint_path,
|
||||
"phase": _PHASE_ENTRYPOINT_CLAIMED,
|
||||
"transport": None,
|
||||
"mode": _RUNTIME_MODE_PRODUCTION,
|
||||
}
|
||||
# Legacy signal for older probes; alone does not authorize mutations.
|
||||
os.environ[SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
return native_runtime_status()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def bind_native_mcp_transport(*, transport: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Bind the live native MCP transport lifecycle (#695).
|
||||
|
||||
Must be called from the resolved canonical entrypoint immediately before
|
||||
the real MCP server transport loop (e.g. ``mcp.run(transport=\"stdio\")``).
|
||||
Requires a prior successful :func:`mark_sanctioned_daemon` claim in this
|
||||
process. Import-only or offline launch without this bind leaves
|
||||
:func:`is_native_mcp_transport` false.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
global _NATIVE_RUNTIME
|
||||
transport_name = (transport or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if transport_name not in _PRODUCTION_TRANSPORTS:
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
f"bind_native_mcp_transport rejected: transport {transport!r} is "
|
||||
f"not a production MCP transport (#695). Allowed: "
|
||||
f"{sorted(_PRODUCTION_TRANSPORTS)}."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
entrypoint_path = _caller_official_entrypoint_path()
|
||||
if entrypoint_path is None:
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
"bind_native_mcp_transport rejected: not called from the resolved "
|
||||
"canonical MCP entrypoint path (#695)."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if _NATIVE_RUNTIME is None or int(_NATIVE_RUNTIME.get("pid") or -1) != os.getpid():
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
"bind_native_mcp_transport rejected: no entrypoint claim in this "
|
||||
"process (#695). Call mark_sanctioned_daemon() from the official "
|
||||
"entrypoint first."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if _NATIVE_RUNTIME.get("mode") != _RUNTIME_MODE_PRODUCTION:
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
"bind_native_mcp_transport rejected: runtime mode is not "
|
||||
"production (#695)."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
claimed = (_NATIVE_RUNTIME.get("entrypoint_path") or "").strip()
|
||||
if claimed and claimed != entrypoint_path:
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
"bind_native_mcp_transport rejected: entrypoint path mismatch "
|
||||
"between mark and bind (#695)."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Pin session-state root for this server lifetime (#695 AC2 / PR #701).
|
||||
# Changing GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_DIR after bind must not manufacture a
|
||||
# second authority domain for decision locks / workflow proofs.
|
||||
raw_state = (os.environ.get(SESSION_STATE_DIR_ENV) or "").strip()
|
||||
if not raw_state:
|
||||
raw_state = _DEFAULT_SESSION_STATE_DIR
|
||||
try:
|
||||
pinned_state = str(Path(raw_state).resolve())
|
||||
except (OSError, RuntimeError, ValueError):
|
||||
pinned_state = raw_state
|
||||
|
||||
_NATIVE_RUNTIME["phase"] = _PHASE_TRANSPORT_BOUND
|
||||
_NATIVE_RUNTIME["transport"] = transport_name
|
||||
_NATIVE_RUNTIME["entrypoint_path"] = entrypoint_path
|
||||
_NATIVE_RUNTIME["bound_at"] = time.time()
|
||||
_NATIVE_RUNTIME["session_state_dir"] = pinned_state
|
||||
os.environ[SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
return native_runtime_status()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def install_test_native_runtime() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Pytest-only seam for hermetic native-transport unit tests (#695).
|
||||
|
||||
Establishes a **test-mode** process-local record so unit tests can exercise
|
||||
gates that require ``is_native_mcp_transport()``. This record:
|
||||
|
||||
- is rejected outside pytest (including a fresh offline interpreter);
|
||||
- never uses production mode;
|
||||
- cannot authorize production Gitea mutation endpoints
|
||||
(:func:`assert_production_mutation_runtime` / production path of
|
||||
:func:`assert_sanctioned_mutation_runtime` when not under pytest).
|
||||
|
||||
There is no public caller-controlled flag that forges production native
|
||||
transport.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
global _NATIVE_RUNTIME
|
||||
if not is_pytest_runtime():
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
"install_test_native_runtime rejected: test-mode native runtime "
|
||||
"is only available under pytest (#695). allow_test_bootstrap and "
|
||||
"similar caller-controlled flags do not exist and cannot authorize "
|
||||
"a fresh offline interpreter."
|
||||
)
|
||||
token, fingerprint = _new_runtime_token()
|
||||
_NATIVE_RUNTIME = {
|
||||
"token": token,
|
||||
"token_fingerprint": fingerprint,
|
||||
"pid": os.getpid(),
|
||||
"started_at": time.time(),
|
||||
"entrypoint": "test_bootstrap",
|
||||
"entrypoint_path": None,
|
||||
"phase": _PHASE_TRANSPORT_BOUND,
|
||||
"transport": "test",
|
||||
"mode": _RUNTIME_MODE_TEST,
|
||||
"bound_at": time.time(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
return native_runtime_status()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def clear_native_runtime_for_tests() -> None:
|
||||
"""Test helper: drop native runtime (does not clear env)."""
|
||||
global _NATIVE_RUNTIME
|
||||
_NATIVE_RUNTIME = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def pinned_session_state_dir() -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Session-state root pinned for this production transport lifetime (#695 AC2).
|
||||
|
||||
When production native transport is bound, durable session proofs must use
|
||||
this directory only. Env overrides of ``GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_DIR`` after
|
||||
bind are ignored so redirected dirs (e.g. ``.mcp_session_701``) cannot
|
||||
manufacture independent decision-lock authority (PR #701 recurrence).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not is_production_native_mcp_transport():
|
||||
return None
|
||||
pinned = (_NATIVE_RUNTIME or {}).get("session_state_dir")
|
||||
text = (str(pinned) if pinned is not None else "").strip()
|
||||
return text or None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def direct_import_env_enabled() -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when the legacy direct-import opt-in env is set (never authorizes)."""
|
||||
return (os.environ.get(ALLOW_DIRECT_IMPORT_ENV) or "").strip().lower() in {
|
||||
"1",
|
||||
"true",
|
||||
"yes",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assert_no_direct_import_bypass(context: str = "mutation") -> None:
|
||||
"""Fail closed when GITEA_ALLOW_DIRECT_MCP_IMPORT is used for mutations (#695 AC1).
|
||||
|
||||
The env flag is never a sanctioned recovery path for LLM/agent sessions.
|
||||
Under pytest hermetic tests this is a no-op so unit tests can set the flag
|
||||
to prove it does not grant authority.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if is_pytest_runtime():
|
||||
return
|
||||
if not direct_import_env_enabled():
|
||||
return
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
f"{ALLOW_DIRECT_IMPORT_ENV} does not authorize {context} (#695 AC1). "
|
||||
"Direct import of gitea_mcp_server mutation tools is forbidden. "
|
||||
"Stop after native MCP failure; reconnect the official MCP daemon. "
|
||||
"Do not set direct-import flags, offline runners, or redirected "
|
||||
f"{SESSION_STATE_DIR_ENV} directories to reconstruct gates."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_native_mcp_transport() -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when this process holds a transport-bound native runtime (#695)."""
|
||||
if (os.environ.get(FORCE_PROVENANCE_FAIL_ENV) or "").strip() in {
|
||||
"1",
|
||||
"true",
|
||||
"yes",
|
||||
}:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if _NATIVE_RUNTIME is None:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if int(_NATIVE_RUNTIME.get("pid") or -1) != os.getpid():
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if not (_NATIVE_RUNTIME.get("token") or "").strip():
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if _NATIVE_RUNTIME.get("phase") != _PHASE_TRANSPORT_BOUND:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if not (_NATIVE_RUNTIME.get("transport") or "").strip():
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_production_native_mcp_transport() -> bool:
|
||||
"""True only for production-mode, transport-bound native runtime."""
|
||||
if not is_native_mcp_transport():
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return (_NATIVE_RUNTIME or {}).get("mode") == _RUNTIME_MODE_PRODUCTION
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_sanctioned_mcp_daemon() -> bool:
|
||||
"""Backward-compatible name; #695 requires native transport, not env alone."""
|
||||
if is_production_native_mcp_transport():
|
||||
if (os.environ.get(SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV) or "").strip() in {"1", "true", "yes"}:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
if (os.environ.get(ALLOW_DIRECT_IMPORT_ENV) or "").strip() in {"1", "true", "yes"}:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
if is_pytest_runtime():
|
||||
return True
|
||||
# Explicit direct-import override is for non-LLM operator/test tools only.
|
||||
# It is deliberately ignored when a native runtime is expected for mutations
|
||||
# under LLM sessions (tests use pytest path). Env alone never grants native.
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assert_production_mutation_runtime(context: str = "mutation") -> None:
|
||||
"""Fail closed unless production native MCP transport is bound (#695).
|
||||
|
||||
Test-mode bootstrap records and pytest-only hermetic allowances do **not**
|
||||
satisfy this gate. Use for production Gitea mutation endpoints that must
|
||||
never be reachable via test bootstrap.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if is_production_native_mcp_transport():
|
||||
return
|
||||
mode = (_NATIVE_RUNTIME or {}).get("mode")
|
||||
if mode == _RUNTIME_MODE_TEST:
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
f"Test-mode native runtime cannot authorize production {context} "
|
||||
"(#695). install_test_native_runtime / former allow_test_bootstrap "
|
||||
"must never reach real Gitea mutation endpoints."
|
||||
)
|
||||
assert_sanctioned_mutation_runtime(context)
|
||||
def mark_sanctioned_daemon() -> None:
|
||||
"""Call from the official MCP server entrypoint before serving tools."""
|
||||
os.environ[SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV] = "1"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assert_sanctioned_mutation_runtime(context: str = "mutation") -> None:
|
||||
"""Fail closed when mutation code runs outside native MCP transport (#695).
|
||||
|
||||
Under pytest, hermetic unit tests are allowed (profile/permission tests).
|
||||
Outside pytest, requires production-mode transport-bound native runtime.
|
||||
Test-mode records do not authorize non-pytest production mutations.
|
||||
``GITEA_ALLOW_DIRECT_MCP_IMPORT`` never authorizes mutations (#695 AC1).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if is_pytest_runtime():
|
||||
"""Fail closed when server mutation code is used outside the MCP daemon."""
|
||||
if is_sanctioned_mcp_daemon():
|
||||
return
|
||||
# AC1: direct-import env is never a mutation recovery path (PR #701).
|
||||
assert_no_direct_import_bypass(context)
|
||||
if is_production_native_mcp_transport():
|
||||
return
|
||||
mode = (_NATIVE_RUNTIME or {}).get("mode")
|
||||
if mode == _RUNTIME_MODE_TEST:
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
f"Test-mode native runtime cannot authorize production {context} "
|
||||
"(#695). Test bootstrap cannot reach production mutation endpoints."
|
||||
)
|
||||
env_spoof = (os.environ.get(SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV) or "").strip() in {
|
||||
"1",
|
||||
"true",
|
||||
"yes",
|
||||
}
|
||||
extra = ""
|
||||
if env_spoof:
|
||||
extra = (
|
||||
f" Note: {SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV} alone is not sufficient (#695); "
|
||||
"native transport requires the official MCP entrypoint and a live "
|
||||
"transport bind."
|
||||
)
|
||||
phase = (_NATIVE_RUNTIME or {}).get("phase")
|
||||
if phase == _PHASE_ENTRYPOINT_CLAIMED:
|
||||
extra = (
|
||||
(extra + " ") if extra else " "
|
||||
) + (
|
||||
"Entrypoint was claimed but native MCP transport was never bound "
|
||||
"(#695); offline launch/import of the real entrypoint does not "
|
||||
"grant mutation authority."
|
||||
)
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
f"Unsanctioned / non-native runtime blocked {context} (#695). "
|
||||
"Do not import gitea_mcp_server or call mutation helpers from a raw "
|
||||
"shell, offline runner, or ad-hoc script after native MCP failure. "
|
||||
"Stop and reconnect the official MCP daemon (mcp_server.py) over "
|
||||
"native transport. "
|
||||
f"Do not set {ALLOW_DIRECT_IMPORT_ENV}, override "
|
||||
f"{SESSION_STATE_DIR_ENV}, or use raw token env vars in LLM "
|
||||
f"sessions.{extra}"
|
||||
f"Unsanctioned runtime blocked {context} (#558). "
|
||||
"Do not import gitea_mcp_server / call mutation helpers from a raw "
|
||||
"shell or ad-hoc script. Use the official MCP daemon entrypoint "
|
||||
f"(sets {SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV}=1), or run under pytest. "
|
||||
f"Operator-only override: {ALLOW_DIRECT_IMPORT_ENV}=1 (not for LLM sessions)."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -441,77 +69,21 @@ def assert_keychain_access_allowed() -> None:
|
||||
"""Fail closed for git-credential keychain fill outside sanctioned contexts."""
|
||||
if is_sanctioned_mcp_daemon():
|
||||
return
|
||||
# Operator-only keychain CLI remains available outside LLM mutation path.
|
||||
if (os.environ.get(ALLOW_KEYCHAIN_CLI_ENV) or "").strip() in {"1", "true", "yes"}:
|
||||
if not is_pytest_runtime():
|
||||
# Still block pure env spoof of SANCTIONED_DAEMON for keychain when
|
||||
# FORCE is set for tests.
|
||||
if (os.environ.get(FORCE_PROVENANCE_FAIL_ENV) or "").strip() in {
|
||||
"1",
|
||||
"true",
|
||||
"yes",
|
||||
}:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
else:
|
||||
return
|
||||
raise UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
"Unsanctioned keychain/credential fill blocked (#558/#695). "
|
||||
"Unsanctioned keychain/credential fill blocked (#558). "
|
||||
"Token extraction via git-credential is only allowed inside the "
|
||||
f"official native MCP daemon or with explicit operator opt-in "
|
||||
f"{ALLOW_KEYCHAIN_CLI_ENV}=1 (never for offline mutation runners)."
|
||||
f"official MCP daemon ({SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV}=1), pytest, or with "
|
||||
f"explicit operator opt-in {ALLOW_KEYCHAIN_CLI_ENV}=1."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def native_runtime_status() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""LLM-safe native runtime status (no raw token)."""
|
||||
rt = _NATIVE_RUNTIME or {}
|
||||
def runtime_status() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"native_mcp_transport": is_native_mcp_transport(),
|
||||
"production_native_mcp_transport": is_production_native_mcp_transport(),
|
||||
"sanctioned_daemon": is_sanctioned_mcp_daemon(),
|
||||
"pytest": is_pytest_runtime(),
|
||||
"pid": rt.get("pid"),
|
||||
"token_fingerprint": rt.get("token_fingerprint"),
|
||||
"started_at": rt.get("started_at"),
|
||||
"entrypoint": rt.get("entrypoint"),
|
||||
"entrypoint_path": rt.get("entrypoint_path"),
|
||||
"phase": rt.get("phase"),
|
||||
"transport": rt.get("transport"),
|
||||
"mode": rt.get("mode"),
|
||||
"session_state_dir": pinned_session_state_dir() or rt.get("session_state_dir"),
|
||||
"session_state_dir_pinned": pinned_session_state_dir() is not None,
|
||||
"direct_import_env_set": direct_import_env_enabled(),
|
||||
"env_sanctioned_alone_insufficient": True,
|
||||
"sanctioned_env": SANCTIONED_DAEMON_ENV,
|
||||
"allow_direct_import_env": ALLOW_DIRECT_IMPORT_ENV,
|
||||
"session_state_dir_env": SESSION_STATE_DIR_ENV,
|
||||
"allow_keychain_cli_env": ALLOW_KEYCHAIN_CLI_ENV,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def runtime_status() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Backward-compatible status payload."""
|
||||
status = native_runtime_status()
|
||||
status["sanctioned_daemon"] = is_sanctioned_mcp_daemon()
|
||||
return status
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def mutation_provenance_fields() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Fields to attach to live mutation / review audit records (#695 AC6)."""
|
||||
st = native_runtime_status()
|
||||
transport = "native_mcp" if st["native_mcp_transport"] else "untrusted"
|
||||
if st.get("mode") == _RUNTIME_MODE_TEST and st["native_mcp_transport"]:
|
||||
transport = "test_native_mcp"
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"transport": transport,
|
||||
"native_mcp_transport": bool(st["native_mcp_transport"]),
|
||||
"production_native_mcp_transport": bool(
|
||||
st.get("production_native_mcp_transport")
|
||||
),
|
||||
"native_runtime_pid": st.get("pid"),
|
||||
"native_token_fingerprint": st.get("token_fingerprint"),
|
||||
"entrypoint": st.get("entrypoint"),
|
||||
"phase": st.get("phase"),
|
||||
"mode": st.get("mode"),
|
||||
"session_state_dir": st.get("session_state_dir"),
|
||||
"session_state_dir_pinned": bool(st.get("session_state_dir_pinned")),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@ from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
AUTHORIZED_CLEANUP_TOOLS = frozenset({
|
||||
"gitea_cleanup_post_merge_moot_lease",
|
||||
"gitea_cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease",
|
||||
"gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups",
|
||||
"gitea_delete_branch",
|
||||
"gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
|
||||
|
||||
+3
-5
@@ -41,17 +41,15 @@ def check_conflict_markers():
|
||||
|
||||
check_conflict_markers()
|
||||
|
||||
# #558 / #695: claim the official entrypoint before loading mutation modules.
|
||||
# This alone does NOT authorize mutations — gitea_mcp_server binds the live
|
||||
# native MCP transport (stdio) immediately before mcp.run. Import-only or
|
||||
# offline launch without that bind fails closed on mutations.
|
||||
# #558: official entrypoint marks the process as the sanctioned MCP daemon
|
||||
# before loading mutation modules (blocks raw shell import bypasses).
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import mcp_daemon_guard
|
||||
|
||||
mcp_daemon_guard.mark_sanctioned_daemon()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# Guard import failures must not hide conflict-marker infra_stop above;
|
||||
# gitea_mcp_server main also marks + binds when run as __main__.
|
||||
# gitea_mcp_server main also marks sanctioned when run as __main__.
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
# Execute the actual server logic via exec in this namespace.
|
||||
|
||||
+8
-458
@@ -36,43 +36,7 @@ KIND_REVIEW_DRAFT = "review_draft"
|
||||
# other session proofs; a contaminated session fails closed on gated mutations
|
||||
# until a reconciler audits and clears it.
|
||||
KIND_STABLE_BRANCH_CONTAMINATION = "stable_branch_contamination"
|
||||
# Durable shadow of the in-memory reviewer session lease (#702). Written on
|
||||
# every sanctioned record/heartbeat and removed on sanctioned clear, so a
|
||||
# daemon that dies without teardown leaves provable orphan evidence (owner
|
||||
# pid + session id) for the guarded lease-cleanup path. Never a substitute
|
||||
# for the in-session lease: mutation gates ignore it.
|
||||
KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE = "reviewer_session_lease"
|
||||
# Durable audit record written whenever the daemon's sanctioned stale-binding
|
||||
# recovery clears an inherited GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE binding (#702).
|
||||
KIND_STALE_BINDING_RECOVERY = "stale_binding_recovery"
|
||||
# #709: archive prior terminal decision ledgers instead of silent overwrite.
|
||||
KIND_DECISION_LOCK_ARCHIVE = "review_decision_lock_archive"
|
||||
# #709: post-merge cleanup/audit reconciliation-required durable record.
|
||||
KIND_POST_MERGE_DECISION_RECOVERY = "post_merge_decision_recovery"
|
||||
# #709: truthful record when historical terminal evidence is irrecoverably gone.
|
||||
KIND_IRRECOVERABLE_DECISION_PROVENANCE = "irrecoverable_decision_provenance"
|
||||
# #709 F1: server-side non-forgeable authorization artifact for recovery.
|
||||
KIND_IRRECOVERABLE_PROVENANCE_AUTH = "irrecoverable_provenance_authorization"
|
||||
|
||||
# Kinds that must survive the default session-state TTL (forensic / recovery).
|
||||
#
|
||||
# KIND_DECISION_LOCK is recovery-critical (#720): terminal review provenance is
|
||||
# not disposable cache. A generic four-hour TTL must not drop old-head evidence
|
||||
# or make ``fresh_review_on_current_head_allowed`` unreachable. Same-head / same-
|
||||
# run #332 protections still apply once the ledger is loadable. Other session
|
||||
# kinds (workflow load, drafts, etc.) remain TTL-bound.
|
||||
RECOVERY_CRITICAL_KINDS = frozenset(
|
||||
{
|
||||
KIND_DECISION_LOCK,
|
||||
KIND_DECISION_LOCK_ARCHIVE,
|
||||
KIND_POST_MERGE_DECISION_RECOVERY,
|
||||
KIND_IRRECOVERABLE_DECISION_PROVENANCE,
|
||||
KIND_IRRECOVERABLE_PROVENANCE_AUTH,
|
||||
# #702 crash-orphan evidence (must outlive TTL; F4)
|
||||
KIND_REVIEWER_SESSION_LEASE,
|
||||
KIND_STALE_BINDING_RECOVERY,
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_SAFE_SEGMENT_RE = re.compile(r"[^A-Za-z0-9._+-]+")
|
||||
@@ -80,34 +44,6 @@ SESSION_PROFILE_LOCK_ENV = "GITEA_SESSION_PROFILE_LOCK"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def default_state_dir() -> str:
|
||||
"""Resolve the durable session-state root.
|
||||
|
||||
When production native MCP transport is bound (#695 AC2), the directory
|
||||
pinned at transport bind is authoritative: later overrides of
|
||||
``GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_DIR`` cannot manufacture a second authority
|
||||
domain (PR #701 recurrence: ``.mcp_session_701`` evasion of cross-PR
|
||||
decision locks).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import mcp_daemon_guard
|
||||
|
||||
pinned = mcp_daemon_guard.pinned_session_state_dir()
|
||||
if pinned:
|
||||
return pinned
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# Fail open to env/default only when guard is unavailable (e.g. partial
|
||||
# import during bootstrap). Mutation gates still fail closed separately.
|
||||
pass
|
||||
raw = (os.environ.get(STATE_DIR_ENV) or DEFAULT_STATE_DIR).strip()
|
||||
return raw or DEFAULT_STATE_DIR
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def env_session_state_dir_unpinned() -> str:
|
||||
"""Raw env/default session-state dir ignoring production transport pin.
|
||||
|
||||
Intended for diagnostics and tests that assert pin behavior — not for
|
||||
mutation-sensitive durable proofs under a bound native daemon.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
raw = (os.environ.get(STATE_DIR_ENV) or DEFAULT_STATE_DIR).strip()
|
||||
return raw or DEFAULT_STATE_DIR
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -150,7 +86,6 @@ def state_key(
|
||||
org: str | None = None,
|
||||
repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
instance_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> str:
|
||||
"""Build durable filename key.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -158,20 +93,17 @@ def state_key(
|
||||
so the primary key is kind + profile identity. Remote/org/repo are stored
|
||||
inside the payload and validated on load (#559), which lets a later daemon
|
||||
process recover state without already knowing the remote argument.
|
||||
|
||||
*instance_id* extends the key for kinds where one-per-profile collides —
|
||||
concurrent same-profile sessions each own their reviewer-lease shadow
|
||||
(#702 F5), keyed by their lease session id so a later heartbeat can never
|
||||
overwrite or misattribute another session's crash evidence.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
# Keep remote/org/repo parameters for API stability / future kinds; they are
|
||||
# intentionally not part of the filename for session-scoped proofs.
|
||||
_ = (remote, org, repo)
|
||||
parts = [kind, profile_identity or "unknown-profile"]
|
||||
instance = (instance_id or "").strip()
|
||||
if instance:
|
||||
parts.append(instance)
|
||||
return "-".join(_sanitize_segment(part) for part in parts)
|
||||
return "-".join(
|
||||
_sanitize_segment(part)
|
||||
for part in (
|
||||
kind,
|
||||
profile_identity or "unknown-profile",
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def state_file_path(
|
||||
@@ -182,7 +114,6 @@ def state_file_path(
|
||||
repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
state_dir: str | None = None,
|
||||
instance_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> str:
|
||||
root = (state_dir or default_state_dir()).strip()
|
||||
name = state_key(
|
||||
@@ -191,7 +122,6 @@ def state_file_path(
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
profile_identity=profile_identity,
|
||||
instance_id=instance_id,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return os.path.join(root, f"{name}.json")
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -270,16 +200,6 @@ def _write_json(path: str, data: dict[str, Any]) -> None:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_recovery_critical_record(record: dict[str, Any] | None, kind: str | None = None) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when a durable record must outlive the generic session-state TTL."""
|
||||
if not record and not kind:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
record_kind = ((record or {}).get("kind") or kind or "").strip()
|
||||
if record_kind in RECOVERY_CRITICAL_KINDS:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
return bool((record or {}).get("recovery_critical"))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def identity_match_reasons(
|
||||
record: dict[str, Any] | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
@@ -322,9 +242,7 @@ def identity_match_reasons(
|
||||
reasons.append("session state missing recorded_at timestamp (fail closed)")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
age = _now_utc() - recorded_at
|
||||
kind = (record.get("kind") or "").strip()
|
||||
ttl_exempt = is_recovery_critical_record(record, kind=kind)
|
||||
if age > timedelta(hours=ttl_hours()) and not ttl_exempt:
|
||||
if age > timedelta(hours=ttl_hours()):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"session state expired after {ttl_hours():g}h (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -333,113 +251,6 @@ def identity_match_reasons(
|
||||
return reasons
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def inspect_state_envelope(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
kind: str,
|
||||
remote: str | None = None,
|
||||
org: str | None = None,
|
||||
repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
state_dir: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Read-only disk inspection for assessment when TTL would otherwise hide state (#720).
|
||||
|
||||
Does **not** apply identity/TTL rejection to the returned presence flags.
|
||||
Callers use this to distinguish:
|
||||
* no file on disk
|
||||
* file present but TTL would reject a non-critical kind
|
||||
* recovery-critical ledger (e.g. KIND_DECISION_LOCK) still loadable
|
||||
Never mutates files. Never returns secrets.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
profile = current_profile_identity(profile_identity=profile_identity)
|
||||
path = state_file_path(
|
||||
kind=kind,
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
profile_identity=profile,
|
||||
state_dir=state_dir,
|
||||
)
|
||||
result: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"kind": kind,
|
||||
"profile_identity": profile,
|
||||
"path_basename": os.path.basename(path),
|
||||
"on_disk": False,
|
||||
"has_payload": False,
|
||||
"recorded_at": None,
|
||||
"updated_at": None,
|
||||
"age_hours": None,
|
||||
"ttl_hours": ttl_hours(),
|
||||
"age_exceeds_default_ttl": False,
|
||||
"recovery_critical": kind in RECOVERY_CRITICAL_KINDS,
|
||||
"ttl_exempt": kind in RECOVERY_CRITICAL_KINDS,
|
||||
"would_ttl_reject": False,
|
||||
"identity_reasons": [],
|
||||
"summary": "no session-state file on disk",
|
||||
}
|
||||
if not path or not os.path.exists(path):
|
||||
return result
|
||||
result["on_disk"] = True
|
||||
envelope = _read_json(path)
|
||||
if not envelope:
|
||||
result["summary"] = "session-state file present but unreadable or empty"
|
||||
return result
|
||||
payload = envelope.get("payload")
|
||||
merged: dict[str, Any] = dict(payload) if isinstance(payload, dict) else {}
|
||||
result["has_payload"] = isinstance(payload, dict)
|
||||
for key in (
|
||||
"kind",
|
||||
"remote",
|
||||
"org",
|
||||
"repo",
|
||||
"profile_identity",
|
||||
"session_profile_lock",
|
||||
"recorded_at",
|
||||
"updated_at",
|
||||
"writer_pid",
|
||||
"recovery_critical",
|
||||
):
|
||||
if key in envelope and key not in merged:
|
||||
merged[key] = envelope[key]
|
||||
if not merged.get("kind"):
|
||||
merged["kind"] = kind
|
||||
recorded_at = _parse_iso(merged.get("recorded_at") or merged.get("updated_at"))
|
||||
result["recorded_at"] = merged.get("recorded_at") or merged.get("updated_at")
|
||||
result["updated_at"] = merged.get("updated_at") or merged.get("recorded_at")
|
||||
if recorded_at is not None:
|
||||
age = _now_utc() - recorded_at
|
||||
age_hours = age.total_seconds() / 3600.0
|
||||
result["age_hours"] = age_hours
|
||||
result["age_exceeds_default_ttl"] = age > timedelta(hours=ttl_hours())
|
||||
ttl_exempt = is_recovery_critical_record(merged, kind=kind)
|
||||
result["recovery_critical"] = ttl_exempt
|
||||
result["ttl_exempt"] = ttl_exempt
|
||||
identity_reasons = identity_match_reasons(
|
||||
merged,
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
profile_identity=profile,
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["identity_reasons"] = list(identity_reasons)
|
||||
result["would_ttl_reject"] = any("expired" in r for r in identity_reasons)
|
||||
if result["has_payload"] and ttl_exempt:
|
||||
result["summary"] = (
|
||||
"recovery-critical session-state present on disk and TTL-exempt; "
|
||||
"load via load_state for full payload"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif result["has_payload"] and result["would_ttl_reject"]:
|
||||
result["summary"] = (
|
||||
"session-state file present on disk but generic TTL would reject load "
|
||||
f"(age_hours={result.get('age_hours')!r}, ttl={ttl_hours():g}h)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif result["has_payload"]:
|
||||
result["summary"] = "session-state file present and within TTL / identity gates"
|
||||
else:
|
||||
result["summary"] = "session-state file present without a dict payload"
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def load_state(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
kind: str,
|
||||
@@ -448,7 +259,6 @@ def load_state(
|
||||
repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
state_dir: str | None = None,
|
||||
instance_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
"""Load durable state payload when identity checks pass."""
|
||||
profile = current_profile_identity(profile_identity=profile_identity)
|
||||
@@ -459,7 +269,6 @@ def load_state(
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
profile_identity=profile,
|
||||
state_dir=state_dir,
|
||||
instance_id=instance_id,
|
||||
)
|
||||
lock_path = f"{path}.lock"
|
||||
with _exclusive_file_lock(lock_path):
|
||||
@@ -505,7 +314,6 @@ def save_state(
|
||||
repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
state_dir: str | None = None,
|
||||
instance_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
"""Persist or clear durable state for the given session identity key."""
|
||||
profile = current_profile_identity(
|
||||
@@ -518,11 +326,6 @@ def save_state(
|
||||
key_remote = remote if remote is not None else (payload or {}).get("remote")
|
||||
key_org = org if org is not None else (payload or {}).get("org")
|
||||
key_repo = repo if repo is not None else (payload or {}).get("repo")
|
||||
key_instance = (
|
||||
(instance_id or "").strip()
|
||||
or str((payload or {}).get("instance_id") or "").strip()
|
||||
or None
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
root = _ensure_state_dir(state_dir)
|
||||
path = state_file_path(
|
||||
@@ -532,7 +335,6 @@ def save_state(
|
||||
repo=key_repo,
|
||||
profile_identity=profile,
|
||||
state_dir=root,
|
||||
instance_id=key_instance,
|
||||
)
|
||||
lock_path = f"{path}.lock"
|
||||
with _exclusive_file_lock(lock_path):
|
||||
@@ -560,28 +362,6 @@ def save_state(
|
||||
body["org"] = key_org
|
||||
if key_repo is not None:
|
||||
body["repo"] = key_repo
|
||||
# Stamp session-state authority used for this write (#695 AC2 / AC6).
|
||||
body.setdefault("session_state_dir", root)
|
||||
if key_instance:
|
||||
body["instance_id"] = key_instance
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import mcp_daemon_guard
|
||||
|
||||
prov = mcp_daemon_guard.mutation_provenance_fields()
|
||||
body.setdefault(
|
||||
"native_token_fingerprint", prov.get("native_token_fingerprint")
|
||||
)
|
||||
body.setdefault(
|
||||
"native_mcp_transport", bool(prov.get("native_mcp_transport"))
|
||||
)
|
||||
body.setdefault(
|
||||
"production_native_mcp_transport",
|
||||
bool(prov.get("production_native_mcp_transport")),
|
||||
)
|
||||
body.setdefault("transport", prov.get("transport"))
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
body.setdefault("native_mcp_transport", False)
|
||||
body.setdefault("transport", "untrusted")
|
||||
|
||||
envelope = {
|
||||
"kind": kind,
|
||||
@@ -593,12 +373,8 @@ def save_state(
|
||||
"recorded_at": body["recorded_at"],
|
||||
"updated_at": body["updated_at"],
|
||||
"writer_pid": body["writer_pid"],
|
||||
"session_state_dir": body.get("session_state_dir"),
|
||||
"transport": body.get("transport"),
|
||||
"payload": body,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if key_instance:
|
||||
envelope["instance_id"] = key_instance
|
||||
_write_json(path, envelope)
|
||||
return dict(body)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -611,7 +387,6 @@ def clear_state(
|
||||
repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
state_dir: str | None = None,
|
||||
instance_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
save_state(
|
||||
kind=kind,
|
||||
@@ -621,229 +396,4 @@ def clear_state(
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
profile_identity=profile_identity,
|
||||
state_dir=state_dir,
|
||||
instance_id=instance_id,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def list_states(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
kind: str,
|
||||
profile_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
state_dir: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
|
||||
"""Enumerate durable records of *kind* across all instance keys.
|
||||
|
||||
Crash recovery cannot know which session id left a shadow behind, so it
|
||||
must be able to enumerate every record of a kind (#702 F5). Identity
|
||||
checks (profile / TTL policy) apply per record exactly as in
|
||||
:func:`load_state`; records that fail closed are omitted.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
root = (state_dir or default_state_dir()).strip()
|
||||
if not root or not os.path.isdir(root):
|
||||
return []
|
||||
profile = current_profile_identity(profile_identity=profile_identity)
|
||||
results: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
try:
|
||||
names = sorted(os.listdir(root))
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
for name in names:
|
||||
if not name.endswith(".json") or name.startswith("."):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
envelope = _read_json(os.path.join(root, name))
|
||||
if not envelope or envelope.get("kind") != kind:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
payload = envelope.get("payload")
|
||||
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
merged = dict(payload)
|
||||
for key in (
|
||||
"kind",
|
||||
"remote",
|
||||
"org",
|
||||
"repo",
|
||||
"profile_identity",
|
||||
"session_profile_lock",
|
||||
"recorded_at",
|
||||
"updated_at",
|
||||
"writer_pid",
|
||||
):
|
||||
if key in envelope and key not in merged:
|
||||
merged[key] = envelope[key]
|
||||
if identity_match_reasons(merged, profile_identity=profile):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
results.append(merged)
|
||||
return results
|
||||
|
||||
def list_decision_lock_profile_identities(
|
||||
state_dir: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Return profile identities that have a durable review_decision_lock file (#709).
|
||||
|
||||
Filename form: ``review_decision_lock-<profile>.json`` (see ``state_key``).
|
||||
Does not validate TTL or identity — callers must load via ``load_state``.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
root = (state_dir or default_state_dir()).strip()
|
||||
if not root or not os.path.isdir(root):
|
||||
return []
|
||||
prefix = f"{_sanitize_segment(KIND_DECISION_LOCK)}-"
|
||||
suffix = ".json"
|
||||
found: list[str] = []
|
||||
try:
|
||||
names = os.listdir(root)
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
for name in names:
|
||||
if not name.startswith(prefix) or not name.endswith(suffix):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if name.endswith(".lock"):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
mid = name[len(prefix) : -len(suffix)]
|
||||
if mid:
|
||||
found.append(mid)
|
||||
return sorted(set(found))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def load_state_for_profile(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
kind: str,
|
||||
profile_identity: str,
|
||||
remote: str | None = None,
|
||||
org: str | None = None,
|
||||
repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
state_dir: str | None = None,
|
||||
skip_identity_match: bool = False,
|
||||
enforce_repo_scope: bool = True,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
"""Load durable state for an explicit profile identity (#709 cross-profile).
|
||||
|
||||
When *skip_identity_match* is True, still requires the file's recorded
|
||||
profile_identity to equal the requested profile (anti-stomp), but does not
|
||||
require the *active* session identity to match — needed so a merger can
|
||||
inspect a reviewer lock after merge.
|
||||
|
||||
#709 F3: remote/org/repo filter reasons are **enforced** (not merely
|
||||
computed). When *enforce_repo_scope* is True (default) and the caller
|
||||
supplies remote/org/repo, mismatches fail closed with ``None``.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
# #709 F3: refuse traversal / malformed profile identities.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
from irrecoverable_provenance import assess_profile_path_identity
|
||||
|
||||
path_gate = assess_profile_path_identity(profile_identity)
|
||||
if not path_gate.get("valid"):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# Module may be mid-import in edge bootstraps; fall through to
|
||||
# conservative checks below.
|
||||
raw = str(profile_identity or "")
|
||||
if ".." in raw or "/" in raw or "\\" in raw or "\x00" in raw:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
profile = current_profile_identity(profile_identity=profile_identity)
|
||||
root = _ensure_state_dir(state_dir)
|
||||
# Refuse symlink escape of the state root (#709 F3).
|
||||
try:
|
||||
real_root = os.path.realpath(root)
|
||||
path = state_file_path(
|
||||
kind=kind,
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
profile_identity=profile,
|
||||
state_dir=root,
|
||||
)
|
||||
real_path = os.path.realpath(path) if os.path.exists(path) else path
|
||||
if os.path.exists(path) and not str(real_path).startswith(
|
||||
str(real_root) + os.sep
|
||||
) and str(real_path) != str(real_root):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
path = state_file_path(
|
||||
kind=kind,
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
profile_identity=profile,
|
||||
state_dir=root,
|
||||
)
|
||||
lock_path = f"{path}.lock"
|
||||
with _exclusive_file_lock(lock_path):
|
||||
envelope = _read_json(path)
|
||||
if not envelope:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
payload = envelope.get("payload")
|
||||
if not isinstance(payload, dict):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
merged = dict(payload)
|
||||
for key in (
|
||||
"kind",
|
||||
"remote",
|
||||
"org",
|
||||
"repo",
|
||||
"profile_identity",
|
||||
"session_profile_lock",
|
||||
"recorded_at",
|
||||
"updated_at",
|
||||
"writer_pid",
|
||||
):
|
||||
if key in envelope and key not in merged:
|
||||
merged[key] = envelope[key]
|
||||
stored = (merged.get("profile_identity") or "").strip()
|
||||
if stored and stored != profile:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if skip_identity_match:
|
||||
# Enforce remote/org/repo when caller provides them (#709 F3).
|
||||
# Drop only *active session* profile-identity mismatches; keep
|
||||
# expiry, spoof, and repository-scope reasons.
|
||||
scope_remote = remote if enforce_repo_scope else None
|
||||
scope_org = org if enforce_repo_scope else None
|
||||
scope_repo = repo if enforce_repo_scope else None
|
||||
reasons = identity_match_reasons(
|
||||
merged,
|
||||
remote=scope_remote,
|
||||
org=scope_org,
|
||||
repo=scope_repo,
|
||||
profile_identity=stored or profile,
|
||||
)
|
||||
filtered = [
|
||||
r
|
||||
for r in reasons
|
||||
if "profile identity mismatch" not in r
|
||||
or (stored and stored != profile)
|
||||
]
|
||||
# When caller requested a specific remote/org/repo, also fail if the
|
||||
# stored record lacks those identity fields entirely (legacy incomplete).
|
||||
if enforce_repo_scope:
|
||||
for field, want in (
|
||||
("remote", remote),
|
||||
("org", org),
|
||||
("repo", repo),
|
||||
):
|
||||
want_s = (want or "").strip()
|
||||
if not want_s:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
have = (str(merged.get(field) or "")).strip()
|
||||
if not have:
|
||||
filtered.append(
|
||||
f"session state {field} missing on durable record "
|
||||
f"(expected={want_s!r}; fail closed, #709 F3)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif have != want_s:
|
||||
# identity_match_reasons already adds mismatch; ensure kept
|
||||
pass
|
||||
if filtered:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return merged
|
||||
reasons = identity_match_reasons(
|
||||
merged,
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
profile_identity=profile,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if reasons:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return merged
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,634 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""MCP tool-boundary error mapping for known Gitea client failures (#699).
|
||||
|
||||
Known authentication / authorization / network / configuration failures leave
|
||||
the tool boundary as a sanitized structured ``CallToolResult`` with
|
||||
``isError=True``. Stdio transport remains connected.
|
||||
|
||||
Design constraints (reviewer-ratified, #699 / PR #701):
|
||||
|
||||
1. **No secret material** in tool results or daemon logs. Messages are fixed
|
||||
constants keyed by ``reason_code``; HTTP bodies / exception text never
|
||||
surface. Sanitization failure fails closed to ``internal_error``.
|
||||
2. **Narrow boundary** wraps the original FastMCP ``Tool.run`` success path;
|
||||
re-raises framework control-flow exceptions (``UrlElicitationRequiredError``);
|
||||
maps only typed client failures. Installation is idempotent.
|
||||
3. **No RuntimeError substring heuristics.** Only explicit typed
|
||||
authentication / authorization / network / configuration exceptions
|
||||
receive those labels.
|
||||
4. **HTTP classification** lives in ``gitea_auth.classify_http_status``;
|
||||
every 403 is authorization-class.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import logging
|
||||
import re
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
logger = logging.getLogger("gitea_mcp.tool_error_boundary")
|
||||
|
||||
# Stable reason codes (#699).
|
||||
REASON_AUTH_FAILED = "auth_failed"
|
||||
REASON_AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN = "auth_invalid_token"
|
||||
REASON_AUTHZ_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE = "authz_insufficient_scope"
|
||||
REASON_AUTHZ_DENIED = "authz_denied"
|
||||
REASON_NETWORK_ERROR = "network_error"
|
||||
REASON_CONFIG_ERROR = "config_error"
|
||||
REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR = "internal_error"
|
||||
REASON_UPSTREAM_UNAVAILABLE = "upstream_unavailable"
|
||||
REASON_HTTP_ERROR = "http_error"
|
||||
# Typed structured errors for previously-opaque raw mutation failures.
|
||||
REASON_PREFLIGHT_ORDER = "preflight_order_violation"
|
||||
REASON_MALFORMED_RESPONSE = "malformed_response"
|
||||
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION = "authentication"
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION = "authorization"
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_NETWORK = "network"
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_CONFIGURATION = "configuration"
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL = "internal"
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_UPSTREAM = "upstream"
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_PRECONDITION = "precondition"
|
||||
|
||||
# Fixed, secret-free operator messages. Never interpolate HTTP bodies,
|
||||
# Keychain contents, tokens, or arbitrary exception text.
|
||||
FIXED_MESSAGES: dict[str, str] = {
|
||||
REASON_AUTH_FAILED: "Gitea authentication failed",
|
||||
REASON_AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN: (
|
||||
"Gitea authentication failed: invalid or revoked credentials"
|
||||
),
|
||||
REASON_AUTHZ_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE: (
|
||||
"Gitea authorization failed: insufficient token scope"
|
||||
),
|
||||
REASON_AUTHZ_DENIED: "Gitea authorization failed: access denied",
|
||||
REASON_NETWORK_ERROR: "Network error contacting Gitea",
|
||||
REASON_CONFIG_ERROR: "Gitea configuration or credential resolution failed",
|
||||
REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR: "Internal tool error",
|
||||
REASON_UPSTREAM_UNAVAILABLE: "Gitea upstream unavailable",
|
||||
REASON_HTTP_ERROR: "Gitea HTTP request failed",
|
||||
REASON_PREFLIGHT_ORDER: (
|
||||
"Mutation blocked: pre-flight order violation (fail closed)"
|
||||
),
|
||||
REASON_MALFORMED_RESPONSE: "Malformed response from Gitea",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Error class for a self-declared safe reason code (``gitea_reason_code``).
|
||||
_REASON_ERROR_CLASS: dict[str, str] = {
|
||||
REASON_AUTH_FAILED: ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION,
|
||||
REASON_AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN: ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION,
|
||||
REASON_AUTHZ_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE: ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION,
|
||||
REASON_AUTHZ_DENIED: ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION,
|
||||
REASON_NETWORK_ERROR: ERROR_CLASS_NETWORK,
|
||||
REASON_CONFIG_ERROR: ERROR_CLASS_CONFIGURATION,
|
||||
REASON_UPSTREAM_UNAVAILABLE: ERROR_CLASS_UPSTREAM,
|
||||
REASON_HTTP_ERROR: ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
|
||||
REASON_PREFLIGHT_ORDER: ERROR_CLASS_PRECONDITION,
|
||||
REASON_MALFORMED_RESPONSE: ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
|
||||
REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR: ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Bounds for the safe diagnostic fields added to the ``internal_error`` path.
|
||||
_DETAIL_LIMIT = 200
|
||||
_CLASS_LIMIT = 120
|
||||
_STAGE_LIMIT = 64
|
||||
|
||||
# Absolute-path prefixes stripped from diagnostic detail (never leak layout).
|
||||
_ABS_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"/(?:Users|home|private|var|tmp|opt|etc|root)/[^\s'\"]*")
|
||||
_DETAIL_SECRET_PREFIXES = ("token ", "Basic ", "Bearer ", "Authorization: ")
|
||||
_SECRET_KEY = (
|
||||
r"token|password|passwd|secret|authorization|api[_-]?key|"
|
||||
r"access[_-]?token|refresh[_-]?token|session|cookie"
|
||||
)
|
||||
_SECRET_JSON_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r'"(' + _SECRET_KEY + r')"\s*:\s*"[^"]*"', re.IGNORECASE
|
||||
)
|
||||
_SECRET_KV_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"\b(" + _SECRET_KEY + r")\s*=\s*[^\s&\"']+", re.IGNORECASE
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
_MUTATION_STAGE_ATTR = "_gitea_mutation_stage"
|
||||
_SELF_DECLARED_REASON_ATTR = "gitea_reason_code"
|
||||
|
||||
_INSTALL_FLAG = "_gitea_auth_boundary_installed"
|
||||
_ORIGINAL_ATTR = "_gitea_auth_boundary_original"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _safe_str(exc: BaseException) -> str:
|
||||
"""``str(exc)`` that never raises (a poisoned ``__str__`` must not escape)."""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return str(exc)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _safe_exception_class(exc: BaseException) -> str:
|
||||
"""Fully-qualified type identifier for *exc* — never instance/message text."""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
t = type(exc)
|
||||
mod = getattr(t, "__module__", "") or ""
|
||||
name = getattr(t, "__qualname__", None) or getattr(t, "__name__", "") or ""
|
||||
ident = f"{mod}.{name}" if mod else name
|
||||
return ident[:_CLASS_LIMIT]
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return "unknown"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _redact_detail(text: Any, limit: int = _DETAIL_LIMIT) -> str:
|
||||
"""Strictly redact free-form exception text for safe diagnostics.
|
||||
|
||||
Removes token/Authorization credentials, raw URLs and hostnames (via the
|
||||
shared audit redactor), and absolute filesystem paths, then collapses
|
||||
whitespace and truncates. Never raises; on any failure returns "".
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not text:
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
out = str(text)
|
||||
# Drop credential-prefixed runs (token/Basic/Bearer/Authorization).
|
||||
for prefix in _DETAIL_SECRET_PREFIXES:
|
||||
idx = 0
|
||||
while True:
|
||||
i = out.find(prefix, idx)
|
||||
if i == -1:
|
||||
break
|
||||
j = i + len(prefix)
|
||||
while j < len(out) and not out[j].isspace():
|
||||
j += 1
|
||||
out = out[:i] + prefix + "[REDACTED]" + out[j:]
|
||||
idx = i + len(prefix) + len("[REDACTED]")
|
||||
# Secret VALUES carried in JSON ("key":"value") or kv (key=value) form,
|
||||
# even short ones (e.g. a password), keyed by a sensitive field name.
|
||||
out = _SECRET_JSON_RE.sub(r'"\1":"[REDACTED]"', out)
|
||||
out = _SECRET_KV_RE.sub(r"\1=[REDACTED]", out)
|
||||
# URLs / query secrets / hostnames.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import gitea_audit
|
||||
|
||||
out = gitea_audit.redact_urls(out)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
# Absolute filesystem paths (workspace layout is not for LLM output).
|
||||
out = _ABS_PATH_RE.sub("[PATH]", out)
|
||||
# Any bare hostname the URL redactor missed (defence in depth).
|
||||
out = re.sub(r"\b[\w.-]+\.(?:cc|net|com|org|io|dev|local)\b", "[HOST]", out)
|
||||
out = " ".join(out.split())
|
||||
return out[:limit]
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _safe_mutation_stage(exc: BaseException) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Return the bounded, redacted mutation stage tagged on *exc* (or None)."""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
raw = getattr(exc, _MUTATION_STAGE_ATTR, None)
|
||||
if not raw:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return _redact_detail(raw, limit=_STAGE_LIMIT) or None
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def fixed_message(reason_code: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""Return the fixed sanitized message for *reason_code* (fail closed)."""
|
||||
return FIXED_MESSAGES.get(reason_code, FIXED_MESSAGES[REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _safe_profile_name() -> str | None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
from gitea_auth import get_profile
|
||||
|
||||
name = (get_profile() or {}).get("profile_name")
|
||||
if name is None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
text = str(name).strip()
|
||||
# Profile names are non-secret identifiers; still bound length.
|
||||
return text[:80] if text else None
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _is_framework_control_flow(exc: BaseException) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True for exceptions the MCP framework must re-raise unchanged."""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
from mcp.shared.exceptions import UrlElicitationRequiredError
|
||||
|
||||
if isinstance(exc, UrlElicitationRequiredError):
|
||||
return True
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
# BaseException subclasses that must never become tool isError payloads.
|
||||
if isinstance(exc, (KeyboardInterrupt, SystemExit, GeneratorExit)):
|
||||
return True
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_known_client_failure(exc: BaseException) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True only for explicit typed Gitea client / config failures.
|
||||
|
||||
Never true for arbitrary ``RuntimeError`` (reviewer finding #3).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import gitea_auth
|
||||
|
||||
if isinstance(
|
||||
exc,
|
||||
(
|
||||
gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError,
|
||||
gitea_auth.GiteaAuthzError,
|
||||
gitea_auth.GiteaNetworkError,
|
||||
gitea_auth.GiteaConfigError,
|
||||
gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError,
|
||||
),
|
||||
):
|
||||
return True
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import gitea_config
|
||||
|
||||
if isinstance(exc, gitea_config.ConfigError):
|
||||
return True
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def classify_exception(exc: BaseException) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Return structured classification with **fixed** messages only.
|
||||
|
||||
Only typed authentication / authorization / network / configuration
|
||||
failures receive those labels. Unexpected programming failures are
|
||||
``internal_error``. HTTP bodies and exception text are never copied
|
||||
into ``message``.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return _classify_exception_impl(exc)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# Fail closed: sanitization / classification failure must not leak.
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reason_code": REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
|
||||
"http_status": None,
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _self_declared_classification(exc: BaseException) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
"""Honor a safe ``gitea_reason_code`` attribute set by server-side raisers.
|
||||
|
||||
Converts a raw exception that self-declares a **known** reason code into a
|
||||
typed structured error (fixed message) instead of an opaque internal_error.
|
||||
Unknown / non-string / secret values are ignored (fail closed to internal).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reason = getattr(exc, _SELF_DECLARED_REASON_ATTR, None)
|
||||
if not isinstance(reason, str) or reason not in FIXED_MESSAGES:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if reason == REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reason_code": reason,
|
||||
"error_class": _REASON_ERROR_CLASS.get(reason, ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL),
|
||||
"http_status": None,
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(reason),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _classify_exception_impl(exc: BaseException) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
import gitea_auth
|
||||
|
||||
declared = _self_declared_classification(exc)
|
||||
if declared is not None:
|
||||
return declared
|
||||
|
||||
if isinstance(exc, gitea_auth.GiteaAuthError):
|
||||
code = getattr(exc, "reason_code", None) or REASON_AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN
|
||||
if code not in (
|
||||
REASON_AUTH_FAILED,
|
||||
REASON_AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN,
|
||||
):
|
||||
code = REASON_AUTH_INVALID_TOKEN
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reason_code": code,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION,
|
||||
"http_status": getattr(exc, "http_status", None) or 401,
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(code),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if isinstance(exc, gitea_auth.GiteaAuthzError):
|
||||
code = getattr(exc, "reason_code", None) or REASON_AUTHZ_DENIED
|
||||
if code not in (REASON_AUTHZ_DENIED, REASON_AUTHZ_INSUFFICIENT_SCOPE):
|
||||
code = REASON_AUTHZ_DENIED
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reason_code": code,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_AUTHORIZATION,
|
||||
"http_status": getattr(exc, "http_status", None) or 403,
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(code),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if isinstance(exc, gitea_auth.GiteaNetworkError):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reason_code": REASON_NETWORK_ERROR,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_NETWORK,
|
||||
"http_status": getattr(exc, "http_status", None),
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(REASON_NETWORK_ERROR),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if isinstance(exc, gitea_auth.GiteaConfigError):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reason_code": REASON_CONFIG_ERROR,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_CONFIGURATION,
|
||||
"http_status": getattr(exc, "http_status", None),
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(REASON_CONFIG_ERROR),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if isinstance(exc, gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError):
|
||||
code = getattr(exc, "reason_code", None) or REASON_HTTP_ERROR
|
||||
if code == REASON_UPSTREAM_UNAVAILABLE:
|
||||
error_class = ERROR_CLASS_UPSTREAM
|
||||
else:
|
||||
error_class = ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL
|
||||
code = REASON_HTTP_ERROR
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reason_code": code,
|
||||
"error_class": error_class,
|
||||
"http_status": getattr(exc, "http_status", None),
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(code),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import gitea_config
|
||||
|
||||
if isinstance(exc, gitea_config.ConfigError):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reason_code": REASON_CONFIG_ERROR,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_CONFIGURATION,
|
||||
"http_status": None,
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(REASON_CONFIG_ERROR),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
# Unwrap FastMCP ToolError cause when the original was a typed failure.
|
||||
cause = getattr(exc, "__cause__", None)
|
||||
if cause is not None and cause is not exc and is_known_client_failure(cause):
|
||||
return _classify_exception_impl(cause)
|
||||
|
||||
# No message-substring authentication heuristics (reviewer finding #3).
|
||||
# Unexpected failure → internal_error, now carrying SAFE diagnostics so the
|
||||
# failure is actionable: a type identifier + strictly-redacted detail +
|
||||
# optional mutation-stage tag. The operator ``message`` stays the fixed
|
||||
# constant; none of these fields carry secrets/bodies/paths/env.
|
||||
result = {
|
||||
"reason_code": REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
|
||||
"http_status": None,
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
"exception_class": _safe_exception_class(exc),
|
||||
"detail": _redact_detail(_safe_str(exc)),
|
||||
}
|
||||
stage = _safe_mutation_stage(exc)
|
||||
if stage:
|
||||
result["mutation_stage"] = stage
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_structured_error_payload(
|
||||
classification: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
tool_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""LLM-safe structured payload — fixed message + typed metadata only."""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
reason = str(classification.get("reason_code") or REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR)
|
||||
message = fixed_message(reason)
|
||||
# Refuse to emit any classification message that is not the fixed constant.
|
||||
if classification.get("message") != message:
|
||||
message = fixed_message(reason)
|
||||
payload: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"isError": True,
|
||||
"reason_code": reason if reason in FIXED_MESSAGES else REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||||
"error_class": classification.get("error_class") or ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
|
||||
"message": message,
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
"retryable": classification.get("error_class")
|
||||
in {
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_AUTHENTICATION,
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_NETWORK,
|
||||
ERROR_CLASS_CONFIGURATION,
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
status = classification.get("http_status")
|
||||
if isinstance(status, int):
|
||||
payload["http_status"] = status
|
||||
if tool_name and isinstance(tool_name, str):
|
||||
# Tool names are identifiers, not secrets; bound length.
|
||||
payload["tool"] = tool_name[:120]
|
||||
if profile_name and isinstance(profile_name, str):
|
||||
payload["profile"] = profile_name[:80]
|
||||
# Safe diagnostics — internal_error path only. These make an otherwise
|
||||
# opaque crash actionable without leaking secrets. Re-derived here from
|
||||
# the fixed message gate above; typed reasons never carry them.
|
||||
if payload["reason_code"] == REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR:
|
||||
exc_cls = classification.get("exception_class")
|
||||
if isinstance(exc_cls, str) and exc_cls:
|
||||
payload["exception_class"] = exc_cls[:_CLASS_LIMIT]
|
||||
detail = classification.get("detail")
|
||||
if isinstance(detail, str):
|
||||
payload["detail"] = _redact_detail(detail)
|
||||
stage = classification.get("mutation_stage")
|
||||
if isinstance(stage, str) and stage:
|
||||
payload["mutation_stage"] = stage[:_STAGE_LIMIT]
|
||||
return payload
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"isError": True,
|
||||
"reason_code": REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
"retryable": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def log_sanitized_daemon_reason(
|
||||
classification: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
tool_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
stream=None,
|
||||
) -> None:
|
||||
"""Daemon log: reason codes only — never exception text or response bodies."""
|
||||
stream = stream if stream is not None else sys.stderr
|
||||
try:
|
||||
reason = classification.get("reason_code") or REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR
|
||||
error_class = classification.get("error_class") or ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL
|
||||
# Only emit known tokens; never classification['message'] from callers
|
||||
# that might have been poisoned.
|
||||
if reason not in FIXED_MESSAGES:
|
||||
reason = REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR
|
||||
error_class = ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL
|
||||
parts = [
|
||||
"mcp_tool_error",
|
||||
f"reason_code={reason}",
|
||||
f"error_class={error_class}",
|
||||
]
|
||||
if tool_name and isinstance(tool_name, str):
|
||||
parts.append(f"tool={tool_name[:120]}")
|
||||
status = classification.get("http_status")
|
||||
if isinstance(status, int):
|
||||
parts.append(f"http_status={status}")
|
||||
# Safe diagnostics — internal_error path ONLY. Typed reasons still emit
|
||||
# no detail= (secrets lived there). class/detail/stage are re-redacted
|
||||
# here as defence in depth.
|
||||
if reason == REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR:
|
||||
exc_cls = classification.get("exception_class")
|
||||
if isinstance(exc_cls, str) and exc_cls:
|
||||
parts.append(f"exception_class={exc_cls[:_CLASS_LIMIT]}")
|
||||
stage = classification.get("mutation_stage")
|
||||
if isinstance(stage, str) and stage:
|
||||
parts.append(
|
||||
f"mutation_stage={_redact_detail(stage, limit=_STAGE_LIMIT)}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
detail = classification.get("detail")
|
||||
if isinstance(detail, str) and detail:
|
||||
parts.append(f"detail={_redact_detail(detail)}")
|
||||
line = " ".join(parts)
|
||||
stream.write(line + "\n")
|
||||
if hasattr(stream, "flush"):
|
||||
stream.flush()
|
||||
logger.warning(line)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# Fail closed: never fall back to logging the exception.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
stream.write(
|
||||
"mcp_tool_error reason_code=internal_error "
|
||||
"error_class=internal\n"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if hasattr(stream, "flush"):
|
||||
stream.flush()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def to_call_tool_result(
|
||||
exc: BaseException,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
tool_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
log: bool = True,
|
||||
) -> Any:
|
||||
"""Build a FastMCP ``CallToolResult`` with ``isError=True`` for *exc*."""
|
||||
from mcp.types import CallToolResult, TextContent
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
classification = classify_exception(exc)
|
||||
if log:
|
||||
log_sanitized_daemon_reason(classification, tool_name=tool_name)
|
||||
payload = build_structured_error_payload(
|
||||
classification, tool_name=tool_name, profile_name=profile_name
|
||||
)
|
||||
text = json.dumps(payload, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
|
||||
return CallToolResult(
|
||||
content=[TextContent(type="text", text=text)],
|
||||
structuredContent=payload,
|
||||
isError=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
# Absolute fail-closed path — no exception text.
|
||||
fallback = {
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"isError": True,
|
||||
"reason_code": REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR,
|
||||
"error_class": ERROR_CLASS_INTERNAL,
|
||||
"message": fixed_message(REASON_INTERNAL_ERROR),
|
||||
"transport_survives": True,
|
||||
"retryable": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
return CallToolResult(
|
||||
content=[
|
||||
TextContent(
|
||||
type="text",
|
||||
text=json.dumps(fallback, indent=2, sort_keys=True),
|
||||
)
|
||||
],
|
||||
structuredContent=fallback,
|
||||
isError=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def install_tool_run_boundary(Tool) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Install a **narrow** error boundary around FastMCP ``Tool.run``.
|
||||
|
||||
Strategy (preserves framework semantics):
|
||||
|
||||
* Call the **original** ``Tool.run`` for the success path (async, return
|
||||
types, convert_result, protocol behavior unchanged).
|
||||
* Re-raise ``UrlElicitationRequiredError`` and other control-flow
|
||||
exceptions without mapping to ``internal_error``.
|
||||
* Map typed Gitea client failures (and ToolError whose ``__cause__`` is
|
||||
typed) to structured ``CallToolResult(isError=True)``.
|
||||
* Map remaining unexpected tool failures to fixed ``internal_error``
|
||||
isError results (transport survival) without secret-bearing text.
|
||||
* Idempotent: second install is a no-op and returns ``False``.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if getattr(Tool.run, _INSTALL_FLAG, False):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
from mcp.server.fastmcp.exceptions import ToolError
|
||||
from mcp.shared.exceptions import UrlElicitationRequiredError
|
||||
|
||||
original_run = Tool.run
|
||||
|
||||
async def run_boundary(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
arguments: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
context=None,
|
||||
convert_result: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> Any:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return await original_run(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
arguments,
|
||||
context=context,
|
||||
convert_result=convert_result,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except UrlElicitationRequiredError:
|
||||
# Framework control-flow — must not become internal_error.
|
||||
raise
|
||||
except BaseException as exc:
|
||||
if _is_framework_control_flow(exc):
|
||||
raise
|
||||
if not isinstance(exc, Exception):
|
||||
raise
|
||||
|
||||
# Prefer typed cause under FastMCP ToolError wrappers.
|
||||
target: BaseException = exc
|
||||
if isinstance(exc, ToolError) and exc.__cause__ is not None:
|
||||
target = exc.__cause__
|
||||
|
||||
# Known client failures → structured isError with reason codes.
|
||||
# Unexpected failures → fixed internal_error isError (no secrets).
|
||||
profile_name = _safe_profile_name()
|
||||
return to_call_tool_result(
|
||||
target,
|
||||
tool_name=getattr(self, "name", None),
|
||||
profile_name=profile_name,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
setattr(run_boundary, _INSTALL_FLAG, True)
|
||||
setattr(run_boundary, _ORIGINAL_ATTR, original_run)
|
||||
Tool.run = run_boundary # type: ignore[method-assign]
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def boundary_is_installed(Tool) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when the #699 boundary is active on *Tool.run*."""
|
||||
return bool(getattr(Tool.run, _INSTALL_FLAG, False))
|
||||
+9
-43
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
|
||||
"""Merge approval must pin the current PR head SHA (#471 / #695).
|
||||
"""Merge approval must pin the current PR head SHA (#471).
|
||||
|
||||
Formal APPROVED reviews that predate the live PR head must not satisfy
|
||||
``gitea_merge_pr`` eligibility. Contaminated / quarantined approvals (#695)
|
||||
must not authorize merge either. Pure assessment helpers are isolated here
|
||||
``gitea_merge_pr`` eligibility. Pure assessment helpers are isolated here
|
||||
for hermetic unit tests apart from MCP HTTP calls.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -13,7 +12,6 @@ def assess_merge_approval_head(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
current_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
latest_by_reviewer: dict,
|
||||
quarantined_review_ids: set | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Return whether a visible approval applies to the live PR head.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -21,43 +19,18 @@ def assess_merge_approval_head(
|
||||
current_head_sha: Current PR head commit SHA.
|
||||
latest_by_reviewer: Map of reviewer login → review entry dicts with
|
||||
``verdict``, ``dismissed``, and ``reviewed_head_sha`` keys.
|
||||
Optional ``review_id`` / ``id`` used for quarantine checks (#695).
|
||||
quarantined_review_ids: Optional set of review IDs that must not count
|
||||
toward merge authorization (#695).
|
||||
|
||||
Returns:
|
||||
dict with ``approval_at_current_head``, ``latest_approved_head_sha``,
|
||||
and ``stale_approval_block_reason`` (set when merge must fail closed).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
current = (current_head_sha or "").strip()
|
||||
blocked_ids = {int(x) for x in (quarantined_review_ids or set()) if x is not None}
|
||||
|
||||
def _rid(entry: dict):
|
||||
raw = entry.get("review_id", entry.get("id"))
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return int(raw) if raw is not None else None
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
approved_entries = []
|
||||
quarantined_at_head = []
|
||||
for entry in (latest_by_reviewer or {}).values():
|
||||
if (entry.get("verdict") or "").upper() != "APPROVED":
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if entry.get("dismissed"):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
rid = _rid(entry)
|
||||
head = (entry.get("reviewed_head_sha") or "").strip()
|
||||
if rid is not None and rid in blocked_ids:
|
||||
if current and head == current:
|
||||
quarantined_at_head.append(entry)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if entry.get("quarantined"):
|
||||
if current and head == current:
|
||||
quarantined_at_head.append(entry)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
approved_entries.append(entry)
|
||||
|
||||
approved_entries = [
|
||||
entry
|
||||
for entry in (latest_by_reviewer or {}).values()
|
||||
if (entry.get("verdict") or "").upper() == "APPROVED"
|
||||
and not entry.get("dismissed")
|
||||
]
|
||||
at_current = any(
|
||||
(entry.get("reviewed_head_sha") or "").strip() == current
|
||||
for entry in approved_entries
|
||||
@@ -74,13 +47,7 @@ def assess_merge_approval_head(
|
||||
)[-1]
|
||||
latest_approved = (latest_entry.get("reviewed_head_sha") or "").strip() or None
|
||||
reason = None
|
||||
if quarantined_at_head and not at_current:
|
||||
reason = (
|
||||
"contaminated/quarantined approval at current head is void for "
|
||||
"merge authorization (#695); required next action: fresh native "
|
||||
"MCP re-review after controller quarantine evidence is recorded"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif approved_entries and not at_current:
|
||||
if approved_entries and not at_current:
|
||||
reason = (
|
||||
f"stale approval: approved SHA '{latest_approved}' does not match "
|
||||
f"current live PR head SHA '{current or '(unknown)'}' (fail closed); "
|
||||
@@ -91,5 +58,4 @@ def assess_merge_approval_head(
|
||||
"approval_at_current_head": at_current,
|
||||
"latest_approved_head_sha": latest_approved,
|
||||
"stale_approval_block_reason": reason,
|
||||
"quarantined_approvals_at_current_head": len(quarantined_at_head),
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -18,34 +18,16 @@ DEFAULT_ADOPTION_REASON = "merger-handoff-approved-head"
|
||||
|
||||
SOURCE_ADOPT = "gitea_adopt_merger_pr_lease"
|
||||
SOURCE_ACQUIRE = "gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease"
|
||||
SOURCE_ACQUIRE_MERGER = "gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease"
|
||||
SOURCE_HEARTBEAT = "gitea_heartbeat_reviewer_pr_lease"
|
||||
SOURCE_RELEASE_MERGER = "gitea_release_merger_pr_lease"
|
||||
|
||||
SANCTIONED_PROVENANCE_SOURCES = frozenset({
|
||||
SOURCE_ADOPT,
|
||||
SOURCE_ACQUIRE,
|
||||
SOURCE_ACQUIRE_MERGER,
|
||||
SOURCE_HEARTBEAT,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
_MERGER_ADOPTABLE_FRESHNESS = frozenset({"active", "stale_warning"})
|
||||
|
||||
# #742: owner-session terminal finalization of a merger-held lease. Append-only
|
||||
# marker; ledger history is never edited or deleted.
|
||||
MERGER_FINALIZATION_MARKER = "<!-- mcp-merger-lease-final:v1 -->"
|
||||
OUTCOME_RELEASED = "released"
|
||||
OUTCOME_ABANDONED = "abandoned"
|
||||
MERGER_FINALIZATION_OUTCOMES = frozenset({OUTCOME_RELEASED, OUTCOME_ABANDONED})
|
||||
DEFAULT_MERGER_FINALIZATION_REASON = "merge-not-performed"
|
||||
|
||||
# Provenance sources whose in-session lease is merger-owned and therefore
|
||||
# finalizable by its owning merger session.
|
||||
MERGER_OWNED_PROVENANCE_SOURCES = frozenset({
|
||||
SOURCE_ACQUIRE_MERGER,
|
||||
SOURCE_ADOPT,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_adoption_body(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
@@ -113,7 +95,6 @@ def build_lease_provenance(
|
||||
adopted_from_profile: str | None = None,
|
||||
adopted_from_reviewer_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
adoption_reason: str | None = None,
|
||||
native_token_fingerprint: str | None = None,
|
||||
recorded_at: datetime | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
recorded_at = recorded_at or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
|
||||
@@ -134,76 +115,9 @@ def build_lease_provenance(
|
||||
proof["adopted_from_reviewer_identity"] = adopted_from_reviewer_identity
|
||||
if adoption_reason:
|
||||
proof["adoption_reason"] = adoption_reason
|
||||
if native_token_fingerprint:
|
||||
proof["native_token_fingerprint"] = native_token_fingerprint
|
||||
return proof
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_acquired_merger_lease_integrity(
|
||||
session: dict[str, Any] | None,
|
||||
) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Ownership/integrity reasons blocking a ``SOURCE_ACQUIRE_MERGER`` lease (#742).
|
||||
|
||||
A merger lease minted by ``gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease`` authorizes an
|
||||
irreversible merge, so it is sanctioned only when the in-session record is
|
||||
complete and self-consistent: comment marker, exact session identity, merger
|
||||
profile/role, repository, PR number, and pinned candidate head. Any missing
|
||||
or contradictory field fails closed — an incomplete record is not proof.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not session:
|
||||
return ["no in-session lease recorded"]
|
||||
provenance = session.get("lease_provenance") or {}
|
||||
if not isinstance(provenance, dict):
|
||||
provenance = {}
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
|
||||
provenance_comment_id = provenance.get("comment_id")
|
||||
session_comment_id = session.get("comment_id")
|
||||
if not (provenance_comment_id or session_comment_id):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"acquired merger lease has no comment marker id (comment-backed "
|
||||
"proof required)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif (
|
||||
provenance_comment_id is not None
|
||||
and session_comment_id is not None
|
||||
and provenance_comment_id != session_comment_id
|
||||
):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"acquired merger lease provenance comment_id does not match the "
|
||||
"session lease comment_id"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if not (session.get("session_id") or "").strip():
|
||||
reasons.append("acquired merger lease has no session_id")
|
||||
if not (session.get("reviewer_identity") or "").strip():
|
||||
reasons.append("acquired merger lease has no holder identity")
|
||||
|
||||
profile = (session.get("profile") or "").strip()
|
||||
if not profile:
|
||||
reasons.append("acquired merger lease has no profile")
|
||||
elif "merger" not in profile.lower():
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"acquired merger lease profile '{profile}' is not a merger profile "
|
||||
"(merger-only; fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if not (session.get("repo") or "").strip():
|
||||
reasons.append("acquired merger lease has no repository")
|
||||
|
||||
pr_number = session.get("pr_number")
|
||||
if not isinstance(pr_number, int) or isinstance(pr_number, bool) or pr_number <= 0:
|
||||
reasons.append("acquired merger lease has no valid PR number")
|
||||
|
||||
if not leases._normalize_sha(session.get("candidate_head")):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"acquired merger lease has no pinned candidate_head (exact-head "
|
||||
"scoping required)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return reasons
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_sanctioned_session_lease(session: dict[str, Any] | None) -> bool:
|
||||
if not session:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
@@ -215,8 +129,6 @@ def is_sanctioned_session_lease(session: dict[str, Any] | None) -> bool:
|
||||
return bool(provenance.get("comment_id")) and bool(
|
||||
provenance.get("adopted_from_session_id")
|
||||
)
|
||||
if source == SOURCE_ACQUIRE_MERGER:
|
||||
return not assess_acquired_merger_lease_integrity(session)
|
||||
if source in {SOURCE_ACQUIRE, SOURCE_HEARTBEAT}:
|
||||
return bool(session.get("comment_id") or provenance.get("comment_id"))
|
||||
return False
|
||||
@@ -254,8 +166,6 @@ def describe_session_lease_proof(
|
||||
if source == SOURCE_ADOPT and sanctioned:
|
||||
kind = "sanctioned_adoption"
|
||||
reason = reason or DEFAULT_ADOPTION_REASON
|
||||
elif source == SOURCE_ACQUIRE_MERGER and sanctioned:
|
||||
kind = "sanctioned_acquire_merger"
|
||||
elif source == SOURCE_ACQUIRE and sanctioned:
|
||||
kind = "sanctioned_acquire"
|
||||
elif source == SOURCE_HEARTBEAT and sanctioned:
|
||||
@@ -299,12 +209,9 @@ _SANCTIONED_LEASE_EVIDENCE_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"(?is)\b("
|
||||
r"gitea_adopt_merger_pr_lease|"
|
||||
r"gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease|"
|
||||
r"gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease|"
|
||||
r"lease_proof_source\s*[:=]\s*gitea_adopt_merger_pr_lease|"
|
||||
r"lease_proof_source\s*[:=]\s*gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease|"
|
||||
r"lease_proof_source\s*[:=]\s*gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease|"
|
||||
r"lease_proof_kind\s*[:=]\s*sanctioned_adoption|"
|
||||
r"lease_proof_kind\s*[:=]\s*sanctioned_acquire_merger|"
|
||||
r"lease_proof_kind\s*[:=]\s*sanctioned_acquire|"
|
||||
r"adoption_comment_id\s*[:=]|"
|
||||
r"sanctioned_adoption|"
|
||||
@@ -336,267 +243,6 @@ def assess_manual_lease_proof_handoff(report_text: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_merger_finalization_body(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
repo: str,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
issue_number: int | None,
|
||||
merger_identity: str,
|
||||
merger_profile: str,
|
||||
merger_session_id: str,
|
||||
worktree: str,
|
||||
candidate_head: str | None,
|
||||
target_branch: str,
|
||||
target_branch_sha: str | None,
|
||||
outcome: str,
|
||||
reason: str,
|
||||
lease_comment_id: int | None,
|
||||
finalized_at: datetime | None = None,
|
||||
) -> str:
|
||||
"""Render the append-only terminal marker for a merger-owned lease (#742).
|
||||
|
||||
The body carries a standard lease marker in a terminal phase, so the
|
||||
existing newest-wins ledger (#577) ends the lease without editing or
|
||||
deleting any prior comment.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
finalized_at = finalized_at or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
|
||||
finalized_text = finalized_at.astimezone(timezone.utc).replace(
|
||||
microsecond=0
|
||||
).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
|
||||
lease_body = leases.format_lease_body(
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
pr_number=pr_number,
|
||||
issue_number=issue_number,
|
||||
reviewer_identity=merger_identity,
|
||||
profile=merger_profile,
|
||||
session_id=merger_session_id,
|
||||
worktree=worktree,
|
||||
phase=outcome,
|
||||
candidate_head=candidate_head,
|
||||
target_branch=target_branch,
|
||||
target_branch_sha=target_branch_sha,
|
||||
last_activity=finalized_at,
|
||||
blocker=reason,
|
||||
)
|
||||
lines = [
|
||||
MERGER_FINALIZATION_MARKER,
|
||||
f"finalized_at: {finalized_text}",
|
||||
f"finalized_by_identity: {merger_identity}",
|
||||
f"finalized_by_profile: {merger_profile}",
|
||||
f"finalized_by_session_id: {merger_session_id}",
|
||||
f"finalization_outcome: {outcome}",
|
||||
f"finalization_reason: {reason}",
|
||||
f"finalized_lease_comment_id: {lease_comment_id or 'none'}",
|
||||
lease_body,
|
||||
]
|
||||
return "\n".join(lines)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_merger_finalization_comment(body: str) -> bool:
|
||||
return MERGER_FINALIZATION_MARKER in (body or "")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_merger_lease_finalization(
|
||||
comments: list[dict],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
session: dict[str, Any] | None,
|
||||
actor_identity: str,
|
||||
actor_profile: str,
|
||||
actor_session_id: str | None,
|
||||
repo: str,
|
||||
worktree: str,
|
||||
candidate_head: str | None,
|
||||
live_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
outcome: str = OUTCOME_RELEASED,
|
||||
reason: str | None = None,
|
||||
runtime_token_fingerprint: str | None = None,
|
||||
issue_number: int | None = None,
|
||||
target_branch: str = "master",
|
||||
target_branch_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
now: datetime | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Decide whether a merger may terminally finalize its own lease (#742).
|
||||
|
||||
Owner-session only: the caller must hold the exact comment-backed merger
|
||||
lease it is finalizing. Foreign sessions, reviewer profiles, and mismatched
|
||||
repository/PR/head/token-fingerprint callers fail closed. Already-terminal
|
||||
leases return ``already_terminal`` so repeat calls are idempotent and post
|
||||
no second marker.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
outcome = (outcome or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
finalization_reason = (reason or "").strip() or DEFAULT_MERGER_FINALIZATION_REASON
|
||||
|
||||
if outcome not in MERGER_FINALIZATION_OUTCOMES:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"outcome '{outcome or 'none'}' is not a terminal merger "
|
||||
f"finalization outcome ({sorted(MERGER_FINALIZATION_OUTCOMES)})"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if "merger" not in (actor_profile or "").lower():
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"profile '{actor_profile or 'unknown'}' is not a merger profile; "
|
||||
"merger lease finalization is merger-only (fail closed). Reviewer "
|
||||
"sessions use gitea_release_reviewer_pr_lease."
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
session = session or None
|
||||
provenance = (session or {}).get("lease_provenance") or {}
|
||||
if not isinstance(provenance, dict):
|
||||
provenance = {}
|
||||
source = (provenance.get("source") or "").strip()
|
||||
|
||||
if not session:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"no in-session merger lease recorded; only the owning session may "
|
||||
"finalize a merger lease"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif source not in MERGER_OWNED_PROVENANCE_SOURCES:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"in-session lease provenance '{source or 'none'}' is not a "
|
||||
"merger-owned lease; refusing to finalize"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif not is_sanctioned_session_lease(session):
|
||||
reasons.extend(
|
||||
assess_acquired_merger_lease_integrity(session)
|
||||
if source == SOURCE_ACQUIRE_MERGER
|
||||
else ["in-session merger lease lacks sanctioned provenance"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
pinned = leases._normalize_sha(candidate_head)
|
||||
live = leases._normalize_sha(live_head_sha)
|
||||
if not pinned:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"candidate_head is required for merger lease finalization "
|
||||
"(exact-head scoping; fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if live and pinned and live != pinned:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"candidate_head does not match live PR head (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if session:
|
||||
session_sid = (session.get("session_id") or "").strip()
|
||||
actor_sid = (actor_session_id or "").strip()
|
||||
if not actor_sid or session_sid != actor_sid:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"session_id does not match the in-session merger lease owner; "
|
||||
"foreign-session release is not permitted (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if session.get("pr_number") != pr_number:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"in-session merger lease is for PR #{session.get('pr_number')}, "
|
||||
f"not #{pr_number}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
session_repo = (session.get("repo") or "").strip()
|
||||
if session_repo and session_repo != (repo or "").strip():
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"in-session merger lease repository '{session_repo}' does not "
|
||||
f"match '{repo}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
session_head = leases._normalize_sha(session.get("candidate_head"))
|
||||
if pinned and session_head and session_head != pinned:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"in-session merger lease candidate_head does not match the "
|
||||
"supplied candidate_head (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
session_identity = (session.get("reviewer_identity") or "").strip()
|
||||
if session_identity and session_identity != (actor_identity or "").strip():
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"authenticated identity does not match the in-session merger "
|
||||
"lease holder (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
session_profile = (session.get("profile") or "").strip()
|
||||
if session_profile and session_profile != (actor_profile or "").strip():
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"active profile does not match the in-session merger lease "
|
||||
"profile (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
recorded_fingerprint = (
|
||||
provenance.get("native_token_fingerprint") or ""
|
||||
).strip()
|
||||
live_fingerprint = (runtime_token_fingerprint or "").strip()
|
||||
if (
|
||||
recorded_fingerprint
|
||||
and live_fingerprint
|
||||
and recorded_fingerprint != live_fingerprint
|
||||
):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"native runtime token fingerprint does not match the one "
|
||||
"recorded when the merger lease was acquired (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
lease_comment_id = (session or {}).get("comment_id") or provenance.get("comment_id")
|
||||
entries = leases._lease_entries(comments, pr_number=pr_number)
|
||||
if session and lease_comment_id is not None:
|
||||
if not any(entry.get("comment_id") == lease_comment_id for entry in entries):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"lease marker comment {lease_comment_id} is not present on PR "
|
||||
f"#{pr_number} (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
active = leases.find_active_reviewer_lease(comments, pr_number=pr_number, now=now)
|
||||
already_terminal = False
|
||||
if active:
|
||||
owner_session = (active.get("session_id") or "").strip()
|
||||
if owner_session and owner_session != (actor_session_id or "").strip():
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"active PR lease is owned by session_id={owner_session}; a "
|
||||
"merger may only finalize its own lease (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
newest = entries[-1] if entries else None
|
||||
newest_phase = ((newest or {}).get("phase") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if newest and newest_phase in leases._TERMINAL_PHASES:
|
||||
already_terminal = True
|
||||
elif not entries:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"no comment-backed lease marker found on PR #{pr_number}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
finalize_allowed = not reasons and not already_terminal
|
||||
body = None
|
||||
if finalize_allowed and session:
|
||||
body = format_merger_finalization_body(
|
||||
repo=(session.get("repo") or repo),
|
||||
pr_number=pr_number,
|
||||
issue_number=(
|
||||
issue_number
|
||||
if issue_number is not None
|
||||
else session.get("issue_number")
|
||||
),
|
||||
merger_identity=actor_identity,
|
||||
merger_profile=actor_profile,
|
||||
merger_session_id=(actor_session_id or ""),
|
||||
worktree=worktree or (session.get("worktree") or ""),
|
||||
candidate_head=pinned,
|
||||
target_branch=(
|
||||
session.get("target_branch") or target_branch or "master"
|
||||
),
|
||||
target_branch_sha=(
|
||||
session.get("target_branch_sha") or target_branch_sha
|
||||
),
|
||||
outcome=outcome,
|
||||
reason=finalization_reason,
|
||||
lease_comment_id=lease_comment_id,
|
||||
finalized_at=now,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"finalize_allowed": finalize_allowed,
|
||||
"already_terminal": already_terminal,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"outcome": outcome,
|
||||
"finalization_reason": finalization_reason,
|
||||
"active_lease": active,
|
||||
"finalization_body": body,
|
||||
"lease_comment_id": lease_comment_id,
|
||||
"candidate_head": pinned,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_adopt_merger_lease(
|
||||
comments: list[dict],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
|
||||
+7
-126
@@ -20,114 +20,12 @@ if PROJECT_ROOT not in sys.path:
|
||||
import gitea_config
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Defaults emit *canonical* operation names only. Shorthand that is not in
|
||||
# gitea_config.GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES (e.g. ``pr.close``, ``issue.close``)
|
||||
# is silently dropped by the production loader and must never appear here.
|
||||
AUTHOR_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.create",
|
||||
"gitea.repo.commit",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
]
|
||||
AUTHOR_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = [
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.request_changes",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
]
|
||||
AUTHOR_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = ["read", "branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr", "comment"]
|
||||
AUTHOR_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = ["approve", "request_changes", "merge"]
|
||||
REVIEWER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.request_changes",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"read", "review", "comment", "approve", "request_changes", "merge"
|
||||
]
|
||||
REVIEWER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = [
|
||||
"gitea.branch.create",
|
||||
"gitea.repo.commit",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
]
|
||||
# Required reconciler ops (read + pr.close) plus recommended comment/close and
|
||||
# branch.delete for guarded merged-PR cleanup. All names must normalize via
|
||||
# gitea_config.normalize_operation without being dropped.
|
||||
RECONCILER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED = [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.close",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.close",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
]
|
||||
RECONCILER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = [
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.repo.commit",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
# Migration-only expansions for common shorthands that are *not* in
|
||||
# GITEA_OPERATION_ALIASES. Emitted output is always the canonical form so a
|
||||
# second canonicalize pass is a no-op (idempotent).
|
||||
_MIGRATION_ONLY_ALIASES = {
|
||||
"pr.close": "gitea.pr.close",
|
||||
"pr.comment": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"issue.close": "gitea.issue.close",
|
||||
"branch.delete": "gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Reconciler required ops that must survive migration (from reconciler_profile).
|
||||
RECONCILER_REQUIRED_CANONICAL = ("gitea.read", "gitea.pr.close")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def canonicalize_operation(op: str) -> str:
|
||||
"""Return a canonical operation name accepted by the production loader.
|
||||
|
||||
Fail closed on unknown/ambiguous spellings so required permissions cannot
|
||||
be silently dropped by ``check_operation`` later.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not isinstance(op, str) or not op.strip():
|
||||
raise ValueError("operation must be a non-empty string (fail closed)")
|
||||
op = op.strip()
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return gitea_config.normalize_operation(op)
|
||||
except gitea_config.ConfigError:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
if op in _MIGRATION_ONLY_ALIASES:
|
||||
return _MIGRATION_ONLY_ALIASES[op]
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"operation {op!r} cannot be canonicalized for migration "
|
||||
"(unknown/ambiguous; fail closed — production loader would drop it)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def canonicalize_operations(ops, *, context: str = "operations") -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Canonicalize a list of operations; preserve order, drop duplicates."""
|
||||
if not isinstance(ops, list):
|
||||
raise ValueError(f"{context} must be a list (fail closed)")
|
||||
out: list[str] = []
|
||||
seen: set[str] = set()
|
||||
for entry in ops:
|
||||
canon = canonicalize_operation(entry)
|
||||
if canon not in seen:
|
||||
seen.add(canon)
|
||||
out.append(canon)
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _assert_reconciler_required_survive(allowed: list[str], profile_name: str) -> None:
|
||||
"""Fail visibly when migration would leave a reconciler without required ops."""
|
||||
missing = [op for op in RECONCILER_REQUIRED_CANONICAL if op not in set(allowed)]
|
||||
if missing:
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"Profile '{profile_name}' (reconciler) is missing required "
|
||||
f"operation(s) after migration: {missing}. Refusing to emit a "
|
||||
"profile that would silently fail pr.close / read (fail closed)."
|
||||
)
|
||||
REVIEWER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN = ["branch", "commit", "push", "open_pr"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def infer_role(name, execution_profile):
|
||||
@@ -192,11 +90,9 @@ def migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data):
|
||||
ident_name = "reviewer"
|
||||
elif role == "author":
|
||||
ident_name = "author"
|
||||
elif role == "reconciler":
|
||||
ident_name = "reconciler"
|
||||
else:
|
||||
role = prof.get("role")
|
||||
if role not in (None, "author", "reviewer", "reconciler"):
|
||||
if role not in (None, "author", "reviewer"):
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"Profile '{name}' has unsupported role {role!r}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -228,35 +124,20 @@ def migrate_v1_to_v2(v1_data):
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"Profile '{name}' operation fields must be lists"
|
||||
)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
identity_data["allowed_operations"] = canonicalize_operations(
|
||||
allowed, context=f"profile '{name}' allowed_operations"
|
||||
)
|
||||
identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = canonicalize_operations(
|
||||
forbidden, context=f"profile '{name}' forbidden_operations"
|
||||
)
|
||||
except ValueError as exc:
|
||||
raise ValueError(f"Profile '{name}': {exc}") from exc
|
||||
identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(allowed)
|
||||
identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(forbidden)
|
||||
elif role == "author":
|
||||
identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(AUTHOR_DEFAULT_ALLOWED)
|
||||
identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(AUTHOR_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN)
|
||||
elif role == "reviewer":
|
||||
identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(REVIEWER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED)
|
||||
identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(REVIEWER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN)
|
||||
elif role == "reconciler":
|
||||
identity_data["allowed_operations"] = list(RECONCILER_DEFAULT_ALLOWED)
|
||||
identity_data["forbidden_operations"] = list(RECONCILER_DEFAULT_FORBIDDEN)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"Profile '{name}' has no explicit operation lists and no "
|
||||
"unambiguous author/reviewer role marker (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if role == "reconciler":
|
||||
_assert_reconciler_required_survive(
|
||||
identity_data["allowed_operations"], name
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Nest inside environments/services structure
|
||||
env = environments.setdefault(env_name, {})
|
||||
services = env.setdefault("services", {})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,286 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Mutation-budget classification for auto-mode attempts (#617).
|
||||
|
||||
Mutation budget must count only *server-side* Gitea state changes. A tool call
|
||||
that fails closed before the Gitea API is reached changed nothing on the
|
||||
server, so it must not consume the budget that protects against repeated real
|
||||
mutations.
|
||||
|
||||
The classifier separates four outcome classes plus an explicit ambiguous class:
|
||||
|
||||
``local_validator_rejection``
|
||||
A canonical-content validator (for example the ``[THREAD STATE LEDGER]`` or
|
||||
``## Canonical Issue State`` blocks) rejected the payload before any API
|
||||
call. No server-side state exists.
|
||||
|
||||
``capability_gate_rejection``
|
||||
A profile/permission gate refused the operation before any API call.
|
||||
|
||||
``transport_failure_before_api``
|
||||
The request never reached the Gitea API (transport/EOF/connection error).
|
||||
|
||||
``server_side_mutation``
|
||||
The API succeeded and returned proof of durable state (comment id, review
|
||||
id, merge commit, label result, or an issue/PR state change).
|
||||
|
||||
``ambiguous_requires_readback``
|
||||
The API *was* reached but the result carries no usable proof either way.
|
||||
This fails closed: the attempt is treated as budget-consuming until a
|
||||
read-after-write check proves otherwise, so #617 never weakens the guard
|
||||
that prevents repeated real mutations.
|
||||
|
||||
Only ``server_side_mutation`` consumes budget outright. Every attempt — failed
|
||||
or not — is still recorded in the local attempt ledger so a final report can
|
||||
show local failed attempts, blocked API attempts, and successful server-side
|
||||
mutations separately.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
from datetime import datetime, timezone
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
LOCAL_VALIDATOR_REJECTION = "local_validator_rejection"
|
||||
CAPABILITY_GATE_REJECTION = "capability_gate_rejection"
|
||||
TRANSPORT_FAILURE_BEFORE_API = "transport_failure_before_api"
|
||||
SERVER_SIDE_MUTATION = "server_side_mutation"
|
||||
AMBIGUOUS_REQUIRES_READBACK = "ambiguous_requires_readback"
|
||||
|
||||
CLASSIFICATIONS = (
|
||||
LOCAL_VALIDATOR_REJECTION,
|
||||
CAPABILITY_GATE_REJECTION,
|
||||
TRANSPORT_FAILURE_BEFORE_API,
|
||||
SERVER_SIDE_MUTATION,
|
||||
AMBIGUOUS_REQUIRES_READBACK,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
#: Result fields that prove durable server-side state was created.
|
||||
MUTATION_PROOF_FIELDS = (
|
||||
"comment_id",
|
||||
"review_id",
|
||||
"merge_commit_sha",
|
||||
"label_result",
|
||||
"state_change",
|
||||
"created_pr_number",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
#: Classes that never consume server-side mutation budget.
|
||||
PRE_API_CLASSIFICATIONS = (
|
||||
LOCAL_VALIDATOR_REJECTION,
|
||||
CAPABILITY_GATE_REJECTION,
|
||||
TRANSPORT_FAILURE_BEFORE_API,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
FINAL_REPORT_REQUIRED_FIELDS = (
|
||||
"local_failed_attempts",
|
||||
"blocked_api_attempts",
|
||||
"successful_server_mutations",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _clean(value: Any) -> str:
|
||||
return (value or "").strip() if isinstance(value, str) else str(value or "").strip()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _proof_fields_present(result: dict) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Return the mutation-proof fields carrying a usable value."""
|
||||
present: list[str] = []
|
||||
for field in MUTATION_PROOF_FIELDS:
|
||||
value = result.get(field)
|
||||
if value is None or value is False:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if isinstance(value, str) and not value.strip():
|
||||
continue
|
||||
present.append(field)
|
||||
return present
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _decision(
|
||||
classification: str,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
budget_consumed: bool,
|
||||
requires_readback: bool,
|
||||
reasons: list[str],
|
||||
proof_fields: list[str],
|
||||
api_called: bool | None,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"classification": classification,
|
||||
"budget_consumed": budget_consumed,
|
||||
"requires_readback": requires_readback,
|
||||
"pre_api": classification in PRE_API_CLASSIFICATIONS,
|
||||
"api_called": api_called,
|
||||
"proof_fields": proof_fields,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def classify_mutation_attempt(result: dict | None) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Classify one mutation attempt and decide whether it consumes budget.
|
||||
|
||||
``result`` is the raw dict a Gitea MCP tool returned. The caller does not
|
||||
pre-interpret it: classification is driven by the explicit ``api_called``
|
||||
signal plus the proof fields the tool reports.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
data = dict(result or {})
|
||||
success = bool(data.get("success"))
|
||||
proof_fields = _proof_fields_present(data)
|
||||
api_called = data.get("api_called")
|
||||
|
||||
# An unambiguous success carrying durable proof is a real mutation however
|
||||
# the attempt was labelled upstream.
|
||||
if success and proof_fields:
|
||||
return _decision(
|
||||
SERVER_SIDE_MUTATION,
|
||||
budget_consumed=True,
|
||||
requires_readback=False,
|
||||
reasons=[
|
||||
"API reported success with durable proof field(s): "
|
||||
+ ", ".join(proof_fields)
|
||||
],
|
||||
proof_fields=proof_fields,
|
||||
api_called=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if api_called is False:
|
||||
# Nothing reached the server; pick the precise pre-API class.
|
||||
if data.get("transport_error") or data.get("transport_failed"):
|
||||
return _decision(
|
||||
TRANSPORT_FAILURE_BEFORE_API,
|
||||
budget_consumed=False,
|
||||
requires_readback=False,
|
||||
reasons=["transport failed before the Gitea API was reached"],
|
||||
proof_fields=[],
|
||||
api_called=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if data.get("permission_report") or data.get("capability_blocked"):
|
||||
return _decision(
|
||||
CAPABILITY_GATE_REJECTION,
|
||||
budget_consumed=False,
|
||||
requires_readback=False,
|
||||
reasons=["capability/permission gate refused before any API call"],
|
||||
proof_fields=[],
|
||||
api_called=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return _decision(
|
||||
LOCAL_VALIDATOR_REJECTION,
|
||||
budget_consumed=False,
|
||||
requires_readback=False,
|
||||
reasons=[
|
||||
"local validator rejected the payload before any API call; "
|
||||
"no server-side state was created"
|
||||
],
|
||||
proof_fields=[],
|
||||
api_called=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if api_called is True:
|
||||
if success:
|
||||
reason = (
|
||||
"API reported success but returned no durable proof field; "
|
||||
"read-after-write verification required before counting budget"
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
reason = (
|
||||
"API was reached and the outcome carries no durable proof; "
|
||||
"read-after-write verification required before counting budget"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return _decision(
|
||||
AMBIGUOUS_REQUIRES_READBACK,
|
||||
budget_consumed=True,
|
||||
requires_readback=True,
|
||||
reasons=[reason],
|
||||
proof_fields=proof_fields,
|
||||
api_called=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# ``api_called`` was not reported at all. Fail closed rather than assuming
|
||||
# nothing happened.
|
||||
return _decision(
|
||||
AMBIGUOUS_REQUIRES_READBACK,
|
||||
budget_consumed=True,
|
||||
requires_readback=True,
|
||||
reasons=[
|
||||
"attempt did not report 'api_called'; cannot prove the request "
|
||||
"stopped before the Gitea API, so the attempt fails closed"
|
||||
],
|
||||
proof_fields=proof_fields,
|
||||
api_called=None,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def record_attempt(
|
||||
ledger: list[dict] | None,
|
||||
result: dict | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
operation: str = "",
|
||||
timestamp: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Append one classified attempt to the local ledger and return the entry.
|
||||
|
||||
Every attempt is recorded, including the ones that consume no budget: the
|
||||
point of #617 is that failed local attempts stay visible without being
|
||||
miscounted as Gitea mutations.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
entries = ledger if isinstance(ledger, list) else []
|
||||
entry = {
|
||||
"operation": _clean(operation),
|
||||
"timestamp": _clean(timestamp) or datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
|
||||
**classify_mutation_attempt(result),
|
||||
}
|
||||
entries.append(entry)
|
||||
return entry
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def summarize_attempt_ledger(ledger: list[dict] | None) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Summarize a ledger into the categories a final report must show."""
|
||||
entries = [e for e in (ledger or []) if isinstance(e, dict)]
|
||||
|
||||
def _count(*classifications: str) -> int:
|
||||
return sum(1 for e in entries if e.get("classification") in classifications)
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"total_attempts": len(entries),
|
||||
"local_failed_attempts": _count(LOCAL_VALIDATOR_REJECTION),
|
||||
"blocked_api_attempts": _count(
|
||||
CAPABILITY_GATE_REJECTION, TRANSPORT_FAILURE_BEFORE_API
|
||||
),
|
||||
"successful_server_mutations": _count(SERVER_SIDE_MUTATION),
|
||||
"ambiguous_attempts": _count(AMBIGUOUS_REQUIRES_READBACK),
|
||||
"budget_consumed": sum(1 for e in entries if e.get("budget_consumed")),
|
||||
"requires_readback": any(e.get("requires_readback") for e in entries),
|
||||
"entries": entries,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_final_report_mutation_accounting(
|
||||
report: dict | None,
|
||||
ledger: list[dict] | None,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Fail closed when a report's mutation accounting contradicts the ledger."""
|
||||
data = dict(report or {})
|
||||
summary = summarize_attempt_ledger(ledger)
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
|
||||
for field in FINAL_REPORT_REQUIRED_FIELDS:
|
||||
if field not in data:
|
||||
reasons.append(f"final report omits required field '{field}'")
|
||||
continue
|
||||
claimed = data.get(field)
|
||||
actual = summary[field]
|
||||
if claimed != actual:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"final report claims {field}={claimed} but the attempt ledger "
|
||||
f"shows {actual}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if summary["requires_readback"] and not data.get("readback_verified"):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"ledger contains an ambiguous attempt; final report must record "
|
||||
"'readback_verified' proof before claiming mutation accounting"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"valid": not reasons,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"ledger_summary": {k: v for k, v in summary.items() if k != "entries"},
|
||||
}
|
||||
+18
-177
@@ -55,86 +55,24 @@ def resolve_namespace_workspace(
|
||||
process_project_root: str,
|
||||
env: dict[str, str] | os._Environ | None = None,
|
||||
session_lease_worktree: str | None = None,
|
||||
session_lock_worktree: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
demotions: list[str] | None = None,
|
||||
verify_paths: bool = False,
|
||||
durable_author_result: dict | None = None,
|
||||
) -> tuple[str, str]:
|
||||
"""Return ``(resolved_path, binding_source)`` for *role_kind*.
|
||||
|
||||
With *verify_paths*, env-sourced candidates whose path no longer exists
|
||||
are demoted (#702) for non-author roles: a binding to a deleted worktree
|
||||
can never name a valid task workspace, so resolution falls through to the
|
||||
next candidate. Explicit arguments are never demoted — a caller-declared
|
||||
path must fail loudly downstream rather than silently rebind. Demotion
|
||||
notes are appended to *demotions* when provided.
|
||||
|
||||
Author role (#618): never demotes a missing configured binding to the
|
||||
control checkout. When *verify_paths* is true, resolution goes through
|
||||
:func:`author_mutation_worktree.resolve_durable_author_worktree` so
|
||||
mutations either use an explicit validated worktree, derive from the
|
||||
active author issue lock, or fail closed. Runtime-context and mutation
|
||||
guards resolve through :func:`resolve_namespace_mutation_context`, which
|
||||
always verifies.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
"""Return ``(resolved_path, binding_source)`` for *role_kind*."""
|
||||
env_map = env if env is not None else os.environ
|
||||
role = normalize_role_kind(role_kind, profile_name=profile_name)
|
||||
role_env_key = ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS[role]
|
||||
|
||||
# #618: durable author resolution — no silent control/master fallback.
|
||||
if role == "author" and verify_paths:
|
||||
durable = durable_author_result
|
||||
if durable is None:
|
||||
durable = amw.resolve_durable_author_worktree(
|
||||
worktree_path=worktree_path,
|
||||
worktree=worktree,
|
||||
process_project_root=process_project_root,
|
||||
active_worktree_env=_env_value(env_map, ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV),
|
||||
author_worktree_env=_env_value(env_map, AUTHOR_WORKTREE_ENV),
|
||||
session_lock_worktree=session_lock_worktree,
|
||||
profile_name=profile_name,
|
||||
# Path selection only here; full validation is re-run in
|
||||
# resolve_namespace_mutation_context with the canonical root.
|
||||
validate=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
workspace = durable.get("workspace_path") or os.path.realpath(
|
||||
process_project_root
|
||||
)
|
||||
source = durable.get("workspace_binding_source") or "no author worktree binding"
|
||||
if demotions is not None and durable.get("bound_worktree_missing"):
|
||||
demotions.append(
|
||||
f"{source} '{workspace}' not demoted: {amw.BOUND_WORKTREE_MISSING_MESSAGE}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return workspace, source
|
||||
|
||||
for candidate, source, env_sourced in (
|
||||
(worktree_path, "worktree_path argument", False),
|
||||
(worktree, "worktree argument", False),
|
||||
(_env_value(env_map, ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV),
|
||||
f"{ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV} environment variable", True),
|
||||
(_env_value(env_map, role_env_key),
|
||||
f"{role_env_key} environment variable", True),
|
||||
for candidate, source in (
|
||||
(worktree_path, "worktree_path argument"),
|
||||
(worktree, "worktree argument"),
|
||||
(_env_value(env_map, ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV), f"{ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV} environment variable"),
|
||||
(_env_value(env_map, role_env_key), f"{role_env_key} environment variable"),
|
||||
(session_lease_worktree if role in {"reviewer", "merger"} else None,
|
||||
"reviewer PR lease worktree", False),
|
||||
# Author lock derivation is handled by the durable path above when
|
||||
# verify_paths is true; when verify_paths is false, surface the lock
|
||||
# path as a non-demoted candidate so tooling can inspect it.
|
||||
(session_lock_worktree if role == "author" else None,
|
||||
"active author issue lock worktree", False),
|
||||
"reviewer PR lease worktree"),
|
||||
):
|
||||
text = (candidate or "").strip()
|
||||
if not text:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
real = os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(text))
|
||||
if verify_paths and env_sourced and not os.path.isdir(real):
|
||||
if demotions is not None:
|
||||
demotions.append(
|
||||
f"{source} '{real}' demoted: path no longer exists "
|
||||
"(stale binding, #702)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
return real, source
|
||||
if text:
|
||||
return os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(text)), source
|
||||
|
||||
return os.path.realpath(process_project_root), "MCP server process root (default)"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -146,67 +84,21 @@ def resolve_namespace_mutation_context(
|
||||
process_project_root: str,
|
||||
env: dict[str, str] | os._Environ | None = None,
|
||||
session_lease_worktree: str | None = None,
|
||||
session_lock_worktree: str | None = None,
|
||||
worktree: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
configured_canonical_root: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Shared workspace resolution for runtime_context and mutation guards.
|
||||
|
||||
When *configured_canonical_root* is supplied (a cross-repository namespace
|
||||
bound to an external target repository, #706), the canonical repository root
|
||||
is that configured target rather than the MCP install checkout. This keeps
|
||||
the branches-only / worktree-membership guards (#274) evaluating against the
|
||||
repository the namespace actually mutates. Without it the single-repo
|
||||
default is preserved: the canonical root follows the process checkout.
|
||||
|
||||
Author role (#618): uses durable worktree resolution (explicit path, env,
|
||||
or active issue lock) and never silently falls back to the control checkout.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
demotions: list[str] = []
|
||||
env_map = env if env is not None else os.environ
|
||||
process_root = os.path.realpath(process_project_root)
|
||||
role = normalize_role_kind(role_kind, profile_name=profile_name)
|
||||
configured = (configured_canonical_root or "").strip()
|
||||
if configured:
|
||||
canonical_root = os.path.realpath(configured)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
canonical_root = amw.resolve_canonical_repo_root(process_root, process_root)
|
||||
|
||||
durable: dict | None = None
|
||||
if role == "author":
|
||||
durable = amw.resolve_durable_author_worktree(
|
||||
worktree_path=worktree_path,
|
||||
worktree=worktree,
|
||||
process_project_root=process_root,
|
||||
active_worktree_env=_env_value(env_map, ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV),
|
||||
author_worktree_env=_env_value(env_map, AUTHOR_WORKTREE_ENV),
|
||||
session_lock_worktree=session_lock_worktree,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=canonical_root,
|
||||
profile_name=profile_name,
|
||||
validate=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
workspace = durable["workspace_path"]
|
||||
binding_source = durable["workspace_binding_source"]
|
||||
if durable.get("bound_worktree_missing"):
|
||||
demotions.append(
|
||||
f"{binding_source} '{workspace}' not demoted: "
|
||||
f"{amw.BOUND_WORKTREE_MISSING_MESSAGE}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
"""Shared workspace resolution for runtime_context and mutation guards."""
|
||||
workspace, binding_source = resolve_namespace_workspace(
|
||||
role_kind=role,
|
||||
role_kind=role_kind,
|
||||
worktree_path=worktree_path,
|
||||
worktree=worktree,
|
||||
process_project_root=process_project_root,
|
||||
env=env,
|
||||
session_lease_worktree=session_lease_worktree,
|
||||
session_lock_worktree=session_lock_worktree,
|
||||
profile_name=profile_name,
|
||||
demotions=demotions,
|
||||
verify_paths=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
process_root = os.path.realpath(process_project_root)
|
||||
role = normalize_role_kind(role_kind, profile_name=profile_name)
|
||||
pollution = assess_foreign_role_worktree_pollution(
|
||||
role_kind=role,
|
||||
resolved_workspace=workspace,
|
||||
@@ -214,26 +106,16 @@ def resolve_namespace_mutation_context(
|
||||
env=env,
|
||||
profile_name=profile_name,
|
||||
)
|
||||
result = {
|
||||
canonical_root = amw.resolve_canonical_repo_root(process_root, process_root)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"workspace_path": workspace,
|
||||
"workspace_binding_source": binding_source,
|
||||
"workspace_role_kind": role,
|
||||
"ignored_bindings": demotions + (pollution.get("ignored_bindings") or []),
|
||||
"ignored_bindings": pollution.get("ignored_bindings") or [],
|
||||
"process_project_root": process_root,
|
||||
"canonical_repo_root": canonical_root,
|
||||
"roots_aligned": canonical_root == process_root,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if durable is not None:
|
||||
result["author_worktree_resolution"] = durable
|
||||
result["bound_worktree_missing"] = bool(durable.get("bound_worktree_missing"))
|
||||
result["path_exists"] = durable.get("path_exists")
|
||||
result["in_git_worktree_list"] = durable.get("in_git_worktree_list")
|
||||
result["inspected_git_root"] = durable.get("inspected_git_root")
|
||||
result["author_worktree_block"] = bool(durable.get("block"))
|
||||
result["author_worktree_reasons"] = list(durable.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
result["author_worktree_blocker_kind"] = durable.get("blocker_kind")
|
||||
result["operator_recovery"] = durable.get("operator_recovery")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_foreign_role_worktree_pollution(
|
||||
@@ -310,29 +192,10 @@ def format_namespace_workspace_binding_error(
|
||||
reasons: list[str] | None = None,
|
||||
ignored_bindings: list[str] | None = None,
|
||||
dirty_files: list[str] | None = None,
|
||||
operator_recovery: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> str:
|
||||
"""Canonical error when namespace workspace binding blocks mutations."""
|
||||
role = normalize_role_kind(role_kind)
|
||||
reason_list = list(reasons or [])
|
||||
# #618: prefer the durable author missing-worktree message when present.
|
||||
if role == "author" and any(
|
||||
amw.BOUND_WORKTREE_MISSING_MESSAGE in r for r in reason_list
|
||||
):
|
||||
return amw.format_bound_worktree_missing_error(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"reasons": reason_list,
|
||||
"binding_source": binding_source,
|
||||
"configured_path": workspace_path,
|
||||
"role_kind": role,
|
||||
"operator_recovery": operator_recovery
|
||||
or amw.OPERATOR_RECOVERY_RECREATE_REPOINT,
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
workspace = os.path.realpath(workspace_path)
|
||||
except OSError:
|
||||
workspace = workspace_path
|
||||
parts = [
|
||||
f"Namespace workspace binding blocked ({role} namespace, #510): "
|
||||
f"resolved workspace '{workspace}' via {binding_source}."
|
||||
@@ -347,11 +210,8 @@ def format_namespace_workspace_binding_error(
|
||||
+ ", ".join(dirty_files)
|
||||
+ "."
|
||||
)
|
||||
if reason_list:
|
||||
parts.append("Details: " + "; ".join(reason_list) + ".")
|
||||
if operator_recovery:
|
||||
parts.append(f"Operator recovery: {operator_recovery}")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
if reasons:
|
||||
parts.append("Details: " + "; ".join(reasons) + ".")
|
||||
parts.append(
|
||||
"Remediation: reconnect or relaunch the MCP server from a clean dedicated "
|
||||
f"branches/ {role} worktree, set "
|
||||
@@ -370,10 +230,8 @@ def assess_namespace_mutation_workspace(
|
||||
process_project_root: str,
|
||||
env: dict[str, str] | os._Environ | None = None,
|
||||
session_lease_worktree: str | None = None,
|
||||
session_lock_worktree: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
current_branch: str | None = None,
|
||||
configured_canonical_root: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Evaluate namespace workspace binding before preflight/mutation."""
|
||||
ctx = resolve_namespace_mutation_context(
|
||||
@@ -383,9 +241,7 @@ def assess_namespace_mutation_workspace(
|
||||
process_project_root=process_project_root,
|
||||
env=env,
|
||||
session_lease_worktree=session_lease_worktree,
|
||||
session_lock_worktree=session_lock_worktree,
|
||||
profile_name=profile_name,
|
||||
configured_canonical_root=configured_canonical_root,
|
||||
)
|
||||
mutation_workspace = ctx["workspace_path"]
|
||||
binding_source = ctx["workspace_binding_source"]
|
||||
@@ -408,16 +264,7 @@ def assess_namespace_mutation_workspace(
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
reasons = list(metadata.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
operator_recovery = ctx.get("operator_recovery")
|
||||
if role == "author":
|
||||
# #618 durable resolution already validated existence, membership,
|
||||
# branches/, lock ownership, and traversal safety when present.
|
||||
durable_reasons = list(ctx.get("author_worktree_reasons") or [])
|
||||
if durable_reasons:
|
||||
reasons.extend(durable_reasons)
|
||||
elif ctx.get("author_worktree_block"):
|
||||
reasons.append(amw.BOUND_WORKTREE_MISSING_MESSAGE)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
branches = amw.assess_author_mutation_worktree(
|
||||
workspace_path=mutation_workspace,
|
||||
project_root=ctx["canonical_repo_root"],
|
||||
@@ -457,10 +304,4 @@ def assess_namespace_mutation_workspace(
|
||||
"metadata_only": metadata.get("metadata_only", False),
|
||||
"declared_worktree_path": metadata.get("declared_worktree_path"),
|
||||
"ignored_bindings": pollution.get("ignored_bindings") or [],
|
||||
"bound_worktree_missing": bool(ctx.get("bound_worktree_missing")),
|
||||
"path_exists": ctx.get("path_exists"),
|
||||
"in_git_worktree_list": ctx.get("in_git_worktree_list"),
|
||||
"inspected_git_root": ctx.get("inspected_git_root"),
|
||||
"operator_recovery": operator_recovery,
|
||||
"blocker_kind": ctx.get("author_worktree_blocker_kind"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -86,22 +86,6 @@ _WRONG_BRANCH_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"deleted branch (?:does not match|!=|differs from) (?:merged )?pr head",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# #698: canonical reviewer lease lifecycle operations are NOT post-merge
|
||||
# cleanup. Releasing a reviewer PR lease (or posting its terminal
|
||||
# phase=released marker) happens after every review — merged or not — and
|
||||
# must never trigger the post-merge branch/worktree cleanup checklist.
|
||||
_LEASE_LIFECYCLE_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"(?:gitea_release_reviewer_pr_lease|gitea_abandon_workflow_lease|"
|
||||
r"release[d]? (?:the )?(?:reviewer|workflow) (?:pr )?lease|"
|
||||
r"reviewer (?:pr )?lease release[d]?|"
|
||||
r"lease (?:marker|comment).{0,40}phase\s*[:=]\s*released|"
|
||||
r"phase\s*[:=]\s*released)",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
_CLEANUP_MUTATIONS_VALUE_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"cleanup mutations\s*:\s*([^\n]+)",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _claims_remote_delete(text: str) -> bool:
|
||||
@@ -220,19 +204,16 @@ def assess_post_merge_cleanup_proof(
|
||||
for field in _worktree_cleanup_fields_present(text)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if (remote_delete or worktree_remove) and not (remote_delete or worktree_remove):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
if not remote_delete and not worktree_remove:
|
||||
value_match = _CLEANUP_MUTATIONS_VALUE_RE.search(text)
|
||||
value = (value_match.group(1).strip() if value_match else "")
|
||||
value_lower = value.lower()
|
||||
substantive = bool(value) and value_lower not in {
|
||||
"none", "n/a", "not applicable",
|
||||
}
|
||||
# #698: reviewer lease release / terminal lease markers are lease
|
||||
# lifecycle, not post-merge cleanup — no checklist owed.
|
||||
lease_lifecycle_only = substantive and bool(
|
||||
_LEASE_LIFECYCLE_RE.search(value)
|
||||
cleanup_mutations = re.search(
|
||||
r"cleanup mutations\s*:\s*(?!none\b)\S",
|
||||
text,
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if substantive and not lease_lifecycle_only:
|
||||
if cleanup_mutations:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"cleanup mutations reported without post-merge cleanup proof checklist"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,279 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Reconciler authorization gate for post-merge moot-lease cleanup (#745).
|
||||
|
||||
``gitea_cleanup_post_merge_moot_lease`` (#515) posts a terminal ``phase:
|
||||
released`` lease marker — a real, durable mutation of the PR lease ledger.
|
||||
Before #745 it was gated on permissions alone (``gitea.read`` to enter,
|
||||
``gitea.pr.comment`` to apply) with no canonical task and no role binding, so
|
||||
any profile carrying ``gitea.pr.comment`` reached the mutation path while the
|
||||
reconciler could not satisfy the operator-required resolve-exact-task ->
|
||||
mutation sequence.
|
||||
|
||||
This module holds the pure half of that gate:
|
||||
|
||||
* the canonical task name and its tool-name alias;
|
||||
* an **append-only** in-process ledger of read-only dry-run assessments;
|
||||
* ``assess_apply_authorization``, which decides whether an apply may proceed.
|
||||
|
||||
Apply is authorized only when all of the following hold:
|
||||
|
||||
* the session resolved exactly the cleanup task (no other task substitutes);
|
||||
* the active profile role is ``reconciler``;
|
||||
* a prior dry run in this session recorded ``lease_moot`` and
|
||||
``cleanup_allowed`` for the *same* repository, PR, lease session, candidate
|
||||
head and lease marker id;
|
||||
* the live assessment still agrees with that evidence, so a lease superseded
|
||||
between the dry run and the apply fails closed;
|
||||
* any caller-supplied expectations match the live lease exactly.
|
||||
|
||||
Everything else fails closed. The ledger is only ever appended to — a
|
||||
superseded dry run stays visible as history instead of being rewritten — which
|
||||
keeps the cleanup audit trail append-only end to end.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
from datetime import datetime, timezone
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
CLEANUP_TASK = "cleanup_post_merge_moot_lease"
|
||||
CLEANUP_TOOL_ALIAS = "gitea_cleanup_post_merge_moot_lease"
|
||||
REQUIRED_ROLE = "reconciler"
|
||||
REQUIRED_PERMISSION = "gitea.pr.comment"
|
||||
|
||||
# The read-only assessment stays reachable under gitea.read for every role —
|
||||
# the convention shared with cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock and
|
||||
# cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease — so any namespace can diagnose a
|
||||
# stuck lease. Only the apply path demands CLEANUP_TASK + REQUIRED_ROLE.
|
||||
ASSESSMENT_PERMISSION = "gitea.read"
|
||||
|
||||
_DRY_RUN_LEDGER: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _norm(value: Any) -> str:
|
||||
return str(value or "").strip()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _norm_comment_id(value: Any) -> int | None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return int(value)
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def record_dry_run(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
repository_slug: str | None,
|
||||
lease_moot: bool,
|
||||
cleanup_allowed: bool,
|
||||
session_id: str | None,
|
||||
candidate_head: str | None,
|
||||
lease_comment_id: Any,
|
||||
recorded_at: datetime | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Append one read-only assessment to the dry-run ledger.
|
||||
|
||||
Never rewrites or removes a prior entry: repeated dry runs accumulate and
|
||||
``latest_dry_run`` returns the newest matching one.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
entry = {
|
||||
"task": CLEANUP_TASK,
|
||||
"pr_number": int(pr_number),
|
||||
"repository_slug": _norm(repository_slug) or None,
|
||||
"lease_moot": bool(lease_moot),
|
||||
"cleanup_allowed": bool(cleanup_allowed),
|
||||
"session_id": _norm(session_id) or None,
|
||||
"candidate_head": _norm(candidate_head) or None,
|
||||
"lease_comment_id": _norm_comment_id(lease_comment_id),
|
||||
"recorded_at": (recorded_at or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).isoformat(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
_DRY_RUN_LEDGER.append(entry)
|
||||
return dict(entry)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def dry_run_history() -> tuple[dict[str, Any], ...]:
|
||||
"""Immutable view of every recorded dry run, oldest first."""
|
||||
return tuple(dict(entry) for entry in _DRY_RUN_LEDGER)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def latest_dry_run(
|
||||
*, pr_number: int, repository_slug: str | None
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
"""Newest dry-run evidence for this repository + PR, or None."""
|
||||
wanted_repo = _norm(repository_slug)
|
||||
for entry in reversed(_DRY_RUN_LEDGER):
|
||||
if entry["pr_number"] != int(pr_number):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if _norm(entry.get("repository_slug")) != wanted_repo:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
return dict(entry)
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _reset_for_testing() -> None:
|
||||
"""Drop ledger state between tests. Never called by production paths."""
|
||||
_DRY_RUN_LEDGER.clear()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_apply_authorization(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
repository_slug: str | None,
|
||||
resolved_task: str | None,
|
||||
active_role_kind: str | None,
|
||||
assessment: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
evidence: dict[str, Any] | None,
|
||||
expected_session_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
expected_candidate_head: str | None = None,
|
||||
expected_lease_comment_id: Any = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Decide whether a moot-lease cleanup apply is authorized (fail closed).
|
||||
|
||||
Returns ``{"allowed", "reasons", "blocker_kind", "evidence_matched", ...}``.
|
||||
``allowed`` is True only when every check passes; each failure contributes a
|
||||
reason so the caller can report all of them together.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
blocker_kind: str | None = None
|
||||
|
||||
def _block(kind: str, reason: str) -> None:
|
||||
nonlocal blocker_kind
|
||||
reasons.append(reason)
|
||||
if blocker_kind is None:
|
||||
blocker_kind = kind
|
||||
|
||||
# 1. Exact resolved cleanup task. Resolving any other task — including a
|
||||
# sibling reconciler task — does not authorize this mutation.
|
||||
if _norm(resolved_task) != CLEANUP_TASK:
|
||||
_block(
|
||||
"unresolved_cleanup_task",
|
||||
"post-merge moot-lease cleanup requires the session to resolve "
|
||||
f"task '{CLEANUP_TASK}' immediately before apply; resolved task is "
|
||||
f"{resolved_task!r} (fail closed)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# 2. Dedicated reconciler role, enforced independently of the permission.
|
||||
if _norm(active_role_kind) != REQUIRED_ROLE:
|
||||
_block(
|
||||
"wrong_role",
|
||||
f"profile role {active_role_kind!r} cannot apply post-merge "
|
||||
f"moot-lease cleanup; required role is {REQUIRED_ROLE} even when "
|
||||
f"{REQUIRED_PERMISSION} is present (fail closed)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# 3. Canonical repository identity must be established, never inferred from
|
||||
# request parameters.
|
||||
if not _norm(repository_slug):
|
||||
_block(
|
||||
"repository_binding",
|
||||
"no canonical repository identity could be established for the "
|
||||
"cleanup target (fail closed)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# 4. The live safety assessment must still say the lease is moot/cleanable.
|
||||
if not assessment.get("is_moot") or not assessment.get("cleanup_allowed"):
|
||||
_block(
|
||||
"lease_not_moot",
|
||||
"live assessment does not report a moot, cleanable lease on PR "
|
||||
f"#{pr_number} (lease_moot={bool(assessment.get('is_moot'))}, "
|
||||
f"cleanup_allowed={bool(assessment.get('cleanup_allowed'))}) "
|
||||
"(fail closed)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
live = assessment.get("active_lease") or {}
|
||||
live_session = _norm(live.get("session_id"))
|
||||
live_head = _norm(live.get("candidate_head"))
|
||||
live_comment_id = _norm_comment_id(live.get("comment_id"))
|
||||
|
||||
# 5. A lease missing identifying fields is malformed and unsafe to act on.
|
||||
if not live_session or not live_head or live_comment_id is None:
|
||||
_block(
|
||||
"malformed_lease",
|
||||
"active lease is malformed: session_id / candidate_head / "
|
||||
"comment_id must all be present to authorize cleanup "
|
||||
f"(session_id={live.get('session_id')!r}, "
|
||||
f"candidate_head={live.get('candidate_head')!r}, "
|
||||
f"comment_id={live.get('comment_id')!r}) (fail closed)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# 6. Caller expectations, when supplied, must match the live lease exactly.
|
||||
if expected_session_id is not None and _norm(expected_session_id) != live_session:
|
||||
_block(
|
||||
"lease_mismatch",
|
||||
f"expected lease session {expected_session_id!r} does not match the "
|
||||
f"live lease session {live.get('session_id')!r} (fail closed)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
if (
|
||||
expected_candidate_head is not None
|
||||
and _norm(expected_candidate_head) != live_head
|
||||
):
|
||||
_block(
|
||||
"lease_mismatch",
|
||||
f"expected candidate head {expected_candidate_head!r} does not "
|
||||
f"match the live lease head {live.get('candidate_head')!r} "
|
||||
"(fail closed)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
if expected_lease_comment_id is not None and (
|
||||
_norm_comment_id(expected_lease_comment_id) != live_comment_id
|
||||
):
|
||||
_block(
|
||||
"lease_mismatch",
|
||||
f"expected lease marker {expected_lease_comment_id!r} does not "
|
||||
f"match the live lease marker {live.get('comment_id')!r} "
|
||||
"(fail closed)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# 7. Matching dry-run evidence recorded earlier in this session.
|
||||
evidence_matched = False
|
||||
if evidence is None:
|
||||
_block(
|
||||
"missing_dry_run_evidence",
|
||||
"no read-only dry run recorded for this repository and PR; run the "
|
||||
"tool with apply=false and confirm lease_moot / cleanup_allowed "
|
||||
"before applying (fail closed)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif not evidence.get("lease_moot") or not evidence.get("cleanup_allowed"):
|
||||
_block(
|
||||
"dry_run_not_allowed",
|
||||
"recorded dry run did not report an allowed cleanup "
|
||||
f"(lease_moot={bool(evidence.get('lease_moot'))}, "
|
||||
f"cleanup_allowed={bool(evidence.get('cleanup_allowed'))}) "
|
||||
"(fail closed)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif int(evidence.get("pr_number") or -1) != int(pr_number) or _norm(
|
||||
evidence.get("repository_slug")
|
||||
) != _norm(repository_slug):
|
||||
_block(
|
||||
"dry_run_mismatch",
|
||||
"recorded dry run targets a different repository or PR "
|
||||
f"({evidence.get('repository_slug')}#{evidence.get('pr_number')} vs "
|
||||
f"{repository_slug}#{pr_number}) (fail closed)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif (
|
||||
_norm(evidence.get("session_id")) != live_session
|
||||
or _norm(evidence.get("candidate_head")) != live_head
|
||||
or _norm_comment_id(evidence.get("lease_comment_id")) != live_comment_id
|
||||
):
|
||||
_block(
|
||||
"superseded_lease",
|
||||
"the lease changed after the recorded dry run (dry run: "
|
||||
f"session={evidence.get('session_id')!r}, "
|
||||
f"head={evidence.get('candidate_head')!r}, "
|
||||
f"marker={evidence.get('lease_comment_id')!r}; live: "
|
||||
f"session={live.get('session_id')!r}, "
|
||||
f"head={live.get('candidate_head')!r}, "
|
||||
f"marker={live.get('comment_id')!r}); re-run the dry run "
|
||||
"(fail closed)",
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
evidence_matched = True
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"allowed": not reasons,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"blocker_kind": blocker_kind,
|
||||
"evidence_matched": evidence_matched,
|
||||
"required_task": CLEANUP_TASK,
|
||||
"required_role_kind": REQUIRED_ROLE,
|
||||
"required_permission": REQUIRED_PERMISSION,
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,849 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""PR synchronization and conflict-remediation lifecycle (#PR-SYNC).
|
||||
|
||||
Pure assessment helpers for:
|
||||
|
||||
* ``gitea_assess_pr_sync_status`` — recommend the next sanctioned action for an
|
||||
open PR when the base branch advances, approvals go stale, or conflicts appear.
|
||||
* ``gitea_update_pr_branch_by_merge`` preflight — author-only, fail-closed pin
|
||||
of both PR head and live base head; never rebase/force-push.
|
||||
|
||||
All recommendation logic is hermetic (no network) so unit tests cover every
|
||||
acceptance path without Gitea credentials.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import re
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
_FULL_SHA = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{40}$", re.IGNORECASE)
|
||||
|
||||
# Recommended next actions (controller / skill vocabulary).
|
||||
ACTION_MERGE_NOW = "merge_now"
|
||||
ACTION_UPDATE_BRANCH_BY_MERGE = "update_branch_by_merge"
|
||||
ACTION_AUTHOR_CONFLICT_REMEDIATION = "author_conflict_remediation"
|
||||
ACTION_FRESH_REVIEW_REQUIRED = "fresh_review_required"
|
||||
ACTION_BLOCKED = "blocked"
|
||||
|
||||
_VALID_ACTIONS = frozenset({
|
||||
ACTION_MERGE_NOW,
|
||||
ACTION_UPDATE_BRANCH_BY_MERGE,
|
||||
ACTION_AUTHOR_CONFLICT_REMEDIATION,
|
||||
ACTION_FRESH_REVIEW_REQUIRED,
|
||||
ACTION_BLOCKED,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
# Author-only mutation; reviewer/merger must never update author branches.
|
||||
_AUTHOR_UPDATE_ROLES = frozenset({"author"})
|
||||
_DENIED_UPDATE_ROLES = frozenset({"reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "mixed", "limited"})
|
||||
|
||||
# Allowed Gitea update style — merge only (never rebase).
|
||||
UPDATE_STYLE_MERGE = "merge"
|
||||
_FORBIDDEN_UPDATE_STYLES = frozenset({"rebase", "rebase-merge", "squash", "force"})
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Commit check classifications (#751) ──────────────────────────────────
|
||||
# Gitea's *combined* commit status reports ``state: pending`` both when a real
|
||||
# check is executing and when the status-context collection is empty. Reading
|
||||
# ``state`` alone therefore cannot distinguish "CI is running" from "no CI
|
||||
# exists", which permanently blocks a merge-ready PR that no check will ever
|
||||
# report on. These classifications are derived from the actual context
|
||||
# collection plus the live branch-protection policy.
|
||||
CHECKS_SUCCESS = "success"
|
||||
CHECKS_FAILURE = "failure"
|
||||
CHECKS_PENDING = "pending"
|
||||
CHECKS_NONE = "none" # configured/produced nothing
|
||||
CHECKS_NOT_REQUIRED = "not_required" # protection does not require checks
|
||||
CHECKS_MISSING_REQUIRED = "missing_required" # required contexts have no result
|
||||
CHECKS_UNKNOWN = "unknown" # indeterminable — fail closed
|
||||
|
||||
# Values that permit merge_now when checks are required.
|
||||
_CHECKS_OK = frozenset({"success", "passed", "ok", "skipped", "not_required"})
|
||||
|
||||
# Raw per-context state vocabularies reported by Gitea.
|
||||
_CTX_SUCCESS = frozenset({"success", "passed", "ok"})
|
||||
_CTX_FAILURE = frozenset({"failure", "failed", "error", "cancelled", "canceled"})
|
||||
_CTX_PENDING = frozenset({"pending", "running", "queued", "expected"})
|
||||
_CTX_SKIPPED = frozenset({"skipped", "neutral"})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _normalize_context_rows(statuses: Any) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
|
||||
"""Reduce a raw status collection to newest-wins ``{context, state}`` rows.
|
||||
|
||||
Gitea returns the status collection newest-first, so the first row seen for
|
||||
a context wins. Rows without a usable state are discarded rather than being
|
||||
silently treated as passing.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
rows: list[dict[str, str]] = []
|
||||
seen: set[str] = set()
|
||||
if not isinstance(statuses, list):
|
||||
return rows
|
||||
for raw in statuses:
|
||||
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
context = (raw.get("context") or raw.get("name") or "").strip()
|
||||
state = (raw.get("status") or raw.get("state") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if not state:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
key = context or f"__unnamed__{len(rows)}"
|
||||
if key in seen:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
seen.add(key)
|
||||
rows.append({"context": context, "state": state})
|
||||
return rows
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _aggregate_context_states(rows: list[dict[str, str]]) -> str:
|
||||
"""Fail-closed aggregate: failure > pending > unknown-state > success."""
|
||||
states = {row["state"] for row in rows}
|
||||
if states & _CTX_FAILURE:
|
||||
return CHECKS_FAILURE
|
||||
if states & _CTX_PENDING:
|
||||
return CHECKS_PENDING
|
||||
unresolved = states - _CTX_SUCCESS - _CTX_SKIPPED
|
||||
if unresolved:
|
||||
# An unrecognized context state must never read as success.
|
||||
return CHECKS_UNKNOWN
|
||||
return CHECKS_SUCCESS
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def classify_commit_checks(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
combined_state: str | None = None,
|
||||
statuses: Any = None,
|
||||
checks_enabled: bool | None = None,
|
||||
required_contexts: Any = None,
|
||||
policy_determinable: bool = True,
|
||||
status_determinable: bool = True,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Classify head checks from live evidence (#751).
|
||||
|
||||
``combined_state`` is deliberately **not** authoritative: it is recorded for
|
||||
observability but never used to infer that CI is executing. The context
|
||||
collection and the live protection policy decide.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns ``checks_status`` (one of the ``CHECKS_*`` values), the derived
|
||||
``checks_required`` flag, and structured ``reasons``.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
rows = _normalize_context_rows(statuses)
|
||||
required = [
|
||||
str(ctx).strip()
|
||||
for ctx in (required_contexts or [])
|
||||
if str(ctx or "").strip()
|
||||
]
|
||||
observed_combined = (combined_state or "").strip().lower() or None
|
||||
|
||||
result: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"checks_status": CHECKS_UNKNOWN,
|
||||
"checks_required": True,
|
||||
"combined_state": observed_combined,
|
||||
"context_count": len(rows),
|
||||
"observed_contexts": [row["context"] for row in rows],
|
||||
"required_contexts": required,
|
||||
"missing_required_contexts": [],
|
||||
"policy_determinable": bool(policy_determinable),
|
||||
"status_determinable": bool(status_determinable),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Policy unreadable → never assume checks are optional.
|
||||
if not policy_determinable:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"branch-protection check policy could not be read; cannot prove "
|
||||
"whether status checks are required (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if checks_enabled is False:
|
||||
result["checks_required"] = False
|
||||
result["checks_status"] = CHECKS_NOT_REQUIRED
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"live branch protection does not require status checks for the base "
|
||||
"branch; head status contexts do not gate merge"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if checks_enabled is None:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"branch-protection status-check requirement is indeterminate "
|
||||
"(fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
# Checks are required from here on.
|
||||
if not status_determinable:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"head commit status collection could not be read while branch "
|
||||
"protection requires status checks (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if required:
|
||||
by_context = {row["context"]: row["state"] for row in rows if row["context"]}
|
||||
missing = [ctx for ctx in required if ctx not in by_context]
|
||||
if missing:
|
||||
result["missing_required_contexts"] = missing
|
||||
result["checks_status"] = CHECKS_MISSING_REQUIRED
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"branch protection requires status context(s) "
|
||||
f"{', '.join(missing)} but no matching status result exists at "
|
||||
"the head commit (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
matched = [
|
||||
{"context": ctx, "state": by_context[ctx]} for ctx in required
|
||||
]
|
||||
result["checks_status"] = _aggregate_context_states(matched)
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"evaluated {len(matched)} required status context(s) from live "
|
||||
"branch protection; unrelated contexts were ignored"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
# Status checks enabled with no specific required contexts configured.
|
||||
if not rows:
|
||||
result["checks_status"] = CHECKS_NONE
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"branch protection enables status checks but no status context was "
|
||||
"produced for the head commit"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if observed_combined in _CTX_PENDING:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"combined commit state '{observed_combined}' does not indicate "
|
||||
"executing CI because the status-context collection is empty"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
result["checks_status"] = _aggregate_context_states(rows)
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"aggregated {len(rows)} reported status context(s); branch protection "
|
||||
"configures no explicit required-context list"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _normalize_sha(value: str | None) -> str | None:
|
||||
text = (value or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if not text:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return text if _FULL_SHA.match(text) else None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _normalize_role(role: str | None) -> str:
|
||||
return (role or "").strip().lower() or "unknown"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_pr_sync_status(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
host: str | None = None,
|
||||
org: str | None = None,
|
||||
repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
pr_state: str | None = None,
|
||||
source_branch: str | None = None,
|
||||
pr_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
base_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
commits_behind: int | None = None,
|
||||
mergeable: bool | None = None,
|
||||
has_conflicts: bool | None = None,
|
||||
branch_protection_requires_current_base: bool | None = None,
|
||||
approval_at_current_head: bool | None = None,
|
||||
checks_status: str | None = None,
|
||||
active_author_lock: bool | None = None,
|
||||
active_reviewer_lease: bool | None = None,
|
||||
active_merger_lease: bool | None = None,
|
||||
prepared_verdict_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
checks_required: bool = True,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Recommend the next sanctioned PR lifecycle action.
|
||||
|
||||
Decision order (fail closed):
|
||||
|
||||
1. Incomplete identity / open state / head SHAs → ``blocked``
|
||||
2. Conflicts (or mergeable false with conflict signal) →
|
||||
``author_conflict_remediation``
|
||||
3. Head changed after approval / prepared verdict for former head →
|
||||
``fresh_review_required`` (unless conflicts already routed author work)
|
||||
4. Behind live base + branch protection requires current base +
|
||||
auto-mergeable → ``update_branch_by_merge``
|
||||
5. Approval at current head + mergeable + checks ok (+ update not
|
||||
required) → ``merge_now``
|
||||
6. Otherwise ``blocked`` with structured reasons
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
pr_head = _normalize_sha(pr_head_sha)
|
||||
base_head = _normalize_sha(base_head_sha)
|
||||
prepared_head = _normalize_sha(prepared_verdict_head_sha)
|
||||
state = (pr_state or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
checks = (checks_status or "unknown").strip().lower()
|
||||
behind = commits_behind if isinstance(commits_behind, int) and commits_behind >= 0 else None
|
||||
requires_current = bool(branch_protection_requires_current_base)
|
||||
approval_ok = bool(approval_at_current_head)
|
||||
|
||||
# Derive conflict when caller only supplies mergeable=False.
|
||||
if has_conflicts is None and mergeable is False:
|
||||
has_conflicts = True
|
||||
conflicts = bool(has_conflicts) if has_conflicts is not None else None
|
||||
|
||||
result: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"host": (host or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
"org": (org or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
"repo": (repo or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
"pr_number": pr_number,
|
||||
"pr_state": state or None,
|
||||
"source_branch": (source_branch or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
"pr_head_sha": pr_head,
|
||||
"base_head_sha": base_head,
|
||||
"commits_behind": behind,
|
||||
"mergeable": mergeable,
|
||||
"has_conflicts": conflicts,
|
||||
"branch_protection_requires_current_base": requires_current,
|
||||
"approval_at_current_head": approval_ok if approval_at_current_head is not None else None,
|
||||
"checks_status": checks,
|
||||
"checks_required": bool(checks_required),
|
||||
"active_locks_and_leases": {
|
||||
"author_lock": bool(active_author_lock) if active_author_lock is not None else None,
|
||||
"reviewer_lease": bool(active_reviewer_lease) if active_reviewer_lease is not None else None,
|
||||
"merger_lease": bool(active_merger_lease) if active_merger_lease is not None else None,
|
||||
},
|
||||
"prepared_verdict_head_sha": prepared_head,
|
||||
"recommended_next_action": ACTION_BLOCKED,
|
||||
"approval_valid_for_merge": False,
|
||||
"stale_approval": False,
|
||||
"stale_prepared_verdict": False,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"performed": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if not isinstance(pr_number, int) or pr_number <= 0:
|
||||
reasons.append("pr_number must be a positive integer (fail closed)")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if state and state not in ("open",):
|
||||
reasons.append(f"PR is not open (state={state}); cannot synchronize or merge")
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
|
||||
return result
|
||||
if not state:
|
||||
reasons.append("PR state missing (fail closed)")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if pr_head is None:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"exact PR head SHA missing or not a full 40-char hex SHA (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if base_head is None:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"exact live base head SHA missing or not a full 40-char hex SHA (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if behind is None:
|
||||
reasons.append("commits_behind missing or invalid (fail closed)")
|
||||
if mergeable is None:
|
||||
reasons.append("mergeable signal missing (fail closed)")
|
||||
if approval_at_current_head is None:
|
||||
reasons.append("approval_at_current_head missing (fail closed)")
|
||||
if branch_protection_requires_current_base is None:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"branch_protection_requires_current_base missing (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if reasons:
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
# Stale prepared verdict / approval across heads.
|
||||
stale_prepared = bool(prepared_head and prepared_head != pr_head)
|
||||
result["stale_prepared_verdict"] = stale_prepared
|
||||
stale_approval = not approval_ok
|
||||
result["stale_approval"] = stale_approval
|
||||
result["approval_valid_for_merge"] = bool(approval_ok and not stale_prepared)
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Conflicts: author remediation in dedicated worktree ──────────────
|
||||
if conflicts is True or mergeable is False:
|
||||
if conflicts is True or mergeable is False:
|
||||
# Distinguish pure non-mergeable without explicit conflict flag
|
||||
# still routes author remediation (Gitea cannot auto-update).
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"PR #{pr_number} has conflicts or is not mergeable at head "
|
||||
f"{pr_head}; route author conflict remediation in the existing "
|
||||
"issue/PR worktree under branches/ (never force-push or rebase)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if stale_approval:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"any approval at a former head is invalid; after remediation "
|
||||
"require a fresh independent review at the new exact head"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_AUTHOR_CONFLICT_REMEDIATION
|
||||
result["approval_valid_for_merge"] = False
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Stale approval / prepared verdict at former head ─────────────────
|
||||
if not approval_ok or stale_prepared:
|
||||
if behind and behind > 0 and requires_current and mergeable is True:
|
||||
# Must update first; update will also invalidate approval.
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"PR is {behind} commit(s) behind live base and branch protection "
|
||||
"requires current base; automatic merge-from-base is available"
|
||||
)
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"approval is not valid at the current head (or prepared verdict "
|
||||
"is head-scoped to a former SHA); after update require fresh review"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_UPDATE_BRANCH_BY_MERGE
|
||||
result["approval_valid_for_merge"] = False
|
||||
return result
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"approval is not valid at the exact current PR head "
|
||||
f"({pr_head}); never reuse a former-head approval for merge"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if stale_prepared:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"prepared verdict pinned to former head {prepared_head} cannot "
|
||||
f"authorize review/merge at current head {pr_head}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if active_reviewer_lease:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"active reviewer lease must be released or superseded for the "
|
||||
"new head before a fresh independent review"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if active_merger_lease:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"active merger lease cannot cross heads; release or re-acquire "
|
||||
"at the new exact head"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_FRESH_REVIEW_REQUIRED
|
||||
result["approval_valid_for_merge"] = False
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Outdated + protection requires current base, auto-updatable ──────
|
||||
if behind and behind > 0 and requires_current:
|
||||
if mergeable is True and conflicts is not True:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"PR is {behind} commit(s) behind live base {base_head}; "
|
||||
"branch protection requires the PR branch to contain current base; "
|
||||
"Gitea can merge base into the PR branch without conflicts"
|
||||
)
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"route author-only update_branch_by_merge; never rebase or force-push; "
|
||||
"new head invalidates prior approval and requires fresh independent review"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_UPDATE_BRANCH_BY_MERGE
|
||||
# Approval today is at old head that will change — not mergeable yet
|
||||
# for final merge until re-reviewed, but assess marks update path.
|
||||
result["approval_valid_for_merge"] = False
|
||||
result["stale_approval"] = True # will become stale after update
|
||||
return result
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"update required by branch protection but automatic merge is not available"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Checks gate for merge_now (#751) ─────────────────────────────────
|
||||
# ``checks_required`` is derived from the live branch-protection policy by
|
||||
# the production caller. When protection does not require status checks,
|
||||
# head contexts cannot gate the merge and this whole gate is skipped.
|
||||
if not checks_required:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"live branch protection does not require status checks; head check "
|
||||
f"state ({checks}) does not gate merge"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif checks not in _CHECKS_OK:
|
||||
if checks in _CTX_PENDING:
|
||||
reasons.append(f"required checks are not finished (status={checks})")
|
||||
elif checks in _CTX_FAILURE:
|
||||
reasons.append(f"required checks failed (status={checks})")
|
||||
elif checks == CHECKS_MISSING_REQUIRED:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"branch protection configures required status context(s) but no "
|
||||
"matching status result exists at the current head (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif checks == CHECKS_NONE:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"branch protection requires status checks but no status context "
|
||||
"was produced for the current head (fail closed); an empty "
|
||||
"status collection is not executing CI"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif checks == CHECKS_UNKNOWN:
|
||||
reasons.append("checks status unknown (fail closed)")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
# Unrecognized vocabulary must never fall through to merge_now.
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"unrecognized checks status '{checks}' cannot prove required "
|
||||
"checks passed (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Ready to merge without update ────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
# Includes: current with approval; outdated when update is NOT required.
|
||||
if approval_ok and mergeable is True and conflicts is not True:
|
||||
if behind and behind > 0 and not requires_current:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"PR is {behind} commit(s) behind live base but branch protection "
|
||||
"does not require the latest base; preserve the approved head"
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"PR has a valid approval at the exact current head, is conflict-free "
|
||||
"and mergeable; do not update the branch unnecessarily"
|
||||
)
|
||||
reasons.append("route directly to the sanctioned merger workflow (merge_now)")
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_MERGE_NOW
|
||||
result["approval_valid_for_merge"] = True
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
reasons.append("no sanctioned next action matched the observed PR state (fail closed)")
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_update_pr_branch_preflight(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
role_kind: str | None,
|
||||
expected_pr_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
live_pr_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
expected_base_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
live_base_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
has_conflicts: bool | None = None,
|
||||
mergeable: bool | None = None,
|
||||
style: str | None = UPDATE_STYLE_MERGE,
|
||||
has_author_lock: bool | None = None,
|
||||
worktree_path: str | None = None,
|
||||
worktree_owns_source_branch: bool | None = None,
|
||||
control_checkout_clean: bool | None = None,
|
||||
master_parity_ok: bool | None = None,
|
||||
force_push: bool = False,
|
||||
rebase: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Author-only preflight for update-by-merge; fail closed on any race.
|
||||
|
||||
When conflicts exist, returns a structured author-remediation handoff and
|
||||
sets ``mutation_allowed=False`` so no partial remote update is performed.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
role = _normalize_role(role_kind)
|
||||
exp_pr = _normalize_sha(expected_pr_head_sha)
|
||||
live_pr = _normalize_sha(live_pr_head_sha)
|
||||
exp_base = _normalize_sha(expected_base_head_sha)
|
||||
live_base = _normalize_sha(live_base_head_sha)
|
||||
style_norm = (style or "").strip().lower() or UPDATE_STYLE_MERGE
|
||||
|
||||
conflicts = has_conflicts
|
||||
if conflicts is None and mergeable is False:
|
||||
conflicts = True
|
||||
|
||||
result: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"mutation_allowed": False,
|
||||
"performed": False,
|
||||
"style": style_norm,
|
||||
"role_kind": role,
|
||||
"expected_pr_head_sha": exp_pr,
|
||||
"live_pr_head_sha": live_pr,
|
||||
"expected_base_head_sha": exp_base,
|
||||
"live_base_head_sha": live_base,
|
||||
"head_race": False,
|
||||
"base_race": False,
|
||||
"has_conflicts": conflicts,
|
||||
"author_remediation_handoff": False,
|
||||
"approval_invalidated_for_former_head": False,
|
||||
"force_push": bool(force_push),
|
||||
"rebase": bool(rebase),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# Role gate — author only.
|
||||
if role not in _AUTHOR_UPDATE_ROLES:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"role '{role}' cannot update an author PR branch "
|
||||
"(author-only; reviewer/merger denial)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if force_push:
|
||||
reasons.append("force-push is forbidden for PR branch update (fail closed)")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
if rebase or style_norm in _FORBIDDEN_UPDATE_STYLES:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"update style '{style_norm}' forbidden; only style=merge is allowed "
|
||||
"(never rebase)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
if style_norm != UPDATE_STYLE_MERGE:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"unknown update style '{style_norm}'; expected '{UPDATE_STYLE_MERGE}'"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if not exp_pr or not live_pr:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"expected and live PR head SHAs must be full 40-char hex (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not exp_base or not live_base:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"expected and live base head SHAs must be full 40-char hex (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if reasons:
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if exp_pr != live_pr:
|
||||
result["head_race"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"PR head race: expected {exp_pr} but live is {live_pr} "
|
||||
"(fail closed; no partial mutation)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
if exp_base != live_base:
|
||||
result["base_race"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"base head race: expected {exp_base} but live is {live_base} "
|
||||
"(fail closed; no partial mutation)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if has_author_lock is not True:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"existing issue/PR lock required before update_branch_by_merge (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
wt = (worktree_path or "").strip()
|
||||
if not wt:
|
||||
reasons.append("existing PR worktree path required under branches/ (fail closed)")
|
||||
else:
|
||||
norm = wt.replace("\\", "/")
|
||||
if "/branches/" not in norm and not norm.startswith("branches/"):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"worktree_path '{wt}' must be under branches/ (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if worktree_owns_source_branch is False:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"worktree does not own the PR source branch (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if control_checkout_clean is False:
|
||||
reasons.append("control checkout is not clean (fail closed)")
|
||||
if master_parity_ok is False:
|
||||
reasons.append("runtime/master parity failed (fail closed)")
|
||||
|
||||
if conflicts is True:
|
||||
result["author_remediation_handoff"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"conflicts present: return structured author-remediation handoff "
|
||||
"without creating a partial remote update"
|
||||
)
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"resolve conflicts explicitly in the existing dedicated worktree, "
|
||||
"run focused and regression tests, commit/push via sanctioned author "
|
||||
"workflow, then route the new exact head to independent review"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if mergeable is False and conflicts is not False:
|
||||
result["author_remediation_handoff"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"PR is not mergeable; refuse automatic update and hand off to "
|
||||
"author conflict remediation (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if reasons:
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
result["mutation_allowed"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"preflight passed: author may merge live base into the PR branch via "
|
||||
"native MCP update (style=merge only)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_post_update_head_transition(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
former_pr_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
new_pr_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
former_approval_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
former_reviewer_lease_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
former_merger_lease_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
prepared_verdict_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""After a successful update-by-merge, invalidate cross-head artifacts.
|
||||
|
||||
The new head never inherits approval, reviewer/merger leases, or prepared
|
||||
verdicts from the former head.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
former = _normalize_sha(former_pr_head_sha)
|
||||
new = _normalize_sha(new_pr_head_sha)
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
result: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"former_pr_head_sha": former,
|
||||
"new_pr_head_sha": new,
|
||||
"head_changed": bool(former and new and former != new),
|
||||
"approval_invalidated": False,
|
||||
"reviewer_lease_superseded": False,
|
||||
"merger_lease_superseded": False,
|
||||
"prepared_verdict_invalidated": False,
|
||||
"recommended_next_action": ACTION_BLOCKED,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if not former or not new:
|
||||
reasons.append("former and new PR head SHAs required (fail closed)")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
if former == new:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"PR head unchanged after update; unexpected for merge-from-base"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_BLOCKED
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
result["head_changed"] = True
|
||||
# Approval at former head is always void at new head.
|
||||
former_approval = _normalize_sha(former_approval_head_sha) or former
|
||||
if former_approval != new:
|
||||
result["approval_invalidated"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"approval for former head {former_approval} is invalid at new head "
|
||||
f"{new}; never preserve approval across a head change"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
rev_lease = _normalize_sha(former_reviewer_lease_head_sha)
|
||||
if rev_lease and rev_lease != new:
|
||||
result["reviewer_lease_superseded"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"reviewer lease for head {rev_lease} cannot cross to {new}; "
|
||||
"release or supersede before fresh review"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif rev_lease is None:
|
||||
# Unknown lease head still must not authorize at new head.
|
||||
result["reviewer_lease_superseded"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"any reviewer lease scoped to the former head is superseded at the new head"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
mer_lease = _normalize_sha(former_merger_lease_head_sha)
|
||||
if mer_lease and mer_lease != new:
|
||||
result["merger_lease_superseded"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"merger lease for head {mer_lease} cannot cross to {new}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
result["merger_lease_superseded"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"any merger lease scoped to the former head is superseded at the new head"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
prepared = _normalize_sha(prepared_verdict_head_sha)
|
||||
if prepared and prepared != new:
|
||||
result["prepared_verdict_invalidated"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"prepared verdict for head {prepared} cannot authorize the new head {new}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif prepared is None:
|
||||
result["prepared_verdict_invalidated"] = True
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"prepared verdicts associated with the former head are invalidated"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
result["recommended_next_action"] = ACTION_FRESH_REVIEW_REQUIRED
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"route the new exact head to independent review "
|
||||
f"({ACTION_FRESH_REVIEW_REQUIRED})"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_sequential_queue_step(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
just_merged: bool,
|
||||
master_refreshed: bool,
|
||||
next_pr_number: int | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Controller sequential processing: reassess only after merge + master refresh."""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
if just_merged and not master_refreshed:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"master must be refreshed after each merge before reassessing the next PR "
|
||||
"(do not update every PR simultaneously)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reassess_allowed": False,
|
||||
"process_next": False,
|
||||
"next_pr_number": next_pr_number,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if not just_merged:
|
||||
reasons.append("no merge completed; sequential step does not advance")
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reassess_allowed": False,
|
||||
"process_next": False,
|
||||
"next_pr_number": next_pr_number,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if next_pr_number:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"merge completed and live master refreshed; reassess the next PR "
|
||||
f"#{next_pr_number}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"merge completed and live master refreshed; reassess the next PR"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reassess_allowed": True,
|
||||
"process_next": True,
|
||||
"next_pr_number": next_pr_number,
|
||||
"post_merge_cleanup_handoff": True,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def merge_approval_usable_at_head(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
current_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
approved_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Stale approval cannot authorize merge (head-scoped only)."""
|
||||
current = _normalize_sha(current_head_sha)
|
||||
approved = _normalize_sha(approved_head_sha)
|
||||
ok = bool(current and approved and current == approved)
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
if not ok:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"stale approval: approved head '{approved or '(none)'}' does not "
|
||||
f"match current head '{current or '(none)'}'; cannot authorize merge"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"approval_usable": ok,
|
||||
"current_head_sha": current,
|
||||
"approved_head_sha": approved,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def lease_usable_at_head(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
lease_kind: str,
|
||||
lease_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
current_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Reviewer/merger leases cannot cross heads."""
|
||||
current = _normalize_sha(current_head_sha)
|
||||
lease_head = _normalize_sha(lease_head_sha)
|
||||
kind = (lease_kind or "").strip().lower() or "unknown"
|
||||
ok = bool(current and lease_head and current == lease_head)
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
if not ok:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"stale {kind} lease: lease head '{lease_head or '(none)'}' cannot "
|
||||
f"authorize work at current head '{current or '(none)'}'"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"lease_usable": ok,
|
||||
"lease_kind": kind,
|
||||
"lease_head_sha": lease_head,
|
||||
"current_head_sha": current,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
}
|
||||
+10
-123
@@ -20,11 +20,7 @@ _FIELD_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE | re.MULTILINE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Must mirror reviewer_pr_lease._TERMINAL_PHASES: both modules read the same
|
||||
# append-only lease markers, so a phase that is terminal in one and active in
|
||||
# the other yields two conflicting truths for the same comment (#742 review
|
||||
# 460). "abandoned" is the owner-session merger finalization outcome.
|
||||
_TERMINAL_REVIEWER_PHASES = frozenset({"done", "released", "blocked", "abandoned"})
|
||||
_TERMINAL_REVIEWER_PHASES = frozenset({"done", "released", "blocked"})
|
||||
_ACTIVE_REVIEWER_PHASES = frozenset({
|
||||
"claimed",
|
||||
"validating",
|
||||
@@ -36,8 +32,7 @@ _TERMINAL_CONFLICT_FIX_PHASES = frozenset({"released", "blocked", "done"})
|
||||
_ACTIVE_CONFLICT_FIX_PHASES = frozenset({"claimed", "pushing", "pushed"})
|
||||
|
||||
DEFAULT_CONFLICT_FIX_TTL_MINUTES = 120
|
||||
# The reviewer/merger PR-lease TTL lives in reviewer_pr_lease.LEASE_TTL_MINUTES
|
||||
# (#747). A second copy here had no readers and could only drift out of sync.
|
||||
DEFAULT_REVIEWER_LEASE_TTL_MINUTES = 120
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _parse_timestamp(value: str | None) -> datetime | None:
|
||||
@@ -158,72 +153,25 @@ def _lease_phase_active(lease: dict, *, active_phases: frozenset[str]) -> bool:
|
||||
))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _reviewer_chain_key(lease: dict) -> tuple | None:
|
||||
"""Identity of the lease chain a reviewer marker belongs to (#742).
|
||||
|
||||
A chain is one session's claim → heartbeat → terminal sequence, keyed by
|
||||
repository, PR, candidate head, session id, identity, and profile. Returns
|
||||
None when any component is missing: an incomplete or malformed marker has
|
||||
no provable chain, so it can neither be cancelled by nor cancel anything.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
raw = lease.get("raw_fields") or {}
|
||||
repo = (raw.get("repo") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
session_id = (lease.get("session_id") or "").strip()
|
||||
identity = (lease.get("reviewer_identity") or "").strip()
|
||||
profile = (lease.get("profile") or "").strip()
|
||||
head = lease.get("candidate_head")
|
||||
pr_number = lease.get("pr_number")
|
||||
if not (repo and session_id and identity and profile and head and pr_number):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return (repo, pr_number, head, session_id, identity, profile)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _chain_terminated_after(entries: list[dict], index: int) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when a later marker terminates the chain of ``entries[index]``.
|
||||
|
||||
Append-only newest-wins (#577 semantics, chain-scoped for #742): a terminal
|
||||
marker ends only its *own* claim, so a foreign, forged, or malformed
|
||||
terminal marker cannot cancel another session's valid active lease.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
key = _reviewer_chain_key(entries[index])
|
||||
if key is None:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
for later in entries[index + 1:]:
|
||||
if (later.get("phase") or "").strip().lower() not in _TERMINAL_REVIEWER_PHASES:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if _reviewer_chain_key(later) == key:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def find_active_reviewer_lease(
|
||||
comments: list[dict],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
now: datetime | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
"""Return the newest unexpired, non-terminated reviewer lease for *pr_number*.
|
||||
|
||||
Walking backward past a terminal marker used to resurrect the older claim of
|
||||
the very chain that marker ended, so a released/abandoned finalization still
|
||||
read as an active lease here while ``reviewer_pr_lease`` reported it ended
|
||||
(#742). A claim is now skipped when a later marker terminates its own chain.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
"""Return the newest unexpired reviewer lease for *pr_number*, if any."""
|
||||
now = now or datetime.now(timezone.utc)
|
||||
candidates = [
|
||||
entry for entry in _comment_entries(comments, pr_number=pr_number)
|
||||
if entry.get("lease_kind") == "reviewer"
|
||||
]
|
||||
for index in range(len(candidates) - 1, -1, -1):
|
||||
lease = candidates[index]
|
||||
for lease in reversed(candidates):
|
||||
if _lease_expired(lease, now=now):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
phase = (lease.get("phase") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if phase in _TERMINAL_REVIEWER_PHASES:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if phase in _ACTIVE_REVIEWER_PHASES or phase:
|
||||
if _chain_terminated_after(candidates, index):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
return lease
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -455,37 +403,10 @@ _REVIEWER_ACTIVE_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"whether any reviewer was active\s*:\s*(yes|no|true|false)",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# #698 phase detection for phase-specific head proofs.
|
||||
_NO_REVIEWED_HEAD_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"(?:reviewed head sha|candidate head sha)\s*:\s*none\b",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
_VERDICT_RECORDED_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"review decision\s*:\s*(?:approve[d]?|request[_ ]changes)\b"
|
||||
r"|review_status\s*:\s*(?:approved|request_changes)\b"
|
||||
r"|terminal review mutation\s*:\s*(?!none\b)\S",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
_MERGE_ATTEMPTED_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"merge result\s*:\s*(?:merged|success|performed|failed|attempted)\b"
|
||||
r"|merge mutations\s*:\s*(?!none\b|not applicable\b)\S",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
_VALIDATION_STARTED_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"validation\s*:\s*(?!none\b|not run\b|not applicable\b|not started\b)"
|
||||
r"[^\n]*(?:pass|fail|ran|executed|\d+\s+passed)",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_reviewer_stale_head_final_report(report_text: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Final-report proof for reviewed vs live head SHAs (#399 AC 6).
|
||||
|
||||
#698: head proofs are phase-specific. A legitimately blocked run that
|
||||
never began validation (no reviewed head, no formal verdict, no merge)
|
||||
owes none of them; approval-time and merge-time live-head proofs are
|
||||
owed only once the corresponding phase actually begins.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
"""Final-report proof for reviewed vs live head SHAs (#399 AC 6)."""
|
||||
text = report_text or ""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
reviewed = _normalize_sha(_REVIEWED_HEAD_RE.search(text).group(1) if _REVIEWED_HEAD_RE.search(text) else None)
|
||||
@@ -501,49 +422,15 @@ def assess_reviewer_stale_head_final_report(report_text: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
)
|
||||
push_during = _PUSH_DURING_VALIDATION_RE.search(text)
|
||||
|
||||
# Phase detection from the report's own claims.
|
||||
no_head_stated = bool(_NO_REVIEWED_HEAD_RE.search(text))
|
||||
verdict_recorded = bool(_VERDICT_RECORDED_RE.search(text))
|
||||
merge_attempted = bool(_MERGE_ATTEMPTED_RE.search(text))
|
||||
validation_started = bool(reviewed) or bool(_VALIDATION_STARTED_RE.search(text))
|
||||
blocked_before_validation = (
|
||||
no_head_stated
|
||||
and not reviewed
|
||||
and not verdict_recorded
|
||||
and not merge_attempted
|
||||
and not validation_started
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if blocked_before_validation:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": True,
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"reviewed_head_sha": None,
|
||||
"live_head_sha_before_approval": None,
|
||||
"live_head_sha_before_merge": None,
|
||||
"push_during_validation": (
|
||||
push_during.group(1).lower() if push_during else None
|
||||
),
|
||||
"phase": "blocked_before_validation",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if not reviewed and not no_head_stated:
|
||||
# The head must always be STATED — either a SHA or an explicit
|
||||
# 'none'. Silence is not a phase claim and fails closed.
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"reviewed head SHA not stated in final report "
|
||||
"(state the SHA or an explicit 'none')"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif not reviewed and (validation_started or verdict_recorded or merge_attempted):
|
||||
if not reviewed:
|
||||
reasons.append("reviewed head SHA not stated in final report")
|
||||
if verdict_recorded and not live_approval:
|
||||
if not live_approval:
|
||||
reasons.append("final live head SHA before approval not stated")
|
||||
if merge_attempted and not live_merge:
|
||||
if not live_merge:
|
||||
reasons.append("final live head SHA before merge not stated")
|
||||
if validation_started and not push_during:
|
||||
if not push_during:
|
||||
reasons.append("whether push occurred during validation not stated")
|
||||
if reviewed and live_approval and reviewed != live_approval:
|
||||
elif reviewed and live_approval and reviewed != live_approval:
|
||||
reasons.append("live head before approval differs from reviewed head SHA")
|
||||
elif reviewed and live_merge and reviewed != live_merge:
|
||||
reasons.append("live head before merge differs from reviewed head SHA")
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -18,11 +18,6 @@ RECONCILER_RECOMMENDED_OPERATIONS = (
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.close",
|
||||
# Merged-branch cleanup is reconciler-owned (task_capability_map maps
|
||||
# cleanup_merged_pr_branch -> reconciler). The permission is only
|
||||
# exercisable through the guarded gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch path
|
||||
# (#514): merged proof, protected-branch refusal, explicit confirmation.
|
||||
"gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
RECONCILER_FORBIDDEN_OPERATIONS = (
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ python-multipart==0.0.32
|
||||
referencing==0.37.0
|
||||
rich==15.0.0
|
||||
rpds-py==2026.5.1
|
||||
sentry-sdk==2.20.0
|
||||
shellingham==1.5.4
|
||||
sse-starlette==3.4.5
|
||||
starlette==1.3.1
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -25,13 +25,8 @@ _REVIEWED_HEAD_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"(?:pinned reviewed head|reviewed head sha)\s*:\s*([0-9a-f]{7,40})",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# #698: validation pass proof appears in several legitimate shapes —
|
||||
# "Validation: pass", "Validation: focused 50 passed; full 2665 passed",
|
||||
# or structured "validation_status: pass". Accept pass evidence anywhere in
|
||||
# the Validation field's value, not only as its first token.
|
||||
_VALIDATION_PASS_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"validation(?:_status)?\s*:[^\n]{0,300}?"
|
||||
r"(?:\bpass(?:ed)?\b|\bstrong\b|\bok\b|\bgreen\b|\d+\s+passed)",
|
||||
r"validation\s*:\s*(?:pass|passed|strong|ok|green)",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
_MERGED_CLAIM_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
|
||||
+9
-36
@@ -858,16 +858,9 @@ _WALKTHROUGH_ARTIFACT_RE = re.compile(r"walkthrough\.md", re.I)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _performed_file_mutations(action_log: list[dict] | None) -> list[dict]:
|
||||
"""Return performed local file mutations, excluding gated rejections.
|
||||
|
||||
Non-dict entries (malformed JSON, LLM mistakes) are ignored instead of
|
||||
raising ``AttributeError`` (#698): a malformed ledger entry can never be
|
||||
authoritative mutation evidence.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
"""Return performed local file mutations, excluding gated rejections."""
|
||||
performed: list[dict] = []
|
||||
for entry in action_log or []:
|
||||
if not isinstance(entry, dict):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if entry.get("gated_rejected") or entry.get("performed") is False:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
action = (entry.get("action") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
@@ -2235,31 +2228,24 @@ HANDOFF_REVIEW_MUTATION_FIELDS = (
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
HANDOFF_ROLE_FIELDS = {
|
||||
# #698: the review/merger required-field sets must stay aligned with the
|
||||
# canonical schema (skills/llm-project-workflow/schemas/
|
||||
# review-merge-final-report.md). The schema explicitly FORBIDS the legacy
|
||||
# fields 'Pinned reviewed head', 'Scratch worktree used', and 'Workspace
|
||||
# mutations' — a validator must never demand a field the schema bans.
|
||||
"review": (
|
||||
("Selected PR", ("selected pr",)),
|
||||
("Reviewer eligibility", ("reviewer eligibility", "eligibility")),
|
||||
("Reviewed head SHA", ("reviewed head sha", "candidate head sha")),
|
||||
("Review worktree path", ("review worktree path", "worktree path",
|
||||
"starting worktree path")),
|
||||
("Review worktree dirty", ("review worktree dirty", "worktree dirty",
|
||||
"whether worktree was dirty")),
|
||||
("Pinned reviewed head", ("pinned reviewed head", "pinned head")),
|
||||
("Worktree path", ("worktree path", "starting worktree path")),
|
||||
("Worktree dirty", ("worktree dirty", "whether worktree was dirty")),
|
||||
("Scratch worktree used", ("scratch worktree used", "scratch clone used",
|
||||
"scratch worktree")),
|
||||
("Unrelated local mutations", ("unrelated local mutations",
|
||||
"unrelated files modified",
|
||||
"file edits by reviewer")),
|
||||
"unrelated files modified")),
|
||||
("Review decision", ("review decision", "decision")),
|
||||
("Merge result", ("merge result",)),
|
||||
("Linked issue status", ("linked issue status", "linked issue")),
|
||||
("Cleanup status", ("cleanup status", "cleanup")),
|
||||
("Safe next action", ("safe next action", "next")),
|
||||
) + HANDOFF_REVIEW_MUTATION_FIELDS,
|
||||
"merger": (
|
||||
("Selected PR", ("selected pr",)),
|
||||
("Reviewed head SHA", ("reviewed head sha", "candidate head sha")),
|
||||
("Pinned reviewed head", ("pinned reviewed head", "pinned head")),
|
||||
("Active profile", ("active profile",)),
|
||||
("Role kind", ("role kind",)),
|
||||
("Merge capability source", ("merge capability source",)),
|
||||
@@ -2447,22 +2433,9 @@ def assess_controller_handoff(report_text, role=None, local_edits=False):
|
||||
# Issue #320: reviewer and merger handoffs use the precise mutation categories
|
||||
# in HANDOFF_REVIEW_MUTATION_FIELDS instead of the legacy ambiguous
|
||||
# "Workspace mutations" field, which is rejected below.
|
||||
# Issue #698: the canonical review-merge schema has no 'Mutations',
|
||||
# 'Next', 'Issue/PR', 'Branch/SHA', or 'Files changed' fields — their
|
||||
# content lives in the precise mutation categories, 'Safe next
|
||||
# action', 'Selected PR'/'Linked issue', head-SHA fields, and 'Files
|
||||
# reviewed'. Requiring the legacy names rejects canonical reports.
|
||||
_non_canonical_for_review = {
|
||||
"Workspace mutations",
|
||||
"Mutations",
|
||||
"Next",
|
||||
"Issue/PR",
|
||||
"Branch/SHA",
|
||||
"Files changed",
|
||||
}
|
||||
required = [
|
||||
field for field in required
|
||||
if field[0] not in _non_canonical_for_review
|
||||
if field[0] != "Workspace mutations"
|
||||
]
|
||||
if any(label.startswith("workspace mutations") for label in labels):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,351 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Controller quarantine of contaminated formal reviews (#695).
|
||||
|
||||
Quarantine records are durable under the MCP session-state root and are only
|
||||
writable when the caller holds a **native** MCP transport runtime. Untrusted
|
||||
local scripts that import this module cannot establish a valid quarantine
|
||||
(writes fail closed). Live server-side gates (eligibility, merge, feedback)
|
||||
honor quarantine by review_id + PR + head.
|
||||
|
||||
Forensic evidence (Gitea review objects, lease comments) is never deleted.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
from datetime import datetime, timezone
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
import mcp_daemon_guard
|
||||
import mcp_session_state
|
||||
|
||||
KIND_QUARANTINE = "review_quarantine"
|
||||
CONFIRMATION_PREFIX = "QUARANTINE CONTAMINATED REVIEW"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _now() -> str:
|
||||
return datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def quarantine_state_path(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
remote: str,
|
||||
org: str,
|
||||
repo: str,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
review_id: int,
|
||||
) -> str:
|
||||
# Dedicated subdir under session state root (mode 0o700).
|
||||
root = os.path.join(mcp_session_state.default_state_dir(), "quarantine")
|
||||
os.makedirs(root, mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
|
||||
# Explicit multi-segment key so remote/org/repo/pr/review cannot collide.
|
||||
segs = [
|
||||
KIND_QUARANTINE,
|
||||
mcp_session_state._sanitize_segment(remote),
|
||||
mcp_session_state._sanitize_segment(org),
|
||||
mcp_session_state._sanitize_segment(repo),
|
||||
f"pr{int(pr_number)}",
|
||||
f"rev{int(review_id)}",
|
||||
]
|
||||
return os.path.join(root, "-".join(segs) + ".json")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_quarantine_record(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
remote: str,
|
||||
org: str,
|
||||
repo: str,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
review_id: int,
|
||||
reviewed_head_sha: str,
|
||||
reason: str,
|
||||
actor_username: str | None,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None,
|
||||
incident_issue: int | None = None,
|
||||
forensic_comment_ids: list[int] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
provenance = mcp_daemon_guard.mutation_provenance_fields()
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"kind": KIND_QUARANTINE,
|
||||
"issue_ref": "#695",
|
||||
"remote": remote,
|
||||
"org": org,
|
||||
"repo": repo,
|
||||
"pr_number": int(pr_number),
|
||||
"review_id": int(review_id),
|
||||
"reviewed_head_sha": (reviewed_head_sha or "").strip().lower(),
|
||||
"reason": (reason or "").strip(),
|
||||
"actor_username": actor_username,
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"incident_issue": incident_issue,
|
||||
"forensic_comment_ids": list(forensic_comment_ids or []),
|
||||
"created_at": _now(),
|
||||
"native_provenance": provenance,
|
||||
"merge_authorization": "void",
|
||||
"retain_forensic_evidence": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_quarantine_write(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
confirmation: str,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
review_id: int,
|
||||
reason: str,
|
||||
native_required: bool = True,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Pure assessment of whether a quarantine write may proceed."""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
expected = f"{CONFIRMATION_PREFIX} {int(review_id)} PR {int(pr_number)}"
|
||||
if (confirmation or "").strip() != expected:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"confirmation must equal exactly '{expected}' (fail closed, #695)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not (reason or "").strip():
|
||||
reasons.append("quarantine reason is required (fail closed, #695)")
|
||||
if native_required and not mcp_daemon_guard.is_native_mcp_transport():
|
||||
if not mcp_daemon_guard.is_pytest_runtime():
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"quarantine write requires native MCP transport; untrusted "
|
||||
"local code cannot create quarantine records (#695)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"allowed": not reasons,
|
||||
"expected_confirmation": expected,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def write_quarantine_record(record: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Persist quarantine record; fail closed outside native/pytest runtime."""
|
||||
if not mcp_daemon_guard.is_native_mcp_transport():
|
||||
if not mcp_daemon_guard.is_pytest_runtime():
|
||||
raise mcp_daemon_guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
"quarantine write blocked: non-native runtime (#695)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
path = quarantine_state_path(
|
||||
remote=str(record["remote"]),
|
||||
org=str(record["org"]),
|
||||
repo=str(record["repo"]),
|
||||
pr_number=int(record["pr_number"]),
|
||||
review_id=int(record["review_id"]),
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Refuse overwriting with weaker provenance from untrusted caller by
|
||||
# requiring native fields present.
|
||||
if not (record.get("native_provenance") or {}).get("native_mcp_transport"):
|
||||
if not mcp_daemon_guard.is_pytest_runtime():
|
||||
raise mcp_daemon_guard.UnsanctionedRuntimeError(
|
||||
"quarantine record missing native provenance (#695)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
tmp = path + ".tmp"
|
||||
data = json.dumps(record, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
|
||||
with open(tmp, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
fh.write(data)
|
||||
fh.flush()
|
||||
os.fsync(fh.fileno())
|
||||
os.replace(tmp, path)
|
||||
os.chmod(path, 0o600)
|
||||
return {"path": path, "written": True, "record": record}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def load_quarantine_record(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
remote: str,
|
||||
org: str,
|
||||
repo: str,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
review_id: int,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
path = quarantine_state_path(
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
pr_number=pr_number,
|
||||
review_id=review_id,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not os.path.isfile(path):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
data = json.load(fh)
|
||||
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if not isinstance(data, dict):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return data
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_review_quarantined(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
remote: str,
|
||||
org: str,
|
||||
repo: str,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
review_id: int | None,
|
||||
reviewed_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Whether a formal review is quarantined for merge authorization (#695)."""
|
||||
if review_id is None:
|
||||
return {"quarantined": False, "record": None, "reasons": []}
|
||||
rec = load_quarantine_record(
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
pr_number=pr_number,
|
||||
review_id=int(review_id),
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not rec:
|
||||
return {"quarantined": False, "record": None, "reasons": []}
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
f"formal review_id {review_id} on PR #{pr_number} is quarantined "
|
||||
f"(#695; incident issue {rec.get('incident_issue')}); "
|
||||
"merge authorization is void; forensic evidence retained"
|
||||
]
|
||||
want_head = (reviewed_head_sha or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
rec_head = (rec.get("reviewed_head_sha") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if want_head and rec_head and want_head != rec_head:
|
||||
# Still quarantined by review_id; note head mismatch for operators.
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"quarantine head {rec_head[:12]}… differs from assessed head "
|
||||
f"{want_head[:12]}… (still void by review_id)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {"quarantined": True, "record": rec, "reasons": reasons}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def filter_approvals_for_merge(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
remote: str,
|
||||
org: str,
|
||||
repo: str,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
current_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
reviews: list[dict],
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Split reviews into merge-usable vs quarantined contaminated approvals."""
|
||||
current = (current_head_sha or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
usable: list[dict] = []
|
||||
quarantined: list[dict] = []
|
||||
for rev in reviews or []:
|
||||
if not isinstance(rev, dict):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
verdict = (rev.get("verdict") or rev.get("state") or "").upper()
|
||||
if verdict not in {"APPROVED", "APPROVE"}:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if rev.get("dismissed"):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
rid = rev.get("review_id") or rev.get("id")
|
||||
head = (
|
||||
rev.get("reviewed_head_sha")
|
||||
or rev.get("commit_id")
|
||||
or rev.get("head_sha")
|
||||
or ""
|
||||
).strip().lower()
|
||||
q = is_review_quarantined(
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
repo=repo,
|
||||
pr_number=pr_number,
|
||||
review_id=int(rid) if rid is not None else None,
|
||||
reviewed_head_sha=head or current,
|
||||
)
|
||||
entry = {**rev, "review_id": rid, "reviewed_head_sha": head}
|
||||
if q["quarantined"]:
|
||||
entry["quarantined"] = True
|
||||
entry["quarantine_reasons"] = q["reasons"]
|
||||
quarantined.append(entry)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
entry["quarantined"] = False
|
||||
usable.append(entry)
|
||||
usable_at_head = [
|
||||
e
|
||||
for e in usable
|
||||
if current and (e.get("reviewed_head_sha") or "") == current
|
||||
]
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"usable_approvals": usable,
|
||||
"usable_approvals_at_current_head": usable_at_head,
|
||||
"quarantined_approvals": quarantined,
|
||||
"approval_visible_for_merge": bool(usable_at_head),
|
||||
"has_quarantined_approval_at_head": any(
|
||||
current
|
||||
and (e.get("reviewed_head_sha") or "") == current
|
||||
for e in quarantined
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_quarantine_audit_comment(record: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
|
||||
"""Append-only forensic audit comment body (does not delete evidence)."""
|
||||
lines = [
|
||||
"## Contaminated formal review quarantine (#695)",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"Status: **QUARANTINED — merge authorization VOID**",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
f"- review_id: `{record.get('review_id')}`",
|
||||
f"- pr: `#{record.get('pr_number')}`",
|
||||
f"- reviewed_head_sha: `{record.get('reviewed_head_sha')}`",
|
||||
f"- actor: `{record.get('actor_username')}`",
|
||||
f"- profile: `{record.get('profile_name')}`",
|
||||
f"- incident_issue: `#{record.get('incident_issue')}`",
|
||||
f"- reason: {record.get('reason')}",
|
||||
f"- created_at: `{record.get('created_at')}`",
|
||||
f"- native_transport: "
|
||||
f"`{(record.get('native_provenance') or {}).get('native_mcp_transport')}`",
|
||||
f"- native_token_fingerprint: "
|
||||
f"`{(record.get('native_provenance') or {}).get('native_token_fingerprint')}`",
|
||||
f"- forensic_comment_ids retained: "
|
||||
f"`{record.get('forensic_comment_ids')}`",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"This record does **not** delete Gitea reviews or historical comments. "
|
||||
"Fresh native-MCP re-review is required before merge.",
|
||||
]
|
||||
return "\n".join(lines)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_untrusted_canonical_approval_claim(body: str) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Reasons to reject canonical comments that claim approved/merge-ready.
|
||||
|
||||
Used when the comment asserts approval without native review proof (#695 AC7).
|
||||
False "official workflow" claims that cite offline/import paths are always
|
||||
rejected even when a NATIVE_REVIEW_PROOF line is present.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
text = body or ""
|
||||
lower = text.lower()
|
||||
claims_approved = (
|
||||
"state:\napproved" in lower
|
||||
or "state: approved" in lower
|
||||
or "who_is_next:\nmerger" in lower
|
||||
or "who_is_next: merger" in lower
|
||||
or "merge_ready: true" in lower
|
||||
or "merge_ready:\ntrue" in lower
|
||||
or "ready-to-merge" in lower
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not claims_approved:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
# Reject explicit offline/import "official workflow" spoofing (#695 AC9).
|
||||
offline_spoof = (
|
||||
"offline_mcp" in lower
|
||||
or "offline import" in lower
|
||||
or "direct import" in lower
|
||||
or "import gitea_mcp_server" in lower
|
||||
or "run_quarantine.py" in lower
|
||||
or "offline_mcp_helper" in lower
|
||||
or "offline_mcp_runner" in lower
|
||||
)
|
||||
has_proof = (
|
||||
"NATIVE_REVIEW_PROOF:" in text
|
||||
or "native_review_proof:" in lower
|
||||
)
|
||||
if offline_spoof:
|
||||
return [
|
||||
"canonical approval claim cites offline/import/helper path; "
|
||||
"NATIVE_REVIEW_PROOF rejected (#695 AC7/AC9); stop after native "
|
||||
"MCP failure — do not construct offline mutation fallbacks"
|
||||
]
|
||||
if has_proof:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
return [
|
||||
"canonical comment claims approved/merge-ready state without "
|
||||
"NATIVE_REVIEW_PROOF from a native MCP review mutation (#695 AC7); "
|
||||
"contaminated or untrusted approvals cannot certify merger handoff"
|
||||
]
|
||||
+44
-935
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
+2
-14
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ AUTHOR_TASKS = frozenset({
|
||||
"create_pr",
|
||||
"comment_pr",
|
||||
"address_pr_change_requests",
|
||||
"delete_branch",
|
||||
"work_issue",
|
||||
"work-issue",
|
||||
"reconcile_landed_pr",
|
||||
@@ -83,15 +84,6 @@ AUTHOR_TASKS = frozenset({
|
||||
|
||||
RECONCILER_TASKS = frozenset({
|
||||
"cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
|
||||
# #729: delete_branch is reconciler-owned (gitea.branch.delete is granted
|
||||
# only to the reconciler profile). Raw gitea_delete_branch redirects here to
|
||||
# the guarded gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch path (#514/#687).
|
||||
"delete_branch",
|
||||
# #745: post-merge moot reviewer-lease cleanup is reconciler-owned; the
|
||||
# apply path posts a terminal lease marker. Kept in step with
|
||||
# task_capability_map so map and router cannot disagree (#723 defect A).
|
||||
"cleanup_post_merge_moot_lease",
|
||||
"gitea_cleanup_post_merge_moot_lease",
|
||||
"reconcile_already_landed_pr",
|
||||
"reconcile_already_landed",
|
||||
"reconcile-landed-pr",
|
||||
@@ -107,8 +99,7 @@ TASK_REQUIRED_ROLE = {
|
||||
"create_pr": "author",
|
||||
"comment_pr": "author",
|
||||
"address_pr_change_requests": "author",
|
||||
# #729: reconciler-owned; see RECONCILER_TASKS and task_capability_map.
|
||||
"delete_branch": "reconciler",
|
||||
"delete_branch": "author",
|
||||
"review_pr": "reviewer",
|
||||
"merge_pr": "merger",
|
||||
"blind_pr_queue_review": "reviewer",
|
||||
@@ -123,9 +114,6 @@ TASK_REQUIRED_ROLE = {
|
||||
"reconcile_already_landed": "reconciler",
|
||||
"reconcile-landed-pr": "reconciler",
|
||||
"cleanup_merged_pr_branch": "reconciler",
|
||||
# #745: post-merge moot reviewer-lease cleanup (canonical task + tool alias).
|
||||
"cleanup_post_merge_moot_lease": "reconciler",
|
||||
"gitea_cleanup_post_merge_moot_lease": "reconciler",
|
||||
# #309: reconciler tasks close already-landed PRs/issues only.
|
||||
"reconcile_close_landed_pr": "reconciler",
|
||||
"reconcile_close_landed_issue": "reconciler",
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,171 +0,0 @@
|
||||
#!/usr/bin/env bash
|
||||
set -euo pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
usage() {
|
||||
cat <<'EOF'
|
||||
usage: scripts/promote-stable-runtime [--root <path>] [--promoted <sha>] \
|
||||
[--source-branch <branch>] [--source-pr <n>] \
|
||||
[--restart-method <text>] [--rollback <text>] \
|
||||
[--health-check-proof <text>] \
|
||||
[--identity-proof <text>] [--profile-proof <text>] \
|
||||
[--workspace-proof <text>] \
|
||||
[--mutation-capability-proof <text>]
|
||||
|
||||
Emit and validate a stable-control-runtime promotion record (#615).
|
||||
|
||||
This helper is READ-ONLY. It never fetches, merges, restarts, reloads, or kills
|
||||
anything: promotion itself is an operator action documented in
|
||||
docs/stable-runtime-promotion-runbook.md. The helper reads the current runtime
|
||||
state, assembles the required record, validates it with
|
||||
stable_control_runtime.assess_promotion_record(), and prints it for the operator
|
||||
to act on and archive.
|
||||
|
||||
Defaults:
|
||||
--root the repository root containing this script
|
||||
--promoted HEAD of that root
|
||||
|
||||
Exit status is non-zero when the assembled record is incomplete, so a promotion
|
||||
cannot be recorded without its proof fields.
|
||||
|
||||
Example:
|
||||
scripts/promote-stable-runtime \
|
||||
--source-branch feat/issue-615-runtime-mode-enforcement \
|
||||
--source-pr 770 \
|
||||
--restart-method "IDE client reconnect (/mcp)" \
|
||||
--rollback "git -C <root> merge --ff-only <previous-sha>; reconnect client" \
|
||||
--health-check-proof "gitea_assess_mcp_namespace_health: all four healthy" \
|
||||
--identity-proof "gitea_whoami per namespace" \
|
||||
--profile-proof "gitea_get_runtime_context per namespace" \
|
||||
--workspace-proof "process root == canonical root; clean" \
|
||||
--mutation-capability-proof "gitea_resolve_task_capability: allowed"
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ROOT=""
|
||||
PROMOTED=""
|
||||
SOURCE_BRANCH=""
|
||||
SOURCE_PR=""
|
||||
RESTART_METHOD=""
|
||||
ROLLBACK=""
|
||||
HEALTH_PROOF=""
|
||||
IDENTITY_PROOF=""
|
||||
PROFILE_PROOF=""
|
||||
WORKSPACE_PROOF=""
|
||||
CAPABILITY_PROOF=""
|
||||
|
||||
while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
|
||||
case "$1" in
|
||||
--root) ROOT="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
|
||||
--promoted) PROMOTED="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
|
||||
--source-branch) SOURCE_BRANCH="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
|
||||
--source-pr) SOURCE_PR="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
|
||||
--restart-method) RESTART_METHOD="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
|
||||
--rollback) ROLLBACK="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
|
||||
--health-check-proof) HEALTH_PROOF="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
|
||||
--identity-proof) IDENTITY_PROOF="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
|
||||
--profile-proof) PROFILE_PROOF="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
|
||||
--workspace-proof) WORKSPACE_PROOF="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
|
||||
--mutation-capability-proof) CAPABILITY_PROOF="${2:-}"; shift 2 ;;
|
||||
-h|--help) usage; exit 0 ;;
|
||||
*) echo "unknown argument: $1" >&2; usage; exit 2 ;;
|
||||
esac
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
||||
SCRIPT_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")" && pwd)"
|
||||
ROOT="${ROOT:-$(cd "$SCRIPT_DIR/.." && pwd)}"
|
||||
|
||||
if ! git -C "$ROOT" rev-parse --show-toplevel >/dev/null 2>&1; then
|
||||
echo "error: '$ROOT' is not a git checkout; cannot read runtime SHAs" >&2
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
PREVIOUS="${GITEA_MCP_PREVIOUS_RUNTIME_SHA:-}"
|
||||
if [[ -z "$PREVIOUS" ]]; then
|
||||
# The runtime the operator is replacing. Best-effort: the commit master
|
||||
# pointed at before the fast-forward, recorded in the reflog.
|
||||
PREVIOUS="$(git -C "$ROOT" rev-parse 'master@{1}' 2>/dev/null || true)"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
PROMOTED="${PROMOTED:-$(git -C "$ROOT" rev-parse HEAD)}"
|
||||
BRANCH="$(git -C "$ROOT" rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)"
|
||||
DIRTY="$(git -C "$ROOT" status --porcelain | wc -l | tr -d ' ')"
|
||||
STAMP="$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)"
|
||||
|
||||
if [[ -z "$WORKSPACE_PROOF" ]]; then
|
||||
WORKSPACE_PROOF="root=$ROOT branch=$BRANCH dirty_files=$DIRTY"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [[ -z "$ROLLBACK" && -n "$PREVIOUS" ]]; then
|
||||
ROLLBACK="git -C $ROOT merge --ff-only $PREVIOUS (or checkout $PREVIOUS), then reload the runtime by the same sanctioned method and re-prove every namespace"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
cat <<EOF
|
||||
# Stable control runtime promotion record (#615)
|
||||
# Generated $STAMP by scripts/promote-stable-runtime (read-only)
|
||||
|
||||
previous_runtime_sha: ${PREVIOUS:-<MISSING: record the SHA the runtime served before promotion>}
|
||||
promoted_runtime_sha: ${PROMOTED}
|
||||
source_branch: ${SOURCE_BRANCH:-<MISSING: pass --source-branch>}
|
||||
source_pr: ${SOURCE_PR:-<MISSING: pass --source-pr>}
|
||||
restart_method: ${RESTART_METHOD:-<MISSING: pass --restart-method>}
|
||||
health_check_proof: ${HEALTH_PROOF:-<MISSING: pass --health-check-proof>}
|
||||
identity_proof: ${IDENTITY_PROOF:-<MISSING: pass --identity-proof>}
|
||||
profile_proof: ${PROFILE_PROOF:-<MISSING: pass --profile-proof>}
|
||||
workspace_proof: ${WORKSPACE_PROOF}
|
||||
mutation_capability_proof: ${CAPABILITY_PROOF:-<MISSING: pass --mutation-capability-proof>}
|
||||
rollback_instructions: ${ROLLBACK:-<MISSING: pass --rollback>}
|
||||
EOF
|
||||
|
||||
if [[ "$DIRTY" != "0" ]]; then
|
||||
{
|
||||
echo
|
||||
echo "WARNING: the stable checkout has $DIRTY dirty file(s); a dirty stable"
|
||||
echo " runtime is itself a mutation blocker (dirty_stable_runtime_checkout)."
|
||||
} >&2
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
PYTHON_BIN="${PYTHON_BIN:-python3}"
|
||||
RECORD_JSON="$(
|
||||
ROOT="$ROOT" \
|
||||
PREVIOUS="$PREVIOUS" PROMOTED="$PROMOTED" \
|
||||
SOURCE_BRANCH="$SOURCE_BRANCH" SOURCE_PR="$SOURCE_PR" \
|
||||
RESTART_METHOD="$RESTART_METHOD" HEALTH_PROOF="$HEALTH_PROOF" \
|
||||
IDENTITY_PROOF="$IDENTITY_PROOF" PROFILE_PROOF="$PROFILE_PROOF" \
|
||||
WORKSPACE_PROOF="$WORKSPACE_PROOF" CAPABILITY_PROOF="$CAPABILITY_PROOF" \
|
||||
ROLLBACK="$ROLLBACK" \
|
||||
"$PYTHON_BIN" -c '
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
|
||||
print(json.dumps({
|
||||
"previous_runtime_sha": os.environ.get("PREVIOUS", ""),
|
||||
"promoted_runtime_sha": os.environ.get("PROMOTED", ""),
|
||||
"source_branch": os.environ.get("SOURCE_BRANCH", ""),
|
||||
"source_pr": os.environ.get("SOURCE_PR", ""),
|
||||
"restart_method": os.environ.get("RESTART_METHOD", ""),
|
||||
"health_check_proof": os.environ.get("HEALTH_PROOF", ""),
|
||||
"identity_proof": os.environ.get("IDENTITY_PROOF", ""),
|
||||
"profile_proof": os.environ.get("PROFILE_PROOF", ""),
|
||||
"workspace_proof": os.environ.get("WORKSPACE_PROOF", ""),
|
||||
"mutation_capability_proof": os.environ.get("CAPABILITY_PROOF", ""),
|
||||
"rollback_instructions": os.environ.get("ROLLBACK", ""),
|
||||
}))
|
||||
'
|
||||
)"
|
||||
|
||||
RECORD_JSON="$RECORD_JSON" ROOT="$ROOT" "$PYTHON_BIN" -c '
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, os.environ["ROOT"])
|
||||
import stable_control_runtime as scr
|
||||
|
||||
record = json.loads(os.environ["RECORD_JSON"])
|
||||
assessment = scr.assess_promotion_record(record)
|
||||
print()
|
||||
print("validation:", json.dumps(assessment, indent=2))
|
||||
print()
|
||||
if not assessment["valid"]:
|
||||
print("Promotion record is INCOMPLETE - do not archive it as a promotion.")
|
||||
sys.exit(1)
|
||||
print("Promotion record is complete. Archive it on the tracking issue.")
|
||||
'
|
||||
@@ -1,907 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Self-propagating canonical handoffs through final controller closure (#626).
|
||||
|
||||
#494-#507 defined the canonical ledger, next-action comments, comment
|
||||
validation, the controller acceptance gate, and the Canonical Thread Handoff
|
||||
(CTH) shape. What none of them enforce is the *chain*: that every actor
|
||||
consumes exactly one canonical handoff, performs exactly one authorized role,
|
||||
records the result durably in Gitea, and emits the next complete handoff until
|
||||
the controller records final closure.
|
||||
|
||||
This module owns that systemic gap:
|
||||
|
||||
* one canonical cross-role handoff schema (:data:`HANDOFF_FIELDS`);
|
||||
* a fail-closed validator that rejects incomplete handoffs;
|
||||
* live-state recovery so a receiving actor never trusts an inherited handoff;
|
||||
* role-limited continuation;
|
||||
* mandatory durable posting into Gitea;
|
||||
* the ``merged-awaiting-controller`` boundary and controller accept/reject
|
||||
continuation;
|
||||
* workflow-failure escalation into separate durable issues, with duplicate
|
||||
handling;
|
||||
* terminal closure that must *not* emit an unnecessary next prompt.
|
||||
|
||||
Everything here is pure assessment: no network calls, no mutation.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import re
|
||||
from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping, Sequence
|
||||
|
||||
MARKER = "<!-- sph:v1 -->"
|
||||
HANDOFF_HEADING = "Canonical Handoff"
|
||||
|
||||
#: Canonical workflow states a handoff may declare.
|
||||
WORKFLOW_STATES: tuple[str, ...] = (
|
||||
"needs-author",
|
||||
"needs-review",
|
||||
"approved-awaiting-merge",
|
||||
"merged-awaiting-controller",
|
||||
"blocked",
|
||||
"complete",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
TERMINAL_STATES = frozenset({"complete"})
|
||||
|
||||
#: The single role authorized to act on each workflow state.
|
||||
NEXT_ACTOR_BY_STATE: dict[str, str] = {
|
||||
"needs-author": "author",
|
||||
"needs-review": "reviewer",
|
||||
"approved-awaiting-merge": "merger",
|
||||
"merged-awaiting-controller": "controller",
|
||||
"blocked": "operator",
|
||||
"complete": "none",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
WORKFLOW_ROLES = frozenset(
|
||||
{"author", "reviewer", "merger", "controller", "operator", "reconciler"}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
#: What each receiving role is authorized to do when it consumes a handoff.
|
||||
ROLE_ALLOWED_ACTIONS: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {
|
||||
"author": ("implement", "commit", "push", "create_pr", "comment"),
|
||||
"reviewer": ("review", "approve", "request_changes", "comment"),
|
||||
"merger": ("verify_approval_parity", "merge", "comment"),
|
||||
"controller": ("accept", "reject", "reopen", "close_issue", "comment"),
|
||||
"operator": ("repair_infrastructure", "comment"),
|
||||
"reconciler": ("close_superseded_pr", "cleanup_branch", "comment"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ROLE_FORBIDDEN_ACTIONS: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {
|
||||
"author": ("approve", "request_changes", "merge", "close_issue"),
|
||||
"reviewer": ("merge", "commit", "push", "create_pr"),
|
||||
"merger": ("approve", "commit", "push", "create_pr"),
|
||||
"controller": ("approve", "merge", "commit", "push"),
|
||||
"operator": ("approve", "merge", "close_issue"),
|
||||
"reconciler": ("approve", "merge", "commit", "push", "create_pr"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#: Ordered canonical handoff fields. Every one of them is required; the
|
||||
#: fields in :data:`NONE_ALLOWED_FIELDS` may legitimately carry ``none``.
|
||||
HANDOFF_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
|
||||
"REPOSITORY",
|
||||
"ISSUE",
|
||||
"PR",
|
||||
"WORKFLOW_STATE",
|
||||
"HEAD_SHA",
|
||||
"BASE_BRANCH",
|
||||
"BASE_OR_MERGE_SHA",
|
||||
"ACTING_ROLE",
|
||||
"ACTING_IDENTITY",
|
||||
"COMPLETED_ACTIONS",
|
||||
"VALIDATION_EVIDENCE",
|
||||
"MUTATION_LEDGER",
|
||||
"BLOCKERS",
|
||||
"NEXT_ACTOR",
|
||||
"NEXT_ACTION",
|
||||
"PROHIBITED_ACTIONS",
|
||||
"NEXT_PROMPT",
|
||||
"WORKFLOW_FAILURE_ISSUES",
|
||||
"LAST_UPDATED",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
NONE_ALLOWED_FIELDS = frozenset(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"PR",
|
||||
"HEAD_SHA",
|
||||
"BASE_OR_MERGE_SHA",
|
||||
"BLOCKERS",
|
||||
"WORKFLOW_FAILURE_ISSUES",
|
||||
"NEXT_PROMPT",
|
||||
"NEXT_ACTION",
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
#: States where no PR or head SHA exists yet, so ``none`` is legitimate.
|
||||
_PRE_PR_STATES = frozenset({"needs-author", "blocked"})
|
||||
|
||||
_PLACEHOLDERS = frozenset({"", "none", "n/a", "na", "tbd", "todo", "unknown", "?"})
|
||||
|
||||
#: A next prompt short enough to be a stub cannot be "ready to run".
|
||||
MIN_NEXT_PROMPT_CHARS = 40
|
||||
|
||||
_FIELD_LINE_RE = re.compile(r"^([A-Z][A-Z0-9_]*)\s*:\s*(.*)$", re.MULTILINE)
|
||||
_HEADING_RE = re.compile(r"^##\s*Canonical Handoff\s*$", re.IGNORECASE | re.MULTILINE)
|
||||
_EXTERNAL_CHAT_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"\b(?:previous chat|prior conversation|earlier conversation|see (?:the )?chat|"
|
||||
r"chat history|paste (?:this )?(?:from|into) chatgpt|ask the operator to paste)\b",
|
||||
re.IGNORECASE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
LIVE_DETECTION_KINDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
|
||||
"changed_pr_head",
|
||||
"stale_approval",
|
||||
"issue_closed",
|
||||
"issue_reopened",
|
||||
"pr_merged",
|
||||
"pr_closed_unmerged",
|
||||
"stale_lease",
|
||||
"foreign_lease",
|
||||
"missing_worktree",
|
||||
"dirty_worktree",
|
||||
"namespace_mismatch",
|
||||
"stale_runtime",
|
||||
"changed_base",
|
||||
"conflicting_canonical_comments",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
CONTROLLER_DECISIONS = frozenset(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"accept",
|
||||
"request_tests",
|
||||
"request_proof",
|
||||
"request_corrections",
|
||||
"reopen",
|
||||
"return_to_actor",
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
CONTROLLER_CLOSURE_PROOF_FIELDS = (
|
||||
"acceptance_criteria_satisfied",
|
||||
"cleanup_complete",
|
||||
"canonical_final_state_posted",
|
||||
"issue_closed_through_workflow",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
WORKFLOW_FAILURE_FIELDS = (
|
||||
"classification",
|
||||
"linked_issue",
|
||||
"temporary_impact",
|
||||
"next_valid_actor",
|
||||
"recovery_prompt",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _is_placeholder(value: Any) -> bool:
|
||||
return str(value or "").strip().lower() in _PLACEHOLDERS
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _clean(value: Any) -> str:
|
||||
text = str(value).strip() if value is not None else ""
|
||||
return text or "none"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# rendering / parsing
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def render_self_propagating_handoff(**values: Any) -> str:
|
||||
"""Render a canonical cross-role handoff block.
|
||||
|
||||
Raises ``ValueError`` for an unknown workflow state so a malformed handoff
|
||||
can never be produced by the sanctioned renderer.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
state = str(values.get("WORKFLOW_STATE", values.get("workflow_state", ""))).strip()
|
||||
if state not in WORKFLOW_STATES:
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"unknown workflow state '{state}'; expected one of {list(WORKFLOW_STATES)}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
lines = [MARKER, f"## {HANDOFF_HEADING}", "", "```text"]
|
||||
for name in HANDOFF_FIELDS:
|
||||
raw = values.get(name, values.get(name.lower()))
|
||||
lines.append(f"{name}: {_clean(raw)}")
|
||||
lines.append("```")
|
||||
return "\n".join(lines)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def parse_self_propagating_handoff(text: str) -> dict[str, str] | None:
|
||||
"""Parse a canonical handoff block, or ``None`` when absent."""
|
||||
body = text or ""
|
||||
if MARKER not in body and not _HEADING_RE.search(body):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
fields = {
|
||||
match.group(1): match.group(2).strip()
|
||||
for match in _FIELD_LINE_RE.finditer(body)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if not fields:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return fields
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def handoff_present(text: str) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Whether *text* carries a canonical handoff block at all."""
|
||||
return parse_self_propagating_handoff(text) is not None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# handoff validation (AC: a validator rejects incomplete handoffs)
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_self_propagating_handoff(text: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Fail closed unless *text* carries one complete canonical handoff."""
|
||||
fields = parse_self_propagating_handoff(text)
|
||||
if fields is None:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"valid": False,
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"present": False,
|
||||
"fields": {},
|
||||
"missing_fields": list(HANDOFF_FIELDS),
|
||||
"workflow_state": None,
|
||||
"next_actor": None,
|
||||
"terminal": False,
|
||||
"reasons": ["report or comment carries no canonical handoff block"],
|
||||
"safe_next_action": (
|
||||
"add a canonical handoff block with all "
|
||||
f"{len(HANDOFF_FIELDS)} fields before posting"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
state = (fields.get("WORKFLOW_STATE") or "").strip()
|
||||
terminal = state in TERMINAL_STATES
|
||||
|
||||
if state not in WORKFLOW_STATES:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"unknown WORKFLOW_STATE '{state or 'missing'}'; "
|
||||
f"expected one of {list(WORKFLOW_STATES)}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
missing = [name for name in HANDOFF_FIELDS if name not in fields]
|
||||
reasons.extend(f"handoff missing field: {name}" for name in missing)
|
||||
|
||||
for name in HANDOFF_FIELDS:
|
||||
if name in missing:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
value = fields.get(name, "")
|
||||
if not _is_placeholder(value):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if name in NONE_ALLOWED_FIELDS:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
# A terminated chain names no next actor by design.
|
||||
if name == "NEXT_ACTOR" and terminal:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
reasons.append(f"handoff field {name} must be concrete, got '{value or ''}'")
|
||||
|
||||
if state and state not in _PRE_PR_STATES and state in WORKFLOW_STATES:
|
||||
for name in ("PR", "HEAD_SHA"):
|
||||
if name not in missing and _is_placeholder(fields.get(name)):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"handoff field {name} must be concrete in state '{state}'"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if state == "blocked" and _is_placeholder(fields.get("BLOCKERS")):
|
||||
reasons.append("state 'blocked' requires a concrete BLOCKERS entry")
|
||||
|
||||
declared_actor = (fields.get("NEXT_ACTOR") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
expected_actor = NEXT_ACTOR_BY_STATE.get(state)
|
||||
if expected_actor and declared_actor != expected_actor:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"NEXT_ACTOR '{declared_actor or 'missing'}' does not match state "
|
||||
f"'{state}', which authorizes '{expected_actor}'"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
next_prompt = (fields.get("NEXT_PROMPT") or "").strip()
|
||||
next_action = (fields.get("NEXT_ACTION") or "").strip()
|
||||
if terminal:
|
||||
# A completed workflow terminates; it must not manufacture more work.
|
||||
if not _is_placeholder(next_prompt):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"terminal state 'complete' must not carry a NEXT_PROMPT; "
|
||||
"the chain ends at controller closure"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not _is_placeholder(next_action):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"terminal state 'complete' must not carry a NEXT_ACTION"
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
if _is_placeholder(next_prompt):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"non-terminal handoff requires a complete ready-to-run NEXT_PROMPT"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif len(next_prompt) < MIN_NEXT_PROMPT_CHARS:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"NEXT_PROMPT is too short to be ready-to-run "
|
||||
f"({len(next_prompt)} < {MIN_NEXT_PROMPT_CHARS} characters)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if _is_placeholder(next_action):
|
||||
reasons.append("non-terminal handoff requires a concrete NEXT_ACTION")
|
||||
|
||||
acting_role = (fields.get("ACTING_ROLE") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if acting_role and acting_role not in WORKFLOW_ROLES:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"unknown ACTING_ROLE '{acting_role}'; expected one of "
|
||||
f"{sorted(WORKFLOW_ROLES)}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
block = bool(reasons)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"valid": not block,
|
||||
"block": block,
|
||||
"present": True,
|
||||
"fields": fields,
|
||||
"missing_fields": missing,
|
||||
"workflow_state": state or None,
|
||||
"next_actor": declared_actor or None,
|
||||
"terminal": terminal,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"safe_next_action": (
|
||||
"complete every canonical handoff field before posting"
|
||||
if block
|
||||
else "proceed"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_thread_recoverability(text: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""The next actor must recover from the thread alone — never outside chat."""
|
||||
assessment = assess_self_propagating_handoff(text)
|
||||
if assessment["block"]:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"recoverable": False,
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"reasons": assessment["reasons"],
|
||||
"safe_next_action": assessment["safe_next_action"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fields = assessment["fields"]
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
if assessment["terminal"]:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"recoverable": True,
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"safe_next_action": "proceed",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
prompt = fields.get("NEXT_PROMPT", "")
|
||||
repository = fields.get("REPOSITORY", "").strip()
|
||||
issue = fields.get("ISSUE", "").strip().lstrip("#")
|
||||
|
||||
if repository and repository.lower() not in prompt.lower():
|
||||
reasons.append("NEXT_PROMPT must name the repository it applies to")
|
||||
if issue and issue not in prompt:
|
||||
reasons.append(f"NEXT_PROMPT must name issue {issue}")
|
||||
if _EXTERNAL_CHAT_RE.search(prompt):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"NEXT_PROMPT must not depend on outside chat history; the issue or "
|
||||
"PR thread, workflow docs, and live repository state must suffice"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
block = bool(reasons)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"recoverable": not block,
|
||||
"block": block,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"safe_next_action": (
|
||||
"rewrite NEXT_PROMPT so it is self-contained" if block else "proceed"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# live-state recovery (AC: head changes invalidate stale review/merge handoffs)
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _detection(kind: str, detail: str) -> dict[str, str]:
|
||||
return {"kind": kind, "detail": detail}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_handoff_live_state(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
handoff: str | Mapping[str, str],
|
||||
live: Mapping[str, Any],
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Re-derive workflow truth from live state instead of trusting *handoff*.
|
||||
|
||||
*live* carries observed facts; absent keys are simply not checked, but any
|
||||
fact that contradicts the inherited handoff fails closed.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if isinstance(handoff, Mapping):
|
||||
fields = dict(handoff)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
parsed = parse_self_propagating_handoff(handoff or "")
|
||||
if parsed is None:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"detections": [_detection("missing_handoff", "no canonical handoff")],
|
||||
"kinds": ["missing_handoff"],
|
||||
"reasons": ["no canonical handoff to reconcile against live state"],
|
||||
"recovered_state": None,
|
||||
"safe_next_action": "post a canonical handoff before continuing",
|
||||
}
|
||||
fields = parsed
|
||||
|
||||
state = (fields.get("WORKFLOW_STATE") or "").strip()
|
||||
next_actor = (fields.get("NEXT_ACTOR") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
detections: list[dict[str, str]] = []
|
||||
recovered_state: str | None = None
|
||||
|
||||
handoff_head = (fields.get("HEAD_SHA") or "").strip()
|
||||
live_head = str(live.get("pr_head_sha") or "").strip()
|
||||
head_changed = bool(
|
||||
live_head and handoff_head and not _is_placeholder(handoff_head)
|
||||
and live_head != handoff_head
|
||||
)
|
||||
if head_changed:
|
||||
detections.append(
|
||||
_detection(
|
||||
"changed_pr_head",
|
||||
f"handoff pinned {handoff_head}, live head is {live_head}",
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
if next_actor in {"reviewer", "merger"}:
|
||||
recovered_state = "needs-review"
|
||||
|
||||
approved_head = str(live.get("approved_head_sha") or "").strip()
|
||||
if approved_head and live_head and approved_head != live_head:
|
||||
detections.append(
|
||||
_detection(
|
||||
"stale_approval",
|
||||
f"approval recorded at {approved_head}, live head is {live_head}",
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
if next_actor == "merger":
|
||||
recovered_state = "needs-review"
|
||||
|
||||
issue_state = str(live.get("issue_state") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if issue_state == "closed" and state not in TERMINAL_STATES:
|
||||
detections.append(
|
||||
_detection("issue_closed", "linked issue is closed but handoff is not complete")
|
||||
)
|
||||
if issue_state == "open" and state in TERMINAL_STATES:
|
||||
detections.append(
|
||||
_detection("issue_reopened", "handoff claims complete but the issue is open")
|
||||
)
|
||||
recovered_state = "needs-author"
|
||||
|
||||
pr_state = str(live.get("pr_state") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if pr_state == "merged" and state in {
|
||||
"needs-author",
|
||||
"needs-review",
|
||||
"approved-awaiting-merge",
|
||||
}:
|
||||
detections.append(
|
||||
_detection("pr_merged", "PR is already merged; controller boundary applies")
|
||||
)
|
||||
recovered_state = "merged-awaiting-controller"
|
||||
if pr_state == "closed" and state not in TERMINAL_STATES:
|
||||
detections.append(
|
||||
_detection("pr_closed_unmerged", "PR is closed without merge")
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
lease = live.get("lease") or {}
|
||||
if isinstance(lease, Mapping) and lease:
|
||||
lease_status = str(lease.get("status") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if lease_status and lease_status != "active":
|
||||
detections.append(
|
||||
_detection("stale_lease", f"lease status is '{lease_status}'")
|
||||
)
|
||||
lease_session = str(lease.get("session_id") or "").strip()
|
||||
actor_session = str(live.get("actor_session_id") or "").strip()
|
||||
if lease_session and actor_session and lease_session != actor_session:
|
||||
detections.append(
|
||||
_detection(
|
||||
"foreign_lease",
|
||||
"lease is owned by another session; never adopt it implicitly",
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
worktree = live.get("worktree") or {}
|
||||
if isinstance(worktree, Mapping) and worktree:
|
||||
if worktree.get("present") is False:
|
||||
detections.append(_detection("missing_worktree", "bound worktree is absent"))
|
||||
if worktree.get("dirty") is True:
|
||||
detections.append(
|
||||
_detection("dirty_worktree", "bound worktree carries uncommitted changes")
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
namespace_role = str(live.get("namespace_role") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if namespace_role and next_actor and next_actor != "none":
|
||||
if namespace_role != next_actor:
|
||||
detections.append(
|
||||
_detection(
|
||||
"namespace_mismatch",
|
||||
f"live namespace role '{namespace_role}' cannot act as '{next_actor}'",
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if live.get("runtime_stale") is True:
|
||||
detections.append(
|
||||
_detection("stale_runtime", "serving runtime is stale; reconnect required")
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
handoff_base = (fields.get("BASE_BRANCH") or "").strip()
|
||||
live_base = str(live.get("base_branch") or "").strip()
|
||||
if handoff_base and live_base and not _is_placeholder(handoff_base):
|
||||
if handoff_base != live_base:
|
||||
detections.append(
|
||||
_detection(
|
||||
"changed_base",
|
||||
f"handoff base '{handoff_base}' but live base '{live_base}'",
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if live.get("conflicting_canonical_comments") is True:
|
||||
detections.append(
|
||||
_detection(
|
||||
"conflicting_canonical_comments",
|
||||
"thread carries contradictory canonical comments",
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
kinds = [item["kind"] for item in detections]
|
||||
reasons = [f"{item['kind']}: {item['detail']}" for item in detections]
|
||||
block = bool(detections)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"block": block,
|
||||
"detections": detections,
|
||||
"kinds": kinds,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"recovered_state": recovered_state,
|
||||
"safe_next_action": (
|
||||
"post a corrected canonical handoff for the recovered live state "
|
||||
"before acting"
|
||||
if block
|
||||
else "proceed"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# role-limited continuation
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_role_continuation(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
handoff: str | Mapping[str, str],
|
||||
actor_role: str,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Only the role the current state authorizes may continue the chain."""
|
||||
if isinstance(handoff, Mapping):
|
||||
fields = dict(handoff)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
fields = parse_self_propagating_handoff(handoff or "") or {}
|
||||
|
||||
role = (actor_role or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
state = (fields.get("WORKFLOW_STATE") or "").strip()
|
||||
expected = NEXT_ACTOR_BY_STATE.get(state)
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
|
||||
if not fields:
|
||||
reasons.append("no canonical handoff to continue from")
|
||||
if role not in WORKFLOW_ROLES:
|
||||
reasons.append(f"unknown actor role '{actor_role}'")
|
||||
if expected is None and fields:
|
||||
reasons.append(f"unknown workflow state '{state}'")
|
||||
elif expected == "none":
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"workflow state 'complete' is terminal; no further role may continue"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif expected and role != expected:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"state '{state}' authorizes '{expected}', not '{role}'"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
block = bool(reasons)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"allowed": not block,
|
||||
"block": block,
|
||||
"expected_actor": expected,
|
||||
"actor_role": role,
|
||||
"allowed_actions": () if block else ROLE_ALLOWED_ACTIONS.get(role, ()),
|
||||
"forbidden_actions": ROLE_FORBIDDEN_ACTIONS.get(role, ()),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"safe_next_action": (
|
||||
f"hand off to '{expected}'" if block and expected else
|
||||
"stop; the workflow is complete" if expected == "none" else
|
||||
"proceed"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# durable posting (AC: a chat-only report is never sufficient)
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_durable_state_update(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
handoff_text: str,
|
||||
posted_comment_id: Any = None,
|
||||
canonical_state_posted: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""A successful actor session must leave the handoff in Gitea, not chat."""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
assessment = assess_self_propagating_handoff(handoff_text)
|
||||
if assessment["block"]:
|
||||
reasons.extend(assessment["reasons"])
|
||||
if not posted_comment_id:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"canonical handoff was not posted to Gitea; a chat-only report is "
|
||||
"not durable workflow state"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not canonical_state_posted:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"canonical issue/PR state and thread ledger were not updated"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
block = bool(reasons)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"durable": not block,
|
||||
"block": block,
|
||||
"posted_comment_id": posted_comment_id,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"safe_next_action": (
|
||||
"post the canonical handoff and state update to Gitea before "
|
||||
"ending the session"
|
||||
if block
|
||||
else "proceed"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# merge -> controller boundary and controller continuation
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_merge_completion_transition(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
merge_succeeded: bool,
|
||||
controller_auto_accept: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""A merged PR is not accepted work until the controller says so."""
|
||||
if not merge_succeeded:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"next_state": "approved-awaiting-merge",
|
||||
"next_actor": "merger",
|
||||
"next_prompt_required": True,
|
||||
"reasons": ["merge did not succeed; the merger retains the work item"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if controller_auto_accept:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"next_state": "complete",
|
||||
"next_actor": "none",
|
||||
"next_prompt_required": False,
|
||||
"reasons": ["configured workflow authorizes automatic acceptance on merge"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"next_state": "merged-awaiting-controller",
|
||||
"next_actor": "controller",
|
||||
"next_prompt_required": True,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
"merge succeeded; acceptance requires the authorized controller"
|
||||
],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_controller_decision(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
decision: str,
|
||||
closure_proof: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
return_to: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Controller acceptance or rejection produces the next or final state."""
|
||||
normalized = (decision or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if normalized not in CONTROLLER_DECISIONS:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"next_state": None,
|
||||
"next_actor": None,
|
||||
"next_prompt_required": True,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
f"unknown controller decision '{decision}'; expected one of "
|
||||
f"{sorted(CONTROLLER_DECISIONS)}"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"safe_next_action": "record a supported controller decision",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if normalized == "accept":
|
||||
proof = dict(closure_proof or {})
|
||||
missing = [
|
||||
name
|
||||
for name in CONTROLLER_CLOSURE_PROOF_FIELDS
|
||||
if proof.get(name) is not True
|
||||
]
|
||||
if missing:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"next_state": "merged-awaiting-controller",
|
||||
"next_actor": "controller",
|
||||
"next_prompt_required": True,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
"controller acceptance missing closure proof: " + ", ".join(missing)
|
||||
],
|
||||
"safe_next_action": (
|
||||
"satisfy and record every closure proof field before closing"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"next_state": "complete",
|
||||
"next_actor": "none",
|
||||
"next_prompt_required": False,
|
||||
"reasons": ["controller accepted; workflow chain terminates"],
|
||||
"safe_next_action": "post the final canonical state and stop",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if normalized == "return_to_actor":
|
||||
target = (return_to or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
state_by_actor = {
|
||||
"author": "needs-author",
|
||||
"reviewer": "needs-review",
|
||||
"merger": "approved-awaiting-merge",
|
||||
}
|
||||
if target not in state_by_actor:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"next_state": None,
|
||||
"next_actor": None,
|
||||
"next_prompt_required": True,
|
||||
"reasons": [
|
||||
f"return_to_actor requires a target in {sorted(state_by_actor)}"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"safe_next_action": "name the actor the work returns to",
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"next_state": state_by_actor[target],
|
||||
"next_actor": target,
|
||||
"next_prompt_required": True,
|
||||
"reasons": [f"controller returned the work item to '{target}'"],
|
||||
"safe_next_action": f"post a complete handoff for '{target}'",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# request_tests / request_proof / request_corrections / reopen
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"next_state": "needs-author",
|
||||
"next_actor": "author",
|
||||
"next_prompt_required": True,
|
||||
"reasons": [f"controller decision '{normalized}' returns the work to the author"],
|
||||
"safe_next_action": "post a complete author handoff describing what is required",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# workflow-failure escalation
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_workflow_failure_escalation(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
failures: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]] | None,
|
||||
active_issue_number: int | str | None,
|
||||
existing_failure_issues: Iterable[Mapping[str, Any]] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Tooling defects hit while working an issue become separate durable work."""
|
||||
entries = list(failures or [])
|
||||
known = {
|
||||
str((item.get("signature") or "")).strip().lower(): item.get("number")
|
||||
for item in (existing_failure_issues or [])
|
||||
if str((item.get("signature") or "")).strip()
|
||||
}
|
||||
active = str(active_issue_number or "").strip().lstrip("#")
|
||||
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
reused: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
seen_signatures: dict[str, str] = {}
|
||||
|
||||
for index, failure in enumerate(entries):
|
||||
label = str(failure.get("signature") or f"failure[{index}]")
|
||||
missing = [
|
||||
name
|
||||
for name in WORKFLOW_FAILURE_FIELDS
|
||||
if _is_placeholder(failure.get(name))
|
||||
]
|
||||
if missing:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"{label}: workflow failure missing " + ", ".join(missing)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
linked = str(failure.get("linked_issue") or "").strip().lstrip("#")
|
||||
if linked and active and linked == active:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"{label}: workflow defects must not be folded into the active "
|
||||
f"work item #{active}; file a separate durable issue"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
signature = str(failure.get("signature") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if not signature:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if signature in known:
|
||||
expected = str(known[signature] or "").strip().lstrip("#")
|
||||
if linked and expected and linked != expected:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"{label}: duplicate workflow-failure issue #{linked}; "
|
||||
f"reuse the existing issue #{expected}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
reused.append({"signature": signature, "issue": expected})
|
||||
if signature in seen_signatures:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"{label}: duplicate workflow-failure signature reported twice "
|
||||
"in one session"
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
seen_signatures[signature] = linked
|
||||
|
||||
block = bool(reasons)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"escalated": not block,
|
||||
"block": block,
|
||||
"failure_count": len(entries),
|
||||
"reused_issues": reused,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"safe_next_action": (
|
||||
"file or reference one durable issue per distinct workflow failure"
|
||||
if block
|
||||
else "proceed"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# final-report integration
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_final_report_self_propagating_handoff(report_text: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""#626 gate for final reports.
|
||||
|
||||
Applicability mirrors the #495 canonical-state gate: once a report adopts
|
||||
the protocol — by carrying the marker, the ``Canonical Handoff`` heading,
|
||||
or a ``WORKFLOW_STATE`` line — the full schema is enforced. Reports that
|
||||
predate the protocol are untouched here; the workflow schemas require the
|
||||
block going forward.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
text = report_text or ""
|
||||
applicable = (
|
||||
MARKER in text
|
||||
or bool(_HEADING_RE.search(text))
|
||||
or bool(re.search(r"^WORKFLOW_STATE\s*:", text, re.MULTILINE))
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not applicable:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"applicable": False,
|
||||
"valid": True,
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"safe_next_action": "proceed",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
assessment = assess_self_propagating_handoff(text)
|
||||
recoverability = assess_thread_recoverability(text)
|
||||
reasons = list(assessment["reasons"])
|
||||
if not assessment["block"]:
|
||||
reasons.extend(recoverability.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
block = bool(assessment["block"] or recoverability.get("block"))
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"applicable": True,
|
||||
"valid": not block,
|
||||
"block": block,
|
||||
"workflow_state": assessment.get("workflow_state"),
|
||||
"next_actor": assessment.get("next_actor"),
|
||||
"terminal": assessment.get("terminal"),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"safe_next_action": (
|
||||
assessment["safe_next_action"]
|
||||
if assessment["block"]
|
||||
else recoverability.get("safe_next_action", "proceed")
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,718 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Sentry → Gitea incident bridge (#607).
|
||||
|
||||
Reads unresolved issues/events from a **self-hosted** Sentry, normalizes them
|
||||
into #612 observations, and reconciles them into durable Gitea issues.
|
||||
|
||||
Hard rules (inherited from #612 and restated here):
|
||||
* Gitea owns workflow state; Sentry is observability **input only**.
|
||||
* Raw Sentry incidents are never assignable control-plane ``work_items``.
|
||||
* Dedupe/link/create is delegated to :mod:`incident_bridge` — this module
|
||||
never invents a second linking substrate.
|
||||
* Tokens, DSNs, and raw headers never appear in returns, bodies, or logs.
|
||||
* The watchdog defaults to dry-run; ``apply`` is explicit.
|
||||
|
||||
Network access is injected as ``http_fn`` so the whole surface is testable
|
||||
without a live Sentry.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import dataclasses
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import re
|
||||
import urllib.error
|
||||
import urllib.parse
|
||||
import urllib.request
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass
|
||||
from typing import Any, Callable, Sequence
|
||||
|
||||
import incident_bridge
|
||||
import sentry_observability
|
||||
|
||||
PROVIDER = "sentry"
|
||||
|
||||
ENV_BASE_URL = "SENTRY_BASE_URL"
|
||||
ENV_AUTH_TOKEN = "SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN"
|
||||
ENV_ORG = "SENTRY_ORG"
|
||||
ENV_PROJECT = "SENTRY_PROJECT"
|
||||
ENV_ENVIRONMENT = "SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT"
|
||||
ENV_BRIDGE_ENABLED = "MCP_SENTRY_ISSUE_BRIDGE_ENABLED"
|
||||
ENV_MIN_EVENTS = "MCP_SENTRY_MIN_EVENTS_FOR_ISSUE"
|
||||
ENV_LOOKBACK = "MCP_SENTRY_LOOKBACK"
|
||||
|
||||
DEFAULT_BASE_URL = "https://sentry.prgs.cc"
|
||||
DEFAULT_LOOKBACK = "24h"
|
||||
DEFAULT_MIN_EVENTS = 2
|
||||
DEFAULT_TIMEOUT = 15.0
|
||||
DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE = 25
|
||||
MAX_PAGE_SIZE = 100
|
||||
DEFAULT_MAX_PAGES = 10
|
||||
|
||||
_TRUTHY = frozenset({"1", "true", "yes", "on"})
|
||||
# Absolute local paths embedded in free text. Mirrors the shape matched by
|
||||
# sentry_observability's internal path detector; each hit is replaced by the
|
||||
# coarse category from sentry_observability.sanitize_path.
|
||||
_ABS_PATH_RE = re.compile(
|
||||
r"(?:/private)?/(?:Users|home|tmp|var|opt|Volumes)/[^\s\"']*"
|
||||
)
|
||||
_LOOKBACK_RE = re.compile(r"^\d+[mhd]$")
|
||||
_CURSOR_RE = re.compile(r'cursor="([^"]+)"')
|
||||
_RESULTS_RE = re.compile(r'results="([^"]+)"')
|
||||
_REL_RE = re.compile(r'rel="([^"]+)"')
|
||||
|
||||
# Error kinds surfaced to callers (stable strings; safe to branch on).
|
||||
ERROR_NOT_CONFIGURED = "not_configured"
|
||||
ERROR_MISSING_TOKEN = "missing_token"
|
||||
ERROR_UNAVAILABLE = "sentry_unavailable"
|
||||
ERROR_HTTP = "sentry_http_error"
|
||||
ERROR_INVALID_RESPONSE = "invalid_response"
|
||||
ERROR_BRIDGE_DISABLED = "bridge_disabled"
|
||||
|
||||
# Watchdog per-issue dispositions.
|
||||
ACTION_RECONCILED = "reconciled"
|
||||
ACTION_SKIPPED_THRESHOLD = "skipped_below_event_threshold"
|
||||
ACTION_SKIPPED_STATUS = "skipped_not_unresolved"
|
||||
ACTION_FAILED = "failed"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class SentryApiError(RuntimeError):
|
||||
"""Sentry read failure with a stable, redacted classification."""
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, message: str, *, kind: str, status: int | None = None):
|
||||
super().__init__(incident_bridge.redact_text(message))
|
||||
self.kind = kind
|
||||
self.status = status
|
||||
|
||||
def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"error_kind": self.kind,
|
||||
"status": self.status,
|
||||
"message": str(self),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass(frozen=True)
|
||||
class SentryBridgeConfig:
|
||||
"""Resolved bridge configuration. Never carries the auth token."""
|
||||
|
||||
base_url: str
|
||||
org: str
|
||||
project: str
|
||||
environment: str | None = None
|
||||
lookback: str = DEFAULT_LOOKBACK
|
||||
min_events_for_issue: int = DEFAULT_MIN_EVENTS
|
||||
bridge_enabled: bool = False
|
||||
timeout: float = DEFAULT_TIMEOUT
|
||||
|
||||
def issues_path(self) -> str:
|
||||
return f"/api/0/projects/{self.org}/{self.project}/issues/"
|
||||
|
||||
def issue_events_path(self, issue_id: str) -> str:
|
||||
return f"/api/0/issues/{issue_id}/events/"
|
||||
|
||||
def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Safe projection. The auth token is never included by construction."""
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"base_url": self.base_url,
|
||||
"org": self.org,
|
||||
"project": self.project,
|
||||
"environment": self.environment,
|
||||
"lookback": self.lookback,
|
||||
"min_events_for_issue": self.min_events_for_issue,
|
||||
"bridge_enabled": self.bridge_enabled,
|
||||
"self_hosted": not self.base_url.rstrip("/").endswith("sentry.io"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _env_bool(name: str, env: dict[str, str], default: bool = False) -> bool:
|
||||
raw = (env.get(name) or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if not raw:
|
||||
return default
|
||||
return raw in _TRUTHY
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _env_int(name: str, env: dict[str, str], default: int) -> int:
|
||||
raw = (env.get(name) or "").strip()
|
||||
if not raw:
|
||||
return default
|
||||
try:
|
||||
value = int(raw)
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
return default
|
||||
return value if value >= 1 else default
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def load_bridge_config(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> SentryBridgeConfig:
|
||||
"""Build config from environment. Never reads or returns the token value."""
|
||||
source = dict(env if env is not None else os.environ)
|
||||
base_url = (source.get(ENV_BASE_URL) or DEFAULT_BASE_URL).strip().rstrip("/")
|
||||
lookback = (source.get(ENV_LOOKBACK) or DEFAULT_LOOKBACK).strip()
|
||||
if not _LOOKBACK_RE.match(lookback):
|
||||
lookback = DEFAULT_LOOKBACK
|
||||
environment = (source.get(ENV_ENVIRONMENT) or "").strip() or None
|
||||
return SentryBridgeConfig(
|
||||
base_url=base_url,
|
||||
org=(source.get(ENV_ORG) or "").strip(),
|
||||
project=(source.get(ENV_PROJECT) or "").strip(),
|
||||
environment=environment,
|
||||
lookback=lookback,
|
||||
min_events_for_issue=_env_int(ENV_MIN_EVENTS, source, DEFAULT_MIN_EVENTS),
|
||||
bridge_enabled=_env_bool(ENV_BRIDGE_ENABLED, source, False),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def config_with_overrides(
|
||||
config: SentryBridgeConfig,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
base_url: str | None = None,
|
||||
org: str | None = None,
|
||||
project: str | None = None,
|
||||
lookback: str | None = None,
|
||||
min_events_for_issue: int | None = None,
|
||||
) -> SentryBridgeConfig:
|
||||
"""Return *config* with explicit per-call overrides applied."""
|
||||
overrides: dict[str, Any] = {}
|
||||
if base_url:
|
||||
overrides["base_url"] = str(base_url).strip().rstrip("/")
|
||||
if org:
|
||||
overrides["org"] = str(org).strip()
|
||||
if project:
|
||||
overrides["project"] = str(project).strip()
|
||||
if lookback:
|
||||
candidate = str(lookback).strip()
|
||||
overrides["lookback"] = candidate if _LOOKBACK_RE.match(candidate) else config.lookback
|
||||
if min_events_for_issue is not None:
|
||||
overrides["min_events_for_issue"] = max(1, int(min_events_for_issue))
|
||||
return dataclasses.replace(config, **overrides) if overrides else config
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def resolve_token(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> str:
|
||||
"""Return the Sentry auth token from env only (never logged or returned)."""
|
||||
source = env if env is not None else os.environ
|
||||
return (source.get(ENV_AUTH_TOKEN) or "").strip()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assert_configured(config: SentryBridgeConfig, token: str) -> None:
|
||||
"""Fail closed before any network call."""
|
||||
missing = [
|
||||
name
|
||||
for name, value in (
|
||||
(ENV_BASE_URL, config.base_url),
|
||||
(ENV_ORG, config.org),
|
||||
(ENV_PROJECT, config.project),
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not value
|
||||
]
|
||||
if missing:
|
||||
raise SentryApiError(
|
||||
"Sentry bridge is not configured; missing " + ", ".join(sorted(missing)),
|
||||
kind=ERROR_NOT_CONFIGURED,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if not token:
|
||||
raise SentryApiError(
|
||||
f"{ENV_AUTH_TOKEN} is not set; refusing to call Sentry (fail closed)",
|
||||
kind=ERROR_MISSING_TOKEN,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# HTTP layer (injectable)
|
||||
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
# http_fn(url, headers, timeout) -> (status, body_bytes, response_headers)
|
||||
HttpFn = Callable[[str, dict[str, str], float], "tuple[int, bytes, dict[str, str]]"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _default_http_fn(
|
||||
url: str, headers: dict[str, str], timeout: float
|
||||
) -> tuple[int, bytes, dict[str, str]]:
|
||||
request = urllib.request.Request(url, headers=headers, method="GET")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
with urllib.request.urlopen(request, timeout=timeout) as response:
|
||||
return (
|
||||
int(response.status),
|
||||
response.read(),
|
||||
{k.lower(): v for k, v in response.headers.items()},
|
||||
)
|
||||
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc: # status is meaningful
|
||||
try:
|
||||
body = exc.read()
|
||||
except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - body is best-effort only
|
||||
body = b""
|
||||
return (
|
||||
int(exc.code),
|
||||
body,
|
||||
{k.lower(): v for k, v in (exc.headers or {}).items()},
|
||||
)
|
||||
except urllib.error.URLError as exc:
|
||||
raise SentryApiError(
|
||||
f"Sentry unreachable: {exc.reason}", kind=ERROR_UNAVAILABLE
|
||||
) from exc
|
||||
except TimeoutError as exc:
|
||||
raise SentryApiError("Sentry request timed out", kind=ERROR_UNAVAILABLE) from exc
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def parse_next_cursor(link_header: str | None) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Extract the ``rel="next"`` cursor when more results exist."""
|
||||
if not link_header:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
for part in link_header.split(","):
|
||||
rel = _REL_RE.search(part)
|
||||
if not rel or rel.group(1) != "next":
|
||||
continue
|
||||
results = _RESULTS_RE.search(part)
|
||||
if results and results.group(1).lower() != "true":
|
||||
return None
|
||||
cursor = _CURSOR_RE.search(part)
|
||||
if cursor:
|
||||
return cursor.group(1)
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _get_json(
|
||||
config: SentryBridgeConfig,
|
||||
path: str,
|
||||
params: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
token: str,
|
||||
http_fn: HttpFn | None = None,
|
||||
) -> tuple[Any, dict[str, str]]:
|
||||
caller = http_fn or _default_http_fn
|
||||
query = urllib.parse.urlencode(
|
||||
{k: v for k, v in params.items() if v not in (None, "")}
|
||||
)
|
||||
url = f"{config.base_url}{path}"
|
||||
if query:
|
||||
url = f"{url}?{query}"
|
||||
headers = {
|
||||
"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}",
|
||||
"Accept": "application/json",
|
||||
"User-Agent": "gitea-tools-sentry-bridge/1.0",
|
||||
}
|
||||
status, body, response_headers = caller(url, headers, config.timeout)
|
||||
if status in (401, 403):
|
||||
raise SentryApiError(
|
||||
"Sentry rejected the auth token (unauthorized)",
|
||||
kind=ERROR_MISSING_TOKEN,
|
||||
status=status,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if status >= 500:
|
||||
raise SentryApiError(
|
||||
f"Sentry server error (HTTP {status})",
|
||||
kind=ERROR_UNAVAILABLE,
|
||||
status=status,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if status >= 400:
|
||||
raise SentryApiError(
|
||||
f"Sentry request failed (HTTP {status})", kind=ERROR_HTTP, status=status
|
||||
)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
payload = json.loads(body.decode("utf-8") or "null")
|
||||
except (UnicodeDecodeError, json.JSONDecodeError) as exc:
|
||||
raise SentryApiError(
|
||||
f"Sentry returned an unparseable response: {exc}",
|
||||
kind=ERROR_INVALID_RESPONSE,
|
||||
status=status,
|
||||
) from exc
|
||||
return payload, response_headers
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Sanitization
|
||||
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _clean(value: Any) -> str:
|
||||
"""Redact secrets, then replace embedded local paths with a category token.
|
||||
|
||||
``sentry_observability.sanitize_path`` categorizes a string that *is* a
|
||||
path; it must never be applied to whole free-text fields (it would collapse
|
||||
a title or timestamp to ``"other"``). Here it is applied only to substrings
|
||||
that actually match an absolute path.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
text = incident_bridge.redact_text(value)
|
||||
if not text:
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
return _ABS_PATH_RE.sub(
|
||||
lambda m: f"[path:{sentry_observability.sanitize_path(m.group(0))}]", text
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def sanitize_issue(raw: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Project one raw Sentry issue into a sanitized, LLM-safe summary."""
|
||||
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
|
||||
raise SentryApiError(
|
||||
"Sentry issue payload is not an object", kind=ERROR_INVALID_RESPONSE
|
||||
)
|
||||
issue_id = raw.get("id")
|
||||
if issue_id is None or str(issue_id).strip() == "":
|
||||
raise SentryApiError(
|
||||
"Sentry issue payload is missing 'id'", kind=ERROR_INVALID_RESPONSE
|
||||
)
|
||||
metadata = raw.get("metadata") if isinstance(raw.get("metadata"), dict) else {}
|
||||
try:
|
||||
count = int(raw.get("count"))
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
||||
count = None
|
||||
permalink = _clean(raw.get("permalink"))
|
||||
if "[REDACTED]" in permalink:
|
||||
permalink = ""
|
||||
user_count = raw.get("userCount")
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"id": str(issue_id).strip(),
|
||||
"short_id": _clean(raw.get("shortId")) or None,
|
||||
"title": _clean(raw.get("title"))[:200],
|
||||
"culprit": _clean(raw.get("culprit")) or None,
|
||||
"level": _clean(raw.get("level")) or None,
|
||||
"status": str(raw.get("status") or "unresolved").strip().lower() or "unresolved",
|
||||
"count": count,
|
||||
"user_count": user_count if isinstance(user_count, int) else None,
|
||||
"first_seen": _clean(raw.get("firstSeen")) or None,
|
||||
"last_seen": _clean(raw.get("lastSeen")) or None,
|
||||
"permalink": permalink or None,
|
||||
"metadata_value": _clean(metadata.get("value"))[:500] or None,
|
||||
"metadata_type": _clean(metadata.get("type")) or None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def sanitize_event(raw: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Project one raw Sentry event into a sanitized summary."""
|
||||
if not isinstance(raw, dict):
|
||||
raise SentryApiError(
|
||||
"Sentry event payload is not an object", kind=ERROR_INVALID_RESPONSE
|
||||
)
|
||||
tags: dict[str, str] = {}
|
||||
raw_tags = raw.get("tags")
|
||||
if isinstance(raw_tags, list):
|
||||
# Sentry events return tags as [{"key": ..., "value": ...}, ...]
|
||||
tags = incident_bridge.sanitize_tags(
|
||||
{
|
||||
t.get("key"): t.get("value")
|
||||
for t in raw_tags
|
||||
if isinstance(t, dict) and t.get("key")
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif isinstance(raw_tags, dict):
|
||||
tags = incident_bridge.sanitize_tags(raw_tags)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"event_id": _clean(raw.get("eventID") or raw.get("id")) or None,
|
||||
"message": _clean(raw.get("message") or raw.get("title"))[:2000] or None,
|
||||
"date_created": _clean(raw.get("dateCreated")) or None,
|
||||
"platform": _clean(raw.get("platform")) or None,
|
||||
"environment": _clean(raw.get("environment")) or None,
|
||||
"release": _clean(raw.get("release")) or None,
|
||||
"tags": tags,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Reads
|
||||
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def list_issues(
|
||||
config: SentryBridgeConfig,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
token: str,
|
||||
query: str = "is:unresolved",
|
||||
limit: int = DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE,
|
||||
max_pages: int = DEFAULT_MAX_PAGES,
|
||||
cursor: str | None = None,
|
||||
environment: str | None = None,
|
||||
http_fn: HttpFn | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""List sanitized unresolved Sentry issues, following ``Link`` pagination."""
|
||||
assert_configured(config, token)
|
||||
page_size = max(1, min(int(limit or DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE), MAX_PAGE_SIZE))
|
||||
pages_allowed = max(1, int(max_pages or 1))
|
||||
|
||||
issues: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
next_cursor = cursor
|
||||
pages_fetched = 0
|
||||
for _ in range(pages_allowed):
|
||||
payload, headers = _get_json(
|
||||
config,
|
||||
config.issues_path(),
|
||||
{
|
||||
"query": query,
|
||||
"statsPeriod": config.lookback,
|
||||
"limit": page_size,
|
||||
"cursor": next_cursor,
|
||||
"environment": environment or config.environment,
|
||||
},
|
||||
token=token,
|
||||
http_fn=http_fn,
|
||||
)
|
||||
pages_fetched += 1
|
||||
if payload is None:
|
||||
payload = []
|
||||
if not isinstance(payload, list):
|
||||
raise SentryApiError(
|
||||
"Sentry issue list response was not a JSON array",
|
||||
kind=ERROR_INVALID_RESPONSE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
issues.extend(sanitize_issue(item) for item in payload)
|
||||
next_cursor = parse_next_cursor(headers.get("link"))
|
||||
if not next_cursor:
|
||||
break
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"issues": issues,
|
||||
"count": len(issues),
|
||||
"pages_fetched": pages_fetched,
|
||||
"next_cursor": next_cursor,
|
||||
"inventory_complete": next_cursor is None,
|
||||
"config": config.as_dict(),
|
||||
"query": query,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def get_issue_events(
|
||||
config: SentryBridgeConfig,
|
||||
issue_id: str,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
token: str,
|
||||
limit: int = 10,
|
||||
http_fn: HttpFn | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Fetch sanitized recent events plus the latest event for one issue."""
|
||||
assert_configured(config, token)
|
||||
if not str(issue_id or "").strip():
|
||||
raise SentryApiError("issue_id is required", kind=ERROR_INVALID_RESPONSE)
|
||||
issue_key = str(issue_id).strip()
|
||||
|
||||
payload, _ = _get_json(
|
||||
config,
|
||||
config.issue_events_path(issue_key),
|
||||
{"limit": max(1, min(int(limit or 10), MAX_PAGE_SIZE))},
|
||||
token=token,
|
||||
http_fn=http_fn,
|
||||
)
|
||||
if payload is None:
|
||||
payload = []
|
||||
if not isinstance(payload, list):
|
||||
raise SentryApiError(
|
||||
"Sentry event list response was not a JSON array",
|
||||
kind=ERROR_INVALID_RESPONSE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
events = [sanitize_event(item) for item in payload]
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"success": True,
|
||||
"issue_id": issue_key,
|
||||
"events": events,
|
||||
"count": len(events),
|
||||
"latest_event": events[0] if events else None,
|
||||
"config": config.as_dict(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Observation mapping + policy
|
||||
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def observation_from_issue(
|
||||
issue: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
config: SentryBridgeConfig,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
gitea_org: str | None = None,
|
||||
gitea_repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
latest_event: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Convert a sanitized Sentry issue into a #612 observation dict."""
|
||||
tags = dict(latest_event.get("tags") or {}) if isinstance(latest_event, dict) else {}
|
||||
environment = None
|
||||
if isinstance(latest_event, dict):
|
||||
environment = latest_event.get("environment")
|
||||
environment = environment or config.environment
|
||||
|
||||
observation: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"provider": PROVIDER,
|
||||
"provider_base_url": config.base_url,
|
||||
"provider_org": config.org,
|
||||
"provider_project": config.project,
|
||||
"provider_issue_id": issue.get("id"),
|
||||
"provider_short_id": issue.get("short_id"),
|
||||
"provider_permalink": issue.get("permalink"),
|
||||
"title": issue.get("title"),
|
||||
"culprit": issue.get("culprit"),
|
||||
"summary": issue.get("metadata_value") or issue.get("title"),
|
||||
"level": issue.get("level"),
|
||||
"status": issue.get("status") or "unresolved",
|
||||
"event_count": issue.get("count"),
|
||||
"first_seen": issue.get("first_seen"),
|
||||
"last_seen": issue.get("last_seen"),
|
||||
"environment": environment,
|
||||
"tags": tags,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if gitea_org:
|
||||
observation["gitea_org"] = gitea_org
|
||||
if gitea_repo:
|
||||
observation["gitea_repo"] = gitea_repo
|
||||
return observation
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def should_bridge_issue(
|
||||
issue: dict[str, Any], config: SentryBridgeConfig
|
||||
) -> tuple[bool, str]:
|
||||
"""Policy gate: is this Sentry issue worth a durable Gitea issue?"""
|
||||
status = str(issue.get("status") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if status and status != "unresolved":
|
||||
return False, f"status '{status}' is not unresolved"
|
||||
count = issue.get("count")
|
||||
threshold = int(config.min_events_for_issue or 1)
|
||||
if isinstance(count, int) and count < threshold:
|
||||
return (
|
||||
False,
|
||||
f"event count {count} below {ENV_MIN_EVENTS} threshold {threshold}",
|
||||
)
|
||||
return True, "meets bridge policy"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Watchdog
|
||||
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def watchdog(
|
||||
db: Any,
|
||||
config: SentryBridgeConfig,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
token: str,
|
||||
apply: bool = False,
|
||||
mappings: Sequence[Any] | None = None,
|
||||
gitea_org: str | None = None,
|
||||
gitea_repo: str | None = None,
|
||||
query: str = "is:unresolved",
|
||||
limit: int = DEFAULT_PAGE_SIZE,
|
||||
max_pages: int = DEFAULT_MAX_PAGES,
|
||||
http_fn: HttpFn | None = None,
|
||||
create_issue_fn: Any = None,
|
||||
comment_issue_fn: Any = None,
|
||||
reconcile_fn: Callable[..., dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
|
||||
fetch_events: bool = True,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Scan Sentry and reconcile active incidents into Gitea issues.
|
||||
|
||||
Dry-run by default. ``apply=True`` additionally requires the bridge to be
|
||||
explicitly enabled via ``MCP_SENTRY_ISSUE_BRIDGE_ENABLED``.
|
||||
|
||||
``comment_issue_fn`` carries the sanctioned issue-comment route used for
|
||||
AC4 recurrence comments on already-linked issues; dry runs never comment.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
result: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"success": False,
|
||||
"apply": bool(apply),
|
||||
"scanned": 0,
|
||||
"reconciled": 0,
|
||||
"skipped": 0,
|
||||
"failed": 0,
|
||||
"results": [],
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"config": config.as_dict(),
|
||||
"raw_incident_assignable": False,
|
||||
"durable_work_system": "gitea_issues",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if apply and not config.bridge_enabled:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"{ENV_BRIDGE_ENABLED} is not enabled; apply refused (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["error_kind"] = ERROR_BRIDGE_DISABLED
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
listing = list_issues(
|
||||
config,
|
||||
token=token,
|
||||
query=query,
|
||||
limit=limit,
|
||||
max_pages=max_pages,
|
||||
http_fn=http_fn,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except SentryApiError as exc:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(str(exc))
|
||||
result.update(exc.as_dict())
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
reconciler = reconcile_fn or incident_bridge.reconcile_incident
|
||||
result["inventory_complete"] = listing.get("inventory_complete", False)
|
||||
result["pages_fetched"] = listing.get("pages_fetched", 0)
|
||||
|
||||
for issue in listing.get("issues", []):
|
||||
result["scanned"] += 1
|
||||
eligible, reason = should_bridge_issue(issue, config)
|
||||
if not eligible:
|
||||
result["skipped"] += 1
|
||||
result["results"].append(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"sentry_issue_id": issue.get("id"),
|
||||
"action": (
|
||||
ACTION_SKIPPED_THRESHOLD
|
||||
if "threshold" in reason
|
||||
else ACTION_SKIPPED_STATUS
|
||||
),
|
||||
"reason": reason,
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
|
||||
latest_event = None
|
||||
if fetch_events:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
events = get_issue_events(
|
||||
config, issue["id"], token=token, limit=1, http_fn=http_fn
|
||||
)
|
||||
latest_event = events.get("latest_event")
|
||||
except SentryApiError as exc:
|
||||
# Event enrichment is best-effort; the issue itself still bridges.
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"event fetch failed for {issue.get('id')}: {exc}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
observation = observation_from_issue(
|
||||
issue,
|
||||
config,
|
||||
gitea_org=gitea_org,
|
||||
gitea_repo=gitea_repo,
|
||||
latest_event=latest_event,
|
||||
)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
reconciled = reconciler(
|
||||
db,
|
||||
observation=observation,
|
||||
mappings=list(mappings or []),
|
||||
apply=bool(apply),
|
||||
create_issue_fn=create_issue_fn,
|
||||
comment_issue_fn=comment_issue_fn,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 - one bad issue must not abort the scan
|
||||
result["failed"] += 1
|
||||
result["results"].append(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"sentry_issue_id": issue.get("id"),
|
||||
"action": ACTION_FAILED,
|
||||
"reason": incident_bridge.redact_text(exc),
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
|
||||
result["reconciled"] += 1
|
||||
result["results"].append(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"sentry_issue_id": issue.get("id"),
|
||||
"action": ACTION_RECONCILED,
|
||||
"outcome": reconciled.get("outcome"),
|
||||
"gitea_issue": reconciled.get("gitea_issue"),
|
||||
"existing_link": reconciled.get("existing_link"),
|
||||
"recurrence_comment": reconciled.get("recurrence_comment"),
|
||||
"reasons": reconciled.get("reasons"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
result["success"] = result["failed"] == 0
|
||||
if not result["results"]:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append("no Sentry issues matched the scan window/policy")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
@@ -1,535 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Optional self-hosted Sentry observability for the Gitea MCP server (#606).
|
||||
|
||||
Adds env-var-gated Sentry SDK instrumentation so runtime errors, fail-closed
|
||||
workflow blockers, lease/terminal-lock/stale-runtime collisions, and recurring
|
||||
watchdog check-ins are visible in a *self-hosted* Sentry at
|
||||
``https://sentry.prgs.cc/`` — never Sentry Cloud, and never as the workflow
|
||||
source of truth (Gitea stays canonical).
|
||||
|
||||
Design constraints (mirror ``gitea_audit`` and the #612 incident bridge):
|
||||
|
||||
- **Off by default.** With ``MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED`` false/unset *or* ``SENTRY_DSN``
|
||||
empty, ``init_sentry`` is a no-op and no events are ever sent — existing tool
|
||||
behaviour and API-call patterns are unchanged (acceptance criterion 1).
|
||||
- **Fail *open* for observability.** A Sentry outage, a missing ``sentry_sdk``
|
||||
package, or any capture error must never break an MCP tool success path. Every
|
||||
public entry point swallows its own exceptions.
|
||||
- **Fail *closed* for redaction.** If a field cannot be proven safe it is dropped
|
||||
rather than sent. Tokens, passwords, keychain IDs, DSNs, private config, raw
|
||||
session-state, full prompt bodies, and full filesystem paths never leave here.
|
||||
- **No hard dependency.** ``sentry_sdk`` is imported lazily; the module is fully
|
||||
importable and testable without it installed.
|
||||
|
||||
Sentry is observe-only: it must not approve, merge, close, or otherwise mutate
|
||||
Gitea workflow state, nor bypass leases, #332, or MCP gates. Alerts may only feed
|
||||
the sanctioned Gitea issue/comment path via the #612 incident bridge.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import hashlib
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import re
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
# Reuse the most comprehensive existing scrubber so redaction stays consistent
|
||||
# with the #612 incident bridge (tokens, DSNs, cookies, bearer/basic, keychain
|
||||
# ids, session ids, user:pass@host).
|
||||
from incident_bridge import redact_text as _redact_text
|
||||
|
||||
# Second, complementary scrubber: catches bare ``token <value>`` /
|
||||
# ``Bearer <value>`` / ``Basic <value>`` prefixes and raw URLs that the
|
||||
# incident-bridge delimiter patterns miss.
|
||||
from gitea_audit import _redact_str as _redact_prefixes
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Optional SDK (lazy, never a hard dependency) ────────────────────────────
|
||||
try: # pragma: no cover - trivial import guard
|
||||
import sentry_sdk # type: ignore
|
||||
except Exception: # pragma: no cover - absence is a supported state
|
||||
sentry_sdk = None # type: ignore
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Env var names (single source of truth) ──────────────────────────────────
|
||||
ENV_ENABLED = "MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED"
|
||||
ENV_DSN = "SENTRY_DSN"
|
||||
ENV_ENVIRONMENT = "SENTRY_ENVIRONMENT"
|
||||
ENV_RELEASE = "SENTRY_RELEASE"
|
||||
ENV_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE = "MCP_SENTRY_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE"
|
||||
ENV_ENABLE_LOGS = "MCP_SENTRY_ENABLE_LOGS"
|
||||
|
||||
_TRUTHY = frozenset({"1", "true", "yes", "on"})
|
||||
|
||||
REDACTED = "[REDACTED]"
|
||||
REDACTED_PATH = "[REDACTED_PATH]"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Cron / watchdog monitor slugs (acceptance criterion 6) ──────────────────
|
||||
# Stable slugs for the recurring/watchdog jobs #606 wants check-ins for. The
|
||||
# slug is the durable monitor identity in Sentry; the wiring call sites pass one
|
||||
# of these keys (or an explicit slug) to ``monitor_checkin``.
|
||||
MONITOR_SLUGS: dict[str, str] = {
|
||||
"stale_lease_scan": "gitea-mcp-stale-lease-scan",
|
||||
"terminal_lock_scan": "gitea-mcp-terminal-lock-scan",
|
||||
"allocator_health": "gitea-mcp-allocator-health",
|
||||
"namespace_health": "gitea-mcp-namespace-health",
|
||||
"dashboard_freshness": "gitea-mcp-dashboard-freshness",
|
||||
"reconciler_cleanup": "gitea-mcp-reconciler-cleanup",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
_CHECKIN_STATUSES = frozenset({"in_progress", "ok", "error"})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Tag allowlist (issue "Suggested Sentry tags/context") ───────────────────
|
||||
# Only these keys are ever attached as Sentry tags. Anything else is dropped so
|
||||
# a caller cannot accidentally leak a sensitive value through a tag.
|
||||
ALLOWED_TAG_KEYS = frozenset({
|
||||
"role",
|
||||
"profile",
|
||||
"namespace",
|
||||
"repo",
|
||||
"org",
|
||||
"issue_number",
|
||||
"pr_number",
|
||||
"blocker_type",
|
||||
"workflow_hash",
|
||||
"session_id_hash", # hash only — never the raw session id
|
||||
"pid",
|
||||
"worktree_category", # category, never the full sensitive path
|
||||
"lease_comment_id",
|
||||
"expected_head_sha",
|
||||
"current_head_sha",
|
||||
"terminal_lock_state",
|
||||
"capability",
|
||||
"mutation_tool",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
# Absolute-path shapes that must never be sent verbatim (macOS/Linux + temp).
|
||||
_PATH_RE = re.compile(r"(?:/private)?/(?:Users|home|tmp|var|opt|Volumes)/[^\s\"']*")
|
||||
|
||||
# ``extra`` keys whose *full* contents are forbidden by the redaction rules
|
||||
# (raw session-state, full prompt/comment bodies, private config blobs, raw
|
||||
# headers).
|
||||
_FORBIDDEN_EXTRA_KEYS = frozenset({
|
||||
"prompt",
|
||||
"prompt_body",
|
||||
"next_prompt",
|
||||
"body",
|
||||
"raw_body",
|
||||
"session_state",
|
||||
"session_state_contents",
|
||||
"config",
|
||||
"config_contents",
|
||||
"private_config",
|
||||
"headers",
|
||||
"authorization",
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Configuration ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
@dataclass(frozen=True)
|
||||
class SentryConfig:
|
||||
"""Immutable snapshot of the Sentry env configuration."""
|
||||
|
||||
enabled: bool = False
|
||||
dsn: str | None = None
|
||||
environment: str = "development"
|
||||
release: str | None = None
|
||||
traces_sample_rate: float = 0.0
|
||||
enable_logs: bool = False
|
||||
|
||||
@property
|
||||
def active(self) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True only when the operator both opted in *and* supplied a DSN.
|
||||
|
||||
This is the single gate that keeps the feature off by default: enabling
|
||||
the flag without a DSN (or vice versa) sends nothing.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
return bool(self.enabled and self.dsn)
|
||||
|
||||
def safe_summary(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Operator-facing status with **no** DSN value (only presence)."""
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"enabled": self.enabled,
|
||||
"dsn_present": bool(self.dsn),
|
||||
"environment": self.environment,
|
||||
"release": self.release,
|
||||
"traces_sample_rate": self.traces_sample_rate,
|
||||
"enable_logs": self.enable_logs,
|
||||
"active": self.active,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _env_bool(name: str, env: dict[str, str]) -> bool:
|
||||
return (env.get(name) or "").strip().lower() in _TRUTHY
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _env_float(name: str, default: float, env: dict[str, str]) -> float:
|
||||
raw = (env.get(name) or "").strip()
|
||||
if not raw:
|
||||
return default
|
||||
try:
|
||||
val = float(raw)
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
||||
return default
|
||||
# Clamp to Sentry's valid [0.0, 1.0] sample-rate range.
|
||||
if val < 0.0:
|
||||
return 0.0
|
||||
if val > 1.0:
|
||||
return 1.0
|
||||
return val
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def load_config(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> SentryConfig:
|
||||
"""Build a :class:`SentryConfig` from the environment (read at call time)."""
|
||||
env = dict(os.environ if env is None else env)
|
||||
dsn = (env.get(ENV_DSN) or "").strip() or None
|
||||
return SentryConfig(
|
||||
enabled=_env_bool(ENV_ENABLED, env),
|
||||
dsn=dsn,
|
||||
environment=(env.get(ENV_ENVIRONMENT) or "").strip() or "development",
|
||||
release=(env.get(ENV_RELEASE) or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
traces_sample_rate=_env_float(ENV_TRACES_SAMPLE_RATE, 0.0, env),
|
||||
enable_logs=_env_bool(ENV_ENABLE_LOGS, env),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def sdk_available() -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when the optional ``sentry_sdk`` package is importable."""
|
||||
return sentry_sdk is not None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Redaction (fail closed) ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
def sanitize_path(value: Any) -> str:
|
||||
"""Reduce a filesystem path to a non-sensitive *category* token.
|
||||
|
||||
Full local paths must never be sent. We keep only a coarse worktree
|
||||
category derived from the path shape (author/reviewer/merger/reconciler/
|
||||
branches/root/other).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
text = "" if value is None else str(value)
|
||||
low = text.lower()
|
||||
if not text:
|
||||
return "unknown"
|
||||
# Order matters: more specific role markers before the generic "branches".
|
||||
if "reconcile" in low:
|
||||
return "reconciler"
|
||||
if "review" in low:
|
||||
return "reviewer"
|
||||
if "merge" in low or "merger" in low:
|
||||
return "merger"
|
||||
if "author" in low or re.search(r"/branches/(?:feat|fix|docs|chore|issue)", low):
|
||||
return "author"
|
||||
if "/branches/" in low:
|
||||
return "branches"
|
||||
if low.rstrip("/").endswith("gitea-tools"):
|
||||
return "root"
|
||||
return "other"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def redact_value(value: Any) -> Any:
|
||||
"""Recursively redact a JSON-able value: secret text, absolute paths, and
|
||||
known-sensitive dict keys are removed. Fail closed — any error drops the
|
||||
value entirely rather than risk leaking it."""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if isinstance(value, dict):
|
||||
out: dict[str, Any] = {}
|
||||
for k, v in value.items():
|
||||
key = str(k)
|
||||
low = key.lower()
|
||||
if low in _FORBIDDEN_EXTRA_KEYS or any(
|
||||
s in low
|
||||
for s in ("token", "secret", "password", "cookie", "auth", "dsn", "keychain")
|
||||
):
|
||||
out[key] = REDACTED
|
||||
continue
|
||||
out[key] = redact_value(v)
|
||||
return out
|
||||
if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
|
||||
return [redact_value(v) for v in value]
|
||||
if isinstance(value, str):
|
||||
scrubbed = _redact_text(value)
|
||||
scrubbed = _redact_prefixes(scrubbed)
|
||||
scrubbed = _PATH_RE.sub(REDACTED_PATH, scrubbed)
|
||||
return scrubbed
|
||||
return value
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return REDACTED
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def hash_session_id(session_id: Any) -> str:
|
||||
"""Short, stable, non-reversible fingerprint of a session id."""
|
||||
digest = hashlib.sha256(str(session_id).encode("utf-8", "replace")).hexdigest()
|
||||
return digest[:12]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_tags(**kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, str]:
|
||||
"""Return a scrubbed, allowlisted tag dict.
|
||||
|
||||
``session_id`` is accepted but only ever surfaced as ``session_id_hash``.
|
||||
``worktree_path`` collapses to ``worktree_category``. Any non-allowlisted
|
||||
key, or a value that still contains redacted material after scrubbing, is
|
||||
dropped.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
raw: dict[str, Any] = dict(kwargs)
|
||||
|
||||
# Hash the session id — never emit it raw.
|
||||
session_id = raw.pop("session_id", None)
|
||||
if session_id and "session_id_hash" not in raw:
|
||||
raw["session_id_hash"] = hash_session_id(session_id)
|
||||
|
||||
# A full worktree path collapses to a category tag.
|
||||
wt = raw.pop("worktree_path", None)
|
||||
if wt and "worktree_category" not in raw:
|
||||
raw["worktree_category"] = sanitize_path(wt)
|
||||
|
||||
out: dict[str, str] = {}
|
||||
for key, val in raw.items():
|
||||
if key not in ALLOWED_TAG_KEYS:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if val is None:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
scrubbed = redact_value(val)
|
||||
text = str(scrubbed)
|
||||
if not text or REDACTED in text or REDACTED_PATH in text:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if len(text) > 200:
|
||||
text = text[:200] + "…"
|
||||
out[key] = text
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def scrub_event(event: Any, hint: Any = None) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
"""Sentry ``before_send`` / ``before_send_log`` hook.
|
||||
|
||||
Recursively redacts the outgoing event. On *any* failure it returns ``None``
|
||||
so the event is dropped rather than sent unscrubbed (fail closed for
|
||||
redaction).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if not isinstance(event, dict):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
scrubbed = redact_value(event)
|
||||
# Drop server_name if it leaked a hostname/path; PID is kept via tags.
|
||||
scrubbed.pop("server_name", None)
|
||||
return scrubbed
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Event builders (pure, independently testable) ───────────────────────────
|
||||
def build_blocker_event(
|
||||
blocker_type: str,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
message: str | None = None,
|
||||
next_action: str | None = None,
|
||||
level: str = "warning",
|
||||
tags: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
extra: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Build a redacted, structured Sentry event for a workflow blocker.
|
||||
|
||||
``next_action`` maps the issue's "canonical next action when available"
|
||||
requirement (acceptance criterion 7).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
merged_tags = dict(tags or {})
|
||||
merged_tags.setdefault("blocker_type", blocker_type)
|
||||
safe_tags = build_tags(**merged_tags)
|
||||
|
||||
safe_extra = redact_value(dict(extra or {}))
|
||||
if next_action:
|
||||
# A short canonical next action is allowed (it is not a full prompt).
|
||||
safe_extra["canonical_next_action"] = redact_value(str(next_action)[:500])
|
||||
|
||||
event: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"message": redact_value(message or blocker_type),
|
||||
"level": level if level in ("debug", "info", "warning", "error", "fatal") else "warning",
|
||||
"logger": "gitea-mcp.workflow",
|
||||
"tags": safe_tags,
|
||||
"extra": safe_extra,
|
||||
"fingerprint": ["workflow-blocker", blocker_type],
|
||||
}
|
||||
return event
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_checkin_payload(
|
||||
monitor: str,
|
||||
status: str,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
check_in_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
duration: float | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Build a Sentry cron check-in payload for one of :data:`MONITOR_SLUGS`.
|
||||
|
||||
``monitor`` may be a registry key (e.g. ``"stale_lease_scan"``) or an
|
||||
explicit slug. Raises ``ValueError`` on an unknown status so callers cannot
|
||||
silently send a malformed check-in.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if status not in _CHECKIN_STATUSES:
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"invalid check-in status {status!r}; expected one of {sorted(_CHECKIN_STATUSES)}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
slug = MONITOR_SLUGS.get(monitor, monitor)
|
||||
payload: dict[str, Any] = {"monitor_slug": slug, "status": status}
|
||||
if check_in_id:
|
||||
payload["check_in_id"] = str(check_in_id)
|
||||
if duration is not None:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
payload["duration"] = float(duration)
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
||||
pass
|
||||
return payload
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ── Runtime init + capture (fail open) ──────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
_STATE: dict[str, Any] = {"initialized": False, "config": None}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def is_initialized() -> bool:
|
||||
return bool(_STATE.get("initialized"))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def active_config() -> SentryConfig | None:
|
||||
return _STATE.get("config")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def reset_for_tests() -> None:
|
||||
"""Clear module init state. Test-only helper (never called in production)."""
|
||||
_STATE["initialized"] = False
|
||||
_STATE["config"] = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def init_sentry(config: SentryConfig | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Initialise the Sentry SDK if (and only if) enabled + DSN + SDK present.
|
||||
|
||||
Idempotent and never raises. Returns an operator-safe status dict (no DSN
|
||||
value). Behaviour is unchanged when the feature is off.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
cfg = config or load_config()
|
||||
status: dict[str, Any] = {"initialized": False, **cfg.safe_summary()}
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if not cfg.active:
|
||||
status["reason"] = "disabled (MCP_SENTRY_ENABLED false or SENTRY_DSN empty)"
|
||||
_STATE["config"] = cfg
|
||||
return status
|
||||
if not sdk_available():
|
||||
status["reason"] = "sentry_sdk not installed"
|
||||
_STATE["config"] = cfg
|
||||
return status
|
||||
|
||||
init_kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"dsn": cfg.dsn,
|
||||
"environment": cfg.environment,
|
||||
"release": cfg.release,
|
||||
"traces_sample_rate": cfg.traces_sample_rate,
|
||||
"before_send": scrub_event,
|
||||
"send_default_pii": False,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if cfg.enable_logs:
|
||||
# sentry-sdk 2.x captures Python logs as structured logs when the
|
||||
# experimental logs feature is enabled; scrub those too.
|
||||
init_kwargs["_experiments"] = {
|
||||
"enable_logs": True,
|
||||
"before_send_log": scrub_event,
|
||||
}
|
||||
sentry_sdk.init(**init_kwargs) # type: ignore[union-attr]
|
||||
_STATE["initialized"] = True
|
||||
_STATE["config"] = cfg
|
||||
status["initialized"] = True
|
||||
status["reason"] = "sentry initialised"
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # fail open: observability must not block startup
|
||||
status["reason"] = f"init failed (ignored): {type(exc).__name__}"
|
||||
_STATE["initialized"] = False
|
||||
return status
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _set_scope_tags(scope: Any, tags: dict[str, str]) -> None:
|
||||
for key, val in tags.items():
|
||||
try:
|
||||
scope.set_tag(key, val)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def capture_workflow_blocker(
|
||||
blocker_type: str,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
message: str | None = None,
|
||||
next_action: str | None = None,
|
||||
level: str = "warning",
|
||||
tags: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
extra: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Capture a fail-closed workflow blocker as a structured Sentry event.
|
||||
|
||||
Always returns the redacted event dict (so callers/tests can inspect it),
|
||||
and sends it to Sentry only when initialised. Fail open.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
event = build_blocker_event(
|
||||
blocker_type,
|
||||
message=message,
|
||||
next_action=next_action,
|
||||
level=level,
|
||||
tags=tags,
|
||||
extra=extra,
|
||||
)
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if is_initialized() and sdk_available():
|
||||
sentry_sdk.capture_event(event) # type: ignore[union-attr]
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
return event
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def capture_exception(
|
||||
exc: BaseException,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
tags: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
extra: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Capture a runtime exception with scrubbed tags. Fail open.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns True only when the event was handed to an initialised SDK.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if not (is_initialized() and sdk_available()):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
safe_tags = build_tags(**(tags or {}))
|
||||
safe_extra = redact_value(dict(extra or {}))
|
||||
with sentry_sdk.push_scope() as scope: # type: ignore[union-attr]
|
||||
_set_scope_tags(scope, safe_tags)
|
||||
for key, val in safe_extra.items():
|
||||
try:
|
||||
scope.set_extra(key, val)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
sentry_sdk.capture_exception(exc) # type: ignore[union-attr]
|
||||
return True
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def monitor_checkin(
|
||||
monitor: str,
|
||||
status: str,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
check_in_id: str | None = None,
|
||||
duration: float | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
"""Send a Sentry cron check-in for a watchdog job. Fail open.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns the payload (for inspection/tests), or ``None`` if the status was
|
||||
invalid. Only transmits when initialised.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
try:
|
||||
payload = build_checkin_payload(
|
||||
monitor, status, check_in_id=check_in_id, duration=duration
|
||||
)
|
||||
except ValueError:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
if is_initialized() and sdk_available() and hasattr(sentry_sdk, "capture_checkin"):
|
||||
sentry_sdk.capture_checkin(**payload) # type: ignore[union-attr]
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
return payload
|
||||
@@ -1,613 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Session-immutable MCP mutation context (#714).
|
||||
|
||||
Pins profile, remote, host, repository, identity, and role for the life of an
|
||||
MCP process (or until an explicit ``gitea_activate_profile`` re-bind).
|
||||
|
||||
Capability resolution and mutation gates must evaluate only the active
|
||||
profile for the requested remote. Silent cross-host / cross-profile
|
||||
substitution is forbidden.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import re
|
||||
import threading
|
||||
import urllib.parse
|
||||
from dataclasses import dataclass
|
||||
from typing import Any, Mapping
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@dataclass(frozen=True, slots=True)
|
||||
class _SessionContext:
|
||||
"""One atomic, immutable process-session binding."""
|
||||
|
||||
profile_name: str | None
|
||||
remote: str | None
|
||||
host: str | None
|
||||
identity: str | None
|
||||
repository: str | None
|
||||
org: str | None
|
||||
role_kind: str | None
|
||||
expected_username: str | None
|
||||
source: str
|
||||
pid: int
|
||||
canonical_repository_root: str | None = None
|
||||
|
||||
def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"profile_name": self.profile_name,
|
||||
"remote": self.remote,
|
||||
"host": self.host,
|
||||
"identity": self.identity,
|
||||
"repository": self.repository,
|
||||
"org": self.org,
|
||||
"role_kind": self.role_kind,
|
||||
"expected_username": self.expected_username,
|
||||
"source": self.source,
|
||||
"pid": self.pid,
|
||||
"canonical_repository_root": self.canonical_repository_root,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Process-local only — never a shared file (same rationale as mutation authority).
|
||||
# The frozen value prevents partial mutation, while the lock makes first-bind and
|
||||
# sanctioned rebind atomic across concurrent MCP calls.
|
||||
_SESSION_CONTEXT: _SessionContext | None = None
|
||||
_SESSION_CONTEXT_LOCK = threading.RLock()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _reset_session_context_for_testing() -> None:
|
||||
"""Reset at a pytest test boundary; unavailable to production callers.
|
||||
|
||||
Production sessions transition only through process startup/PID change or
|
||||
the explicit profile-activation rebind. Keeping this helper private and
|
||||
requiring pytest's per-test marker prevents it from becoming an MCP/runtime
|
||||
bypass.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if "PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST" not in os.environ:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError("session context reset is restricted to pytest boundaries")
|
||||
global _SESSION_CONTEXT
|
||||
with _SESSION_CONTEXT_LOCK:
|
||||
_SESSION_CONTEXT = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def get_session_context() -> dict[str, Any] | None:
|
||||
"""Return a detached snapshot of the bound context, or None if unbound."""
|
||||
with _SESSION_CONTEXT_LOCK:
|
||||
if _SESSION_CONTEXT is None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return _SESSION_CONTEXT.as_dict()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def profile_host(profile: dict | None) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Hostname from profile base_url, lowercased, or None."""
|
||||
if not profile:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
base = (profile.get("base_url") or "").strip()
|
||||
if not base:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(base)
|
||||
host = (parsed.netloc or parsed.path or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
return host or None
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def remote_host(remote: str | None, remotes: dict | None) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Hostname for a known remote key."""
|
||||
if not remote or not remotes:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
entry = remotes.get(remote) or {}
|
||||
return (entry.get("host") or "").strip().lower() or None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def profile_matches_remote(
|
||||
profile: dict | None,
|
||||
remote: str | None,
|
||||
remotes: dict | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
contexts: dict | None = None,
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when *profile* is bound to the same host/context as *remote*."""
|
||||
if not profile or not remote:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
r_host = remote_host(remote, remotes)
|
||||
p_host = profile_host(profile)
|
||||
if r_host and p_host:
|
||||
return r_host == p_host
|
||||
# Fall back to context name heuristics when base_url missing.
|
||||
ctx = (profile.get("context") or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if not ctx or not contexts:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
ctx_data = contexts.get(ctx) or {}
|
||||
gitea = ctx_data.get("gitea") or {}
|
||||
base = (gitea.get("base_url") or "").strip()
|
||||
if not base or not r_host:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
try:
|
||||
parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(base)
|
||||
c_host = (parsed.netloc or parsed.path or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return bool(c_host) and c_host == r_host
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def bind_session_context(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
profile_name: str,
|
||||
remote: str | None,
|
||||
host: str | None,
|
||||
identity: str | None,
|
||||
repository: str | None = None,
|
||||
org: str | None = None,
|
||||
role_kind: str | None = None,
|
||||
expected_username: str | None = None,
|
||||
source: str = "bind",
|
||||
canonical_repository_root: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Atomically bind/re-bind context (the explicit activation path)."""
|
||||
with _SESSION_CONTEXT_LOCK:
|
||||
return _bind_session_context_unlocked(
|
||||
profile_name=profile_name,
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
host=host,
|
||||
identity=identity,
|
||||
repository=repository,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
role_kind=role_kind,
|
||||
expected_username=expected_username,
|
||||
source=source,
|
||||
canonical_repository_root=canonical_repository_root,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _bind_session_context_unlocked(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
profile_name: str,
|
||||
remote: str | None,
|
||||
host: str | None,
|
||||
identity: str | None,
|
||||
repository: str | None,
|
||||
org: str | None,
|
||||
role_kind: str | None,
|
||||
expected_username: str | None,
|
||||
source: str,
|
||||
canonical_repository_root: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Store a complete immutable context while the caller holds the lock."""
|
||||
global _SESSION_CONTEXT
|
||||
_SESSION_CONTEXT = _SessionContext(
|
||||
profile_name=(profile_name or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
remote=(remote or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
host=(host or "").strip().lower() or None,
|
||||
identity=(identity or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
repository=(repository or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
org=(org or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
role_kind=(role_kind or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
expected_username=(expected_username or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
source=source,
|
||||
pid=os.getpid(),
|
||||
canonical_repository_root=(canonical_repository_root or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return _SESSION_CONTEXT.as_dict()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def seed_session_context_if_unbound(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
profile_name: str,
|
||||
remote: str | None,
|
||||
host: str | None,
|
||||
identity: str | None,
|
||||
repository: str | None = None,
|
||||
org: str | None = None,
|
||||
role_kind: str | None = None,
|
||||
expected_username: str | None = None,
|
||||
source: str = "seed",
|
||||
canonical_repository_root: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Atomically bind only when this process has no current context.
|
||||
|
||||
A changed environment or an interleaved call is not a session boundary and
|
||||
therefore cannot replace an established binding. A newly started/forked
|
||||
process is recognized by PID; explicit ``gitea_activate_profile`` uses
|
||||
:func:`bind_session_context` as its sanctioned logical-session transition.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
with _SESSION_CONTEXT_LOCK:
|
||||
if _SESSION_CONTEXT is None or _SESSION_CONTEXT.pid != os.getpid():
|
||||
return _bind_session_context_unlocked(
|
||||
profile_name=profile_name,
|
||||
remote=remote,
|
||||
host=host,
|
||||
identity=identity,
|
||||
repository=repository,
|
||||
org=org,
|
||||
role_kind=role_kind,
|
||||
expected_username=expected_username,
|
||||
source=source,
|
||||
canonical_repository_root=canonical_repository_root,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return _SESSION_CONTEXT.as_dict()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_session_context(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None,
|
||||
remote: str | None,
|
||||
host: str | None = None,
|
||||
identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
repository: str | None = None,
|
||||
org: str | None = None,
|
||||
expected_username: str | None = None,
|
||||
canonical_repository_root: str | None = None,
|
||||
require_bound: bool = False,
|
||||
require_complete: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Compare live values against the bound session context.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns ``proven`` / ``block`` / ``reasons``. When unbound and
|
||||
``require_bound`` is false, does not block (caller may seed). When
|
||||
unbound and ``require_bound`` is true, fails closed. ``require_complete``
|
||||
additionally fails closed when the binding carries no verified
|
||||
repository/organization identity, so a mutation can never run against an
|
||||
unknown repository (#714).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
with _SESSION_CONTEXT_LOCK:
|
||||
bound = _SESSION_CONTEXT
|
||||
ctx = bound.as_dict() if bound is not None else None
|
||||
if ctx is None or ctx.get("pid") != os.getpid():
|
||||
if require_bound:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"session mutation context is unbound; call gitea_whoami or "
|
||||
"gitea_activate_profile before mutating (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return _assessment(False, reasons, ctx)
|
||||
return _assessment(True, reasons, ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
if require_complete and not (ctx.get("repository") and ctx.get("org")):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"session repository/organization identity is unverified "
|
||||
f"(repository={ctx.get('repository')!r}, org={ctx.get('org')!r}); "
|
||||
"a mutation cannot proceed without a verified workspace "
|
||||
"repository (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return _assessment(False, reasons, ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
live_profile = (profile_name or "").strip() or None
|
||||
live_remote = (remote or "").strip() or None
|
||||
live_host = (host or "").strip().lower() or None
|
||||
live_identity = (identity or "").strip() or None
|
||||
live_repo = (repository or "").strip() or None
|
||||
live_org = (org or "").strip() or None
|
||||
live_canonical = (canonical_repository_root or "").strip() or None
|
||||
|
||||
if ctx.get("profile_name") and live_profile and live_profile != ctx.get("profile_name"):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"profile drift: live '{live_profile}' != bound "
|
||||
f"'{ctx.get('profile_name')}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if ctx.get("remote") and live_remote and live_remote != ctx.get("remote"):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"remote drift: live '{live_remote}' != bound "
|
||||
f"'{ctx.get('remote')}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if ctx.get("host") and live_host and live_host != ctx.get("host"):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"host drift: live '{live_host}' != bound "
|
||||
f"'{ctx.get('host')}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if (
|
||||
ctx.get("identity")
|
||||
and live_identity
|
||||
and live_identity != ctx.get("identity")
|
||||
):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"identity drift: live '{live_identity}' != bound "
|
||||
f"'{ctx.get('identity')}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if ctx.get("repository") and live_repo and live_repo != ctx.get("repository"):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"repository drift: live '{live_repo}' != bound "
|
||||
f"'{ctx.get('repository')}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if ctx.get("org") and live_org and live_org != ctx.get("org"):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"org drift: live '{live_org}' != bound "
|
||||
f"'{ctx.get('org')}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
bound_canonical = ctx.get("canonical_repository_root")
|
||||
if bound_canonical and live_canonical and live_canonical != bound_canonical:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"canonical repository root drift: live '{live_canonical}' != bound "
|
||||
f"'{bound_canonical}' (forged or conflicting cross-repository "
|
||||
"binding, fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
expected = expected_username or ctx.get("expected_username")
|
||||
if expected and live_identity and live_identity != expected:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"identity mismatch: authenticated '{live_identity}' != "
|
||||
f"profile expected '{expected}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return _assessment(not reasons, reasons, ctx)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_identity_match(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
authenticated: str | None,
|
||||
expected_username: str | None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Fail closed when profile declares a username that does not match live auth."""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
auth = (authenticated or "").strip() or None
|
||||
expected = (expected_username or "").strip() or None
|
||||
if expected and auth and auth != expected:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"identity mismatch: authenticated '{auth}' != "
|
||||
f"profile expected '{expected}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": not reasons,
|
||||
"block": bool(reasons),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"authenticated": auth,
|
||||
"expected_username": expected,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_REPO_SLUG_RE = re.compile(r"^\s*(?P<org>[^/\s]+)\s*/\s*(?P<repo>[^/\s]+?)(?:\.git)?\s*$")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def parse_repository_slug(slug: str | None) -> tuple[str, str] | None:
|
||||
"""Split a canonical ``owner/repository`` slug, or None when unparseable."""
|
||||
match = _REPO_SLUG_RE.match(slug or "")
|
||||
if not match:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return match.group("org"), match.group("repo")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_repository_slug(org: str | None, repo: str | None) -> str | None:
|
||||
"""``owner/repository`` from parts, or None when either side is missing."""
|
||||
left = (org or "").strip()
|
||||
right = (repo or "").strip()
|
||||
if not left or not right:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return f"{left}/{right}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def declared_allowed_repositories(
|
||||
profile: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
strict: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Canonical ``owner/repository`` authorization boundary declared by *profile*.
|
||||
|
||||
This list is an authorization boundary, never the session binding itself:
|
||||
the verified workspace selects exactly one entry (see
|
||||
:func:`assess_repository_scope`).
|
||||
|
||||
When *strict* is true (mutation path), missing profile, non-list values, or
|
||||
any malformed entry raise ``ValueError`` instead of silently collapsing to
|
||||
an empty scope (which would fail open). Read-only diagnostics may use
|
||||
strict=False.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not profile:
|
||||
if strict:
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
"profile unresolved; cannot declare allowed_repositories "
|
||||
"(fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return []
|
||||
raw = profile.get("allowed_repositories")
|
||||
if raw is None:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
if not isinstance(raw, (list, tuple)):
|
||||
if strict:
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
"allowed_repositories must be a list of owner/repository slugs "
|
||||
"(fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return []
|
||||
slugs: list[str] = []
|
||||
errors: list[str] = []
|
||||
for entry in raw:
|
||||
if not isinstance(entry, str):
|
||||
errors.append(f"non-string allowed_repositories entry {entry!r}")
|
||||
continue
|
||||
parsed = parse_repository_slug(entry)
|
||||
if not parsed:
|
||||
errors.append(
|
||||
f"malformed allowed_repositories entry {entry!r} "
|
||||
"(expected owner/repository)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
slugs.append(f"{parsed[0]}/{parsed[1]}")
|
||||
if strict and errors:
|
||||
raise ValueError("; ".join(errors) + " (fail closed)")
|
||||
return slugs
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_repository_scope(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
workspace_slug: str | None,
|
||||
allowed: list[str] | None,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None = None,
|
||||
require_scope: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Authorize the verified workspace repository against the profile allowlist.
|
||||
|
||||
The workspace-derived slug is the only candidate: a profile that authorizes
|
||||
several repositories still binds to the single verified one, and never to
|
||||
the list as a whole.
|
||||
|
||||
*require_scope* (mutation path): missing/empty allowlist fails closed. The
|
||||
workspace remote cannot self-authorize without a configured boundary.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
scope = list(allowed or [])
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
name = profile_name or "(active profile)"
|
||||
if not scope:
|
||||
if require_scope:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"mutation denied: profile '{name}' has no non-empty "
|
||||
"allowed_repositories authorization boundary (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": False,
|
||||
"block": True,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"scope_enforced": True,
|
||||
"workspace_slug": workspace_slug,
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": True,
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"scope_enforced": False,
|
||||
"workspace_slug": workspace_slug,
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if not workspace_slug:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"no verified workspace repository could be established for profile "
|
||||
f"'{name}'; repository scope cannot be authorized (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
elif workspace_slug.lower() not in {entry.lower() for entry in scope}:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"repository scope denial: workspace repository '{workspace_slug}' "
|
||||
f"is not authorized by profile '{name}' allowed_repositories "
|
||||
f"{sorted(scope)} (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": not reasons,
|
||||
"block": bool(reasons),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"scope_enforced": True,
|
||||
"workspace_slug": workspace_slug,
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": sorted(scope),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_repository_override(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
requested_org: str | None,
|
||||
requested_repo: str | None,
|
||||
bound_org: str | None,
|
||||
bound_repo: str | None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Caller-supplied org/repo must agree with the immutable binding.
|
||||
|
||||
A mutation request is never allowed to establish, complete, or replace the
|
||||
binding — it may only be checked against it.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
req_org = (requested_org or "").strip() or None
|
||||
req_repo = (requested_repo or "").strip() or None
|
||||
if req_repo and bound_repo and req_repo.lower() != bound_repo.lower():
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"repository override denial: request targets '{req_repo}' but the "
|
||||
f"session is bound to '{bound_repo}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if req_org and bound_org and req_org.lower() != bound_org.lower():
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"organization override denial: request targets '{req_org}' but the "
|
||||
f"session is bound to '{bound_org}' (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {"proven": not reasons, "block": bool(reasons), "reasons": reasons}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def filter_profiles_for_remote(
|
||||
config: dict | None,
|
||||
remote: str | None,
|
||||
remotes: dict | None,
|
||||
) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Profile names whose host/context matches *remote* (enabled only)."""
|
||||
if not config or not remote:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
profiles = config.get("profiles") or {}
|
||||
contexts = config.get("contexts") or {}
|
||||
names: list[str] = []
|
||||
for name, data in profiles.items():
|
||||
if not isinstance(data, dict):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if not data.get("enabled", True):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
if profile_matches_remote(data, remote, remotes, contexts=contexts):
|
||||
names.append(name)
|
||||
return sorted(names)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def profile_allowed_for_remote(
|
||||
profile: dict | None,
|
||||
remote: str | None,
|
||||
remotes: dict | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
contexts: dict | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Assess whether the active profile may serve *remote*."""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
if not profile:
|
||||
reasons.append("active profile unresolved (fail closed)")
|
||||
return {"proven": False, "block": True, "reasons": reasons}
|
||||
if not remote:
|
||||
return {"proven": True, "block": False, "reasons": reasons}
|
||||
# Legacy env-only profiles have no configured base URL or v2 context. Their
|
||||
# first call may establish the process remote/host pin; after that,
|
||||
# assess_session_context rejects any drift. Configured v2 profiles still
|
||||
# require positive host/context alignment here.
|
||||
if not profile_host(profile) and not (profile.get("context") or "").strip():
|
||||
return {"proven": True, "block": False, "reasons": reasons}
|
||||
if not profile_matches_remote(profile, remote, remotes, contexts=contexts):
|
||||
p_name = profile.get("profile_name") or profile.get("name") or "(unknown)"
|
||||
p_host = profile_host(profile) or "(none)"
|
||||
r_host = remote_host(remote, remotes) or "(none)"
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"cross-host profile denial: profile '{p_name}' (host '{p_host}') "
|
||||
f"cannot serve remote '{remote}' (host '{r_host}') (fail closed)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {"proven": not reasons, "block": bool(reasons), "reasons": reasons}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def mutation_context_audit_fields(
|
||||
ctx: Mapping[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Fields to include in pre-mutation audit records."""
|
||||
data = ctx if ctx is not None else get_session_context()
|
||||
if not data:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"session_context_bound": False,
|
||||
"session_profile": None,
|
||||
"session_remote": None,
|
||||
"session_host": None,
|
||||
"session_identity": None,
|
||||
"session_repository": None,
|
||||
"session_org": None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"session_context_bound": True,
|
||||
"session_profile": data.get("profile_name"),
|
||||
"session_remote": data.get("remote"),
|
||||
"session_host": data.get("host"),
|
||||
"session_identity": data.get("identity"),
|
||||
"session_repository": data.get("repository"),
|
||||
"session_org": data.get("org"),
|
||||
"session_role_kind": data.get("role_kind"),
|
||||
"session_context_source": data.get("source"),
|
||||
"session_canonical_repository_root": data.get("canonical_repository_root"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _assessment(
|
||||
proven: bool, reasons: list[str], ctx: Mapping[str, Any] | None
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"proven": proven,
|
||||
"block": not proven,
|
||||
"reasons": list(reasons),
|
||||
"bound_context": dict(ctx) if ctx else None,
|
||||
"audit": mutation_context_audit_fields(ctx),
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -224,17 +224,6 @@ format canonical field set per issue #182; mode-specific schemas in
|
||||
for the loaded workflow mode — not the legacy compact block alone.
|
||||
`review_proofs.assess_controller_handoff()` validates presence.
|
||||
|
||||
## Canonical self-propagating handoff
|
||||
|
||||
Every workflow mode also carries the cross-role handoff block defined in
|
||||
[`schemas/self-propagating-handoff.md`](schemas/self-propagating-handoff.md)
|
||||
(#626). Each actor consumes exactly one canonical handoff, performs exactly one
|
||||
authorized role, posts the result to the Gitea issue or PR thread, and emits the
|
||||
next complete handoff — until the controller records final closure. The block
|
||||
must be posted to Gitea, not returned in chat alone, and the next prompt is not
|
||||
an optional prose section. `self_propagating_handoff.py` implements the schema;
|
||||
`final_report_validator.py` enforces it as `shared.self_propagating_handoff`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Prompt templates
|
||||
|
||||
Ready-to-copy task prompts live in [`templates/`](templates/):
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -44,7 +44,3 @@ mutations occurred).
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
Identity format: `username / profile` (not personal email unless required — #305).
|
||||
|
||||
The report must also carry the canonical self-propagating handoff block
|
||||
(`schemas/self-propagating-handoff.md`, #626) and that block must be posted to
|
||||
the Gitea issue thread.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -29,7 +29,3 @@ use `none` where nothing occurred. Validated by
|
||||
* Read-only diagnostics:
|
||||
* Blockers:
|
||||
* Safe next action: (fresh run for the next PR)
|
||||
|
||||
The report must also carry the canonical self-propagating handoff block
|
||||
(`schemas/self-propagating-handoff.md`, #626) and that block must be posted to
|
||||
the Gitea PR thread.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ occurred).
|
||||
- Git ref mutations:
|
||||
- MCP/Gitea mutations:
|
||||
- Reconciliation mutations:
|
||||
- Terminal label cleanup:
|
||||
- External-state mutations:
|
||||
- Read-only diagnostics:
|
||||
- Blockers:
|
||||
@@ -52,14 +51,3 @@ occurred).
|
||||
Identity format: `username / profile` (not personal email unless required — #305).
|
||||
|
||||
`git fetch` belongs under `Git ref mutations`, not read-only diagnostics (#297).
|
||||
|
||||
`Terminal label cleanup` (#780) reports the `pr_open_label_cleanup` record the
|
||||
reconciliation tool returned — `clean` / `failed` / `not applicable (no linked
|
||||
issue)`, with the labels removed and preserved. Reconciliation is a terminal
|
||||
transition, so a non-`clean` record blocks any "reconciled" claim; recover with
|
||||
`gitea_cleanup_terminal_pr_labels` (`terminal_reason='retry_recovery'`) and
|
||||
confirm with `gitea_assess_terminal_label_hygiene`.
|
||||
|
||||
The report must also carry the canonical self-propagating handoff block
|
||||
(`schemas/self-propagating-handoff.md`, #626) and that block must be posted to
|
||||
the Gitea issue or PR thread.
|
||||
@@ -99,21 +99,6 @@ Narrative final report and controller handoff must agree on eligibility class,
|
||||
candidate/reviewed head SHA, mutation state, worktree usage, review decision,
|
||||
terminal review mutation, merge result, and linked issue status.
|
||||
|
||||
### Terminal label state (#780)
|
||||
|
||||
A run that takes a PR to a terminal state — merged, closed without merge,
|
||||
superseded, or reconciled as already landed — must report what happened to the
|
||||
linked issue's `status:pr-open` label, quoting the `pr_open_label_cleanup`
|
||||
record the terminal tool returned:
|
||||
|
||||
- Terminal label cleanup: `clean` / `failed` / `not applicable (no linked issue)`
|
||||
- Labels removed and preserved per issue, with the read-after-write read-back
|
||||
|
||||
Never claim the transition is complete while that record is not `clean`. A
|
||||
failed cleanup does not undo the merge; the safe next action is
|
||||
`gitea_cleanup_terminal_pr_labels` with `terminal_reason='retry_recovery'`,
|
||||
confirmed by `gitea_assess_terminal_label_hygiene`.
|
||||
|
||||
### Proof-backed claims (#395)
|
||||
|
||||
Proof-sensitive claims must cite explicit command/tool evidence in the report
|
||||
@@ -132,8 +117,3 @@ or structured MCP metadata — not narrative alone:
|
||||
When a claim relies on prior-session blocker state or MCP metadata only, label
|
||||
the proof source explicitly (`command`, `MCP metadata`, `prior blocker`,
|
||||
`not checked`). Do not use `live proof` without that classification.
|
||||
|
||||
The report must also carry the canonical self-propagating handoff block
|
||||
(`schemas/self-propagating-handoff.md`, #626) and that block must be posted to
|
||||
the Gitea PR thread. A reviewer hands off to `merger`; a merger transitions to
|
||||
`merged-awaiting-controller` rather than declaring the work accepted.
|
||||
@@ -1,114 +0,0 @@
|
||||
# Canonical self-propagating handoff schema (#626)
|
||||
|
||||
**Applies to:** every workflow actor — author, reviewer, merger, controller,
|
||||
operator, reconciler.
|
||||
|
||||
`#494`–`#507` defined the ledger, the canonical state comments, and the
|
||||
Canonical Thread Handoff shape. This schema owns the *chain*: each actor
|
||||
consumes exactly one canonical handoff, performs exactly one authorized role,
|
||||
records the result durably in Gitea, and emits the next complete handoff —
|
||||
until the controller records final closure.
|
||||
|
||||
Implemented and enforced by `self_propagating_handoff.py`; wired into
|
||||
`final_report_validator.py` as rule `shared.self_propagating_handoff`.
|
||||
|
||||
## The block
|
||||
|
||||
Post this block into the Gitea issue or PR thread, and include it verbatim in
|
||||
the final report. It is not an optional prose section.
|
||||
|
||||
```md
|
||||
<!-- sph:v1 -->
|
||||
## Canonical Handoff
|
||||
|
||||
```text
|
||||
REPOSITORY: <org>/<repo>
|
||||
ISSUE: <number>
|
||||
PR: <number or none>
|
||||
WORKFLOW_STATE: <one of the workflow states below>
|
||||
HEAD_SHA: <current head, or none before a branch exists>
|
||||
BASE_BRANCH: <base branch>
|
||||
BASE_OR_MERGE_SHA: <base SHA, or merge commit SHA after merge>
|
||||
ACTING_ROLE: <author|reviewer|merger|controller|operator|reconciler>
|
||||
ACTING_IDENTITY: <username (profile)>
|
||||
COMPLETED_ACTIONS: <what this actor actually did>
|
||||
VALIDATION_EVIDENCE: <commands run and their results>
|
||||
MUTATION_LEDGER: <every durable mutation performed>
|
||||
BLOCKERS: <active blockers, or none>
|
||||
NEXT_ACTOR: <role authorized by WORKFLOW_STATE, or none when complete>
|
||||
NEXT_ACTION: <exact next action, or none when complete>
|
||||
PROHIBITED_ACTIONS: <what the next actor must not do>
|
||||
NEXT_PROMPT: <complete ready-to-run prompt, or none when complete>
|
||||
WORKFLOW_FAILURE_ISSUES: <durable issue refs for tooling defects, or none>
|
||||
LAST_UPDATED: <UTC timestamp>
|
||||
```
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
## Workflow states and the single authorized actor
|
||||
|
||||
| `WORKFLOW_STATE` | `NEXT_ACTOR` |
|
||||
| --------------------------- | ------------ |
|
||||
| `needs-author` | `author` |
|
||||
| `needs-review` | `reviewer` |
|
||||
| `approved-awaiting-merge` | `merger` |
|
||||
| `merged-awaiting-controller`| `controller` |
|
||||
| `blocked` | `operator` |
|
||||
| `complete` | `none` |
|
||||
|
||||
A merged PR is **not** accepted work: merge transitions to
|
||||
`merged-awaiting-controller` unless the configured workflow explicitly
|
||||
authorizes automatic acceptance.
|
||||
|
||||
## Fail-closed rules
|
||||
|
||||
* Every field is required. Only `PR`, `HEAD_SHA`, `BASE_OR_MERGE_SHA`,
|
||||
`BLOCKERS`, `WORKFLOW_FAILURE_ISSUES`, `NEXT_ACTION`, and `NEXT_PROMPT` may
|
||||
carry `none`, and `PR`/`HEAD_SHA` only in `needs-author` or `blocked`.
|
||||
* `NEXT_ACTOR` must equal the actor the declared state authorizes.
|
||||
* `blocked` requires a concrete `BLOCKERS` entry.
|
||||
* A non-terminal handoff requires a concrete `NEXT_ACTION` and a
|
||||
`NEXT_PROMPT` long enough to be ready to run.
|
||||
* `complete` must carry no `NEXT_ACTION` and no `NEXT_PROMPT`: a finished
|
||||
workflow terminates instead of manufacturing more work.
|
||||
* `NEXT_PROMPT` must name the repository and the issue, and must not depend on
|
||||
outside chat history. The issue or PR thread, workflow documentation, and
|
||||
live repository state must be sufficient to recover the task.
|
||||
* The handoff must be posted to Gitea. A chat-only report is not durable
|
||||
workflow state.
|
||||
|
||||
## Live-state recovery before acting
|
||||
|
||||
The receiving actor re-derives truth from live state instead of trusting the
|
||||
inherited handoff. `assess_handoff_live_state` detects and fails closed on:
|
||||
`changed_pr_head`, `stale_approval`, `issue_closed`, `issue_reopened`,
|
||||
`pr_merged`, `pr_closed_unmerged`, `stale_lease`, `foreign_lease`,
|
||||
`missing_worktree`, `dirty_worktree`, `namespace_mismatch`, `stale_runtime`,
|
||||
`changed_base`, and `conflicting_canonical_comments`.
|
||||
|
||||
A changed head invalidates any inherited review or merge handoff; the chain
|
||||
recovers to `needs-review`.
|
||||
|
||||
## Controller closure
|
||||
|
||||
`accept` is only honored with all four closure proofs recorded:
|
||||
`acceptance_criteria_satisfied`, `cleanup_complete`,
|
||||
`canonical_final_state_posted`, `issue_closed_through_workflow`. Otherwise the
|
||||
work item stays at `merged-awaiting-controller`.
|
||||
|
||||
`request_tests`, `request_proof`, `request_corrections`, and `reopen` return
|
||||
the work to the author; `return_to_actor` returns it to a named earlier actor.
|
||||
|
||||
## Workflow-failure escalation
|
||||
|
||||
Tooling or workflow defects found while working an item never get folded into
|
||||
the active feature issue. Each distinct failure carries `classification`,
|
||||
`linked_issue`, `temporary_impact`, `next_valid_actor`, and `recovery_prompt`.
|
||||
A failure whose signature already has a durable issue must reuse that issue
|
||||
instead of filing a duplicate.
|
||||
|
||||
## Applicability
|
||||
|
||||
Enforcement is applicability-gated exactly like the #495 canonical-state gate:
|
||||
once a report carries the `sph:v1` marker, the `Canonical Handoff` heading, or
|
||||
a `WORKFLOW_STATE:` line, the full schema is enforced and incomplete handoffs
|
||||
are rejected. Reports written before the protocol existed are unaffected.
|
||||
@@ -71,8 +71,3 @@ selected issue, and mutation ledger categories (#319, #320).
|
||||
|
||||
Forbidden claims without proof (#330): `next eligible issue`, `issue claimed`,
|
||||
`validation passed`, `PR created`, `worktree clean`, `all gates passed`, etc.
|
||||
|
||||
The report must also carry the canonical self-propagating handoff block
|
||||
(`schemas/self-propagating-handoff.md`, #626) and that block must be posted to
|
||||
the Gitea issue or PR thread. The next prompt is not an optional prose
|
||||
section.
|
||||
@@ -33,34 +33,22 @@ Steps:
|
||||
*If the current identity does not match the required role (or is the PR author), STOP. Relaunch/switch to the correct profile first.*
|
||||
2. Verify authenticated identity + active profile.
|
||||
3. Confirm PR #<pr>: author (not you), state open, mergeable, review approved. Check if PR body uses `Closes #N` or `Fixes #N`; if it uses `Implements #N` or `Refs #N`, manual closing will be needed in step 29.
|
||||
4. **PR sync assess (required):** call `gitea_assess_pr_sync_status` with
|
||||
explicit `remote`/`org`/`repo`. Route on `recommended_next_action`:
|
||||
- `merge_now` → continue merger path (do **not** update the branch)
|
||||
- `update_branch_by_merge` → STOP; hand off to **author** for
|
||||
`gitea_update_pr_branch_by_merge` (pins expected PR head + base head)
|
||||
- `author_conflict_remediation` → STOP; author worktree conflict fix
|
||||
- `fresh_review_required` → STOP; independent re-review at current head
|
||||
- `blocked` → STOP and diagnose
|
||||
Never merge on a former-head approval after update/remediation.
|
||||
5. Capability evidence (#179): cite the exact gitea_resolve_task_capability
|
||||
4. Capability evidence (#179): cite the exact gitea_resolve_task_capability
|
||||
output (or runtime context) proving merge_pr is allowed — a bare
|
||||
"capability checks passed" claim is downgraded.
|
||||
6. Final live-state recheck (#179), immediately before the merge mutation —
|
||||
5. Final live-state recheck (#179), immediately before the merge mutation —
|
||||
re-read the live PR and prove:
|
||||
- PR still open
|
||||
- live head SHA still equals the pinned/reviewed head SHA
|
||||
- base branch unchanged
|
||||
- no undismissed REQUEST_CHANGES / blocking review state remains
|
||||
If any recheck fails → STOP, re-pin, re-validate.
|
||||
7. If any gate fails → STOP and report.
|
||||
8. Merge with explicit confirmation (e.g. confirmation="MERGE PR <pr>"),
|
||||
6. If any gate fails → STOP and report.
|
||||
7. Merge with explicit confirmation (e.g. confirmation="MERGE PR <pr>"),
|
||||
pinning the reviewed head SHA (expected_head_sha) and, where supported,
|
||||
the changed-file set.
|
||||
9. Confirm remote master now contains the merge commit (or the expected changes if squash merged).
|
||||
8. Confirm remote master now contains the merge commit (or the expected changes if squash merged).
|
||||
*Note: Gitea PR "closed" state is NOT equivalent to "merged". Do not assume a closed PR succeeded without verifying the actual landed changes.*
|
||||
10. **Sequential queue:** after merge, refresh live `master`, run post-merge
|
||||
cleanup handoff, then reassess the **next** PR (do not batch-update all
|
||||
open PRs).
|
||||
|
||||
Post-merge cleanup (#517): merger sessions must NOT perform ad hoc cleanup.
|
||||
- Record merge mutations separately from cleanup mutations in the controller handoff.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -450,35 +450,6 @@ If any gate fails, do not create the issue.
|
||||
|
||||
Produce a recovery handoff or duplicate report.
|
||||
|
||||
### 18a. Sanctioned first-mutation path (#749)
|
||||
|
||||
`gitea_create_issue` is a **pure remote mutation** (no local tree write). The
|
||||
issue-first gate forbids creating `branches/issue-<N>-*` before the issue
|
||||
number exists. Therefore the **only sanctioned first mutation** is:
|
||||
|
||||
1. Read-only identity + capability + duplicate search from the control checkout.
|
||||
2. Ensure the **canonical control checkout** is:
|
||||
* the configured repository root for the requested remote/org/repo;
|
||||
* on an accepted base branch (`master` / `main` / `dev`);
|
||||
* base-equivalent to live master;
|
||||
* clean (no tracked local edits);
|
||||
* in runtime/master parity.
|
||||
3. Resolve exact task `create_issue`, then call `gitea_create_issue` **from that
|
||||
clean control checkout** (no `worktree_path` required for this step alone).
|
||||
4. After the issue number exists: create a **registered** worktree under
|
||||
`branches/issue-<N>-*`, claim/lock, and perform every subsequent author
|
||||
mutation from that worktree only.
|
||||
|
||||
**Forbidden improvisations (fail closed):**
|
||||
|
||||
* `mkdir` dummy directories under `branches/` (#713)
|
||||
* borrowing an unrelated pre-existing worktree
|
||||
* creating a pre-issue worktree in violation of issue-first
|
||||
* running create_issue from a dirty, drifted, detached, or non-canonical root
|
||||
|
||||
Post-creation mutations (`lock_issue`, commit, push, `create_pr`, etc.) **never**
|
||||
receive this bootstrap exemption.
|
||||
|
||||
## 19. Issue commenting gate
|
||||
|
||||
Before commenting on an existing issue, verify:
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,8 +14,6 @@ before any PR mutation. Final report schema:
|
||||
|
||||
**BLOCKED + DIAGNOSE (universal default):** If at any point you cannot perform a required step (skill not available, terminal broken, capability missing, wrong profile, guard blocks, worktree misbound, instructions unavailable, preflight fails, etc.), STOP. Clearly state BLOCKED. Use the standard [`../templates/blocked-diagnose-report.md`](../templates/blocked-diagnose-report.md) template. Only safe non-mutating recovery. Report using the template. Do not continue or use any fallback (temp scripts, direct API, etc.) unless controller authorizes. All blocker classes listed in llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md must trigger this.
|
||||
|
||||
**Native MCP failure is a hard stop (#695):** If the native MCP namespace dies (EOF, capability disconnect, session death), STOP. Do **not** import `gitea_mcp_server` from a standalone process, do **not** run offline helpers (`offline_mcp_helper.py`, `offline_mcp_runner.py`, `run_quarantine.py`), and do **not** set direct-import / keychain-bypass / raw-token environment variables. Reconnect the official MCP daemon only. Contaminated approvals must be controller-quarantined; they never authorize merge.
|
||||
|
||||
**Default task prompt:**
|
||||
|
||||
> Review the next eligible open PR in this project. Merge it only if every
|
||||
@@ -950,53 +948,9 @@ Final reports must state:
|
||||
* final live head SHA before merge
|
||||
* whether any push occurred during validation
|
||||
|
||||
## 26D. PR synchronization and conflict-remediation lifecycle
|
||||
|
||||
**Do not treat “approved” as the final readiness state.** For every approved
|
||||
open PR, call `gitea_assess_pr_sync_status` (native MCP only) and route by
|
||||
`recommended_next_action`:
|
||||
|
||||
| Action | Meaning | Next role / tools |
|
||||
|--------|---------|-------------------|
|
||||
| `merge_now` | Valid approval at exact current head; conflict-free; update not required; checks ok | Merger: sanctioned merge workflow only — **do not** update the branch |
|
||||
| `update_branch_by_merge` | Behind live base; protection requires current base; Gitea can merge base without conflicts | **Author only:** `gitea_update_pr_branch_by_merge` with pinned `expected_pr_head_sha` + `expected_base_head_sha` |
|
||||
| `author_conflict_remediation` | Conflicts / not auto-updatable | **Author only:** existing `branches/` worktree, issue lock, merge master, resolve, test, push; never force-push/rebase |
|
||||
| `fresh_review_required` | Head changed after approval, or update/remediation produced a new head | Independent reviewer at the **new exact head**; old approvals/leases/verdicts are void |
|
||||
| `blocked` | Other gate (checks, incomplete facts, closed PR, …) | Diagnose; do not merge or update |
|
||||
|
||||
### Hard rules
|
||||
|
||||
* Pin both expected PR head and expected base head for every update. Either
|
||||
race → fail closed with no partial mutation.
|
||||
* Never rebase or force-push author branches.
|
||||
* Never update an author branch from a reviewer or merger profile.
|
||||
* Never preserve approval, reviewer lease, merger lease, or prepared verdict
|
||||
across a head change.
|
||||
* Process PRs **sequentially**: synchronize/remediate one → review new head →
|
||||
merge → refresh live `master` → reassess the next PR. Do not update every
|
||||
open PR at once (each merge restales the rest).
|
||||
* Conflict remediation only in the existing dedicated issue/PR worktree under
|
||||
`branches/`. Do not delete that worktree until the updated PR is merged and
|
||||
cleanup eligibility is proven.
|
||||
* Post-merge: canonical cleanup handoff to reconciler (section 28).
|
||||
|
||||
### After `gitea_update_pr_branch_by_merge` succeeds
|
||||
|
||||
1. Treat former-head approval as invalidated.
|
||||
2. Release/supersede obsolete reviewer and merger leases.
|
||||
3. Route `recommended_next_action=fresh_review_required` at the new head.
|
||||
4. Independent re-review, then merger lease/adopt + merge at the new head only.
|
||||
|
||||
All Gitea reads/mutations use native MCP. Never substitute direct API, curl,
|
||||
tea/gh, Web UI mutation by an LLM, database changes, raw Git push, or token
|
||||
access.
|
||||
|
||||
## 27. Merge rules
|
||||
|
||||
Before merge, call `gitea_assess_pr_sync_status` when the PR is approved/open
|
||||
and may be behind base. Only proceed with merge when
|
||||
`recommended_next_action` is `merge_now` and approval remains at the current
|
||||
head. Then rerun fresh live checks:
|
||||
Before merge, rerun fresh live checks:
|
||||
|
||||
* whoami
|
||||
* active profile/runtime
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -14,8 +14,6 @@ before any issue implementation mutation. Final report schema:
|
||||
|
||||
**BLOCKED + DIAGNOSE (universal default):** If at any point you cannot perform a required step (skill not available, terminal broken, capability missing, wrong profile, guard blocks, worktree misbound, instructions unavailable, preflight fails, etc.), STOP. Clearly state BLOCKED. Use the standard [`../templates/blocked-diagnose-report.md`](../templates/blocked-diagnose-report.md) template. Only safe non-mutating recovery. Report using the template. Do not continue or use any fallback (temp scripts, direct API, etc.) unless controller authorizes. All blocker classes listed in llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md must trigger this.
|
||||
|
||||
**Native MCP failure is a hard stop (#695):** Do not import MCP server internals, run offline mutation helpers, or set credential-bypass env vars after a native transport failure. Reconnect the official daemon only.
|
||||
|
||||
**Default task prompt:**
|
||||
|
||||
> Find the next eligible issue in this project, work on it only if all gates
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,641 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Stable-control vs dev/test runtime classification and mutation gates (#615).
|
||||
|
||||
``docs/architecture/mcp-stable-control-runtime-policy-adr.md`` states the policy:
|
||||
real Gitea mutations may only be performed by the **stable control runtime**,
|
||||
while MCP server development happens in isolated ``branches/`` worktrees and
|
||||
optional dev/test runtimes. The ADR alone is not enforcement — a daemon
|
||||
relaunched from a feature worktree still holds production credentials and will
|
||||
happily mutate production issues.
|
||||
|
||||
This module supplies the runtime half of that policy:
|
||||
|
||||
* :func:`classify_runtime_mode` decides whether the running process is a
|
||||
``stable-control``, ``dev-test``, or ``unknown`` runtime.
|
||||
* :func:`build_runtime_report` collects the reporting fields the ADR requires
|
||||
(mode, SHA, branch, checkout path, process root, workspace, binding, dirty
|
||||
files, alignment, and whether real mutations are allowed).
|
||||
* :func:`assess_runtime_mutation_gate` turns that report into a fail-closed
|
||||
mutation gate.
|
||||
* The post-transport-flap helpers keep namespace re-proving **per namespace**,
|
||||
so proving the author namespace never implies the reviewer, merger, or
|
||||
reconciler namespace is callable.
|
||||
|
||||
Every assessment is pure: callers inject the observed facts, so the logic is
|
||||
unit-testable without a git checkout or a live daemon. Only the thin
|
||||
:func:`observe_runtime` reader touches the filesystem.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import subprocess
|
||||
|
||||
# Operator declaration of the runtime this process is. An explicit, valid
|
||||
# declaration wins over inference — an operator running a packaged release
|
||||
# layout may have no git checkout to infer from.
|
||||
ENV_RUNTIME_MODE = "GITEA_MCP_RUNTIME_MODE"
|
||||
# Escape hatch mirroring the #420 parity gate: disables enforcement only.
|
||||
ENV_DISABLE = "GITEA_MCP_DISABLE_RUNTIME_MODE_GATE"
|
||||
|
||||
RUNTIME_MODE_STABLE = "stable-control"
|
||||
RUNTIME_MODE_DEV_TEST = "dev-test"
|
||||
RUNTIME_MODE_UNKNOWN = "unknown"
|
||||
|
||||
VALID_RUNTIME_MODES = frozenset(
|
||||
{RUNTIME_MODE_STABLE, RUNTIME_MODE_DEV_TEST, RUNTIME_MODE_UNKNOWN}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Branches a stable control checkout is allowed to sit on. Anything else is a
|
||||
# development checkout by definition (the global worktree rule keeps the
|
||||
# control checkout on a stable branch).
|
||||
STABLE_BRANCHES = frozenset({"master", "main", "dev"})
|
||||
|
||||
# Path segment that marks an isolated development worktree.
|
||||
DEV_WORKTREE_SEGMENT = "branches"
|
||||
|
||||
BLOCKER_DEV_TEST_PRODUCTION = "dev_test_runtime_targets_production"
|
||||
BLOCKER_UNKNOWN_RUNTIME = "unknown_runtime_mode"
|
||||
BLOCKER_DIRTY_STABLE_RUNTIME = "dirty_stable_runtime_checkout"
|
||||
BLOCKER_DEV_WORKTREE_LAUNCH = "runtime_launched_from_dev_worktree"
|
||||
BLOCKER_UNSAFE_ALIGNMENT = "unsafe_process_root_workspace_alignment"
|
||||
BLOCKER_NAMESPACE_NOT_REPROVEN = "namespace_not_reproven_after_flap"
|
||||
|
||||
# Namespaces that must each be re-proven independently after a transport flap.
|
||||
WORKFLOW_NAMESPACES = ("author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def gate_disabled() -> bool:
|
||||
"""Whether the runtime-mode gate is disabled by env escape hatch."""
|
||||
return bool((os.environ.get(ENV_DISABLE) or "").strip())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def declared_runtime_mode() -> str | None:
|
||||
"""Return the operator-declared runtime mode, if a valid one is set.
|
||||
|
||||
An unset or unrecognised value returns ``None`` so classification falls
|
||||
back to inference rather than trusting a typo.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
value = (os.environ.get(ENV_RUNTIME_MODE) or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
if value in VALID_RUNTIME_MODES:
|
||||
return value
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _path_segments(path: str) -> list[str]:
|
||||
return [seg for seg in os.path.normpath(path).split(os.sep) if seg]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def launched_from_dev_worktree(process_root: str | None) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Whether *process_root* sits inside a ``branches/`` development worktree."""
|
||||
if not process_root:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return DEV_WORKTREE_SEGMENT in _path_segments(process_root)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def classify_runtime_mode(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
process_root: str | None,
|
||||
checkout_branch: str | None,
|
||||
is_git_checkout: bool = True,
|
||||
declared_mode: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Classify the runtime this process is serving from.
|
||||
|
||||
``declared_mode`` (normally :func:`declared_runtime_mode`) is authoritative
|
||||
when supplied and valid. Otherwise the mode is inferred:
|
||||
|
||||
* no resolvable root, or a root that is not a git checkout → ``unknown``
|
||||
(a packaged deployment must declare its mode explicitly);
|
||||
* a root inside a ``branches/`` worktree → ``dev-test``;
|
||||
* an unreadable branch → ``unknown``;
|
||||
* a stable branch (``master``/``main``/``dev``) → ``stable-control``;
|
||||
* any other branch → ``dev-test``.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns the mode plus the discriminating facts and human-readable reasons.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
dev_worktree = launched_from_dev_worktree(process_root)
|
||||
|
||||
if declared_mode in VALID_RUNTIME_MODES:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"runtime mode declared by operator via {ENV_RUNTIME_MODE}="
|
||||
f"{declared_mode}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return _mode_result(declared_mode, dev_worktree, True, reasons)
|
||||
|
||||
if not process_root:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"runtime process root could not be resolved; runtime mode is "
|
||||
"indeterminate"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return _mode_result(RUNTIME_MODE_UNKNOWN, dev_worktree, False, reasons)
|
||||
|
||||
if not is_git_checkout:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"runtime process root '{process_root}' is not a git checkout and "
|
||||
f"no {ENV_RUNTIME_MODE} declaration was supplied"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return _mode_result(RUNTIME_MODE_UNKNOWN, dev_worktree, False, reasons)
|
||||
|
||||
if dev_worktree:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"runtime was launched from development worktree '{process_root}' "
|
||||
f"(inside '{DEV_WORKTREE_SEGMENT}/')"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return _mode_result(RUNTIME_MODE_DEV_TEST, True, False, reasons)
|
||||
|
||||
branch = (checkout_branch or "").strip()
|
||||
if not branch:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"runtime checkout branch at '{process_root}' could not be read "
|
||||
f"(detached HEAD or unreadable); runtime mode is indeterminate"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return _mode_result(RUNTIME_MODE_UNKNOWN, False, False, reasons)
|
||||
|
||||
if branch in STABLE_BRANCHES:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"runtime checkout '{process_root}' is on stable branch '{branch}'"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return _mode_result(RUNTIME_MODE_STABLE, False, False, reasons)
|
||||
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"runtime checkout '{process_root}' is on development branch "
|
||||
f"'{branch}', not a stable branch "
|
||||
f"({', '.join(sorted(STABLE_BRANCHES))})"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return _mode_result(RUNTIME_MODE_DEV_TEST, False, False, reasons)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _mode_result(mode, dev_worktree, declared, reasons) -> dict:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"runtime_mode": mode,
|
||||
"dev_worktree_launched": bool(dev_worktree),
|
||||
"declared": bool(declared),
|
||||
"reasons": list(reasons),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_runtime_report(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
process_root: str | None,
|
||||
checkout_branch: str | None,
|
||||
runtime_head: str | None,
|
||||
active_task_workspace: str | None = None,
|
||||
canonical_repository_root: str | None = None,
|
||||
repository_slug: str | None = None,
|
||||
profile: str | None = None,
|
||||
authenticated_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
dirty_files: list[str] | tuple[str, ...] | None = None,
|
||||
workspace_roots_aligned: bool | None = None,
|
||||
is_git_checkout: bool = True,
|
||||
declared_mode: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Build the ADR-required runtime report (#615 acceptance criterion 6).
|
||||
|
||||
``real_mutations_allowed`` is the summary bit: it is true only when the
|
||||
corresponding mutation gate finds nothing to block on for a production
|
||||
target.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
classification = classify_runtime_mode(
|
||||
process_root=process_root,
|
||||
checkout_branch=checkout_branch,
|
||||
is_git_checkout=is_git_checkout,
|
||||
declared_mode=declared_mode,
|
||||
)
|
||||
report = {
|
||||
"runtime_mode": classification["runtime_mode"],
|
||||
"runtime_mode_declared": classification["declared"],
|
||||
"runtime_mode_reasons": classification["reasons"],
|
||||
"dev_worktree_launched": classification["dev_worktree_launched"],
|
||||
"runtime_git_sha": runtime_head,
|
||||
"runtime_branch": checkout_branch,
|
||||
"runtime_checkout_path": process_root,
|
||||
"mcp_process_root": process_root,
|
||||
"active_task_workspace": active_task_workspace,
|
||||
"canonical_repository_root": canonical_repository_root,
|
||||
"repository_slug": repository_slug,
|
||||
"profile": profile,
|
||||
"authenticated_identity": authenticated_identity,
|
||||
"dirty_files": sorted(dirty_files or []),
|
||||
"workspace_roots_aligned": workspace_roots_aligned,
|
||||
"gate_enforced": not gate_disabled(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
gate = assess_runtime_mutation_gate(report)
|
||||
report["real_mutations_allowed"] = not gate["block"]
|
||||
report["mutation_block_reasons"] = gate["reasons"]
|
||||
return report
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_runtime_mutation_gate(
|
||||
report: dict,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
target_is_production: bool = True,
|
||||
namespace: str | None = None,
|
||||
namespace_reproof: dict | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Fail-closed mutation gate for the runtime a mutation would execute in.
|
||||
|
||||
Blocks when (acceptance criterion 7):
|
||||
|
||||
* the runtime is ``dev-test`` and the mutation targets the production
|
||||
repository;
|
||||
* the runtime mode is ``unknown``;
|
||||
* the stable runtime checkout is dirty;
|
||||
* the runtime was launched from a development worktree;
|
||||
* process-root / workspace alignment is unsafe;
|
||||
* (criterion 8) the namespace has not been re-proven since a transport flap.
|
||||
|
||||
The disabled escape hatch never blocks; the caller decides read-vs-mutate
|
||||
before calling.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
blockers: list[str] = []
|
||||
|
||||
if gate_disabled():
|
||||
return _gate_result(False, blockers, reasons, disabled=True)
|
||||
|
||||
mode = (report or {}).get("runtime_mode")
|
||||
|
||||
if mode == RUNTIME_MODE_UNKNOWN:
|
||||
blockers.append(BLOCKER_UNKNOWN_RUNTIME)
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"runtime mode is 'unknown'; a runtime that cannot prove it is the "
|
||||
f"stable control runtime must not mutate production (declare "
|
||||
f"{ENV_RUNTIME_MODE} or run from a stable checkout)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if mode == RUNTIME_MODE_DEV_TEST and target_is_production:
|
||||
blockers.append(BLOCKER_DEV_TEST_PRODUCTION)
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"runtime mode is 'dev-test' and the mutation targets the "
|
||||
"production repository; dev/test runtimes must not mutate real "
|
||||
"issues or PRs (ADR: stable control runtime vs dev runtime)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if report.get("dev_worktree_launched") and target_is_production:
|
||||
blockers.append(BLOCKER_DEV_WORKTREE_LAUNCH)
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"runtime was launched from a '{DEV_WORKTREE_SEGMENT}/' development "
|
||||
f"worktree ('{report.get('mcp_process_root')}'); production "
|
||||
f"mutations require the promoted stable control runtime"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
dirty = list(report.get("dirty_files") or [])
|
||||
if mode == RUNTIME_MODE_STABLE and dirty:
|
||||
blockers.append(BLOCKER_DIRTY_STABLE_RUNTIME)
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"stable control runtime checkout is dirty "
|
||||
f"({len(dirty)} file(s): {', '.join(dirty[:5])}"
|
||||
f"{'...' if len(dirty) > 5 else ''}); the control plane must run "
|
||||
"promoted, unmodified code"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if report.get("workspace_roots_aligned") is False:
|
||||
blockers.append(BLOCKER_UNSAFE_ALIGNMENT)
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"process-root / active-workspace alignment is unsafe; the runtime "
|
||||
"and the task workspace disagree about which checkout is being "
|
||||
"mutated"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if namespace:
|
||||
reproof = assess_namespace_reproof(namespace_reproof, namespace)
|
||||
if reproof["reproof_required"] and not reproof["proven"]:
|
||||
blockers.append(BLOCKER_NAMESPACE_NOT_REPROVEN)
|
||||
reasons.extend(reproof["reasons"])
|
||||
|
||||
return _gate_result(bool(blockers), blockers, reasons)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _gate_result(block, blockers, reasons, *, disabled=False) -> dict:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"block": bool(block),
|
||||
"blocker_kinds": list(blockers),
|
||||
"blocker_kind": blockers[0] if blockers else None,
|
||||
"reasons": list(reasons),
|
||||
"gate_disabled": bool(disabled),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def runtime_block_reasons(
|
||||
report: dict,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
target_is_production: bool = True,
|
||||
namespace: str | None = None,
|
||||
namespace_reproof: dict | None = None,
|
||||
) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Block reasons for a mutation gate (empty when the mutation may proceed)."""
|
||||
gate = assess_runtime_mutation_gate(
|
||||
report,
|
||||
target_is_production=target_is_production,
|
||||
namespace=namespace,
|
||||
namespace_reproof=namespace_reproof,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return gate["reasons"]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def runtime_report_payload(report: dict, gate: dict | None = None) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Structured recovery payload for permission-block responses."""
|
||||
gate = gate or assess_runtime_mutation_gate(report)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"kind": "runtime_mode_block",
|
||||
"runtime_mode": report.get("runtime_mode"),
|
||||
"runtime_git_sha": report.get("runtime_git_sha"),
|
||||
"runtime_branch": report.get("runtime_branch"),
|
||||
"runtime_checkout_path": report.get("runtime_checkout_path"),
|
||||
"blocker_kind": gate.get("blocker_kind"),
|
||||
"blocker_kinds": list(gate.get("blocker_kinds") or []),
|
||||
"reasons": list(gate.get("reasons") or []),
|
||||
"recovery": [
|
||||
"Real workflow mutations run only on the promoted stable control "
|
||||
"runtime (see docs/architecture/"
|
||||
"mcp-stable-control-runtime-policy-adr.md).",
|
||||
"Operator action: promote the intended revision into the stable "
|
||||
"runtime and reload it — see "
|
||||
"docs/stable-runtime-promotion-runbook.md.",
|
||||
"Normal author/reviewer/merger/reconciler sessions must not kill, "
|
||||
"restart, or relaunch the MCP server themselves.",
|
||||
],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_runtime_mode(report: dict) -> str:
|
||||
"""One-line human summary for logs / runtime context."""
|
||||
mode = report.get("runtime_mode") or RUNTIME_MODE_UNKNOWN
|
||||
sha = report.get("runtime_git_sha")
|
||||
branch = report.get("runtime_branch") or "unknown-branch"
|
||||
short = sha[:12] if sha else "unknown-sha"
|
||||
suffix = (
|
||||
"" if report.get("real_mutations_allowed", True) else " (mutations blocked)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return f"{mode} at {short} on {branch}{suffix}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Post-transport-flap namespace re-proving (#615 acceptance criterion 8)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# A transport flap (#584) drops every gitea-* namespace at once. Proving the
|
||||
# author namespace afterwards says nothing about the reviewer, merger, or
|
||||
# reconciler namespace, so proof is tracked per namespace and a flap
|
||||
# invalidates all of them.
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
REQUIRED_NAMESPACE_PROOF_STEPS = (
|
||||
"whoami",
|
||||
"runtime_context",
|
||||
"capability_resolved",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def new_reproof_state() -> dict:
|
||||
"""Return an empty post-flap re-proving state."""
|
||||
return {"flap_at": None, "namespaces": {}}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def record_transport_flap(state: dict | None, *, at: str) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Record a transport flap: every namespace must be re-proven after *at*.
|
||||
|
||||
Existing per-namespace proofs are kept for audit but no longer satisfy the
|
||||
gate, because they were recorded before the flap.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
result = dict(state or new_reproof_state())
|
||||
result["flap_at"] = at
|
||||
result["namespaces"] = dict(result.get("namespaces") or {})
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def record_namespace_proof(
|
||||
state: dict | None,
|
||||
namespace: str,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
at: str,
|
||||
whoami: bool = False,
|
||||
runtime_context: bool = False,
|
||||
capability_resolved: bool = False,
|
||||
stale_runtime_reported: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Record proof steps completed for exactly one namespace.
|
||||
|
||||
A namespace whose proof reported a reconnect/restart/stale-runtime gate is
|
||||
never counted as proven, regardless of which steps ran.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
result = dict(state or new_reproof_state())
|
||||
namespaces = dict(result.get("namespaces") or {})
|
||||
namespaces[(namespace or "").strip()] = {
|
||||
"at": at,
|
||||
"whoami": bool(whoami),
|
||||
"runtime_context": bool(runtime_context),
|
||||
"capability_resolved": bool(capability_resolved),
|
||||
"stale_runtime_reported": bool(stale_runtime_reported),
|
||||
}
|
||||
result["namespaces"] = namespaces
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_namespace_reproof(state: dict | None, namespace: str) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Whether *namespace* is re-proven after the most recent transport flap.
|
||||
|
||||
``reproof_required`` is false when no flap has been recorded — this gate
|
||||
only speaks to post-flap proof and never invents a requirement.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
ns = (namespace or "").strip()
|
||||
store = state or {}
|
||||
flap_at = store.get("flap_at")
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
|
||||
if not flap_at:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"namespace": ns,
|
||||
"reproof_required": False,
|
||||
"proven": True,
|
||||
"flap_at": None,
|
||||
"proof_at": None,
|
||||
"missing_steps": [],
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
entry = (store.get("namespaces") or {}).get(ns)
|
||||
if not entry:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"MCP namespace '{ns}' has not been re-proven since the transport "
|
||||
f"flap at {flap_at}; run whoami, runtime context, and capability "
|
||||
f"resolve for '{ns}' itself (proof of another namespace does not "
|
||||
f"transfer)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"namespace": ns,
|
||||
"reproof_required": True,
|
||||
"proven": False,
|
||||
"flap_at": flap_at,
|
||||
"proof_at": None,
|
||||
"missing_steps": list(REQUIRED_NAMESPACE_PROOF_STEPS),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
proof_at = entry.get("at")
|
||||
if proof_at is not None and str(proof_at) < str(flap_at):
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"MCP namespace '{ns}' proof at {proof_at} predates the transport "
|
||||
f"flap at {flap_at}; re-prove the namespace before mutating"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"namespace": ns,
|
||||
"reproof_required": True,
|
||||
"proven": False,
|
||||
"flap_at": flap_at,
|
||||
"proof_at": proof_at,
|
||||
"missing_steps": list(REQUIRED_NAMESPACE_PROOF_STEPS),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
missing = [step for step in REQUIRED_NAMESPACE_PROOF_STEPS if not entry.get(step)]
|
||||
if missing:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"MCP namespace '{ns}' post-flap proof is incomplete; missing: "
|
||||
f"{', '.join(missing)}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if entry.get("stale_runtime_reported"):
|
||||
missing = missing or ["stale_runtime_clear"]
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"MCP namespace '{ns}' reported a reconnect/restart/stale-runtime "
|
||||
f"gate during re-proving; mutation stays blocked until the "
|
||||
f"namespace reconnects cleanly"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"namespace": ns,
|
||||
"reproof_required": True,
|
||||
"proven": not missing,
|
||||
"flap_at": flap_at,
|
||||
"proof_at": proof_at,
|
||||
"missing_steps": list(missing),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def unproven_namespaces(
|
||||
state: dict | None, namespaces=WORKFLOW_NAMESPACES
|
||||
) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Return the namespaces still requiring post-flap re-proving."""
|
||||
out = []
|
||||
for ns in namespaces:
|
||||
assessment = assess_namespace_reproof(state, ns)
|
||||
if assessment["reproof_required"] and not assessment["proven"]:
|
||||
out.append(ns)
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Promotion records (#615 acceptance criterion 4 / 10)
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
PROMOTION_REQUIRED_FIELDS = (
|
||||
"previous_runtime_sha",
|
||||
"promoted_runtime_sha",
|
||||
"source_branch",
|
||||
"source_pr",
|
||||
"restart_method",
|
||||
"health_check_proof",
|
||||
"identity_proof",
|
||||
"profile_proof",
|
||||
"workspace_proof",
|
||||
"mutation_capability_proof",
|
||||
"rollback_instructions",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_promotion_record(record: dict | None) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Validate an operator promotion record against the ADR checklist.
|
||||
|
||||
A promotion that does not record both the previous and the promoted SHA is
|
||||
not a promotion — it is an undocumented restart.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
data = record or {}
|
||||
missing = [
|
||||
field
|
||||
for field in PROMOTION_REQUIRED_FIELDS
|
||||
if not str(data.get(field) or "").strip()
|
||||
]
|
||||
reasons = []
|
||||
if missing:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"promotion record is incomplete; missing: " + ", ".join(missing)
|
||||
)
|
||||
previous = str(data.get("previous_runtime_sha") or "").strip()
|
||||
promoted = str(data.get("promoted_runtime_sha") or "").strip()
|
||||
if previous and promoted and previous == promoted:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"promotion record lists the same previous and promoted SHA "
|
||||
f"({previous[:12]}); nothing was promoted"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"valid": not reasons,
|
||||
"missing_fields": missing,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# Filesystem observation (the only impure helper)
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _git_capture(root: str, *args: str) -> str | None:
|
||||
if not root:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
res = subprocess.run(
|
||||
["git", "-C", root, *args],
|
||||
capture_output=True,
|
||||
text=True,
|
||||
check=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if res.returncode != 0:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return (res.stdout or "").strip() or None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def observe_dirty_files(process_root: str | None) -> list[str]:
|
||||
"""Read the live dirty-file list at *process_root*.
|
||||
|
||||
Split out from :func:`observe_runtime` because dirtiness is the one runtime
|
||||
fact that legitimately changes during a process lifetime. The mutation gate
|
||||
must re-read it per call rather than trust a startup snapshot, or a checkout
|
||||
that goes dirty after the snapshot is never blocked again (#615).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not process_root:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
porcelain = _git_capture(process_root, "status", "--porcelain") or ""
|
||||
return [line[3:].strip() for line in porcelain.splitlines() if line.strip()]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def observe_runtime(process_root: str | None) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Read the runtime facts classification needs from *process_root*.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns ``checkout_branch``, ``runtime_head``, ``is_git_checkout``, and
|
||||
``dirty_files``. Every read failure degrades to ``None``/empty rather than
|
||||
raising, so a runtime that cannot be inspected classifies as ``unknown``
|
||||
instead of crashing the caller.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
empty = {
|
||||
"checkout_branch": None,
|
||||
"runtime_head": None,
|
||||
"is_git_checkout": False,
|
||||
"dirty_files": [],
|
||||
}
|
||||
if not process_root:
|
||||
return empty
|
||||
if not _git_capture(process_root, "rev-parse", "--show-toplevel"):
|
||||
return empty
|
||||
branch = _git_capture(process_root, "rev-parse", "--abbrev-ref", "HEAD")
|
||||
if branch == "HEAD": # detached HEAD has no branch name
|
||||
branch = None
|
||||
dirty = observe_dirty_files(process_root)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"checkout_branch": branch,
|
||||
"runtime_head": _git_capture(process_root, "rev-parse", "HEAD"),
|
||||
"is_git_checkout": True,
|
||||
"dirty_files": dirty,
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Sanctioned recovery for stale env-bound task workspace bindings (#702).
|
||||
|
||||
When the MCP daemon dies from an unhandled exception it never runs teardown,
|
||||
and the auto-reconnected daemon inherits ``GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE`` from its
|
||||
parent environment. That inherited value can permanently bind the fresh
|
||||
session to a prior task's worktree (the PR #701 / ``review-pr-654`` incident).
|
||||
|
||||
This module classifies the active env binding against live session evidence
|
||||
and produces a fail-closed recovery plan. Only two situations permit the
|
||||
daemon to clear the binding on its own:
|
||||
|
||||
- the bound path no longer exists on disk (``provably_stale_missing_path``)
|
||||
- the binding was inherited at daemon boot and a *sanctioned* in-session
|
||||
reviewer/merger lease later bound a different worktree
|
||||
(``superseded_by_session_lease``)
|
||||
|
||||
Everything else is surfaced (``unverified_inherited``) and left for the
|
||||
managed reconnect path — never cleared silently, never rebound to a guessed
|
||||
worktree.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
from typing import Any
|
||||
|
||||
ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV = "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"
|
||||
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_UNBOUND = "unbound"
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_CORROBORATED = "corroborated"
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_UNVERIFIED_INHERITED = "unverified_inherited"
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_PROVABLY_STALE_MISSING_PATH = "provably_stale_missing_path"
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_SUPERSEDED_BY_SESSION_LEASE = "superseded_by_session_lease"
|
||||
|
||||
CLASSIFICATIONS = frozenset({
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_UNBOUND,
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_CORROBORATED,
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_UNVERIFIED_INHERITED,
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_PROVABLY_STALE_MISSING_PATH,
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_SUPERSEDED_BY_SESSION_LEASE,
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
# Roles whose task workspace is owned by a lease lifecycle, so an inherited
|
||||
# generic binding without a corroborating lease is suspect.
|
||||
LEASE_BOUND_ROLES = frozenset({"reviewer", "merger"})
|
||||
|
||||
RECOVERY_ACTION_NONE = "none"
|
||||
RECOVERY_ACTION_CLEAR_ENV = "clear_env"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _norm(path: str | None) -> str:
|
||||
text = (path or "").strip()
|
||||
if not text:
|
||||
return ""
|
||||
return os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(text))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def snapshot_boot_bindings(
|
||||
env: dict[str, str] | os._Environ | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Capture worktree env bindings present when the daemon booted.
|
||||
|
||||
A value present in this snapshot was inherited from the parent
|
||||
environment, not established by any sanctioned tool in this daemon's
|
||||
lifetime.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
env_map = env if env is not None else os.environ
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"active_worktree": (env_map.get(ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV) or "").strip() or None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def classify_active_worktree_binding(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
active_value: str | None,
|
||||
role_env_value: str | None = None,
|
||||
session_lease_worktree: str | None = None,
|
||||
boot_inherited: bool,
|
||||
path_exists: bool | None,
|
||||
role_kind: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Classify the GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE binding against live evidence.
|
||||
|
||||
Fail closed: unknown evidence never yields a clear-eligible class.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
active = _norm(active_value)
|
||||
if not active:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"classification": CLASSIFICATION_UNBOUND,
|
||||
"clear_eligible": False,
|
||||
"active_worktree": None,
|
||||
"reasons": ["no GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE binding present"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
role = (role_kind or "").strip().lower()
|
||||
role_env = _norm(role_env_value)
|
||||
lease_wt = _norm(session_lease_worktree)
|
||||
|
||||
result: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"active_worktree": active,
|
||||
"boot_inherited": bool(boot_inherited),
|
||||
"role_kind": role or None,
|
||||
"session_lease_worktree": lease_wt or None,
|
||||
"role_env_worktree": role_env or None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if path_exists is False:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"bound worktree '{active}' no longer exists on disk; the binding "
|
||||
"cannot name a valid task workspace"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result.update({
|
||||
"classification": CLASSIFICATION_PROVABLY_STALE_MISSING_PATH,
|
||||
"clear_eligible": True,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if lease_wt and lease_wt == active:
|
||||
reasons.append("binding matches the sanctioned in-session lease worktree")
|
||||
result.update({
|
||||
"classification": CLASSIFICATION_CORROBORATED,
|
||||
"clear_eligible": False,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if lease_wt and lease_wt != active and boot_inherited:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"boot-inherited binding disagrees with the sanctioned in-session "
|
||||
f"lease worktree '{lease_wt}'; the lease is live authority"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result.update({
|
||||
"classification": CLASSIFICATION_SUPERSEDED_BY_SESSION_LEASE,
|
||||
"clear_eligible": True,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if lease_wt and lease_wt != active and not boot_inherited:
|
||||
# Set after boot by tooling; disagreement is surfaced, never auto-cleared.
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"post-boot binding disagrees with the in-session lease worktree; "
|
||||
"surfacing only (fail closed, no automatic clear)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result.update({
|
||||
"classification": CLASSIFICATION_UNVERIFIED_INHERITED,
|
||||
"clear_eligible": False,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if role_env and role_env == active:
|
||||
reasons.append("binding matches the role-specific worktree env binding")
|
||||
result.update({
|
||||
"classification": CLASSIFICATION_CORROBORATED,
|
||||
"clear_eligible": False,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if boot_inherited and role in LEASE_BOUND_ROLES and not lease_wt:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"binding was inherited at daemon boot, no sanctioned in-session "
|
||||
f"lease corroborates it, and the {role} role binds workspaces "
|
||||
"through the lease lifecycle; treat as unverified until a fresh "
|
||||
"lease or managed reconnect re-establishes the workspace"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result.update({
|
||||
"classification": CLASSIFICATION_UNVERIFIED_INHERITED,
|
||||
"clear_eligible": False,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
reasons.append("no contradicting evidence; binding treated as corroborated")
|
||||
result.update({
|
||||
"classification": CLASSIFICATION_CORROBORATED,
|
||||
"clear_eligible": False,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
})
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def plan_recovery(classification_result: dict[str, Any]) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Turn a classification into an explicit, fail-closed recovery plan."""
|
||||
classification = classification_result.get("classification")
|
||||
clear_eligible = bool(classification_result.get("clear_eligible"))
|
||||
reasons = list(classification_result.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
|
||||
if classification not in CLASSIFICATIONS:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"action": RECOVERY_ACTION_NONE,
|
||||
"clear_allowed": False,
|
||||
"classification": classification,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons + ["unknown classification (fail closed)"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if clear_eligible and classification in {
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_PROVABLY_STALE_MISSING_PATH,
|
||||
CLASSIFICATION_SUPERSEDED_BY_SESSION_LEASE,
|
||||
}:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"action": RECOVERY_ACTION_CLEAR_ENV,
|
||||
"clear_allowed": True,
|
||||
"classification": classification,
|
||||
"active_worktree": classification_result.get("active_worktree"),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
exact_next_action = None
|
||||
if classification == CLASSIFICATION_UNVERIFIED_INHERITED:
|
||||
exact_next_action = (
|
||||
"managed recovery required: reconnect the MCP namespace through "
|
||||
"the managed client configuration (or start a fresh session) so "
|
||||
"the daemon boots without the inherited GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE, or "
|
||||
"corroborate the binding by acquiring a lease for that worktree; "
|
||||
"do not clear or rewrite the environment manually"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"action": RECOVERY_ACTION_NONE,
|
||||
"clear_allowed": False,
|
||||
"classification": classification,
|
||||
"active_worktree": classification_result.get("active_worktree"),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
**({"exact_next_action": exact_next_action} if exact_next_action else {}),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def apply_recovery(
|
||||
plan: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
env: dict[str, str] | os._Environ | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Apply a clear-eligible plan by removing the stale env binding.
|
||||
|
||||
This is the sanctioned in-daemon mechanism (#702 AC2); callers must
|
||||
persist the returned record for audit. Refuses anything but an explicit
|
||||
``clear_env`` plan.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
env_map = env if env is not None else os.environ
|
||||
if not plan.get("clear_allowed") or plan.get("action") != RECOVERY_ACTION_CLEAR_ENV:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"performed": False,
|
||||
"action": RECOVERY_ACTION_NONE,
|
||||
"reasons": ["recovery plan does not authorize clearing (fail closed)"],
|
||||
}
|
||||
cleared_value = (env_map.get(ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV) or "").strip() or None
|
||||
env_map.pop(ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV, None)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"performed": True,
|
||||
"action": RECOVERY_ACTION_CLEAR_ENV,
|
||||
"cleared_env": ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV,
|
||||
"cleared_value": cleared_value,
|
||||
"classification": plan.get("classification"),
|
||||
"reasons": list(plan.get("reasons") or []),
|
||||
}
|
||||
+13
-706
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
"""Stale / moot #332 review-decision lock detection and cleanup policy (#594/#620/#693).
|
||||
"""Stale / moot #332 review-decision lock detection and cleanup policy (#594/#620).
|
||||
|
||||
#332 correctly hard-stops a reviewer session after a terminal live review
|
||||
mutation. After #559 those locks are durable on disk, so they can outlive the
|
||||
@@ -12,11 +12,6 @@ on head B of the **same open PR**. Same-head duplicates remain fail-closed.
|
||||
Open-PR lock *cleanup* remains forbidden unless the PR is truly merged/closed
|
||||
(#594); new-head re-review is allowed without deleting the durable lock.
|
||||
|
||||
#693 scopes the terminal boundary by **PR number**: a terminal on open PR A
|
||||
must not block a fresh formal decision on open PR B on the same durable
|
||||
profile lock (cross-PR isolation). Correction authorization is scoped to the
|
||||
named prior review's PR/head and cannot unlock a different PR.
|
||||
|
||||
This module is pure policy (no Gitea I/O). The MCP tool
|
||||
``gitea_cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock`` fetches live PR state, calls these
|
||||
helpers, and only then clears durable state when cleanup is allowed.
|
||||
@@ -85,45 +80,17 @@ def last_terminal_mutation(lock: dict | None) -> dict | None:
|
||||
return terminals[-1] if terminals else None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def correction_applies(
|
||||
lock: dict | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
pr_number: int | None = None,
|
||||
expected_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when operator correction is active and scoped to the target (#693).
|
||||
|
||||
Global ``correction_authorized`` alone is not enough: correction must name
|
||||
the same PR (and head when recorded) as the decision being re-opened.
|
||||
Missing scope fields on legacy locks fail closed (do not apply).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not lock or not lock.get("correction_authorized"):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
corr_pr = lock.get("correction_pr_number")
|
||||
if corr_pr is None:
|
||||
# Legacy unscoped correction — refuse as generic unlock (#693).
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if pr_number is not None and int(corr_pr) != int(pr_number):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
corr_head = normalize_head_sha(lock.get("correction_head_sha"))
|
||||
target = normalize_head_sha(expected_head_sha)
|
||||
if corr_head and target and not heads_equal(corr_head, target):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def prior_live_mutations_block_boundary(
|
||||
lock: dict | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
expected_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when prior live mutations block a new decision for PR+head (#620/#693).
|
||||
"""True when prior live mutations block a new decision for PR+head (#620).
|
||||
|
||||
Historical terminals on a **different head of the same PR** do not block.
|
||||
Terminals on a **different PR** do not block (#693 cross-PR isolation).
|
||||
Same PR + same head (or same PR without a comparable head SHA) blocks
|
||||
unless a scoped correction applies.
|
||||
Any prior mutation on another PR, the same head, or without a comparable
|
||||
head SHA fails closed (blocks).
|
||||
|
||||
Head resolution uses ``mutation_head_sha(m, lock)`` so pre-#620 ledgers
|
||||
that only stored ``ready_expected_head_sha`` still compare correctly
|
||||
@@ -131,9 +98,7 @@ def prior_live_mutations_block_boundary(
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not lock:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if correction_applies(
|
||||
lock, pr_number=pr_number, expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha
|
||||
):
|
||||
if lock.get("correction_authorized"):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
prior = list(lock.get("live_mutations") or [])
|
||||
if not prior:
|
||||
@@ -143,14 +108,10 @@ def prior_live_mutations_block_boundary(
|
||||
if not isinstance(m, dict):
|
||||
return True
|
||||
m_pr = m.get("pr_number")
|
||||
if m_pr is None:
|
||||
return True # fail closed — unscoped mutation
|
||||
if int(m_pr) != int(pr_number):
|
||||
# #693: foreign-PR history on the shared durable lock does not block.
|
||||
continue
|
||||
m_head = mutation_head_sha(m, lock)
|
||||
if (
|
||||
target
|
||||
m_pr == pr_number
|
||||
and target
|
||||
and m_head
|
||||
and not heads_equal(m_head, target)
|
||||
):
|
||||
@@ -167,34 +128,23 @@ def terminal_boundary_allows_fresh_decision(
|
||||
expected_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
operation: str,
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Whether #332 hard-stop should yield for a new PR+head boundary (#620/#693).
|
||||
"""Whether #332 hard-stop should yield for a new PR+head boundary (#620).
|
||||
|
||||
For ``mark_ready`` / ``review`` / ``resume``:
|
||||
|
||||
* **same PR, different head** — allowed (#620)
|
||||
* **different PR than last terminal** — allowed (#693 cross-PR isolation)
|
||||
* **same PR, same head** — not allowed (unless scoped correction)
|
||||
|
||||
Merge is never reopened by head change or cross-PR isolation (approved
|
||||
head merge path is separate).
|
||||
Only for ``mark_ready`` / ``review`` / ``resume`` on the **same PR** when
|
||||
the requested head differs from the last terminal's head. Merge is never
|
||||
reopened by head change (approved head merge path is separate).
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if operation not in ("mark_ready", "review", "resume"):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if not lock:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if correction_applies(
|
||||
lock, pr_number=pr_number, expected_head_sha=expected_head_sha
|
||||
):
|
||||
if lock.get("correction_authorized"):
|
||||
return True
|
||||
last = last_terminal_mutation(lock)
|
||||
if last is None:
|
||||
return True
|
||||
last_pr = last.get("pr_number")
|
||||
if last_pr is None:
|
||||
if last.get("pr_number") != pr_number:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if int(last_pr) != int(pr_number):
|
||||
# #693: last terminal belongs to another PR — do not hard-stop this PR.
|
||||
return True
|
||||
locked_head = mutation_head_sha(last, lock)
|
||||
target = normalize_head_sha(expected_head_sha)
|
||||
if not locked_head or not target:
|
||||
@@ -488,646 +438,3 @@ def format_cleanup_audit_comment(audit: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
|
||||
"This path only clears a lock when the referenced PR is merged/closed.",
|
||||
]
|
||||
return "\n".join(lines)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# --- #693 classification / recovery / correction audit -----------------------
|
||||
|
||||
# Deterministic classification labels for diagnostics and recovery routing.
|
||||
CLASS_NO_LOCK = "no_lock"
|
||||
CLASS_READY_FOR_TARGET = "ready_for_target"
|
||||
CLASS_IN_PROGRESS_SAME_HEAD = "in_progress_same_head"
|
||||
CLASS_TERMINAL_ACTIVE_SAME_HEAD = "terminal_active_same_head"
|
||||
CLASS_STALE_SUPERSEDED_HEAD = "stale_superseded_head"
|
||||
CLASS_FOREIGN_PR_TERMINAL = "foreign_pr_terminal"
|
||||
CLASS_MOOT_MERGED_CLOSED = "moot_merged_closed"
|
||||
CLASS_CORRECTION_ACTIVE = "correction_active"
|
||||
CLASS_SESSION_OR_PROFILE_MISMATCH = "session_or_profile_mismatch"
|
||||
CLASS_AMBIGUOUS = "ambiguous"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def classify_review_decision_lock(
|
||||
lock: dict | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
target_pr_number: int | None = None,
|
||||
target_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
pr_live: dict | None = None,
|
||||
pr_lookup_error: str | None = None,
|
||||
active_profile_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
session_blockers: list[str] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Deterministic review-decision-lock classification (#693).
|
||||
|
||||
Returns classification, exact next_action, owner/evidence fields, and
|
||||
whether mark_final / cleanup / correction are appropriate.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
summary = lock_summary(lock)
|
||||
target_head = normalize_head_sha(target_head_sha)
|
||||
result: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"classification": CLASS_NO_LOCK,
|
||||
"has_lock": lock is not None,
|
||||
"lock_summary": summary,
|
||||
"target_pr_number": target_pr_number,
|
||||
"target_head_sha": target_head,
|
||||
"last_terminal_pr": None,
|
||||
"last_terminal_action": None,
|
||||
"locked_head_sha": None,
|
||||
"owner_profile_identity": (summary or {}).get("profile_identity"),
|
||||
"session_profile": (summary or {}).get("session_profile"),
|
||||
"updated_at": (summary or {}).get("updated_at"),
|
||||
"correction_authorized": bool((lock or {}).get("correction_authorized")),
|
||||
"correction_pr_number": (lock or {}).get("correction_pr_number"),
|
||||
"correction_head_sha": normalize_head_sha(
|
||||
(lock or {}).get("correction_head_sha")
|
||||
),
|
||||
"mark_final_allowed": True,
|
||||
"cleanup_allowed": False,
|
||||
"correction_eligible": False,
|
||||
"next_action": "gitea_resolve_task_capability(task='review_pr') then mark_final",
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"evidence": {},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if lock is None:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append("no review decision lock present")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
session_blockers = list(session_blockers or [])
|
||||
if session_blockers:
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_SESSION_OR_PROFILE_MISMATCH
|
||||
result["mark_final_allowed"] = False
|
||||
result["next_action"] = (
|
||||
"reconnect matching prgs-reviewer session or wait for lock TTL; "
|
||||
"do not use gitea_authorize_review_correction as unlock; "
|
||||
"do not delete session-state files"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["reasons"].extend(session_blockers)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
stored = (
|
||||
(lock.get("profile_identity") or lock.get("session_profile_lock") or "")
|
||||
.strip()
|
||||
)
|
||||
active = (active_profile_identity or "").strip()
|
||||
if active and stored and active != stored:
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_SESSION_OR_PROFILE_MISMATCH
|
||||
result["mark_final_allowed"] = False
|
||||
result["next_action"] = (
|
||||
f"switch to profile '{stored}' or wait for moot cleanup; "
|
||||
"do not use correction authorization as a generic unlock"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"lock profile '{stored}' does not match active '{active}'"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
last = last_terminal_mutation(lock)
|
||||
if last is None:
|
||||
ready_pr = lock.get("ready_pr_number")
|
||||
ready_head = normalize_head_sha(lock.get("ready_expected_head_sha"))
|
||||
if (
|
||||
target_pr_number is not None
|
||||
and ready_pr == target_pr_number
|
||||
and ready_head
|
||||
and target_head
|
||||
and heads_equal(ready_head, target_head)
|
||||
and lock.get("final_review_decision_ready")
|
||||
):
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_IN_PROGRESS_SAME_HEAD
|
||||
result["mark_final_allowed"] = True # idempotent re-mark
|
||||
result["next_action"] = (
|
||||
"gitea_submit_pr_review with final_review_decision_ready=true "
|
||||
"for the ready PR/head"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
"final decision already marked ready for this PR/head (idempotent)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_READY_FOR_TARGET
|
||||
result["next_action"] = "gitea_mark_final_review_decision then submit"
|
||||
result["reasons"].append("no terminal live mutations; mark_final allowed")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
last_pr = last.get("pr_number")
|
||||
last_action = last.get("action")
|
||||
locked_head = mutation_head_sha(last, lock)
|
||||
result["last_terminal_pr"] = last_pr
|
||||
result["last_terminal_action"] = last_action
|
||||
result["locked_head_sha"] = locked_head
|
||||
result["evidence"] = {
|
||||
"last_review_id": last.get("review_id"),
|
||||
"live_mutations_count": len(lock.get("live_mutations") or []),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if correction_applies(
|
||||
lock, pr_number=target_pr_number, expected_head_sha=target_head
|
||||
):
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_CORRECTION_ACTIVE
|
||||
result["mark_final_allowed"] = True
|
||||
result["next_action"] = (
|
||||
"gitea_mark_final_review_decision for the correction-scoped PR/head, "
|
||||
"then submit once"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"scoped correction active for PR #{lock.get('correction_pr_number')}"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
# Live state of last terminal PR when provided.
|
||||
live = None
|
||||
if pr_lookup_error:
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_AMBIGUOUS
|
||||
result["mark_final_allowed"] = False
|
||||
result["next_action"] = (
|
||||
"retry diagnosis after live PR state is available; "
|
||||
"fail closed under ambiguous evidence"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(f"live PR lookup failed: {pr_lookup_error}")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
if pr_live is not None:
|
||||
live = classify_pr_live_state(pr_live)
|
||||
result["evidence"]["last_terminal_pr_state"] = live.get("pr_state")
|
||||
result["evidence"]["last_terminal_pr_merged"] = live.get("pr_merged")
|
||||
if live.get("pr_merged_or_closed"):
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_MOOT_MERGED_CLOSED
|
||||
result["cleanup_allowed"] = True
|
||||
result["mark_final_allowed"] = target_pr_number is not None and (
|
||||
int(last_pr) != int(target_pr_number)
|
||||
if last_pr is not None and target_pr_number is not None
|
||||
else True
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["next_action"] = (
|
||||
"gitea_cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock(apply=true, "
|
||||
f"expected_terminal_pr={last_pr}) then mark_final on the target PR"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"terminal on PR #{last_pr} is moot (merged/closed); cleanup allowed"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if target_pr_number is None:
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_AMBIGUOUS
|
||||
result["mark_final_allowed"] = False
|
||||
result["next_action"] = "re-run diagnosis with target_pr_number"
|
||||
result["reasons"].append("target_pr_number required for open-PR classification")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
if last_pr is not None and int(last_pr) != int(target_pr_number):
|
||||
# Cross-PR isolation: foreign terminal is history, not a block.
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_FOREIGN_PR_TERMINAL
|
||||
result["mark_final_allowed"] = True
|
||||
result["correction_eligible"] = False # must not use correction to "unlock"
|
||||
result["next_action"] = (
|
||||
f"gitea_mark_final_review_decision(pr_number={target_pr_number}, ...) "
|
||||
f"— foreign terminal on PR #{last_pr} does not block (#693); "
|
||||
"do not call gitea_authorize_review_correction for cross-PR unlock"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"last terminal is {last_action} on foreign open/closed PR #{last_pr}; "
|
||||
f"target PR #{target_pr_number} is isolated (#693)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
# Same PR as target.
|
||||
if (
|
||||
locked_head
|
||||
and target_head
|
||||
and not heads_equal(locked_head, target_head)
|
||||
):
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_STALE_SUPERSEDED_HEAD
|
||||
result["mark_final_allowed"] = True
|
||||
result["next_action"] = (
|
||||
f"gitea_mark_final_review_decision with expected_head_sha="
|
||||
f"{target_head} (#620 same-PR new head)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"terminal {last_action} on head {locked_head[:12]}…; target head "
|
||||
f"{target_head[:12]}… — fresh formal review allowed without cleanup"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
# Same PR + same head (or missing head comparison) — active terminal.
|
||||
result["classification"] = CLASS_TERMINAL_ACTIVE_SAME_HEAD
|
||||
result["mark_final_allowed"] = False
|
||||
result["correction_eligible"] = True
|
||||
result["next_action"] = (
|
||||
"if the prior verdict was mistaken: gitea_authorize_review_correction "
|
||||
f"with prior_review_id={last.get('review_id')}, "
|
||||
f"prior_review_state={last_action}, target_pr_number={target_pr_number}, "
|
||||
"operator_authorized=true, then re-mark once; "
|
||||
"if the prior verdict is correct: stop and hand off (do not duplicate)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
f"terminal {last_action} already recorded for PR #{target_pr_number} "
|
||||
f"at this head; same-head duplicate blocked (#332/#620)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_precise_mark_final_failure(
|
||||
classification: dict[str, Any],
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""One precise recovery instruction + durable issue handoff payload (#693 AC4/8)."""
|
||||
cls = classification.get("classification")
|
||||
next_action = classification.get("next_action") or (
|
||||
"stop and create a durable Gitea issue with lock evidence"
|
||||
)
|
||||
reasons = list(classification.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
reasons.append(f"exact_next_action: {next_action}")
|
||||
handoff = {
|
||||
"required": cls
|
||||
in (
|
||||
CLASS_AMBIGUOUS,
|
||||
CLASS_SESSION_OR_PROFILE_MISMATCH,
|
||||
CLASS_TERMINAL_ACTIVE_SAME_HEAD,
|
||||
)
|
||||
and not classification.get("mark_final_allowed"),
|
||||
"title_hint": (
|
||||
"Review-decision-lock recovery failed during formal review"
|
||||
),
|
||||
"classification": cls,
|
||||
"exact_next_action": next_action,
|
||||
"owner_profile_identity": classification.get("owner_profile_identity"),
|
||||
"last_terminal_pr": classification.get("last_terminal_pr"),
|
||||
"last_terminal_action": classification.get("last_terminal_action"),
|
||||
"locked_head_sha": classification.get("locked_head_sha"),
|
||||
"target_pr_number": classification.get("target_pr_number"),
|
||||
"target_head_sha": classification.get("target_head_sha"),
|
||||
"evidence": classification.get("evidence") or {},
|
||||
"instruction": (
|
||||
"If recovery cannot complete with the exact_next_action above, "
|
||||
"create or update a durable Gitea issue with this payload and stop; "
|
||||
"do not delete session-state files; do not misuse correction as unlock."
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"classification": cls,
|
||||
"exact_next_action": next_action,
|
||||
"durable_issue_handoff": handoff,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_correction_audit_record(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
prior_review_id: int | None,
|
||||
prior_review_state: str | None,
|
||||
target_pr_number: int | None,
|
||||
target_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
reason: str | None,
|
||||
actor_username: str | None,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None,
|
||||
authorized: bool,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Structured durable audit for review-correction authorization (#693)."""
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"event": "review_correction_authorization",
|
||||
"issue_ref": "#693",
|
||||
"authorized": bool(authorized),
|
||||
"timestamp": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
|
||||
"actor_username": actor_username,
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"prior_review_id": prior_review_id,
|
||||
"prior_review_state": prior_review_state,
|
||||
"target_pr_number": target_pr_number,
|
||||
"target_head_sha": normalize_head_sha(target_head_sha),
|
||||
"reason": reason,
|
||||
"scope": "same_pr_head_only",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_correction_audit_comment(audit: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
|
||||
"""Markdown body for a thread-visible correction authorization audit."""
|
||||
status = "AUTHORIZED" if audit.get("authorized") else "DENIED"
|
||||
lines = [
|
||||
"## Review correction authorization audit (#693)",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
f"Status: **{status}**",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
f"- actor: `{audit.get('actor_username')}`",
|
||||
f"- profile: `{audit.get('profile_name')}`",
|
||||
f"- timestamp: `{audit.get('timestamp')}`",
|
||||
f"- prior_review_id: `{audit.get('prior_review_id')}`",
|
||||
f"- prior_review_state: `{audit.get('prior_review_state')}`",
|
||||
f"- target_pr: `#{audit.get('target_pr_number')}`",
|
||||
f"- target_head_sha: `{audit.get('target_head_sha')}`",
|
||||
f"- reason: {audit.get('reason')}",
|
||||
f"- scope: `{audit.get('scope')}` (cannot unlock a different PR)",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"This is **not** a generic decision-lock unlock. Cross-PR recovery "
|
||||
"uses isolation (#693) or moot cleanup (#594), never correction.",
|
||||
]
|
||||
return "\n".join(lines)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_open_pr_decision_lock_recovery(
|
||||
lock: dict | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
target_pr_number: int,
|
||||
target_head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
last_terminal_pr_live: dict | None = None,
|
||||
pr_lookup_error: str | None = None,
|
||||
active_profile_identity: str | None = None,
|
||||
session_blockers: list[str] | None = None,
|
||||
controller_recovery_authorized: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Assess guarded recovery for decision locks affecting an open target PR (#693).
|
||||
|
||||
Recovery here means *workflow recovery routing*, not necessarily lock wipe.
|
||||
Foreign-PR terminals are recoverable by isolation (mark_final allowed).
|
||||
Moot terminals use #594 cleanup. Same-head active terminals refuse wipe.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
classification = classify_review_decision_lock(
|
||||
lock,
|
||||
target_pr_number=target_pr_number,
|
||||
target_head_sha=target_head_sha,
|
||||
pr_live=last_terminal_pr_live,
|
||||
pr_lookup_error=pr_lookup_error,
|
||||
active_profile_identity=active_profile_identity,
|
||||
session_blockers=session_blockers,
|
||||
)
|
||||
cls = classification["classification"]
|
||||
recovery_allowed = False
|
||||
recovery_mode = None
|
||||
if cls == CLASS_FOREIGN_PR_TERMINAL:
|
||||
recovery_allowed = True
|
||||
recovery_mode = "cross_pr_isolation"
|
||||
elif cls == CLASS_STALE_SUPERSEDED_HEAD:
|
||||
recovery_allowed = True
|
||||
recovery_mode = "same_pr_new_head"
|
||||
elif cls == CLASS_MOOT_MERGED_CLOSED:
|
||||
recovery_allowed = True
|
||||
recovery_mode = "moot_cleanup"
|
||||
elif cls == CLASS_READY_FOR_TARGET:
|
||||
recovery_allowed = True
|
||||
recovery_mode = "none_required"
|
||||
elif cls == CLASS_CORRECTION_ACTIVE:
|
||||
recovery_allowed = True
|
||||
recovery_mode = "scoped_correction"
|
||||
elif cls == CLASS_TERMINAL_ACTIVE_SAME_HEAD:
|
||||
recovery_allowed = False
|
||||
recovery_mode = "correction_only_if_mistake"
|
||||
else:
|
||||
recovery_allowed = False
|
||||
recovery_mode = "fail_closed"
|
||||
|
||||
if recovery_mode == "moot_cleanup" and not controller_recovery_authorized:
|
||||
# Cleanup still needs apply + capability; assess reports path.
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
**classification,
|
||||
"recovery_allowed": recovery_allowed,
|
||||
"recovery_mode": recovery_mode,
|
||||
"controller_recovery_authorized": bool(controller_recovery_authorized),
|
||||
"manual_file_delete_forbidden": True,
|
||||
"correction_as_generic_unlock_forbidden": True,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
# #709 cross-profile cleanup, overwrite protection, recovery provenance
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def has_unresolved_terminal_evidence(lock: dict | None) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when *lock* still carries a terminal live mutation ledger."""
|
||||
return last_terminal_mutation(lock) is not None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def assess_init_overwrite(
|
||||
existing_lock: dict | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
force: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Whether init_review_decision_lock may replace an existing durable lock (#709 AC2).
|
||||
|
||||
Unresolved terminal evidence must never be silently replaced by an empty
|
||||
initialized lock. *force* does not authorize destruction of terminal
|
||||
ledgers — only explicit cleanup / archive transitions may remove them.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
result: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||
"overwrite_allowed": True,
|
||||
"has_existing": existing_lock is not None,
|
||||
"has_unresolved_terminal": False,
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
"last_terminal_pr": None,
|
||||
"last_terminal_action": None,
|
||||
"existing_profile_identity": None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if existing_lock is None:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append("no existing lock; empty init allowed")
|
||||
return result
|
||||
result["existing_profile_identity"] = (
|
||||
existing_lock.get("profile_identity")
|
||||
or existing_lock.get("session_profile_lock")
|
||||
or existing_lock.get("session_profile")
|
||||
)
|
||||
last = last_terminal_mutation(existing_lock)
|
||||
if last is None:
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
"existing lock has no terminal mutations; re-init allowed"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
result["has_unresolved_terminal"] = True
|
||||
result["overwrite_allowed"] = False
|
||||
result["last_terminal_pr"] = last.get("pr_number")
|
||||
result["last_terminal_action"] = last.get("action")
|
||||
result["reasons"].append(
|
||||
"refuse empty re-init: unresolved terminal decision-lock evidence "
|
||||
f"present ({last.get('action')} on PR #{last.get('pr_number')}); "
|
||||
"use gitea_cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock when moot, or archive "
|
||||
f"via sanctioned recovery — force={force!r} does not authorize overwrite "
|
||||
"(#709 AC2)"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return result
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def lock_targets_merged_pr_approval(
|
||||
lock: dict | None,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
expected_head_sha: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
"""True when *lock*'s last terminal mutation is approve of *pr_number*.
|
||||
|
||||
When *expected_head_sha* is provided, a **recorded** terminal head must
|
||||
match. Legacy same-repo approve locks with no recorded head do **not**
|
||||
match (fail closed, #709 F3 residual / review 435) — callers must use the
|
||||
strict secondary path that refuses no-head clears.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
last = last_terminal_mutation(lock)
|
||||
if last is None:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if last.get("action") != "approve":
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if last.get("pr_number") != pr_number:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
if expected_head_sha:
|
||||
want = normalize_head_sha(expected_head_sha)
|
||||
if not want:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
locked = mutation_head_sha(last, lock)
|
||||
# Require recorded-head match; unrecorded head is not a match (#709 F3).
|
||||
if not locked or not heads_equal(locked, want):
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return True
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_post_merge_recovery_record(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
merge_commit_sha: str | None,
|
||||
target_profile_identity: str | None,
|
||||
failed_step: str,
|
||||
error: str | None,
|
||||
remote: str | None,
|
||||
org: str | None,
|
||||
repo: str | None,
|
||||
actor_username: str | None,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Durable recovery-required payload after irreversible merge (#709 AC3)."""
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"event": "post_merge_decision_lock_recovery_required",
|
||||
"status": "recovery_required",
|
||||
"issue_ref": "#709",
|
||||
"recovery_critical": True,
|
||||
"applied": False, # never claim historical cleanup succeeded
|
||||
"timestamp": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
|
||||
"pr_number": pr_number,
|
||||
"head_sha": normalize_head_sha(head_sha),
|
||||
"merge_commit_sha": merge_commit_sha,
|
||||
"target_profile_identity": target_profile_identity,
|
||||
"failed_step": failed_step,
|
||||
"error": error,
|
||||
"remote": remote,
|
||||
"org": org,
|
||||
"repo": repo,
|
||||
"actor_username": actor_username,
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"required_recovery_action": (
|
||||
"retry cross-profile decision-lock cleanup and audit publication "
|
||||
"for the merged PR; if terminal evidence is gone, use "
|
||||
"gitea_record_irrecoverable_decision_lock_provenance"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_irrecoverable_provenance_record(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
pr_number: int,
|
||||
head_sha: str | None,
|
||||
remote: str | None,
|
||||
org: str | None,
|
||||
repo: str | None,
|
||||
actor_username: str | None,
|
||||
profile_name: str | None,
|
||||
reason: str,
|
||||
incident_ref: str | None = None,
|
||||
# Deprecated kwargs retained only so stale call sites fail closed:
|
||||
operator_authorized: bool | None = None,
|
||||
# Required for merger-acceptable records (#709 F1):
|
||||
authorization: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||
incident_issue: int | None = None,
|
||||
incident_comment_id: int | None = None,
|
||||
destroyed_subject: str | None = None,
|
||||
historical_provenance_subject: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Truthful absence-of-proof record (#709 AC5). Never sets applied=True.
|
||||
|
||||
Caller-supplied ``operator_authorized`` is **ignored** as authorization
|
||||
evidence (review 434 F1). Prefer
|
||||
:func:`irrecoverable_provenance.build_irrecoverable_provenance_record`
|
||||
with a verified server-side authorization artifact.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
# Explicitly ignore deprecated self-assertable Boolean.
|
||||
_ = operator_authorized
|
||||
if authorization is not None and incident_issue is not None and incident_comment_id is not None:
|
||||
from irrecoverable_provenance import (
|
||||
build_irrecoverable_provenance_record as _build,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return _build(
|
||||
pr_number=int(pr_number),
|
||||
head_sha=str(head_sha or ""),
|
||||
remote=str(remote or ""),
|
||||
org=str(org or ""),
|
||||
repo=str(repo or ""),
|
||||
actor_username=actor_username,
|
||||
profile_name=profile_name,
|
||||
reason=reason,
|
||||
incident_issue=int(incident_issue),
|
||||
incident_comment_id=int(incident_comment_id),
|
||||
authorization=authorization,
|
||||
destroyed_subject=destroyed_subject,
|
||||
historical_provenance_subject=historical_provenance_subject
|
||||
or destroyed_subject,
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Fail-closed skeleton when no server authorization is supplied: never
|
||||
# sets merger_may_accept True (even if operator_authorized was True).
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"event": "irrecoverable_decision_lock_provenance",
|
||||
"status": "provenance_irrecoverable",
|
||||
"record_type": "irrecoverable_decision_provenance",
|
||||
"operator_recovery_required": True,
|
||||
"issue_ref": "#709",
|
||||
"recovery_critical": True,
|
||||
"applied": False,
|
||||
"historical_cleanup_proven": False,
|
||||
"timestamp": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
|
||||
"pr_number": pr_number,
|
||||
"head_sha": normalize_head_sha(head_sha),
|
||||
"remote": remote,
|
||||
"org": org,
|
||||
"repo": repo,
|
||||
"actor_username": actor_username,
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"reason": reason,
|
||||
"incident_ref": incident_ref,
|
||||
"incident_issue": incident_issue,
|
||||
"incident_comment_id": incident_comment_id,
|
||||
"authorization_verified": False,
|
||||
"merger_may_accept": False,
|
||||
"acceptance_rule": (
|
||||
"Merger may accept this record only when a server-side "
|
||||
"authorization artifact verifies for remote/org/repo/PR/exact "
|
||||
"head/incident, the record is durable and read back, and normal "
|
||||
"merge gates still pass. Caller Booleans never authorize. This "
|
||||
"does not prove historical cleanup."
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_irrecoverable_audit_comment(record: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
|
||||
"""Markdown body for irrecoverable provenance audit (no applied=true claim)."""
|
||||
from irrecoverable_provenance import (
|
||||
format_irrecoverable_audit_comment as _fmt,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
return _fmt(record)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def format_post_merge_recovery_comment(record: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
|
||||
"""Markdown body for post-merge recovery-required audit."""
|
||||
lines = [
|
||||
"## Post-merge decision-lock recovery required (#709)",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"Status: **RECOVERY_REQUIRED** (merge is irreversible; cleanup/audit incomplete)",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
f"- actor: `{record.get('actor_username')}`",
|
||||
f"- profile: `{record.get('profile_name')}`",
|
||||
f"- timestamp: `{record.get('timestamp')}`",
|
||||
f"- PR: `#{record.get('pr_number')}`",
|
||||
f"- head_sha: `{record.get('head_sha')}`",
|
||||
f"- merge_commit_sha: `{record.get('merge_commit_sha')}`",
|
||||
f"- target_profile_identity: `{record.get('target_profile_identity')}`",
|
||||
f"- failed_step: `{record.get('failed_step')}`",
|
||||
f"- error: `{record.get('error')}`",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
f"Required action: {record.get('required_recovery_action')}",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
"applied=false — do not treat this as successful cleanup evidence.",
|
||||
]
|
||||
return "\n".join(lines)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-224
@@ -36,12 +36,6 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
# #780: retire status:pr-open after a terminal PR transition. Same label
|
||||
# authority as set_issue_labels — it is a strictly narrower operation.
|
||||
"cleanup_terminal_pr_labels": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"create_label": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
@@ -66,121 +60,22 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.close",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
# Non-closing PR metadata edits (title/body/base). Closing uses close_pr.
|
||||
"edit_pr": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_edit_pr": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"address_pr_change_requests": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
# PR synchronization lifecycle: assess is read-only (any role with gitea.read);
|
||||
# update-by-merge is author-only and mutates the PR head via Gitea API.
|
||||
"assess_pr_sync_status": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_assess_pr_sync_status": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"update_pr_branch_by_merge": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_update_pr_branch_by_merge": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"review_pr": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"submit_pr_review": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"merge_pr": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"role": "merger",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"acquire_reviewer_pr_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
# #695 AC8: controller quarantine of contaminated formal reviews.
|
||||
# Apply path posts an append-only forensic audit comment (pr.comment).
|
||||
"quarantine_contaminated_review": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_quarantine_contaminated_review": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"adopt_merger_pr_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "merger",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_adopt_merger_pr_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "merger",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"acquire_merger_pr_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "merger",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "merger",
|
||||
},
|
||||
# #742: owner-session terminal release/abandon of a merger-held lease when
|
||||
# the merge does not occur. Apply path posts an append-only terminal lease
|
||||
# marker (gitea.pr.comment); merger-only, never a reviewer path.
|
||||
"release_merger_pr_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "merger",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_release_merger_pr_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "merger",
|
||||
},
|
||||
# #691: guarded non-owner cleanup of obsolete comment-backed reviewer leases.
|
||||
# Apply path posts lease release + audit comments (gitea.pr.comment).
|
||||
"cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_cleanup_obsolete_reviewer_comment_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
# #745: post-merge moot reviewer-lease cleanup is reconciler-owned. The
|
||||
# apply path posts an append-only terminal `phase: released` lease marker
|
||||
# (gitea.pr.comment), so holding the comment permission alone must not
|
||||
# authorize it — author, reviewer and merger fail closed on the role gate
|
||||
# even though their profiles carry gitea.pr.comment. The read-only
|
||||
# `apply=false` assessment deliberately stays reachable under gitea.read
|
||||
# inside the tool (the same convention as cleanup_stale_review_decision_lock
|
||||
# below), so any namespace can diagnose a stuck lease; only apply requires
|
||||
# this task plus the reconciler role.
|
||||
"cleanup_post_merge_moot_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_cleanup_post_merge_moot_lease": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"blind_pr_queue_review": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
@@ -212,58 +107,9 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
# #693: read-only classification of durable decision locks (incl. open PRs).
|
||||
"diagnose_review_decision_lock": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_diagnose_review_decision_lock": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.read",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"authorize_review_correction": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_authorize_review_correction": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"role": "reviewer",
|
||||
},
|
||||
# #709: truthful absence-of-proof recovery (server-side auth + record + consume).
|
||||
# Dedicated mutation capability — gitea.read is insufficient (review 434 F1).
|
||||
"issue_irrecoverable_provenance_authorization": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.decision_lock.irrecoverable_recovery",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_issue_irrecoverable_provenance_authorization": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.decision_lock.irrecoverable_recovery",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"record_irrecoverable_decision_lock_provenance": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.decision_lock.irrecoverable_recovery",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_record_irrecoverable_decision_lock_provenance": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.decision_lock.irrecoverable_recovery",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"consume_irrecoverable_decision_lock_provenance": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"role": "merger",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"gitea_consume_irrecoverable_decision_lock_provenance": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"role": "merger",
|
||||
},
|
||||
# #729: delete_branch is reconciler-owned. gitea.branch.delete is granted
|
||||
# only to the reconciler profile, so the resolver must classify this task as
|
||||
# reconciler (previously "author", which no delete-capable profile held).
|
||||
# Raw gitea_delete_branch still redirects reconciler to the guarded
|
||||
# gitea_cleanup_merged_pr_branch path (#514/#687); author/reviewer/merger
|
||||
# stay denied by both the permission gate and this role gate.
|
||||
"delete_branch": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
},
|
||||
"cleanup_merged_pr_branch": {
|
||||
"permission": "gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
@@ -438,74 +284,6 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# A reviewer lease is the first mutation in the canonical ``review_pr``
|
||||
# workflow, so the already-resolved review capability is valid for that one
|
||||
# narrower transition. Keep this directed and explicit: lease acquisition
|
||||
# does not authorize a review verdict, and reviewer proof never authorizes a
|
||||
# merger lease (#763).
|
||||
_PREFLIGHT_TASK_TRANSITIONS = frozenset({
|
||||
("review_pr", "acquire_reviewer_pr_lease"),
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _canonical_preflight_task(task: str | None) -> str:
|
||||
"""Normalize only declared ``gitea_`` aliases for preflight comparison."""
|
||||
value = (task or "").strip()
|
||||
if value.startswith("gitea_") and value[6:] in TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP:
|
||||
return value[6:]
|
||||
return value
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def preflight_task_matches(
|
||||
resolved_task: str | None,
|
||||
mutation_task: str | None,
|
||||
) -> bool:
|
||||
"""Return whether capability proof authorizes this mutation transition."""
|
||||
resolved = _canonical_preflight_task(resolved_task)
|
||||
mutation = _canonical_preflight_task(mutation_task)
|
||||
if not resolved or not mutation:
|
||||
return False
|
||||
return resolved == mutation or (resolved, mutation) in _PREFLIGHT_TASK_TRANSITIONS
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Tasks for which permission alone is insufficient: the active/configured
|
||||
# profile's declared role must also match the task role. This is the complete
|
||||
# resolver set from master at the #723 reconstruction point, shared with
|
||||
# runtime reporting so those two authorities cannot drift again.
|
||||
ROLE_EXCLUSIVE_TASKS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"acquire_reviewer_pr_lease",
|
||||
"gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease",
|
||||
"review_pr",
|
||||
"approve_pr",
|
||||
"request_changes_pr",
|
||||
"blind_pr_queue_review",
|
||||
"pr_queue_cleanup",
|
||||
"pr-queue-cleanup",
|
||||
"merge_pr",
|
||||
"acquire_merger_pr_lease",
|
||||
"gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease",
|
||||
"adopt_merger_pr_lease",
|
||||
"gitea_adopt_merger_pr_lease",
|
||||
"release_merger_pr_lease",
|
||||
"gitea_release_merger_pr_lease",
|
||||
"create_branch",
|
||||
"push_branch",
|
||||
"create_pr",
|
||||
"commit_files",
|
||||
"gitea_commit_files",
|
||||
"address_pr_change_requests",
|
||||
"update_pr_branch_by_merge",
|
||||
"gitea_update_pr_branch_by_merge",
|
||||
"delete_branch",
|
||||
"cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
|
||||
"reconciliation_cleanup",
|
||||
"work_issue",
|
||||
"work-issue",
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
# Issue-mutating MCP tools and their resolver task keys.
|
||||
ISSUE_MUTATION_TOOL_TASKS: dict[str, str] = {
|
||||
"gitea_create_issue": "create_issue",
|
||||
@@ -513,7 +291,6 @@ ISSUE_MUTATION_TOOL_TASKS: dict[str, str] = {
|
||||
"gitea_create_issue_comment": "comment_issue",
|
||||
"gitea_mark_issue": "mark_issue",
|
||||
"gitea_set_issue_labels": "set_issue_labels",
|
||||
"gitea_cleanup_terminal_pr_labels": "cleanup_terminal_pr_labels",
|
||||
"gitea_create_label": "create_label",
|
||||
"gitea_commit_files": "commit_files",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,308 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Authoritative terminal-transition cleanup for ``status:pr-open`` (#780).
|
||||
|
||||
``status:pr-open`` is applied by ``gitea_create_pr`` while a linked pull
|
||||
request is open. Nothing removed it again: the workflow's terminal paths
|
||||
(merge, close-without-merge, supersession, already-landed reconciliation,
|
||||
controller closure) each ended without touching the label, so a repository
|
||||
audit found 40 closed issues still carrying it.
|
||||
|
||||
This module is the single source of truth for that cleanup. Every sanctioned
|
||||
terminal path plans its label mutation here rather than implementing its own
|
||||
rule, so the paths cannot drift apart:
|
||||
|
||||
- :func:`plan_pr_open_cleanup` decides the exact resulting label set. It only
|
||||
ever removes ``status:pr-open``; every other label is preserved verbatim,
|
||||
including the case where the result is an empty label set.
|
||||
- :func:`verify_pr_open_cleanup` is the read-after-write check. It proves the
|
||||
label is gone *and* that no unrelated label was dropped or added.
|
||||
- :func:`detect_residual_pr_open` is the terminal validation: given issues, it
|
||||
reports any that still carry the label, so a controller closure or audit
|
||||
fails loudly instead of leaving the leak behind.
|
||||
|
||||
The rule is idempotent by construction: an issue without the label plans no
|
||||
mutation, so retries and recovery re-runs are harmless.
|
||||
|
||||
This module performs no I/O — callers own the Gitea API calls.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
from typing import Any, Iterable, Mapping, Sequence
|
||||
|
||||
import issue_workflow_labels
|
||||
|
||||
#: The single label this module is responsible for retiring.
|
||||
PR_OPEN_LABEL = "status:pr-open"
|
||||
|
||||
# Canonical terminal reasons — the sanctioned ways an issue can end up
|
||||
# associated with a pull request that is no longer open.
|
||||
MERGED = "merged"
|
||||
CLOSED_WITHOUT_MERGE = "closed_without_merge"
|
||||
SUPERSEDED = "superseded"
|
||||
ALREADY_LANDED = "already_landed"
|
||||
CONTROLLER_CLOSURE = "controller_closure"
|
||||
ABANDONED = "abandoned"
|
||||
RETRY_RECOVERY = "retry_recovery"
|
||||
|
||||
TERMINAL_REASONS: tuple[str, ...] = (
|
||||
MERGED,
|
||||
CLOSED_WITHOUT_MERGE,
|
||||
SUPERSEDED,
|
||||
ALREADY_LANDED,
|
||||
CONTROLLER_CLOSURE,
|
||||
ABANDONED,
|
||||
RETRY_RECOVERY,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
_REASON_ALIASES: dict[str, str] = {
|
||||
"merge": MERGED,
|
||||
"merged": MERGED,
|
||||
"pr_merged": MERGED,
|
||||
"closed": CLOSED_WITHOUT_MERGE,
|
||||
"close": CLOSED_WITHOUT_MERGE,
|
||||
"closed_without_merge": CLOSED_WITHOUT_MERGE,
|
||||
"pr_closed": CLOSED_WITHOUT_MERGE,
|
||||
"supersede": SUPERSEDED,
|
||||
"superseded": SUPERSEDED,
|
||||
"supersession": SUPERSEDED,
|
||||
"already_landed": ALREADY_LANDED,
|
||||
"reconcile_already_landed": ALREADY_LANDED,
|
||||
"controller_closure": CONTROLLER_CLOSURE,
|
||||
"close_issue": CONTROLLER_CLOSURE,
|
||||
"abandon": ABANDONED,
|
||||
"abandoned": ABANDONED,
|
||||
"retry": RETRY_RECOVERY,
|
||||
"recovery": RETRY_RECOVERY,
|
||||
"retry_recovery": RETRY_RECOVERY,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#: Human-readable phrasing used in audit comments and diagnostics.
|
||||
REASON_DESCRIPTIONS: dict[str, str] = {
|
||||
MERGED: "the linked PR was merged",
|
||||
CLOSED_WITHOUT_MERGE: "the linked PR was closed without merging",
|
||||
SUPERSEDED: "the linked PR was superseded by another merged PR",
|
||||
ALREADY_LANDED: "the linked PR's change was already on the target branch",
|
||||
CONTROLLER_CLOSURE: "the issue reached controller closure",
|
||||
ABANDONED: "the linked PR was abandoned",
|
||||
RETRY_RECOVERY: "a partial terminal transition is being recovered",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def canonical_terminal_reason(reason: str | None) -> str:
|
||||
"""Normalize a terminal reason, failing closed on anything unrecognized."""
|
||||
name = (reason or "").strip()
|
||||
if name in TERMINAL_REASONS:
|
||||
return name
|
||||
normalized = name.lower().replace("-", "_").replace(" ", "_")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
return _REASON_ALIASES[normalized]
|
||||
except KeyError as exc:
|
||||
raise ValueError(
|
||||
f"unknown terminal PR reason '{reason}' (expected one of: "
|
||||
+ ", ".join(TERMINAL_REASONS)
|
||||
+ ")"
|
||||
) from exc
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def plan_pr_open_cleanup(
|
||||
current_labels: Iterable[str | Mapping[str, object]] | Mapping[str, object],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
terminal_reason: str,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Plan the label set an issue must carry after a terminal PR transition.
|
||||
|
||||
The plan removes ``status:pr-open`` and nothing else. When the label is
|
||||
absent the plan is an explicit no-op (``cleanup_required`` False), which is
|
||||
what makes repeated cleanup calls harmless. When it was the only label the
|
||||
resulting set is legitimately empty.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
reason = canonical_terminal_reason(terminal_reason)
|
||||
before = issue_workflow_labels.label_names(current_labels)
|
||||
after = [name for name in before if name != PR_OPEN_LABEL]
|
||||
present = len(after) != len(before)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"terminal_reason": reason,
|
||||
"terminal_reason_description": REASON_DESCRIPTIONS[reason],
|
||||
"label": PR_OPEN_LABEL,
|
||||
"label_present": present,
|
||||
"cleanup_required": present,
|
||||
"idempotent_noop": not present,
|
||||
"labels_before": before,
|
||||
"labels_after": after,
|
||||
"removed": [PR_OPEN_LABEL] if present else [],
|
||||
"preserved": list(after),
|
||||
"empty_label_set": not after,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def verify_pr_open_cleanup(
|
||||
observed_labels: Iterable[str | Mapping[str, object]] | Mapping[str, object],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
plan: Mapping[str, Any],
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Read-after-write check for a planned cleanup.
|
||||
|
||||
Verifies the label is gone and that the observed set matches the plan
|
||||
exactly, so an unrelated label silently dropped (or re-added) by the API is
|
||||
reported rather than accepted.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
observed = issue_workflow_labels.label_names(observed_labels)
|
||||
expected = list(plan.get("labels_after") or [])
|
||||
observed_set = set(observed)
|
||||
expected_set = set(expected)
|
||||
residual = PR_OPEN_LABEL in observed_set
|
||||
unexpected_removals = sorted(expected_set - observed_set)
|
||||
unexpected_additions = sorted(observed_set - expected_set - {PR_OPEN_LABEL})
|
||||
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
if residual:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
f"'{PR_OPEN_LABEL}' is still present after terminal cleanup"
|
||||
)
|
||||
if unexpected_removals:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"unrelated labels were dropped by the cleanup: "
|
||||
+ ", ".join(unexpected_removals)
|
||||
)
|
||||
if unexpected_additions:
|
||||
reasons.append(
|
||||
"unexpected labels appeared during the cleanup: "
|
||||
+ ", ".join(unexpected_additions)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
verified = not reasons
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"verified": verified,
|
||||
"residual": residual,
|
||||
"observed_labels": observed,
|
||||
"expected_labels": expected,
|
||||
"unexpected_removals": unexpected_removals,
|
||||
"unexpected_additions": unexpected_additions,
|
||||
"empty_label_set": not observed,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"safe_next_action": (
|
||||
""
|
||||
if verified
|
||||
else (
|
||||
"Re-run the terminal cleanup for this issue with "
|
||||
f"terminal_reason='{RETRY_RECOVERY}' and confirm the read-back "
|
||||
f"no longer reports '{PR_OPEN_LABEL}'."
|
||||
)
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def summarize_cleanup_results(
|
||||
results: Sequence[Mapping[str, Any]],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
terminal_reason: str,
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Aggregate per-issue cleanup outcomes into one reportable record."""
|
||||
reason = canonical_terminal_reason(terminal_reason)
|
||||
entries = [dict(entry) for entry in results]
|
||||
removed = [e.get("issue_number") for e in entries if e.get("status") == "removed"]
|
||||
absent = [
|
||||
e.get("issue_number") for e in entries if e.get("status") == "not present"
|
||||
]
|
||||
failed = [
|
||||
e.get("issue_number")
|
||||
for e in entries
|
||||
if e.get("status") not in ("removed", "not present") or not e.get("verified")
|
||||
]
|
||||
reasons: list[str] = []
|
||||
for entry in entries:
|
||||
for text in entry.get("reasons") or []:
|
||||
reasons.append(f"issue #{entry.get('issue_number')}: {text}")
|
||||
clean = not failed
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"label": PR_OPEN_LABEL,
|
||||
"terminal_reason": reason,
|
||||
"clean": clean,
|
||||
"checked": [e.get("issue_number") for e in entries],
|
||||
"removed": removed,
|
||||
"already_absent": absent,
|
||||
"failed": failed,
|
||||
"results": entries,
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"safe_next_action": (
|
||||
""
|
||||
if clean
|
||||
else (
|
||||
"Terminal label cleanup did not complete for "
|
||||
+ ", ".join(f"#{num}" for num in failed)
|
||||
+ ". Re-run gitea_cleanup_terminal_pr_labels with "
|
||||
f"terminal_reason='{RETRY_RECOVERY}' for those issues."
|
||||
)
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def detect_residual_pr_open(
|
||||
issues: Iterable[Mapping[str, Any]],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
open_pr_issue_numbers: Iterable[int] = (),
|
||||
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||
"""Terminal validation: report issues still carrying ``status:pr-open``.
|
||||
|
||||
An issue with a genuinely open pull request is allowed to keep the label,
|
||||
so *open_pr_issue_numbers* is excluded from the residual set rather than
|
||||
being reported as a leak.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
legitimate: set[int] = set()
|
||||
for num in open_pr_issue_numbers or ():
|
||||
try:
|
||||
legitimate.add(int(num))
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
||||
continue
|
||||
|
||||
checked = 0
|
||||
residual: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
|
||||
exempt: list[int] = []
|
||||
|
||||
for issue in issues or []:
|
||||
checked += 1
|
||||
names = issue_workflow_labels.label_names(issue)
|
||||
if PR_OPEN_LABEL not in names:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
try:
|
||||
number = int(issue.get("number"))
|
||||
except (TypeError, ValueError):
|
||||
number = None
|
||||
if number is not None and number in legitimate:
|
||||
exempt.append(number)
|
||||
continue
|
||||
residual.append(
|
||||
{
|
||||
"number": number,
|
||||
"state": issue.get("state"),
|
||||
"labels": names,
|
||||
}
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
clean = not residual
|
||||
reasons = [
|
||||
(
|
||||
f"issue #{entry['number']} ({entry.get('state') or 'unknown state'}) "
|
||||
f"still carries '{PR_OPEN_LABEL}' with no open PR"
|
||||
)
|
||||
for entry in residual
|
||||
]
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"label": PR_OPEN_LABEL,
|
||||
"clean": clean,
|
||||
"checked_count": checked,
|
||||
"residual_count": len(residual),
|
||||
"residual_issues": residual,
|
||||
"exempt_open_pr_issues": sorted(exempt),
|
||||
"reasons": reasons,
|
||||
"safe_next_action": (
|
||||
""
|
||||
if clean
|
||||
else (
|
||||
"Run gitea_cleanup_terminal_pr_labels with "
|
||||
f"terminal_reason='{RETRY_RECOVERY}' for issues "
|
||||
+ ", ".join(f"#{entry['number']}" for entry in residual)
|
||||
+ " before declaring the terminal transition complete."
|
||||
)
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
+1
-58
@@ -26,14 +26,6 @@ def _reset_mutation_authority(monkeypatch):
|
||||
Pin ``default_state_dir`` / ``DEFAULT_STATE_DIR`` to a per-test temp dir
|
||||
so durable load/save never touches host state even after env clears.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import session_context_binding as session_ctx
|
||||
|
||||
# Each pytest item is an independent logical MCP session. Reset both before
|
||||
# and after the item; the post-yield reset is in a finally block so an
|
||||
# assertion, exception, or unittest teardown failure cannot pollute the
|
||||
# next item. Production code has no automatic per-call reset path.
|
||||
session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
|
||||
|
||||
for env_key in [
|
||||
"GITEA_SESSION_PROFILE_LOCK",
|
||||
"GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE",
|
||||
@@ -66,17 +58,6 @@ def _reset_mutation_authority(monkeypatch):
|
||||
_fallback: str = state_dir,
|
||||
_env_key: str = mcp_session_state.STATE_DIR_ENV,
|
||||
) -> str:
|
||||
# #695 AC2: when production native transport has pinned a session
|
||||
# state root, that pin is authoritative even under test isolation
|
||||
# (PR #701 redirected-state regression).
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import mcp_daemon_guard
|
||||
|
||||
pinned = mcp_daemon_guard.pinned_session_state_dir()
|
||||
if pinned:
|
||||
return pinned
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
raw = (os.environ.get(_env_key) or "").strip()
|
||||
return raw or _fallback
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -88,31 +69,11 @@ def _reset_mutation_authority(monkeypatch):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import mcp_server
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
yield
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
|
||||
_state_tmp.cleanup()
|
||||
yield
|
||||
return
|
||||
import gitea_config
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(gitea_config, "_active_profile_override", None)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_MUTATION_AUTHORITY", None)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_IDENTITY_CACHE", {})
|
||||
# #714: clear both module namespaces. mcp_server.py execs gitea_mcp_server.py
|
||||
# into its own globals, so `import gitea_mcp_server` is a separate module
|
||||
# object with its own identity caches; leaving it dirty leaks login across
|
||||
# tests that import the implementation module directly.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import gitea_mcp_server as _gitea_impl
|
||||
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(_gitea_impl, "_IDENTITY_CACHE", {})
|
||||
if hasattr(_gitea_impl, "_ACTOR_IDENTITY_CACHE"):
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(_gitea_impl, "_ACTOR_IDENTITY_CACHE", {})
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
if hasattr(mcp_server, "_ACTOR_IDENTITY_CACHE"):
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_ACTOR_IDENTITY_CACHE", {})
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_REVIEW_DECISION_LOCK", None)
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_LIVE_NAMESPACE_HEALTH", {})
|
||||
monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_preflight_whoami_called", False)
|
||||
@@ -141,9 +102,7 @@ def _reset_mutation_authority(monkeypatch):
|
||||
capability_stop_terminal.clear()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
try:
|
||||
yield
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import capability_stop_terminal
|
||||
capability_stop_terminal.clear()
|
||||
@@ -158,20 +117,4 @@ def _reset_mutation_authority(monkeypatch):
|
||||
mcp_server._REVIEW_DECISION_LOCK = None
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
|
||||
session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
|
||||
_state_tmp.cleanup()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# #714: deterministic workspace remotes only (no host git dependency).
|
||||
import pytest
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@pytest.fixture(autouse=True)
|
||||
def _deterministic_workspace_remotes():
|
||||
try:
|
||||
from mutation_profile_fixture import install_deterministic_remote_urls
|
||||
install_deterministic_remote_urls()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
yield
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,483 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Centralized config-backed mutation fixture for #714.
|
||||
|
||||
Mutation tests must opt into this helper explicitly. It never grants
|
||||
mutation authority via environment variables alone.
|
||||
|
||||
Design rules:
|
||||
- temporary v2 configuration with non-empty ``allowed_repositories``
|
||||
- profile-scoped operations (not every mutation op for every test)
|
||||
- deterministic workspace remotes (no host Git dependency)
|
||||
- one canonical repository per profile by default
|
||||
- isolated state + cleanup in ``finally``
|
||||
"""
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
from contextlib import contextmanager
|
||||
from copy import deepcopy
|
||||
from typing import Iterable, Sequence
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||||
|
||||
PRGS_SLUG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"
|
||||
PRGS_URL = f"https://gitea.prgs.cc/{PRGS_SLUG}.git"
|
||||
MDCPS_SLUG = "913443/eAgenda"
|
||||
MDCPS_URL = f"https://gitea.dadeschools.net/{MDCPS_SLUG}.git"
|
||||
EXAMPLE_SLUG = "Example-Org/Example-Repo"
|
||||
EXAMPLE_URL = f"https://gitea.example.com/{EXAMPLE_SLUG}.git"
|
||||
TIMESHEET_SLUG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Timesheet"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _author_ops() -> list[str]:
|
||||
return [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.create",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.close",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.create",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.repo.commit",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _author_forbidden() -> list[str]:
|
||||
return [
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.request_changes",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _reviewer_ops() -> list[str]:
|
||||
return [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.comment",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _merger_ops() -> list[str]:
|
||||
return [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.comment",
|
||||
]
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _profile(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
name: str,
|
||||
context: str,
|
||||
role: str,
|
||||
base_url: str,
|
||||
auth_env: str,
|
||||
allowed_operations: Sequence[str],
|
||||
forbidden_operations: Sequence[str],
|
||||
allowed_repositories: Sequence[str],
|
||||
username: str | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
body = {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
"context": context,
|
||||
"role": role,
|
||||
"base_url": base_url,
|
||||
"auth": {"type": "env", "name": auth_env},
|
||||
"allowed_operations": list(allowed_operations),
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": list(forbidden_operations),
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": list(allowed_repositories),
|
||||
"execution_profile": name,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if username:
|
||||
body["username"] = username
|
||||
return body
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_dual_remote_config(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
allowed_operations: Iterable[str] | None = None,
|
||||
allowed_repositories_prgs: Sequence[str] | None = None,
|
||||
allowed_repositories_mdcps: Sequence[str] | None = None,
|
||||
extra_profiles: dict | None = None,
|
||||
include_example_repo: bool = False,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Build a minimal dual-host v2 config.
|
||||
|
||||
Each profile authorizes only its host-canonical repository by default.
|
||||
``include_example_repo`` adds Example-Org/Example-Repo when a test patches
|
||||
REMOTES to that synthetic unit-test identity.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
ops = list(allowed_operations or _author_ops())
|
||||
forb = _author_forbidden()
|
||||
prgs_repos = list(allowed_repositories_prgs or [PRGS_SLUG])
|
||||
mdcps_repos = list(allowed_repositories_mdcps or [MDCPS_SLUG])
|
||||
if include_example_repo:
|
||||
for repos in (prgs_repos, mdcps_repos):
|
||||
if EXAMPLE_SLUG not in repos:
|
||||
repos.append(EXAMPLE_SLUG)
|
||||
|
||||
profiles = {
|
||||
"test-author-prgs": _profile(
|
||||
name="test-author-prgs",
|
||||
context="prgs",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
base_url="https://gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
auth_env="GITEA_TOKEN_TEST",
|
||||
allowed_operations=ops,
|
||||
forbidden_operations=forb,
|
||||
allowed_repositories=prgs_repos,
|
||||
),
|
||||
"test-author-dadeschools": _profile(
|
||||
name="test-author-dadeschools",
|
||||
context="mdcps",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
base_url="https://gitea.dadeschools.net",
|
||||
auth_env="GITEA_TOKEN_TEST",
|
||||
allowed_operations=ops,
|
||||
forbidden_operations=forb,
|
||||
allowed_repositories=mdcps_repos,
|
||||
),
|
||||
"test-reviewer-prgs": _profile(
|
||||
name="test-reviewer-prgs",
|
||||
context="prgs",
|
||||
role="reviewer",
|
||||
base_url="https://gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
auth_env="GITEA_TOKEN_TEST",
|
||||
allowed_operations=_reviewer_ops(),
|
||||
forbidden_operations=[
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.merge",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.create",
|
||||
],
|
||||
allowed_repositories=prgs_repos,
|
||||
),
|
||||
"test-merger-prgs": _profile(
|
||||
name="test-merger-prgs",
|
||||
context="prgs",
|
||||
role="merger",
|
||||
base_url="https://gitea.prgs.cc",
|
||||
auth_env="GITEA_TOKEN_TEST",
|
||||
allowed_operations=_merger_ops(),
|
||||
forbidden_operations=[
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.approve",
|
||||
"gitea.issue.create",
|
||||
],
|
||||
allowed_repositories=prgs_repos,
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if extra_profiles:
|
||||
profiles.update(deepcopy(extra_profiles))
|
||||
|
||||
# Legacy aliases used by older tests — same host scope as the base profile.
|
||||
for alias, base in (
|
||||
("gitea-author", "test-author-prgs"),
|
||||
("author-test", "test-author-dadeschools"),
|
||||
("author", "test-author-dadeschools"),
|
||||
("full-author", "test-author-dadeschools"),
|
||||
("test-author", "test-author-dadeschools"),
|
||||
("prgs-author", "test-author-prgs"),
|
||||
("gitea-reviewer", "test-reviewer-prgs"),
|
||||
("prgs-reviewer", "test-reviewer-prgs"),
|
||||
("gitea-merger", "test-merger-prgs"),
|
||||
("prgs-merger", "test-merger-prgs"),
|
||||
):
|
||||
if alias not in profiles and base in profiles:
|
||||
clone = deepcopy(profiles[base])
|
||||
clone["execution_profile"] = alias
|
||||
profiles[alias] = clone
|
||||
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"version": 2,
|
||||
"rules": {"allow_runtime_switching": True},
|
||||
"contexts": {
|
||||
"prgs": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
"gitea": {"enabled": True, "base_url": "https://gitea.prgs.cc"},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"mdcps": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
"gitea": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
"base_url": "https://gitea.dadeschools.net",
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"profiles": profiles,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def build_v2_config(**kwargs):
|
||||
"""Back-compat alias."""
|
||||
return build_dual_remote_config(
|
||||
allowed_operations=kwargs.get("allowed_operations"),
|
||||
extra_profiles=kwargs.get("extra_profiles"),
|
||||
include_example_repo=bool(kwargs.get("include_example_repo")),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def inject_allowed_repositories(
|
||||
config: dict,
|
||||
repos: Sequence[str],
|
||||
*,
|
||||
profiles: Sequence[str] | None = None,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Return a deep copy of *config* with allowlists set on selected profiles."""
|
||||
out = deepcopy(config)
|
||||
targets = set(profiles) if profiles is not None else set(out.get("profiles") or {})
|
||||
for name, prof in (out.get("profiles") or {}).items():
|
||||
if name in targets:
|
||||
prof["allowed_repositories"] = list(repos)
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def ensure_all_profiles_have_scope(
|
||||
config: dict,
|
||||
default_repos: Sequence[str],
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Add non-empty allowed_repositories to every profile that lacks one."""
|
||||
out = deepcopy(config)
|
||||
for _name, prof in (out.get("profiles") or {}).items():
|
||||
raw = prof.get("allowed_repositories")
|
||||
if not isinstance(raw, (list, tuple)) or not raw:
|
||||
prof["allowed_repositories"] = list(default_repos)
|
||||
return out
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@contextmanager
|
||||
def mutation_profile_env(
|
||||
*,
|
||||
profile_name: str = "test-author-dadeschools",
|
||||
allowed_operations: Iterable[str] | None = None,
|
||||
allowed_repositories: Sequence[str] | None = None,
|
||||
workspace_urls: dict | None = None,
|
||||
clear_env: bool = False,
|
||||
extra_env: dict | None = None,
|
||||
extra_profiles: dict | None = None,
|
||||
include_example_repo: bool = False,
|
||||
config: dict | None = None,
|
||||
):
|
||||
"""Context manager: config-backed mutation authority + deterministic remotes."""
|
||||
import gitea_config
|
||||
import gitea_mcp_server as srv
|
||||
import session_context_binding as session_ctx
|
||||
|
||||
if config is None:
|
||||
prgs_repos = None
|
||||
mdcps_repos = None
|
||||
if allowed_repositories is not None:
|
||||
# Caller-specified single allowlist applied to both host profiles.
|
||||
prgs_repos = list(allowed_repositories)
|
||||
mdcps_repos = list(allowed_repositories)
|
||||
cfg = build_dual_remote_config(
|
||||
allowed_operations=allowed_operations,
|
||||
allowed_repositories_prgs=prgs_repos,
|
||||
allowed_repositories_mdcps=mdcps_repos,
|
||||
extra_profiles=extra_profiles,
|
||||
include_example_repo=include_example_repo,
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
cfg = deepcopy(config)
|
||||
if allowed_repositories is not None:
|
||||
cfg = ensure_all_profiles_have_scope(cfg, list(allowed_repositories))
|
||||
|
||||
urls = (
|
||||
{"prgs": PRGS_URL, "dadeschools": MDCPS_URL}
|
||||
if workspace_urls is None
|
||||
else dict(workspace_urls)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory(prefix="gitea-mut-cfg-")
|
||||
try:
|
||||
cfg_path = os.path.join(tmp.name, "profiles.json")
|
||||
with open(cfg_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
json.dump(cfg, fh)
|
||||
env = {
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": cfg_path,
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": profile_name,
|
||||
"GITEA_TOKEN_TEST": "test-token",
|
||||
"PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST": os.environ.get(
|
||||
"PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST", "mutation_profile_env"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
if extra_env:
|
||||
env.update(extra_env)
|
||||
|
||||
def _remote_url(name: str):
|
||||
if name in urls:
|
||||
return urls[name]
|
||||
# Prefer live REMOTES (tests often patch Example-Org).
|
||||
try:
|
||||
entry = srv.REMOTES.get(name) or {}
|
||||
host = entry.get("host")
|
||||
org = entry.get("org")
|
||||
repo = entry.get("repo")
|
||||
if host and org and repo:
|
||||
if (
|
||||
name == "prgs"
|
||||
and org == "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
|
||||
and repo == "Timesheet"
|
||||
):
|
||||
return PRGS_URL
|
||||
if name == "dadeschools" and repo == "Timesheet":
|
||||
return MDCPS_URL
|
||||
return f"https://{host}/{org}/{repo}.git"
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
|
||||
payload = {
|
||||
"env": env,
|
||||
"config_path": cfg_path,
|
||||
"profile_name": profile_name,
|
||||
"urls": urls,
|
||||
"config": cfg,
|
||||
}
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=clear_env):
|
||||
os.environ.setdefault(
|
||||
"PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST",
|
||||
env.get("PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST", "mutation_profile_env"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
with patch.object(srv, "_local_git_remote_url", side_effect=_remote_url):
|
||||
mcp_srv = None
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import mcp_server as mcp_srv # type: ignore
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
mcp_srv = None
|
||||
if mcp_srv is not None:
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_srv, "_local_git_remote_url", side_effect=_remote_url
|
||||
):
|
||||
yield payload
|
||||
else:
|
||||
yield payload
|
||||
finally:
|
||||
try:
|
||||
session_ctx._reset_session_context_for_testing()
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
|
||||
tmp.cleanup()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Process-lifetime shared config for mass-migrating env-only mutation tests.
|
||||
_SHARED_CFG_PATH = None
|
||||
_SHARED_CFG_DIR = None
|
||||
_SHARED_CFG_WITH_EXAMPLE_PATH = None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def shared_mutation_config_path(*, include_example_repo: bool = False) -> str:
|
||||
"""Write (once) a dual-remote mutation config and return its path."""
|
||||
global _SHARED_CFG_PATH, _SHARED_CFG_DIR, _SHARED_CFG_WITH_EXAMPLE_PATH
|
||||
import atexit
|
||||
import shutil
|
||||
|
||||
if include_example_repo:
|
||||
if _SHARED_CFG_WITH_EXAMPLE_PATH and os.path.isfile(
|
||||
_SHARED_CFG_WITH_EXAMPLE_PATH
|
||||
):
|
||||
return _SHARED_CFG_WITH_EXAMPLE_PATH
|
||||
if _SHARED_CFG_DIR is None:
|
||||
_SHARED_CFG_DIR = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gitea-shared-mut-cfg-")
|
||||
atexit.register(lambda: shutil.rmtree(_SHARED_CFG_DIR, ignore_errors=True))
|
||||
path = os.path.join(_SHARED_CFG_DIR, "profiles-with-example.json")
|
||||
with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
json.dump(build_dual_remote_config(include_example_repo=True), fh)
|
||||
_SHARED_CFG_WITH_EXAMPLE_PATH = path
|
||||
return path
|
||||
|
||||
if _SHARED_CFG_PATH and os.path.isfile(_SHARED_CFG_PATH):
|
||||
return _SHARED_CFG_PATH
|
||||
if _SHARED_CFG_DIR is None:
|
||||
_SHARED_CFG_DIR = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gitea-shared-mut-cfg-")
|
||||
atexit.register(lambda: shutil.rmtree(_SHARED_CFG_DIR, ignore_errors=True))
|
||||
_SHARED_CFG_PATH = os.path.join(_SHARED_CFG_DIR, "profiles.json")
|
||||
with open(_SHARED_CFG_PATH, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
|
||||
json.dump(build_dual_remote_config(), fh)
|
||||
return _SHARED_CFG_PATH
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def shared_mutation_env(
|
||||
profile_name: str = "test-author-dadeschools",
|
||||
*,
|
||||
include_example_repo: bool = False,
|
||||
**extra,
|
||||
) -> dict:
|
||||
"""Env dict for mutation tests: config-backed + optional extras.
|
||||
|
||||
Always carries ``PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST`` so ``patch.dict(..., clear=True)``
|
||||
does not strip the pytest marker and trip the #695 native-transport wall.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
env = {
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": shared_mutation_config_path(
|
||||
include_example_repo=include_example_repo
|
||||
),
|
||||
"GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": profile_name,
|
||||
"GITEA_TOKEN_TEST": "test-token",
|
||||
"PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST": os.environ.get(
|
||||
"PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST", "mutation_profile_env"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
env.update(extra)
|
||||
# Callers must not be able to drop the pytest marker by accident.
|
||||
env.setdefault(
|
||||
"PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST",
|
||||
os.environ.get("PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST", "mutation_profile_env"),
|
||||
)
|
||||
return env
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def install_deterministic_remote_urls() -> None:
|
||||
"""Patch server modules so workspace remotes are deterministic.
|
||||
|
||||
Prefer live ``REMOTES`` entries (so tests that patch Example-Org keep
|
||||
workspace alignment). Map the historical prgs→Timesheet default to
|
||||
Gitea-Tools so session binding matches the control repository under test.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
import gitea_mcp_server as srv
|
||||
|
||||
def _url(name: str):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
entry = srv.REMOTES.get(name) or {}
|
||||
host = entry.get("host")
|
||||
org = entry.get("org")
|
||||
repo = entry.get("repo")
|
||||
if host and org and repo:
|
||||
if (
|
||||
name == "prgs"
|
||||
and org == "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
|
||||
and repo == "Timesheet"
|
||||
):
|
||||
return PRGS_URL
|
||||
if name == "dadeschools" and repo == "Timesheet":
|
||||
# Prefer mdcps eAgenda canonical for dual-config tests.
|
||||
return MDCPS_URL
|
||||
return f"https://{host}/{org}/{repo}.git"
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
if name == "prgs":
|
||||
return PRGS_URL
|
||||
if name == "dadeschools":
|
||||
return MDCPS_URL
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
srv._local_git_remote_url = _url # type: ignore[method-assign]
|
||||
try:
|
||||
import mcp_server as mcp_srv
|
||||
|
||||
mcp_srv._local_git_remote_url = _url # type: ignore[method-assign]
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
pass
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
|
||||
import sys as _sys
|
||||
from pathlib import Path as _Path
|
||||
_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
|
||||
from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env # noqa: E402
|
||||
"""Tests for agent temp artifact detection and preflight warnings (#261)."""
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
@@ -69,9 +65,11 @@ class TestPreflightWarnings(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
# Issue-write tools are profile-gated (#69); gitea_lock_issue requires
|
||||
# gitea.issue.comment (see task_capability_map), so the gate must be
|
||||
# seeded exactly like tests/test_mcp_server.py::TestIssueLocking (#359).
|
||||
ISSUE_WRITE_ENV = shared_mutation_env(
|
||||
"test-author-prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
ISSUE_WRITE_ENV = {
|
||||
"GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": (
|
||||
"gitea.issue.create,gitea.issue.close,gitea.issue.comment"
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestIssueLockArtifactWarning(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,266 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Dependency parsing/resolution and allocator completeness tests (#758).
|
||||
|
||||
Covers the two defects behind #758:
|
||||
|
||||
* Defect 1 — candidate truncation before ranking, which let a result-size
|
||||
parameter change the winner.
|
||||
* Defect 2 — dependency state inferred from body substrings, which emitted
|
||||
canonical ``Depends:`` blocked issues as eligible.
|
||||
|
||||
No production behavior is special-cased for any issue number (#758 AC14), so
|
||||
these tests use synthetic issue numbers throughout.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
|
||||
import allocator_dependencies
|
||||
from allocator_service import (
|
||||
OUTCOME_PREVIEW,
|
||||
SELECTION_POLICY,
|
||||
WorkCandidate,
|
||||
allocate_next_work,
|
||||
classify_skip,
|
||||
sort_candidates,
|
||||
)
|
||||
from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB
|
||||
|
||||
# The canonical linkage line this repository writes into issue bodies.
|
||||
CANONICAL_BODY = (
|
||||
"## Dependencies and linkage\n\n"
|
||||
"* Parent: #900 · Depends: #901, #902 · Related: #903, #904\n"
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class ParseDependencyRefsTest(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_parses_canonical_depends_field(self) -> None:
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
allocator_dependencies.parse_dependency_refs(CANONICAL_BODY),
|
||||
(901, 902),
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_stops_at_sibling_field_and_ignores_related(self) -> None:
|
||||
""""Related:" refs must never be treated as dependencies."""
|
||||
refs = allocator_dependencies.parse_dependency_refs(CANONICAL_BODY)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(903, refs)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(904, refs)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(900, refs) # Parent is not a dependency
|
||||
|
||||
def test_single_reference(self) -> None:
|
||||
body = "* Parent: #10 · Depends: #11 · Related: #12"
|
||||
self.assertEqual(allocator_dependencies.parse_dependency_refs(body), (11,))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_depends_on_spelling_and_and_separator(self) -> None:
|
||||
body = "Depends on #21 and #22\n"
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
allocator_dependencies.parse_dependency_refs(body), (21, 22)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_newline_terminates_declaration(self) -> None:
|
||||
body = "Depends: #31, #32\nRelated: #33\n"
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
allocator_dependencies.parse_dependency_refs(body), (31, 32)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_legacy_blocked_on_marker_still_recognized(self) -> None:
|
||||
body = "This work is blocked on #41 until that lands.\n"
|
||||
self.assertEqual(allocator_dependencies.parse_dependency_refs(body), (41,))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_dependencies_heading_alone_is_not_a_declaration(self) -> None:
|
||||
""""Dependencies and linkage" must not parse as "Depends"."""
|
||||
body = "## Dependencies and linkage\n\n* Related: #51\n"
|
||||
self.assertEqual(allocator_dependencies.parse_dependency_refs(body), ())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_deduplicates_and_preserves_order(self) -> None:
|
||||
body = "Depends: #61, #62, #61\n"
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
allocator_dependencies.parse_dependency_refs(body), (61, 62)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_malformed_and_empty_inputs(self) -> None:
|
||||
for body in ("", None, "Depends:", "Depends: none", "Depends: TBD\n"):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(allocator_dependencies.parse_dependency_refs(body), ())
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class ResolveDependencyStateTest(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_open_dependency_is_unmet(self) -> None:
|
||||
result = allocator_dependencies.resolve_dependency_state(
|
||||
(901, 902), lambda n: "open", subject="issue#644"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["dependency_unmet"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["unmet"], (901, 902))
|
||||
self.assertIn("#901", result["reason"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_closed_dependencies_are_met(self) -> None:
|
||||
result = allocator_dependencies.resolve_dependency_state(
|
||||
(901, 902), lambda n: "closed"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["dependency_unmet"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["met"], (901, 902))
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(result["reason"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_mixed_open_and_closed_is_unmet(self) -> None:
|
||||
states = {901: "closed", 902: "open"}
|
||||
result = allocator_dependencies.resolve_dependency_state(
|
||||
(901, 902), states.get
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["dependency_unmet"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["unmet"], (902,))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["met"], (901,))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unavailable_evidence_fails_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC7: unknown state must block, never pass."""
|
||||
result = allocator_dependencies.resolve_dependency_state(
|
||||
(901,), lambda n: None
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["dependency_unmet"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["unavailable"], (901,))
|
||||
self.assertIn("fail closed", result["reason"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_raising_lookup_fails_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
def boom(_n: int) -> str:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError("lookup exploded")
|
||||
|
||||
result = allocator_dependencies.resolve_dependency_state((901,), boom)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["dependency_unmet"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["unavailable"], (901,))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_no_refs_is_eligible(self) -> None:
|
||||
result = allocator_dependencies.resolve_dependency_state((), lambda n: None)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["dependency_unmet"])
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(result["reason"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class DependencyBlockedCandidateTest(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""A dependency-blocked candidate must be skipped, not selected."""
|
||||
|
||||
def test_classify_skip_rejects_unmet_dependency(self) -> None:
|
||||
candidate = WorkCandidate(
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=644,
|
||||
labels=("status:ready",),
|
||||
priority=20,
|
||||
dependency_unmet=True,
|
||||
dependency_reason="issue#644 depends on unresolved issue(s) #633",
|
||||
)
|
||||
reason = classify_skip(candidate, role="author", terminal_pr=None)
|
||||
self.assertIsNotNone(reason)
|
||||
self.assertIn("#633", reason)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class SelectionInvarianceTest(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""AC1/AC2/AC11: ranking sees everything; result bounds cannot move the winner."""
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self) -> None:
|
||||
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
|
||||
self.db = ControlPlaneDB(os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3"))
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self) -> None:
|
||||
self._tmp.cleanup()
|
||||
|
||||
@staticmethod
|
||||
def _ready_issue(number: int, **kw) -> WorkCandidate:
|
||||
return WorkCandidate(
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=number,
|
||||
labels=("status:ready",),
|
||||
priority=20,
|
||||
title=f"issue {number}",
|
||||
**kw,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def _preview(self, candidates):
|
||||
return allocate_next_work(
|
||||
self.db,
|
||||
session_id="s-758",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
candidates=candidates,
|
||||
apply=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_more_than_fifty_candidates_lowest_number_wins(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""Winner is the oldest eligible issue across a >50 inventory."""
|
||||
candidates = [self._ready_issue(n) for n in range(600, 700)] # 100 items
|
||||
result = self._preview(candidates)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], OUTCOME_PREVIEW)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["selected"]["number"], 600)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_selection_is_invariant_to_candidate_ordering(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""Ranking must not depend on the order the inventory arrived in."""
|
||||
forward = [self._ready_issue(n) for n in range(600, 700)]
|
||||
reverse = list(reversed(forward))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
self._preview(forward)["selected"]["number"],
|
||||
self._preview(reverse)["selected"]["number"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_truncating_inventory_changes_winner(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""Regression guard: this is exactly what pre-ranking slicing did.
|
||||
|
||||
A 50-item slice of a 100-item inventory yields a different winner, so
|
||||
any future reintroduction of pre-ranking truncation is detectable.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
full = [self._ready_issue(n) for n in range(600, 700)]
|
||||
sliced = sorted(full, key=lambda c: -c.number)[:50]
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(
|
||||
self._preview(full)["selected"]["number"],
|
||||
self._preview(sliced)["selected"]["number"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_blocked_first_candidate_falls_through_to_next(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC8: a blocked winner must not end the iteration."""
|
||||
blocked = self._ready_issue(
|
||||
600,
|
||||
dependency_unmet=True,
|
||||
dependency_reason="issue#600 depends on unresolved issue(s) #599",
|
||||
)
|
||||
result = self._preview([blocked, self._ready_issue(601)])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["selected"]["number"], 601)
|
||||
skipped = {s["number"] for s in result["skipped"]}
|
||||
self.assertIn(600, skipped)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_all_blocked_yields_no_safe_work(self) -> None:
|
||||
candidates = [
|
||||
self._ready_issue(
|
||||
n, dependency_unmet=True, dependency_reason=f"issue#{n} blocked"
|
||||
)
|
||||
for n in range(600, 605)
|
||||
]
|
||||
result = self._preview(candidates)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(result["selected"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(result["skipped"]), 5)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_dry_run_and_apply_select_identically(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC9: apply mode must not re-rank differently from preview."""
|
||||
candidates = [self._ready_issue(n) for n in range(600, 700)]
|
||||
preview = self._preview(candidates)
|
||||
applied = allocate_next_work(
|
||||
self.db,
|
||||
session_id="s-758-apply",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
|
||||
repo="Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
candidates=candidates,
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
preview["selected"]["number"], applied["selected"]["number"]
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_sort_is_stable_and_documented(self) -> None:
|
||||
ordered = sort_candidates(
|
||||
[self._ready_issue(603), self._ready_issue(601), self._ready_issue(602)]
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual([c.number for c in ordered], [601, 602, 603])
|
||||
self.assertIn("never affect selection", SELECTION_POLICY)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -1,380 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Allocator ownership exclusion tests (#765).
|
||||
|
||||
One session's active lease must never blockade the author queue for a
|
||||
different controller. Covers: foreign lease skipped, next unclaimed candidate
|
||||
selected, own task resumable, task-local blocker quarantined, all-claimed ->
|
||||
wait, same profile + different controller_instance_id -> different ownership,
|
||||
and claimed candidates reported in skipped results.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
|
||||
from allocator_service import (
|
||||
OUTCOME_OWNERSHIP_DEFECT,
|
||||
OUTCOME_PREVIEW,
|
||||
OUTCOME_WAIT,
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_FOREIGN,
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_OWN,
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_UNKNOWN,
|
||||
SKIP_CLAIMED_BY_OTHER_SESSION,
|
||||
WorkCandidate,
|
||||
allocate_next_work,
|
||||
classify_claim_ownership,
|
||||
resolve_controller_instance_id,
|
||||
)
|
||||
from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB
|
||||
|
||||
REMOTE = "prgs"
|
||||
ORG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
|
||||
REPO = "Gitea-Tools"
|
||||
|
||||
MINE = "ctl-mine-0001"
|
||||
THEIRS = "ctl-theirs-0002"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _issue(number: int, **kwargs) -> WorkCandidate:
|
||||
base = dict(
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=number,
|
||||
state="open",
|
||||
labels=("status:ready", "type:bug"),
|
||||
title=f"issue {number}",
|
||||
priority=20,
|
||||
)
|
||||
base.update(kwargs)
|
||||
return WorkCandidate(**base)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _claim(number: int, *, session_id: str, instance: str | None, kind: str = "issue"):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"lease_id": f"lease-{number}",
|
||||
"session_id": session_id,
|
||||
"controller_instance_id": instance,
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
"profile": "prgs-author",
|
||||
"expires_at": "2026-07-20T07:06:09Z",
|
||||
"work_kind": kind,
|
||||
"work_number": number,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AllocatorOwnershipTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
|
||||
self.addCleanup(self._tmp.cleanup)
|
||||
self.db = ControlPlaneDB(os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3"))
|
||||
|
||||
def _allocate(
|
||||
self,
|
||||
candidates,
|
||||
*,
|
||||
claims,
|
||||
session_id="sess-mine",
|
||||
instance=MINE,
|
||||
apply=False,
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
):
|
||||
return allocate_next_work(
|
||||
self.db,
|
||||
session_id=session_id,
|
||||
role=role,
|
||||
remote=REMOTE,
|
||||
org=ORG,
|
||||
repo=REPO,
|
||||
candidates=candidates,
|
||||
apply=apply,
|
||||
profile_name="prgs-author",
|
||||
controller_instance_id=instance,
|
||||
claims=claims,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestOwnershipClassification(AllocatorOwnershipTestCase):
|
||||
def test_no_claim_returns_none(self):
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(
|
||||
classify_claim_ownership(
|
||||
None, session_id="s", controller_instance_id=MINE
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_same_controller_instance_is_own(self):
|
||||
claim = _claim(1, session_id="other-session", instance=MINE)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
classify_claim_ownership(
|
||||
claim, session_id="sess-mine", controller_instance_id=MINE
|
||||
),
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_OWN,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_same_profile_different_instance_is_foreign(self):
|
||||
"""Shared profile must not imply shared ownership."""
|
||||
claim = _claim(1, session_id="other-session", instance=THEIRS)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
classify_claim_ownership(
|
||||
claim, session_id="sess-mine", controller_instance_id=MINE
|
||||
),
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_FOREIGN,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_exact_session_match_is_own(self):
|
||||
claim = _claim(1, session_id="sess-mine", instance=None)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
classify_claim_ownership(
|
||||
claim, session_id="sess-mine", controller_instance_id=None
|
||||
),
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_OWN,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_legacy_claim_with_neither_side_identified_is_foreign(self):
|
||||
"""No identities anywhere: a different session id is simply not ours."""
|
||||
claim = _claim(1, session_id="someone-else", instance=None)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
classify_claim_ownership(
|
||||
claim, session_id="sess-mine", controller_instance_id=None
|
||||
),
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_FOREIGN,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_claim_identified_but_local_undeclared_is_unknown(self):
|
||||
"""Only one side identified: not comparable, so never adopt."""
|
||||
claim = _claim(1, session_id="someone-else", instance=THEIRS)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
classify_claim_ownership(
|
||||
claim, session_id="sess-mine", controller_instance_id=None
|
||||
),
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_UNKNOWN,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_local_identified_but_claim_undeclared_is_unknown(self):
|
||||
"""A legacy lease may be our own under an old session id; do not guess."""
|
||||
claim = _claim(1, session_id="someone-else", instance=None)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
classify_claim_ownership(
|
||||
claim, session_id="sess-mine", controller_instance_id=MINE
|
||||
),
|
||||
OWNERSHIP_UNKNOWN,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_resolve_controller_instance_id_reads_env(self):
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
resolve_controller_instance_id({"GITEA_CONTROLLER_INSTANCE_ID": MINE}),
|
||||
MINE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(resolve_controller_instance_id({}))
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(
|
||||
resolve_controller_instance_id({"GITEA_CONTROLLER_INSTANCE_ID": " "})
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestForeignLeaseDoesNotBlockade(AllocatorOwnershipTestCase):
|
||||
def test_foreign_claim_skipped_and_next_issue_selected(self):
|
||||
"""Skip the claimed issue, select the next unclaimed one."""
|
||||
candidates = [_issue(607), _issue(615), _issue(617)]
|
||||
claims = {
|
||||
("issue", 607): _claim(607, session_id="sess-theirs", instance=THEIRS)
|
||||
}
|
||||
result = self._allocate(candidates, claims=claims)
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], OUTCOME_PREVIEW)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["selected"]["number"], 615)
|
||||
skipped_607 = [s for s in result["skipped"] if s["number"] == 607]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(skipped_607), 1)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
skipped_607[0]["reason_code"], SKIP_CLAIMED_BY_OTHER_SESSION
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIn(SKIP_CLAIMED_BY_OTHER_SESSION, skipped_607[0]["reason"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_claimed_candidate_appears_in_skipped_inventory(self):
|
||||
"""Skipped reporting must reflect claimed candidates."""
|
||||
candidates = [_issue(607), _issue(615)]
|
||||
claims = {
|
||||
("issue", 607): _claim(607, session_id="sess-theirs", instance=THEIRS)
|
||||
}
|
||||
result = self._allocate(candidates, claims=claims)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(result["skipped"]), 1)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(result["claims_excluded"]), 1)
|
||||
excluded = result["claims_excluded"][0]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(excluded["number"], 607)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(excluded["ownership"], OWNERSHIP_FOREIGN)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(excluded["owner_controller_instance_id"], THEIRS)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_task_local_blocker_does_not_freeze_unrelated_work(self):
|
||||
"""A quarantined task must not stop the rest of the queue."""
|
||||
candidates = [_issue(607), _issue(615), _issue(617)]
|
||||
claims = {
|
||||
("issue", 607): _claim(607, session_id="sess-theirs", instance=THEIRS)
|
||||
}
|
||||
first = self._allocate(candidates, claims=claims)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(first["selected"]["number"], 615)
|
||||
|
||||
# 615 then gets claimed by yet another controller; queue still advances.
|
||||
claims[("issue", 615)] = _claim(
|
||||
615, session_id="sess-third", instance="ctl-third-0003"
|
||||
)
|
||||
second = self._allocate(candidates, claims=claims)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(second["selected"]["number"], 617)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_multiple_controllers_get_different_issues(self):
|
||||
"""Concurrent author sessions work on different issues."""
|
||||
candidates = [_issue(607), _issue(615)]
|
||||
claims = {
|
||||
("issue", 607): _claim(607, session_id="sess-theirs", instance=THEIRS)
|
||||
}
|
||||
mine = self._allocate(candidates, claims=claims, instance=MINE)
|
||||
theirs = self._allocate(
|
||||
candidates, claims=claims, session_id="sess-theirs", instance=THEIRS
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(mine["selected"]["number"], 615)
|
||||
# The other controller may still be handed its own in-progress task.
|
||||
self.assertEqual(theirs["selected"]["number"], 607)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unclaimed_queue_is_unaffected(self):
|
||||
candidates = [_issue(607), _issue(615)]
|
||||
result = self._allocate(candidates, claims={})
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["selected"]["number"], 607)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["skipped"], [])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["claims_excluded"], [])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestOwnTaskResume(AllocatorOwnershipTestCase):
|
||||
def test_controller_may_resume_its_own_active_task(self):
|
||||
"""Own claim stays selectable across a new session id."""
|
||||
candidates = [_issue(607), _issue(615)]
|
||||
claims = {
|
||||
("issue", 607): _claim(607, session_id="sess-mine-old", instance=MINE)
|
||||
}
|
||||
result = self._allocate(
|
||||
candidates, claims=claims, session_id="sess-mine-new", instance=MINE
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["selected"]["number"], 607)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["claims_excluded"], [])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_own_claim_by_exact_session_is_selectable(self):
|
||||
candidates = [_issue(607)]
|
||||
claims = {("issue", 607): _claim(607, session_id="sess-mine", instance=None)}
|
||||
result = self._allocate(
|
||||
candidates, claims=claims, session_id="sess-mine", instance=None
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["selected"]["number"], 607)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestAllCandidatesClaimed(AllocatorOwnershipTestCase):
|
||||
def test_all_claimed_returns_wait_not_a_claimed_selection(self):
|
||||
"""Never hand back a claimed issue; report waiting instead."""
|
||||
candidates = [_issue(607), _issue(615)]
|
||||
claims = {
|
||||
("issue", 607): _claim(607, session_id="sess-a", instance=THEIRS),
|
||||
("issue", 615): _claim(615, session_id="sess-b", instance="ctl-c-0003"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
result = self._allocate(candidates, claims=claims)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(result["selected"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], OUTCOME_WAIT)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(result["claims_excluded"]), 2)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unidentifiable_owner_reports_ownership_defect(self):
|
||||
"""Refuse to adopt when ownership cannot be established."""
|
||||
candidates = [_issue(607)]
|
||||
claims = {("issue", 607): _claim(607, session_id="sess-legacy", instance=None)}
|
||||
result = self._allocate(candidates, claims=claims)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(result["selected"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], OUTCOME_OWNERSHIP_DEFECT)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(result["ownership_defects"]), 1)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
result["ownership_defects"][0]["ownership"], OWNERSHIP_UNKNOWN
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestClaimsFromControlPlaneDb(AllocatorOwnershipTestCase):
|
||||
"""End-to-end against the real substrate, not injected claim dicts."""
|
||||
|
||||
def _seed_lease(self, number: int, *, session_id: str, instance: str | None):
|
||||
self.db.upsert_session(
|
||||
session_id=session_id,
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
profile="prgs-author",
|
||||
pid=4242,
|
||||
controller_instance_id=instance,
|
||||
)
|
||||
return self.db.assign_and_lease(
|
||||
session_id=session_id,
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote=REMOTE,
|
||||
org=ORG,
|
||||
repo=REPO,
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=number,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_controller_instance_id_persists_on_session(self):
|
||||
row = self.db.upsert_session(
|
||||
session_id="sess-x",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
profile="prgs-author",
|
||||
pid=1,
|
||||
controller_instance_id=MINE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(row["controller_instance_id"], MINE)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_heartbeat_without_instance_does_not_erase_ownership(self):
|
||||
self.db.upsert_session(
|
||||
session_id="sess-x",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
profile="prgs-author",
|
||||
pid=1,
|
||||
controller_instance_id=MINE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
row = self.db.upsert_session(
|
||||
session_id="sess-x", role="author", profile="prgs-author", pid=1
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(row["controller_instance_id"], MINE)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_list_active_claims_surfaces_owner_instance(self):
|
||||
self._seed_lease(607, session_id="sess-theirs", instance=THEIRS)
|
||||
claims = self.db.list_active_claims(remote=REMOTE, org=ORG, repo=REPO)
|
||||
self.assertIn(("issue", 607), claims)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(claims[("issue", 607)]["controller_instance_id"], THEIRS)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_live_foreign_lease_is_excluded_without_injected_claims(self):
|
||||
self._seed_lease(607, session_id="sess-theirs", instance=THEIRS)
|
||||
result = allocate_next_work(
|
||||
self.db,
|
||||
session_id="sess-mine",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote=REMOTE,
|
||||
org=ORG,
|
||||
repo=REPO,
|
||||
candidates=[_issue(607), _issue(615)],
|
||||
apply=False,
|
||||
profile_name="prgs-author",
|
||||
controller_instance_id=MINE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["selected"]["number"], 615)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
result["skipped"][0]["reason_code"], SKIP_CLAIMED_BY_OTHER_SESSION
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_apply_reserves_the_unclaimed_issue(self):
|
||||
self._seed_lease(607, session_id="sess-theirs", instance=THEIRS)
|
||||
result = allocate_next_work(
|
||||
self.db,
|
||||
session_id="sess-mine",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote=REMOTE,
|
||||
org=ORG,
|
||||
repo=REPO,
|
||||
candidates=[_issue(607), _issue(615)],
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
profile_name="prgs-author",
|
||||
controller_instance_id=MINE,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "assigned_work")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["selected"]["number"], 615)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["assignment"]["work_number"], 615)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -1,227 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""MCP-level allocator inventory and dependency regressions (#758).
|
||||
|
||||
Exercises ``_allocator_candidates_from_gitea`` and the ``gitea_allocate_next_work``
|
||||
tool end to end against a faked Gitea API, proving:
|
||||
|
||||
* the complete open-issue inventory is ranked (no pre-ranking truncation);
|
||||
* ``limit`` cannot change which candidate wins;
|
||||
* canonical ``Depends:`` declarations are resolved from live issue state;
|
||||
* unavailable dependency evidence fails closed;
|
||||
* an incomplete listing fails closed instead of ranking a partial set.
|
||||
|
||||
Issue numbers here are synthetic; no production number is special-cased.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||||
|
||||
import gitea_mcp_server as srv
|
||||
from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB
|
||||
|
||||
FAKE_AUTH = "token REDACTED"
|
||||
ORG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
|
||||
REPO = "Gitea-Tools"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _issue(number: int, *, body: str = "", labels=("status:ready",)) -> dict:
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"number": number,
|
||||
"title": f"issue {number}",
|
||||
"body": body,
|
||||
"labels": [{"name": name} for name in labels],
|
||||
"state": "open",
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _depends_body(*refs: int) -> str:
|
||||
joined = ", ".join(f"#{r}" for r in refs)
|
||||
return f"## Dependencies and linkage\n\n* Parent: #999 · Depends: {joined}\n"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class _FakeGitea:
|
||||
"""Minimal stand-in for the two Gitea list endpoints plus issue lookups."""
|
||||
|
||||
def __init__(self, issues, *, closed=(), unavailable=(), fail_issue_list=False):
|
||||
self.issues = list(issues)
|
||||
self.closed = set(closed)
|
||||
self.unavailable = set(unavailable)
|
||||
self.fail_issue_list = fail_issue_list
|
||||
self.lookups: list[int] = []
|
||||
|
||||
def api_get_all(self, url, _auth, **_kw):
|
||||
if "/pulls" in url:
|
||||
return []
|
||||
if self.fail_issue_list:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError("issue listing failed")
|
||||
return list(self.issues)
|
||||
|
||||
def api_request(self, _method, url, _auth, **_kw):
|
||||
number = int(url.rsplit("/", 1)[-1])
|
||||
self.lookups.append(number)
|
||||
if number in self.unavailable:
|
||||
raise RuntimeError("lookup failed")
|
||||
if number in self.closed:
|
||||
return {"number": number, "state": "closed"}
|
||||
return {"number": number, "state": "open"}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AllocatorInventoryTest(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""Direct tests of the candidate loader."""
|
||||
|
||||
def _load(self, fake, **kwargs):
|
||||
with patch("gitea_mcp_server._resolve", return_value=("h", ORG, REPO)), patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH
|
||||
), patch("gitea_mcp_server.api_get_all", side_effect=fake.api_get_all), patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=fake.api_request
|
||||
):
|
||||
return srv._allocator_candidates_from_gitea(
|
||||
remote="prgs", host=None, org=ORG, repo=REPO, **kwargs
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_full_inventory_above_fifty_is_ranked(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC1: all 73 open issues become candidates, not the first 50."""
|
||||
fake = _FakeGitea([_issue(n) for n in range(600, 673)])
|
||||
candidates, _reasons, complete = self._load(fake)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(complete)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(candidates), 73)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(min(c.number for c in candidates), 600)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(max(c.number for c in candidates), 672)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_open_dependency_marks_candidate_unmet(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC4/AC5/AC6: canonical Depends on an open issue blocks the candidate."""
|
||||
fake = _FakeGitea(
|
||||
[_issue(600, body=_depends_body(601, 602)), _issue(601), _issue(602)]
|
||||
)
|
||||
candidates, _reasons, _complete = self._load(fake)
|
||||
blocked = next(c for c in candidates if c.number == 600)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(blocked.dependency_unmet)
|
||||
self.assertIn("#601", blocked.dependency_reason)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_closed_dependency_is_eligible(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""A dependency absent from the open list is confirmed closed, not assumed."""
|
||||
fake = _FakeGitea([_issue(600, body=_depends_body(500))], closed={500})
|
||||
candidates, _reasons, _complete = self._load(fake)
|
||||
candidate = next(c for c in candidates if c.number == 600)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(candidate.dependency_unmet)
|
||||
self.assertIn(500, fake.lookups) # proved live, not inferred
|
||||
|
||||
def test_unavailable_dependency_evidence_fails_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC7: an unreachable dependency must block, never pass."""
|
||||
fake = _FakeGitea([_issue(600, body=_depends_body(500))], unavailable={500})
|
||||
candidates, _reasons, _complete = self._load(fake)
|
||||
candidate = next(c for c in candidates if c.number == 600)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(candidate.dependency_unmet)
|
||||
self.assertIn("fail closed", candidate.dependency_reason)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_dependency_state_lookups_are_cached(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""Repeated references resolve with a single live lookup."""
|
||||
fake = _FakeGitea(
|
||||
[_issue(n, body=_depends_body(500)) for n in range(600, 610)],
|
||||
closed={500},
|
||||
)
|
||||
self._load(fake)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(fake.lookups.count(500), 1)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_open_dependency_needs_no_lookup(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""The complete open listing already proves openness."""
|
||||
fake = _FakeGitea([_issue(600, body=_depends_body(601)), _issue(601)])
|
||||
self._load(fake)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(601, fake.lookups)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_failed_issue_listing_reports_incomplete(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC3: a failed listing must not silently yield a short inventory."""
|
||||
fake = _FakeGitea([], fail_issue_list=True)
|
||||
_candidates, reasons, complete = self._load(fake)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(complete)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("failed to list open issues" in r for r in reasons))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AllocateNextWorkToolTest(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""End-to-end tests of the gitea_allocate_next_work MCP tool."""
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self) -> None:
|
||||
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
|
||||
self.db = ControlPlaneDB(os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3"))
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self) -> None:
|
||||
self._tmp.cleanup()
|
||||
|
||||
def _allocate(self, fake, **kwargs):
|
||||
with patch("gitea_mcp_server._profile_operation_gate", return_value=None), patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server._resolve", return_value=("h", ORG, REPO)
|
||||
), patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH), patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server.get_profile",
|
||||
return_value={"profile_name": "prgs-author", "role": "author"},
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server._authenticated_username", return_value="jcwalker3"
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server._control_plane_db_or_error", return_value=(self.db, [])
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server.api_get_all", side_effect=fake.api_get_all
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server.api_request", side_effect=fake.api_request
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server.sentry_observability.monitor_checkin", return_value=None
|
||||
):
|
||||
return srv.gitea_allocate_next_work(
|
||||
remote="prgs", org=ORG, repo=REPO, role="author", **kwargs
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_limit_does_not_change_selection(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC2/AC11: the winner is identical at limit=1 and limit=300."""
|
||||
issues = [_issue(n) for n in range(600, 673)] # 73 candidates
|
||||
low = self._allocate(_FakeGitea(issues), limit=1)
|
||||
high = self._allocate(_FakeGitea(issues), limit=300)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(low["selected"]["number"], high["selected"]["number"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(low["selected"]["number"], 600)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(low["candidate_count"], 73)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(high["candidate_count"], 73)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_dependency_blocked_winner_falls_through(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC8: a blocked highest-ranked issue yields the next eligible one."""
|
||||
issues = [
|
||||
_issue(600, body=_depends_body(601)),
|
||||
_issue(601),
|
||||
_issue(602),
|
||||
]
|
||||
result = self._allocate(_FakeGitea(issues))
|
||||
# 600 is blocked by open 601; 601 itself is a valid candidate.
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["selected"]["number"], 601)
|
||||
skipped = {s["number"] for s in result["skipped"]}
|
||||
self.assertIn(600, skipped)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_limit_truncates_only_the_reported_skip_list(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""A shortened report is labelled, never presented as full coverage."""
|
||||
issues = [_issue(n, body=_depends_body(999)) for n in range(600, 640)]
|
||||
issues.append(_issue(999)) # open dependency blocks all of the above
|
||||
issues.append(_issue(700)) # the one eligible candidate
|
||||
result = self._allocate(_FakeGitea(issues), limit=5)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["skipped_report_truncated"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(result["skipped"]), 5)
|
||||
self.assertGreater(result["skipped_total"], 5)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["limit_applies_to"], "reported_skip_list_only")
|
||||
|
||||
def test_incomplete_inventory_fails_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC3: no selection is made from a partial candidate set."""
|
||||
result = self._allocate(_FakeGitea([], fail_issue_list=True))
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["success"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["inventory_complete"])
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(result["assignment"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
any("fail closed" in r for r in result["reasons"]),
|
||||
result["reasons"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_selection_policy_is_reported(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC10: tie-breaking is stated in the result, not left implicit."""
|
||||
result = self._allocate(_FakeGitea([_issue(600)]))
|
||||
self.assertIn("selection_policy", result)
|
||||
self.assertIn("number asc", result["selection_policy"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -1,349 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Allocator pre-rank exclusions and candidates_json transport (#776).
|
||||
|
||||
Covers:
|
||||
* #617 excluded before ranking (never leased when exclude_issue_numbers=[617]);
|
||||
* excluded top candidate selects the next safe candidate;
|
||||
* all candidates excluded → WAIT, no lease;
|
||||
* decoded-list and JSON-string candidates_json;
|
||||
* malformed / type-invalid fail-closed cases;
|
||||
* dry-run/apply fingerprint match and drift rejection;
|
||||
* foreign lease and same-owner lease on excluded issue;
|
||||
* skipped-accounting reason parity (excluded_by_controller);
|
||||
* public MCP entry-point coverage for exclude_issue_numbers.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import json
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch
|
||||
|
||||
import gitea_mcp_server as srv
|
||||
from allocator_service import (
|
||||
OUTCOME_ASSIGNED,
|
||||
OUTCOME_BLOCKED_EXCLUDED_OWN_LEASE,
|
||||
OUTCOME_CANDIDATE_SET_DRIFT,
|
||||
OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
|
||||
OUTCOME_PREVIEW,
|
||||
OUTCOME_WAIT,
|
||||
SKIP_CLAIMED_BY_OTHER_SESSION,
|
||||
SKIP_EXCLUDED_BY_CONTROLLER,
|
||||
WorkCandidate,
|
||||
allocate_next_work,
|
||||
candidate_from_dict,
|
||||
candidate_set_fingerprint,
|
||||
normalize_candidates_payload,
|
||||
normalize_exclude_issue_numbers,
|
||||
)
|
||||
from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB
|
||||
|
||||
REMOTE = "prgs"
|
||||
ORG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting"
|
||||
REPO = "Gitea-Tools"
|
||||
MINE = "ctl-mine-776"
|
||||
THEIRS = "ctl-theirs-776"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _issue(number: int, **kwargs) -> WorkCandidate:
|
||||
base = dict(
|
||||
kind="issue",
|
||||
number=number,
|
||||
state="open",
|
||||
labels=("status:ready", "type:bug"),
|
||||
title=f"issue {number}",
|
||||
priority=20,
|
||||
)
|
||||
base.update(kwargs)
|
||||
return WorkCandidate(**base)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _claim(number: int, *, session_id: str, instance: str | None, kind: str = "issue"):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"lease_id": f"lease-{number}",
|
||||
"session_id": session_id,
|
||||
"controller_instance_id": instance,
|
||||
"role": "author",
|
||||
"profile": "prgs-author",
|
||||
"expires_at": "2026-07-21T12:00:00Z",
|
||||
"work_kind": kind,
|
||||
"work_number": number,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _cand_dict(number: int, **kwargs) -> dict:
|
||||
d = {
|
||||
"kind": "issue",
|
||||
"number": number,
|
||||
"state": "open",
|
||||
"labels": ["status:ready", "type:bug"],
|
||||
"title": f"issue {number}",
|
||||
"priority": 20,
|
||||
}
|
||||
d.update(kwargs)
|
||||
return d
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AllocatorExcludeServiceTest(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def setUp(self) -> None:
|
||||
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
|
||||
self.addCleanup(self._tmp.cleanup)
|
||||
self.db = ControlPlaneDB(os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3"))
|
||||
|
||||
def _alloc(self, candidates, **kwargs):
|
||||
defaults = dict(
|
||||
session_id="sess-776",
|
||||
role="author",
|
||||
remote=REMOTE,
|
||||
org=ORG,
|
||||
repo=REPO,
|
||||
profile_name="prgs-author",
|
||||
controller_instance_id=MINE,
|
||||
claims={},
|
||||
apply=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
defaults.update(kwargs)
|
||||
return allocate_next_work(self.db, candidates=candidates, **defaults)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_exclude_617_before_ranking_never_selects(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC2/AC8: highest-ranked #617 is removed before ranking."""
|
||||
cands = [_issue(617), _issue(700), _issue(701)]
|
||||
res = self._alloc(cands, exclude_issue_numbers=[617])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_PREVIEW)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 700)
|
||||
skipped = {s["number"]: s for s in res["skipped"]}
|
||||
self.assertIn(617, skipped)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
skipped[617]["reason_code"], SKIP_EXCLUDED_BY_CONTROLLER
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIn(SKIP_EXCLUDED_BY_CONTROLLER, skipped[617]["reason"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_excluded_top_selects_next_safe(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC2: excluding the oldest ready issue promotes the next number."""
|
||||
cands = [_issue(600), _issue(601), _issue(602)]
|
||||
res = self._alloc(cands, exclude_issue_numbers=[600])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 601)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_all_candidates_excluded_wait_no_lease(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC7: every candidate excluded → WAIT, no assignment."""
|
||||
cands = [_issue(617), _issue(700)]
|
||||
res = self._alloc(cands, exclude_issue_numbers=[617, 700], apply=True)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_WAIT)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(res["selected"])
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(res["assignment"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(res["controller_excluded"]), 2)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_omit_exclude_retains_existing_behavior(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC1/AC9: omit exclusions → #617 still wins when oldest ready."""
|
||||
cands = [_issue(617), _issue(700)]
|
||||
res = self._alloc(cands)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 617)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res.get("exclude_issue_numbers"), [])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_foreign_lease_still_skipped(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC6/AC9: foreign claims keep SKIP_CLAIMED_BY_OTHER_SESSION."""
|
||||
cands = [_issue(617), _issue(700)]
|
||||
claims = {
|
||||
("issue", 700): _claim(700, session_id="other", instance=THEIRS),
|
||||
}
|
||||
res = self._alloc(
|
||||
cands, exclude_issue_numbers=[617], claims=claims
|
||||
)
|
||||
# 617 excluded, 700 foreign → wait, no selection
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_WAIT)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(res["selected"])
|
||||
codes = {s["reason_code"] for s in res["skipped"]}
|
||||
self.assertIn(SKIP_EXCLUDED_BY_CONTROLLER, codes)
|
||||
self.assertIn(SKIP_CLAIMED_BY_OTHER_SESSION, codes)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_same_owner_lease_on_excluded_blocks_resume_release(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC5: excluded + live same-owner lease → structured blocker."""
|
||||
cands = [_issue(617), _issue(700)]
|
||||
claims = {
|
||||
("issue", 617): _claim(617, session_id="sess-776", instance=MINE),
|
||||
}
|
||||
res = self._alloc(
|
||||
cands, exclude_issue_numbers=[617], claims=claims, apply=True
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_BLOCKED_EXCLUDED_OWN_LEASE)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(res["assignment"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["blocked_lease"]["number"], 617)
|
||||
self.assertIn("resume", res["blocked_lease"]["safe_next_action"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_dry_run_apply_fingerprint_match(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC4: dry-run and apply share the same fingerprint."""
|
||||
cands = [_issue(617), _issue(700)]
|
||||
dry = self._alloc(cands, exclude_issue_numbers=[617], apply=False)
|
||||
apply_res = self._alloc(
|
||||
cands,
|
||||
exclude_issue_numbers=[617],
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
expected_candidate_set_fingerprint=dry["candidate_set_fingerprint"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
dry["candidate_set_fingerprint"],
|
||||
apply_res["candidate_set_fingerprint"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(apply_res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(apply_res["selected"]["number"], 700)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_apply_rejects_fingerprint_drift(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC4: material candidate-set drift fails closed on apply."""
|
||||
cands = [_issue(617), _issue(700)]
|
||||
res = self._alloc(
|
||||
cands,
|
||||
exclude_issue_numbers=[617],
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
expected_candidate_set_fingerprint="0" * 64,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_CANDIDATE_SET_DRIFT)
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(res["assignment"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_fingerprint_stable_helper(self) -> None:
|
||||
cands = [_issue(700), _issue(617)]
|
||||
a = candidate_set_fingerprint(cands, exclude_issue_numbers=[617])
|
||||
b = candidate_set_fingerprint(
|
||||
list(reversed(cands)), exclude_issue_numbers=[617]
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(a, b)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_normalize_exclude_rejects_bool(self) -> None:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
|
||||
normalize_exclude_issue_numbers([True])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_normalize_exclude_rejects_scalar(self) -> None:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
|
||||
normalize_exclude_issue_numbers(617)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class CandidatesJsonNormalizeTest(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_decoded_list(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC3: already-decoded list from MCP transport."""
|
||||
cands = normalize_candidates_payload([_cand_dict(617), _cand_dict(700)])
|
||||
self.assertEqual([c.number for c in cands], [617, 700])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_json_string(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC3: backward-compatible JSON string."""
|
||||
raw = json.dumps([_cand_dict(617)])
|
||||
cands = normalize_candidates_payload(raw)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(cands[0].number, 617)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_malformed_json_fail_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(ValueError) as ctx:
|
||||
normalize_candidates_payload("{not json")
|
||||
self.assertIn("malformed", str(ctx.exception).lower())
|
||||
|
||||
def test_scalar_fail_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
|
||||
normalize_candidates_payload(42)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_bool_number_fail_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
|
||||
normalize_candidates_payload([_cand_dict(True)]) # type: ignore[arg-type]
|
||||
|
||||
def test_invalid_record_fail_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
|
||||
normalize_candidates_payload(["not-a-dict"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_object_not_list_fail_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
|
||||
normalize_candidates_payload(json.dumps({"number": 1}))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_candidate_from_dict_rejects_bool_number(self) -> None:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
|
||||
candidate_from_dict({"kind": "issue", "number": True})
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class AllocateNextWorkMcpExcludeTest(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""Public MCP entry-point coverage (#776 AC8)."""
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self) -> None:
|
||||
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
|
||||
self.db = ControlPlaneDB(os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3"))
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self) -> None:
|
||||
self._tmp.cleanup()
|
||||
|
||||
def _call(self, **kwargs):
|
||||
with patch("gitea_mcp_server._profile_operation_gate", return_value=None), patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server._resolve", return_value=("h", ORG, REPO)
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server.get_profile",
|
||||
return_value={"profile_name": "prgs-author", "role": "author"},
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server._authenticated_username", return_value="jcwalker3"
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server._control_plane_db_or_error", return_value=(self.db, [])
|
||||
), patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server.sentry_observability.monitor_checkin", return_value=None
|
||||
):
|
||||
return srv.gitea_allocate_next_work(
|
||||
remote="prgs", org=ORG, repo=REPO, role="author", **kwargs
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_mcp_exclude_617_decoded_list_never_selects(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC8: public tool with decoded list + exclude_issue_numbers=[617]."""
|
||||
candidates = [_cand_dict(617), _cand_dict(700)]
|
||||
res = self._call(
|
||||
candidates_json=candidates,
|
||||
exclude_issue_numbers=[617],
|
||||
apply=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res.get("success"), res)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 700)
|
||||
skipped = {s["number"]: s for s in res["skipped"]}
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
skipped[617]["reason_code"], SKIP_EXCLUDED_BY_CONTROLLER
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 617)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_mcp_exclude_617_json_string_apply(self) -> None:
|
||||
"""AC8: JSON-string transport + apply never leases #617."""
|
||||
raw = json.dumps([_cand_dict(617), _cand_dict(700)])
|
||||
res = self._call(
|
||||
candidates_json=raw,
|
||||
exclude_issue_numbers=[617],
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_ASSIGNED)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["assignment"]["work_number"], 700)
|
||||
self.assertNotEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 617)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_mcp_malformed_candidates_json_fail_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
res = self._call(candidates_json="{bad", apply=False)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(res["assignment"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("fail closed" in r for r in res["reasons"]))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_mcp_bool_number_fail_closed(self) -> None:
|
||||
res = self._call(
|
||||
candidates_json=[{"kind": "issue", "number": True, "priority": 20}],
|
||||
apply=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["success"])
|
||||
self.assertIsNone(res["assignment"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_mcp_fingerprint_dry_run_apply_parity(self) -> None:
|
||||
candidates = [_cand_dict(617), _cand_dict(700)]
|
||||
dry = self._call(
|
||||
candidates_json=candidates,
|
||||
exclude_issue_numbers=[617],
|
||||
apply=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
apply_res = self._call(
|
||||
candidates_json=candidates,
|
||||
exclude_issue_numbers=[617],
|
||||
apply=True,
|
||||
expected_candidate_set_fingerprint=dry["candidate_set_fingerprint"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
dry["candidate_set_fingerprint"],
|
||||
apply_res["candidate_set_fingerprint"],
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(apply_res["selected"]["number"], 700)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -79,46 +79,41 @@ class TestApiRequestFailures(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
|
||||
def test_timeout_converted_to_runtimeerror(self, mock_open):
|
||||
mock_open.side_effect = TimeoutError("timed out")
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaNetworkError) as ctx:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
# Fixed message only (#699) — still a RuntimeError subclass.
|
||||
self.assertIsInstance(ctx.exception, RuntimeError)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(str(ctx.exception), "Network error contacting Gitea")
|
||||
self.assertIn("network error contacting Gitea", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
|
||||
def test_dns_network_failure_converted(self, mock_open):
|
||||
mock_open.side_effect = urllib.error.URLError("Name or service not known")
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaNetworkError) as ctx:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(str(ctx.exception), "Network error contacting Gitea")
|
||||
self.assertIn("network error contacting Gitea", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
|
||||
def test_502_upstream_message(self, mock_open):
|
||||
mock_open.side_effect = http_error(502, "bad gateway")
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError) as ctx:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
msg = str(ctx.exception)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(msg, "Gitea upstream unavailable")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.reason_code, "upstream_unavailable")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.http_status, 502)
|
||||
self.assertIn("HTTP 502", msg)
|
||||
self.assertIn("upstream unavailable", msg)
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
|
||||
def test_503_upstream_message(self, mock_open):
|
||||
mock_open.side_effect = http_error(503, "")
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError) as ctx:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(str(ctx.exception), "Gitea upstream unavailable")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(ctx.exception.http_status, 503)
|
||||
self.assertIn("HTTP 503", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
self.assertIn("upstream unavailable", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
|
||||
def test_malformed_error_payload_does_not_crash(self, mock_open):
|
||||
# Non-JSON garbage error body must still yield a clean typed error
|
||||
# with a fixed message (no body echo — #699).
|
||||
# Non-JSON garbage error body must still yield a clean RuntimeError.
|
||||
mock_open.side_effect = http_error(500, "<html>garbage</html>")
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError) as ctx:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(str(ctx.exception), "Gitea HTTP request failed")
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("<html>", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
self.assertIn("HTTP 500", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
|
||||
def test_malformed_success_json_raises_clean_error(self, mock_open):
|
||||
@@ -131,17 +126,16 @@ class TestApiRequestFailures(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_no_secret_leak_in_error_body(self, mock_open):
|
||||
mock_open.side_effect = http_error(
|
||||
400, "failed: token supersecret123 rejected")
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError) as ctx:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
msg = str(ctx.exception)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("supersecret123", msg)
|
||||
# Fixed message — body never appears (stronger than redaction).
|
||||
self.assertEqual(msg, "Gitea HTTP request failed")
|
||||
self.assertIn(gitea_audit.REDACTED, msg)
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
|
||||
def test_auth_header_never_in_error(self, mock_open):
|
||||
mock_open.side_effect = http_error(400, "bad request")
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(gitea_auth.GiteaHttpError) as ctx:
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
self.assertNotIn(FAKE_AUTH, str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
|
||||
import sys as _sys
|
||||
from pathlib import Path as _Path
|
||||
_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
|
||||
from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env # noqa: E402
|
||||
"""Regression tests for gitea_assess_conflict_fix_push structured failures (#519)."""
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
|
||||
+22
-66
@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
|
||||
import sys as _sys
|
||||
from pathlib import Path as _Path
|
||||
_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
|
||||
from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env # noqa: E402
|
||||
"""Tests for Gitea MCP mutating-action audit logging (issue #18).
|
||||
|
||||
Covers the pure audit module (redaction, event building, sink writes) and the
|
||||
@@ -165,23 +161,11 @@ class _AuditWiringBase(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
self._dir.cleanup()
|
||||
|
||||
def _env(self, **extra):
|
||||
# Default: prgs-aligned author with create/close (remote=prgs tests).
|
||||
# Callers override GITEA_MCP_PROFILE for merger/reviewer paths.
|
||||
profile = extra.pop("GITEA_MCP_PROFILE", None) or extra.pop(
|
||||
"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME", None
|
||||
) or "test-author-prgs"
|
||||
env = shared_mutation_env(
|
||||
profile,
|
||||
GITEA_AUDIT_LOG=self.audit_path,
|
||||
GITEA_TOKEN_TEST="test-token",
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Strip legacy env-only authority knobs if callers still pass them;
|
||||
# config-backed profiles own operations and repositories (#714).
|
||||
extra.pop("GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS", None)
|
||||
extra.pop("GITEA_FORBIDDEN_OPERATIONS", None)
|
||||
extra.pop("GITEA_PROFILE_NAME", None)
|
||||
env = {"GITEA_AUDIT_LOG": self.audit_path,
|
||||
"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-author",
|
||||
"GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": (
|
||||
"read,merge,gitea.issue.create,gitea.issue.close")}
|
||||
env.update(extra)
|
||||
env["GITEA_MCP_PROFILE"] = profile
|
||||
return env
|
||||
|
||||
def _records(self):
|
||||
@@ -212,7 +196,7 @@ class TestSimpleToolAudit(_AuditWiringBase):
|
||||
rec = recs[0]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rec["action"], "create_issue")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rec["result"], "succeeded")
|
||||
self.assertIn(rec["profile_name"], ("gitea-author", "test-author-prgs", "prgs-author"))
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rec["profile_name"], "gitea-author")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rec["authenticated_username"], "author-bot")
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rec["issue_number"], 11)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(rec["request_metadata"]["title"], "Add thing")
|
||||
@@ -238,17 +222,7 @@ class TestSimpleToolAudit(_AuditWiringBase):
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.api_request")
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
def test_close_issue_audited(self, _auth, mock_api):
|
||||
# Keyed rather than positional: closing an issue also reads its labels
|
||||
# before and after the state change for the #780 terminal cleanup and
|
||||
# its read-after-write check, so call order is not a fixed sequence.
|
||||
def api(method, url, auth, payload=None):
|
||||
if method == "PATCH":
|
||||
return {"state": "closed"}
|
||||
if "/issues/" in url:
|
||||
return {"number": 42, "labels": []}
|
||||
return {"login": "mgr-bot"}
|
||||
|
||||
mock_api.side_effect = api
|
||||
mock_api.side_effect = [{"state": "closed"}, {"login": "mgr-bot"}]
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env(), clear=True):
|
||||
gitea_close_issue(issue_number=42, remote="prgs")
|
||||
recs = self._records()
|
||||
@@ -265,11 +239,10 @@ class TestSimpleToolAudit(_AuditWiringBase):
|
||||
def test_disabled_writes_nothing_and_no_extra_call(self, _auth, _get_all, mock_api, _role):
|
||||
# No GITEA_AUDIT_LOG -> audit is a no-op: one create POST, no file.
|
||||
mock_api.return_value = {"number": 1, "html_url": "http://x/1"}
|
||||
with patch.dict(
|
||||
os.environ,
|
||||
shared_mutation_env("test-author-prgs"),
|
||||
clear=True,
|
||||
):
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, {
|
||||
"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-author",
|
||||
"GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "gitea.issue.create",
|
||||
}, clear=True):
|
||||
gitea_create_issue(title="x", remote="prgs")
|
||||
issue_posts = [
|
||||
c for c in mock_api.call_args_list if c.args[0] == "POST"
|
||||
@@ -356,20 +329,17 @@ class TestGatedToolAudit(_AuditWiringBase):
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.api_request")
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
def test_merge_success_audited(self, _auth, mock_api):
|
||||
# user, pr, eligibility feedback pr+reviews (#695), gate-7 feedback
|
||||
# pr+reviews, merge POST, readback.
|
||||
approval = [{
|
||||
"id": 1, "user": {"login": "reviewer-bot"}, "state": "APPROVED",
|
||||
"commit_id": "abc123", "submitted_at": "2026-07-06T10:00:00Z",
|
||||
"dismissed": False,
|
||||
}]
|
||||
# user, pr, feedback pr+reviews, merge POST, readback.
|
||||
mock_api.side_effect = [
|
||||
{"login": "merger-bot"}, self._pr("author-bot"),
|
||||
self._pr("author-bot"), approval, # eligibility merge feedback
|
||||
self._pr("author-bot"), approval, # gate 7 feedback
|
||||
self._pr("author-bot"),
|
||||
[{"id": 1, "user": {"login": "reviewer-bot"}, "state": "APPROVED",
|
||||
"commit_id": "abc123", "submitted_at": "2026-07-06T10:00:00Z",
|
||||
"dismissed": False}],
|
||||
{}, {"merged_commit_sha": "c1"},
|
||||
]
|
||||
env = self._env(GITEA_MCP_PROFILE="test-merger-prgs")
|
||||
env = self._env(GITEA_PROFILE_NAME="gitea-merger",
|
||||
GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS="read,merge")
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_load_review_workflow()
|
||||
r = gitea_merge_pr(pr_number=8, confirmation="MERGE PR 8",
|
||||
@@ -388,7 +358,8 @@ class TestGatedToolAudit(_AuditWiringBase):
|
||||
def test_merge_blocked_audited(self, _auth, mock_api):
|
||||
# Self-author merge is blocked; must still be recorded as blocked.
|
||||
mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "jcwalker3"}, self._pr("jcwalker3")]
|
||||
env = self._env(GITEA_MCP_PROFILE="test-merger-prgs")
|
||||
env = self._env(GITEA_PROFILE_NAME="gitea-merger",
|
||||
GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS="read,merge")
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_load_review_workflow()
|
||||
r = gitea_merge_pr(pr_number=8, confirmation="MERGE PR 8", remote="prgs")
|
||||
@@ -410,23 +381,11 @@ class TestGatedToolAudit(_AuditWiringBase):
|
||||
[{"id": 7, "user": {"login": "reviewer-bot"}, "state": "APPROVED",
|
||||
"submitted_at": "2026-07-06T10:00:00Z", "dismissed": False}],
|
||||
]
|
||||
env = self._env(GITEA_MCP_PROFILE="test-reviewer-prgs")
|
||||
env = self._env(GITEA_PROFILE_NAME="gitea-reviewer",
|
||||
GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS="read,review,approve")
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
|
||||
import session_context_binding as _sc
|
||||
from tests.test_mcp_server import (
|
||||
_init_reviewer_session,
|
||||
_install_owned_reviewer_lease,
|
||||
)
|
||||
from mcp_server import gitea_mark_final_review_decision
|
||||
|
||||
# Rebind after profile env is applied so durable session state
|
||||
# matches the active reviewer profile (#714 / #695).
|
||||
_sc._reset_session_context_for_testing()
|
||||
_init_reviewer_session("prgs")
|
||||
lease = _install_owned_reviewer_lease(8)
|
||||
lease.start()
|
||||
self.addCleanup(lease.stop)
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_load_review_workflow()
|
||||
gitea_mark_final_review_decision(
|
||||
8, "approve", expected_head_sha="abc123", remote="prgs",
|
||||
)
|
||||
@@ -435,10 +394,7 @@ class TestGatedToolAudit(_AuditWiringBase):
|
||||
body="LGTM", remote="prgs",
|
||||
final_review_decision_ready=True,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
r["performed"],
|
||||
msg=f"submit_pr_review blocked: {r}",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(r["performed"])
|
||||
recs = self._records()
|
||||
self.assertEqual(len(recs), 1)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(recs[0]["action"], "submit_pr_review")
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -26,15 +26,8 @@ from review_proofs import assess_audit_reconciliation_report as proofs_assess
|
||||
from task_capability_map import required_permission, required_role
|
||||
|
||||
DELETE_PROFILE = {
|
||||
# #729: delete_branch is reconciler-owned.
|
||||
"profile_name": "prgs-reconciler-delete",
|
||||
"role": "reconciler",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": [
|
||||
"gitea.read",
|
||||
"gitea.pr.create",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
"gitea.branch.delete",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"profile_name": "prgs-author-delete",
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.branch.delete"],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [],
|
||||
"audit_label": "prgs-author-delete",
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -239,7 +232,7 @@ class TestMcpGates(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.get_profile", return_value=DELETE_PROFILE)
|
||||
def test_delete_branch_blocked_in_audit_phase(self, _profile):
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check("whoami")
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role="reconciler")
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role="author")
|
||||
result = mcp_server.gitea_delete_branch(branch="feat/dup", remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertFalse(result["success"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(result["audit_phase"], PHASE_AUDIT)
|
||||
@@ -279,7 +272,7 @@ class TestMcpGates(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
after_state="gone",
|
||||
)
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check("whoami")
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role="reconciler")
|
||||
mcp_server.record_preflight_check("capability", resolved_role="author")
|
||||
self.mock_api.return_value = {}
|
||||
result = mcp_server.gitea_delete_branch(branch="feat/dup", remote="prgs")
|
||||
self.assertTrue(result["success"])
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -79,18 +79,10 @@ class TestPreflightIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called = True
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_capability_called = True
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_resolved_role = "author"
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_resolved_task = None
|
||||
control_root = "/repo/Gitea-Tools"
|
||||
with mock.patch.object(mcp_server, "PROJECT_ROOT", control_root):
|
||||
with mock.patch.object(mcp_server, "_enforce_root_checkout_guard"):
|
||||
with mock.patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server._session_author_lock_worktree",
|
||||
return_value=None,
|
||||
):
|
||||
with mock.patch(
|
||||
"gitea_auth.get_profile",
|
||||
return_value={"profile_name": "gitea-author"},
|
||||
):
|
||||
with mock.patch("gitea_auth.get_profile", return_value={"profile_name": "gitea-author"}):
|
||||
with mock.patch.dict(
|
||||
"os.environ",
|
||||
{"GITEA_TEST_PORCELAIN": ""},
|
||||
@@ -98,14 +90,7 @@ class TestPreflightIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
):
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity()
|
||||
blob = str(ctx.exception)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
"Branches-only mutation guard" in blob
|
||||
or "control checkout" in blob
|
||||
or "author worktree" in blob.lower()
|
||||
or "#618" in blob,
|
||||
msg=blob,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIn("Branches-only mutation guard", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_verify_preflight_allows_branches_worktree(self):
|
||||
import mcp_server
|
||||
@@ -113,40 +98,8 @@ class TestPreflightIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called = True
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_capability_called = True
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_resolved_role = "author"
|
||||
mcp_server._preflight_resolved_task = None
|
||||
worktree = "/repo/Gitea-Tools/branches/issue-274"
|
||||
healthy_ctx = {
|
||||
"workspace_path": worktree,
|
||||
"workspace_binding_source": "worktree_path argument",
|
||||
"workspace_role_kind": "author",
|
||||
"ignored_bindings": [],
|
||||
"process_project_root": "/repo/Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
"canonical_repo_root": "/repo/Gitea-Tools",
|
||||
"roots_aligned": True,
|
||||
"bound_worktree_missing": False,
|
||||
"author_worktree_block": False,
|
||||
"author_worktree_reasons": [],
|
||||
"author_worktree_resolution": {
|
||||
"proven": True,
|
||||
"block": False,
|
||||
"bound_worktree_missing": False,
|
||||
"workspace_path": worktree,
|
||||
"workspace_binding_source": "worktree_path argument",
|
||||
"reasons": [],
|
||||
},
|
||||
"path_exists": True,
|
||||
"in_git_worktree_list": True,
|
||||
"inspected_git_root": worktree,
|
||||
}
|
||||
with mock.patch.object(mcp_server, "_enforce_root_checkout_guard"):
|
||||
with mock.patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server, "_session_author_lock_worktree", return_value=None
|
||||
):
|
||||
with mock.patch.object(
|
||||
mcp_server,
|
||||
"_resolve_namespace_mutation_context",
|
||||
return_value=healthy_ctx,
|
||||
):
|
||||
with mock.patch.dict(
|
||||
"os.environ",
|
||||
{"GITEA_TEST_PORCELAIN": ""},
|
||||
|
||||
+21
-1106
File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
@@ -94,7 +94,6 @@ REVIEW_STATUS: approved / approval_at_current_head
|
||||
MERGE_READY: true
|
||||
BLOCKERS: none
|
||||
VALIDATION: pytest passed; reviewer approved at head {FULL_SHA}
|
||||
NATIVE_REVIEW_PROOF: transport=native_mcp; entrypoint=mcp_server; token_fingerprint=testharmless
|
||||
LAST_UPDATED_BY: prgs-reviewer
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ CONFIG = {
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.repo.commit"],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": ["gitea.pr.create"],
|
||||
"execution_profile": "commit-author",
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
"pr-only-author": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
@@ -40,7 +39,6 @@ CONFIG = {
|
||||
"allowed_operations": ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.create"],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": ["gitea.repo.commit"],
|
||||
"execution_profile": "pr-only-author",
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
"reviewer-profile": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
@@ -53,7 +51,6 @@ CONFIG = {
|
||||
"gitea.repo.commit", "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"execution_profile": "reviewer-profile",
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"rules": {"allow_runtime_switching": False},
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ CONFIG = {
|
||||
],
|
||||
"forbidden_operations": [],
|
||||
"execution_profile": "full-author",
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
"reviewer-no-commit": {
|
||||
"enabled": True,
|
||||
@@ -50,7 +49,6 @@ CONFIG = {
|
||||
"gitea.repo.commit", "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"
|
||||
],
|
||||
"execution_profile": "reviewer-no-commit",
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
"rules": {"allow_runtime_switching": False},
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ CONFIG = {
|
||||
"gitea.pr.review",
|
||||
],
|
||||
"execution_profile": "full-author",
|
||||
"allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -228,7 +227,6 @@ class TestCommitPayloads(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.api_request")
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
|
||||
def test_commit_files_traversal_blocked(self, _auth, mock_api):
|
||||
mock_api.return_value = {"login": "author-user"}
|
||||
# Remove active lock file to ensure it fails on traversal/invalid locks
|
||||
os.remove(self.lock_file_path)
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -250,7 +248,6 @@ class TestCommitPayloads(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.api_request")
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
|
||||
def test_commit_files_outside_scope_blocked(self, _auth, mock_api):
|
||||
mock_api.return_value = {"login": "author-user"}
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("full-author"), clear=True):
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(ValueError) as ctx:
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_commit_files(
|
||||
@@ -269,7 +266,6 @@ class TestCommitPayloads(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.api_request")
|
||||
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token author-pass")
|
||||
def test_commit_files_multiple_sources_blocked(self, _auth, mock_api):
|
||||
mock_api.return_value = {"login": "author-user"}
|
||||
with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("full-author"), clear=True):
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(ValueError) as ctx:
|
||||
mcp_server.gitea_commit_files(
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,7 +1,3 @@
|
||||
import sys as _sys
|
||||
from pathlib import Path as _Path
|
||||
_sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
|
||||
from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env # noqa: E402
|
||||
"""Tests for canonical JSON runtime-profile configuration (gitea_config) and
|
||||
its integration into gitea_auth.get_profile / get_auth_header.
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
|
||||
import os
|
||||
"""Tests for create_issue.py.
|
||||
|
||||
Every test mocks auth functions so no real network calls or keychain
|
||||
@@ -13,7 +12,7 @@ import sys
|
||||
import tempfile
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
import contextlib
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock, patch
|
||||
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
|
||||
|
||||
# The module under test lives in the repo root, not a package.
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
|
||||
@@ -93,26 +92,6 @@ class TestRemoteResolution(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
@unittest.skipIf(_SKIP, _REASON)
|
||||
class TestAPIPayload(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""#714: omitted --org/--repo uses workspace-bound repo (Gitea-Tools),
|
||||
not the historical REMOTES Timesheet default. Intentional security-policy
|
||||
migration of legacy omitted-target assertions.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
self._ws_env = patch.dict(
|
||||
os.environ,
|
||||
{
|
||||
"GITEA_TEST_WORKSPACE_REMOTE_URL": (
|
||||
"https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools.git"
|
||||
)
|
||||
},
|
||||
clear=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self._ws_env.start()
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
self._ws_env.stop()
|
||||
|
||||
"""Ensure the JSON payload sent to Gitea is correct."""
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("create_issue.get_credentials", return_value=FAKE_CREDS)
|
||||
@@ -163,7 +142,7 @@ class TestAPIPayload(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
url = mock_api.call_args[0][1]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
url,
|
||||
"https://gitea.prgs.cc/api/v1/repos/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues",
|
||||
"https://gitea.prgs.cc/api/v1/repos/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Timesheet/issues",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,367 +0,0 @@
|
||||
"""Regression tests for create_issue bootstrap (#749).
|
||||
|
||||
TDD: these tests define the sanctioned first-mutation path for
|
||||
``gitea_create_issue`` from a clean canonical control checkout, and prove
|
||||
the exemption cannot widen to dirty roots, foreign clones, arbitrary
|
||||
``branches/`` directories, or post-creation author mutations.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||
|
||||
import os
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
from pathlib import Path
|
||||
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
|
||||
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
|
||||
|
||||
import create_issue_bootstrap as cib # noqa: E402
|
||||
import gitea_mcp_server as srv # noqa: E402
|
||||
import workflow_scope_guard as wsg # noqa: E402
|
||||
|
||||
FAKE_AUTH = {"Authorization": "token test-token"}
|
||||
MASTER_SHA = "a" * 40
|
||||
STALE_SHA = "b" * 40
|
||||
|
||||
current_file_path = Path(__file__).resolve()
|
||||
if "branches" in current_file_path.parts:
|
||||
CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT = str(current_file_path.parents[3])
|
||||
else:
|
||||
CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT = str(current_file_path.parents[1])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestCreateIssueBootstrapAssessor(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
ROOT = "/repo/Gitea-Tools"
|
||||
|
||||
def test_non_create_issue_task_not_applicable(self):
|
||||
res = cib.assess_create_issue_bootstrap(
|
||||
workspace_path=self.ROOT,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=self.ROOT,
|
||||
current_branch="master",
|
||||
head_sha=MASTER_SHA,
|
||||
porcelain_status="",
|
||||
remote_master_sha=MASTER_SHA,
|
||||
task="lock_issue",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["not_applicable"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["block"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_branches_worktree_not_applicable(self):
|
||||
res = cib.assess_create_issue_bootstrap(
|
||||
workspace_path=f"{self.ROOT}/branches/issue-1-x",
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=self.ROOT,
|
||||
current_branch="fix/issue-1-x",
|
||||
task="create_issue",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["not_applicable"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_clean_control_checkout_allowed(self):
|
||||
res = cib.assess_create_issue_bootstrap(
|
||||
workspace_path=self.ROOT,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=self.ROOT,
|
||||
current_branch="master",
|
||||
head_sha=MASTER_SHA,
|
||||
porcelain_status="",
|
||||
remote_master_sha=MASTER_SHA,
|
||||
task="create_issue",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["not_applicable"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["block"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["bootstrap_path"], "clean_canonical_control_checkout")
|
||||
# Post-create next action must name issue-backed worktree after N exists.
|
||||
self.assertIn("branches/issue-<N>-*", res["exact_next_action"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_tool_alias_gitea_create_issue_allowed(self):
|
||||
res = cib.assess_create_issue_bootstrap(
|
||||
workspace_path=self.ROOT,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=self.ROOT,
|
||||
current_branch="main",
|
||||
head_sha=MASTER_SHA,
|
||||
porcelain_status="",
|
||||
remote_master_sha=MASTER_SHA,
|
||||
task="gitea_create_issue",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_dirty_control_checkout_blocked(self):
|
||||
res = cib.assess_create_issue_bootstrap(
|
||||
workspace_path=self.ROOT,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=self.ROOT,
|
||||
current_branch="master",
|
||||
head_sha=MASTER_SHA,
|
||||
porcelain_status=" M gitea_mcp_server.py\n",
|
||||
remote_master_sha=MASTER_SHA,
|
||||
task="create_issue",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["block"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["allowed"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("tracked local edits" in r for r in res["reasons"]))
|
||||
# Pre-issue phase: next action must be satisfiable without inventing <N>.
|
||||
next_a = res["exact_next_action"] or ""
|
||||
self.assertIn("clean accepted base branch", next_a)
|
||||
self.assertIn("before the issue exists", next_a)
|
||||
# Must not prescribe "bind branches/issue-<N>" as the recovery step.
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("Bind an issue-backed worktree", next_a)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_stale_base_blocked(self):
|
||||
res = cib.assess_create_issue_bootstrap(
|
||||
workspace_path=self.ROOT,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=self.ROOT,
|
||||
current_branch="master",
|
||||
head_sha=STALE_SHA,
|
||||
porcelain_status="",
|
||||
remote_master_sha=MASTER_SHA,
|
||||
task="create_issue",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["block"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("live master" in r for r in res["reasons"]))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_non_base_branch_blocked(self):
|
||||
res = cib.assess_create_issue_bootstrap(
|
||||
workspace_path=self.ROOT,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=self.ROOT,
|
||||
current_branch="feat/something",
|
||||
head_sha=MASTER_SHA,
|
||||
porcelain_status="",
|
||||
remote_master_sha=MASTER_SHA,
|
||||
task="create_issue",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["block"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_detached_head_blocked(self):
|
||||
res = cib.assess_create_issue_bootstrap(
|
||||
workspace_path=self.ROOT,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=self.ROOT,
|
||||
current_branch="",
|
||||
head_sha=MASTER_SHA,
|
||||
porcelain_status="",
|
||||
remote_master_sha=MASTER_SHA,
|
||||
task="create_issue",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["block"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("detached" in r for r in res["reasons"]))
|
||||
|
||||
def test_foreign_workspace_blocked(self):
|
||||
res = cib.assess_create_issue_bootstrap(
|
||||
workspace_path="/other/clone",
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=self.ROOT,
|
||||
current_branch="master",
|
||||
head_sha=MASTER_SHA,
|
||||
porcelain_status="",
|
||||
remote_master_sha=MASTER_SHA,
|
||||
task="create_issue",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["block"])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(any("canonical control checkout" in r for r in res["reasons"]))
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestCreateIssueBootstrapIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
srv._preflight_whoami_called = True
|
||||
srv._preflight_capability_called = True
|
||||
srv._preflight_resolved_role = "author"
|
||||
srv._preflight_resolved_task = "create_issue"
|
||||
srv._preflight_whoami_violation = False
|
||||
srv._preflight_capability_violation = False
|
||||
self._orig_in_test = srv._preflight_in_test_mode
|
||||
srv._preflight_in_test_mode = lambda: False
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
srv._preflight_in_test_mode = self._orig_in_test
|
||||
srv._preflight_resolved_task = None
|
||||
|
||||
def _git_state(self, branch="master", head=MASTER_SHA, porcelain=""):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"current_branch": branch,
|
||||
"head_sha": head,
|
||||
"porcelain_status": porcelain,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._profile_permission_block", return_value=None)
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._namespace_mutation_block", return_value=None)
|
||||
@patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server.role_session_router.check_author_mutation_after_reviewer_stop",
|
||||
return_value=(True, []),
|
||||
)
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server.api_request")
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=[])
|
||||
@patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server.root_checkout_guard.resolve_remote_master_sha",
|
||||
return_value=MASTER_SHA,
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_clean_control_checkout_create_issue_succeeds(
|
||||
self, _remote_sha, _get_all, mock_api, _role, _ns, _prof, _auth
|
||||
):
|
||||
mock_api.return_value = {
|
||||
"number": 99,
|
||||
"html_url": "https://gitea.example.com/issues/99",
|
||||
}
|
||||
with patch.object(srv, "PROJECT_ROOT", CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT):
|
||||
with patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server.issue_lock_worktree.read_worktree_git_state",
|
||||
return_value=self._git_state(),
|
||||
):
|
||||
with patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server._get_workspace_porcelain", return_value=""
|
||||
):
|
||||
with patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server._enforce_root_checkout_guard"
|
||||
):
|
||||
# Anti-stomp / master parity: keep gates green.
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
srv,
|
||||
"_run_anti_stomp_preflight",
|
||||
return_value=None,
|
||||
):
|
||||
res = srv.gitea_create_issue(
|
||||
title="Bootstrap issue from clean control",
|
||||
body="Body text for content gate.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res.get("number"), 99)
|
||||
mock_api.assert_called_once()
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._profile_permission_block", return_value=None)
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._namespace_mutation_block", return_value=None)
|
||||
@patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server.role_session_router.check_author_mutation_after_reviewer_stop",
|
||||
return_value=(True, []),
|
||||
)
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server.api_request")
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=[])
|
||||
def test_dirty_control_checkout_create_issue_fails_closed(
|
||||
self, _get_all, mock_api, _role, _ns, _prof, _auth
|
||||
):
|
||||
with patch.object(srv, "PROJECT_ROOT", CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT):
|
||||
with patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server.issue_lock_worktree.read_worktree_git_state",
|
||||
return_value=self._git_state(
|
||||
porcelain=" M author_mutation_worktree.py\n"
|
||||
),
|
||||
):
|
||||
with patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server._get_workspace_porcelain",
|
||||
return_value=" M author_mutation_worktree.py\n",
|
||||
):
|
||||
res = srv.gitea_create_issue(
|
||||
title="Should fail on dirty root",
|
||||
body="Body text for content gate.",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res.get("success", True) and res.get("number"))
|
||||
if isinstance(res, dict) and res.get("success") is False:
|
||||
blob = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
"tracked local edits" in blob
|
||||
or "dirty" in blob.lower()
|
||||
or "control checkout" in blob.lower()
|
||||
or res.get("blocker_kind")
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Pre-issue phase must not demand issue-<N> worktree.
|
||||
next_a = res.get("exact_next_action") or ""
|
||||
if next_a:
|
||||
self.assertNotIn("issue-<N>-*", next_a)
|
||||
mock_api.assert_not_called()
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._profile_permission_block", return_value=None)
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._namespace_mutation_block", return_value=None)
|
||||
@patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server.role_session_router.check_author_mutation_after_reviewer_stop",
|
||||
return_value=(True, []),
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_lock_issue_still_requires_branches_worktree(self, _role, _ns, _prof, _auth):
|
||||
"""Existing issue-backed mutations receive no exemption (#749 AC3/AC7)."""
|
||||
srv._preflight_resolved_task = "lock_issue"
|
||||
with patch.object(srv, "PROJECT_ROOT", CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT):
|
||||
with patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server.issue_lock_worktree.read_worktree_git_state",
|
||||
return_value=self._git_state(),
|
||||
):
|
||||
with patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server._get_workspace_porcelain", return_value=""
|
||||
):
|
||||
with patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server.root_checkout_guard.resolve_remote_master_sha",
|
||||
return_value=MASTER_SHA,
|
||||
):
|
||||
with patch.object(
|
||||
srv, "_enforce_root_checkout_guard"
|
||||
):
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
srv.verify_preflight_purity(
|
||||
remote="prgs",
|
||||
task="lock_issue",
|
||||
)
|
||||
msg = str(ctx.exception)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
"Branches-only mutation guard" in msg
|
||||
or "stable control checkout" in msg,
|
||||
msg,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertIn("control checkout", msg)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_workflow_scope_skips_missing_worktree_for_create_issue_clean_root(self):
|
||||
"""#683 root assessor must not block clean-root create_issue bootstrap."""
|
||||
res = wsg.assess_root_source_mutation(
|
||||
workspace_path=CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT,
|
||||
porcelain_status="",
|
||||
role_kind="author",
|
||||
mutation_task="create_issue",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["block"], res)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res.get("create_issue_bootstrap") or res["proven"])
|
||||
|
||||
def test_workflow_scope_still_blocks_clean_root_for_lock_issue(self):
|
||||
res = wsg.assess_root_source_mutation(
|
||||
workspace_path=CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT,
|
||||
porcelain_status="",
|
||||
role_kind="author",
|
||||
mutation_task="lock_issue",
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["block"])
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res["blocker_kind"], wsg.BLOCKER_MISSING_WORKTREE)
|
||||
|
||||
def test_arbitrary_branches_directory_not_bootstrap(self):
|
||||
"""#713: mkdir fake under branches/ is not the bootstrap path."""
|
||||
fake = os.path.join(CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT, "branches", "fake-mkdir-only")
|
||||
res = cib.assess_create_issue_bootstrap(
|
||||
workspace_path=fake,
|
||||
canonical_repo_root=CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT,
|
||||
current_branch="master",
|
||||
head_sha=MASTER_SHA,
|
||||
porcelain_status="",
|
||||
remote_master_sha=MASTER_SHA,
|
||||
task="create_issue",
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Under branches/ → not bootstrap; ordinary membership/registration applies.
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res["not_applicable"])
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res["allowed"])
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
class TestCreateIssueCapabilityAgreement(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
def test_map_and_alias_agree_on_create_issue(self):
|
||||
import task_capability_map as tcm
|
||||
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
tcm.required_permission("create_issue"),
|
||||
"gitea.issue.create",
|
||||
)
|
||||
# Tool alias must resolve to the same task contract.
|
||||
alias = getattr(tcm, "TOOL_TASK_ALIASES", None) or getattr(
|
||||
tcm, "TASK_ALIASES", None
|
||||
)
|
||||
if alias is not None:
|
||||
mapped = alias.get("gitea_create_issue")
|
||||
if mapped is not None:
|
||||
self.assertEqual(mapped, "create_issue")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if __name__ == "__main__":
|
||||
unittest.main()
|
||||
@@ -26,23 +26,15 @@ class TestCreateIssueWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
srv._preflight_whoami_called = True
|
||||
srv._preflight_capability_called = True
|
||||
srv._preflight_resolved_role = "author"
|
||||
srv._preflight_resolved_task = "create_issue"
|
||||
srv._preflight_whoami_violation = False
|
||||
srv._preflight_capability_violation = False
|
||||
|
||||
# Disable early return in verify_preflight_purity for testing
|
||||
self._orig_in_test = srv._preflight_in_test_mode
|
||||
srv._preflight_in_test_mode = lambda: False
|
||||
# #618: isolate from ambient session issue locks
|
||||
self._lock_patch = patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server._session_author_lock_worktree", return_value=None
|
||||
)
|
||||
self._lock_patch.start()
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
srv._preflight_in_test_mode = self._orig_in_test
|
||||
srv._preflight_resolved_task = None
|
||||
self._lock_patch.stop()
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._profile_permission_block", return_value=None)
|
||||
@@ -59,62 +51,15 @@ class TestCreateIssueWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"porcelain_status": "",
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_create_issue_stable_checkout_bootstrap_allowed_when_clean(
|
||||
def test_create_issue_stable_checkout_rejected(
|
||||
self, _git, _remote_sha, _get_all, mock_api, _role, _ns, _prof, _auth,
|
||||
):
|
||||
# #749: clean canonical control checkout is the sanctioned create_issue path.
|
||||
mock_api.return_value = {
|
||||
"number": 77,
|
||||
"html_url": "https://gitea.example.com/issues/77",
|
||||
}
|
||||
# Without worktree_path/env hints, workspace resolves to PROJECT_ROOT. When that
|
||||
# path is the stable control checkout (not under branches/), mutation must fail.
|
||||
with patch.object(srv, "PROJECT_ROOT", CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT):
|
||||
with patch("gitea_mcp_server._get_workspace_porcelain", return_value=""):
|
||||
with patch.object(srv, "_run_anti_stomp_preflight", return_value=None):
|
||||
with patch.object(srv, "_enforce_root_checkout_guard"):
|
||||
res = srv.gitea_create_issue(
|
||||
title="Test issue", body="body text for gate"
|
||||
)
|
||||
self.assertEqual(res.get("number"), 77)
|
||||
mock_api.assert_called_once()
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._profile_permission_block", return_value=None)
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._namespace_mutation_block", return_value=None)
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server.role_session_router.check_author_mutation_after_reviewer_stop", return_value=(True, []))
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server.api_request")
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=[])
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server.root_checkout_guard.resolve_remote_master_sha", return_value="a" * 40)
|
||||
@patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server.issue_lock_worktree.read_worktree_git_state",
|
||||
return_value={
|
||||
"current_branch": "master",
|
||||
"head_sha": "a" * 40,
|
||||
"porcelain_status": " M dirty.py\n",
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
def test_create_issue_dirty_control_checkout_rejected(
|
||||
self, _git, _remote_sha, _get_all, mock_api, _role, _ns, _prof, _auth,
|
||||
):
|
||||
# #749: dirty control checkout still fails closed (no bootstrap).
|
||||
with patch.object(srv, "PROJECT_ROOT", CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT):
|
||||
with patch(
|
||||
"gitea_mcp_server._get_workspace_porcelain",
|
||||
return_value=" M dirty.py\n",
|
||||
):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
res = srv.gitea_create_issue(title="Test issue", body="body text")
|
||||
except RuntimeError as exc:
|
||||
self.assertTrue(
|
||||
"tracked local edits" in str(exc)
|
||||
or "dirty" in str(exc).lower()
|
||||
or "bootstrap" in str(exc).lower()
|
||||
or "control checkout" in str(exc).lower()
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res.get("success", True) and res.get("number"))
|
||||
blob = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
self.assertTrue(blob or res.get("blocker_kind"))
|
||||
mock_api.assert_not_called()
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
srv.gitea_create_issue(title="Test issue", body="body text")
|
||||
self.assertIn("stable control checkout", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._profile_permission_block", return_value=None)
|
||||
@@ -160,17 +105,11 @@ class TestCreateIssueWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
with patch.object(srv, "PROJECT_ROOT", CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
res = srv.gitea_create_issue(
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
srv.gitea_create_issue(
|
||||
title="Test issue", body="body", worktree_path=missing_path
|
||||
)
|
||||
except RuntimeError as exc:
|
||||
self.assertIn("does not exist", str(exc))
|
||||
else:
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
|
||||
blob = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
self.assertIn("does not exist", blob)
|
||||
self.assertTrue(res.get("exact_next_action") or res.get("reasons"))
|
||||
self.assertIn("does not exist (fail closed)", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._profile_permission_block", return_value=None)
|
||||
@@ -203,20 +142,11 @@ class TestCreateIssueWorkspaceGuard(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
|
||||
with patch.object(srv, "PROJECT_ROOT", CONTROL_CHECKOUT_ROOT):
|
||||
with patch("gitea_mcp_server._get_workspace_porcelain", return_value=""):
|
||||
try:
|
||||
res = srv.gitea_create_issue(
|
||||
title="Test issue",
|
||||
body="body",
|
||||
worktree_path=wrong_repo_path,
|
||||
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
|
||||
srv.gitea_create_issue(
|
||||
title="Test issue", body="body", worktree_path=wrong_repo_path
|
||||
)
|
||||
except RuntimeError as exc:
|
||||
self.assertIn(
|
||||
"does not belong to the target repository", str(exc)
|
||||
)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
self.assertFalse(res.get("success"))
|
||||
blob = " ".join(res.get("reasons") or [])
|
||||
self.assertIn("does not belong to the target repository", blob)
|
||||
self.assertIn("does not belong to the target repository", str(ctx.exception))
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._auth", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
|
||||
@patch("gitea_mcp_server._profile_permission_block", return_value=None)
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-23
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
|
||||
import os
|
||||
"""Tests for create_pr.py.
|
||||
|
||||
Every test mocks `get_credentials` and `urllib.request.urlopen` so no real
|
||||
@@ -9,7 +8,7 @@ import json
|
||||
import sys
|
||||
import unittest
|
||||
import contextlib
|
||||
from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock, patch
|
||||
from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
|
||||
|
||||
sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
|
||||
import create_pr # noqa: E402
|
||||
@@ -75,26 +74,6 @@ class TestRemoteResolution(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
# API payload
|
||||
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||
class TestAPIPayload(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
"""#714: omitted --org/--repo uses workspace-bound repo (Gitea-Tools),
|
||||
not the historical REMOTES Timesheet default. Intentional security-policy
|
||||
migration of legacy omitted-target assertions.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
|
||||
def setUp(self):
|
||||
self._ws_env = patch.dict(
|
||||
os.environ,
|
||||
{
|
||||
"GITEA_TEST_WORKSPACE_REMOTE_URL": (
|
||||
"https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools.git"
|
||||
)
|
||||
},
|
||||
clear=False,
|
||||
)
|
||||
self._ws_env.start()
|
||||
|
||||
def tearDown(self):
|
||||
self._ws_env.stop()
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@patch("create_pr.get_credentials", return_value=FAKE_CREDS)
|
||||
def test_payload_fields(self, _cred):
|
||||
@@ -134,7 +113,7 @@ class TestAPIPayload(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||
url = MockReq.call_args[0][0]
|
||||
self.assertEqual(
|
||||
url,
|
||||
"https://gitea.prgs.cc/api/v1/repos/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/pulls",
|
||||
"https://gitea.prgs.cc/api/v1/repos/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Timesheet/pulls",
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
Some files were not shown because too many files have changed in this diff Show More
Reference in New Issue
Block a user