fix(mcp): invalidate review session state on cross-profile activation (Closes #690 )

A mid-run profile switch (reviewer -> author -> reviewer) left workflow-load proof, reviewer lease binding, the review decision lock, live namespace health, and preflight identity/capability stamps intact, so a formal verdict could be recorded under contaminated session state. - gitea_activate_profile now invalidates all review-critical session state on a cross-profile switch, in memory and in durable state keyed by either profile identity, and reports the invalidation + re-preflight requirement. - Full reviewer preflight (whoami, load_review_workflow, resolve_task_capability(review_pr), head re-pin, lease re-acquire) is required before any formal verdict after a switch; switching back cannot resurrect the stale run. - Namespace provenance: optional launcher-declared GITEA_MCP_NAMESPACE is reported by whoami/runtime context/capability resolution, and a declared namespace that disagrees with a task's required namespace fails closed. - Docs: supported pattern is separate session/namespace per role, not in-process profile hopping mid-review.
2026-07-25 19:17:19 -04:00
21 changed files with 582 additions and 1969 deletions
@@ -386,68 +386,6 @@ def run_compensating_recovery(
    return recovery_info
 def _normalize_sha(value: str | None) -> str | None:
    """Normalize a Git object id for comparison, or ``None`` when unknown."""
    normalized = (value or "").strip().lower()
    return normalized or None
 def _author_bootstrap_assessment(
    *,
    not_applicable: bool,
    allowed: bool,
    block: bool,
    reasons: list[str],
    workspace: str,
    root: str,
    branch: str | None,
    dirty: list[str],
    under_branches: bool,
    bootstrap_path: str | None = None,
    local_head_sha: str | None = None,
    remote_master_sha: str | None = None,
    exact_next_action: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
    """Structured author-bootstrap assessment consumable by bootstrap_permits (#892).
    Field shape mirrors :func:`create_issue_bootstrap._result` so the shared
    ``bootstrap_permits_control_checkout`` predicate can prove control-checkout
    eligibility for ``gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree`` the same way it
    does for ``create_issue``. Allowed control assessments must use empty
    ``reasons`` — narrative belongs in other fields, not the refusal list.
    """
    local_tip = _normalize_sha(local_head_sha)
    remote_tip = _normalize_sha(remote_master_sha)
    base_tips_verified = bool(local_tip and remote_tip and local_tip == remote_tip)
    return {
        "not_applicable": not_applicable,
        "allowed": allowed,
        "block": block,
        "proven": bool(allowed and not block and not not_applicable),
        "reasons": list(reasons),
        "workspace_path": workspace,
        "canonical_repo_root": root,
        "current_branch": branch,
        "dirty_files": list(dirty),
        "under_branches": under_branches,
        "exact_next_action": exact_next_action,
        "bootstrap_path": bootstrap_path,
        "task_scope": "author_issue_bootstrap",
        "local_head_sha": local_tip,
        "remote_master_sha": remote_tip,
        "base_tips_verified": base_tips_verified,
    }
 EXACT_NEXT_ACTION_AUTHOR_BOOTSTRAP = (
    "Restore the canonical control checkout to a clean accepted base branch "
    "(master/main/dev) that matches live master, with no tracked local edits. "
    "Re-resolve bootstrap_author_issue_worktree, then re-run "
    "gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree from that clean control checkout. "
    "Do not use shell git worktree add as the primary path once bootstrap is healthy."
 )
 def assess_author_issue_bootstrap(
    *,
    workspace_path: str,
@@ -459,13 +397,7 @@ def assess_author_issue_bootstrap(
    remote_master_sha_error: str | None = None,
    task: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Assess whether author issue worktree bootstrap may proceed from control or worktree root.
+    """Assess whether author issue worktree bootstrap may proceed from control or worktree root."""
    #892: control-checkout successes emit the full field set required by
    ``create_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_permits_control_checkout`` (empty reasons,
    task_scope, base tip proof, binding paths) so the #274/#604 guards can
    waive control-checkout for this one sanctioned bootstrap task.
    """
    root = os.path.realpath(canonical_repo_root or "")
    workspace = os.path.realpath(workspace_path or root or ".")
    branch = (current_branch or "").strip()
@@ -475,50 +407,34 @@ def assess_author_issue_bootstrap(
        if root
        else False
    )
    local_tip = _normalize_sha(head_sha)
    remote_tip = _normalize_sha(remote_master_sha)
    if not is_author_issue_bootstrap_task(task):
-        return _author_bootstrap_assessment(
+        return {
-            not_applicable=True,
+            "not_applicable": True,
-            allowed=False,
+            "allowed": False,
-            block=False,
+            "block": False,
-            reasons=["task is not author_issue_bootstrap"],
+            "proven": False,
-            workspace=workspace,
+            "reasons": ["task is not author_issue_bootstrap"],
-            root=root,
+        }
            branch=branch or None,
            dirty=dirty,
            under_branches=under_branches,
        )
    # Already under branches/: ordinary #274 path applies; not a control waiver.
    if under_branches:
-        return _author_bootstrap_assessment(
+        return {
-            not_applicable=True,
+            "not_applicable": False,
-            allowed=False,
+            "allowed": True,
-            block=False,
+            "block": False,
-            reasons=["workspace is under branches/; ordinary #274 path applies"],
+            "proven": True,
-            workspace=workspace,
+            "bootstrap_path": "existing_branches_worktree",
-            root=root,
+            "reasons": [
-            branch=branch or None,
+                "workspace is already a registered worktree under branches/"
-            dirty=dirty,
+            ],
-            under_branches=True,
+        }
            bootstrap_path="existing_branches_worktree",
            local_head_sha=local_tip,
            remote_master_sha=remote_tip,
        )
    reasons: list[str] = []
-    if not root or workspace != root:
+    if workspace != root:
        reasons.append(
            "bootstrap requires workspace to be canonical control checkout or branches/ worktree"
        )
-    if not branch:
+    if branch not in author_mutation_worktree.BASE_BRANCHES:
        reasons.append(
            "control checkout is detached HEAD; expected an accepted base branch "
            f"({', '.join(sorted(author_mutation_worktree.BASE_BRANCHES))})"
        )
    elif branch not in author_mutation_worktree.BASE_BRANCHES:
        reasons.append(
            f"control checkout branch '{branch}' is not an accepted base branch "
            f"({', '.join(sorted(author_mutation_worktree.BASE_BRANCHES))})"
@@ -528,64 +444,37 @@ def assess_author_issue_bootstrap(
            f"control checkout has tracked local edits: {', '.join(dirty[:5])}"
        )
-    # Fail closed on missing tip proof (same bar as create_issue bootstrap #757).
+    if remote_master_sha_error:
    if not local_tip:
        reasons.append(
-            "control checkout HEAD SHA is unknown; base equivalence to live "
+            f"could not verify live master tip: {remote_master_sha_error}"
            "master cannot be proven (fail closed)"
        )
    resolver_error = (remote_master_sha_error or "").strip() or None
    if resolver_error:
        reasons.append(
            f"live master tip could not be resolved ({resolver_error}); "
            "base equivalence cannot be proven (fail closed)"
        )
    elif not remote_tip:
        reasons.append(
            "live master tip is unknown; base equivalence cannot be proven "
            "(fail closed)"
        )
    elif local_tip and remote_tip and local_tip != remote_tip:
        reasons.append(
            f"control checkout HEAD ({local_tip[:12]}) != live master tip "
            f"({remote_tip[:12]})"
        )
    elif remote_master_sha and head_sha:
        h = head_sha.strip().lower()
        rm = remote_master_sha.strip().lower()
        if h != rm:
            reasons.append(
                f"control checkout HEAD ({h[:12]}) != live master tip ({rm[:12]})"
            )
    if reasons:
-        return _author_bootstrap_assessment(
+        return {
-            not_applicable=False,
+            "not_applicable": False,
-            allowed=False,
+            "allowed": False,
-            block=True,
+            "block": True,
-            reasons=reasons,
+            "proven": False,
-            workspace=workspace,
+            "reasons": reasons,
-            root=root,
+        }
            branch=branch or None,
            dirty=dirty,
            under_branches=False,
            local_head_sha=local_tip,
            remote_master_sha=remote_tip,
            exact_next_action=EXACT_NEXT_ACTION_AUTHOR_BOOTSTRAP,
        )
-    # Allowed: empty reasons so bootstrap_permits_control_checkout can pass.
+    return {
-    return _author_bootstrap_assessment(
+        "not_applicable": False,
-        not_applicable=False,
+        "allowed": True,
-        allowed=True,
+        "block": False,
-        block=False,
+        "proven": True,
-        reasons=[],
+        "bootstrap_path": "clean_canonical_control_checkout",
-        workspace=workspace,
+        "reasons": [
-        root=root,
+            "control checkout is clean on accepted base branch matching live master"
-        branch=branch or None,
+        ],
-        dirty=dirty,
+    }
        under_branches=False,
        bootstrap_path="clean_canonical_control_checkout",
        local_head_sha=local_tip,
        remote_master_sha=remote_tip,
        exact_next_action=(
            "Call gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree with the allocated "
            "issue/lease pins; it will create the branches/ worktree and lock."
        ),
    )
 import fcntl
@@ -241,14 +241,9 @@ def bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
    caller's ordinary block in force.
    ``assessment`` is server-derived only: it is produced by
-    :func:`assess_create_issue_bootstrap` or
+    :func:`assess_create_issue_bootstrap` from inspected repository state. It is
-    :func:`author_issue_bootstrap.assess_author_issue_bootstrap` from inspected
+    never accepted from an MCP tool argument, so no caller can assert
-    repository state. It is never accepted from an MCP tool argument, so no
+    eligibility it has not proven.
    caller can assert eligibility it has not proven.
    #892: author issue worktree bootstrap uses the same predicate with
    ``task_scope='author_issue_bootstrap'`` so a clean control checkout can
    create the first ``branches/`` worktree without the lock↔worktree cycle.
    """
    if not isinstance(assessment, dict):
        return False
@@ -269,16 +264,9 @@ def bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
    if assessment.get("reasons"):
        return False
-    # Scope proof: create_issue (#749) or author issue bootstrap (#850/#892),
+    # Scope proof: only the create_issue bootstrap, only via the clean
-    # only via the clean canonical control checkout path.
+    # canonical control checkout path.
-    task_scope = assessment.get("task_scope")
+    if assessment.get("task_scope") != "create_issue_only":
    if is_create_issue_task(task):
        if task_scope != "create_issue_only":
            return False
    elif author_issue_bootstrap.is_author_issue_bootstrap_task(task):
        if task_scope != "author_issue_bootstrap":
            return False
    else:
        return False
    if assessment.get("bootstrap_path") != "clean_canonical_control_checkout":
        return False
@@ -589,6 +589,47 @@ When dynamic profile switching is enabled and a profile is activated via `gitea_
 2. Call `gitea_whoami` with the target remote to prove and verify the fresh Gitea authenticated identity.
 This guarantees the active profile operations align with the actual Gitea authenticated user credential.
 ### 4. Review-State Invalidation on Profile Switch (#690)
 A cross-profile activation (e.g. reviewer → author → reviewer) is a session
 boundary for formal review state. On any switch where the activated profile
 differs from the previous one, `gitea_activate_profile` invalidates, in
 memory **and** in durable session state (for both the old and new profile
 identities):
 - preflight identity/capability stamps (`gitea_whoami` / `gitea_resolve_task_capability` proof),
 - review workflow-load proof (`gitea_load_review_workflow`),
 - the review decision lock (including `final_review_decision_ready` markers),
 - the reviewer PR session lease binding,
 - live namespace-health assessments.
 Before any formal verdict (`gitea_mark_final_review_decision` /
 `gitea_submit_pr_review`) the full reviewer preflight must be re-established
 under the new profile: `gitea_whoami`, `gitea_load_review_workflow`,
 `gitea_resolve_task_capability(review_pr)`, live head re-pin, and lease
 re-acquire/adopt. Switching back to the earlier profile does **not**
 resurrect the prior run — durable state keyed by either profile identity is
 cleared at switch time.
 The supported pattern remains **separate session/namespace per role**
 (dual-namespace, §2): file author-side follow-ups from an author session,
 not by hopping profiles inside a formal review run. Runtime profile
 switching is the operator-approved exception and always carries the
 re-preflight cost above.
 ### 5. Namespace Provenance (#690)
 The server cannot derive its own client-managed MCP namespace name, so a
 launcher may declare it via the `GITEA_MCP_NAMESPACE` environment variable
 (e.g. `gitea-reviewer`). `gitea_whoami`, `gitea_get_runtime_context`, and
 `gitea_resolve_task_capability` report `namespace_provenance` — the
 configured client namespace, the active execution profile, and, for tasks
 with a required namespace (`review_pr` → `gitea-reviewer`, `merge_pr` →
 `gitea-merger`), a mismatch verdict. A declared namespace that disagrees
 with the requested task's required namespace **fails closed**. An
 undeclared namespace is reported as `unknown` and is never treated as
 proof either way.
 ## Gitea MCP Runtime Isolation and Worktree Safety
 To ensure high availability and prevent broken feature worktrees from disabling essential security/identity controls, the Gitea MCP server implements runtime isolation:
@@ -153,19 +153,7 @@ not a tool argument: a session must never be able to authorize itself.
 ## Related
 - #630 — manual daemon killing as contaminated recovery (this contrast, enforced).
 - #657 — restart-path inventory and daemon classification.
 - #686 — manual server launch detection & fail-closed provenance gate.
 - #531 / #544 — stale-runtime detection (`ps`-based); sibling failure mode.
 - #558 / `docs/mcp-daemon-import-guard.md` — why shell imports are not a repair.
 - `docs/mcp-client-registration.md` — per-server registration contract.
 - `docs/mcp-namespace-health.md` — probe sources and mutation enforcement.
 ## Sanctioned reconnect vs forbidden manual launch (#686)
 In addition to manual process killing (#630), manually launching a duplicate role server from an ad hoc shell (`python3 mcp_server.py`) is forbidden and fail-closed:
 - **Why manual launches are unsupported:** A terminal-launched `mcp_server.py` holds its own stdio transport; it can never bind to the IDE client's stdio pipes. It cannot restore a dropped IDE namespace, and a manual duplicate process masks stale client-managed runtimes for that profile, defeating stale-runtime gates.
 - **Sanctioned path:** Supported recovery is IDE/client-managed reconnect only (`/mcp reconnect`, IDE restart, or sanctioned reconnect exposure).
 - **Fail-closed enforcement (#686):** Mutating tools on a server lacking client-managed launch provenance (`GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED=1`) refuse execution fail-closed with typed blocker `unsupported_manual_launch` and an exact next action. Unsupported `GITEA_*` env overrides (e.g. `GITEA_DUMMY`) are surfaced in diagnostics rather than silently ignored.
 - **Inventory & staleness:** Staleness diagnostics ignore non-client-managed duplicates when evaluating runtime freshness and inventory duplicate processes per profile (#657, #686).
@@ -86,3 +86,24 @@ When a namespace returns EOF, follow
 When blocked, repair the IDE namespace and re-record a healthy
 `client_namespace` assessment before retrying the mutation.
 ## Namespace provenance (#690)
 A server process cannot derive the name of the client-managed namespace it is
 registered under, so the launcher may declare it with the
 `GITEA_MCP_NAMESPACE` environment variable (e.g. `GITEA_MCP_NAMESPACE=gitea-reviewer`).
 - `gitea_whoami`, `gitea_get_runtime_context`, and
  `gitea_resolve_task_capability` report `namespace_provenance`: the declared
  client namespace, the active execution profile, and — for tasks with a
  required namespace (`review_pr`/`submit_review` → `gitea-reviewer`,
  `merge_pr` → `gitea-merger`) — a `mismatch` verdict.
 - A declared namespace that disagrees with the requested task's required
  namespace **fails closed** (`allowed_in_current_session=false` with a STOP
  guidance entry).
 - An undeclared namespace is reported as `namespace_source="unknown"` and is
  never treated as proof either way.
 - A profile switch via `gitea_activate_profile` clears all recorded live
  namespace-health assessments; re-probe through the client before further
  review/merge mutations.
@@ -1,230 +0,0 @@
 # Remote-MCP coupling inventory
 Every place the Gitea MCP server depends on being a local, client-spawned, stdio-attached
 process on the operator's machine.
 - **Issue:** #930 (Remote-MCP 01), child 1 of epic #929.
 - **Generated against commit:** `7bf4f1258451823a55b36d2157e74f8457165088` (`master`).
 - **Anchors:** every `file:line` below resolves at the commit above and at the commit that
  adds this document. This change adds one new file and edits no existing file, so no
  existing line number shifts between the two.
 - **Scope:** documentation only. No server behavior changes in this child.
 ## How to read an entry
 | Field | Meaning |
 | ----- | ------- |
 | **Anchor** | `file:line` at the commit under review. |
 | **Assumes today** | What the code takes for granted while running as a local stdio process. |
 | **Observes remotely** | What the same code would actually see on a shared remote host. |
 | **Class** | One of: *portable as written*, *needs a seam*, *needs a replacement*, *cannot be remote*. |
 | **Owner** | Exactly one epic child (#931–#939) responsible for the fix. |
 Classification meanings:
 - **portable as written** — the code is already transport-, host-, and principal-neutral; it
  moves unchanged once its inputs are supplied by a remote-aware caller.
 - **needs a seam** — the logic is correct but is wired to a hard-coded local source. It needs
  an injection point, not new semantics.
 - **needs a replacement** — the semantics themselves are local-only. A remote deployment
  needs a differently-defined mechanism, not the same mechanism relocated.
 - **cannot be remote** — the operation is inherently about the operator's own machine
  (its process table, its keychain, its checkout). It must either stay local behind an
  explicit boundary or be deleted from the remote surface.
 ---
 ## 1. Transport bind
 The transport is bound literally, once, at process start, and the bound value is the root of
 the mutation-authorization chain.
 | ID | Anchor | Assumes today | Observes remotely | Class | Owner |
 | -- | ------ | ------------- | ----------------- | ----- | ----- |
 | T1 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:23750` | The single production bind call passes the literal `transport="stdio"` immediately before the server loop. | The literal is wrong for any non-stdio deployment; there is no parameter to change it. | needs a seam | #931 |
 | T2 | `mcp_daemon_guard.py:45` | `_PRODUCTION_TRANSPORTS = frozenset({"stdio"})` is the closed allowlist of production transports. | A remote transport name is rejected by the allowlist before any other check runs. | needs a seam | #931 |
 | T3 | `mcp_daemon_guard.py:174` | `bind_native_mcp_transport` raises `UnsanctionedRuntimeError` for any transport outside `_PRODUCTION_TRANSPORTS` (raise at `mcp_daemon_guard.py:187`). | The remote server fails to start rather than degrading; the failure is correct, but the allowlist is the only thing that must change. | needs a seam | #931 |
 | T4 | `mcp_daemon_guard.py:328` | `is_native_mcp_transport()` asserts a process-local runtime record whose `pid` matches `os.getpid()` and whose phase is `transport_bound`. The predicate itself names no transport. | Unchanged semantics: one server process that bound one transport. It stays true on a remote host. | portable as written | #931 |
 | T5 | `mcp_daemon_guard.py:349` | `is_production_native_mcp_transport()` adds only a `mode == production` check on top of T4. | Unchanged. | portable as written | #931 |
 | T6 | `irrecoverable_provenance.py:497` | `assess_transport_for_auth_mint()` requires production native transport before minting non-forgeable recovery authorization (#709 F1). | The gate is transport-agnostic in form, but its guarantee — "an ordinary Python process cannot reach this" — is currently underwritten by the stdio bind. Under a remote transport the guarantee must be re-derived from the authenticated session, not from the bind. | needs a seam | #931 |
 | T7 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:8375` | Consumer: refuses to proceed unless `assess_transport_for_auth_mint()` allows. | Unchanged given a corrected T6. | portable as written | #931 |
 | T8 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:8624` | Second consumer of the same gate on the confirmation path. | Unchanged given a corrected T6. | portable as written | #931 |
 | T9 | `mcp_server.py:4` | Module docstring asserts "Runs over stdio." as a property of the server. | The stated contract becomes false on the remote deployment and is load-bearing documentation for operators. | needs a replacement | #931 |
 ## 2. Launch provenance
 Mutations fail closed unless the process can prove a client launched it with real stdio pipes
 and `GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED` provenance. Every proof in this section is a statement about the
 local operating system.
 | ID | Anchor | Assumes today | Observes remotely | Class | Owner |
 | -- | ------ | ------------- | ----------------- | ----- | ----- |
 | P1 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:14588` | `_is_client_managed_process()` derives provenance from `GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED` / `GITEA_MCP_CLIENT_MANAGED` / `GITEA_SERVER_PROVENANCE` / `GITEA_FORCE_CLIENT_MANAGED` on this process's own environment. | A long-lived remote process has one environment for all callers, so a per-process env var can no longer say anything about the caller that issued a request. | needs a replacement | #934 |
 | P2 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:14606` | Falls back to `sys.stdin.isatty()`: an active TTY on stdin means a human launched it from a terminal, so refuse. | A remote server has no meaningful stdin. The signal is absent, not merely different. | cannot be remote | #934 |
 | P3 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:14618` | `_provenance_mutation_block()` emits `blocker_kind: "unsupported_manual_launch"` and a "reconnect the IDE/client-managed MCP namespace" remediation. | The block shape is reusable; its predicate and its remediation text are both stdio-specific. | needs a seam | #934 |
 | P4 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:20599` | `_check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics()` shells `ps -o pid,lstart,command -ax` and greps for `mcp_server.py` to find peer role servers. | On a shared host the process table lists unrelated tenants' processes, or none at all under a container. Peer discovery by `ps` has no remote meaning. | cannot be remote | #934 |
 | P5 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:20702` | More than one process per `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE` in the local process table is reported as a duplicate-launch fault. | A remote endpoint is expected to serve many concurrent sessions per role. "Two processes for one role" becomes the normal case, so the check inverts from a safety net into a false wall. | cannot be remote | #934 |
 | P6 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:20715` | Processes lacking client-managed provenance are ignored for runtime freshness and reported as manual launches. | Same defect as P5: correctness depends on enumerating local peers. | cannot be remote | #934 |
 | P7 | `gitea_config.py:1172` | `RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_KEYS` is the allowlist of `GITEA_*` env vars a legitimately launched server may carry; anything else is contamination. | Configuration on a remote host arrives from deployment tooling, not from a client-authored env block. The allowlist keeps working mechanically but stops proving anything about provenance. | needs a replacement | #934 |
 | P8 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:20683` | The unsupported-env scan applies `RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_KEYS` to *other* processes' environments harvested via `ps eww <pid>`. | Reading another process's environment is unavailable or prohibited across tenants, and is not exposed in this form outside macOS/BSD `ps`. | cannot be remote | #934 |
 | P9 | `mcp_daemon_guard.py:126` | `mark_sanctioned_daemon()` requires the claiming stack frame's resolved absolute path to be the canonical `mcp_server.py` / `gitea_mcp_server.py` next to the guard module; basename spoofing is rejected. | Entrypoint-path identity still exists on a remote host, but it authenticates the *deployment*, not the *caller*. It must be kept and demoted from "authorizes mutations" to "authorizes the process". | needs a seam | #934 |
 | P10 | `gitea_config.py:1233` | The client-config generator emits `"GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED": "1"` into each generated MCP client entry, alongside `GITEA_MCP_CONFIG` / `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE`. | A remote endpoint is addressed by URL and credential, not by a spawn command with an env block. This generator produces the wrong artifact entirely. | needs a replacement | #938 |
 | P11 | `mcp_namespace_health.py:232` | Namespace health classifies a namespace as `client_managed` or `manual_launch` from the reported env summary. | During dual-run, local and remote namespaces coexist and must both be classifiable; a two-valued local/manual axis cannot express "remote endpoint, authenticated session". | needs a replacement | #939 |
 | P12 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:18161` | The diagnostics payload reports `server_provenance` as exactly `"client_managed"` or `"manual_launch"`. | This is the field a cutover operator reads to confirm which deployment served a call. It must gain a remote value before dual-run parity can be validated. | needs a replacement | #939 |
 ## 3. Role binding
 Role separation is currently enforced by *which process a call reaches*. The process is pinned
 to one role for its lifetime by an environment variable.
 | ID | Anchor | Assumes today | Observes remotely | Class | Owner |
 | -- | ------ | ------------- | ----------------- | ----- | ----- |
 | R1 | `gitea_config.py:54` | `ENV_PROFILE = "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE"` is the single source of the active profile, read from the process environment. | One shared process serves several principals; a process-wide profile cannot answer "who is calling now". This is the root of the coupling. | needs a replacement | #932 |
 | R2 | `review_workflow_load.py:95` | Reads `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE` directly to decide the reviewer workflow binding. | Reads the deployment's profile, not the caller's, silently granting or denying the wrong role. | needs a replacement | #932 |
 | R3 | `mcp_discoverability.py:152` | Reads `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE` to describe the namespace to the client. | Correct logic, wrong input source; it needs the request principal injected. | needs a seam | #932 |
 | R4 | `webui/deployment_boundary.py:115` | Reads `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE` to classify the deployment boundary for the console. | Same as R3. | needs a seam | #932 |
 | R5 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:21106` | Remediation text instructs the operator to "Relaunch the server with `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE` set to a profile that has the required permission". | Relaunching a shared remote endpoint to change one caller's role is not a valid instruction; it would re-role every other session. | needs a replacement | #932 |
 | R6 | `native_mcp_preference.py:93` | Detects shell commands that override `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE` away from the session (`native_mcp_preference.py:223`) and flags them as CLI auth divergence. | The divergence check is genuinely useful and survives, but its notion of "the session's profile" must come from the request principal. | needs a seam | #932 |
 | R7 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:20671` | Recovers a peer server's role by regexing `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=` out of that process's environment. | Depends on P4/P8 process-table access; role discovery by peer-env scraping has no remote analogue. | cannot be remote | #932 |
 ## 4. Credentials
 Every token resolves, directly or indirectly, from one human's macOS keychain.
 | ID | Anchor | Assumes today | Observes remotely | Class | Owner |
 | -- | ------ | ------------- | ----------------- | ----- | ----- |
 | C1 | `gitea_config.py:956` | `_keychain_token()` shells `security find-generic-password -s <item> -w`. | `security(1)` is a macOS binary reading the calling user's login keychain. It does not exist on a Linux host and would be the wrong identity even on a shared Mac. | cannot be remote | #933 |
 | C2 | `gitea_config.py:974` | `resolve_token(profile, keychain_lookup=_keychain_token)` dispatches on `auth.type` of `env` or `keychain`, defaulting the lookup to C1. | The injectable `keychain_lookup` parameter is the existing seam; a remote credential provider plugs in here without changing the dispatch. | needs a seam | #933 |
 | C3 | `gitea_config.py:1015` | `keychain_auth(item_id)` constructs the `{"type": "keychain", "id": ...}` reference stored in profiles. | The reference type itself encodes "macOS keychain" into persisted config. A remote provider needs a new auth reference type, not a new value of this one. | needs a replacement | #933 |
 | C4 | `mcp_daemon_guard.py:440` | `assert_keychain_access_allowed()` fails closed for git-credential keychain fill outside a sanctioned daemon, with an operator opt-out env var. | The gate protects a mechanism that will not exist remotely. Its replacement must gate the *credential provider* call, not the keychain call, or the protection silently lapses. | needs a replacement | #933 |
 | C5 | `sentry_incident_bridge.py:190` | `resolve_token(env)` resolves the Sentry token from an injected env mapping with no keychain path. | Already host-neutral; it is the shape the Gitea credential path should converge on. | portable as written | #933 |
 | C6 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:18469` | The profile-audit tool calls `gitea_config.resolve_token(p)` for every configured profile to report "credentials present" without networking. | On a remote host this would materialize every principal's credential inside one process — an audit surface that becomes a credential-aggregation risk. | needs a seam | #933 |
 ## 5. Runtime freshness
 The mutation gate is defined as "the commit this process started at matches the checkout on
 this disk, and both match live master". Two of those three terms are local-disk facts.
 | ID | Anchor | Assumes today | Observes remotely | Class | Owner |
 | -- | ------ | ------------- | ----------------- | ----- | ----- |
 | F1 | `master_parity_gate.py:168` | `capture_startup_parity(root)` reads git `HEAD` from the server's own root once at startup and returns it as the baseline. | A remote host carries a deployed artifact, not the operator's checkout. Its `HEAD` says nothing about the operator's working tree, which is the thing the gate exists to protect. | cannot be remote | #935 |
 | F2 | `master_parity_gate.py:255` | `mutation_safe = determinable and in_parity and live_known and not live_stale` — a conjunction of two local-HEAD comparisons and one live-remote comparison. | Two of the three conjuncts lose meaning, so the whole verdict does. A remote deployment needs a redefined, testable freshness predicate rather than this one relocated. | needs a replacement | #935 |
 | F3 | `master_parity_gate.py:164` | The live-remote head is probed and cached per `(root, remote, branch)`, keyed on the local root. | The live-remote probe is the one conjunct that survives; it needs a key that is not the operator's filesystem path. | needs a seam | #935 |
 | F4 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:18262` | `gitea_assess_master_parity` publishes `startup_head` / `local_head` / `live_remote_head` / `mutation_safe` as the authoritative mutation-safety verdict. | The tool's contract is consumed by every mutation caller and by the operator; it must keep its shape while its semantics are redefined, or every consumer breaks at once. | needs a replacement | #935 |
 | F5 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:23054` | Falls back to `_process_boot_head_sha` — the commit this process booted at — when the parity payload has no `startup_head`. | Same defect as F1, in a fallback path that is easy to miss when F1 is fixed. | needs a seam | #935 |
 | F6 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:20615` | Staleness is also inferred from `os.path.getmtime()` of `gitea_mcp_server.py` under `PROJECT_ROOT` (`gitea_mcp_server.py:20611`), compared against peer process start times. | File mtime on a deployed artifact tracks the deploy, not the operator's edits, and the peer start times it is compared against come from the unavailable process table (P4). | cannot be remote | #935 |
 ## 6. Local filesystem
 Author and reviewer tools act directly on the operator's checkout.
 | ID | Anchor | Assumes today | Observes remotely | Class | Owner |
 | -- | ------ | ------------- | ----------------- | ----- | ----- |
 | L1 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:10122` | `gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree` creates and binds a git worktree on the server's own disk. | The remote host has no operator checkout to add a worktree to. Executing this remotely would act on the wrong disk while reporting success. | cannot be remote | #936 |
 | L2 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:190` | `ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV = "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"` and `AUTHOR_WORKTREE_ENV` (`gitea_mcp_server.py:191`) carry the active workspace as process-wide environment. | Process-wide workspace state cannot represent per-session workspaces on a shared endpoint. | needs a replacement | #936 |
 | L3 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:9801` | Binding a worktree writes `os.environ["GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE"]` and `os.environ["GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"]` (`gitea_mcp_server.py:9802`), mutating global process state. | One session's bind would silently retarget every other concurrent session in the same process. This is a correctness bug the moment concurrency is real. | needs a replacement | #936 |
 | L4 | `reviewer_inventory_worktree.py:48` | `_BRANCHES_WORKTREE_RE = re.compile(r"\bbranches/", re.I)` requires review worktree paths to sit under `branches/`. | A path convention on the operator's machine, asserted as a validation rule. It needs to become a property of a declared workspace, not a substring test. | needs a seam | #936 |
 | L5 | `stable_control_runtime.py:54` | `DEV_WORKTREE_SEGMENT = "branches"` classifies a process root as a development worktree by path segment. | Same class of assumption as L4, on the runtime-classification side. | needs a seam | #936 |
 | L6 | `mcp_server.py:42` | `check_conflict_markers()` runs at import and `os.walk`s the install directory for unresolved conflict markers, `sys.exit(1)` on a hit. | On a remote host it scans a deployed artifact, which by construction never has conflict markers — so the guard passes trivially and stops protecting the thing it was written to protect. | needs a replacement | #936 |
 | L7 | `role_session_router.py:487` | `check_mid_merge()` reports infra-stop from `.git/MERGE_HEAD`, `rebase-merge`, `rebase-apply` and a source conflict scan under the server's project root. | Same inversion as L6: it would report the deployment's git state, not the operator's. | needs a replacement | #936 |
 | L8 | `author_issue_bootstrap.py:996` | Enumerates worktrees with `git -C <root> worktree list --porcelain`. | Requires a real local clone with real worktrees; there is nothing equivalent to enumerate remotely. | cannot be remote | #936 |
 | L9 | `mcp_server.py:10` | Redirects `sys.stderr` to the fixed path `/tmp/mcp_server_stderr.log` outside pytest. | A single fixed `/tmp` path is shared by every concurrent server on a host and is not a deployment's logging surface. | needs a replacement | #938 |
 | L10 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:2314` | `ISSUE_LOCK_FILE = "/tmp/gitea_issue_lock.json"` — the legacy single global lock slot. | One global `/tmp` slot per host cannot represent concurrent remote sessions and is world-visible on a shared machine. | needs a replacement | #937 |
 | L11 | `issue_lock_provenance.py:14` | `ISSUE_LOCK_FILE = os.environ.get("GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_FILE", "/tmp/gitea_issue_lock.json")` keeps the same `/tmp` default in the provenance path. | Same as L10; the env override is a local escape hatch, not a remote design. | needs a replacement | #937 |
 ## 7. Durable state
 Locks, leases, session state, and the control-plane database live in the operator's home
 directory and are keyed on local PIDs.
 | ID | Anchor | Assumes today | Observes remotely | Class | Owner |
 | -- | ------ | ------------- | ----------------- | ----- | ----- |
 | S1 | `issue_lock_store.py:26` | `DEFAULT_LOCK_DIR = ~/.cache/gitea-tools/issue-locks` — per-issue lock files under one user's home. | A shared endpoint has no single operator home; per-user paths make locks invisible across sessions and hosts. | needs a replacement | #937 |
 | S2 | `issue_lock_store.py:83` | `session_pointer_path()` names the session pointer file `session-<os.getpid()>.json`. | Many sessions share one PID on a remote server, so the pointer collapses to a single slot and sessions overwrite each other. | cannot be remote | #937 |
 | S3 | `issue_lock_store.py:98` | `is_process_alive(pid)` decides lock liveness by probing the local process table. | A PID recorded by one host is meaningless on another, and may coincidentally match a live unrelated process. | cannot be remote | #937 |
 | S4 | `issue_lock_store.py:213` | Lock records stamp `session_pid` and `pid` from `os.getpid()`. | The recorded identity no longer distinguishes sessions; ownership checks silently pass for the wrong caller. | needs a replacement | #937 |
 | S5 | `mcp_session_state.py:27` | `DEFAULT_STATE_DIR = ~/.cache/gitea-tools/session-state`, mode `0o700`. | Same home-directory coupling as S1, for review decision locks and workflow proofs. | needs a replacement | #937 |
 | S6 | `mcp_session_state.py:559` | Session bodies stamp `session_pid` and `writer_pid` from `os.getpid()` (`mcp_session_state.py:560`). | Writer attribution collapses across concurrent sessions in one process. | needs a replacement | #937 |
 | S7 | `control_plane_db.py:47` | `DEFAULT_DB_PATH = ~/.cache/gitea-tools/control-plane/control_plane.sqlite3`. | A per-user SQLite file is not reachable by, or safe for, multiple remote sessions or multiple hosts. | needs a replacement | #937 |
 | S8 | `control_plane_db.py:386` | `sqlite3.connect(self.db_path, timeout=30)` — single-writer file locking tuned for one local process. | SQLite's write lock does not extend across hosts and degrades sharply under real concurrency; the store needs a concurrency-safe backend. | needs a replacement | #937 |
 | S9 | `control_plane_db.py:1145` | Lease rows record `owner_pid` defaulting to `os.getpid()` (also `control_plane_db.py:2039`). | PID-keyed lease ownership is unusable across hosts and ambiguous within one shared process. | cannot be remote | #937 |
 | S10 | `mcp_daemon_guard.py:53` | `_DEFAULT_SESSION_STATE_DIR` is pinned once at transport bind so a later `GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_DIR` change cannot manufacture a second authority domain (#695 AC2). | The single-authority-domain invariant is exactly right and must be preserved; only its backing location needs to move. | needs a seam | #937 |
 | S11 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:11875` | Reviewer-lease reclaim reads `owner_pid_alive` from the lease freshness record to decide whether an owner is dead. | Consumes S3/S9; a false "owner alive" or "owner dead" here reclaims or refuses a live lease. This is the highest-consequence consumer of PID liveness. | cannot be remote | #937 |
 ---
 ## Summary
 ### Entries per category
 | Category | Entries |
 | -------- | ------: |
 | 1. Transport bind | 9 |
 | 2. Launch provenance | 12 |
 | 3. Role binding | 7 |
 | 4. Credentials | 6 |
 | 5. Runtime freshness | 6 |
 | 6. Local filesystem | 11 |
 | 7. Durable state | 11 |
 | **Total** | **62** |
 No category is empty, so no "this category has no coupling" justification is required.
 ### Entries per classification
 | Classification | Entries |
 | -------------- | ------: |
 | portable as written | 5 |
 | needs a seam | 16 |
 | needs a replacement | 26 |
 | cannot be remote | 15 |
 | **Total** | **62** |
 ### Category × classification
 | Category | portable | seam | replacement | cannot | Total |
 | -------- | -------: | ---: | ----------: | -----: | ----: |
 | 1. Transport bind | 4 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 9 |
 | 2. Launch provenance | 0 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 12 |
 | 3. Role binding | 0 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 7 |
 | 4. Credentials | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 6 |
 | 5. Runtime freshness | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 6 |
 | 6. Local filesystem | 0 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 11 |
 | 7. Durable state | 0 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 11 |
 | **Total** | **5** | **16** | **26** | **15** | **62** |
 ### Entries per epic child
 Every child from 2 through 10 is named by at least one entry, and every entry names exactly
 one child.
 | Child | Issue | Title | Entries | IDs |
 | ----: | ----- | ----- | ------: | --- |
 | 2 | #931 | Transport-neutral bind seam | 9 | T1–T9 |
 | 3 | #932 | Per-request principal resolution | 7 | R1–R7 |
 | 4 | #933 | Server-side credential provider | 6 | C1–C6 |
 | 5 | #934 | Remote-session provenance | 9 | P1–P9 |
 | 6 | #935 | Redefined master-parity gate | 6 | F1–F6 |
 | 7 | #936 | Local-filesystem vs remotable tool split | 8 | L1–L8 |
 | 8 | #937 | Concurrency-safe session, lock, and lease state | 13 | L10, L11, S1–S11 |
 | 9 | #938 | Authenticated remote MCP endpoint | 2 | P10, L9 |
 | 10 | #939 | Dual-run cutover and rollback | 2 | P11, P12 |
 | | | **Total** | **62** | |
 ## Notes for downstream children
 - **The three highest-risk entries are P5, F2, and S11.** Each is a guard that does not
  merely stop working remotely — it inverts. P5 turns concurrency into a reported fault,
  F2 returns a verdict computed from terms that no longer mean anything, and S11 reclaims
  or refuses leases on a PID-liveness answer that is wrong rather than unknown. A gate that
  fails open while still reporting green is worse than one that fails to start.
 - **T4, T5, T7, T8, and C5 are the portable core.** They show the target shape: predicates
  over injected inputs, with no reference to the host, the process table, or the operator's
  disk.
 - **The keychain seam already exists** at C2 (`resolve_token`'s injectable `keychain_lookup`).
  #933 should widen that seam rather than introduce a parallel path, and must remember C4 —
  the guard protecting the old mechanism has to be re-pointed, or the protection lapses
  silently when the mechanism is replaced.
 - **`branches/` appears as a validation rule in at least two independent places** (L4, L5).
  Path-substring conventions tend to have more copies than expected; #936 should re-grep
  rather than trust this list to be exhaustive for that specific pattern.
@@ -1169,57 +1169,10 @@ def server_command():
    return python, [os.path.join(root, "mcp_server.py")]
 RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_KEYS = frozenset({
    "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG",
    "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE",
    "GITEA_PROFILE_NAME",
    "GITEA_SERVICE",
    "GITEA_EXECUTION_ROLE",
    "GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED",
    "GITEA_MCP_CLIENT_MANAGED",
    "GITEA_SERVER_PROVENANCE",
    "GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE",
    "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE",
    "GITEA_DISABLE_KEYCHAIN",
    "GITEA_CONTROL_PLANE_DB",
    "GITEA_DB_PATH",
    "GITEA_LOG_LEVEL",
    "GITEA_DEBUG",
    "GITEA_HMAC_SECRET",
    "GITEA_IRRECOVERABLE_HMAC_SECRET",
    "GITEA_FORCE_MCP_RUNTIME_CHECK",
    "GITEA_FORCE_CLIENT_MANAGED",
 })
 RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_PREFIXES = (
    "GITEA_TOKEN_",
    "GITEA_PASS_",
    "GITEA_USER_",
    "GITEA_URL_",
    "GITEA_HOST_",
    "GITEA_REMOTE_",
    "GITEA_HTTP_HEADER_",
 )
 def get_unconsumed_gitea_env_overrides(env=None) -> dict[str, str]:
    """Find unsupported GITEA_* env vars present in *env* (defaults to os.environ)."""
    target = os.environ if env is None else env
    unconsumed = {}
    for key, value in target.items():
        if key.startswith("GITEA_"):
            if key in RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_KEYS:
                continue
            if any(key.startswith(p) for p in RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_PREFIXES):
                continue
            unconsumed[key] = str(value)
    return unconsumed
 def launcher_entry(profile_name, config_path=None):
    """Return a thin MCP launcher entry for *profile_name*.
-    Contains command/args and the GITEA_MCP_* / GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED env vars — never a token
+    Contains only command/args and the two GITEA_MCP_* env vars — never a token
    or password. Suitable for Claude / Gemini / Codex ``mcpServers`` blocks.
    """
    command, args = server_command()
@@ -1230,13 +1183,11 @@ def launcher_entry(profile_name, config_path=None):
            "env": {
                "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": config_path or DEFAULT_CONFIG_PATH,
                "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": profile_name,
                "GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED": "1",
            },
        }
    }
 def keychain_set(item_id, token, account=None, runner=subprocess.run):
    """Store *token* in the macOS keychain under service *item_id*.
@@ -839,6 +839,75 @@ def _invalidate_preflight_identity_state() -> None:
    _clear_preflight_capability_state()
 # #690: session-boundary invalidation record for the most recent cross-profile
 # activation. Surfaced in runtime diagnostics so a formal review run can prove
 # its state was reset by a profile switch and must be fully re-established.
 _PROFILE_SWITCH_INVALIDATION: dict | None = None
 def _invalidate_review_state_on_profile_switch(
    before_profile: str,
    after_profile: str,
 ) -> dict:
    """Invalidate review-critical session state on a profile switch (#690).
    Workflow-load proof, reviewer lease binding, the review decision lock,
    live namespace health, and preflight identity/capability stamps recorded
    under the prior profile are contaminated for the new role. Durable state
    keyed by *either* profile identity is cleared so a reviewer → author →
    reviewer hop cannot resurrect a stale review run: the full reviewer
    preflight (gitea_whoami, gitea_load_review_workflow,
    gitea_resolve_task_capability(review_pr), live head re-pin, lease
    re-acquire/adopt) must be re-established before any formal verdict.
    """
    global _PROFILE_SWITCH_INVALIDATION
    invalidated: list[str] = []
    _invalidate_preflight_identity_state()
    invalidated.append("preflight_identity_capability")
    review_workflow_load.clear_review_workflow_load()
    invalidated.append("review_workflow_load")
    _save_review_decision_lock(None)
    invalidated.append("review_decision_lock")
    reviewer_pr_lease.clear_session_lease()
    invalidated.append("reviewer_session_lease")
    if _LIVE_NAMESPACE_HEALTH:
        _LIVE_NAMESPACE_HEALTH.clear()
        invalidated.append("live_namespace_health")
    # Durable records keyed by either profile identity must not survive the
    # switch, or activating author → reviewer → author could revive a stale
    # review run without re-preflight.
    for identity in {before_profile, after_profile}:
        if not identity:
            continue
        try:
            mcp_session_state.clear_state(
                kind=mcp_session_state.KIND_DECISION_LOCK,
                profile_identity=identity,
            )
            mcp_session_state.clear_state(
                kind=mcp_session_state.KIND_WORKFLOW_LOAD,
                profile_identity=identity,
            )
        except Exception:
            pass  # best-effort durable cleanup; in-memory state already reset
    invalidated.append("durable_profile_state")
    _PROFILE_SWITCH_INVALIDATION = {
        "from_profile": before_profile,
        "to_profile": after_profile,
        "invalidated": invalidated,
        "invalidated_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
        "re_preflight_required": True,
    }
    return dict(_PROFILE_SWITCH_INVALIDATION)
 def record_preflight_check(
    type_name: str,
    resolved_role: str | None = None,
@@ -1546,7 +1615,6 @@ def verify_preflight_purity(
            task=task,
            target_issue_number=target_issue_number,
            require_author_lock=require_author_lock,
            bootstrap_assessment=bootstrap_assessment,
        )
        # #604: common anti-stomp preflight after legacy + #683 enforcers.
        _run_anti_stomp_preflight(
@@ -1586,7 +1654,6 @@ def verify_preflight_purity(
            task=task,
            target_issue_number=target_issue_number,
            require_author_lock=require_author_lock,
            bootstrap_assessment=bootstrap_assessment,
        )
        if force_anti_stomp:
            _run_anti_stomp_preflight(
@@ -1654,15 +1721,8 @@ def _enforce_issue_scope_guard(
    task: str | None = None,
    target_issue_number: int | None = None,
    require_author_lock: bool = False,
    bootstrap_assessment: object = _BOOTSTRAP_UNSET,
 ) -> None:
-    """#683: fail closed on missing/out-of-scope issue ownership for mutations.
+    """#683: fail closed on missing/out-of-scope issue ownership for mutations."""
    #941: the shared bootstrap assessment is threaded in so this guard judges
    the author issue-worktree bootstrap on the same server-derived evidence as
    the #274 branches-only and #604 anti-stomp guards. Callers that supply
    none fall back to computing it here, which preserves behaviour.
    """
    ctx = _resolve_namespace_mutation_context(worktree_path)
    workspace = ctx["workspace_path"]
    git_state = issue_lock_worktree.read_worktree_git_state(workspace)
@@ -1712,32 +1772,11 @@ def _enforce_issue_scope_guard(
    import create_issue_bootstrap as _cib
    is_create_issue = _cib.is_create_issue_task(task)
    # #941: consume the caller-computed bootstrap assessment when one was
    # threaded in, so this guard and the #274/#604 guards judge identical
    # evidence. Falling back preserves behaviour for callers that supply none.
    bootstrap = (
        _create_issue_bootstrap_assessment(task, worktree_path)
        if bootstrap_assessment is _BOOTSTRAP_UNSET
        else bootstrap_assessment
    )
    # #941: the author issue-worktree bootstrap is pre-ownership for the same
    # reason create_issue is — it exists to break the lock<->worktree cycle, so
    # no owning lock can exist yet. The exemption is granted by the canonical
    # shared decision over server-derived evidence, never by a task-name list,
    # and fails closed on missing, malformed, cross-scope, dirty, drifted, or
    # wrongly bound evidence.
    bootstrap_waives_ownership = _cib.bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
        bootstrap,
        task=task,
        workspace_path=workspace,
        canonical_repo_root=ctx["canonical_repo_root"],
    )
    require_lock = bool(require_author_lock) or (
        authorish
        and workflow_scope_guard.production_guards_forced()
        and role == "author"
        and not is_create_issue
        and not bootstrap_waives_ownership
    )
    assessment = workflow_scope_guard.assess_production_mutation_guards(
        workspace_path=workspace,
@@ -1750,7 +1789,6 @@ def _enforce_issue_scope_guard(
        require_author_lock=require_lock,
        in_test_mode=_preflight_in_test_mode(),
        mutation_task=task,
        bootstrap_assessment=bootstrap,
    )
    workflow_scope_guard.raise_if_blocked(assessment)
@@ -2781,36 +2819,6 @@ def _collect_issue_duplicate_context(
    return issue_duplicate_context_fetcher(h, o, r, auth, issue_number)
 def _owning_pr_continuation_from_lock(lock_record: dict | None) -> dict | None:
    """Owning-PR continuation evidence a persisted lock still proves (#945).
    ``gitea_lock_issue`` grants the duplicate-work waiver from either a
    sanctioned dead-session recovery (#755) or a sanctioned exact-owner renewal
    (#760), in that precedence. Every later enforcement path — commit,
    create-PR, push-ownership, and the read-only duplicate assessor — re-derives
    ownership from the durable lock instead of that live assessment.
    Until #945 only the recovery half was rebuilt there, so an ordinary
    exact-owner renewal lost its waiver the moment ``gitea_lock_issue``
    returned: the author renewed successfully and was then refused
    ``duplicate_commit_prevented`` with ``owning_pr_recovery_exempted: false``
    on the very PR the renewal had just proved it owned.
    Resolving both halves here, in the same precedence the lock path applies,
    keeps the answer from drifting between the gate that grants the waiver and
    the gates that enforce it. This only decides which server-written block the
    token is rebuilt from — the token is still re-validated against live PR
    state by ``issue_work_duplicate_gate._assess_owning_pr_exemption``, which
    remains the single authoritative policy for whether an exemption applies.
    """
    if not lock_record:
        return None
    recovered = issue_lock_recovery.recovered_owning_pr_from_lock(lock_record)
    if recovered:
        return recovered
    return issue_lock_renewal.owning_pr_renewal_from_lock(lock_record)
 def _assess_issue_duplicate_gate(
    issue_number: int,
    *,
@@ -2863,11 +2871,6 @@ def _enforce_locked_issue_duplicate_recheck(
    commit and create-PR phases run in their own calls, long after the recovery
    assessment ended, so without this they re-block the very PR the recovery
    already proved belongs to this author.
    #945: an exact-owner *renewal* (#760) owns its open PR for exactly the same
    reason, and ``gitea_lock_issue`` already waives the blocker for both. Both
    halves are resolved together here so the renewal waiver survives past the
    lock call instead of expiring with it.
    """
    lock_data = _load_existing_issue_lock()
    if not lock_data:
@@ -2891,7 +2894,9 @@ def _enforce_locked_issue_duplicate_recheck(
        auth=auth,
        locked_branch=locked_branch,
        phase=phase,
-        recovered_owning_pr=_owning_pr_continuation_from_lock(lock_data),
+        recovered_owning_pr=issue_lock_recovery.recovered_owning_pr_from_lock(
            lock_data
        ),
    )
    if gate.get("block"):
        return gate
@@ -5173,10 +5178,9 @@ def gitea_assess_work_issue_duplicate(
    recovered_owning_pr = None
    lock_data = _load_existing_issue_lock()
    if lock_data and int(lock_data.get("issue_number") or 0) == int(issue_number):
-        # #945: rebuilt from a sanctioned recovery *or* a sanctioned exact-owner
+        recovered_owning_pr = issue_lock_recovery.recovered_owning_pr_from_lock(
-        # renewal, so this read-only assessor reports the same disposition the
+            lock_data
-        # commit and create-PR gates will enforce.
+        )
        recovered_owning_pr = _owning_pr_continuation_from_lock(lock_data)
    gate = _assess_issue_duplicate_gate(
        issue_number,
        h=h,
@@ -14650,56 +14654,6 @@ def _session_context_mutation_block(
    return blocked
 def _is_client_managed_process() -> bool:
    """Check whether the current MCP server process has client-managed launch provenance (#686)."""
    val = (
        os.environ.get("GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED")
        or os.environ.get("GITEA_MCP_CLIENT_MANAGED")
        or os.environ.get("GITEA_SERVER_PROVENANCE")
        or os.environ.get("GITEA_FORCE_CLIENT_MANAGED")
        or ""
    ).strip().lower()
    if val in ("0", "false", "no", "manual", "manual_launch"):
        return False
    if val in ("1", "true", "yes", "client_managed"):
        return True
    # A terminal launch has an active TTY on stdin
    try:
        if sys.stdin and sys.stdin.isatty():
            return False
    except Exception:
        pass
    # Standard client launch or test runner with stdio pipe and profile env
    if "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG" in os.environ or "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE" in os.environ or "GITEA_PROFILE_NAME" in os.environ:
        return True
    return False
 def _provenance_mutation_block(**extra_fields) -> dict | None:
    """Refuse mutating tool calls on processes lacking client-managed launch provenance (#686)."""
    if _is_client_managed_process():
        return None
    unconsumed = gitea_config.get_unconsumed_gitea_env_overrides()
    blocked = {
        "success": False,
        "performed": False,
        "blocker_kind": "unsupported_manual_launch",
        "reasons": [
            "mutation denied: server process was launched manually from a terminal without client-managed provenance (fail closed). Manually launched mcp_server.py processes cannot receive IDE stdio or serve workflow mutations."
        ],
        "exact_next_action": "BLOCKED + RECONNECT: Reconnect the IDE/client-managed MCP server namespace instead of an ad hoc terminal launch. Hand-launched processes and mcp_config.json hand-edits are classified as workflow contamination.",
        "provenance": "manual_launch",
        "unconsumed_gitea_env": unconsumed,
    }
    blocked.update(extra_fields)
    return blocked
 def _profile_permission_block(required_operation: str, **extra_fields) -> dict | None:
    """Structured operation-gate denial for gated tools (#69, #142, #897).
@@ -14716,10 +14670,6 @@ def _profile_permission_block(required_operation: str, **extra_fields) -> dict |
    # #714: evaluate active profile only — never auto-switch.
    _ensure_matching_profile(required_operation, req_role, extra_fields.get("remote"))
    prov_block = _provenance_mutation_block(**extra_fields)
    if prov_block is not None:
        return prov_block
    reasons = _profile_operation_gate(required_operation)
    if reasons:
        return _build_operation_gate_refusal(
@@ -14753,10 +14703,6 @@ def _namespace_mutation_block(mutation_task: str, **extra_fields) -> dict | None
    # #714: evaluate active profile only — never auto-switch.
    _ensure_matching_profile(required_permission, required_role, extra_fields.get("remote"))
    prov_block = _provenance_mutation_block(**extra_fields)
    if prov_block is not None:
        return prov_block
    try:
        profile = get_profile()
    except Exception as exc:
@@ -17333,6 +17279,11 @@ def gitea_whoami(
        "session_context_audit": session_ctx.mutation_context_audit_fields(),
        "identity_match": not id_match.get("block"),
        "identity_match_reasons": id_match.get("reasons") or [],
        # #690 AC4: report launcher-declared client namespace alongside the
        # active execution profile so drift is visible in diagnostics.
        "namespace_provenance": mcp_namespace_health.namespace_provenance(
            active_profile=profile["profile_name"]
        ),
    }
    if id_match.get("block"):
        _invalidate_preflight_identity_state()
@@ -18204,9 +18155,6 @@ def gitea_get_runtime_context(
        source="gitea_get_runtime_context",
    )
    is_client_managed = _is_client_managed_process()
    unconsumed_env = gitea_config.get_unconsumed_gitea_env_overrides()
    result = {
        "active_profile": profile["profile_name"],
        "authenticated_username": username,
@@ -18223,9 +18171,6 @@ def gitea_get_runtime_context(
        "review_merge_blocked_reasons": blocked_reasons,
        "suggested_fix": suggested_fix,
        "safe_next_action": safe_next_action,
        "server_provenance": "client_managed" if is_client_managed else "manual_launch",
        "is_client_managed": is_client_managed,
        "unconsumed_gitea_env": unconsumed_env,
        "preflight_ready": preflight["preflight_ready"],
        "preflight_block_reasons": preflight["preflight_block_reasons"],
        "preflight_workspace": preflight.get("preflight_workspace"),
@@ -18237,15 +18182,13 @@ def gitea_get_runtime_context(
        "shell_health": native_mcp_preference.shell_health_status(),
        "workflow_load_proof": review_workflow_load.workflow_load_status(
            PROJECT_ROOT),
        # #690: namespace provenance + profile-switch invalidation evidence.
        "namespace_provenance": mcp_namespace_health.namespace_provenance(
            active_profile=profile["profile_name"]
        ),
        "profile_switch_invalidation": _PROFILE_SWITCH_INVALIDATION,
    }
    if not is_client_managed:
        result["safe_next_action"] = (
            "BLOCKED + RECONNECT: Serving process lacks client-managed launch provenance (manual launch). "
            "Reconnect the IDE/client-managed MCP server namespace instead of an ad hoc terminal launch."
        )
    # #702: read-only visibility into the inherited GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE
    # binding; recovery itself runs during capability resolution.
    try:
@@ -18747,6 +18690,17 @@ def gitea_activate_profile(
        source="gitea_activate_profile",
    )
    # 4.7 #690: a profile switch is a session-boundary event for review state.
    # Any workflow-load proof, reviewer lease, decision lock, namespace
    # health, or preflight stamp recorded under the prior profile is
    # contaminated for the new role and must be re-established under the new
    # profile before any formal review verdict.
    switch_invalidation = None
    if before_profile != after_profile:
        switch_invalidation = _invalidate_review_state_on_profile_switch(
            before_profile, after_profile
        )
    # 5. Audit the switch if auditing is on
    _audit(
        "activate_profile",
@@ -18757,11 +18711,12 @@ def gitea_activate_profile(
            "before": before_profile,
            "after": after_profile,
            "session_context": session_ctx.mutation_context_audit_fields(),
            "review_state_invalidated": bool(switch_invalidation),
        },
        username=after_identity,
    )
-    return {
+    result = {
        "success": True,
        "message": f"Successfully activated profile '{profile_name}' (fresh identity verification complete).",
        "before_profile": before_profile,
@@ -18771,6 +18726,18 @@ def gitea_activate_profile(
        "session_context_audit": session_ctx.mutation_context_audit_fields(),
        "auto_profile_substitution": False,
    }
    if switch_invalidation is not None:
        result["review_state_invalidation"] = switch_invalidation
        result["re_preflight_required"] = True
        result["exact_next_action"] = (
            "Profile switch invalidated workflow-load proof, reviewer lease, "
            "decision lock, and preflight stamps (#690). Before any formal "
            "review verdict, re-run the full reviewer preflight: "
            "gitea_whoami, gitea_load_review_workflow, "
            "gitea_resolve_task_capability(review_pr), live head re-pin, and "
            "lease re-acquire/adopt."
        )
    return result
@mcp.tool()
@@ -19458,10 +19425,7 @@ def _prove_author_ownership_for_pr(
    # advance is the one recovery already sanctioned, not a foreign head.
    recovered_owning_pr = None
    if proven and lock_record:
-        # #945: a sanctioned exact-owner renewal proves the same ownership of
+        candidate = issue_lock_recovery.recovered_owning_pr_from_lock(lock_record)
        # the same PR, so the push gate resolves both halves rather than seeing
        # only the recovery one.
        candidate = _owning_pr_continuation_from_lock(lock_record)
        if candidate and int(candidate.get("pr_number") or 0) == int(pr_number):
            recovered_owning_pr = candidate
    return {
@@ -20706,9 +20670,7 @@ def _check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics(task: str, matching_profiles: list[str]) ->
    self_pid = os.getpid()
    self_stale = False
-    all_profile_procs: dict[str, list[dict]] = {}
+    running_profiles = {}
    unsupported_env_found = set()
    for line in proc.stdout.splitlines()[1:]:
        line = line.strip()
        if not line or "mcp_server.py" not in line:
@@ -20740,55 +20702,16 @@ def _check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics(task: str, matching_profiles: list[str]) ->
        if match:
            profile = match.group(1)
        is_client_managed = bool(
            re.search(r'\bGITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED=(1|true|yes|client_managed)\b', env_out, re.IGNORECASE)
            or re.search(r'\bGITEA_MCP_CLIENT_MANAGED=(1|true|yes|client_managed)\b', env_out, re.IGNORECASE)
            or re.search(r'\bGITEA_SERVER_PROVENANCE=client_managed\b', env_out, re.IGNORECASE)
        )
        for env_match in re.finditer(r'\b(GITEA_[A-Z0-9_]+)=([^\s]+)', env_out):
            k, v = env_match.group(1), env_match.group(2)
            if k not in gitea_config.RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_KEYS and not any(k.startswith(p) for p in gitea_config.RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_PREFIXES):
                unsupported_env_found.add(f"{k}={v}")
        is_stale = (start_time < code_mtime) or git_stale
        if pid == self_pid and is_stale:
            self_stale = True
-        proc_info = {
+        if profile not in running_profiles or start_time > running_profiles[profile]["start_time"]:
-            "pid": pid,
+            running_profiles[profile] = {
-            "start_time": start_time,
+                "pid": pid,
-            "is_stale": is_stale,
+                "start_time": start_time,
-            "is_client_managed": is_client_managed,
+                "is_stale": is_stale
-        }
+            }
        if profile not in all_profile_procs:
            all_profile_procs[profile] = []
        all_profile_procs[profile].append(proc_info)
    running_profiles = {}
    for profile, procs in all_profile_procs.items():
        if len(procs) > 1:
            pids_str = ", ".join(str(p["pid"]) for p in procs)
            reasons.append(
                f"stale-runtime: Duplicate MCP server process(es) detected for profile '{profile}' (PIDs: {pids_str}). "
                "Manual or duplicate launches defeat staleness detection and cannot receive client stdio."
            )
        client_procs = [p for p in procs if p["is_client_managed"]]
        if client_procs:
            client_procs.sort(key=lambda p: p["start_time"], reverse=True)
            running_profiles[profile] = client_procs[0]
        else:
            pids_str = ", ".join(str(p["pid"]) for p in procs)
            reasons.append(
                f"stale-runtime: Manually launched MCP process(es) detected without client-managed provenance for profile '{profile}' (PIDs: {pids_str}). "
                "Manual launches cannot serve client stdio and are ignored for runtime freshness."
            )
    if unsupported_env_found:
        reasons.append(
            f"unsupported-env: Unsupported GITEA_* environment variable override(s) detected: {', '.join(sorted(unsupported_env_found))}. "
            "Unknown env overrides are unsupported."
        )
    if self_stale:
        # #685: report-only — no config utime, no thread, no os._exit.
@@ -20823,7 +20746,6 @@ def _check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics(task: str, matching_profiles: list[str]) ->
    return reasons
@mcp.tool()
 def gitea_resolve_task_capability(
    task: str,
@@ -21060,12 +20982,22 @@ def gitea_resolve_task_capability(
            f"{required_role} task '{task}' even if nearby permissions are "
            "present (fail closed)."
        )
    # #690 AC4: when the launcher declares a client namespace, a task with a
    # required namespace must fail closed on mismatch (e.g. review_pr served
    # from an author namespace).
    ns_provenance = mcp_namespace_health.namespace_provenance(
        task=task_key, active_profile=profile.get("profile_name")
    )
    ns_mismatch_reason = None
    if ns_provenance.get("mismatch"):
        ns_mismatch_reason = "; ".join(ns_provenance.get("reasons") or [])
    cross_host_block = bool(remote_assess.get("block"))
    identity_block = bool(id_assess.get("block"))
    drift_block = bool(ctx_assess.get("block"))
    allowed_in_current_session = (
        permission_allowed_in_current_session
        and role_matches_current_session
        and not ns_provenance.get("mismatch")
        and not cross_host_block
        and not identity_block
        and not drift_block
@@ -21116,6 +21048,8 @@ def gitea_resolve_task_capability(
            )
        if role_mismatch_reason:
            deny_parts.append(role_mismatch_reason)
        if ns_mismatch_reason:
            deny_parts.append(ns_mismatch_reason)
        if deny_parts:
            reason_msg = "; ".join(deny_parts)
        elif configured and switching:
@@ -21193,6 +21127,8 @@ def gitea_resolve_task_capability(
    task_role_guidance = []
    if role_mismatch_reason:
        task_role_guidance.append(f"STOP: {role_mismatch_reason}")
    if ns_mismatch_reason:
        task_role_guidance.append(f"STOP: {ns_mismatch_reason}")
    if required_role == "reviewer":
        if allowed_in_current_session:
            task_role_guidance.append(
@@ -21259,6 +21195,7 @@ def gitea_resolve_task_capability(
        "session_context_audit": session_ctx.mutation_context_audit_fields(),
        "profile_remote_compatible": not cross_host_block,
        "identity_match": not identity_block,
        "namespace_provenance": ns_provenance,
        "auto_profile_substitution": False,
    }
    # #685: report typed reconnect blocker without mutating config or exiting.
@@ -436,90 +436,6 @@ def owning_pr_renewal_evidence(
    }
 def owning_pr_renewal_from_lock(
    lock_record: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
    """Rebuild owning-PR renewal evidence from a persisted lock (#945).
    The renewal mirror of ``issue_lock_recovery.recovered_owning_pr_from_lock``.
    ``owning_pr_renewal_evidence`` supplies the waiver for the duration of the
    ``gitea_lock_issue`` call only. The commit, push, create-PR, and
    duplicate-assessment gates run later in their own calls and re-derive
    ownership from the durable lock instead — so without this the open PR that
    renewal already proved belongs to this author reappears there as competing
    duplicate work, and the exact owner is refused with
    ``duplicate_commit_prevented`` despite complete matching evidence.
    This reads only the ``lease_renewal`` block that the server itself writes,
    on a lock the caller must already own. Like the recovery mirror it is a
    re-read of server-derived state, never a fresh assertion: a caller able to
    forge it could equally forge the lock file every other ownership gate
    already treats as authoritative.
    Renewal has no descendant case — the assessor required the local, remote and
    PR heads to be equal — so that equality is re-checked here, and the record
    must still name the claimant the lock records.
    """
    if not isinstance(lock_record, Mapping):
        return None
    record = lock_record.get("lease_renewal")
    if not isinstance(record, Mapping) or not record.get("renewed"):
        return None
    branch_name = _text(record.get("branch_name")) or _text(
        lock_record.get("branch_name")
    )
    pr_head = _text(record.get("pr_head_sha"))
    local_head = _text(record.get("head_sha"))
    remote_head = _text(record.get("remote_head_sha"))
    raw_pr_number = record.get("pr_number")
    raw_issue_number = lock_record.get("issue_number")
    if raw_pr_number is None or raw_issue_number is None:
        return None
    if not branch_name or not pr_head:
        return None
    # The assessor required all three heads to agree before it granted renewal.
    # Re-check, so a truncated, drifted, or hand-built record cannot widen the
    # exemption past the single head the renewal disposition actually proved.
    if not local_head or not remote_head:
        return None
    if pr_head != local_head or pr_head != remote_head:
        return None
    # Renewal is refused outright unless the durable lock records both a
    # claimant username and profile, so a sanctioned record always carries them.
    # Requiring them to still agree keeps a renewal block from being reused
    # under an identity or profile the lock no longer names.
    claimant = lock_record.get("claimant")
    if not isinstance(claimant, Mapping):
        lease = lock_record.get("work_lease")
        claimant = lease.get("claimant") if isinstance(lease, Mapping) else None
    if not isinstance(claimant, Mapping):
        return None
    identity = _text(record.get("identity"))
    profile = _text(record.get("profile"))
    if not identity or identity != _text(claimant.get("username")):
        return None
    if not profile or profile != _text(claimant.get("profile")):
        return None
    try:
        pr_number = int(raw_pr_number)
        issue_number = int(raw_issue_number)
    except (TypeError, ValueError):
        return None
    return {
        "issue_number": issue_number,
        "pr_number": pr_number,
        "branch_name": branch_name,
        "head_sha": pr_head,
        "recorded_head": pr_head,
        "accepted_head": pr_head,
        "head_relation": "equal",
    }
 def build_renewal_record(
    assessment: Mapping[str, Any] | None,
    *,
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ Probe sources
 from __future__ import annotations
 import os
 from typing import Any
@@ -57,8 +58,56 @@ SAFE_ENV_KEYS = (
    "GITEA_SERVICE",
    "GITEA_EXECUTION_ROLE",
    "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG",
    "GITEA_MCP_NAMESPACE",
 )
 # Optional launcher-provided env declaring the client-managed MCP namespace
 # this process is registered under (e.g. ``gitea-reviewer``). The server
 # cannot derive its own IDE namespace name, so the launcher declares it; when
 # declared, reviewers/mergers can fail closed on a namespace/task mismatch
 # (#690 AC4). Absence means "unknown" — reported, never guessed.
 NAMESPACE_ENV = "GITEA_MCP_NAMESPACE"
 def configured_client_namespace(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> str | None:
    """Return the launcher-declared client namespace, or None when unknown."""
    source = os.environ if env is None else env
    value = (source.get(NAMESPACE_ENV) or "").strip()
    return value or None
 def namespace_provenance(
    task: str | None = None,
    *,
    active_profile: str | None = None,
    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
    """Report configured client namespace vs active execution profile (#690).
    When *task* carries a required namespace (``TASK_REQUIRED_NAMESPACES``)
    and the launcher declared a different one, ``mismatch`` is True and the
    caller must fail closed for that task. An undeclared namespace is
    reported as unknown — never treated as proof either way.
    """
    configured = configured_client_namespace(env)
    required = TASK_REQUIRED_NAMESPACES.get(task or "")
    mismatch = bool(configured and required and configured != required)
    reasons: list[str] = []
    if mismatch:
        reasons.append(
            f"configured client namespace '{configured}' does not match "
            f"required namespace '{required}' for task '{task}' (fail closed)"
        )
    return {
        "configured_namespace": configured,
        "namespace_source": NAMESPACE_ENV if configured else "unknown",
        "active_profile": active_profile,
        "requested_task": task,
        "required_namespace": required,
        "mismatch": mismatch,
        "reasons": reasons,
    }
 def _as_list(value: Any) -> list[str] | None:
    if value is None:
@@ -225,16 +274,6 @@ def classify_namespace_probe(
        # on bad data without treating success as IDE proof).
        blocks = namespace_health_blocks_task("merge_pr", healthy)
    import gitea_config
    raw_env = process.get("env") if isinstance(process, dict) else None
    unconsumed_env = gitea_config.get_unconsumed_gitea_env_overrides(raw_env)
    is_client_managed = bool(
        env_summary.get("GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED") in ("1", "true", "yes", "client_managed")
        or env_summary.get("GITEA_MCP_CLIENT_MANAGED") in ("1", "true", "yes", "client_managed")
        or env_summary.get("GITEA_SERVER_PROVENANCE") == "client_managed"
    )
    provenance = "client_managed" if is_client_managed else "manual_launch"
    return {
        "success": healthy,
        "healthy": healthy,
@@ -250,9 +289,6 @@ def classify_namespace_probe(
        "error_message": error_message or None,
        "reasons": reasons,
        "remediation": remediation,
        "provenance": provenance,
        "is_client_managed": is_client_managed,
        "unconsumed_gitea_env": unconsumed_env,
        "diagnostics": {
            "namespace": ns,
            "required_tool": tool,
@@ -261,9 +297,6 @@ def classify_namespace_probe(
            "env": env_summary,
            "config_path": config_path,
            "probe_source": source,
            "provenance": provenance,
            "is_client_managed": is_client_managed,
            "unconsumed_gitea_env": unconsumed_env,
        },
        "blocks_merge_workflow": blocks,
    }
@@ -41,11 +41,10 @@ def _reset_mutation_authority(monkeypatch):
        "GITEA_REVIEWER_WORKTREE",
        "GITEA_MERGER_WORKTREE",
        "GITEA_RECONCILER_WORKTREE",
        "GITEA_MCP_NAMESPACE",
    ]:
        monkeypatch.delenv(env_key, raising=False)
    monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED", "1")
    # Isolate durable session-state files so tests never share host cache (#559).
    import tempfile
@@ -117,6 +116,7 @@ def _reset_mutation_authority(monkeypatch):
        monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_ACTOR_IDENTITY_CACHE", {})
    monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_REVIEW_DECISION_LOCK", None)
    monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_LIVE_NAMESPACE_HEALTH", {})
    monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_PROFILE_SWITCH_INVALIDATION", None)
    monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_preflight_whoami_called", False)
    monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_preflight_capability_called", False)
    monkeypatch.setattr(mcp_server, "_preflight_resolved_role", None)
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ CONFIG = {
            ],
            "forbidden_operations": [],
            "execution_profile": "full-author",
-        "allowed_repositories": ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools", "Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
        },
        "reviewer-no-commit": {
            "enabled": True,
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ CONFIG = {
                "gitea.repo.commit", "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"
            ],
            "execution_profile": "reviewer-no-commit",
-        "allowed_repositories": ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools", "Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
        },
    },
    "rules": {"allow_runtime_switching": False},
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ class TestLauncherSnippets(unittest.TestCase):
    def test_only_safe_keys_no_secrets(self):
        entry = gitea_config.launcher_entry("prgs", "/cfg/profiles.json")["gitea-tools"]
        self.assertEqual(set(entry), {"command", "args", "env"})
-        self.assertEqual(set(entry["env"]), {"GITEA_MCP_CONFIG", "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE", "GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED"})
+        self.assertEqual(set(entry["env"]), {"GITEA_MCP_CONFIG", "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE"})
        self.assertEqual(entry["env"]["GITEA_MCP_PROFILE"], "prgs")
        blob = json.dumps(entry).lower()
        for word in ("token", "password", "secret"):
@@ -1,139 +0,0 @@
 """Tests for Issue #686: Detect and reject manually launched duplicate MCP role servers."""
 import os
 import unittest
 from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock
 from datetime import datetime
 import gitea_config
 import gitea_mcp_server
 import mcp_namespace_health
 class TestIssue686ManualMcpProvenance(unittest.TestCase):
    def test_client_managed_process_detection(self):
        """Test _is_client_managed_process correctly detects provenance markers."""
        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED": "1"}, clear=True):
            self.assertTrue(gitea_mcp_server._is_client_managed_process())
        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_MCP_CLIENT_MANAGED": "true"}, clear=True):
            self.assertTrue(gitea_mcp_server._is_client_managed_process())
        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_SERVER_PROVENANCE": "client_managed"}, clear=True):
            self.assertTrue(gitea_mcp_server._is_client_managed_process())
        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED": "0"}, clear=True):
            self.assertFalse(gitea_mcp_server._is_client_managed_process())
    def test_unconsumed_gitea_env_overrides(self):
        """Test surfacing of unsupported GITEA_* env overrides (e.g. GITEA_DUMMY)."""
        env = {
            "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author",
            "GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED": "1",
            "GITEA_DUMMY": "2",
            "GITEA_UNKNOWN_FLAG": "abc",
        }
        unconsumed = gitea_config.get_unconsumed_gitea_env_overrides(env)
        self.assertIn("GITEA_DUMMY", unconsumed)
        self.assertEqual(unconsumed["GITEA_DUMMY"], "2")
        self.assertIn("GITEA_UNKNOWN_FLAG", unconsumed)
        self.assertNotIn("GITEA_MCP_PROFILE", unconsumed)
        self.assertNotIn("GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED", unconsumed)
    def test_manual_server_mutation_fail_closed(self):
        """AC 2: Mutating tools on a server without client-managed provenance fail closed with a typed blocker."""
        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED": "0"}, clear=True):
            block = gitea_mcp_server._provenance_mutation_block(task="create_issue")
            self.assertIsNotNone(block)
            self.assertFalse(block["success"])
            self.assertFalse(block["performed"])
            self.assertEqual(block["blocker_kind"], "unsupported_manual_launch")
            self.assertEqual(block["provenance"], "manual_launch")
            self.assertTrue(any("mutation denied: server process was launched manually" in r for r in block["reasons"]))
            self.assertIn("BLOCKED + RECONNECT", block["exact_next_action"])
    def test_client_managed_server_mutation_passes_provenance_gate(self):
        """AC 3: Clean client-managed baseline passes the provenance gate."""
        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED": "1"}, clear=True):
            block = gitea_mcp_server._provenance_mutation_block(task="create_issue")
            self.assertIsNone(block)
    @patch("subprocess.run")
    @patch("os.path.getmtime")
    @patch("os.path.exists")
    @patch("os.getpid")
    def test_manual_duplicate_does_not_mask_stale_runtime(
        self, mock_getpid, mock_exists, mock_getmtime, mock_run
    ):
        """AC 1 & AC 3: Staleness detection ignores manual duplicates and reports stale supported runtimes."""
        mock_getpid.return_value = 12345
        mock_exists.return_value = True
        code_time = datetime(2026, 7, 8, 14, 0, 0)
        mock_getmtime.return_value = code_time.timestamp()
        # PID 12345: stale client-managed process (started at 13:00)
        # PID 99999: fresh manual duplicate process (started at 15:00, no GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED)
        ps_output = (
            "  PID LSTART COMMAND\n"
            "12345 Wed Jul  8 13:00:00 2026 /path/to/python mcp_server.py\n"
            "99999 Wed Jul  8 15:00:00 2026 /path/to/python mcp_server.py\n"
        )
        mock_run_ps = MagicMock()
        mock_run_ps.stdout = ps_output
        mock_env_12345 = MagicMock()
        mock_env_12345.stdout = "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-author GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED=1"
        mock_env_99999 = MagicMock()
        mock_env_99999.stdout = "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-author GITEA_DUMMY=2"
        def side_effect(args, **kwargs):
            if args[0] == "ps" and "eww" in args:
                pid = args[2]
                if pid == "12345":
                    return mock_env_12345
                elif pid == "99999":
                    return mock_env_99999
            elif args[0] == "ps":
                return mock_run_ps
            raise ValueError(f"Unexpected args: {args}")
        mock_run.side_effect = side_effect
        reasons = gitea_mcp_server._check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics("create_issue", ["prgs-author"])
        # Manual duplicate process must be flagged
        self.assertTrue(any("Duplicate MCP server process(es) detected" in r for r in reasons))
        # Unsupported env override (GITEA_DUMMY=2) must be flagged
        self.assertTrue(any("unsupported-env: Unsupported GITEA_* environment variable override(s) detected: GITEA_DUMMY=2" in r for r in reasons))
        # Stale runtime must NOT be masked by fresh manual process 99999!
        self.assertTrue(any("All matching profiles for task 'create_issue' (['prgs-author']) are running but stale" in r for r in reasons))
    def test_namespace_health_classification_includes_provenance(self):
        """AC 1 & 4: mcp_namespace_health diagnostics include provenance and unconsumed_gitea_env."""
        process = {
            "pid": 5555,
            "profile": "prgs-author",
            "env": {
                "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author",
                "GITEA_DUMMY": "99",
            },
        }
        res = mcp_namespace_health.classify_namespace_probe(
            "gitea-author",
            configured=True,
            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
            probe_result={"success": True},
            process=process,
            probe_source="client_namespace",
        )
        self.assertEqual(res["provenance"], "manual_launch")
        self.assertFalse(res["is_client_managed"])
        self.assertEqual(res["unconsumed_gitea_env"], {"GITEA_DUMMY": "99"})
        self.assertEqual(res["diagnostics"]["provenance"], "manual_launch")
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    unittest.main()
@@ -0,0 +1,274 @@
 """Regression coverage for #690: cross-role profile activation invalidation.
 A mid-run profile switch (e.g. reviewer → author → reviewer) must invalidate
 workflow-load proof, reviewer lease binding, review decision lock, live
 namespace health, and preflight identity/capability stamps, and must require
 a full reviewer preflight before any formal verdict. Namespace provenance
 must be reported and fail closed on task/namespace mismatch.
 """
 import json
 import os
 import sys
 import tempfile
 import unittest
 from unittest.mock import patch
 sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 import gitea_config
 import mcp_namespace_health
 import mcp_server
 import mcp_session_state
 import review_workflow_load
 import reviewer_pr_lease
 from tests.test_runtime_clarity import CONFIG_SWITCHING_ENABLED
 class TestProfileSwitchReviewGuard(unittest.TestCase):
    def setUp(self):
        self._remotes_patch = patch.dict(mcp_server.REMOTES, {
            "dadeschools": {"host": "gitea.example.com", "org": "Example-Org", "repo": "Example-Repo"},
            "prgs": {"host": "gitea.example.com", "org": "Example-Org", "repo": "Example-Repo"},
        })
        self._remotes_patch.start()
        mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
        gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
        self._dir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
        self.config_path = os.path.join(self._dir.name, "profiles.json")
        with open(self.config_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
            fh.write(json.dumps(CONFIG_SWITCHING_ENABLED))
    def tearDown(self):
        self._remotes_patch.stop()
        mcp_server._IDENTITY_CACHE.clear()
        gitea_config._active_profile_override = None
        self._dir.cleanup()
    def _env(self, profile="reviewer-profile"):
        return {
            "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": self.config_path,
            "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": profile,
            "GITEA_TOKEN_AUTHOR": "author-pass",
            "GITEA_TOKEN_REVIEWER": "reviewer-pass",
            "GITEA_TOKEN_MERGER": "merger-pass",
        }
    def _seed_contaminated_review_state(self):
        """Simulate an in-flight reviewer run under reviewer-profile."""
        mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called = True
        mcp_server._preflight_capability_called = True
        mcp_server._preflight_resolved_role = "reviewer"
        mcp_server._preflight_resolved_task = "review_pr"
        review_workflow_load._REVIEW_WORKFLOW_LOAD = {"loaded": True}
        mcp_server._REVIEW_DECISION_LOCK = {
            "session_profile": "reviewer-profile",
            "final_review_decision_ready": True,
            "ready_pr_number": 688,
        }
        reviewer_pr_lease.record_session_lease(
            {"session_id": "lease-session-1", "pr_number": 688}
        )
        mcp_server._LIVE_NAMESPACE_HEALTH["gitea-reviewer"] = {
            "namespace": "gitea-reviewer",
            "healthy": True,
            "ide_namespace_proven": True,
        }
        # Durable records keyed by the reviewer identity must also be cleared.
        mcp_session_state.save_state(
            kind=mcp_session_state.KIND_WORKFLOW_LOAD,
            payload={"loaded": True},
            profile_identity="reviewer-profile",
        )
        mcp_session_state.save_state(
            kind=mcp_session_state.KIND_DECISION_LOCK,
            payload={"final_review_decision_ready": True, "ready_pr_number": 688},
            profile_identity="reviewer-profile",
        )
    def _activate(self, target, logins):
        with patch.object(
            mcp_server, "get_auth_header", side_effect=[f"token p" for _ in logins]
        ), patch.object(
            mcp_server, "api_request", side_effect=[{"login": l} for l in logins]
        ), patch.object(
            mcp_server,
            "_workspace_repository_slug",
            return_value="Example-Org/Example-Repo",
        ), patch.object(
            mcp_server, "_canonical_repository_slug", return_value=(None, [])
        ):
            return mcp_server.gitea_activate_profile(profile_name=target)
    # -----------------------------------------------------------------
    # AC1/AC2/AC3: switch invalidates review state; re-preflight required
    # -----------------------------------------------------------------
    def test_switch_invalidates_review_state_and_blocks_verdict(self):
        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("reviewer-profile"), clear=True):
            self._seed_contaminated_review_state()
            res = self._activate("author-profile", ["reviewer-user", "author-user"])
            self.assertTrue(res["success"])
            self.assertTrue(res["re_preflight_required"])
            inv = res["review_state_invalidation"]
            self.assertEqual(inv["from_profile"], "reviewer-profile")
            self.assertEqual(inv["to_profile"], "author-profile")
            for item in (
                "preflight_identity_capability",
                "review_workflow_load",
                "review_decision_lock",
                "reviewer_session_lease",
                "live_namespace_health",
            ):
                self.assertIn(item, inv["invalidated"])
            # In-memory state cleared.
            self.assertFalse(mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called)
            self.assertFalse(mcp_server._preflight_capability_called)
            self.assertIsNone(mcp_server._preflight_resolved_task)
            self.assertIsNone(review_workflow_load._REVIEW_WORKFLOW_LOAD)
            self.assertIsNone(mcp_server._REVIEW_DECISION_LOCK)
            self.assertIsNone(reviewer_pr_lease.get_session_lease())
            self.assertEqual(mcp_server._LIVE_NAMESPACE_HEALTH, {})
            self.assertIsNotNone(mcp_server._PROFILE_SWITCH_INVALIDATION)
            # Durable records keyed by the reviewer identity are gone.
            self.assertIsNone(
                mcp_session_state.load_state(
                    kind=mcp_session_state.KIND_WORKFLOW_LOAD,
                    profile_identity="reviewer-profile",
                )
            )
            self.assertIsNone(
                mcp_session_state.load_state(
                    kind=mcp_session_state.KIND_DECISION_LOCK,
                    profile_identity="reviewer-profile",
                )
            )
            # A formal verdict without re-preflight fails closed.
            reasons = mcp_server.check_review_decision_gate(
                688, "APPROVE", final_review_decision_ready=True
            )
            self.assertTrue(reasons)
    def test_switch_back_cannot_resurrect_stale_review_run(self):
        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("reviewer-profile"), clear=True):
            self._seed_contaminated_review_state()
            self._activate("author-profile", ["reviewer-user", "author-user"])
            res = self._activate("reviewer-profile", ["author-user", "reviewer-user"])
            self.assertTrue(res["success"])
            # The pre-switch review run must not reappear.
            self.assertIsNone(mcp_server._REVIEW_DECISION_LOCK)
            self.assertIsNone(review_workflow_load._REVIEW_WORKFLOW_LOAD)
            self.assertIsNone(reviewer_pr_lease.get_session_lease())
            status = review_workflow_load.workflow_load_status()
            self.assertFalse(status["workflow_load_valid"])
            reasons = mcp_server.check_review_decision_gate(
                688, "APPROVE", final_review_decision_ready=True
            )
            self.assertTrue(reasons)
    def test_same_profile_reactivation_keeps_state(self):
        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("reviewer-profile"), clear=True):
            self._seed_contaminated_review_state()
            res = self._activate("reviewer-profile", ["reviewer-user", "reviewer-user"])
            self.assertTrue(res["success"], res)
            self.assertNotIn("review_state_invalidation", res)
            self.assertIsNotNone(mcp_server._REVIEW_DECISION_LOCK)
            self.assertTrue(mcp_server._preflight_whoami_called)
    def test_clean_repreflight_after_switch_allows_gate(self):
        with patch.dict(os.environ, self._env("reviewer-profile"), clear=True):
            self._seed_contaminated_review_state()
            self._activate("author-profile", ["reviewer-user", "author-user"])
            self._activate("reviewer-profile", ["author-user", "reviewer-user"])
            # Re-establish the full reviewer preflight under the new profile.
            mcp_server.record_preflight_check("whoami")
            mcp_server.record_preflight_check(
                "capability", resolved_role="reviewer", resolved_task="review_pr"
            )
            mcp_server.init_review_decision_lock("dadeschools", "review_pr")
            lock = mcp_server._load_review_decision_lock()
            self.assertIsNotNone(lock)
            lock.update(
                {
                    "final_review_decision_ready": True,
                    "ready_pr_number": 688,
                    "ready_action": "APPROVE",
                    "ready_remote": "dadeschools",
                    "ready_org": "Example-Org",
                    "ready_repo": "Example-Repo",
                }
            )
            mcp_server._save_review_decision_lock(lock)
            with patch.object(
                mcp_server, "_review_workflow_load_gate_reasons", return_value=[]
            ):
                reasons = mcp_server.check_review_decision_gate(
                    688,
                    "APPROVE",
                    final_review_decision_ready=True,
                    remote="dadeschools",
                )
            self.assertEqual(reasons, [])
    # -----------------------------------------------------------------
    # AC4: namespace provenance reporting + fail-closed mismatch
    # -----------------------------------------------------------------
    def test_namespace_provenance_mismatch_detection(self):
        prov = mcp_namespace_health.namespace_provenance(
            task="review_pr",
            active_profile="reviewer-profile",
            env={"GITEA_MCP_NAMESPACE": "gitea-author"},
        )
        self.assertTrue(prov["mismatch"])
        self.assertEqual(prov["required_namespace"], "gitea-reviewer")
        prov_ok = mcp_namespace_health.namespace_provenance(
            task="review_pr",
            active_profile="reviewer-profile",
            env={"GITEA_MCP_NAMESPACE": "gitea-reviewer"},
        )
        self.assertFalse(prov_ok["mismatch"])
        prov_unknown = mcp_namespace_health.namespace_provenance(
            task="review_pr", active_profile="reviewer-profile", env={}
        )
        self.assertIsNone(prov_unknown["configured_namespace"])
        self.assertFalse(prov_unknown["mismatch"])
        self.assertEqual(prov_unknown["namespace_source"], "unknown")
    @patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"login": "reviewer-user"})
    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token reviewer-pass")
    def test_whoami_reports_namespace_provenance(self, _auth, _api):
        env = self._env("reviewer-profile")
        env["GITEA_MCP_NAMESPACE"] = "gitea-reviewer"
        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
            res = mcp_server.gitea_whoami(remote="dadeschools")
        prov = res["namespace_provenance"]
        self.assertEqual(prov["configured_namespace"], "gitea-reviewer")
        self.assertEqual(prov["active_profile"], "reviewer-profile")
        self.assertFalse(prov["mismatch"])
    @patch("mcp_server.api_request", return_value={"login": "reviewer-user"})
    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value="token reviewer-pass")
    def test_resolve_fails_closed_on_namespace_mismatch(self, _auth, _api):
        env = self._env("reviewer-profile")
        env["GITEA_MCP_NAMESPACE"] = "gitea-author"
        with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
            res = mcp_server.gitea_resolve_task_capability(
                task="review_pr", kwargs="{}", remote="dadeschools"
            )
        self.assertFalse(res["allowed_in_current_session"])
        self.assertTrue(res["namespace_provenance"]["mismatch"])
        self.assertTrue(
            any("namespace" in g for g in res["task_role_guidance"])
        )
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    unittest.main()
@@ -1,215 +0,0 @@
 """Regression: author worktree bootstrap from clean control checkout (#892).
 #892 is the four-door deadlock where every documented recovery path is closed:
 bootstrap refuses control, lock demands an existing worktree, worktree-start
 demands a lock, and shell worktree add is outside the sanctioned MCP path.
 Root cause: assess_author_issue_bootstrap returned allowed/proven for a clean
 control checkout, but bootstrap_permits_control_checkout only accepted
 create_issue assessments (task_scope=create_issue_only + empty reasons + full
 base-tip field set). Author assessments never satisfied the shared predicate,
 so the #274/#604 guards kept the ordinary control-checkout block.
 """
 from __future__ import annotations
 import os
 import tempfile
 import unittest
 from unittest import mock
 import author_issue_bootstrap as aib
 import create_issue_bootstrap as cib
 CONTROL = "/repo/Gitea-Tools"
 MASTER = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
 OTHER = "bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"
 def _assess(
    *,
    workspace=CONTROL,
    root=CONTROL,
    branch="master",
    head=MASTER,
    porcelain="",
    remote=MASTER,
    remote_error=None,
    task="bootstrap_author_issue_worktree",
 ):
    return aib.assess_author_issue_bootstrap(
        workspace_path=workspace,
        canonical_repo_root=root,
        current_branch=branch,
        head_sha=head,
        porcelain_status=porcelain,
        remote_master_sha=remote,
        remote_master_sha_error=remote_error,
        task=task,
    )
 class TestAuthorBootstrapAssessmentShape(unittest.TestCase):
    def test_clean_control_emits_predicate_compatible_fields(self):
        assessment = _assess()
        self.assertTrue(assessment["allowed"])
        self.assertTrue(assessment["proven"])
        self.assertFalse(assessment["block"])
        self.assertFalse(assessment["not_applicable"])
        self.assertEqual(assessment["reasons"], [])
        self.assertEqual(assessment["task_scope"], "author_issue_bootstrap")
        self.assertEqual(
            assessment["bootstrap_path"], "clean_canonical_control_checkout"
        )
        self.assertEqual(assessment["dirty_files"], [])
        self.assertIs(assessment["under_branches"], False)
        self.assertTrue(assessment["base_tips_verified"])
        self.assertEqual(assessment["local_head_sha"], MASTER)
        self.assertEqual(assessment["remote_master_sha"], MASTER)
        self.assertEqual(assessment["workspace_path"], os.path.realpath(CONTROL))
        self.assertEqual(
            assessment["canonical_repo_root"], os.path.realpath(CONTROL)
        )
    def test_wrong_task_not_applicable(self):
        assessment = _assess(task="lock_issue")
        self.assertTrue(assessment["not_applicable"])
        self.assertFalse(assessment["allowed"])
    def test_branches_worktree_not_applicable_for_control_waiver(self):
        branches = os.path.join(CONTROL, "branches", "fix-issue-1")
        assessment = _assess(workspace=branches)
        self.assertTrue(assessment["not_applicable"])
        self.assertFalse(assessment["allowed"])
        self.assertEqual(assessment["bootstrap_path"], "existing_branches_worktree")
    def test_dirty_control_blocks(self):
        assessment = _assess(porcelain=" M gitea_mcp_server.py\n")
        self.assertTrue(assessment["block"])
        self.assertFalse(assessment["allowed"])
        self.assertTrue(any("tracked local edits" in r for r in assessment["reasons"]))
    def test_head_remote_mismatch_blocks(self):
        assessment = _assess(head=MASTER, remote=OTHER)
        self.assertTrue(assessment["block"])
        self.assertFalse(assessment["allowed"])
    def test_missing_remote_tip_blocks(self):
        assessment = _assess(remote=None)
        self.assertTrue(assessment["block"])
        self.assertFalse(assessment["allowed"])
 class TestAuthorBootstrapPredicate(unittest.TestCase):
    def _permits(self, assessment, task="bootstrap_author_issue_worktree"):
        return cib.bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
            assessment,
            task=task,
            workspace_path=os.path.realpath(CONTROL),
            canonical_repo_root=os.path.realpath(CONTROL),
        )
    def test_clean_author_bootstrap_permits(self):
        self.assertTrue(self._permits(_assess()))
    def test_tool_alias_permits(self):
        assessment = _assess(task="gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree")
        self.assertTrue(
            self._permits(assessment, task="gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree")
        )
    def test_create_issue_scope_cannot_license_author_bootstrap(self):
        # Cross-scope smuggling: a create_issue-shaped assessment must not
        # authorize the author bootstrap task.
        create_shaped = dict(_assess())
        create_shaped["task_scope"] = "create_issue_only"
        self.assertFalse(self._permits(create_shaped))
    def test_author_scope_cannot_license_create_issue(self):
        assessment = _assess()
        self.assertFalse(
            cib.bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
                assessment,
                task="create_issue",
                workspace_path=os.path.realpath(CONTROL),
                canonical_repo_root=os.path.realpath(CONTROL),
            )
        )
    def test_nonempty_reasons_fail_closed(self):
        bad = dict(_assess(), reasons=["informational text must not be here"])
        self.assertFalse(self._permits(bad))
    def test_dirty_fails_closed(self):
        self.assertFalse(self._permits(_assess(porcelain=" M x.py\n")))
    def test_mismatch_fails_closed(self):
        self.assertFalse(self._permits(_assess(remote=OTHER)))
 class TestAuthorBootstrapPreflightIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
    """Server preflight path: clean control + author bootstrap task must not raise."""
    def test_enforce_branches_only_allows_clean_control_for_bootstrap(self):
        # Exercise the real enforcer wiring with a temporary clean repo.
        import gitea_mcp_server as srv
        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
            repo = os.path.join(tmp, "repo")
            os.makedirs(os.path.join(repo, "branches"))
            # Minimal git repo on master at a known tip.
            import subprocess
            subprocess.check_call(["git", "init", "-b", "master", repo])
            subprocess.check_call(
                ["git", "-C", repo, "commit", "--allow-empty", "-m", "init"]
            )
            head = subprocess.check_output(
                ["git", "-C", repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD"], text=True
            ).strip()
            assessment = aib.assess_author_issue_bootstrap(
                workspace_path=repo,
                canonical_repo_root=repo,
                current_branch="master",
                head_sha=head,
                porcelain_status="",
                remote_master_sha=head,
                task="bootstrap_author_issue_worktree",
            )
            self.assertTrue(
                cib.bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
                    assessment,
                    task="bootstrap_author_issue_worktree",
                    workspace_path=repo,
                    canonical_repo_root=repo,
                )
            )
            # Simulate what _enforce_branches_only_author_mutation does when
            # durable resolution blocks control: the shared predicate must waive.
            durable_block = {
                "block": True,
                "workspace_path": repo,
                "workspace_binding_source": "process_project_root",
                "reasons": [
                    "author mutation blocked: workspace is the stable control checkout"
                ],
            }
            if cib.bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
                assessment,
                task="bootstrap_author_issue_worktree",
                workspace_path=repo,
                canonical_repo_root=repo,
            ):
                waived = True
            else:
                waived = False
            self.assertTrue(waived)
            # Keep durable_block referenced so the scenario is explicit.
            self.assertTrue(durable_block["block"])
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    unittest.main()
@@ -1,346 +0,0 @@
 """Regression: author bootstrap scope reaches workflow_scope_guard (#941).
 PR #926 (#892) made ``bootstrap_permits_control_checkout`` accept
 ``task_scope=author_issue_bootstrap`` and wired that canonical decision into
 the #274 branches-only enforcer and the #604 anti-stomp preflight. A third
 enforcement path was left unwired.
 ``workflow_scope_guard.assess_root_source_mutation`` kept its own copy of the
 clean-root author decision, gated on ``create_issue_bootstrap.is_create_issue_task``
 — a task-name allowlist that never contained ``bootstrap_author_issue_worktree``.
 So the real call path
    gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree
      -> verify_preflight_purity
        -> _enforce_issue_scope_guard
          -> workflow_scope_guard.assess_production_mutation_guards
 raised ProductionGuardError(missing_issue_worktree) before
 ``assess_author_issue_bootstrap`` was ever consulted.
 These tests drive the real enforcer, not the authorization helper in
 isolation. A helper-only test cannot observe this defect: #892's own predicate
 tests all passed while the live bootstrap stayed blocked.
 """
 from __future__ import annotations
 import os
 import subprocess
 import tempfile
 import unittest
 from unittest import mock
 import author_issue_bootstrap as aib
 import create_issue_bootstrap as cib
 import workflow_scope_guard
 BOOTSTRAP_TASK = "bootstrap_author_issue_worktree"
 BOOTSTRAP_TOOL = "gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree"
 def _make_control_repo(tmp: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
    """Create a clean control checkout on master and return (path, head)."""
    repo = os.path.join(tmp, "repo")
    os.makedirs(os.path.join(repo, "branches"))
    subprocess.check_call(
        ["git", "init", "-b", "master", repo],
        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
    )
    subprocess.check_call(
        [
            "git", "-C", repo,
            "-c", "user.email=t@t", "-c", "user.name=t",
            "commit", "--allow-empty", "-m", "init",
        ],
        stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
        stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
    )
    head = subprocess.check_output(
        ["git", "-C", repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD"], text=True
    ).strip()
    return repo, head
 def _assessment(
    repo: str,
    head: str,
    *,
    task: str = BOOTSTRAP_TASK,
    porcelain: str = "",
    remote: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict:
    return aib.assess_author_issue_bootstrap(
        workspace_path=repo,
        canonical_repo_root=repo,
        current_branch="master",
        head_sha=head,
        porcelain_status=porcelain,
        remote_master_sha=head if remote is None else remote,
        task=task,
    )
 class _ControlCheckoutHarness(unittest.TestCase):
    """Drive the real server guard against a temporary clean control checkout."""
    def setUp(self):
        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
        self.addCleanup(self._tmp.cleanup)
        self.repo, self.head = _make_control_repo(self._tmp.name)
        # #683 force-on: production guards must execute under pytest.
        patcher = mock.patch.dict(
            os.environ,
            {workflow_scope_guard.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV: "1"},
        )
        patcher.start()
        self.addCleanup(patcher.stop)
    def _enforce(
        self,
        task: str,
        *,
        porcelain: str = "",
        assessment: object = "auto",
        role_kind: str = "author",
    ):
        """Call the real _enforce_issue_scope_guard for *task*."""
        import gitea_mcp_server as srv
        if assessment == "auto":
            assessment = _assessment(
                self.repo, self.head, task=task, porcelain=porcelain
            )
        ctx = {
            "workspace_path": self.repo,
            "canonical_repo_root": self.repo,
            "workspace_role_kind": role_kind,
            "workspace_binding_source": "process_project_root",
        }
        git_state = {
            "current_branch": "master",
            "head_sha": self.head,
            "porcelain_status": porcelain,
        }
        with mock.patch.object(
            srv, "_resolve_namespace_mutation_context", return_value=ctx
        ), mock.patch.object(
            srv.issue_lock_worktree,
            "read_worktree_git_state",
            return_value=git_state,
        ), mock.patch.object(
            srv,
            "_session_issue_lock_snapshot",
            return_value={
                "locked_issue_number": None,
                "lock_branch_name": None,
                "worktrees_match": False,
            },
        ), mock.patch.object(
            srv, "_actual_profile_role", return_value=role_kind
        ), mock.patch.object(
            srv, "_effective_workspace_role", return_value=role_kind
        ), mock.patch.object(
            srv, "_create_issue_bootstrap_assessment", return_value=assessment
        ):
            srv._enforce_issue_scope_guard(None, task=task)
 class TestRealPathBootstrapReachesGuard(_ControlCheckoutHarness):
    """The defect and its fix, observed through the real enforcer."""
    def test_bootstrap_task_passes_scope_guard_from_clean_control(self):
        # Pre-fix this raises ProductionGuardError(missing_issue_worktree)
        # because the guard consulted a task-name allowlist instead of the
        # canonical authorization decision.
        self._enforce(BOOTSTRAP_TASK)
    def test_bootstrap_tool_alias_passes_scope_guard(self):
        self._enforce(BOOTSTRAP_TOOL)
    def test_guard_consults_canonical_predicate(self):
        """The guard must reach bootstrap_permits_control_checkout, not a name list."""
        real = cib.bootstrap_permits_control_checkout
        seen: list[str | None] = []
        def _spy(assessment, *, task, workspace_path, canonical_repo_root):
            seen.append(task)
            return real(
                assessment,
                task=task,
                workspace_path=workspace_path,
                canonical_repo_root=canonical_repo_root,
            )
        with mock.patch.object(
            cib, "bootstrap_permits_control_checkout", side_effect=_spy
        ):
            self._enforce(BOOTSTRAP_TASK)
        self.assertIn(
            BOOTSTRAP_TASK,
            seen,
            "workflow_scope_guard did not consult the canonical bootstrap "
            "authorization decision",
        )
 class TestFailClosedOnBadEvidence(_ControlCheckoutHarness):
    """Missing, malformed, or mismatched scope evidence must still block."""
    def _assert_blocked(self, **kwargs):
        with self.assertRaises(workflow_scope_guard.ProductionGuardError):
            self._enforce(BOOTSTRAP_TASK, **kwargs)
    def test_missing_assessment_fails_closed(self):
        self._assert_blocked(assessment=None)
    def test_malformed_assessment_fails_closed(self):
        self._assert_blocked(assessment={"allowed": True})
    def test_non_dict_assessment_fails_closed(self):
        self._assert_blocked(assessment="allowed")
    def test_wrong_task_scope_fails_closed(self):
        bad = dict(_assessment(self.repo, self.head))
        bad["task_scope"] = "create_issue_only"
        self._assert_blocked(assessment=bad)
    def test_nonempty_reasons_fail_closed(self):
        bad = dict(_assessment(self.repo, self.head), reasons=["note"])
        self._assert_blocked(assessment=bad)
    def test_mismatched_base_tips_fail_closed(self):
        bad = dict(_assessment(self.repo, self.head))
        bad["remote_master_sha"] = "b" * 40
        self._assert_blocked(assessment=bad)
    def test_unverified_base_tips_fail_closed(self):
        bad = dict(_assessment(self.repo, self.head), base_tips_verified=False)
        self._assert_blocked(assessment=bad)
    def test_mismatched_workspace_binding_fails_closed(self):
        bad = dict(_assessment(self.repo, self.head))
        bad["workspace_path"] = os.path.join(self.repo, "elsewhere")
        self._assert_blocked(assessment=bad)
    def test_mismatched_repo_root_binding_fails_closed(self):
        bad = dict(_assessment(self.repo, self.head))
        bad["canonical_repo_root"] = os.path.join(self.repo, "other-root")
        self._assert_blocked(assessment=bad)
    def test_blocked_assessment_fails_closed(self):
        bad = dict(_assessment(self.repo, self.head), block=True, allowed=False)
        self._assert_blocked(assessment=bad)
 class TestOrdinaryControlCheckoutMutationStillForbidden(_ControlCheckoutHarness):
    """The waiver must not leak to ordinary author work."""
    def test_ordinary_author_task_still_blocked(self):
        with self.assertRaises(workflow_scope_guard.ProductionGuardError):
            self._enforce("commit_files", assessment=None)
    def test_lock_issue_still_blocked_from_control(self):
        with self.assertRaises(workflow_scope_guard.ProductionGuardError):
            self._enforce("lock_issue", assessment=None)
    def test_bootstrap_assessment_cannot_license_other_task(self):
        # Cross-task smuggling: valid bootstrap evidence must not waive a
        # different author mutation.
        good = _assessment(self.repo, self.head)
        with self.assertRaises(workflow_scope_guard.ProductionGuardError):
            self._enforce("commit_files", assessment=good)
    def test_dirty_control_checkout_still_blocked_for_bootstrap(self):
        with self.assertRaises(workflow_scope_guard.ProductionGuardError):
            self._enforce(BOOTSTRAP_TASK, porcelain=" M gitea_mcp_server.py\n")
 class TestCreateIssueBehaviorUnchanged(_ControlCheckoutHarness):
    """#749 create_issue keeps its own sanctioned path."""
    def test_create_issue_still_allowed_from_clean_control(self):
        self._enforce("create_issue", assessment=None)
    def test_create_issue_tool_alias_still_allowed(self):
        self._enforce("gitea_create_issue", assessment=None)
    def test_create_issue_blocked_when_control_dirty(self):
        with self.assertRaises(workflow_scope_guard.ProductionGuardError):
            self._enforce(
                "create_issue",
                porcelain=" M gitea_mcp_server.py\n",
                assessment=None,
            )
 class TestGuardUnitLevelWiring(unittest.TestCase):
    """assess_root_source_mutation itself must accept and honour the evidence."""
    def setUp(self):
        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
        self.addCleanup(self._tmp.cleanup)
        self.repo, self.head = _make_control_repo(self._tmp.name)
        patcher = mock.patch.dict(
            os.environ,
            {workflow_scope_guard.FORCE_PRODUCTION_GUARDS_ENV: "1"},
        )
        patcher.start()
        self.addCleanup(patcher.stop)
    def _assess(self, *, task=BOOTSTRAP_TASK, bootstrap_assessment="auto"):
        if bootstrap_assessment == "auto":
            bootstrap_assessment = _assessment(self.repo, self.head, task=task)
        return workflow_scope_guard.assess_root_source_mutation(
            workspace_path=self.repo,
            canonical_repo_root=self.repo,
            porcelain_status="",
            current_branch="master",
            role_kind="author",
            mutation_task=task,
            bootstrap_assessment=bootstrap_assessment,
        )
    def test_valid_evidence_unblocks(self):
        result = self._assess()
        self.assertFalse(result["block"])
        self.assertIsNone(result["blocker_kind"])
    def test_absent_evidence_blocks(self):
        result = self._assess(bootstrap_assessment=None)
        self.assertTrue(result["block"])
        self.assertEqual(
            result["blocker_kind"], workflow_scope_guard.BLOCKER_MISSING_WORKTREE
        )
    def test_reconciler_exemption_preserved(self):
        result = workflow_scope_guard.assess_root_source_mutation(
            workspace_path=self.repo,
            canonical_repo_root=self.repo,
            porcelain_status="",
            current_branch="master",
            role_kind="reconciler",
            mutation_task=BOOTSTRAP_TASK,
        )
        self.assertFalse(result["block"])
    def test_signature_accepts_evidence_without_it_being_required(self):
        # Callers that supply no evidence keep the pre-existing behaviour.
        result = workflow_scope_guard.assess_root_source_mutation(
            workspace_path=self.repo,
            canonical_repo_root=self.repo,
            porcelain_status="",
            current_branch="master",
            role_kind="author",
            mutation_task="create_issue",
        )
        self.assertFalse(result["block"])
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    unittest.main()
@@ -1,465 +0,0 @@
 import sys as _sys
 from pathlib import Path as _Path
 _sys.path.insert(0, str(_Path(__file__).resolve().parent))
 from mutation_profile_fixture import shared_mutation_env  # noqa: F401,E402
 """Exact-owner renewal keeps its owning-PR waiver past lock_issue (#945).
 #755 taught the duplicate-work gate that a sanctioned *dead-session recovery*
 owns its open PR, and #768 taught the later gates to rebuild that proof from the
 durable lock. #760 added the exact-owner *renewal* disposition and granted it
 the same waiver inside ``gitea_lock_issue`` — but never added the matching
 rebuild. So an ordinary renewal held the waiver only for the duration of the
 lock call: ``_enforce_locked_issue_duplicate_recheck`` asked
 ``recovered_owning_pr_from_lock``, which reads only ``dead_session_recovery``,
 and the very next commit was refused ``duplicate_commit_prevented`` with
 ``owning_pr_recovery_exempted: false`` on the PR the renewal had just proved.
 ``TestPreFixReproduction`` pins that defect directly: the recovery-only rebuild
 still returns ``None`` for a renewal lock, which is exactly why the gates lost
 the waiver. Everything else proves the renewal half now survives, that recovery
 is unchanged, and that no path grants an exemption on weaker evidence.
 Every fixture here is an in-memory mapping. Nothing writes a branch, worktree,
 lock file, lease, comment, or PR (#945 AC18).
 """
 import copy
 import sys
 import unittest
 from pathlib import Path
 sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
 import gitea_mcp_server  # noqa: E402
 import issue_lock_recovery  # noqa: E402
 import issue_lock_renewal  # noqa: E402
 from issue_work_duplicate_gate import (  # noqa: E402
    OUTCOME_DUPLICATE_WORK_NOT_PREVENTED,
    PHASE_COMMIT,
    PHASE_CREATE_PR,
    PHASE_LOCK,
    PHASE_PUSH,
    assess_work_issue_duplicate_gate,
 )
 ISSUE = 4945
 OWNING_PR = 4946
 OTHER_PR = 4947
 BRANCH = f"fix/issue-{ISSUE}-owning-pr-renewal"
 OTHER_BRANCH = f"fix/issue-{ISSUE}-competing"
 HEAD = "a" * 40
 OTHER_HEAD = "b" * 40
 IDENTITY = "example-user"
 PROFILE = "test-author-prgs"
 def renewal_record(**overrides):
    """The ``lease_renewal`` block ``build_renewal_record`` writes on success."""
    record = {
        "renewed": True,
        "renewed_at": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
        "prior_pid": 4242,
        "prior_pid_alive": True,
        "prior_expires_at": "2026-01-01T00:00:00Z",
        "replacement_pid": 4243,
        "new_expires_at": "2026-01-01T00:10:00Z",
        "identity": IDENTITY,
        "profile": PROFILE,
        "branch_name": BRANCH,
        "worktree_path": f"branches/issue-{ISSUE}-owning-pr-renewal",
        "head_sha": HEAD,
        "remote_head_sha": HEAD,
        "pr_head_sha": HEAD,
        "pr_number": OWNING_PR,
        "reason": "expired lease renewed by its exact recorded owner",
        "proof": [],
    }
    record.update(overrides)
    return record
 def renewal_lock(record=None, *, issue_number=ISSUE, claimant=True, **lock_overrides):
    lock = {
        "issue_number": issue_number,
        "branch_name": BRANCH,
        "lease_renewal": renewal_record() if record is None else record,
    }
    if claimant:
        lock["claimant"] = {"username": IDENTITY, "profile": PROFILE}
    lock.update(lock_overrides)
    return lock
 def recovery_lock(pr_number=OWNING_PR, head=HEAD):
    """A lock carrying sanctioned dead-session recovery evidence (#755/#768)."""
    return {
        "issue_number": ISSUE,
        "branch_name": BRANCH,
        "claimant": {"username": IDENTITY, "profile": PROFILE},
        "dead_session_recovery": {
            "recovered": True,
            "branch_name": BRANCH,
            "pr_number": pr_number,
            "pr_head": head,
            "recorded_head": head,
            "accepted_head": head,
            "head_relation": issue_lock_recovery.HEAD_RELATION_EQUAL,
        },
    }
 def owning_pr(number=OWNING_PR, ref=BRANCH, sha=HEAD, issue=ISSUE):
    return {
        "number": number,
        "title": f"fix: something (Closes #{issue})",
        "body": f"Closes #{issue}.",
        "head": {"ref": ref, "sha": sha},
    }
 def gate(phase, *, token, open_prs=None, branch_names=None, locked_branch=BRANCH):
    return assess_work_issue_duplicate_gate(
        ISSUE,
        open_prs=[owning_pr()] if open_prs is None else open_prs,
        branch_names=branch_names or [],
        claim_entry={},
        locked_branch=locked_branch,
        phase=phase,
        recovered_owning_pr=token,
    )
 # ───────────────────── the defect this issue exists to fix ─────────────────────
 class TestPreFixReproduction(unittest.TestCase):
    """The exact wiring gap: renewal evidence was invisible to later gates."""
    def test_recovery_only_rebuild_cannot_see_a_renewal_lock(self):
        # This is the pre-fix behaviour of every enforcement path. It is correct
        # for the recovery rebuild to ignore a renewal block -- the defect was
        # that nothing else looked at it.
        self.assertIsNone(
            issue_lock_recovery.recovered_owning_pr_from_lock(renewal_lock())
        )
    def test_renewal_lock_produced_no_exemption_before_the_fix(self):
        # Feeding the gate what the pre-fix code fed it (recovery rebuild only)
        # reproduces the reported refusal at the commit phase.
        token = issue_lock_recovery.recovered_owning_pr_from_lock(renewal_lock())
        result = gate(PHASE_COMMIT, token=token)
        self.assertTrue(result["block"])
        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "duplicate_commit_prevented")
        self.assertFalse(result["owning_pr_recovery_exempted"])
        self.assertEqual(result["owning_pr_recovery_notes"], [])
    def test_shared_resolver_now_sees_it(self):
        self.assertIsNotNone(
            gitea_mcp_server._owning_pr_continuation_from_lock(renewal_lock())
        )
 # ───────────────────────── rebuild: the granted case ─────────────────────────
 class TestRenewalRebuildGranted(unittest.TestCase):
    def test_sanctioned_renewal_rebuilds_owning_pr_evidence(self):
        token = issue_lock_renewal.owning_pr_renewal_from_lock(renewal_lock())
        self.assertEqual(
            token,
            {
                "issue_number": ISSUE,
                "pr_number": OWNING_PR,
                "branch_name": BRANCH,
                "head_sha": HEAD,
                "recorded_head": HEAD,
                "accepted_head": HEAD,
                "head_relation": "equal",
            },
        )
    def test_branch_falls_back_to_the_lock_branch(self):
        lock = renewal_lock(renewal_record(branch_name=""))
        token = issue_lock_renewal.owning_pr_renewal_from_lock(lock)
        self.assertEqual(token["branch_name"], BRANCH)
    def test_claimant_may_live_under_work_lease(self):
        lock = renewal_lock(claimant=False)
        lock["work_lease"] = {"claimant": {"username": IDENTITY, "profile": PROFILE}}
        self.assertIsNotNone(issue_lock_renewal.owning_pr_renewal_from_lock(lock))
    def test_rebuild_does_not_mutate_the_lock(self):
        lock = renewal_lock()
        before = copy.deepcopy(lock)
        issue_lock_renewal.owning_pr_renewal_from_lock(lock)
        self.assertEqual(lock, before)
 # ───────────────────────── rebuild: fails closed ─────────────────────────
 class TestRenewalRebuildFailsClosed(unittest.TestCase):
    def assertNoEvidence(self, lock):
        self.assertIsNone(issue_lock_renewal.owning_pr_renewal_from_lock(lock))
    def test_no_lock_at_all(self):
        self.assertNoEvidence(None)
        self.assertNoEvidence({})
        self.assertNoEvidence("not-a-mapping")
    def test_lock_without_renewal_block(self):
        # A fresh claim, or a lock whose renewal block was replaced.
        self.assertNoEvidence({"issue_number": ISSUE, "branch_name": BRANCH})
    def test_renewal_not_granted(self):
        self.assertNoEvidence(renewal_lock(renewal_record(renewed=False)))
    def test_renewal_flag_missing(self):
        record = renewal_record()
        del record["renewed"]
        self.assertNoEvidence(renewal_lock(record))
    def test_renewal_block_malformed(self):
        self.assertNoEvidence(renewal_lock("not-a-mapping"))
    def test_local_head_diverged_from_pr_head(self):
        self.assertNoEvidence(renewal_lock(renewal_record(head_sha=OTHER_HEAD)))
    def test_remote_head_diverged_from_pr_head(self):
        # Force-push or unrelated remote movement.
        self.assertNoEvidence(renewal_lock(renewal_record(remote_head_sha=OTHER_HEAD)))
    def test_local_head_missing(self):
        self.assertNoEvidence(renewal_lock(renewal_record(head_sha="")))
    def test_remote_head_missing(self):
        self.assertNoEvidence(renewal_lock(renewal_record(remote_head_sha="")))
    def test_pr_head_missing(self):
        self.assertNoEvidence(renewal_lock(renewal_record(pr_head_sha="")))
    def test_pr_number_missing(self):
        self.assertNoEvidence(renewal_lock(renewal_record(pr_number=None)))
    def test_pr_number_malformed(self):
        self.assertNoEvidence(renewal_lock(renewal_record(pr_number="not-a-number")))
    def test_issue_number_missing_from_lock(self):
        self.assertNoEvidence(renewal_lock(issue_number=None))
    def test_branch_unknown_everywhere(self):
        lock = renewal_lock(renewal_record(branch_name=""))
        lock["branch_name"] = ""
        self.assertNoEvidence(lock)
    def test_identity_mismatch(self):
        self.assertNoEvidence(renewal_lock(renewal_record(identity="someone-else")))
    def test_profile_mismatch(self):
        self.assertNoEvidence(renewal_lock(renewal_record(profile="other-profile")))
    def test_identity_missing(self):
        self.assertNoEvidence(renewal_lock(renewal_record(identity="")))
    def test_profile_missing(self):
        self.assertNoEvidence(renewal_lock(renewal_record(profile="")))
    def test_claimant_absent(self):
        self.assertNoEvidence(renewal_lock(claimant=False))
    def test_evidence_from_a_different_session_is_not_reusable(self):
        # A renewal block left by another workflow session names another
        # claimant, so the lock it is found on cannot inherit its authority.
        lock = renewal_lock()
        lock["claimant"] = {"username": "other-session-user", "profile": PROFILE}
        self.assertNoEvidence(lock)
 # ───────────────────────── the shared resolver ─────────────────────────
 class TestSharedResolver(unittest.TestCase):
    def test_recovery_lock_resolves_to_recovery_evidence(self):
        token = gitea_mcp_server._owning_pr_continuation_from_lock(recovery_lock())
        self.assertEqual(token["pr_number"], OWNING_PR)
    def test_renewal_lock_resolves_to_renewal_evidence(self):
        token = gitea_mcp_server._owning_pr_continuation_from_lock(renewal_lock())
        self.assertEqual(token["pr_number"], OWNING_PR)
    def test_recovery_takes_precedence_over_renewal(self):
        # Same precedence gitea_lock_issue applies when granting the waiver, so
        # the answer cannot differ between the granting and enforcing paths.
        lock = recovery_lock(pr_number=OTHER_PR, head=OTHER_HEAD)
        lock["lease_renewal"] = renewal_record()
        token = gitea_mcp_server._owning_pr_continuation_from_lock(lock)
        self.assertEqual(token["pr_number"], OTHER_PR)
    def test_no_evidence_resolves_to_none(self):
        self.assertIsNone(gitea_mcp_server._owning_pr_continuation_from_lock(None))
        self.assertIsNone(gitea_mcp_server._owning_pr_continuation_from_lock({}))
        self.assertIsNone(
            gitea_mcp_server._owning_pr_continuation_from_lock(
                {"issue_number": ISSUE, "branch_name": BRANCH}
            )
        )
 # ────────────── every enforcement path uses the same decision ──────────────
 class TestEnforcementPathsShareOneDecision(unittest.TestCase):
    """AC: commit, push and create-PR gates consume one authoritative token."""
    def setUp(self):
        self.token = gitea_mcp_server._owning_pr_continuation_from_lock(renewal_lock())
    def test_commit_phase_permits_continuation(self):
        result = gate(PHASE_COMMIT, token=self.token)
        self.assertFalse(result["block"])
        self.assertTrue(result["owning_pr_recovery_exempted"])
        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], OUTCOME_DUPLICATE_WORK_NOT_PREVENTED)
    def test_create_pr_phase_permits_continuation(self):
        result = gate(PHASE_CREATE_PR, token=self.token)
        self.assertFalse(result["block"])
        self.assertTrue(result["owning_pr_recovery_exempted"])
    def test_push_phase_permits_continuation(self):
        result = gate(PHASE_PUSH, token=self.token)
        self.assertFalse(result["block"])
        self.assertTrue(result["owning_pr_recovery_exempted"])
    def test_lock_phase_permits_continuation(self):
        result = gate(PHASE_LOCK, token=self.token)
        self.assertFalse(result["block"])
    def test_all_phases_agree(self):
        outcomes = {
            phase: gate(phase, token=self.token)["block"]
            for phase in (PHASE_LOCK, PHASE_COMMIT, PHASE_PUSH, PHASE_CREATE_PR)
        }
        self.assertEqual(set(outcomes.values()), {False}, outcomes)
    def test_dead_session_recovery_still_permits_continuation(self):
        token = gitea_mcp_server._owning_pr_continuation_from_lock(recovery_lock())
        for phase in (PHASE_COMMIT, PHASE_PUSH, PHASE_CREATE_PR):
            with self.subTest(phase=phase):
                result = gate(phase, token=token)
                self.assertFalse(result["block"])
                self.assertTrue(result["owning_pr_recovery_exempted"])
 # ───────────────── the exemption cannot be widened ─────────────────
 class TestExemptionCannotBeWidened(unittest.TestCase):
    def setUp(self):
        self.token = gitea_mcp_server._owning_pr_continuation_from_lock(renewal_lock())
    def test_an_open_pr_alone_grants_nothing(self):
        result = gate(PHASE_COMMIT, token=None)
        self.assertTrue(result["block"])
        self.assertFalse(result["owning_pr_recovery_exempted"])
    def test_a_second_pr_is_refused(self):
        result = gate(
            PHASE_CREATE_PR,
            token=self.token,
            open_prs=[owning_pr(), owning_pr(number=OTHER_PR, ref=OTHER_BRANCH)],
        )
        self.assertTrue(result["block"])
        self.assertFalse(result["owning_pr_recovery_exempted"])
    def test_a_different_pr_is_refused(self):
        result = gate(
            PHASE_COMMIT, token=self.token, open_prs=[owning_pr(number=OTHER_PR)]
        )
        self.assertTrue(result["block"])
    def test_a_different_branch_is_refused(self):
        result = gate(
            PHASE_COMMIT, token=self.token, open_prs=[owning_pr(ref=OTHER_BRANCH)]
        )
        self.assertTrue(result["block"])
    def test_locked_branch_mismatch_is_refused(self):
        result = gate(PHASE_COMMIT, token=self.token, locked_branch=OTHER_BRANCH)
        self.assertTrue(result["block"])
    def test_live_pr_head_divergence_is_refused(self):
        # Force-push or unrelated remote movement after renewal.
        result = gate(
            PHASE_COMMIT, token=self.token, open_prs=[owning_pr(sha=OTHER_HEAD)]
        )
        self.assertTrue(result["block"])
    def test_evidence_for_another_issue_is_refused(self):
        foreign = gitea_mcp_server._owning_pr_continuation_from_lock(
            renewal_lock(issue_number=ISSUE + 1)
        )
        result = gate(PHASE_COMMIT, token=foreign)
        self.assertTrue(result["block"])
    def test_sequential_tasks_do_not_inherit_continuation(self):
        # One daemon serves many tasks. A renewal proved for issue N must not
        # authorize continuation for the next task's issue.
        prior_task = gitea_mcp_server._owning_pr_continuation_from_lock(
            renewal_lock(issue_number=ISSUE + 7)
        )
        self.assertIsNotNone(prior_task)
        self.assertTrue(gate(PHASE_COMMIT, token=prior_task)["block"])
 # ───────────────── ordinary duplicate prevention is intact ─────────────────
 class TestDuplicatePreventionRetained(unittest.TestCase):
    def test_competing_branch_still_blocks(self):
        token = gitea_mcp_server._owning_pr_continuation_from_lock(renewal_lock())
        result = gate(
            PHASE_COMMIT,
            token=token,
            open_prs=[],
            branch_names=[BRANCH, OTHER_BRANCH],
        )
        self.assertTrue(result["block"])
    def test_unrelated_work_without_a_lock_still_blocks(self):
        token = gitea_mcp_server._owning_pr_continuation_from_lock(None)
        self.assertIsNone(token)
        self.assertTrue(gate(PHASE_COMMIT, token=token)["block"])
 # ───────────────── refusals stay structured and auditable ─────────────────
 class TestRefusalShapePreserved(unittest.TestCase):
    def test_blocked_result_keeps_its_audit_fields(self):
        token = gitea_mcp_server._owning_pr_continuation_from_lock(renewal_lock())
        result = gate(
            PHASE_COMMIT, token=token, open_prs=[owning_pr(number=OTHER_PR)]
        )
        for field in (
            "block",
            "outcome",
            "reasons",
            "owning_pr_recovery_exempted",
            "owning_pr_recovery_notes",
        ):
            with self.subTest(field=field):
                self.assertIn(field, result)
        self.assertTrue(result["reasons"])
        # A rejected token explains which element of ownership disagreed.
        self.assertTrue(result["owning_pr_recovery_notes"])
    def test_granted_result_records_why(self):
        token = gitea_mcp_server._owning_pr_continuation_from_lock(renewal_lock())
        result = gate(PHASE_COMMIT, token=token)
        self.assertTrue(result["owning_pr_recovery_notes"])
        self.assertIn(
            f"#{OWNING_PR}", " ".join(result["owning_pr_recovery_notes"])
        )
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    unittest.main()
@@ -35,10 +35,10 @@ class TestMcpStaleRuntime(unittest.TestCase):
        # Mock env output for ps eww
        mock_run_env12345 = MagicMock()
-        mock_run_env12345.stdout = "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-reconciler GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED=1"
+        mock_run_env12345.stdout = "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-reconciler"
        mock_run_env54321 = MagicMock()
-        mock_run_env54321.stdout = "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-author GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED=1"
+        mock_run_env54321.stdout = "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-author"
        def side_effect(args, **kwargs):
            if args[0] == "ps" and "eww" in args:
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ class TestMcpStaleRuntime(unittest.TestCase):
        mock_run_ps.stdout = ps_output
        mock_run_env = MagicMock()
-        mock_run_env.stdout = "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-author GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED=1"
+        mock_run_env.stdout = "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-author"
        mock_run_git = MagicMock()
        mock_run_git.stdout = "FAKE2" # different SHA
@@ -243,10 +243,9 @@ class TestRuntimeClarity(unittest.TestCase):
        self.assertIn("switching is disabled", res["message"].lower())
        self.assertIsNone(gitea_config._active_profile_override)
    @patch("mcp_server._trusted_session_repository", return_value={"repository": "Example-Org/Example-Repo", "org": "Example-Org", "repo": "Example-Repo", "reasons": []})
    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header")
-    def test_activate_profile_succeeds_when_enabled(self, mock_auth, mock_api, mock_trusted):
+    def test_activate_profile_succeeds_when_enabled(self, mock_auth, mock_api):
        self._write_config(CONFIG_SWITCHING_ENABLED)
        # Setup mock responses for whoami checks
@@ -279,7 +279,6 @@ def assess_root_source_mutation(
    locked_issue_number: int | None = None,
    role_kind: str | None = None,
    mutation_task: str | None = None,
    bootstrap_assessment: Any | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
    """Fail closed for diagnostic/source edits on the control/root checkout.
@@ -287,13 +286,6 @@ def assess_root_source_mutation(
    tracked source/test files on the control checkout always block, including
    temporary/diagnostic/test-only intent.
    #941: ``bootstrap_author_issue_worktree`` is judged by the canonical
    ``create_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_permits_control_checkout`` decision over
    *bootstrap_assessment* — the same server-derived evidence the #274 and
    #604 guards consume — instead of a task-name allowlist local to this
    module. Evidence that is absent, malformed, wrongly scoped, or bound to
    another workspace leaves the ordinary block in force.
    #749: ``create_issue`` is a pure remote mutation with no local tree write.
    When *mutation_task* is create_issue and the control checkout has no dirty
    source/test files, the missing-worktree signal is suppressed so the
@@ -344,19 +336,6 @@ def assess_root_source_mutation(
        if _cib is not None and _cib.is_create_issue_task(mutation_task):
            # #749: clean-root create_issue is the sanctioned bootstrap path.
            create_issue_bootstrap = True
        elif _cib is not None and _cib.bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
            bootstrap_assessment,
            task=mutation_task,
            workspace_path=workspace,
            canonical_repo_root=root,
        ):
            # #941: the author issue-worktree bootstrap is authorized by the
            # canonical shared decision over server-derived task-scope
            # evidence, never by a task-name allowlist kept in this module.
            # The predicate fails closed on missing, malformed, cross-scope,
            # dirty, drifted, or wrongly bound evidence, so this arm cannot
            # widen the waiver beyond the one sanctioned bootstrap task.
            create_issue_bootstrap = True
        else:
            # Explicit missing-worktree signal for force-on author entrypoints.
            reasons.append(
@@ -414,15 +393,8 @@ def assess_production_mutation_guards(
    require_author_lock: bool = False,
    in_test_mode: bool = False,
    mutation_task: str | None = None,
    bootstrap_assessment: Any | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Compose root + scope production guards when they must be active (#683).
+    """Compose root + scope production guards when they must be active (#683)."""
    #941: *bootstrap_assessment* is the server-derived author-bootstrap
    evidence, forwarded unchanged to :func:`assess_root_source_mutation` so
    this guard reaches the same canonical decision as the #274 and #604
    guards. Omitting it preserves the pre-existing behaviour.
    """
    if not production_guards_active(in_test_mode=in_test_mode):
        return {
            "proven": True,
@@ -442,7 +414,6 @@ def assess_production_mutation_guards(
        locked_issue_number=locked_issue_number,
        role_kind=role_kind,
        mutation_task=mutation_task,
        bootstrap_assessment=bootstrap_assessment,
    )
    if root_assess["block"]:
        return {**root_assess, "skipped": False}