Merge pull request 'feat(webui): Runtime and session view (Phase 1) (Closes #641)' (#898) from feat/issue-641-runtime-session-view into master

Addresses the two blockers raised in the PR #886 review (comment 16559) for
issue #663.

B1 — apply_authorized ignored restart-class authorization.

The #663 restart-class matrix and the #661 drain-proof hard gate are
independent authorizations that first coexisted when PR #882 landed on
master and this branch merged it. The union preserved both, but the apply
decision consulted only the drain gate:

    payload["apply_authorized"] = gate.allow

so a clean drain proof — or an authorized break-glass, which needs no proof
at all — reported apply_authorized: True for a class the least-privilege
matrix had just denied, in the same payload carrying allow_restart: False
and "role 'author' may not request full_mcp_restart". One environment
variable therefore collapsed the whole nine-class matrix for the apply
decision, including host_restart.

The apply decision is now the conjunction of both authorizations, and
apply_gate carries drain_gate_allow and restart_class_authorized so a denial
is attributable to the authorization that produced it. Break-glass keeps its
purpose — bypassing the drain proof — and never bypasses the class matrix.
No existing fail-closed behaviour is weakened: allow_restart, drain-proof
verification, fingerprint binding, and requester authorization are untouched.

B2 — docs/mcp-restart-coordinator.md described pre-#661 behaviour.

The document still called the drain proof "a separate child" and omitted
drain_proof_json and request_break_glass from the published signature, so a
safety document asserted there was no gate where a gate now exists. It now
documents both parameters, states that the gate executes inside this tool,
and records dry-run versus apply behaviour, authorization ordering, the
break-glass scope, and fail-closed conditions as implemented.

Regression coverage.

tests/test_issue_886_apply_authorization_conjunction.py exercises the MCP
tool itself, which previously had no test at all — that absence is why the
defect shipped. It pins both conjunction directions, proves a clean proof
cannot override a role, approval, unknown-class, or missing-target denial,
proves break-glass does not collapse the matrix for any worker role or
restricted class, and proves the existing scoped and unscoped paths and the
#661 denials still hold. Against the pre-fix tree 24 of these fail; against
this commit all 19 pass with 45 subtests.

tests/test_mcp_restart_governance_docs.py now binds the published signature
to inspect.signature() of the real tool and forbids the stale pre-#661
phrasing, so the drift that produced B2 cannot return unnoticed.

Verification: targeted restart/drain/governance/webui suites 194 passed,
113 subtests. Full suite 23 failed, 5230 passed, 6 skipped, 912 subtests —
the failure set is identical to the reviewed baseline at 9bc021e
(23 failed, 5201 passed), with +29 passing from the added tests and no new
or changed failure. Zero conflict markers; py_compile passes; the #882
union remains intact in both directions.

Refs #663, PR #886

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01V6xFqovhbArPv61j9KCGkL

docs/mcp-restart-classes.md

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# MCP restart classes and blast-radius permissions (#663)
+
+This is the machine-enforced class matrix used by
+`restart_coordinator.RESTART_CLASS_POLICIES`. It implements the narrower-first
+recovery ladder from #655 and the authorization policy from #656, using the
+path inventory from #657 and the impact coordinator from #658. Product and
+delivery lineage: vision #652 and roadmap #653.
+
+Unknown class names are denied. The coordinator requires both the class
+permission and an eligible request role. Approval gates are additional: a
+caller cannot turn a request permission into execution authority.
+
+| Restart class | Required permission | Expected blast radius | Drain requirement | Approval requirement | Audit requirement | Recovery behavior |
+|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
+| `client_reconnect` | `mcp.reconnect.client` | none | none | self service | class, actor, client namespace, reason, outcome | Reconnect only the caller's client transport. No daemon or peer work changes. |
+| `session_reconnect` | `mcp.reconnect.session` | low | requesting-session safe point | self service | class, actor, session, reason, outcome | Rebind identity, capability, and workspace state for one session. |
+| `worker_restart` | `mcp.restart.worker.request` | low | target worker | controller approval + automated gates | class, actor, worker, approval, scoped drain, outcome | Restart one worker after its own leases and mutations drain. |
+| `role_runtime_restart` | `mcp.restart.role_runtime.request` | medium | target role runtime | controller approval + automated gates | class, actor, role namespace, approval, scoped drain, outcome | Restart and re-probe one role runtime; unrelated roles remain available. |
+| `connector_restart` | `mcp.restart.connector.request` | medium | target connector | controller approval + automated gates | class, actor, connector, approval, scoped drain, outcome | Restart one connector while unrelated runtimes remain available. |
+| `configuration_reload` | `mcp.reload.configuration.request` | low | mutation quiesce | controller approval + automated gates | class, actor, configuration revision, approval, outcome | Gracefully reload configuration without replacing the daemon. |
+| `rolling_mcp_restart` | `mcp.restart.rolling.request` | medium | one instance at a time | controller approval + automated gates | class, actor, instance order, approval, per-instance drains, outcome | Drain, restart, verify, and restore each instance before advancing. |
+| `full_mcp_restart` | `mcp.restart.full.request` | high | all sessions and mutations | controller approval + automated gates | class, actor, full impact, approval, full drain proof, outcome | Replace the complete MCP runtime only after a verified full drain. |
+| `host_restart` | `mcp.restart.host.request` | high | all host work | controller approval + infrastructure operator | class, actor, host/change or incident id, approval, full drain proof, outcome | Hand off to infrastructure ownership and reconcile every runtime afterward. |
+
+## Drain boundary
+
+Only `full_mcp_restart` and `host_restart` set `full_drain_required=true`.
+Reconnects and configuration reloads do not disrupt peer sessions. Worker,
+role-runtime, and connector restarts evaluate only their explicitly named
+target. Rolling restart drains one instance at a time. Missing required target
+scope denies the request rather than silently widening it to a full restart.
+
+## Permission and approval boundary
+
+Author, reviewer, merger, and reconciler roles may self-request reconnects and
+request scoped worker/role/connector/reload recovery. They cannot request
+rolling, full, or host restart classes. Controller/operator/admin roles may
+request the broader classes, while execution remains operator/admin-owned.
+Controller approval is independently required for every class above a session
+reconnect. Host restart additionally requires infrastructure-operator proof.
+
+The MCP request tool derives class permissions from its authenticated runtime
+role. It does not accept caller-supplied permissions. Controller and operator
+authorization are read from the already-running daemon environment, never
+from a request argument.
+
+## Audit and failure behavior
+
+Every impact audit and every console restart/reload audit includes a
+`restart_class` field. The impact audit also includes the exact
+`required_permission`. Unknown classes, missing permissions, ineligible roles,
+missing approval, missing scoped targets, and incomplete inventory all deny
+fail closed. Manual process kills remain forbidden and contaminating (#630).

docs/mcp-restart-coordinator.md

@@ -6,11 +6,23 @@ console (#642 / #652) can see the blast radius *before* concurrent LLM work is
 disrupted. Uncoordinated restarts destroy in-flight author/reviewer/merger work
 and give operators no way to see what they are about to break.
 
-This lands the coordinator + impact DTO + a dry-run MCP tool. It is the single
+This lands the coordinator + impact DTO + the MCP tool. It is the single
 sanctioned entry point for restart evaluation post-#657 (which inventoried the
-restart/reload/kill paths). The **mutative apply** path — actually performing a
+restart/reload/kill paths).
-restart — is a later child gated by a drain proof and is explicitly out of
+
-scope here.
+The **drain-proof hard gate now executes inside this tool** (#661, via PR #882):
+an apply request (`dry_run=False`) is evaluated against a drain proof here and
+denied when that proof is missing, expired, unclean, tampered with, or stale.
+It is no longer a separate child operation. What remains a later child is only
+the **execution** step — actually stopping and restoring a process. This tool
+still never restarts anything: `apply_supported` is always `false` and
+`restart_performed` is always `false`.
+
+The coordinator now routes every request through the restart-class policy
+matrix defined for #663. See
+[`mcp-restart-classes.md`](./mcp-restart-classes.md) for permissions, expected
+blast radius, scoped drain and approval requirements, audit fields, and
+recovery behavior for all nine classes.
 
 ## Components
 
@@ -19,7 +31,8 @@ scope here.
 | `restart_coordinator.evaluate_restart_impact` | `restart_coordinator.py` | Pure classification: inventory → impact report DTO. No I/O, no restart. |
 | `RestartImpactReport` / `SessionImpact` / `LeaseImpact` | `restart_coordinator.py` | Console-facing DTO (`.as_dict()` is JSON-serializable). |
 | `ControlPlaneDB.list_sessions` | `control_plane_db.py` | Read-only session inventory (the process-level unit a restart kills). |
-| `gitea_request_mcp_restart` | `gitea_mcp_server.py` | MCP tool: gathers inventory from the #613 DB, calls the coordinator, returns the report. Dry-run only. |
+| `gitea_request_mcp_restart` | `gitea_mcp_server.py` | MCP tool: gathers inventory from the #613 DB, calls the coordinator, returns the report, and on `dry_run=False` runs the #661 drain-proof hard gate. Never restarts a process. |
+| `drain_proof.gate_apply_restart` | `drain_proof.py` | The #661 hard gate: verifies a drain proof against the current impact fingerprint, or records an authorized break-glass bypass. |
 
 ## Dimensions evaluated
 
@@ -77,17 +90,61 @@ authorization is present.
 ```text
 gitea_request_mcp_restart(remote, host, org, repo,
                           dry_run=True, request_override=False,
-                          session_id=None, limit=200)
+                          session_id=None, limit=200,
+                          restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
+                          target_session_id=None, target_role=None,
+                          target_connector=None,
+                          drain_proof_json=None,
+                          request_break_glass=False)
 ```
 
-Read-only, dry-run, and it **never restarts anything**. `apply_supported` is
+It **never restarts anything**: `apply_supported` is always `false` and
-always `false`; passing `dry_run=False` performs no restart and reports that
+`restart_performed` is always `false`.
-apply is gated by a drain proof (a separate child).
+
+### Dry-run versus apply
+
+| Call | Behavior |
+|------|----------|
+| `dry_run=True` (default) | Read-only impact preview. No drain proof is required or consulted. |
+| `dry_run=False` | The #661 drain-proof hard gate runs **in this tool**. The outcome is reported under `apply_gate` / `apply_authorized`; a denial also returns a durable `incident` descriptor. Still no restart. |
+
+### Authorization ordering
+
+An apply requires **both** authorizations, and they are independent:
+
+1. **Restart-class authorization** (#663) — the requester's role and permissions
+   must allow the requested class, the class's approval requirement must be
+   satisfied, and any target-scoped class must name its target. Failing any of
+   these makes `allow_restart` `false`.
+2. **Drain-proof gate** (#661) — a valid, unexpired, clean proof bound to the
+   current impact fingerprint, or an authorized break-glass.
+
+`apply_authorized` is the conjunction: `gate.allow and allow_restart`. A clean
+drain proof therefore cannot override a class or requester-role denial, and a
+denied class never reports an authorized apply. `apply_gate` carries
+`drain_gate_allow` and `restart_class_authorized` so a denial is attributable to
+the authorization that produced it.
+
+### Break-glass
+
+Break-glass bypasses the **drain proof only** — never the restart-class matrix.
+It is honoured solely when `request_break_glass` is set *and* the environment
+carries `GITEA_BREAKGLASS_RESTART_AUTHORIZATION`; like operator override, the
+tool argument expresses caller intent and cannot be self-asserted by a worker
+session. `break_glass_requested` and `break_glass_authorized` are both reported,
+so a bypass is never silent.
+
+### Fail closed on apply
+
+A missing, malformed, expired, unclean, tampered, or fingerprint-stale drain
+proof denies the apply and returns an `incident` descriptor. An unknown restart
+class denies before any of this. Ambiguity always denies.
 
 ## Audit
 
 Every evaluation carries an `audit_record` (event, coordinator version, verdict,
-allow decision, blast radius, counts, timestamp) so restart decisions are
+restart class, required permission, allow decision, blast radius, counts,
+timestamp) so restart decisions are
 auditable. No secrets flow through the coordinator — session ids, pids, and
 profiles are operational metadata only.
 

docs/webui-local-dev.md

@@ -77,7 +77,9 @@ status, onboarding checklist state, and the fail-closed error payloads (#635).
 | `/api/actions/{id}/preview` | Mutation ledger preview (GET, read-only) |
 | `/leases` | Lease and collision visibility (#433) |
 | `/api/leases` | JSON lease/collision export |
-| `/sessions` | Phase 1 shell stub — session inventory (backed by #636) |
+| `/sessions` | Runtime and session view (#641) — health + inventory sessions/namespaces/worktrees |
+| `/api/sessions` | JSON export for the runtime/session view |
+| `/api/v1/sessions` | Versioned alias of `/api/sessions` |
 | `/inventory` | Phase 1 shell stub — unified inventory (backed by #636) |
 | `/timeline` | Phase 1 shell stub — workflow event timeline |
 | `/policy` | Phase 1 shell stub — capability/role policy placeholder |
@@ -284,11 +286,46 @@ The header carries two read-only status badges — an **environment** badge
 a **mode: read-only** badge — plus a **Docs** link to this document. No
 privileged action controls are present in the Phase 1 shell.
 
-Not-yet-implemented surfaces (`/sessions`, `/inventory`, `/timeline`,
+Not-yet-implemented surfaces (`/inventory`, `/timeline`, `/policy`,
-`/policy`, `/insights`) resolve to graceful read-only stub pages instead of
+`/insights`) resolve to graceful read-only stub pages instead of 404s; their
-404s; their backing views land in later child issues of #631 (the inventory
+backing views land in later child issues of #631 (the inventory surfaces are
-surfaces are backed by #636). Mutating methods on stub routes still fail closed
+backed by #636). Mutating methods on stub routes still fail closed with
-with `read-only-mvp`.
+`read-only-mvp`.
+
+### Runtime and sessions (#641)
+
+`/sessions` is a live Phase 1 read-only view that composes:
+
+* runtime health from `#430` (profile, role, identity, master parity, stale warning)
+* control-plane sessions / leases and filesystem locks / worktrees / namespaces from `#636`
+* durable contamination markers when detectable (`#630` runtime recovery, `#671` stable-branch push)
+
+It surfaces stale indicators (dead PID, expired lease) and never silences an
+active contamination marker. Recovery links point only at sanctioned
+reconnect/operator restart docs (`docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md`,
+`docs/mcp-namespace-health.md`, `docs/mcp-restart-path-inventory.md`, this
+document). The page does **not** restart, kill, or take over sessions; manual
+`pkill` of MCP daemons is contamination, not recovery.
+
+Honesty rules specific to this view:
+
+* **Ownership columns never assert absence they cannot prove.** When the
+  `leases` or `locks` section is degraded or unavailable, the Leases and
+  Worktree-binding cells render `unknown (inventory <status>)` with an
+  *authority unproven* badge instead of `none` / `unbound`, and a caveat names
+  the unreadable sections. A worktree binding is correlated through lease work
+  numbers, so it is unproven when *either* section fails to read.
+  `/api/sessions` carries the same facts as `ownership_authority_complete`,
+  `ownership_section_status`, and per-row `lease_authority` /
+  `worktree_authority`, so a JSON consumer can tell "holds none" from "could
+  not be read".
+* **Contamination text is redacted at the display boundary.** Marker payloads
+  (`command_summary`, `reason_class`, `session_id`, `role`) are
+  operator-supplied free text that does not arrive through inventory scrubbing,
+  so they pass through `webui.inventory.scrub_text`, which collapses `$HOME` and
+  redacts credential-shaped tokens and URL userinfo *anywhere* in the string.
+  The write-time redactor is a narrow denylist and is not relied on. The field
+  itself is kept — it is the `#630` evidence naming which daemon was killed.
 
 ## System-health dashboard (#639)
 

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -22343,12 +22343,17 @@ def gitea_request_mcp_restart(
     request_override: bool = False,
     session_id: str | None = None,
     limit: int = 200,
+    restart_class: str = "full_mcp_restart",
+    target_session_id: str | None = None,
+    target_role: str | None = None,
+    target_connector: str | None = None,
     drain_proof_json: str | None = None,
     request_break_glass: bool = False,
 ) -> dict:
     """Evaluate a proposed MCP restart and return an impact preview (#658).
 
-    Central restart coordinator: gathers live control-plane state (sessions,
+    Central restart coordinator: resolves the requested restart class, gathers
+    live control-plane state (sessions,
     leases/locks, in-flight issue/PR work, mutations, worktrees) and returns a
     blast-radius impact report with a ``safe`` / ``unsafe`` / ``override``
     verdict, so the console (#642/#652) and operators can see what a restart
@@ -22362,7 +22367,16 @@ def gitea_request_mcp_restart(
     only when ``request_break_glass`` is set *and* the environment carries
     ``GITEA_BREAKGLASS_RESTART_AUTHORIZATION``. Even an authorized gate performs
     no restart here; actual execution is a further child. The gate outcome is
-    reported under ``apply_gate`` / ``apply_authorized``.
+    reported under ``apply_gate``.
+
+    ``apply_authorized`` requires **both** authorizations to pass: the #661 drain
+    gate *and* the #663 restart-class matrix (``allow_restart``). They are
+    independent — the drain gate proves the blast radius was drained and knows
+    nothing about whether this requester may request this class — so a class the
+    matrix denied never reports an authorized apply. Break-glass bypasses the
+    drain proof only; it never bypasses the class matrix. ``apply_gate`` carries
+    ``drain_gate_allow`` and ``restart_class_authorized`` so a denial is
+    attributable to the authorization that produced it.
 
     Operator override authority is read from the process environment
     (``GITEA_OPERATOR_RESTART_OVERRIDE_AUTHORIZATION``), never self-asserted by
@@ -22447,6 +22461,9 @@ def gitea_request_mcp_restart(
 
     profile = get_profile()
     profile_name = (profile.get("profile_name") or "").strip() or "session"
+    requester_role = (
+        profile.get("role_kind") or profile.get("role") or ""
+    ).strip().lower()
     sid = (session_id or "").strip() or f"{profile_name}-{os.getpid()}"
 
     # Override authority is read from the environment only — a worker session
@@ -22456,6 +22473,15 @@ def gitea_request_mcp_restart(
         (os.environ.get("GITEA_OPERATOR_RESTART_OVERRIDE_AUTHORIZATION") or "").strip()
     )
     operator_override = bool(request_override and operator_authorized)
+    controller_approved = bool(
+        (
+            os.environ.get("GITEA_CONTROLLER_RESTART_APPROVAL_AUTHORIZATION")
+            or ""
+        ).strip()
+    )
+    requester_permissions = restart_coordinator.permissions_for_role(
+        requester_role
+    )
 
     inventory = {
         "sessions": sessions,
@@ -22470,6 +22496,14 @@ def gitea_request_mcp_restart(
         operator_override=operator_override,
         requesting_session_id=sid,
         dry_run=True,  # coordinator is always analysis-only (#658)
+        restart_class=restart_class,
+        requester_role=requester_role,
+        requester_permissions=requester_permissions,
+        controller_approved=controller_approved,
+        operator_authorized=operator_authorized,
+        target_session_id=target_session_id,
+        target_role=target_role,
+        target_connector=target_connector,
     )
 
     payload = report.as_dict()
@@ -22481,6 +22515,9 @@ def gitea_request_mcp_restart(
     payload["requesting_session_id"] = sid
     payload["operator_override_requested"] = bool(request_override)
     payload["operator_override_authorized"] = operator_authorized
+    payload["controller_approval_authorized"] = controller_approved
+    payload["requester_role"] = requester_role
+    payload["requester_permissions"] = list(requester_permissions)
     # Actual restart execution remains a further child; this tool never restarts
     # a process. What #661 adds is the *hard gate*: an apply request (dry_run
     # False) must present a valid, unexpired, clean drain proof, or it is denied
@@ -22518,8 +22555,25 @@ def gitea_request_mcp_restart(
             gate_payload["reasons"] = [proof_parse_error] + list(
                 gate_payload.get("reasons") or []
             )
+        # The #663 restart-class matrix and the #661 drain gate are two
+        # independent authorizations, and an apply requires BOTH. ``gate.allow``
+        # proves only that the blast radius was drained — or that break-glass
+        # was authorized — and knows nothing about whether this requester may
+        # request this class at all. Conjoining them keeps a class the matrix
+        # denied from ever reporting an authorized apply, and keeps break-glass
+        # scoped to what it is for: bypassing the drain proof, never the
+        # least-privilege class matrix.
+        restart_class_authorized = bool(report.allow_restart)
+        gate_payload["drain_gate_allow"] = bool(gate.allow)
+        gate_payload["restart_class_authorized"] = restart_class_authorized
+        if not restart_class_authorized:
+            gate_payload["reasons"] = list(gate_payload.get("reasons") or []) + [
+                "restart class authorization denied; apply denied regardless of "
+                "drain proof or break-glass (fail closed, #663)",
+                *(report.authorization_reasons or []),
+            ]
         payload["apply_gate"] = gate_payload
-        payload["apply_authorized"] = gate.allow
+        payload["apply_authorized"] = bool(gate.allow and restart_class_authorized)
         payload["break_glass_requested"] = bool(request_break_glass)
         payload["break_glass_authorized"] = break_glass_authorized
         # Even an authorized gate performs no restart here: execution is a later

restart_coordinator.py

@@ -28,11 +28,12 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 from dataclasses import dataclass, field
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from enum import Enum
 from typing import Any, Mapping, Sequence
 
 import lease_lifecycle
 
-COORDINATOR_VERSION = "1.0.0-issue-658"
+COORDINATOR_VERSION = "1.1.0-issue-663"
 
 # Restart verdicts. Exactly the three the acceptance criteria name.
 VERDICT_SAFE = "safe"
@@ -54,6 +55,194 @@ LEASE_FRESHNESS_LIVE = "active"
 DEFAULT_SESSION_HEARTBEAT_STALE_SECONDS = 900
 
 
+class RestartClass(str, Enum):
+    """The only restart/recovery classes accepted by the coordinator."""
+
+    CLIENT_RECONNECT = "client_reconnect"
+    SESSION_RECONNECT = "session_reconnect"
+    WORKER_RESTART = "worker_restart"
+    ROLE_RUNTIME_RESTART = "role_runtime_restart"
+    CONNECTOR_RESTART = "connector_restart"
+    CONFIGURATION_RELOAD = "configuration_reload"
+    ROLLING_MCP_RESTART = "rolling_mcp_restart"
+    FULL_MCP_RESTART = "full_mcp_restart"
+    HOST_RESTART = "host_restart"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RestartClassPolicy:
+    """Least-privilege policy for one :class:`RestartClass`."""
+
+    restart_class: RestartClass
+    required_permission: str
+    expected_blast_radius: str
+    drain_requirement: str
+    full_drain_required: bool
+    approval_requirement: str
+    audit_requirement: str
+    recovery_behavior: str
+    request_roles: tuple[str, ...]
+    execution_roles: tuple[str, ...]
+
+    def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "restart_class": self.restart_class.value,
+            "required_permission": self.required_permission,
+            "expected_blast_radius": self.expected_blast_radius,
+            "drain_requirement": self.drain_requirement,
+            "full_drain_required": self.full_drain_required,
+            "approval_requirement": self.approval_requirement,
+            "audit_requirement": self.audit_requirement,
+            "recovery_behavior": self.recovery_behavior,
+            "request_roles": list(self.request_roles),
+            "execution_roles": list(self.execution_roles),
+        }
+
+
+WORKER_ROLES = ("author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler")
+CONTROL_ROLES = ("controller", "operator", "admin")
+ALL_REQUEST_ROLES = WORKER_ROLES + CONTROL_ROLES
+
+RESTART_CLASS_POLICIES: dict[RestartClass, RestartClassPolicy] = {
+    RestartClass.CLIENT_RECONNECT: RestartClassPolicy(
+        RestartClass.CLIENT_RECONNECT,
+        "mcp.reconnect.client",
+        BLAST_NONE,
+        "none",
+        False,
+        "self_service",
+        "record class, actor, client namespace, reason, and outcome",
+        "Reconnect only the caller's client transport; no daemon or peer session changes.",
+        ALL_REQUEST_ROLES,
+        ALL_REQUEST_ROLES,
+    ),
+    RestartClass.SESSION_RECONNECT: RestartClassPolicy(
+        RestartClass.SESSION_RECONNECT,
+        "mcp.reconnect.session",
+        BLAST_LOW,
+        "requesting_session_safe_point",
+        False,
+        "self_service",
+        "record class, actor, session id, reason, and outcome",
+        "Rebind identity, capability, and workspace state for one session.",
+        ALL_REQUEST_ROLES,
+        ALL_REQUEST_ROLES,
+    ),
+    RestartClass.WORKER_RESTART: RestartClassPolicy(
+        RestartClass.WORKER_RESTART,
+        "mcp.restart.worker.request",
+        BLAST_LOW,
+        "target_worker",
+        False,
+        "controller_approval_and_automated_gates",
+        "record class, actor, target worker, approval, drain proof, and outcome",
+        "Restart one worker after its own lease and mutation scope is drained.",
+        ALL_REQUEST_ROLES,
+        ("operator", "admin"),
+    ),
+    RestartClass.ROLE_RUNTIME_RESTART: RestartClassPolicy(
+        RestartClass.ROLE_RUNTIME_RESTART,
+        "mcp.restart.role_runtime.request",
+        BLAST_MEDIUM,
+        "target_role_runtime",
+        False,
+        "controller_approval_and_automated_gates",
+        "record class, actor, role namespace, approval, drain proof, and outcome",
+        "Restart only the selected role runtime and then re-probe that namespace.",
+        ALL_REQUEST_ROLES,
+        ("operator", "admin"),
+    ),
+    RestartClass.CONNECTOR_RESTART: RestartClassPolicy(
+        RestartClass.CONNECTOR_RESTART,
+        "mcp.restart.connector.request",
+        BLAST_MEDIUM,
+        "target_connector",
+        False,
+        "controller_approval_and_automated_gates",
+        "record class, actor, connector id, approval, drain proof, and outcome",
+        "Restart one connector while unrelated role runtimes remain available.",
+        ALL_REQUEST_ROLES,
+        ("operator", "admin"),
+    ),
+    RestartClass.CONFIGURATION_RELOAD: RestartClassPolicy(
+        RestartClass.CONFIGURATION_RELOAD,
+        "mcp.reload.configuration.request",
+        BLAST_LOW,
+        "mutation_quiesce",
+        False,
+        "controller_approval_and_automated_gates",
+        "record class, actor, configuration revision, approval, and outcome",
+        "Gracefully reload configuration without replacing the daemon process.",
+        ALL_REQUEST_ROLES,
+        ("operator", "admin"),
+    ),
+    RestartClass.ROLLING_MCP_RESTART: RestartClassPolicy(
+        RestartClass.ROLLING_MCP_RESTART,
+        "mcp.restart.rolling.request",
+        BLAST_MEDIUM,
+        "one_instance_at_a_time",
+        False,
+        "controller_approval_and_automated_gates",
+        "record class, actor, instance order, approval, per-instance drains, and outcome",
+        "Drain, restart, verify, and restore one instance before advancing to the next.",
+        CONTROL_ROLES,
+        ("operator", "admin"),
+    ),
+    RestartClass.FULL_MCP_RESTART: RestartClassPolicy(
+        RestartClass.FULL_MCP_RESTART,
+        "mcp.restart.full.request",
+        BLAST_HIGH,
+        "all_sessions_and_mutations",
+        True,
+        "controller_approval_and_automated_gates",
+        "record class, actor, full impact report, approval, drain proof, and outcome",
+        "Stop and restore the complete MCP runtime only after a verified full drain.",
+        CONTROL_ROLES,
+        ("operator", "admin"),
+    ),
+    RestartClass.HOST_RESTART: RestartClassPolicy(
+        RestartClass.HOST_RESTART,
+        "mcp.restart.host.request",
+        BLAST_HIGH,
+        "all_host_work",
+        True,
+        "controller_approval_plus_infrastructure_operator",
+        "record class, actor, host, incident or change id, approval, drain proof, and outcome",
+        "Hand off to infrastructure ownership; reconcile every runtime after the host returns.",
+        ("controller", "operator", "admin"),
+        ("operator", "admin"),
+    ),
+}
+
+
+def resolve_restart_class(value: RestartClass | str) -> RestartClass:
+    """Resolve a restart class or fail closed for an unknown value."""
+
+    if isinstance(value, RestartClass):
+        return value
+    try:
+        return RestartClass(str(value).strip())
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        raise ValueError(f"unknown restart class {value!r}; deny (fail closed)") from exc
+
+
+def restart_class_policy(value: RestartClass | str) -> RestartClassPolicy:
+    """Return the canonical policy for *value*."""
+
+    return RESTART_CLASS_POLICIES[resolve_restart_class(value)]
+
+
+def permissions_for_role(role: str | None) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+    """Return request permissions granted to a workflow role by this policy."""
+
+    normalized = str(role or "").strip().lower()
+    return tuple(
+        policy.required_permission
+        for policy in RESTART_CLASS_POLICIES.values()
+        if normalized in policy.request_roles
+    )
+
+
 def _utc_now() -> datetime:
     return datetime.now(timezone.utc)
 
@@ -75,6 +264,7 @@ class SessionImpact:
     heartbeat_stale: bool
     is_requester: bool
     live: bool
+    connector: str | None = None
 
     def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
         return {
@@ -87,6 +277,7 @@ class SessionImpact:
             "heartbeat_stale": self.heartbeat_stale,
             "is_requester": self.is_requester,
             "live": self.live,
+            "connector": self.connector,
         }
 
 
@@ -105,6 +296,7 @@ class LeaseImpact:
     disruptive: bool
     is_mutation: bool
     is_critical_section: bool
+    connector: str | None = None
 
     def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
         return {
@@ -119,6 +311,7 @@ class LeaseImpact:
             "disruptive": self.disruptive,
             "is_mutation": self.is_mutation,
             "is_critical_section": self.is_critical_section,
+            "connector": self.connector,
         }
 
 
@@ -127,6 +320,13 @@ class RestartImpactReport:
     """Impact preview DTO returned to the console / operator (#642/#652)."""
 
     coordinator_version: str
+    restart_class: str
+    restart_policy: dict[str, Any]
+    policy_enforced: bool
+    permission_authorized: bool
+    role_authorized: bool
+    approval_satisfied: bool
+    authorization_reasons: list[str]
     evaluated_at: str
     dry_run: bool
     restart_performed: bool
@@ -153,6 +353,13 @@ class RestartImpactReport:
     def as_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
         return {
             "coordinator_version": self.coordinator_version,
+            "restart_class": self.restart_class,
+            "restart_policy": dict(self.restart_policy),
+            "policy_enforced": self.policy_enforced,
+            "permission_authorized": self.permission_authorized,
+            "role_authorized": self.role_authorized,
+            "approval_satisfied": self.approval_satisfied,
+            "authorization_reasons": list(self.authorization_reasons),
             "evaluated_at": self.evaluated_at,
             "dry_run": self.dry_run,
             "restart_performed": self.restart_performed,
@@ -206,6 +413,7 @@ def _classify_session(
             requesting_session_id and session_id == requesting_session_id
         ),
         live=live,
+        connector=(str(row.get("connector") or "").strip() or None),
     )
 
 
@@ -258,6 +466,7 @@ def _classify_lease(row: Mapping[str, Any]) -> LeaseImpact:
         disruptive=disruptive,
         is_mutation=is_mutation,
         is_critical_section=disruptive,
+        connector=(str(row.get("connector") or "").strip() or None),
     )
 
 
@@ -279,6 +488,14 @@ def evaluate_restart_impact(
     requesting_session_id: str | None = None,
     dry_run: bool = True,
     session_heartbeat_stale_seconds: int = DEFAULT_SESSION_HEARTBEAT_STALE_SECONDS,
+    restart_class: RestartClass | str | None = None,
+    requester_role: str | None = None,
+    requester_permissions: Sequence[str] | None = None,
+    controller_approved: bool = False,
+    operator_authorized: bool = False,
+    target_session_id: str | None = None,
+    target_role: str | None = None,
+    target_connector: str | None = None,
 ) -> RestartImpactReport:
     """Evaluate a proposed MCP restart and return an impact preview.
 
@@ -301,6 +518,61 @@ def evaluate_restart_impact(
     """
     moment = now or _utc_now()
     reasons: list[str] = []
+    authorization_reasons: list[str] = []
+
+    # ``None`` preserves the pre-#663 impact-only API for callers that have not
+    # yet been migrated. All MCP requests pass an explicit class and therefore
+    # take the fail-closed policy path.
+    policy_enforced = restart_class is not None
+    try:
+        resolved_class = resolve_restart_class(
+            restart_class or RestartClass.FULL_MCP_RESTART
+        )
+        policy = RESTART_CLASS_POLICIES[resolved_class]
+        unknown_class = False
+    except ValueError as exc:
+        resolved_class = None
+        policy = None
+        unknown_class = True
+        authorization_reasons.append(str(exc))
+
+    normalized_role = str(requester_role or "").strip().lower()
+    granted = {str(p).strip() for p in (requester_permissions or ())}
+    if policy_enforced and policy is not None:
+        permission_authorized = policy.required_permission in granted
+        role_authorized = normalized_role in policy.request_roles
+        if not permission_authorized:
+            authorization_reasons.append(
+                f"missing required permission {policy.required_permission!r}"
+            )
+        if not role_authorized:
+            authorization_reasons.append(
+                f"role {normalized_role or 'unknown'!r} may not request "
+                f"{policy.restart_class.value}"
+            )
+    elif unknown_class:
+        permission_authorized = False
+        role_authorized = False
+    else:
+        permission_authorized = True
+        role_authorized = True
+
+    if policy_enforced and policy is not None:
+        approval = policy.approval_requirement
+        if approval == "self_service":
+            approval_satisfied = True
+        elif approval == "controller_approval_plus_infrastructure_operator":
+            approval_satisfied = bool(controller_approved and operator_authorized)
+        else:
+            approval_satisfied = bool(controller_approved)
+        if not approval_satisfied:
+            authorization_reasons.append(
+                f"approval requirement not satisfied: {approval}"
+            )
+    elif unknown_class:
+        approval_satisfied = False
+    else:
+        approval_satisfied = True
 
     inventory_complete = bool(inventory.get("inventory_complete", False))
     incomplete_reasons = [str(r) for r in (inventory.get("incomplete_reasons") or [])]
@@ -323,15 +595,67 @@ def evaluate_restart_impact(
     ]
     lease_impacts = [_classify_lease(l) for l in leases_raw]
 
-    # Only *other* live sessions and live leases constitute blast radius: a
+    # Route impact through the selected class. Narrow classes never inherit a
-    # restart that would kill only the requesting session with no other work in
+    # full-runtime drain merely because unrelated work exists.
-    # flight is safe.
+    target_complete = True
-    other_live_sessions = [
+    if resolved_class in {
-        s for s in session_impacts if s.live and not s.is_requester
+        RestartClass.CLIENT_RECONNECT,
+        RestartClass.SESSION_RECONNECT,
+        RestartClass.CONFIGURATION_RELOAD,
+    }:
+        scoped_sessions: list[SessionImpact] = []
+        scoped_leases: list[LeaseImpact] = []
+    elif resolved_class == RestartClass.WORKER_RESTART:
+        selected_session = (target_session_id or "").strip()
+        target_complete = bool(selected_session)
+        scoped_sessions = [
+            s for s in session_impacts if s.session_id == selected_session
         ]
-    disruptive_leases = [l for l in lease_impacts if l.disruptive]
+        scoped_leases = [
-    critical_sections = [l for l in lease_impacts if l.is_critical_section]
+            l for l in lease_impacts if l.session_id == selected_session
-    mutations = [l for l in lease_impacts if l.is_mutation]
+        ]
+    elif resolved_class == RestartClass.ROLE_RUNTIME_RESTART:
+        selected_role = (target_role or "").strip().lower()
+        target_complete = bool(selected_role)
+        scoped_sessions = [
+            s for s in session_impacts if str(s.role or "").lower() == selected_role
+        ]
+        scoped_leases = [
+            l for l in lease_impacts if str(l.role or "").lower() == selected_role
+        ]
+    elif resolved_class == RestartClass.CONNECTOR_RESTART:
+        selected_connector = (target_connector or "").strip()
+        target_complete = bool(selected_connector)
+        scoped_sessions = [
+            s for s in session_impacts if s.connector == selected_connector
+        ]
+        scoped_leases = [
+            l for l in lease_impacts if l.connector == selected_connector
+        ]
+    else:
+        scoped_sessions = list(session_impacts)
+        scoped_leases = list(lease_impacts)
+
+    if policy_enforced and not target_complete:
+        authorization_reasons.append(
+            f"target required for {resolved_class.value if resolved_class else 'unknown class'}"
+        )
+
+    other_live_sessions = [
+        s for s in scoped_sessions if s.live and not s.is_requester
+    ]
+    disruptive_leases = [l for l in scoped_leases if l.disruptive]
+    critical_sections = [l for l in scoped_leases if l.is_critical_section]
+    mutations = [l for l in scoped_leases if l.is_mutation]
+    terminal_lock_in_scope = (
+        terminal_lock
+        if resolved_class
+        not in {
+            RestartClass.CLIENT_RECONNECT,
+            RestartClass.SESSION_RECONNECT,
+        }
+        else None
+    )
 
     affected_issues = sorted(
         {
@@ -348,9 +672,24 @@ def evaluate_restart_impact(
         }
     )
 
-    disruptive = bool(disruptive_leases or other_live_sessions or terminal_lock)
+    disruptive = bool(
+        disruptive_leases or other_live_sessions or terminal_lock_in_scope
+    )
 
-    if not inventory_complete:
+    authorization_ok = bool(
+        not unknown_class
+        and permission_authorized
+        and role_authorized
+        and approval_satisfied
+        and target_complete
+    )
+
+    if policy_enforced and not authorization_ok:
+        verdict = VERDICT_UNSAFE
+        allow_restart = False
+        reasons.append("restart class authorization denied (fail closed)")
+        reasons.extend(authorization_reasons)
+    elif not inventory_complete:
         verdict = VERDICT_UNSAFE
         allow_restart = False
         reasons.append(
@@ -381,7 +720,7 @@ def evaluate_restart_impact(
             f"{len(critical_sections)} critical section(s) in flight "
             "(active lease with a live owner)"
         )
-    if terminal_lock:
+    if terminal_lock_in_scope:
         reasons.append("active terminal (merge) lock present")
 
     override_would_allow = bool(inventory_complete and disruptive)
@@ -411,6 +750,12 @@ def evaluate_restart_impact(
     audit_record = {
         "event": "restart_impact_evaluated",
         "coordinator_version": COORDINATOR_VERSION,
+        "restart_class": (
+            resolved_class.value if resolved_class else str(restart_class or "")
+        ),
+        "required_permission": (
+            policy.required_permission if policy is not None else None
+        ),
         "evaluated_at": moment.isoformat(),
         "dry_run": dry_run,
         "operator_override": bool(operator_override),
@@ -424,6 +769,15 @@ def evaluate_restart_impact(
 
     return RestartImpactReport(
         coordinator_version=COORDINATOR_VERSION,
+        restart_class=(
+            resolved_class.value if resolved_class else str(restart_class or "")
+        ),
+        restart_policy=policy.as_dict() if policy is not None else {},
+        policy_enforced=policy_enforced,
+        permission_authorized=permission_authorized,
+        role_authorized=role_authorized,
+        approval_satisfied=approval_satisfied,
+        authorization_reasons=authorization_reasons,
         evaluated_at=moment.isoformat(),
         dry_run=dry_run,
         restart_performed=False,
@@ -440,9 +794,11 @@ def evaluate_restart_impact(
         affected_issues=affected_issues,
         affected_prs=affected_prs,
         mutations=mutations,
-        terminal_lock=dict(terminal_lock)
+        terminal_lock=(
-        if isinstance(terminal_lock, Mapping)
+            dict(terminal_lock_in_scope)
-        else terminal_lock,
+            if isinstance(terminal_lock_in_scope, Mapping)
+            else terminal_lock_in_scope
+        ),
         ack_state=ack_state,
         prior_recovery_attempts=prior_recovery_attempts,
         counts=counts,

tests/test_issue_886_apply_authorization_conjunction.py

@@ -0,0 +1,381 @@
+"""``apply_authorized`` requires BOTH authorizations (#886 review blocker B1).
+
+The #663 restart-class matrix and the #661 drain-proof hard gate are independent
+authorizations that first coexisted when PR #882 landed on master and PR #886
+merged it into the restart-class branch. The union preserved both, but the apply
+decision consulted only the drain gate::
+
+    payload["apply_authorized"] = gate.allow          # pre-fix
+
+so a clean drain proof — or an authorized break-glass, which needs no proof at
+all — reported ``apply_authorized: True`` for a restart class the least-privilege
+matrix had just denied, in the same payload that carried
+``allow_restart: False`` and "role 'author' may not request full_mcp_restart".
+
+These tests pin the conjunction and the properties that must survive it. They
+exercise the real MCP tool, which previously had no test coverage at all — that
+absence is why the defect shipped.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import json
+import os
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+import drain_proof
+import gitea_mcp_server as srv
+
+CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV = "GITEA_CONTROLLER_RESTART_APPROVAL_AUTHORIZATION"
+BREAK_GLASS_ENV = "GITEA_BREAKGLASS_RESTART_AUTHORIZATION"
+
+# A quiet control plane: nothing live, so the blast radius never masks the
+# authorization outcome under test.
+QUIET_SESSIONS: list[dict] = []
+QUIET_LEASES: list[dict] = []
+
+
+class _FakeDB:
+    """Minimal control-plane DB stand-in for the restart inventory."""
+
+    def __init__(self, sessions=QUIET_SESSIONS, terminal=None):
+        self._sessions = list(sessions)
+        self._terminal = terminal
+
+    def list_sessions(self, statuses=None, limit=None):
+        return list(self._sessions)
+
+    def get_active_terminal_lock(self, remote=None, org=None, repo=None):
+        return self._terminal
+
+
+def _profile(role: str) -> dict:
+    return {"profile_name": f"prgs-{role}", "role_kind": role, "role": role}
+
+
+class _RestartToolHarness(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Drives the real ``gitea_request_mcp_restart`` with a stubbed inventory."""
+
+    def _call(self, *, role: str, env: dict | None = None, **kwargs) -> dict:
+        environ = {k: v for k, v in os.environ.items()
+                   if k not in (CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV, BREAK_GLASS_ENV)}
+        environ.update(env or {})
+        with patch.object(srv, "_profile_operation_gate", return_value=None), \
+                patch.object(srv, "_resolve",
+                             return_value=("gitea.prgs.cc",
+                                           "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                                           "Gitea-Tools")), \
+                patch.object(srv, "get_profile", return_value=_profile(role)), \
+                patch.object(srv, "_control_plane_db_or_error",
+                             return_value=(_FakeDB(), [])), \
+                patch.object(srv.lease_lifecycle, "list_active_leases",
+                             return_value={"leases": list(QUIET_LEASES)}), \
+                patch.dict(os.environ, environ, clear=True):
+            return srv.gitea_request_mcp_restart(
+                remote="prgs",
+                org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+                repo="Gitea-Tools",
+                session_id="probe-session",
+                **kwargs,
+            )
+
+    def _clean_proof_for(self, preview: dict) -> str:
+        """Mint a genuinely clean, signature-valid proof bound to *preview*.
+
+        Built from the tool's own dry-run report, so the fingerprint matches and
+        the proof is rejected for authorization reasons only — never because it
+        was stale or forged.
+        """
+        proof = drain_proof.build_drain_proof(
+            impact_report=preview,
+            drain_state={
+                "assignments_stopped": True,
+                "checkpoints_complete": True,
+                "handoffs_verified": True,
+                "leases_handled": True,
+                "acks": {},
+            },
+            requesting_session_id="probe-session",
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(proof.clean, "harness must mint a clean proof")
+        return json.dumps(proof.as_dict())
+
+
+class TestConjunction(_RestartToolHarness):
+    """AC1/AC2 — the two authorizations are ANDed, in both directions."""
+
+    def test_gate_allow_with_class_denied_yields_apply_authorized_false(self):
+        # An author may not request full_mcp_restart (CONTROL_ROLES only).
+        preview = self._call(role="author", restart_class="full_mcp_restart")
+        self.assertFalse(preview["allow_restart"])
+
+        result = self._call(
+            role="author",
+            restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
+            dry_run=False,
+            drain_proof_json=self._clean_proof_for(preview),
+        )
+
+        self.assertTrue(result["apply_gate"]["drain_gate_allow"],
+                        "drain gate itself should have allowed this proof")
+        self.assertFalse(result["apply_gate"]["restart_class_authorized"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["apply_authorized"],
+                         "a clean proof must not authorize a denied class")
+        self.assertFalse(result["allow_restart"])
+
+    def test_gate_allow_with_class_allowed_can_yield_apply_authorized_true(self):
+        preview = self._call(
+            role="operator",
+            restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
+            env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "operator-approved"},
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(preview["allow_restart"],
+                        "operator + controller approval must authorize the class")
+
+        result = self._call(
+            role="operator",
+            restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
+            dry_run=False,
+            drain_proof_json=self._clean_proof_for(preview),
+            env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "operator-approved"},
+        )
+
+        self.assertTrue(result["apply_gate"]["drain_gate_allow"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["apply_gate"]["restart_class_authorized"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["apply_authorized"],
+                        "both authorizations pass; apply must be authorized")
+
+    def test_denial_is_attributable_to_the_authorization_that_caused_it(self):
+        preview = self._call(role="author", restart_class="full_mcp_restart")
+        result = self._call(
+            role="author",
+            restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
+            dry_run=False,
+            drain_proof_json=self._clean_proof_for(preview),
+        )
+        blob = " ".join(result["apply_gate"]["reasons"]).lower()
+        self.assertIn("restart class authorization denied", blob)
+        self.assertIn("full_mcp_restart", blob)
+
+
+class TestProofCannotOverrideAuthorization(_RestartToolHarness):
+    """AC3 — a clean proof never overrides a class or requester-role denial."""
+
+    def test_clean_proof_cannot_override_role_denial(self):
+        for role in ("author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler"):
+            with self.subTest(role=role):
+                preview = self._call(role=role, restart_class="full_mcp_restart")
+                result = self._call(
+                    role=role,
+                    restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
+                    dry_run=False,
+                    drain_proof_json=self._clean_proof_for(preview),
+                )
+                self.assertFalse(result["apply_authorized"])
+
+    def test_clean_proof_cannot_override_missing_controller_approval(self):
+        # Correct role, but the class demands controller approval and the
+        # environment carries none.
+        preview = self._call(role="operator", restart_class="full_mcp_restart")
+        self.assertFalse(preview["allow_restart"])
+        result = self._call(
+            role="operator",
+            restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
+            dry_run=False,
+            drain_proof_json=self._clean_proof_for(preview),
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["apply_authorized"])
+
+    def test_clean_proof_cannot_override_unknown_class(self):
+        preview = self._call(role="operator", restart_class="not_a_real_class",
+                             env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "yes"})
+        self.assertFalse(preview["allow_restart"])
+        result = self._call(
+            role="operator",
+            restart_class="not_a_real_class",
+            dry_run=False,
+            drain_proof_json=self._clean_proof_for(preview),
+            env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "yes"},
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["apply_authorized"])
+
+    def test_clean_proof_cannot_override_missing_scope_target(self):
+        # worker_restart without target_session_id fails closed on scoping.
+        preview = self._call(role="operator", restart_class="worker_restart",
+                             env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "yes"})
+        self.assertFalse(preview["allow_restart"])
+        result = self._call(
+            role="operator",
+            restart_class="worker_restart",
+            dry_run=False,
+            drain_proof_json=self._clean_proof_for(preview),
+            env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "yes"},
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["apply_authorized"])
+
+
+class TestBreakGlassDoesNotCollapseTheMatrix(_RestartToolHarness):
+    """AC4 — break-glass bypasses the drain proof only, never the class matrix."""
+
+    def test_break_glass_does_not_authorize_a_denied_class(self):
+        result = self._call(
+            role="author",
+            restart_class="host_restart",
+            dry_run=False,
+            request_break_glass=True,
+            env={BREAK_GLASS_ENV: "operator-issued"},
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["break_glass_authorized"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["apply_gate"]["drain_gate_allow"],
+                        "break-glass does satisfy the drain gate")
+        self.assertFalse(result["apply_gate"]["restart_class_authorized"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["apply_authorized"],
+                         "break-glass must not collapse the class matrix")
+
+    def test_break_glass_across_every_worker_role_and_restricted_class(self):
+        for role in ("author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler"):
+            for klass in ("rolling_mcp_restart", "full_mcp_restart",
+                          "host_restart"):
+                with self.subTest(role=role, restart_class=klass):
+                    result = self._call(
+                        role=role,
+                        restart_class=klass,
+                        dry_run=False,
+                        request_break_glass=True,
+                        env={BREAK_GLASS_ENV: "operator-issued"},
+                    )
+                    self.assertFalse(result["apply_authorized"])
+
+    def test_break_glass_still_works_when_the_class_is_authorized(self):
+        # Break-glass keeps its purpose: skipping the drain proof for a caller
+        # the matrix does allow.
+        result = self._call(
+            role="operator",
+            restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
+            dry_run=False,
+            request_break_glass=True,
+            env={BREAK_GLASS_ENV: "operator-issued",
+                 CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "operator-approved"},
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["apply_authorized"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["apply_gate"]["verdict"], "break_glass")
+
+    def test_break_glass_is_not_self_assertable(self):
+        # Requested but no environment authorization -> no bypass, and the
+        # unproven apply is denied.
+        result = self._call(
+            role="operator",
+            restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
+            dry_run=False,
+            request_break_glass=True,
+            env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "operator-approved"},
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["break_glass_requested"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["break_glass_authorized"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["apply_authorized"])
+        self.assertIn("incident", result)
+
+
+class TestRestrictedClassesStayDenied(_RestartToolHarness):
+    """AC5 — restricted classes remain denied to unauthorized requesters."""
+
+    def test_restricted_classes_denied_for_worker_roles(self):
+        for role in ("author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler"):
+            for klass in ("rolling_mcp_restart", "full_mcp_restart",
+                          "host_restart"):
+                with self.subTest(role=role, restart_class=klass):
+                    preview = self._call(
+                        role=role,
+                        restart_class=klass,
+                        env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "yes"},
+                    )
+                    self.assertFalse(preview["allow_restart"])
+                    self.assertFalse(preview["permission_authorized"])
+                    self.assertFalse(preview["role_authorized"])
+
+    def test_host_restart_needs_controller_and_infrastructure_operator(self):
+        # controller approval alone is not enough for host_restart.
+        preview = self._call(role="controller", restart_class="host_restart",
+                             env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "yes"})
+        self.assertFalse(preview["approval_satisfied"])
+        self.assertFalse(preview["allow_restart"])
+
+
+class TestExistingPathsStillWork(_RestartToolHarness):
+    """AC6 — valid scoped and unscoped restart paths are unaffected."""
+
+    def test_dry_run_never_reports_apply_authorization(self):
+        result = self._call(role="operator", restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
+                            env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "yes"})
+        self.assertNotIn("apply_authorized", result)
+        self.assertNotIn("apply_gate", result)
+        self.assertFalse(result["apply_supported"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["restart_performed"])
+
+    def test_self_service_unscoped_classes_authorize_for_every_role(self):
+        for role in ("author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler",
+                     "controller", "operator", "admin"):
+            for klass in ("client_reconnect", "session_reconnect"):
+                with self.subTest(role=role, restart_class=klass):
+                    preview = self._call(role=role, restart_class=klass)
+                    self.assertTrue(preview["allow_restart"])
+
+    def test_scoped_class_with_target_authorizes_and_applies(self):
+        env = {CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "operator-approved"}
+        preview = self._call(role="operator", restart_class="worker_restart",
+                             target_session_id="worker-1", env=env)
+        self.assertTrue(preview["allow_restart"])
+
+        result = self._call(
+            role="operator",
+            restart_class="worker_restart",
+            target_session_id="worker-1",
+            dry_run=False,
+            drain_proof_json=self._clean_proof_for(preview),
+            env=env,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["apply_authorized"])
+
+    def test_apply_still_denies_without_any_proof(self):
+        # The #661 hard gate is untouched by the conjunction.
+        result = self._call(
+            role="operator",
+            restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
+            dry_run=False,
+            env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "operator-approved"},
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["apply_gate"]["drain_gate_allow"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["apply_gate"]["restart_class_authorized"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["apply_authorized"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["incident"]["kind"], "restart_drain_gate_denied")
+
+    def test_apply_denies_on_malformed_proof(self):
+        result = self._call(
+            role="operator",
+            restart_class="full_mcp_restart",
+            dry_run=False,
+            drain_proof_json="{not valid json",
+            env={CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "operator-approved"},
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["apply_authorized"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("invalid drain_proof_json" in reason
+                            for reason in result["apply_gate"]["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_tool_never_restarts_on_any_path(self):
+        for kwargs in (
+            {"restart_class": "client_reconnect"},
+            {"restart_class": "full_mcp_restart", "dry_run": False},
+            {"restart_class": "host_restart", "dry_run": False,
+             "request_break_glass": True},
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(**kwargs):
+                result = self._call(role="operator", env={
+                    CONTROLLER_APPROVAL_ENV: "yes", BREAK_GLASS_ENV: "yes"},
+                    **kwargs)
+                self.assertFalse(result["restart_performed"])
+                self.assertFalse(result["apply_supported"])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_mcp_restart_governance_docs.py

@@ -105,3 +105,120 @@ def test_cross_links_do_not_embed_secrets():
         text = _read(path)
         for marker in ("ghp_", "BEGIN PRIVATE KEY", "Authorization: Bearer"):
             assert marker not in text, f"{path} contains {marker!r}"
+
+
+# --- Coordinator doc stays in lock-step with the tool (#886 review blocker B2) --
+#
+# PR #882 moved the #661 drain-proof hard gate *into* gitea_request_mcp_restart,
+# but the coordinator document still described the proof as "a separate child"
+# and omitted both new parameters. Nothing referenced that document, so nothing
+# caught the drift. These tests bind the prose to the real signature.
+
+COORDINATOR_DOC = REPO_ROOT / "docs" / "mcp-restart-coordinator.md"
+
+# Affirmative claims that were accurate before #661 landed and are now false.
+# Matched against whitespace-normalized text so re-wrapping cannot hide them.
+# Deliberately not the bare phrase "a separate child": the corrected prose uses
+# it in a negation ("no longer a separate child operation"), and a guard that
+# forbids naming the old behaviour would block explaining that it changed.
+STALE_PRE_661_PHRASES = (
+    "gated by a drain proof (a separate child)",
+    "is a later child gated by a drain proof",
+    "mutative apply path is explicitly out of scope",
+    "apply is gated by a drain proof (a separate child)",
+)
+
+
+def _documented_signature_block() -> str:
+    """The fenced signature block for the tool, as published in the doc."""
+    text = _read(COORDINATOR_DOC)
+    marker = "gitea_request_mcp_restart("
+    start = text.index(marker)
+    end = text.index("```", start)
+    return text[start:end]
+
+
+def test_documented_signature_matches_the_real_tool_signature():
+    import inspect
+
+    import gitea_mcp_server
+
+    block = _documented_signature_block()
+    real = inspect.signature(gitea_mcp_server.gitea_request_mcp_restart)
+    for name in real.parameters:
+        assert name in block, (
+            f"docs/mcp-restart-coordinator.md documents no {name!r} parameter; "
+            "the published signature has drifted from the tool"
+        )
+
+
+def test_drain_proof_and_break_glass_parameters_are_documented():
+    block = _documented_signature_block()
+    for name in ("drain_proof_json", "request_break_glass"):
+        assert name in block, f"signature block missing {name}"
+
+
+def test_restart_class_and_target_scoping_parameters_survive():
+    block = _documented_signature_block()
+    for name in ("restart_class", "target_session_id", "target_role",
+                 "target_connector"):
+        assert name in block, f"signature block lost #663 parameter {name}"
+
+
+def test_gate_is_documented_as_executing_inside_this_tool():
+    lower = _read(COORDINATOR_DOC).lower()
+    assert "inside this tool" in lower, (
+        "the coordinator doc must state that the drain-proof gate executes in "
+        "gitea_request_mcp_restart, not in a later child"
+    )
+    assert "no longer a separate child operation" in lower
+
+
+def test_stale_pre_661_wording_cannot_return():
+    normalized = " ".join(_read(COORDINATOR_DOC).split()).lower()
+    for phrase in STALE_PRE_661_PHRASES:
+        assert phrase not in normalized, (
+            f"stale pre-#661 wording returned to the coordinator doc: {phrase!r}"
+        )
+
+
+def test_dry_run_versus_apply_behavior_is_documented():
+    lower = _read(COORDINATOR_DOC).lower()
+    assert "dry_run=true" in lower and "dry_run=false" in lower
+    assert "apply_supported" in lower and "restart_performed" in lower
+    assert "never restarts anything" in lower
+
+
+def test_authorization_ordering_and_conjunction_are_documented():
+    text = _read(COORDINATOR_DOC)
+    lower = text.lower()
+    assert "authorization ordering" in lower
+    assert "allow_restart" in text
+    assert "apply_authorized" in text
+    # The conjunction itself, and the attribution fields behind it.
+    assert "gate.allow and allow_restart" in text
+    for field in ("drain_gate_allow", "restart_class_authorized"):
+        assert field in text, f"doc omits apply_gate.{field}"
+
+
+def test_break_glass_scope_is_documented_as_drain_proof_only():
+    text = _read(COORDINATOR_DOC)
+    lower = text.lower()
+    assert "break-glass" in lower
+    assert "drain proof only" in lower, (
+        "doc must state break-glass never bypasses the restart-class matrix"
+    )
+    assert "GITEA_BREAKGLASS_RESTART_AUTHORIZATION" in text
+
+
+def test_fail_closed_on_apply_is_documented():
+    lower = _read(COORDINATOR_DOC).lower()
+    assert "fail closed" in lower
+    for condition in ("expired", "unclean", "tampered", "stale"):
+        assert condition in lower, f"fail-closed list omits {condition!r}"
+
+
+def test_coordinator_doc_embeds_no_secrets():
+    text = _read(COORDINATOR_DOC)
+    for marker in ("ghp_", "BEGIN PRIVATE KEY", "Authorization: Bearer"):
+        assert marker not in text, f"{COORDINATOR_DOC} contains {marker!r}"

tests/test_restart_classes.py

@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+"""Permission, drain, routing, and audit matrix for restart classes (#663)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+
+import restart_coordinator as rc
+
+NOW = datetime(2026, 7, 24, 20, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+
+
+def _inventory() -> dict:
+    return {
+        "inventory_complete": True,
+        "sessions": [
+            {
+                "session_id": "requester",
+                "role": "author",
+                "profile": "prgs-author",
+                "pid": os.getpid(),
+                "status": "active",
+                "last_heartbeat_at": NOW.isoformat(),
+            },
+            {
+                "session_id": "reviewer",
+                "role": "reviewer",
+                "profile": "prgs-reviewer",
+                "pid": os.getpid(),
+                "status": "active",
+                "last_heartbeat_at": NOW.isoformat(),
+            },
+        ],
+        "leases": [
+            {
+                "lease_id": "review-lease",
+                "session_id": "reviewer",
+                "role": "reviewer",
+                "phase": "reviewing",
+                "work_kind": "pr",
+                "work_number": 900,
+                "worktree_path": "/tmp/review-900",
+                "freshness": {"freshness": "active"},
+            }
+        ],
+    }
+
+
+def _evaluate(
+    restart_class: rc.RestartClass,
+    *,
+    role: str = "controller",
+    permissions: tuple[str, ...] | None = None,
+    approved: bool = True,
+    operator: bool = True,
+    **targets,
+):
+    return rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
+        _inventory(),
+        now=NOW,
+        requesting_session_id="requester",
+        restart_class=restart_class,
+        requester_role=role,
+        requester_permissions=(
+            permissions if permissions is not None
+            else rc.permissions_for_role(role)
+        ),
+        controller_approved=approved,
+        operator_authorized=operator,
+        **targets,
+    )
+
+
+def test_policy_table_covers_exactly_all_nine_classes():
+    assert set(rc.RESTART_CLASS_POLICIES) == set(rc.RestartClass)
+    assert len(rc.RESTART_CLASS_POLICIES) == 9
+    for restart_class, policy in rc.RESTART_CLASS_POLICIES.items():
+        assert policy.restart_class is restart_class
+        assert policy.required_permission
+        assert policy.expected_blast_radius in {
+            rc.BLAST_NONE, rc.BLAST_LOW, rc.BLAST_MEDIUM, rc.BLAST_HIGH
+        }
+        assert policy.drain_requirement
+        assert policy.approval_requirement
+        assert policy.audit_requirement
+        assert policy.recovery_behavior
+
+
+def test_permission_matrix_allows_each_class_with_exact_permission():
+    targets = {
+        rc.RestartClass.WORKER_RESTART: {"target_session_id": "reviewer"},
+        rc.RestartClass.ROLE_RUNTIME_RESTART: {"target_role": "reviewer"},
+        rc.RestartClass.CONNECTOR_RESTART: {"target_connector": "github"},
+    }
+    for restart_class, policy in rc.RESTART_CLASS_POLICIES.items():
+        report = _evaluate(
+            restart_class,
+            permissions=(policy.required_permission,),
+            **targets.get(restart_class, {}),
+        )
+        assert report.permission_authorized, restart_class
+        assert report.role_authorized, restart_class
+        assert report.approval_satisfied, restart_class
+        assert report.audit_record["restart_class"] == restart_class.value
+        assert (
+            report.audit_record["required_permission"]
+            == policy.required_permission
+        )
+
+
+def test_missing_or_nearby_permission_denies():
+    report = _evaluate(
+        rc.RestartClass.ROLE_RUNTIME_RESTART,
+        permissions=("mcp.restart.worker.request",),
+        target_role="reviewer",
+    )
+    assert report.verdict == rc.VERDICT_UNSAFE
+    assert not report.allow_restart
+    assert not report.permission_authorized
+    assert any("missing required permission" in r for r in report.reasons)
+
+
+def test_unknown_restart_class_denies_fail_closed():
+    report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
+        _inventory(),
+        now=NOW,
+        restart_class="surprise_reboot",
+        requester_role="admin",
+        requester_permissions=("mcp.restart.host.request",),
+        controller_approved=True,
+        operator_authorized=True,
+    )
+    assert report.verdict == rc.VERDICT_UNSAFE
+    assert not report.allow_restart
+    assert report.restart_policy == {}
+    assert any("unknown restart class" in r for r in report.reasons)
+
+
+def test_worker_roles_cannot_request_full_or_host_restart():
+    for role in rc.WORKER_ROLES:
+        granted = rc.permissions_for_role(role)
+        assert "mcp.restart.full.request" not in granted
+        assert "mcp.restart.host.request" not in granted
+        report = _evaluate(
+            rc.RestartClass.FULL_MCP_RESTART,
+            role=role,
+            permissions=granted,
+        )
+        assert not report.role_authorized
+        assert not report.allow_restart
+
+
+def test_controller_approval_is_independent_of_permission():
+    report = _evaluate(
+        rc.RestartClass.WORKER_RESTART,
+        approved=False,
+        target_session_id="reviewer",
+    )
+    assert report.permission_authorized
+    assert not report.approval_satisfied
+    assert not report.allow_restart
+
+
+def test_narrow_classes_do_not_inherit_full_drain_or_peer_lease_block():
+    for restart_class in (
+        rc.RestartClass.CLIENT_RECONNECT,
+        rc.RestartClass.SESSION_RECONNECT,
+        rc.RestartClass.CONFIGURATION_RELOAD,
+    ):
+        report = _evaluate(restart_class)
+        assert not report.restart_policy["full_drain_required"]
+        assert report.counts["leases_disruptive"] == 0
+        assert report.counts["sessions_live_other"] == 0
+        assert report.counts["critical_sections"] == 0
+        assert report.counts["mutations"] == 0
+        assert report.allow_restart, (restart_class, report.reasons)
+
+
+def test_client_reconnect_does_not_wait_for_unrelated_terminal_lock():
+    inventory = _inventory()
+    inventory["terminal_lock"] = {"terminal_pr": 901}
+    report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
+        inventory,
+        now=NOW,
+        requesting_session_id="requester",
+        restart_class=rc.RestartClass.CLIENT_RECONNECT,
+        requester_role="author",
+        requester_permissions=rc.permissions_for_role("author"),
+    )
+    assert report.allow_restart
+    assert report.terminal_lock is None
+
+
+def test_scoped_restart_only_counts_named_target():
+    report = _evaluate(
+        rc.RestartClass.ROLE_RUNTIME_RESTART,
+        target_role="author",
+    )
+    assert report.counts["leases_disruptive"] == 0
+    assert report.affected_prs == []
+    assert report.allow_restart
+
+    reviewer = _evaluate(
+        rc.RestartClass.ROLE_RUNTIME_RESTART,
+        target_role="reviewer",
+    )
+    assert reviewer.counts["leases_disruptive"] == 1
+    assert reviewer.affected_prs == [900]
+    assert not reviewer.allow_restart
+
+
+def test_missing_scoped_target_denies_instead_of_widening():
+    for restart_class in (
+        rc.RestartClass.WORKER_RESTART,
+        rc.RestartClass.ROLE_RUNTIME_RESTART,
+        rc.RestartClass.CONNECTOR_RESTART,
+    ):
+        report = _evaluate(restart_class)
+        assert not report.allow_restart
+        assert any("target required" in r for r in report.reasons)
+
+
+def test_only_full_and_host_classes_require_full_drain():
+    requiring_full = {
+        restart_class
+        for restart_class, policy in rc.RESTART_CLASS_POLICIES.items()
+        if policy.full_drain_required
+    }
+    assert requiring_full == {
+        rc.RestartClass.FULL_MCP_RESTART,
+        rc.RestartClass.HOST_RESTART,
+    }

tests/test_webui_sanctioned_restart.py

@@ -444,6 +444,12 @@ class TestAuditEmission(unittest.TestCase):
         )
         self.assertEqual(record["target"]["namespace"], NAMESPACE)
         self.assertEqual(record["target"]["mode"], "restart")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            record["target"]["restart_class"], "role_runtime_restart"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            record["metadata"]["restart_class"], "role_runtime_restart"
+        )
         self.assertEqual(record["result"], console_audit.RESULT_ALLOWED)
         self.assertEqual(record["actor"]["subject"], "[email protected]")
         self.assertFalse(record["metadata"]["process_kill_executed"])

tests/test_webui_sessions_view.py

@@ -0,0 +1,739 @@
+"""Tests for the Runtime and session view (Phase 1, #641).
+
+Covers clean and stale session rendering, contamination marker surfacing,
+worktree binding display, sanctioned recovery links (no pkill), nav/live
+status, and the JSON API export.
+
+Also pins the two invariants a reviewer found violated at head a81db754:
+degraded ownership sections must render as *unknown* rather than as an
+affirmative "none"/"unbound", and contamination payload text must be redacted
+at the display boundary rather than trusted from the write-time denylist.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import sys
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+from unittest import mock
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
+
+from webui.app import create_app
+from webui.inventory import (
+    AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB,
+    AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+    InventorySection,
+    InventorySnapshot,
+    STATUS_DEGRADED,
+    STATUS_OK,
+    STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
+)
+from webui.nav import NAV_GROUPS, STUB_PAGES, iter_nav_items
+from webui.runtime_health import FileHash, RuntimeSnapshot
+from webui.session_loader import (
+    ContaminationMarker,
+    SessionRow,
+    SessionViewSnapshot,
+    _build_session_rows,
+    _inspect_contamination,
+    load_session_view_snapshot,
+    snapshot_to_dict,
+)
+from webui.session_views import render_sessions_page
+
+
+def _runtime(
+    *,
+    stale: str | None = None,
+    profile: str = "prgs-author",
+    role: str = "author",
+) -> RuntimeSnapshot:
+    return RuntimeSnapshot(
+        project_id="gitea-tools",
+        repo_root="/tmp/repo",
+        remote="prgs",
+        host="gitea.prgs.cc",
+        profile_name=profile,
+        role_kind=role,
+        config_model="v2-contexts",
+        profile_mode="dynamic-profile",
+        profile_source="config file profile",
+        authenticated_username="jcwalker3",
+        identity_error=None,
+        repo_sha="a" * 40,
+        remote_master_sha="a" * 40,
+        commits_behind_master=0,
+        stale_runtime_warning=stale,
+        shell_health={"shell_use_allowed": True, "consecutive_spawn_failures": 0},
+        workflow_hashes=(
+            FileHash(label="SKILL.md", path="skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md", sha256="abc"),
+        ),
+        schema_hashes=(),
+        restart_guidance="docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md",
+        fetch_error=None,
+    )
+
+
+def _inventory(
+    *,
+    sessions: tuple[dict, ...] = (),
+    leases: tuple[dict, ...] = (),
+    locks: tuple[dict, ...] = (),
+    worktrees: tuple[dict, ...] = (),
+    namespaces: tuple[dict, ...] = (),
+    statuses: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+) -> InventorySnapshot:
+    """Build a snapshot; ``statuses`` degrades named sections (default all ok)."""
+    status_of = statuses or {}
+
+    def _status(name: str) -> str:
+        return status_of.get(name, STATUS_OK)
+
+    sections = (
+        InventorySection(
+            name="sessions",
+            authority=AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB,
+            status=_status("sessions"),
+            items=sessions,
+        ),
+        InventorySection(
+            name="leases",
+            authority=AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB,
+            status=_status("leases"),
+            items=leases,
+        ),
+        InventorySection(
+            name="locks",
+            authority=AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+            status=_status("locks"),
+            items=locks,
+        ),
+        InventorySection(
+            name="worktrees",
+            authority=AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+            status=_status("worktrees"),
+            items=worktrees,
+        ),
+        InventorySection(
+            name="namespaces",
+            authority=AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+            status=_status("namespaces"),
+            items=namespaces
+            or (
+                {
+                    "profile_name": "prgs-author",
+                    "role": "author",
+                    "mcp_namespace": "gitea-author",
+                    "capability_summary": {
+                        "can_author": True,
+                        "can_review": False,
+                        "can_merge": False,
+                    },
+                    "active": True,
+                },
+            ),
+            reason="only the profile serving this web process is observable",
+        ),
+    )
+    index = {section.name: section for section in sections}
+    return InventorySnapshot(
+        generated_at="2026-07-25T00:00:00+00:00",
+        sections=sections,
+        collisions=(),
+        correlations=(),
+        scan_ms=1.0,
+        _section_index=index,
+    )
+
+
+def _clean_session() -> dict:
+    return {
+        "session_id": "prgs-author-111-clean",
+        "role": "author",
+        "profile": "prgs-author",
+        "namespace": "gitea-author",
+        "pid": 1111,
+        "pid_alive": True,
+        "status": "active",
+        "started_at": "2026-07-25T00:00:00Z",
+        "last_heartbeat_at": "2026-07-25T01:00:00Z",
+    }
+
+
+def _stale_session() -> dict:
+    return {
+        "session_id": "prgs-author-222-stale",
+        "role": "author",
+        "profile": "prgs-author",
+        "namespace": "gitea-author",
+        "pid": 2222,
+        "pid_alive": False,
+        "status": "active",
+        "started_at": "2026-07-24T00:00:00Z",
+        "last_heartbeat_at": "2026-07-24T01:00:00Z",
+    }
+
+
+class TestBuildSessionRows(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_clean_session_has_no_stale_or_contamination_flags(self):
+        inventory = _inventory(
+            sessions=(_clean_session(),),
+            leases=(
+                {
+                    "lease_id": "lease-clean",
+                    "session_id": "prgs-author-111-clean",
+                    "status": "active",
+                    "expired": False,
+                    "work_kind": "issue",
+                    "work_number": 641,
+                },
+            ),
+            locks=(
+                {
+                    "issue_number": 641,
+                    "branch_name": "feat/issue-641-runtime-session-view",
+                    "worktree_path": "~/Development/Gitea-Tools/branches/feat-issue-641",
+                    "live": True,
+                },
+            ),
+        )
+        rows = _build_session_rows(inventory, contamination=())
+        self.assertEqual(len(rows), 1)
+        row = rows[0]
+        self.assertEqual(row.session_id, "prgs-author-111-clean")
+        self.assertEqual(row.role, "author")
+        self.assertEqual(row.namespace, "gitea-author")
+        self.assertEqual(row.pid_alive, True)
+        self.assertEqual(row.lease_ids, ("lease-clean",))
+        self.assertEqual(row.work_refs, ("issue#641",))
+        self.assertTrue(row.worktree_paths)
+        self.assertEqual(row.stale_flags, ())
+        self.assertEqual(row.contamination_flags, ())
+
+    def test_stale_session_flags_dead_pid(self):
+        inventory = _inventory(sessions=(_stale_session(),))
+        rows = _build_session_rows(inventory, contamination=())
+        self.assertEqual(rows[0].stale_flags, ("pid-dead",))
+
+    def test_contamination_marker_binds_to_session(self):
+        inventory = _inventory(sessions=(_clean_session(),))
+        marker = ContaminationMarker(
+            kind="runtime_recovery_contamination",
+            on_disk=True,
+            has_payload=True,
+            summary="manual daemon kill",
+            reason_class="manual_daemon_kill",
+            session_id="prgs-author-111-clean",
+            role="author",
+            command_summary="pkill -f mcp_server.py",
+            cleared=False,
+        )
+        rows = _build_session_rows(inventory, contamination=(marker,))
+        self.assertIn("runtime_recovery_contamination", rows[0].contamination_flags)
+
+    def test_process_wide_contamination_surfaces_on_all_sessions(self):
+        inventory = _inventory(sessions=(_clean_session(), _stale_session()))
+        marker = ContaminationMarker(
+            kind="stable_branch_contamination",
+            on_disk=True,
+            has_payload=True,
+            summary="direct master push attempt",
+            reason_class="stable_branch_push",
+            session_id=None,
+            cleared=False,
+        )
+        rows = _build_session_rows(inventory, contamination=(marker,))
+        self.assertEqual(len(rows), 2)
+        for row in rows:
+            self.assertTrue(
+                any("stable_branch_contamination" in f for f in row.contamination_flags)
+            )
+
+
+class TestRenderSessionsPage(unittest.TestCase):
+    def _snapshot(
+        self,
+        *,
+        sessions: tuple[dict, ...],
+        contamination: tuple[ContaminationMarker, ...] = (),
+        stale_runtime: str | None = None,
+    ) -> SessionViewSnapshot:
+        inventory = _inventory(
+            sessions=sessions,
+            leases=(
+                {
+                    "lease_id": "lease-1",
+                    "session_id": sessions[0]["session_id"] if sessions else "",
+                    "status": "active",
+                    "expired": False,
+                    "work_kind": "issue",
+                    "work_number": 641,
+                },
+            )
+            if sessions
+            else (),
+            locks=(
+                {
+                    "issue_number": 641,
+                    "worktree_path": "branches/feat-issue-641",
+                },
+            )
+            if sessions
+            else (),
+            worktrees=(
+                {
+                    "rel_path": "branches/feat-issue-641",
+                    "branch": "feat/issue-641-runtime-session-view",
+                    "classification": "active_issue_work",
+                    "registered_worktree": True,
+                    "dirty": False,
+                },
+            ),
+        )
+        rows = _build_session_rows(inventory, contamination)
+        return SessionViewSnapshot(
+            runtime=_runtime(stale=stale_runtime),
+            inventory=inventory,
+            sessions=rows,
+            contamination_markers=contamination,
+        )
+
+    def test_clean_session_render(self):
+        html = render_sessions_page(self._snapshot(sessions=(_clean_session(),)))
+        self.assertIn("Runtime and sessions", html)
+        self.assertIn("prgs-author-111-clean", html)
+        self.assertIn("gitea-author", html)
+        self.assertIn("branches/feat-issue-641", html)
+        self.assertIn("Sanctioned recovery", html)
+        self.assertIn("docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md", html)
+        # Recovery section must name reconnect and forbid manual kill.
+        recovery_idx = html.lower().find("sanctioned recovery")
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(recovery_idx, 0)
+        recovery = html[recovery_idx:].lower()
+        self.assertIn("reconnect", recovery)
+        self.assertIn("contamination", recovery)
+        self.assertIn("not recovery", recovery)
+        self.assertNotIn("run pkill", recovery)
+        self.assertNotIn("killall", recovery)
+
+    def test_stale_session_render(self):
+        html = render_sessions_page(self._snapshot(sessions=(_stale_session(),)))
+        self.assertIn("prgs-author-222-stale", html)
+        self.assertIn("pid-dead", html)
+        self.assertIn("badge-stale", html)
+
+    def test_contamination_render_is_not_silent(self):
+        marker = ContaminationMarker(
+            kind="runtime_recovery_contamination",
+            on_disk=True,
+            has_payload=True,
+            summary="manual kill",
+            reason_class="manual_daemon_kill",
+            session_id="prgs-author-111-clean",
+            command_summary="pkill -f mcp_server.py",
+            cleared=False,
+        )
+        html = render_sessions_page(
+            self._snapshot(sessions=(_clean_session(),), contamination=(marker,))
+        )
+        self.assertIn("Contamination markers", html)
+        self.assertIn("runtime_recovery_contamination", html)
+        self.assertIn("ACTIVE", html)
+        self.assertIn("badge-blocked", html)
+
+    def test_stale_runtime_banner(self):
+        html = render_sessions_page(
+            self._snapshot(
+                sessions=(_clean_session(),),
+                stale_runtime="server behind master by 3 commits",
+            )
+        )
+        self.assertIn("Stale runtime", html)
+        self.assertIn("server behind master", html)
+
+
+class TestSessionLoaderComposition(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_load_with_injected_sources(self):
+        inventory = _inventory(sessions=(_clean_session(), _stale_session()))
+        snap = load_session_view_snapshot(
+            load_runtime=lambda: _runtime(),
+            load_inventory=lambda: inventory,
+            inspect_contamination=lambda **_k: {
+                "on_disk": False,
+                "has_payload": False,
+                "summary": "absent",
+            },
+            load_contamination_payload=lambda **_k: None,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(len(snap.sessions), 2)
+        self.assertEqual(snap.stale_session_count, 1)
+        self.assertEqual(snap.contaminated_session_count, 0)
+        data = snapshot_to_dict(snap)
+        self.assertEqual(data["view"], "runtime-sessions")
+        self.assertEqual(data["issue"], 641)
+        self.assertTrue(data["read_only"])
+        self.assertEqual(data["session_counts"]["total"], 2)
+        self.assertEqual(data["session_counts"]["stale"], 1)
+        self.assertIn("recovery_docs", data)
+
+
+class TestSessionsRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
+        inventory = _inventory(
+            sessions=(_clean_session(), _stale_session()),
+            leases=(
+                {
+                    "lease_id": "lease-x",
+                    "session_id": "prgs-author-111-clean",
+                    "status": "active",
+                    "expired": False,
+                    "work_kind": "issue",
+                    "work_number": 641,
+                },
+            ),
+            locks=(
+                {
+                    "issue_number": 641,
+                    "worktree_path": "branches/feat-issue-641",
+                },
+            ),
+            worktrees=(
+                {
+                    "rel_path": "branches/feat-issue-641",
+                    "branch": "feat/issue-641-runtime-session-view",
+                    "classification": "active_issue_work",
+                    "registered_worktree": True,
+                    "dirty": False,
+                },
+            ),
+        )
+        rows = _build_session_rows(inventory, contamination=())
+        self.snapshot = SessionViewSnapshot(
+            runtime=_runtime(stale="stale for test"),
+            inventory=inventory,
+            sessions=rows,
+            contamination_markers=(),
+        )
+        self._patch = mock.patch(
+            "webui.app.load_session_view_snapshot",
+            return_value=self.snapshot,
+        )
+        self._patch.start()
+
+    def tearDown(self):
+        self._patch.stop()
+
+    def test_sessions_page_live(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/sessions")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
+        self.assertIn("Runtime and sessions", response.text)
+        self.assertIn("prgs-author-111-clean", response.text)
+        self.assertIn("prgs-author-222-stale", response.text)
+        self.assertIn("pid-dead", response.text)
+        self.assertIn("Sanctioned recovery", response.text)
+        self.assertNotIn("Phase 1 shell placeholder", response.text)
+        self.assertNotIn("child issue of #425", response.text.lower())
+
+    def test_api_sessions_json(self):
+        for path in ("/api/sessions", "/api/v1/sessions"):
+            response = self.client.get(path)
+            self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200, path)
+            data = response.json()
+            self.assertEqual(data["view"], "runtime-sessions")
+            self.assertEqual(data["session_counts"]["total"], 2)
+            self.assertEqual(data["session_counts"]["stale"], 1)
+            self.assertTrue(data["read_only"])
+            self.assertEqual(data["mutations"], [])
+
+    def test_nav_marks_sessions_live(self):
+        sessions_items = [
+            item for item in iter_nav_items() if item.href == "/sessions"
+        ]
+        self.assertEqual(len(sessions_items), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(sessions_items[0].status, "live")
+        self.assertNotIn("/sessions", STUB_PAGES)
+        # Home page should not mark Sessions as stub.
+        home = self.client.get("/")
+        self.assertEqual(home.status_code, 200)
+        self.assertIn('href="/sessions"', home.text)
+        # Stub marker only appears next to remaining stub destinations.
+        self.assertNotIn(
+            'href="/sessions">Sessions</a> <span class="muted">(stub)</span>',
+            home.text,
+        )
+
+
+class TestDegradedOwnershipAuthority(unittest.TestCase):
+    """B1: a section that could not be read must never render as absence."""
+
+    def _snapshot(self, inventory: InventorySnapshot) -> SessionViewSnapshot:
+        return SessionViewSnapshot(
+            runtime=_runtime(),
+            inventory=inventory,
+            sessions=_build_session_rows(inventory, contamination=()),
+            contamination_markers=(),
+        )
+
+    def test_unavailable_leases_mark_row_authority_unproven(self):
+        inventory = _inventory(
+            sessions=(_clean_session(),),
+            statuses={"leases": STATUS_UNAVAILABLE},
+        )
+        row = _build_session_rows(inventory, contamination=())[0]
+        self.assertEqual(row.lease_ids, ())
+        self.assertEqual(row.lease_authority, STATUS_UNAVAILABLE)
+        # Worktree binding is correlated through lease work numbers, so it
+        # inherits the unreadable lease section.
+        self.assertEqual(row.worktree_authority, STATUS_UNAVAILABLE)
+        self.assertFalse(row.ownership_authority_complete)
+
+    def test_readable_locks_are_not_reported_unbound_when_leases_degrade(self):
+        # The narrow variant: locks hold a real worktree_path and read cleanly,
+        # but the lease section that supplies the correlating work number does
+        # not. The row must say unknown, not "unbound".
+        inventory = _inventory(
+            sessions=(_clean_session(),),
+            locks=(
+                {
+                    "issue_number": 641,
+                    "worktree_path": "branches/feat-issue-641",
+                },
+            ),
+            statuses={"leases": STATUS_DEGRADED},
+        )
+        row = _build_session_rows(inventory, contamination=())[0]
+        self.assertEqual(row.worktree_paths, ())
+        self.assertEqual(row.worktree_authority, STATUS_DEGRADED)
+        self.assertFalse(row.ownership_authority_complete)
+
+    def test_degraded_render_says_unknown_not_none_or_unbound(self):
+        inventory = _inventory(
+            sessions=(_clean_session(),),
+            statuses={"leases": STATUS_UNAVAILABLE, "locks": STATUS_UNAVAILABLE},
+        )
+        html = render_sessions_page(self._snapshot(inventory))
+        self.assertIn("unknown (inventory unavailable)", html)
+        self.assertIn("authority unproven", html)
+        self.assertIn("Ownership authority incomplete", html)
+        # The affirmative-absence strings must be gone from the row entirely.
+        self.assertNotIn(">none<", html)
+        self.assertNotIn(">unbound<", html)
+
+    def test_clean_inventory_still_renders_affirmative_absence(self):
+        # Guards against over-correcting B1 into "everything is unknown".
+        inventory = _inventory(sessions=(_clean_session(),))
+        html = render_sessions_page(self._snapshot(inventory))
+        self.assertIn(">none<", html)
+        self.assertIn(">unbound<", html)
+        # The column legend mentions "unknown (inventory …)" as static copy, so
+        # assert on the per-row marker and the concrete statuses instead.
+        self.assertNotIn("authority unproven", html)
+        self.assertNotIn("unknown (inventory unavailable)", html)
+        self.assertNotIn("unknown (inventory degraded)", html)
+        self.assertNotIn("Ownership authority incomplete", html)
+
+    def test_json_export_carries_snapshot_and_per_row_authority(self):
+        inventory = _inventory(
+            sessions=(_clean_session(),),
+            statuses={"locks": STATUS_UNAVAILABLE},
+        )
+        data = snapshot_to_dict(self._snapshot(inventory))
+        self.assertFalse(data["ownership_authority_complete"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            data["ownership_section_status"]["locks"], STATUS_UNAVAILABLE
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(data["ownership_section_status"]["leases"], STATUS_OK)
+        self.assertIn("unknown, not unowned", data["ownership_note"])
+
+        row = data["sessions"][0]
+        self.assertTrue(row["lease_authority_complete"])
+        self.assertFalse(row["worktree_authority_complete"])
+        self.assertEqual(row["worktree_authority"], STATUS_UNAVAILABLE)
+        self.assertFalse(row["ownership_authority_complete"])
+        self.assertIn("unknown, not unowned", row["ownership_note"])
+
+    def test_json_export_is_affirmative_when_every_source_reads(self):
+        inventory = _inventory(sessions=(_clean_session(),))
+        data = snapshot_to_dict(self._snapshot(inventory))
+        self.assertTrue(data["ownership_authority_complete"])
+        self.assertTrue(data["sessions"][0]["ownership_authority_complete"])
+
+    def test_missing_session_list_is_not_reported_as_no_sessions(self):
+        inventory = _inventory(statuses={"sessions": STATUS_UNAVAILABLE})
+        html = render_sessions_page(self._snapshot(inventory))
+        self.assertIn("could not be read", html)
+        self.assertIn("not evidence that no sessions exist", html)
+
+    def test_expired_lease_flags_row_as_stale(self):
+        inventory = _inventory(
+            sessions=(_clean_session(),),
+            leases=(
+                {
+                    "lease_id": "lease-expired-1",
+                    "session_id": "prgs-author-111-clean",
+                    "status": "active",
+                    "expired": True,
+                    "work_kind": "issue",
+                    "work_number": 641,
+                },
+            ),
+        )
+        row = _build_session_rows(inventory, contamination=())[0]
+        self.assertIn("lease-expired", row.stale_flags)
+        self.assertIn("active-lease-past-expiry", row.stale_flags)
+
+
+class TestContaminationRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
+    """B2: marker payload text is redacted at the display boundary."""
+
+    def _marker(self, payload: dict) -> ContaminationMarker:
+        return _inspect_contamination(
+            "runtime_recovery_contamination",
+            remote="prgs",
+            inspect=lambda **_k: {
+                "on_disk": True,
+                "has_payload": True,
+                "summary": "",
+            },
+            load=lambda **_k: payload,
+        )
+
+    def test_home_paths_are_collapsed(self):
+        home = os.path.expanduser("~")
+        marker = self._marker(
+            {"command_summary": f"pkill -f {home}/Development/Gitea-Tools/x.py"}
+        )
+        self.assertNotIn(home, marker.command_summary)
+        self.assertIn("~/Development/Gitea-Tools/x.py", marker.command_summary)
+
+    def test_secrets_missed_by_the_write_time_denylist_are_redacted(self):
+        # Each of these was verified in review to survive
+        # stable_branch_push_guard.redact_command untouched.
+        cases = (
+            ("curl -H 'X-Api-Key: SUPERSECRET123' https://example.invalid", "SUPERSECRET123"),
+            ("cmd --password hunter2 origin master", "hunter2"),
+            ("PRIVATE_KEY=abc123 python deploy.py", "abc123"),
+            ("fetch https://user:[email protected]/x.git", "user:pw"),
+        )
+        for raw, secret in cases:
+            with self.subTest(raw=raw):
+                marker = self._marker({"command_summary": raw})
+                self.assertNotIn(secret, marker.command_summary)
+                self.assertIn("[redacted]", marker.command_summary)
+
+    def test_command_summary_is_redacted_not_removed(self):
+        # It is legitimate #630 evidence: the operator must still see which
+        # daemon was killed.
+        marker = self._marker(
+            {
+                "command_summary": "pkill -f gitea_mcp_server.py",
+                "reason_class": "manual_daemon_kill",
+                "session_id": "prgs-author-111-clean",
+                "role": "author",
+            }
+        )
+        self.assertIn("pkill -f gitea_mcp_server.py", marker.command_summary)
+        self.assertEqual(marker.reason_class, "manual_daemon_kill")
+        self.assertEqual(marker.session_id, "prgs-author-111-clean")
+        self.assertEqual(marker.role, "author")
+
+    def test_rendered_page_exposes_no_home_path_from_a_marker(self):
+        home = os.path.expanduser("~")
+        marker = self._marker(
+            {
+                "command_summary": f"pkill -f {home}/Development/Gitea-Tools/x.py",
+                "reason_class": "manual_daemon_kill",
+            }
+        )
+        inventory = _inventory(sessions=(_clean_session(),))
+        html = render_sessions_page(
+            SessionViewSnapshot(
+                runtime=_runtime(),
+                inventory=inventory,
+                sessions=_build_session_rows(inventory, (marker,)),
+                contamination_markers=(marker,),
+            )
+        )
+        self.assertIn("Contamination markers", html)
+        self.assertNotIn(home, html)
+
+
+class TestSessionsPageEscaping(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Hostile values from every rendered source stay inert (N2)."""
+
+    HOSTILE = '<script>alert("xss")</script>'
+
+    def test_hostile_session_and_marker_values_are_escaped(self):
+        session = dict(_clean_session())
+        session["session_id"] = f"sid-{self.HOSTILE}"
+        session["role"] = self.HOSTILE
+        session["profile"] = self.HOSTILE
+        session["namespace"] = self.HOSTILE
+        session["status"] = self.HOSTILE
+        inventory = _inventory(
+            sessions=(session,),
+            leases=(
+                {
+                    "lease_id": self.HOSTILE,
+                    "session_id": session["session_id"],
+                    "status": "active",
+                    "expired": False,
+                    "work_kind": self.HOSTILE,
+                    "work_number": 641,
+                },
+            ),
+            locks=(
+                {
+                    "issue_number": 641,
+                    "worktree_path": self.HOSTILE,
+                },
+            ),
+        )
+        marker = ContaminationMarker(
+            kind="runtime_recovery_contamination",
+            on_disk=True,
+            has_payload=True,
+            summary=self.HOSTILE,
+            reason_class=self.HOSTILE,
+            session_id=session["session_id"],
+            role=self.HOSTILE,
+            command_summary=self.HOSTILE,
+            cleared=False,
+        )
+        html = render_sessions_page(
+            SessionViewSnapshot(
+                runtime=_runtime(),
+                inventory=inventory,
+                sessions=_build_session_rows(inventory, (marker,)),
+                contamination_markers=(marker,),
+            )
+        )
+        self.assertNotIn("<script>", html)
+        self.assertNotIn('alert("xss")', html)
+        self.assertIn("&lt;script&gt;", html)
+
+    def test_hostile_values_in_a_degraded_render_are_escaped(self):
+        inventory = _inventory(
+            sessions=(dict(_clean_session(), session_id=f"sid-{self.HOSTILE}"),),
+            statuses={"leases": STATUS_UNAVAILABLE, "locks": STATUS_DEGRADED},
+        )
+        html = render_sessions_page(
+            SessionViewSnapshot(
+                runtime=_runtime(),
+                inventory=inventory,
+                sessions=_build_session_rows(inventory, contamination=()),
+                contamination_markers=(),
+            )
+        )
+        self.assertNotIn("<script>", html)
+        self.assertIn("&lt;script&gt;", html)
+        self.assertIn("unknown (inventory", html)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

webui/app.py

@@ -48,6 +48,11 @@ from webui.worktree_scanner import load_hygiene_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as wo
 from webui.worktree_views import render_worktrees_page
 from webui.runtime_health import load_runtime_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as runtime_snapshot_to_dict
 from webui.runtime_views import render_runtime_page
+from webui.session_loader import (
+    load_session_view_snapshot,
+    snapshot_to_dict as session_view_snapshot_to_dict,
+)
+from webui.session_views import render_sessions_page
 from webui.inventory import (
     SECTION_NAMES as _INVENTORY_SECTIONS,
     load_inventory_snapshot,
@@ -87,6 +92,7 @@ _LEGACY_PAGES = (
     ("/projects", "Projects", "registry and onboarding (#427)"),
     ("/prompts", "Prompts", "canonical workflow prompt library (#428)"),
     ("/runtime", "Runtime", "MCP health and stale-runtime detection (#430)"),
+    ("/sessions", "Sessions", "runtime and session view (#641)"),
     ("/audit", "Audit", "final-report paste and validator preview (#431)"),
     ("/worktrees", "Worktrees", "branch hygiene dashboard (#432)"),
     ("/leases", "Leases", "collision and lease visibility (#433)"),
@@ -325,6 +331,17 @@ async def api_runtime(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     return JSONResponse(runtime_snapshot_to_dict(load_runtime_snapshot()))
 
 
+async def sessions(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
+    """Runtime and session view (#641) — read-only composition of health + inventory."""
+    snapshot = load_session_view_snapshot()
+    return HTMLResponse(render_sessions_page(snapshot))
+
+
+async def api_sessions(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
+    """JSON export for the runtime/session view (#641)."""
+    return JSONResponse(session_view_snapshot_to_dict(load_session_view_snapshot()))
+
+
 async def _parse_audit_form(request: Request) -> tuple[str, str | None]:
     if request.method == "GET":
         return "", None
@@ -764,6 +781,9 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
             Route("/api/prompts", api_prompts, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/runtime", runtime, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/api/runtime", api_runtime, methods=["GET"]),
+            Route("/sessions", sessions, methods=["GET"]),
+            Route("/api/sessions", api_sessions, methods=["GET"]),
+            Route("/api/v1/sessions", api_sessions, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/api/v1/timeline", api_v1_timeline, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/analytics", analytics, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/api/analytics", api_v1_analytics, methods=["GET"]),

webui/inventory.py

@@ -76,6 +76,35 @@ _CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = re.compile(
 )
 _REDACTED = "[redacted]"
 
+#: Credential-shaped *name* as it appears inside a free-form command line. This
+#: is deliberately broader than :data:`_CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE` — it also matches a
+#: bare ``key`` component, so ``PRIVATE_KEY=`` is caught. Over-redacting a
+#: displayed string is safe; under-redacting one is not.
+_TEXT_CREDENTIAL_NAME = (
+    r"[A-Za-z0-9_.\-]*"
+    r"(?:token|secret|password|passwd|key|authorization|bearer|credential)"
+    r"[A-Za-z0-9_.\-]*"
+)
+#: A value following such a name: single-quoted, double-quoted, or bare. The
+#: bare form stops at a quote so an enclosing quote survives the redaction.
+_TEXT_CREDENTIAL_VALUE = r"'[^']*'|\"[^\"]*\"|[^\s'\"]+"
+
+_TEXT_CREDENTIAL_FLAG_RE = re.compile(
+    rf"(?P<key>(?<![\w\-])--?{_TEXT_CREDENTIAL_NAME})"
+    rf"(?P<sep>[=\s]+)"
+    rf"(?P<value>{_TEXT_CREDENTIAL_VALUE})",
+    re.IGNORECASE,
+)
+_TEXT_CREDENTIAL_ASSIGN_RE = re.compile(
+    rf"(?P<key>(?<![\w\-]){_TEXT_CREDENTIAL_NAME})"
+    rf"(?P<sep>\s*[:=]\s*)"
+    rf"(?P<value>{_TEXT_CREDENTIAL_VALUE})",
+    re.IGNORECASE,
+)
+_TEXT_URL_USERINFO_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(?P<scheme>\b[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.\-]*://)[^\s/@]+@"
+)
+
 
 @dataclass(frozen=True)
 class InventorySection:
@@ -225,6 +254,42 @@ def scrub(value: Any, *, key: str | None = None) -> Any:
     return repr(value)
 
 
+def collapse_home(text: str) -> str:
+    """Collapse every ``$HOME`` occurrence *inside* a string, not just a prefix."""
+    home = os.path.expanduser("~")
+    if not home or home == "/":
+        return text
+    return text.replace(home, "~")
+
+
+def scrub_text(value: Any) -> Any:
+    """Redact a free-form text blob such as a recorded command line.
+
+    :func:`scrub` keys off structured field *names* and whole-value prefixes,
+    which is right for inventory records but blind to a secret embedded in the
+    middle of a sentence. This collapses ``$HOME`` and redacts credential-shaped
+    tokens and URL userinfo *anywhere* in the string, so operator-supplied text
+    rendered verbatim — contamination ``command_summary`` (#630) above all — is
+    held to the same standard as every other field on the page.
+
+    Returns ``None`` unchanged so callers can keep "absent" distinct from "".
+    """
+    if value is None:
+        return None
+    text = value if isinstance(value, str) else str(value)
+    text = collapse_home(text)
+    text = _TEXT_URL_USERINFO_RE.sub(
+        lambda m: f"{m.group('scheme')}{_REDACTED}@", text
+    )
+    text = _TEXT_CREDENTIAL_FLAG_RE.sub(
+        lambda m: f"{m.group('key')}{m.group('sep')}{_REDACTED}", text
+    )
+    text = _TEXT_CREDENTIAL_ASSIGN_RE.sub(
+        lambda m: f"{m.group('key')}{m.group('sep')}{_REDACTED}", text
+    )
+    return text
+
+
 # ── control-plane database (read-only) ───────────────────────────────────────
 
 

webui/nav.py

@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ NAV_GROUPS: tuple[NavGroup, ...] = (
     )),
     NavGroup("Runtime/Sessions", (
         NavItem("/runtime", "Runtime health"),
-        NavItem("/sessions", "Sessions", "stub"),
+        NavItem("/sessions", "Sessions"),
     )),
     NavGroup("Projects", (
         NavItem("/projects", "Projects"),
@@ -76,11 +76,6 @@ NAV_GROUPS: tuple[NavGroup, ...] = (
 # issues of epic #631. Each maps a path to (title, description). Routes are
 # registered so nav links resolve to a graceful, read-only stub page.
 STUB_PAGES: dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {
-    "/sessions": (
-        "Sessions",
-        "Active session, capability, and role inventory. Backed by the unified "
-        "inventory API (#636) once it lands.",
-    ),
     "/inventory": (
         "Inventory",
         "Unified sessions, leases, locks, namespaces, and worktree inventory. "

webui/runtime_views.py

@@ -88,5 +88,7 @@ def render_runtime_page(snapshot: RuntimeSnapshot) -> str:
         "<p class='muted'>MVP is read-only — restart MCP servers from your IDE/operator "
         "workflow. Related issue: <code>#420</code>. Guidance: "
         f"<code>{html.escape(snapshot.restart_guidance)}</code></p>"
-        "<p class='muted'>This page does not expose tokens or perform MCP restarts.</p>"
+        "<p class='muted'>This page does not expose tokens or perform MCP restarts. "
+        "Correlated sessions, worktree bindings, and contamination markers: "
+        "<a href='/sessions'>/sessions</a> (#641).</p>"
     )

webui/sanctioned_restart.py

@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
 from typing import Any
 
 import mcp_namespace_health
+import restart_coordinator
 import runtime_recovery_guard
 from webui import console_audit, console_authz
 
@@ -99,6 +100,14 @@ def _clean(value: Any) -> str:
     return str(value or "").strip()
 
 
+def restart_class_for_mode(mode: str) -> str:
+    """Map the existing namespace controls onto the #663 class taxonomy."""
+
+    if _clean(mode) == MODE_RELOAD:
+        return restart_coordinator.RestartClass.CONFIGURATION_RELOAD.value
+    return restart_coordinator.RestartClass.ROLE_RUNTIME_RESTART.value
+
+
 # --- Mutation ledger --------------------------------------------------------
 
 
@@ -256,6 +265,7 @@ def build_restart_preview(
 
     return {
         "action_id": action_id,
+        "restart_class": restart_class_for_mode(md),
         "namespace": ns,
         "mode": md,
         "scope_valid": scope_error is None,
@@ -309,6 +319,7 @@ def assess_restart_request(
             "reason_code": reason_code,
             "detail": detail,
             "action_id": action_id,
+            "restart_class": restart_class_for_mode(md),
             "namespace": ns,
             "mode": md,
             "preview": preview,
@@ -393,6 +404,7 @@ def assess_restart_request(
             "process."
         ),
         "action_id": action_id,
+        "restart_class": restart_class_for_mode(md),
         "namespace": ns,
         "mode": md,
         "preview": preview,
@@ -441,7 +453,11 @@ def execute_restart(
             else console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
         ),
         principal=principal,
-        target={"namespace": assessment["namespace"], "mode": assessment["mode"]},
+        target={
+            "namespace": assessment["namespace"],
+            "mode": assessment["mode"],
+            "restart_class": assessment["restart_class"],
+        },
         reason_code=assessment["reason_code"],
         detail=assessment["detail"],
         request_id=request_id,
@@ -450,6 +466,7 @@ def execute_restart(
             "gates_passed": assessment["gates_passed"],
             "process_kill_executed": False,
             "post_restart_verification_required": True,
+            "restart_class": assessment["restart_class"],
         },
     )
 
@@ -463,6 +480,7 @@ def execute_restart(
         "namespace": assessment["namespace"],
         "mode": assessment["mode"],
         "action_id": action_id,
+        "restart_class": assessment["restart_class"],
         "process_kill_executed": False,
         "host_hook": assessment["preview"]["restart_hook"],
         "next_action": (

webui/session_loader.py

@@ -0,0 +1,517 @@
+"""Compose runtime health + inventory into a sessions/runtime view (#641).
+
+Phase 1 is read-only. It correlates namespaces, sessions, capabilities,
+worktree bindings, lease ownership, stale flags, and contamination markers
+when they are detectable on disk (#630 / #671). It never restarts, kills, or
+takes over a session.
+
+Sources:
+
+* :mod:`webui.runtime_health` — profile, role, stale runtime, shell health.
+* :mod:`webui.inventory` — sessions, leases, locks, worktrees, namespaces
+  and collision signals from the control-plane DB + filesystem.
+* :mod:`mcp_session_state` — durable contamination markers (inspect only).
+
+Secrets are never read. Inventory-sourced values arrive already redacted by
+:func:`webui.inventory.scrub`; free-form marker text this module loads itself is
+put through :func:`webui.inventory.scrub_text`, which collapses ``$HOME`` and
+redacts credential-shaped tokens *inside* a string rather than only at its start.
+
+Ownership columns are authority-aware. A lease or lock section that could not be
+read renders as ``unknown``, never as ``none`` or ``unbound``: a lease the reader
+could not load is not an absent lease (see
+:attr:`webui.inventory.InventorySnapshot.ownership_authority_complete`).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Any, Callable
+
+import mcp_session_state
+from webui.inventory import (
+    OWNERSHIP_SECTIONS,
+    STATUS_OK,
+    InventorySection,
+    InventorySnapshot,
+    load_inventory_snapshot,
+    scrub_text,
+    snapshot_to_dict as inventory_snapshot_to_dict,
+)
+from webui.runtime_health import (
+    RuntimeSnapshot,
+    load_runtime_snapshot,
+    snapshot_to_dict as runtime_snapshot_to_dict,
+)
+
+# Sanctioned recovery pointers only — never pkill / killall (#630).
+SANCTIONED_RECOVERY_DOCS: tuple[dict[str, str], ...] = (
+    {
+        "label": "MCP namespace EOF recovery (reconnect only)",
+        "path": "docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md",
+        "note": "IDE/client reconnect or operator-owned restart; never kill daemons.",
+    },
+    {
+        "label": "MCP namespace health",
+        "path": "docs/mcp-namespace-health.md",
+        "note": "client_namespace probe proves namespace health.",
+    },
+    {
+        "label": "Restart path inventory",
+        "path": "docs/mcp-restart-path-inventory.md",
+        "note": "Catalog of sanctioned reconnect/restart paths.",
+    },
+    {
+        "label": "Local web UI recovery",
+        "path": "docs/webui-local-dev.md",
+        "note": "Operator console start and documented recovery sequence.",
+    },
+)
+
+_CONTAMINATION_KINDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
+    mcp_session_state.KIND_RUNTIME_RECOVERY_CONTAMINATION,
+    mcp_session_state.KIND_STABLE_BRANCH_CONTAMINATION,
+)
+
+#: Status recorded on a row when the backing inventory section is absent
+#: entirely — distinct from a section that reported itself degraded.
+AUTHORITY_MISSING = "missing"
+
+
+def _section_status(section: InventorySection | None) -> str:
+    """Status of an ownership section, treating an absent section as missing."""
+    if section is None:
+        return AUTHORITY_MISSING
+    return section.status
+
+
+def _combined_authority(*statuses: str) -> str:
+    """Worst status of the sections a derived column depends on.
+
+    A column proved from two sections is only trustworthy when *both* read
+    cleanly, so the first non-``ok`` status wins.
+    """
+    for status in statuses:
+        if status != STATUS_OK:
+            return status
+    return STATUS_OK
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class ContaminationMarker:
+    """A detectable durable contamination marker (audit-safe summary)."""
+
+    kind: str
+    on_disk: bool
+    has_payload: bool
+    summary: str
+    reason_class: str | None = None
+    session_id: str | None = None
+    role: str | None = None
+    command_summary: str | None = None
+    cleared: bool = False
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "kind": self.kind,
+            "on_disk": self.on_disk,
+            "has_payload": self.has_payload,
+            "summary": self.summary,
+            "reason_class": self.reason_class,
+            "session_id": self.session_id,
+            "role": self.role,
+            "command_summary": self.command_summary,
+            "cleared": self.cleared,
+            "active": self.on_disk and self.has_payload and not self.cleared,
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class SessionRow:
+    """One correlated session row for the sessions table."""
+
+    session_id: str
+    role: str | None
+    profile: str | None
+    namespace: str | None
+    pid: int | None
+    pid_alive: bool | None
+    status: str | None
+    started_at: str | None
+    last_heartbeat_at: str | None
+    lease_ids: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    work_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    worktree_paths: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    stale_flags: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    contamination_flags: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+    #: Status of the section backing ``lease_ids``/``work_refs``. While this is
+    #: not ``ok`` those tuples mean "could not be read", never "none held".
+    lease_authority: str = STATUS_OK
+    #: Worst status across the sections backing ``worktree_paths`` (locks are
+    #: correlated through lease work numbers, so both must read cleanly).
+    worktree_authority: str = STATUS_OK
+
+    @property
+    def ownership_authority_complete(self) -> bool:
+        """True only when this row's ownership columns are provable."""
+        return self.lease_authority == STATUS_OK and self.worktree_authority == STATUS_OK
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "session_id": self.session_id,
+            "role": self.role,
+            "profile": self.profile,
+            "namespace": self.namespace,
+            "pid": self.pid,
+            "pid_alive": self.pid_alive,
+            "status": self.status,
+            "started_at": self.started_at,
+            "last_heartbeat_at": self.last_heartbeat_at,
+            "lease_ids": list(self.lease_ids),
+            "work_refs": list(self.work_refs),
+            "worktree_paths": list(self.worktree_paths),
+            "stale_flags": list(self.stale_flags),
+            "contamination_flags": list(self.contamination_flags),
+            "is_stale": bool(self.stale_flags),
+            "is_contaminated": bool(self.contamination_flags),
+            "lease_authority": self.lease_authority,
+            "worktree_authority": self.worktree_authority,
+            "lease_authority_complete": self.lease_authority == STATUS_OK,
+            "worktree_authority_complete": self.worktree_authority == STATUS_OK,
+            "ownership_authority_complete": self.ownership_authority_complete,
+            "ownership_note": (
+                "Lease and worktree columns are proved from sections that read "
+                "cleanly."
+                if self.ownership_authority_complete
+                else "An ownership source could not be read; empty lease_ids or "
+                "worktree_paths on this row mean unknown, not unowned."
+            ),
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class SessionViewSnapshot:
+    """Composed runtime + session inventory view (#641)."""
+
+    runtime: RuntimeSnapshot
+    inventory: InventorySnapshot
+    sessions: tuple[SessionRow, ...]
+    contamination_markers: tuple[ContaminationMarker, ...]
+    recovery_docs: tuple[dict[str, str], ...] = SANCTIONED_RECOVERY_DOCS
+    fetch_error: str | None = None
+
+    @property
+    def stale_session_count(self) -> int:
+        return sum(1 for row in self.sessions if row.stale_flags)
+
+    @property
+    def contaminated_session_count(self) -> int:
+        return sum(1 for row in self.sessions if row.contamination_flags)
+
+    @property
+    def active_contamination(self) -> tuple[ContaminationMarker, ...]:
+        return tuple(m for m in self.contamination_markers if m.to_dict()["active"])
+
+    @property
+    def ownership_authority_complete(self) -> bool:
+        """False while any ownership section is degraded, absent, or unavailable."""
+        return self.inventory.ownership_authority_complete
+
+    @property
+    def ownership_section_status(self) -> dict[str, str]:
+        """Per-section status for the three ownership-bearing sections."""
+        return {
+            name: _section_status(self.inventory.section(name))
+            for name in OWNERSHIP_SECTIONS
+        }
+
+
+def _inspect_contamination(
+    kind: str,
+    *,
+    remote: str | None,
+    inspect: Callable[..., dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
+    load: Callable[..., dict[str, Any] | None] | None = None,
+) -> ContaminationMarker:
+    """Inspect one contamination kind; never raises into the page render path."""
+    inspect_fn = inspect or mcp_session_state.inspect_state_envelope
+    load_fn = load or mcp_session_state.load_state
+    try:
+        envelope = inspect_fn(kind=kind, remote=remote)
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — fail soft for the dashboard
+        return ContaminationMarker(
+            kind=kind,
+            on_disk=False,
+            has_payload=False,
+            summary=f"contamination inspect failed: {type(exc).__name__}",
+        )
+
+    reason_class = None
+    session_id = None
+    role = None
+    command_summary = None
+    cleared = False
+    summary = scrub_text(str(envelope.get("summary") or ""))
+
+    if envelope.get("on_disk") and envelope.get("has_payload"):
+        try:
+            payload = load_fn(kind=kind, remote=remote) or {}
+        except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001
+            payload = {}
+        if isinstance(payload, dict):
+            reason_class = payload.get("reason_class")
+            session_id = payload.get("session_id")
+            role = payload.get("role")
+            command_summary = payload.get("command_summary") or payload.get("detail")
+            cleared = bool(payload.get("cleared_by_reconciler"))
+            if not summary:
+                summary = scrub_text(
+                    f"{kind}: {reason_class or 'present'}"
+                    + (" (cleared)" if cleared else "")
+                )
+
+    # Marker payloads are operator-supplied free text and are the one thing on
+    # this page that does not arrive through inventory scrubbing. The write-time
+    # redactor is a narrow denylist, so redact again at the display boundary:
+    # it leaves $HOME paths, `-H 'X-Api-Key: …'`, `--password …`, and
+    # `PRIVATE_KEY=…` intact. The field itself stays — it is #630 evidence.
+    return ContaminationMarker(
+        kind=kind,
+        on_disk=bool(envelope.get("on_disk")),
+        has_payload=bool(envelope.get("has_payload")),
+        summary=summary or f"{kind}: not present",
+        reason_class=scrub_text(str(reason_class)) if reason_class else None,
+        session_id=scrub_text(str(session_id)) if session_id else None,
+        role=scrub_text(str(role)) if role else None,
+        command_summary=scrub_text(str(command_summary)) if command_summary else None,
+        cleared=cleared,
+    )
+
+
+def _load_contamination_markers(
+    *,
+    remote: str | None,
+    inspect: Callable[..., dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
+    load: Callable[..., dict[str, Any] | None] | None = None,
+) -> tuple[ContaminationMarker, ...]:
+    return tuple(
+        _inspect_contamination(kind, remote=remote, inspect=inspect, load=load)
+        for kind in _CONTAMINATION_KINDS
+    )
+
+
+def _build_session_rows(
+    inventory: InventorySnapshot,
+    contamination: tuple[ContaminationMarker, ...],
+) -> tuple[SessionRow, ...]:
+    sessions_section = inventory.section("sessions")
+    leases_section = inventory.section("leases")
+    locks_section = inventory.section("locks")
+
+    # Ownership columns may only assert absence when their source read cleanly.
+    lease_authority = _section_status(leases_section)
+    # Locks carry claimant profile/username, not control-plane session ids, so a
+    # worktree binding is correlated through lease work numbers: it depends on
+    # the locks *and* the leases section.
+    worktree_authority = _combined_authority(
+        lease_authority, _section_status(locks_section)
+    )
+
+    leases_by_session: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] = {}
+    for lease in (leases_section.items if leases_section else ()):
+        sid = str(lease.get("session_id") or "")
+        if sid:
+            leases_by_session.setdefault(sid, []).append(lease)
+
+    active_markers = [m for m in contamination if m.to_dict()["active"]]
+    marker_session_ids = {
+        m.session_id for m in active_markers if m.session_id
+    }
+
+    rows: list[SessionRow] = []
+    for raw in sessions_section.items if sessions_section else ():
+        sid = str(raw.get("session_id") or "")
+        if not sid:
+            continue
+        session_leases = leases_by_session.get(sid, [])
+        lease_ids = tuple(
+            str(lease["lease_id"])
+            for lease in session_leases
+            if lease.get("lease_id")
+        )
+        work_refs: list[str] = []
+        work_numbers: list[int] = []
+        for lease in session_leases:
+            kind = lease.get("work_kind")
+            number = lease.get("work_number")
+            if kind and number is not None:
+                work_refs.append(f"{kind}#{number}")
+                try:
+                    work_numbers.append(int(number))
+                except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                    pass
+
+        worktree_paths: list[str] = []
+        for lock in (locks_section.items if locks_section else ()):
+            try:
+                issue_no = int(lock.get("issue_number"))
+            except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                continue
+            if issue_no in work_numbers and lock.get("worktree_path"):
+                worktree_paths.append(str(lock["worktree_path"]))
+
+        stale_flags: list[str] = []
+        if raw.get("pid_alive") is False:
+            stale_flags.append("pid-dead")
+        status = str(raw.get("status") or "").lower()
+        if status and status not in {"active", "alive", "running", "ok"}:
+            stale_flags.append(f"status:{status}")
+        for lease in session_leases:
+            if lease.get("expired") is True:
+                stale_flags.append("lease-expired")
+            if str(lease.get("status") or "").lower() == "active" and lease.get(
+                "expired"
+            ) is True:
+                stale_flags.append("active-lease-past-expiry")
+
+        contamination_flags: list[str] = []
+        if sid in marker_session_ids:
+            for marker in active_markers:
+                if marker.session_id == sid:
+                    contamination_flags.append(marker.kind)
+        # Process-wide contamination with no session binding still surfaces
+        # against every live session so it cannot be silent (#630).
+        for marker in active_markers:
+            if not marker.session_id and marker.kind not in contamination_flags:
+                contamination_flags.append(f"{marker.kind}:process-wide")
+
+        rows.append(
+            SessionRow(
+                session_id=sid,
+                role=raw.get("role"),
+                profile=raw.get("profile"),
+                namespace=raw.get("namespace"),
+                pid=raw.get("pid") if isinstance(raw.get("pid"), int) else None,
+                pid_alive=raw.get("pid_alive")
+                if isinstance(raw.get("pid_alive"), bool)
+                else None,
+                status=raw.get("status"),
+                started_at=raw.get("started_at"),
+                last_heartbeat_at=raw.get("last_heartbeat_at"),
+                lease_ids=lease_ids,
+                work_refs=tuple(work_refs),
+                worktree_paths=tuple(worktree_paths),
+                stale_flags=tuple(dict.fromkeys(stale_flags)),
+                contamination_flags=tuple(dict.fromkeys(contamination_flags)),
+                lease_authority=lease_authority,
+                worktree_authority=worktree_authority,
+            )
+        )
+
+    return tuple(rows)
+
+
+def load_session_view_snapshot(
+    *,
+    load_runtime: Callable[..., RuntimeSnapshot] | None = None,
+    load_inventory: Callable[..., InventorySnapshot] | None = None,
+    inspect_contamination: Callable[..., dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
+    load_contamination_payload: Callable[..., dict[str, Any] | None] | None = None,
+) -> SessionViewSnapshot:
+    """Build the composed sessions/runtime view. Fail-soft on partial sources."""
+    runtime_loader = load_runtime or load_runtime_snapshot
+    inventory_loader = load_inventory or load_inventory_snapshot
+    fetch_error: str | None = None
+
+    try:
+        runtime = runtime_loader()
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
+        fetch_error = f"runtime snapshot failed: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}"
+        # Minimal placeholder so the page still renders inventory + recovery.
+        from webui.runtime_health import RuntimeSnapshot as _RS
+
+        runtime = _RS(
+            project_id="unknown",
+            repo_root="",
+            remote="",
+            host="",
+            profile_name="unknown",
+            role_kind="unknown",
+            config_model="unknown",
+            profile_mode="unknown",
+            profile_source="unknown",
+            authenticated_username=None,
+            identity_error=str(exc),
+            repo_sha=None,
+            remote_master_sha=None,
+            commits_behind_master=None,
+            stale_runtime_warning=None,
+            shell_health={},
+            workflow_hashes=(),
+            schema_hashes=(),
+            restart_guidance="docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md",
+            fetch_error=str(exc),
+        )
+
+    try:
+        inventory = inventory_loader()
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
+        msg = f"inventory snapshot failed: {type(exc).__name__}: {exc}"
+        fetch_error = f"{fetch_error}; {msg}" if fetch_error else msg
+        inventory = load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path="/nonexistent-for-fail-soft",
+            lock_dir="/nonexistent-for-fail-soft",
+        )
+
+    remote = getattr(runtime, "remote", None)
+    contamination = _load_contamination_markers(
+        remote=remote,
+        inspect=inspect_contamination,
+        load=load_contamination_payload,
+    )
+    sessions = _build_session_rows(inventory, contamination)
+    return SessionViewSnapshot(
+        runtime=runtime,
+        inventory=inventory,
+        sessions=sessions,
+        contamination_markers=contamination,
+        fetch_error=fetch_error,
+    )
+
+
+def snapshot_to_dict(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """JSON export for ``/api/sessions`` (read-only)."""
+    return {
+        "api_version": "v1",
+        "view": "runtime-sessions",
+        "issue": 641,
+        "fetch_error": snapshot.fetch_error,
+        "runtime": runtime_snapshot_to_dict(snapshot.runtime),
+        "inventory": inventory_snapshot_to_dict(snapshot.inventory),
+        "sessions": [row.to_dict() for row in snapshot.sessions],
+        "session_counts": {
+            "total": len(snapshot.sessions),
+            "stale": snapshot.stale_session_count,
+            "contaminated": snapshot.contaminated_session_count,
+        },
+        "ownership_authority_complete": snapshot.ownership_authority_complete,
+        "ownership_section_status": snapshot.ownership_section_status,
+        "ownership_note": (
+            "Every ownership source read cleanly; a session with no lease and no "
+            "worktree path genuinely holds neither."
+            if snapshot.ownership_authority_complete
+            else "An ownership source is degraded or unavailable. Empty lease_ids "
+            "and worktree_paths mean unknown, not unowned; consult each row's "
+            "lease_authority and worktree_authority."
+        ),
+        "contamination_markers": [
+            marker.to_dict() for marker in snapshot.contamination_markers
+        ],
+        "active_contamination": [
+            marker.to_dict() for marker in snapshot.active_contamination
+        ],
+        "recovery_docs": [dict(doc) for doc in snapshot.recovery_docs],
+        "read_only": True,
+        "phase": 1,
+        "mutations": [],
+    }

webui/session_views.py

@@ -0,0 +1,403 @@
+"""HTML views for the Runtime and session view (Phase 1, #641).
+
+Read-only composition of runtime health (#430) and inventory sessions /
+namespaces / worktrees (#636). Surfaces stale and contamination indicators
+when detectable. Recovery links point only at sanctioned reconnect/restart
+docs — never at manual process kill (#630).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from html import escape
+from typing import Sequence
+
+from webui.inventory import STATUS_OK
+from webui.layout import render_page
+from webui.session_loader import (
+    ContaminationMarker,
+    SessionRow,
+    SessionViewSnapshot,
+)
+
+
+def _badge(text: str, css: str) -> str:
+    return f'<span class="badge {css}">{escape(text)}</span>'
+
+
+def _flags(flags: Sequence[str], *, css: str) -> str:
+    if not flags:
+        return '<span class="muted">—</span>'
+    return " ".join(_badge(flag, css) for flag in flags)
+
+
+def _unproven_cell(status: str) -> str:
+    """Render an ownership column whose backing inventory section failed to read.
+
+    Never "none" and never "unbound": an unreadable source proves nothing about
+    ownership, and claiming otherwise is the exact failure the
+    ``ownership_authority_complete`` invariant exists to prevent.
+    """
+    return (
+        f'<span class="muted">unknown (inventory {escape(status)})</span><br>'
+        f'{_badge("authority unproven", "badge-health-degraded")}'
+    )
+
+
+def _runtime_banner(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> str:
+    runtime = snapshot.runtime
+    stale = runtime.stale_runtime_warning
+    stale_html = ""
+    if stale:
+        stale_html = (
+            f'<div class="health-card health-stale" style="margin-top:0.75rem;">'
+            f"<strong>Stale runtime:</strong> {escape(stale)}</div>"
+        )
+    identity = runtime.authenticated_username or "unresolved"
+    if runtime.identity_error:
+        identity = f"unresolved ({runtime.identity_error})"
+
+    return f"""<div class="health-card">
+  <h3>Runtime context</h3>
+  <table class="detail">
+    <tr><th>Profile</th><td><code>{escape(runtime.profile_name)}</code></td></tr>
+    <tr><th>Role kind</th><td>{escape(runtime.role_kind)}</td></tr>
+    <tr><th>Identity</th><td>{escape(str(identity))}</td></tr>
+    <tr><th>Remote / host</th>
+      <td><code>{escape(runtime.remote)}</code> · <code>{escape(runtime.host)}</code></td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr><th>Local HEAD</th>
+      <td><code>{escape(runtime.repo_sha or "unknown")}</code></td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr><th>Remote master</th>
+      <td><code>{escape(runtime.remote_master_sha or "unknown")}</code></td>
+    </tr>
+    <tr><th>Commits behind</th>
+      <td>{escape(str(runtime.commits_behind_master if runtime.commits_behind_master is not None else "unknown"))}</td>
+    </tr>
+  </table>
+  <p class="muted">Full runtime detail: <a href="/runtime">/runtime</a> ·
+  Inventory API: <a href="/api/v1/inventory"><code>/api/v1/inventory</code></a></p>
+  {stale_html}
+</div>"""
+
+
+def _summary_bar(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> str:
+    total = len(snapshot.sessions)
+    stale = snapshot.stale_session_count
+    contaminated = snapshot.contaminated_session_count
+    active_markers = len(snapshot.active_contamination)
+    inv_status = snapshot.inventory.status
+    authority_complete = snapshot.ownership_authority_complete
+    authority_text = "complete" if authority_complete else "incomplete"
+    authority_css = "badge-health-ok" if authority_complete else "badge-health-degraded"
+    return f"""<div class="health-card" style="display:flex; flex-wrap:wrap; gap:1rem; align-items:center;">
+  <div><strong>Sessions:</strong> <span class="badge badge-health-ok">{total}</span></div>
+  <div><strong>Stale:</strong> <span class="badge badge-stale">{stale}</span></div>
+  <div><strong>Contaminated:</strong> <span class="badge badge-blocked">{contaminated}</span></div>
+  <div><strong>Active markers:</strong> <span class="badge badge-health-unproven">{active_markers}</span></div>
+  <div><strong>Inventory:</strong> <span class="badge badge-health-skipped">{escape(inv_status)}</span></div>
+  <div><strong>Ownership authority:</strong> <span class="badge {authority_css}">{authority_text}</span></div>
+</div>"""
+
+
+def _ownership_caveat(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> str:
+    """Name the unreadable ownership sections, or render nothing when all read."""
+    if snapshot.ownership_authority_complete:
+        return ""
+    degraded = ", ".join(
+        f"{name}: {status}"
+        for name, status in snapshot.ownership_section_status.items()
+        if status != STATUS_OK
+    )
+    return (
+        '<div class="health-card health-stale">'
+        "<strong>Ownership authority incomplete:</strong> "
+        f"{escape(degraded)}. Columns marked <em>unknown</em> could not be read. "
+        "No session below may be treated as holding no lease or no worktree "
+        "binding — absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.</div>"
+    )
+
+
+def _render_session_row(row: SessionRow) -> str:
+    pid = "—" if row.pid is None else str(row.pid)
+    pid_alive = "—" if row.pid_alive is None else ("alive" if row.pid_alive else "dead")
+    pid_css = (
+        "badge-health-ok"
+        if row.pid_alive is True
+        else ("badge-blocked" if row.pid_alive is False else "badge-health-skipped")
+    )
+    # An empty tuple only means "holds none" when its source read cleanly.
+    if row.lease_authority != STATUS_OK:
+        lease_cell = _unproven_cell(row.lease_authority)
+    else:
+        leases = (
+            ", ".join(f"<code>{escape(lid)}</code>" for lid in row.lease_ids)
+            if row.lease_ids
+            else '<span class="muted">none</span>'
+        )
+        work = (
+            ", ".join(escape(ref) for ref in row.work_refs)
+            if row.work_refs
+            else '<span class="muted">—</span>'
+        )
+        lease_cell = (
+            f'{leases}<div class="muted" style="font-size:0.82rem; '
+            f'margin-top:0.2rem;">{work}</div>'
+        )
+
+    if row.worktree_authority != STATUS_OK:
+        worktrees = _unproven_cell(row.worktree_authority)
+    else:
+        worktrees = (
+            "<br>".join(f"<code>{escape(path)}</code>" for path in row.worktree_paths)
+            if row.worktree_paths
+            else '<span class="muted">unbound</span>'
+        )
+    return f"""<tr>
+  <td><code>{escape(row.session_id)}</code></td>
+  <td>
+    <div><code>{escape(str(row.role or "—"))}</code> / <code>{escape(str(row.profile or "—"))}</code></div>
+    <div class="muted" style="font-size:0.82rem;">ns: <code>{escape(str(row.namespace or "—"))}</code></div>
+  </td>
+  <td>
+    <code>{escape(pid)}</code>
+    {_badge(pid_alive, pid_css)}
+  </td>
+  <td>{escape(str(row.status or "—"))}<div class="muted" style="font-size:0.82rem;">{escape(str(row.last_heartbeat_at or ""))}</div></td>
+  <td>{lease_cell}</td>
+  <td>{worktrees}</td>
+  <td>{_flags(row.stale_flags, css="badge-stale")}</td>
+  <td>{_flags(row.contamination_flags, css="badge-blocked")}</td>
+</tr>"""
+
+
+def _sessions_table(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> str:
+    rows: Sequence[SessionRow] = snapshot.sessions
+    if not rows:
+        sessions_status = snapshot.ownership_section_status.get("sessions", STATUS_OK)
+        if sessions_status != STATUS_OK:
+            return (
+                '<p class="muted">Session inventory is '
+                f"<strong>{escape(sessions_status)}</strong> — the session list "
+                "could not be read. This is not evidence that no sessions "
+                "exist.</p>"
+            )
+        return (
+            '<p class="muted">No control-plane sessions recorded. Inventory may '
+            "be unavailable, or no MCP workers have registered yet.</p>"
+        )
+    body = "".join(_render_session_row(row) for row in rows)
+    return f"""<table class="registry">
+  <thead>
+    <tr>
+      <th>Session</th>
+      <th>Role / profile / namespace</th>
+      <th>PID</th>
+      <th>Status</th>
+      <th>Leases / work</th>
+      <th>Worktree binding</th>
+      <th>Stale</th>
+      <th>Contamination</th>
+    </tr>
+  </thead>
+  <tbody>
+    {body}
+  </tbody>
+</table>"""
+
+
+def _namespaces_section(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> str:
+    section = snapshot.inventory.section("namespaces")
+    if section is None:
+        return (
+            '<div class="prompt-card"><h3>Namespaces</h3>'
+            '<p class="muted">Namespaces section not loaded.</p></div>'
+        )
+    if not section.ok:
+        return f"""<div class="prompt-card">
+  <h3>Namespaces {_badge(section.status, "badge-health-degraded")}</h3>
+  <p class="muted">{escape(section.reason or "unavailable")}</p>
+</div>"""
+
+    rows = []
+    for item in section.items:
+        caps = item.get("capability_summary") or {}
+        cap_bits = ", ".join(
+            name for name, ok in sorted(caps.items()) if ok
+        ) or "none"
+        rows.append(
+            "<tr>"
+            f"<td><code>{escape(str(item.get('mcp_namespace') or '—'))}</code></td>"
+            f"<td><code>{escape(str(item.get('profile_name') or '—'))}</code></td>"
+            f"<td>{escape(str(item.get('role') or '—'))}</td>"
+            f"<td>{escape(cap_bits)}</td>"
+            f"<td>{'yes' if item.get('active') else 'no'}</td>"
+            "</tr>"
+        )
+    reason = (
+        f'<p class="muted">{escape(section.reason)}</p>'
+        if section.reason
+        else ""
+    )
+    return f"""<div class="prompt-card">
+  <h3>Namespaces / capabilities</h3>
+  {reason}
+  <table class="registry">
+    <thead>
+      <tr>
+        <th>Namespace</th>
+        <th>Profile</th>
+        <th>Role</th>
+        <th>Capabilities</th>
+        <th>Active in process</th>
+      </tr>
+    </thead>
+    <tbody>
+      {"".join(rows) if rows else '<tr><td colspan="5" class="muted">No namespace rows.</td></tr>'}
+    </tbody>
+  </table>
+</div>"""
+
+
+def _worktrees_section(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> str:
+    section = snapshot.inventory.section("worktrees")
+    if section is None:
+        return ""
+    if not section.ok and not section.items:
+        return f"""<div class="prompt-card">
+  <h3>Worktrees {_badge(section.status, "badge-health-degraded")}</h3>
+  <p class="muted">{escape(section.reason or "unavailable")}</p>
+</div>"""
+
+    rows = []
+    for item in section.items[:50]:
+        rows.append(
+            "<tr>"
+            f"<td><code>{escape(str(item.get('rel_path') or item.get('path') or '—'))}</code></td>"
+            f"<td><code>{escape(str(item.get('branch') or '—'))}</code></td>"
+            f"<td>{escape(str(item.get('classification') or '—'))}</td>"
+            f"<td>{'yes' if item.get('registered_worktree') else 'no'}</td>"
+            f"<td>{'dirty' if item.get('dirty') else 'clean'}</td>"
+            "</tr>"
+        )
+    more = ""
+    if len(section.items) > 50:
+        more = f'<p class="muted">Showing 50 of {len(section.items)}. Full list: <a href="/worktrees">/worktrees</a>.</p>'
+    return f"""<div class="prompt-card">
+  <h3>Worktree bindings</h3>
+  <p class="muted">Registered issue worktrees under <code>branches/</code>. Hygiene detail: <a href="/worktrees">/worktrees</a>.</p>
+  <table class="registry">
+    <thead>
+      <tr>
+        <th>Path</th>
+        <th>Branch</th>
+        <th>Classification</th>
+        <th>Registered</th>
+        <th>State</th>
+      </tr>
+    </thead>
+    <tbody>
+      {"".join(rows) if rows else '<tr><td colspan="5" class="muted">No worktrees recorded.</td></tr>'}
+    </tbody>
+  </table>
+  {more}
+</div>"""
+
+
+def _contamination_section(markers: Sequence[ContaminationMarker]) -> str:
+    if not markers:
+        return (
+            '<div class="prompt-card"><h3>Contamination markers</h3>'
+            '<p class="muted">No contamination kinds inspected.</p></div>'
+        )
+    rows = []
+    for marker in markers:
+        active = marker.to_dict()["active"]
+        status = "ACTIVE" if active else ("cleared" if marker.cleared else "absent")
+        css = "badge-blocked" if active else "badge-health-ok"
+        rows.append(
+            "<tr>"
+            f"<td><code>{escape(marker.kind)}</code></td>"
+            f"<td>{_badge(status, css)}</td>"
+            f"<td>{escape(marker.reason_class or '—')}</td>"
+            f"<td><code>{escape(marker.session_id or '—')}</code></td>"
+            f"<td>{escape(marker.command_summary or marker.summary)}</td>"
+            "</tr>"
+        )
+    return f"""<div class="prompt-card">
+  <h3>Contamination markers (#630 / #671)</h3>
+  <p class="muted">Durable markers only — never silent when present. Clearance is reconciler-only.</p>
+  <table class="registry">
+    <thead>
+      <tr>
+        <th>Kind</th>
+        <th>State</th>
+        <th>Reason class</th>
+        <th>Session</th>
+        <th>Summary</th>
+      </tr>
+    </thead>
+    <tbody>
+      {"".join(rows)}
+    </tbody>
+  </table>
+</div>"""
+
+
+def _recovery_section(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> str:
+    items = []
+    for doc in snapshot.recovery_docs:
+        items.append(
+            "<li>"
+            f"<code>{escape(doc['path'])}</code> — "
+            f"<strong>{escape(doc['label'])}</strong>: {escape(doc['note'])}"
+            "</li>"
+        )
+    return f"""<div class="prompt-card">
+  <h3>Sanctioned recovery (read-only)</h3>
+  <p class="muted">This view does <strong>not</strong> restart, kill, or take over sessions.
+  Manual <code>pkill</code> / <code>kill</code> of MCP daemons is contamination (#630), not recovery.</p>
+  <ul class="reasons">
+    {"".join(items)}
+    <li>Prefer IDE/client reconnect (<code>/mcp reconnect</code>) or an operator-owned restart recorded in the restart inventory.</li>
+  </ul>
+</div>"""
+
+
+def render_sessions_page(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> str:
+    """Render the full HTML body for the runtime/session view."""
+    error_block = ""
+    if snapshot.fetch_error:
+        error_block = (
+            f'<div class="health-card health-stale"><strong>Partial load:</strong> '
+            f"{escape(snapshot.fetch_error)}</div>"
+        )
+    if snapshot.runtime.fetch_error:
+        error_block += (
+            f'<div class="health-card health-stale"><strong>Runtime note:</strong> '
+            f"{escape(snapshot.runtime.fetch_error)}</div>"
+        )
+
+    body = f"""
+{error_block}
+{_runtime_banner(snapshot)}
+{_summary_bar(snapshot)}
+
+<div class="prompt-card">
+  <h3>Sessions</h3>
+  <p class="muted">Control-plane sessions correlated with leases and worktree bindings.
+  Stale and contamination flags are fail-soft: absence of a marker is not proof of cleanliness when inventory is degraded.
+  Lease and worktree columns read <em>unknown (inventory …)</em> when their source could not be loaded.</p>
+  {_ownership_caveat(snapshot)}
+  {_sessions_table(snapshot)}
+</div>
+
+{_namespaces_section(snapshot)}
+{_worktrees_section(snapshot)}
+{_contamination_section(snapshot.contamination_markers)}
+{_recovery_section(snapshot)}
+"""
+    return render_page(title="Sessions", body_html=f"""<h2>Runtime and sessions</h2>
+<p class="meta">Phase 1 read-only view (#641). Combines runtime health (#430) with
+unified inventory sessions/namespaces/worktrees (#636). No restart or session-takeover controls.</p>
+{body}""")

webui/system_health_views.py

@@ -278,8 +278,10 @@ def _recovery_card() -> str:
         "controls arrive in Phase 2 (#642); until then recovery runs through "
         "the sanctioned client reconnect / operator restart path.</p>"
         "<ul class='reasons'>"
-        "<li><a href='/runtime'>Runtime and session view</a> — active profile, "
+        "<li><a href='/runtime'>Runtime health</a> — active profile, workflow "
-        "workflow hashes, and shell health.</li>"
+        "hashes, and shell health.</li>"
+        "<li><a href='/sessions'>Runtime and sessions</a> — namespaces, session "
+        "rows, worktree bindings, and contamination markers (#641).</li>"
         "<li>Reconnect the MCP client from the IDE, then re-run the blocked "
         "cycle. Never kill the daemon process manually: unmanaged kills are "
         "recorded as runtime contamination (#630).</li>"