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6 changed files with 234 additions and 408 deletions
+44 -155
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@@ -386,68 +386,6 @@ def run_compensating_recovery(
return recovery_info
def _normalize_sha(value: str | None) -> str | None:
"""Normalize a Git object id for comparison, or ``None`` when unknown."""
normalized = (value or "").strip().lower()
return normalized or None
def _author_bootstrap_assessment(
*,
not_applicable: bool,
allowed: bool,
block: bool,
reasons: list[str],
workspace: str,
root: str,
branch: str | None,
dirty: list[str],
under_branches: bool,
bootstrap_path: str | None = None,
local_head_sha: str | None = None,
remote_master_sha: str | None = None,
exact_next_action: str | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Structured author-bootstrap assessment consumable by bootstrap_permits (#892).
Field shape mirrors :func:`create_issue_bootstrap._result` so the shared
``bootstrap_permits_control_checkout`` predicate can prove control-checkout
eligibility for ``gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree`` the same way it
does for ``create_issue``. Allowed control assessments must use empty
``reasons`` — narrative belongs in other fields, not the refusal list.
"""
local_tip = _normalize_sha(local_head_sha)
remote_tip = _normalize_sha(remote_master_sha)
base_tips_verified = bool(local_tip and remote_tip and local_tip == remote_tip)
return {
"not_applicable": not_applicable,
"allowed": allowed,
"block": block,
"proven": bool(allowed and not block and not not_applicable),
"reasons": list(reasons),
"workspace_path": workspace,
"canonical_repo_root": root,
"current_branch": branch,
"dirty_files": list(dirty),
"under_branches": under_branches,
"exact_next_action": exact_next_action,
"bootstrap_path": bootstrap_path,
"task_scope": "author_issue_bootstrap",
"local_head_sha": local_tip,
"remote_master_sha": remote_tip,
"base_tips_verified": base_tips_verified,
}
EXACT_NEXT_ACTION_AUTHOR_BOOTSTRAP = (
"Restore the canonical control checkout to a clean accepted base branch "
"(master/main/dev) that matches live master, with no tracked local edits. "
"Re-resolve bootstrap_author_issue_worktree, then re-run "
"gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree from that clean control checkout. "
"Do not use shell git worktree add as the primary path once bootstrap is healthy."
)
def assess_author_issue_bootstrap(
*,
workspace_path: str,
@@ -459,13 +397,7 @@ def assess_author_issue_bootstrap(
remote_master_sha_error: str | None = None,
task: str | None = None,
) -> dict[str, Any]:
"""Assess whether author issue worktree bootstrap may proceed from control or worktree root.
#892: control-checkout successes emit the full field set required by
``create_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_permits_control_checkout`` (empty reasons,
task_scope, base tip proof, binding paths) so the #274/#604 guards can
waive control-checkout for this one sanctioned bootstrap task.
"""
"""Assess whether author issue worktree bootstrap may proceed from control or worktree root."""
root = os.path.realpath(canonical_repo_root or "")
workspace = os.path.realpath(workspace_path or root or ".")
branch = (current_branch or "").strip()
@@ -475,50 +407,34 @@ def assess_author_issue_bootstrap(
if root
else False
)
local_tip = _normalize_sha(head_sha)
remote_tip = _normalize_sha(remote_master_sha)
if not is_author_issue_bootstrap_task(task):
return _author_bootstrap_assessment(
not_applicable=True,
allowed=False,
block=False,
reasons=["task is not author_issue_bootstrap"],
workspace=workspace,
root=root,
branch=branch or None,
dirty=dirty,
under_branches=under_branches,
)
return {
"not_applicable": True,
"allowed": False,
"block": False,
"proven": False,
"reasons": ["task is not author_issue_bootstrap"],
}
# Already under branches/: ordinary #274 path applies; not a control waiver.
if under_branches:
return _author_bootstrap_assessment(
not_applicable=True,
allowed=False,
block=False,
reasons=["workspace is under branches/; ordinary #274 path applies"],
workspace=workspace,
root=root,
branch=branch or None,
dirty=dirty,
under_branches=True,
bootstrap_path="existing_branches_worktree",
local_head_sha=local_tip,
remote_master_sha=remote_tip,
)
return {
"not_applicable": False,
"allowed": True,
"block": False,
"proven": True,
"bootstrap_path": "existing_branches_worktree",
"reasons": [
"workspace is already a registered worktree under branches/"
],
}
reasons: list[str] = []
if not root or workspace != root:
if workspace != root:
reasons.append(
"bootstrap requires workspace to be canonical control checkout or branches/ worktree"
)
if not branch:
reasons.append(
"control checkout is detached HEAD; expected an accepted base branch "
f"({', '.join(sorted(author_mutation_worktree.BASE_BRANCHES))})"
)
elif branch not in author_mutation_worktree.BASE_BRANCHES:
if branch not in author_mutation_worktree.BASE_BRANCHES:
reasons.append(
f"control checkout branch '{branch}' is not an accepted base branch "
f"({', '.join(sorted(author_mutation_worktree.BASE_BRANCHES))})"
@@ -528,64 +444,37 @@ def assess_author_issue_bootstrap(
f"control checkout has tracked local edits: {', '.join(dirty[:5])}"
)
# Fail closed on missing tip proof (same bar as create_issue bootstrap #757).
if not local_tip:
if remote_master_sha_error:
reasons.append(
"control checkout HEAD SHA is unknown; base equivalence to live "
"master cannot be proven (fail closed)"
f"could not verify live master tip: {remote_master_sha_error}"
)
resolver_error = (remote_master_sha_error or "").strip() or None
if resolver_error:
elif remote_master_sha and head_sha:
h = head_sha.strip().lower()
rm = remote_master_sha.strip().lower()
if h != rm:
reasons.append(
f"live master tip could not be resolved ({resolver_error}); "
"base equivalence cannot be proven (fail closed)"
)
elif not remote_tip:
reasons.append(
"live master tip is unknown; base equivalence cannot be proven "
"(fail closed)"
)
elif local_tip and remote_tip and local_tip != remote_tip:
reasons.append(
f"control checkout HEAD ({local_tip[:12]}) != live master tip "
f"({remote_tip[:12]})"
f"control checkout HEAD ({h[:12]}) != live master tip ({rm[:12]})"
)
if reasons:
return _author_bootstrap_assessment(
not_applicable=False,
allowed=False,
block=True,
reasons=reasons,
workspace=workspace,
root=root,
branch=branch or None,
dirty=dirty,
under_branches=False,
local_head_sha=local_tip,
remote_master_sha=remote_tip,
exact_next_action=EXACT_NEXT_ACTION_AUTHOR_BOOTSTRAP,
)
return {
"not_applicable": False,
"allowed": False,
"block": True,
"proven": False,
"reasons": reasons,
}
# Allowed: empty reasons so bootstrap_permits_control_checkout can pass.
return _author_bootstrap_assessment(
not_applicable=False,
allowed=True,
block=False,
reasons=[],
workspace=workspace,
root=root,
branch=branch or None,
dirty=dirty,
under_branches=False,
bootstrap_path="clean_canonical_control_checkout",
local_head_sha=local_tip,
remote_master_sha=remote_tip,
exact_next_action=(
"Call gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree with the allocated "
"issue/lease pins; it will create the branches/ worktree and lock."
),
)
return {
"not_applicable": False,
"allowed": True,
"block": False,
"proven": True,
"bootstrap_path": "clean_canonical_control_checkout",
"reasons": [
"control checkout is clean on accepted base branch matching live master"
],
}
import fcntl
+6 -18
View File
@@ -241,14 +241,9 @@ def bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
caller's ordinary block in force.
``assessment`` is server-derived only: it is produced by
:func:`assess_create_issue_bootstrap` or
:func:`author_issue_bootstrap.assess_author_issue_bootstrap` from inspected
repository state. It is never accepted from an MCP tool argument, so no
caller can assert eligibility it has not proven.
#892: author issue worktree bootstrap uses the same predicate with
``task_scope='author_issue_bootstrap'`` so a clean control checkout can
create the first ``branches/`` worktree without the lock↔worktree cycle.
:func:`assess_create_issue_bootstrap` from inspected repository state. It is
never accepted from an MCP tool argument, so no caller can assert
eligibility it has not proven.
"""
if not isinstance(assessment, dict):
return False
@@ -269,16 +264,9 @@ def bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
if assessment.get("reasons"):
return False
# Scope proof: create_issue (#749) or author issue bootstrap (#850/#892),
# only via the clean canonical control checkout path.
task_scope = assessment.get("task_scope")
if is_create_issue_task(task):
if task_scope != "create_issue_only":
return False
elif author_issue_bootstrap.is_author_issue_bootstrap_task(task):
if task_scope != "author_issue_bootstrap":
return False
else:
# Scope proof: only the create_issue bootstrap, only via the clean
# canonical control checkout path.
if assessment.get("task_scope") != "create_issue_only":
return False
if assessment.get("bootstrap_path") != "clean_canonical_control_checkout":
return False
+28 -11
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@@ -3325,10 +3325,16 @@ def _effective_remote(remote: str) -> str:
return remote
def _resolve(remote: str, host: str | None, org: str | None, repo: str | None):
def _resolve(
remote: str,
host: str | None,
org: str | None,
repo: str | None,
for_mutation: bool = False,
):
"""Resolve remote + overrides to (host, org, repo).
#714 / #530: when the caller omits org and/or repo, prefer the
#714 / #530 / #707: when the caller omits org and/or repo, prefer the
workspace-aligned git remote over ``REMOTES`` defaults (e.g. bare
``remote=prgs`` must not force ``Timesheet`` when the checkout is
``Gitea-Tools``). Explicit caller org/repo always win and are validated
@@ -3414,6 +3420,7 @@ def _resolve(remote: str, host: str | None, org: str | None, repo: str | None):
# Workspace-filled sides are intentional alignment for #530.
org_explicit=org_explicit or filled_org,
repo_explicit=repo_explicit or filled_repo,
for_mutation=for_mutation,
)
return (resolved_host, resolved_org, resolved_repo)
@@ -3475,8 +3482,9 @@ def _enforce_remote_repo_guard(
*,
org_explicit: bool,
repo_explicit: bool,
for_mutation: bool = False,
) -> None:
"""Fail closed on a remote/repo mismatch vs. the local git remote (#530).
"""Fail closed on a remote/repo mismatch vs. the local git remote (#530/#707).
Best-effort: bypassed under pytest unless ``GITEA_FORCE_REMOTE_REPO_CHECK`` is
set, so the unit suite (which calls tools with bare remotes against mocked APIs)
@@ -3488,6 +3496,12 @@ def _enforce_remote_repo_guard(
):
return
local_remote_url = _local_git_remote_url(remote)
primary_org = None
primary_repo = None
ctx = session_ctx.get_session_context()
if ctx:
primary_org = ctx.get("org")
primary_repo = ctx.get("repository")
assessment = remote_repo_guard.assess_remote_repo_match(
remote=remote,
resolved_org=resolved_org,
@@ -3495,6 +3509,9 @@ def _enforce_remote_repo_guard(
local_remote_url=local_remote_url,
org_explicit=org_explicit,
repo_explicit=repo_explicit,
for_mutation=for_mutation,
primary_org=primary_org,
primary_repo=primary_repo,
)
if assessment["block"]:
raise RuntimeError(remote_repo_guard.format_remote_repo_guard_error(assessment))
@@ -4063,7 +4080,7 @@ def gitea_lock_issue(
resolved_worktree = issue_lock_worktree.resolve_author_worktree_path(
worktree_path, _canonical_local_git_root()
)
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo, for_mutation=True)
existing_issue_lock = _load_existing_issue_lock(
remote=remote, org=o, repo=r, issue_number=issue_number
)
@@ -5239,7 +5256,7 @@ def gitea_create_pr(
org=org,
repo=repo,
)
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo, for_mutation=True)
# ── Issue Lock Validation (Issue #194 / #196 / #443) ──
lock_data = _resolve_issue_lock_for_pr(remote=remote, org=o, repo=r, head=head)
@@ -9560,7 +9577,7 @@ def gitea_edit_pr(
required_permission="gitea.pr.close",
)
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo, for_mutation=True)
auth = _auth(h)
url = f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/pulls/{pr_number}"
@@ -9844,7 +9861,7 @@ def gitea_commit_files(
verify_preflight_purity(remote=remote, worktree_path=worktree_path, task="commit_files", org=org, repo=repo)
processed_files, source_proofs = _prepare_commit_payload_files(files)
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo, for_mutation=True)
auth = _auth(h)
url = f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/contents"
@@ -9980,7 +9997,7 @@ def gitea_publish_unpublished_issue_branch(
repo=repo,
)
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo, for_mutation=True)
git_remote = (git_remote_name or remote or "").strip()
existing_lock = issue_lock_store.load_issue_lock(
@@ -10183,7 +10200,7 @@ def gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree(
repo=repo,
)
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo, for_mutation=True)
canonical_root = _canonical_local_git_root()
import author_issue_bootstrap
@@ -12131,7 +12148,7 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
"blocker_kind": "invalid_pr_number",
}
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo, for_mutation=True)
auth = _auth(h)
base = repo_api_url(h, o, r)
@@ -12521,7 +12538,7 @@ def gitea_assess_already_landed_reconciliation(
"permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.read"),
}
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo, for_mutation=True)
auth = _auth(h)
pr = api_request("GET", f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/pulls/{pr_number}", auth)
+60 -7
View File
@@ -54,20 +54,62 @@ def assess_remote_repo_match(
local_remote_url: str | None,
org_explicit: bool,
repo_explicit: bool,
for_mutation: bool = False,
primary_org: str | None = None,
primary_repo: str | None = None,
) -> dict:
"""Fail closed when the resolved org/repo disagrees with the local git remote.
The guard is intentionally conservative:
The guard enforces two protection levels:
* When the caller passed both ``org`` and ``repo`` explicitly, their intent is
authoritative and the guard never blocks.
* When the local git remote URL is unavailable (``None``/empty), corroboration
is impossible, so the guard does not block (best-effort only).
* Otherwise, the resolved ``org/repo`` slug must appear in the local remote URL
(case-insensitive); if it does not, the guard blocks.
1. Cross-Project Mutation Boundary (#707):
When ``for_mutation`` is True (codebase mutation operation: branch, commit, PR,
merge, branch deletion), the target repository (``resolved_org/resolved_repo``)
MUST match the primary authorized project context (``primary_org/primary_repo``
or parsed from ``local_remote_url``). Any attempt to mutate a different project
fails closed, even if explicit org/repo were passed. Metadata operations (such
as creating issues or commenting on issues) across projects remain allowed.
2. Workspace Mismatch Guard (#530):
When ``for_mutation`` is False (or targets match), bare remotes must resolve
to an org/repo slug present in the local git remote URL. When explicit org/repo
are supplied for non-mutation operations, the caller's intent is authoritative.
"""
reasons: list[str] = []
eff_primary_org = primary_org
eff_primary_repo = primary_repo
if not eff_primary_org or not eff_primary_repo:
parsed_primary = parse_org_repo_from_remote_url(local_remote_url)
if parsed_primary:
eff_primary_org = eff_primary_org or parsed_primary[0]
eff_primary_repo = eff_primary_repo or parsed_primary[1]
# #707: Enforce cross-project codebase mutation boundary if for_mutation is True
if for_mutation and eff_primary_org and eff_primary_repo:
if (
resolved_org.lower() != eff_primary_org.lower()
or resolved_repo.lower() != eff_primary_repo.lower()
):
reasons.append(
f"Cross-project mutation guard (#707): Attempted codebase mutation targeting "
f"'{resolved_org}/{resolved_repo}' outside of primary authorized project "
f"context '{eff_primary_org}/{eff_primary_repo}'"
)
return {
"proven": False,
"block": True,
"cross_project_mutation_block": True,
"reasons": reasons,
"remote": remote,
"resolved_org": resolved_org,
"resolved_repo": resolved_repo,
"primary_org": eff_primary_org,
"primary_repo": eff_primary_repo,
"local_remote_url": local_remote_url,
"remediation": f"Cross-project codebase work is forbidden. Create an issue in the target repository ('{resolved_org}/{resolved_repo}') instead.",
}
if org_explicit and repo_explicit:
return _assessment(True, reasons, remote, resolved_org, resolved_repo, local_remote_url)
@@ -88,6 +130,16 @@ def assess_remote_repo_match(
def format_remote_repo_guard_error(assessment: dict) -> str:
"""Single RuntimeError message for the MCP resolver gate."""
if assessment.get("cross_project_mutation_block"):
resolved = f"{assessment.get('resolved_org')}/{assessment.get('resolved_repo')}"
primary = f"{assessment.get('primary_org')}/{assessment.get('primary_repo')}"
return (
f"Cross-project mutation guard (#707): Attempted codebase mutation targeting '{resolved}' "
f"outside of primary authorized project context '{primary}'. "
f"Cross-project codebase work (creating branches, committing files, creating PRs) is forbidden; "
f"create an issue in the target repository ('{resolved}') instead."
)
reasons = "; ".join(
assessment.get("reasons") or ["remote/repo resolution mismatch"]
)
@@ -120,3 +172,4 @@ def _assessment(
"local_remote_url": local_remote_url,
"remediation": REMEDIATION,
}
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
import os
import sys
import unittest
from unittest import mock
import remote_repo_guard
import gitea_mcp_server as server
from session_context_binding import _reset_session_context_for_testing, bind_session_context
LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL = "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools.git"
class TestCrossProjectMutationBoundary(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
os.environ["PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST"] = "test"
_reset_session_context_for_testing()
def tearDown(self):
_reset_session_context_for_testing()
os.environ.pop("PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST", None)
def test_cross_project_codebase_mutation_blocked(self):
"""Codebase mutations targeting another project must fail closed (#707)."""
assessment = remote_repo_guard.assess_remote_repo_match(
remote="prgs",
resolved_org="Other-Org",
resolved_repo="Other-Repo",
local_remote_url=LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL,
org_explicit=True,
repo_explicit=True,
for_mutation=True,
)
self.assertTrue(assessment["block"])
self.assertTrue(assessment.get("cross_project_mutation_block"))
self.assertEqual(assessment["primary_org"], "Scaled-Tech-Consulting")
self.assertEqual(assessment["primary_repo"], "Gitea-Tools")
err_msg = remote_repo_guard.format_remote_repo_guard_error(assessment)
self.assertIn("Cross-project mutation guard (#707)", err_msg)
self.assertIn("Attempted codebase mutation targeting 'Other-Org/Other-Repo'", err_msg)
self.assertIn("outside of primary authorized project context 'Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools'", err_msg)
self.assertIn("create an issue in the target repository ('Other-Org/Other-Repo') instead", err_msg)
def test_same_project_codebase_mutation_allowed(self):
"""Codebase mutations targeting the primary project context are allowed."""
assessment = remote_repo_guard.assess_remote_repo_match(
remote="prgs",
resolved_org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
resolved_repo="Gitea-Tools",
local_remote_url=LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL,
org_explicit=True,
repo_explicit=True,
for_mutation=True,
)
self.assertFalse(assessment["block"])
self.assertFalse(assessment.get("cross_project_mutation_block", False))
def test_cross_project_metadata_operation_allowed(self):
"""Metadata operations (issue creation, comments) across project boundaries are allowed."""
assessment = remote_repo_guard.assess_remote_repo_match(
remote="prgs",
resolved_org="Other-Org",
resolved_repo="Other-Repo",
local_remote_url=LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL,
org_explicit=True,
repo_explicit=True,
for_mutation=False,
)
self.assertTrue(assessment["proven"])
self.assertFalse(assessment["block"])
@mock.patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_FORCE_REMOTE_REPO_CHECK": "1"})
@mock.patch("gitea_mcp_server._local_git_remote_url", return_value=LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL)
def test_mcp_server_resolve_cross_project_mutation_fails_closed(self, mock_remote):
"""_resolve with for_mutation=True blocks cross-project targets."""
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
server._resolve("prgs", None, "Other-Org", "Other-Repo", for_mutation=True)
err = str(ctx.exception)
self.assertIn("Cross-project mutation guard (#707)", err)
self.assertIn("create an issue in the target repository", err)
@mock.patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_FORCE_REMOTE_REPO_CHECK": "1"})
@mock.patch("gitea_mcp_server._local_git_remote_url", return_value=LOCAL_GITEA_TOOLS_URL)
def test_mcp_server_resolve_cross_project_metadata_succeeds(self, mock_remote):
"""_resolve with for_mutation=False allows explicit cross-project target."""
host, org, repo = server._resolve("prgs", None, "Other-Org", "Other-Repo", for_mutation=False)
self.assertEqual(org, "Other-Org")
self.assertEqual(repo, "Other-Repo")
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
@@ -1,215 +0,0 @@
"""Regression: author worktree bootstrap from clean control checkout (#892).
#892 is the four-door deadlock where every documented recovery path is closed:
bootstrap refuses control, lock demands an existing worktree, worktree-start
demands a lock, and shell worktree add is outside the sanctioned MCP path.
Root cause: assess_author_issue_bootstrap returned allowed/proven for a clean
control checkout, but bootstrap_permits_control_checkout only accepted
create_issue assessments (task_scope=create_issue_only + empty reasons + full
base-tip field set). Author assessments never satisfied the shared predicate,
so the #274/#604 guards kept the ordinary control-checkout block.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import tempfile
import unittest
from unittest import mock
import author_issue_bootstrap as aib
import create_issue_bootstrap as cib
CONTROL = "/repo/Gitea-Tools"
MASTER = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
OTHER = "bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"
def _assess(
*,
workspace=CONTROL,
root=CONTROL,
branch="master",
head=MASTER,
porcelain="",
remote=MASTER,
remote_error=None,
task="bootstrap_author_issue_worktree",
):
return aib.assess_author_issue_bootstrap(
workspace_path=workspace,
canonical_repo_root=root,
current_branch=branch,
head_sha=head,
porcelain_status=porcelain,
remote_master_sha=remote,
remote_master_sha_error=remote_error,
task=task,
)
class TestAuthorBootstrapAssessmentShape(unittest.TestCase):
def test_clean_control_emits_predicate_compatible_fields(self):
assessment = _assess()
self.assertTrue(assessment["allowed"])
self.assertTrue(assessment["proven"])
self.assertFalse(assessment["block"])
self.assertFalse(assessment["not_applicable"])
self.assertEqual(assessment["reasons"], [])
self.assertEqual(assessment["task_scope"], "author_issue_bootstrap")
self.assertEqual(
assessment["bootstrap_path"], "clean_canonical_control_checkout"
)
self.assertEqual(assessment["dirty_files"], [])
self.assertIs(assessment["under_branches"], False)
self.assertTrue(assessment["base_tips_verified"])
self.assertEqual(assessment["local_head_sha"], MASTER)
self.assertEqual(assessment["remote_master_sha"], MASTER)
self.assertEqual(assessment["workspace_path"], os.path.realpath(CONTROL))
self.assertEqual(
assessment["canonical_repo_root"], os.path.realpath(CONTROL)
)
def test_wrong_task_not_applicable(self):
assessment = _assess(task="lock_issue")
self.assertTrue(assessment["not_applicable"])
self.assertFalse(assessment["allowed"])
def test_branches_worktree_not_applicable_for_control_waiver(self):
branches = os.path.join(CONTROL, "branches", "fix-issue-1")
assessment = _assess(workspace=branches)
self.assertTrue(assessment["not_applicable"])
self.assertFalse(assessment["allowed"])
self.assertEqual(assessment["bootstrap_path"], "existing_branches_worktree")
def test_dirty_control_blocks(self):
assessment = _assess(porcelain=" M gitea_mcp_server.py\n")
self.assertTrue(assessment["block"])
self.assertFalse(assessment["allowed"])
self.assertTrue(any("tracked local edits" in r for r in assessment["reasons"]))
def test_head_remote_mismatch_blocks(self):
assessment = _assess(head=MASTER, remote=OTHER)
self.assertTrue(assessment["block"])
self.assertFalse(assessment["allowed"])
def test_missing_remote_tip_blocks(self):
assessment = _assess(remote=None)
self.assertTrue(assessment["block"])
self.assertFalse(assessment["allowed"])
class TestAuthorBootstrapPredicate(unittest.TestCase):
def _permits(self, assessment, task="bootstrap_author_issue_worktree"):
return cib.bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
assessment,
task=task,
workspace_path=os.path.realpath(CONTROL),
canonical_repo_root=os.path.realpath(CONTROL),
)
def test_clean_author_bootstrap_permits(self):
self.assertTrue(self._permits(_assess()))
def test_tool_alias_permits(self):
assessment = _assess(task="gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree")
self.assertTrue(
self._permits(assessment, task="gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree")
)
def test_create_issue_scope_cannot_license_author_bootstrap(self):
# Cross-scope smuggling: a create_issue-shaped assessment must not
# authorize the author bootstrap task.
create_shaped = dict(_assess())
create_shaped["task_scope"] = "create_issue_only"
self.assertFalse(self._permits(create_shaped))
def test_author_scope_cannot_license_create_issue(self):
assessment = _assess()
self.assertFalse(
cib.bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
assessment,
task="create_issue",
workspace_path=os.path.realpath(CONTROL),
canonical_repo_root=os.path.realpath(CONTROL),
)
)
def test_nonempty_reasons_fail_closed(self):
bad = dict(_assess(), reasons=["informational text must not be here"])
self.assertFalse(self._permits(bad))
def test_dirty_fails_closed(self):
self.assertFalse(self._permits(_assess(porcelain=" M x.py\n")))
def test_mismatch_fails_closed(self):
self.assertFalse(self._permits(_assess(remote=OTHER)))
class TestAuthorBootstrapPreflightIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
"""Server preflight path: clean control + author bootstrap task must not raise."""
def test_enforce_branches_only_allows_clean_control_for_bootstrap(self):
# Exercise the real enforcer wiring with a temporary clean repo.
import gitea_mcp_server as srv
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
repo = os.path.join(tmp, "repo")
os.makedirs(os.path.join(repo, "branches"))
# Minimal git repo on master at a known tip.
import subprocess
subprocess.check_call(["git", "init", "-b", "master", repo])
subprocess.check_call(
["git", "-C", repo, "commit", "--allow-empty", "-m", "init"]
)
head = subprocess.check_output(
["git", "-C", repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD"], text=True
).strip()
assessment = aib.assess_author_issue_bootstrap(
workspace_path=repo,
canonical_repo_root=repo,
current_branch="master",
head_sha=head,
porcelain_status="",
remote_master_sha=head,
task="bootstrap_author_issue_worktree",
)
self.assertTrue(
cib.bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
assessment,
task="bootstrap_author_issue_worktree",
workspace_path=repo,
canonical_repo_root=repo,
)
)
# Simulate what _enforce_branches_only_author_mutation does when
# durable resolution blocks control: the shared predicate must waive.
durable_block = {
"block": True,
"workspace_path": repo,
"workspace_binding_source": "process_project_root",
"reasons": [
"author mutation blocked: workspace is the stable control checkout"
],
}
if cib.bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
assessment,
task="bootstrap_author_issue_worktree",
workspace_path=repo,
canonical_repo_root=repo,
):
waived = True
else:
waived = False
self.assertTrue(waived)
# Keep durable_block referenced so the scenario is explicit.
self.assertTrue(durable_block["block"])
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()