chore: merge master into feat/issue-646-policy-guardrail-visibility (base sync)

Phase 3 child of the Web Console epic #631. Operators can now see the active
workflow policy/guardrail configuration from the console instead of reading the
repo tree.

- webui/policy_inventory.py (new): redacted, machine-readable guardrail
  inventory. One row per major guardrail (role separation/RBAC, lease rules,
  worktree binding, merge confirmation, redaction, contamination, allocator
  policy, audit logging, mutation gating) with source pointers (file/module/doc)
  and a compact active projection from the existing safe policy accessors.
  Fail-soft per entry; whole payload run through console_redaction before emit;
  diff vs documented default where feasible.
- webui/policy_views.py (new): HTML cards with source pointers, active config,
  and the documented-default diff; read-only page copy, no forms.
- webui/app.py: register GET /policy and GET /api/v1/policy (additive).
- webui/layout.py: add Policy nav item.
- tests/test_webui_policy_visibility.py (new): guardrail presence + source
  pointers (AC1), redaction incl. planted-secret masking and scan_for_secrets
  (AC2/AC3), read-only page + no-mutation routes (AC4), fail-soft rendering.
- docs/webui-local-dev.md: route table + read-only policy-visibility section.

Read-only throughout; no policy editing, no gate-weakening toggle, secrets
redacted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

canonical_thread_handoff.py

@@ -46,17 +46,6 @@ _FIELD_RE = re.compile(
 )
 
 
-def is_known_cth_type(value: str | None) -> bool:
-    """True when *value* is a declared member of the :data:`CTH_TYPES` contract.
-
-    ``CTH_TYPES`` is the single authority for what a CTH type may be. The
-    heading a comment carries is free text, so a *read* path that turns a parsed
-    type into something durable — a serialized field, a routing decision — must
-    check membership here rather than trust the parse or keep a list of its own.
-    """
-    return (value or "").strip() in CTH_TYPES
-
-
 def format_cth_body(
     *,
     cth_type: str,
@@ -71,7 +60,7 @@ def format_cth_body(
 ) -> str:
     """Render a canonical CTH comment body."""
     normalized_type = (cth_type or "").strip()
-    if not is_known_cth_type(normalized_type):
+    if normalized_type not in CTH_TYPES:
         raise ValueError(
             f"unknown CTH type '{cth_type}'; expected one of {sorted(CTH_TYPES)}"
         )
@@ -112,12 +101,6 @@ def parse_cth_comment(body: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
         fields[key] = match.group(2).strip()
     return {
         "cth_type": cth_type,
-        # The heading capture is unconstrained free text, so the parse states
-        # whether it satisfies the CTH_TYPES contract instead of leaving every
-        # reader to decide (or forget). Parsing stays total — an unknown type is
-        # still parsed and reported, never raised on — but a reader that turns
-        # the type into a durable value can now tell the two apart.
-        "cth_type_known": is_known_cth_type(cth_type),
         "fields": fields,
         "raw_body": text,
     }
@@ -136,7 +119,7 @@ def assess_cth_comment(body: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
         }
 
     cth_type = parsed.get("cth_type") or ""
-    if not is_known_cth_type(cth_type):
+    if cth_type not in CTH_TYPES:
         reasons.append(
             f"unknown CTH type '{cth_type}'; expected one of {sorted(CTH_TYPES)}"
         )

docs/webui-local-dev.md

@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ status, onboarding checklist state, and the fail-closed error payloads (#635).
 | `/api/prompts` | JSON prompt export with workflow hashes |
 | `/runtime` | MCP runtime health and stale detection (#430) |
 | `/api/runtime` | JSON runtime health export |
+| `/policy` | Workflow policy and guardrail configuration visibility (#646) |
+| `/api/v1/policy` | Versioned JSON guardrail inventory (redacted, read-only) |
 | `/audit` | Report audit paste + validator preview (#431) |
 | `/api/audit` | JSON validator preview (POST `report_text`, optional `task_kind`) |
 | `/worktrees` | Worktree hygiene dashboard (#432) |
@@ -74,11 +76,6 @@ status, onboarding checklist state, and the fail-closed error payloads (#635).
 | `/api/actions/{id}/preview` | Mutation ledger preview (GET, read-only) |
 | `/leases` | Lease and collision visibility (#433) |
 | `/api/leases` | JSON lease/collision export |
-| `/sessions` | Phase 1 shell stub — session inventory (backed by #636) |
-| `/inventory` | Phase 1 shell stub — unified inventory (backed by #636) |
-| `/timeline` | Phase 1 shell stub — workflow event timeline |
-| `/policy` | Phase 1 shell stub — capability/role policy placeholder |
-| `/insights` | Phase 1 shell stub — operational insights placeholder |
 
 Most routes are GET-only. POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE return `405` with
 `read-only-mvp`, except `/audit` and `/api/audit` which accept POST for
@@ -238,25 +235,18 @@ health, workflow/schema SHA-256 hashes, and stale-runtime warnings when the
 checkout is behind merged safety-gate changes. Restart guidance links to #420;
 no tokens or MCP restart actions are exposed.
 
-## Application shell — Phase 1 (#638)
+## Policy & guardrail visibility (#646)
 
-The console shell (`webui/layout.py`) renders a grouped navigation driven by a
+`/policy` (HTML) and `/api/v1/policy` (JSON) surface a **read-only** projection
-single nav-config module, `webui/nav.py`. Nav groups follow the epic #631
+of the major workflow guardrails — role separation/RBAC, lease lifecycle,
-Phase 1 information architecture: **Health, Traffic, Runtime/Sessions,
+author worktree binding, merge confirmation, secret redaction, contamination
-Projects, Inventory, Timeline, Policy** (placeholder), and **Insights**
+containment, allocator policy, audit logging, and mutation gating. Each entry
-(placeholder). Live views and Phase 1 placeholders (`stub`) are declared in one
+carries source pointers to the file/module/doc that owns it, a compact active
-place so the layout and the route table cannot drift.
+value derived from the existing safe policy accessors, and — where a documented
-
+default is declared — a diff of active vs documented. The whole payload is run
-The header carries two read-only status badges — an **environment** badge
+through the console redaction pass before it is emitted, so a planted or
-(`local` for loopback binds, `remote` otherwise, derived from `WEBUI_HOST`) and
+accidental secret degrades to the placeholder rather than reaching a client.
-a **mode: read-only** badge — plus a **Docs** link to this document. No
+The view never edits policy and exposes no gate-weakening toggle.
-privileged action controls are present in the Phase 1 shell.
-
-Not-yet-implemented surfaces (`/sessions`, `/inventory`, `/timeline`,
-`/policy`, `/insights`) resolve to graceful read-only stub pages instead of
-404s; their backing views land in later child issues of #631 (the inventory
-surfaces are backed by #636). Mutating methods on stub routes still fail closed
-with `read-only-mvp`.
 
 ## Deployment boundary (#435)
 
@@ -317,108 +307,6 @@ health, workflow/schema SHA-256 hashes, and stale-runtime warnings when the
 checkout is behind merged safety-gate changes. Restart guidance links to #420;
 no tokens or MCP restart actions are exposed.
 
-## Workflow-event timeline (#637)
-
-`GET /api/v1/timeline` is a read-only, versioned aggregation of workflow
-events from every available source into one normalised, filterable stream. It
-is the model layer for the Phase 1 timeline console view (a later child issue
-of #631); this issue ships the schema, adapters, and read API only.
-
-### Schema (versioned)
-
-`webui/timeline.py` declares `TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION` (currently `1`) and the
-frozen `WorkflowEvent` record. Every response carries `schema_version` so a
-consumer can branch on shape. One event:
-
-```json
-{
-  "source": "control_plane",
-  "event_type": "lease.renew",
-  "event_key": "cp:1421",
-  "timestamp": "2026-07-23T02:00:00Z",
-  "actor": null,
-  "role": null,
-  "issue_number": 637,
-  "pr_number": null,
-  "session_id": null,
-  "tool_name": null,
-  "decision": null,
-  "message": "lease renewed",
-  "correlation_id": "issue#637",
-  "evidence_refs": [],
-  "sensitive": true
-}
-```
-
-`event_key` is stable and unique per source (`cp:<event_id>`,
-`cth:<kind>:<number>:<comment_id>`), so pagination and dedup are deterministic.
-
-### Sources and field authority
-
-| Source | Adapter | Authority |
-|---|---|---|
-| Control-plane `events` ⋈ `work_items` | `adapt_cp_events` | `event_type`, `message`, `timestamp`, issue/PR scope come from the CP database, read through a `mode=ro` URI (never creates the DB or runs migrations) |
-| Gitea Canonical Thread Handoff comments | `adapt_cth_comments` | `actor`, `role` (next owner), `decision`, `evidence_refs`, `timestamp` come from the parsed CTH comment body (`canonical_thread_handoff`) |
-
-Handoff comments are thread-scoped: they are only read when the request filters
-by a single `issue` or `pr`. Otherwise the handoff source reports `not run`
-with a reason — it is never rendered as empty-and-healthy. Each source degrades
-independently: an unavailable control-plane DB or a failed comment fetch is a
-`sources[]` entry with `ok:false` and a `reason`, never a dropped timeline.
-
-### Query parameters
-
-`issue`, `pr`, `session` (conjunctive filters); `limit` (default 50, max 500)
-and `offset` for pagination; `remote`, `org`, `repo` to override the default
-registry-project scope. Events sort ascending by
-`(timestamp, source_rank, event_key)`; missing timestamps sort last.
-
-### Filter authority, and refusing what cannot be answered
-
-A filter dimension is only meaningful for a source whose records carry it.
-Each source declares its own support in `_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT` and reports it
-per response as `supported_filters` / `unsupported_filters`:
-
-| Source | issue | pr | session |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| `control_plane` | yes | yes | **no** — the `events` table is `(event_id, work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at)` and records no session |
-| `gitea_handoff` | yes | yes | yes — a CTH comment declares its own `Session:` field |
-
-`session_id` is read only from that declared CTH field. It is never inferred
-from a work item, an actor, or message text, and a value that is
-redaction-altering or bare-secret-shaped is dropped rather than emitted.
-
-When **no source that ran** can carry a requested dimension, the request is
-refused rather than answered: the response is `422` with `ok:false` and a
-structured `error` naming `unsupported_filters` and the per-source reason. A
-`200` with zero events would tell an operator that no such activity exists,
-which is a stronger — and false — claim than "this cannot be answered here".
-A source that *can* answer the dimension and simply matched nothing still
-returns `200` with `ok:true` and an empty page.
-
-### Redaction
-
-Every free-text field (event messages, decision/proof text, roles, actors) is
-passed through the console redaction policy (`webui.console_redaction`, backed
-by `gitea_audit.redact`) before it leaves the module, failing closed to the
-placeholder. No unredacted tool arguments or secrets are ever emitted, and a
-generation error never drops raw data to a caller or a log.
-
-Redaction also runs *before* any structured value is derived from free text.
-`evidence_refs` are extracted from already-redacted proof/decision text, and a
-commit reference is recognised only where the text declares one (`commit`,
-`head`, `base`, `sha`, …). An undeclared 40-character hex run has the exact
-shape of a Gitea access token, so it is never lifted out of prose into a
-structured field. Every reference is then independently revalidated against an
-allowed shape and a second redaction pass immediately before serialization;
-anything unproven is dropped and the event is flagged `sensitive`.
-
-### Tests
-
-```bash
-pytest tests/test_webui_timeline.py -q
-```
-
 ## Tests
 
 ```bash

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -1450,7 +1450,7 @@ def verify_preflight_purity(
             dirty_files = sorted(
                 _parse_porcelain_entries(_get_workspace_porcelain(workspace))
             )
-            if dirty_files and task != "commit_files":
+            if dirty_files:
                 raise RuntimeError(
                     nwb.format_namespace_workspace_binding_error(
                         role_kind=role,
@@ -2031,7 +2031,6 @@ import issue_lock_store  # noqa: E402
 import issue_lock_adoption  # noqa: E402
 import issue_lock_recovery  # noqa: E402
 import issue_lock_renewal  # noqa: E402
-import dirty_orphan_worktree_recovery  # noqa: E402  # #860 dirty orphan recovery
 import stacked_pr_support  # noqa: E402
 import merge_approval_gate  # noqa: E402
 import review_quarantine  # noqa: E402  # #695 contaminated formal-review quarantine
@@ -4343,280 +4342,6 @@ def gitea_lock_issue(
     return result
 
 
-@mcp.tool()
-def gitea_recover_dirty_orphaned_issue_worktree(
-    issue_number: int,
-    branch_name: str,
-    source_worktree_path: str,
-    expected_local_head: str,
-    expected_remote_head: str,
-    expected_dirty_fingerprints: dict,
-    remote: str = "dadeschools",
-    host: str | None = None,
-    org: str | None = None,
-    repo: str | None = None,
-    recovery_worktree_path: str | None = None,
-    dry_run: bool = False,
-) -> dict:
-    """Recover a dirty orphaned same-claimant author issue worktree (#860).
-
-    Explicit recovery operation — does **not** silently widen ``gitea_lock_issue``.
-
-    Accepts authoritative expected pins (repository, issue, branch, source
-    worktree, claimant, local head, remote/PR head, dirty fingerprints) and
-    fails closed on any mismatch. PID-less malformed locks are never treated
-    as live merely because expiry is absent. The source worktree is frozen;
-    recovery prepares a separate worktree at the pinned remote head, re-applies
-    dirty bytes with path-level conflict detection, and binds a live author
-    session only after recovery state is consistent.
-
-    Args:
-        issue_number: Issue whose durable claim is being recovered.
-        branch_name: Locked branch ``(fix|feat|docs|chore)/issue-N-…``.
-        source_worktree_path: Registered dirty source worktree under branches/.
-        expected_local_head: Full 40-char SHA of the source worktree HEAD.
-        expected_remote_head: Full 40-char SHA of the remote/PR head to sync to.
-        expected_dirty_fingerprints: ``{relative_path: sha256}`` of dirty bytes.
-        remote/host/org/repo: Repository binding.
-        recovery_worktree_path: Optional recovery worktree path under branches/.
-        dry_run: Assess eligibility only; no filesystem or lock mutation.
-
-    Returns:
-        dict with success, outcome, conflicts, recovery_worktree_path, reasons,
-        evidence, and journal metadata.
-    """
-    task = "recover_dirty_orphaned_issue_worktree"
-    ok, block_reasons = role_session_router.check_author_mutation_after_reviewer_stop(
-        task
-    )
-    if not ok:
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "performed": False,
-            "outcome": "REFUSED",
-            "reasons": block_reasons,
-        }
-    blocked = _namespace_mutation_block(task, remote=remote)
-    if blocked:
-        return blocked
-    blocked = _profile_permission_block(
-        task_capability_map.required_permission(task),
-        remote=remote,
-        host=host,
-        org=org,
-        repo=repo,
-        org_explicit=org is not None,
-        repo_explicit=repo is not None,
-    )
-    if blocked:
-        return blocked
-
-    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
-    profile_meta = get_profile() or {}
-    identity = (_authenticated_username(h) or "").strip()
-    profile = (profile_meta.get("profile_name") or "").strip()
-    if not identity or not profile:
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "performed": False,
-            "outcome": "REFUSED",
-            "reasons": ["could not resolve authenticated identity/profile"],
-        }
-
-    existing_lock = _load_existing_issue_lock(
-        remote=remote, org=o, repo=r, issue_number=issue_number
-    )
-
-    src = os.path.realpath(source_worktree_path)
-    git_state = issue_lock_worktree.read_worktree_git_state(src)
-    observed_local = (git_state.get("head_sha") or "").strip()
-    porcelain = git_state.get("porcelain_status") or ""
-    current_branch = git_state.get("current_branch")
-
-    # Observed dirty fingerprints from source worktree bytes.
-    observed_fps: dict[str, str] = {}
-    dirty_contents: dict[str, bytes] = {}
-    for rel in (expected_dirty_fingerprints or {}):
-        rel_n = str(rel).strip()
-        fpath = os.path.join(src, rel_n)
-        if not os.path.isfile(fpath):
-            continue
-        with open(fpath, "rb") as fh:
-            data = fh.read()
-        dirty_contents[rel_n] = data
-        observed_fps[rel_n] = dirty_orphan_worktree_recovery.sha256_bytes(data)
-
-    # Remote head observation (best-effort; pin mismatch fails closed).
-    observed_remote = ""
-    try:
-        probe = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "ls-remote", remote or "prgs", f"refs/heads/{branch_name}"],
-            cwd=src,
-            capture_output=True,
-            text=True,
-            check=False,
-        )
-        if probe.returncode == 0 and (probe.stdout or "").strip():
-            observed_remote = (probe.stdout or "").strip().split()[0]
-    except Exception:
-        observed_remote = ""
-
-    registered = False
-    try:
-        listing = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "worktree", "list", "--porcelain"],
-            cwd=src,
-            capture_output=True,
-            text=True,
-            check=False,
-        )
-        if listing.returncode == 0:
-            registered = src in (listing.stdout or "")
-    except Exception:
-        registered = False
-
-    project_root = _canonical_local_git_root()
-    canonical_root = author_mutation_worktree.resolve_canonical_repo_root(
-        src, project_root
-    )
-
-    competing_locks: list[dict] = []
-    try:
-        all_live = issue_lock_store.list_live_locks()
-        for l in all_live:
-            if l.get("issue_number") == issue_number:
-                wt = l.get("worktree_path")
-                if not wt or not issue_lock_store._same_realpath(wt, src):
-                    competing_locks.append(l)
-    except Exception:
-        competing_locks = []
-
-    wf_active = False
-    wf_expired = True
-    try:
-        db, _ = _control_plane_db_or_error()
-        if db is not None:
-            active_leases_data = lease_lifecycle.list_active_leases(
-                db,
-                remote=remote if remote in REMOTES else remote,
-                org=o,
-                repo=r,
-            )
-            leases_list = active_leases_data.get("leases") or []
-            for l in leases_list:
-                if l.get("work_number") == issue_number and l.get("work_kind") == "issue":
-                    fresh = l.get("freshness") or {}
-                    if fresh.get("status") == "active":
-                        wf_active = True
-                        wf_expired = False
-                    elif fresh.get("status") in ("expired", "stale_dead_process"):
-                        wf_active = False
-                        wf_expired = True
-    except Exception:
-        pass
-
-    assessment = dirty_orphan_worktree_recovery.assess_dirty_orphan_recovery(
-        existing_lock,
-        issue_number=issue_number,
-        branch_name=branch_name,
-        source_worktree_path=src,
-        remote=remote if remote else "prgs",
-        org=o,
-        repo=r,
-        identity=identity,
-        profile=profile,
-        expected_local_head=expected_local_head,
-        expected_remote_head=expected_remote_head,
-        expected_dirty_fingerprints=expected_dirty_fingerprints or {},
-        current_branch=current_branch,
-        porcelain_status=porcelain,
-        observed_local_head=observed_local,
-        observed_remote_head=observed_remote,
-        observed_dirty_fingerprints=observed_fps,
-        competing_live_locks=competing_locks,
-        competing_live_sessions=[],
-        workflow_lease_active=wf_active,
-        workflow_lease_expired=wf_expired,
-        canonical_repo_root=canonical_root,
-        worktree_registered=registered,
-        current_pid=os.getpid(),
-    )
-    if dry_run or not assessment.get("eligible"):
-        return {
-            "success": bool(assessment.get("eligible")),
-            "performed": False,
-            "dry_run": dry_run,
-            "outcome": assessment.get("outcome"),
-            "reasons": list(assessment.get("reasons") or []),
-            "evidence": dict(assessment.get("evidence") or {}),
-            "eligible": bool(assessment.get("eligible")),
-        }
-
-    if not recovery_worktree_path:
-        recovery_worktree_path = os.path.join(
-            canonical_root,
-            "branches",
-            f"recovery-issue-{issue_number}-dirty-orphan",
-        )
-
-    # Load blob contents at local/remote heads for conflict detection.
-    def _blob_at(head: str, rel: str) -> bytes | None:
-        try:
-            proc = subprocess.run(
-                ["git", "show", f"{head}:{rel}"],
-                cwd=src,
-                capture_output=True,
-                check=False,
-            )
-            if proc.returncode != 0:
-                return None
-            return proc.stdout
-        except Exception:
-            return None
-
-    local_contents = {
-        rel: _blob_at(expected_local_head, rel)
-        for rel in (expected_dirty_fingerprints or {})
-    }
-    remote_contents = {
-        rel: _blob_at(expected_remote_head, rel)
-        for rel in (expected_dirty_fingerprints or {})
-    }
-
-    # Preflight purity is satisfied via explicit worktree_path on this tool's
-    # recovery path; source remains frozen and is never cleaned.
-    result = dirty_orphan_worktree_recovery.run_dirty_orphan_recovery(
-        assessment=assessment,
-        existing_lock=existing_lock or {},
-        issue_number=issue_number,
-        branch_name=branch_name,
-        source_worktree_path=src,
-        recovery_worktree_path=recovery_worktree_path,
-        remote=remote if remote else "prgs",
-        org=o,
-        repo=r,
-        identity=identity,
-        profile=profile,
-        expected_local_head=expected_local_head,
-        expected_remote_head=expected_remote_head,
-        expected_dirty_fingerprints=expected_dirty_fingerprints or {},
-        dirty_contents=dirty_contents,
-        local_head_contents=local_contents,
-        remote_head_contents=remote_contents,
-        canonical_repo_root=canonical_root,
-        bind_lock=True,
-        session_pid=os.getpid(),
-    )
-    # Surface preflight recognition for recovered provenance.
-    if result.get("success") and result.get("lock_record"):
-        result["preflight_provenance"] = (
-            dirty_orphan_worktree_recovery.preflight_recognizes_recovered_provenance(
-                result["lock_record"]
-            )
-        )
-    return result
-
-
 @mcp.tool()
 def gitea_assess_work_issue_duplicate(
     issue_number: int,
@@ -11517,163 +11242,127 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
     if dry_run:
         report["dry_run"] = True
         report["executed"] = False
-        # #851: surface planned lifecycle order so dry-run matches execute.
-        report["planned_execution_orders"] = {
-            str(entry.get("pr_number")): entry.get("planned_execution_order") or []
-            for entry in (report.get("entries") or [])
-        }
         return {"success": True, "performed": False, **report}
 
     verify_preflight_purity(
         remote, task="reconcile_merged_cleanups", org=org, repo=repo
     )
     actions: list[dict] = []
-    project_root = _canonical_local_git_root()
-
-    def _ownership_records_for_branch(
-        head_branch: str, pr_num_int: int | None
-    ) -> list[dict]:
-        ownership_bundle = _collect_branch_ownership_records(
-            remote=remote,
-            host=h,
-            org=o,
-            repo=r,
-            branch=head_branch,
-            pr_number=pr_num_int,
-            project_root=project_root,
-            auth=auth,
-            base_api=base,
-        )
-        ownership_records = list(ownership_bundle.get("records") or [])
-        if ownership_bundle.get("inventory_error"):
-            ownership_records.append(
-                {
-                    "category": (
-                        branch_cleanup_guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_INVENTORY_ERROR
-                    ),
-                    "status": "unknown",
-                    "remote": remote,
-                    "host": h,
-                    "org": o,
-                    "repo": r,
-                    "branch": head_branch,
-                    "reclaim_allowed": False,
-                    "role": "inventory",
-                }
-            )
-        return ownership_records
-
-    def _attempt_owned_remote_delete(
-        *,
-        head_branch: str,
-        pr_num_int: int | None,
-        after_worktree_removal: bool = False,
-    ) -> dict:
-        """Fail-closed remote delete with live ownership reassessment (#851)."""
-        import urllib.parse
-
-        ownership_records = _ownership_records_for_branch(head_branch, pr_num_int)
-        ownership = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_active_branch_ownership(
-            remote=remote,
-            org=o,
-            repo=r,
-            branch=head_branch,
-            host=h,
-            records=ownership_records,
-        )
-        if ownership.get("block"):
-            return {
-                "action": "delete_remote_branch",
-                "branch": head_branch,
-                "success": False,
-                "performed": False,
-                "delete_acknowledged": False,
-                "verified_absent": False,
-                "blocker_kind": "active_branch_ownership",
-                "reasons": ownership.get("reasons") or [],
-                "blocking_categories": ownership.get("blocking_categories") or [],
-                "after_worktree_removal": after_worktree_removal,
-                "ownership_reassessed": after_worktree_removal,
-            }
-
-        encoded = urllib.parse.quote(head_branch, safe="")
-        url = f"{base}/branches/{encoded}"
-        with _audited(
-            "delete_branch",
-            host=h,
-            remote=remote,
-            org=o,
-            repo=r,
-            target_branch=head_branch,
-            request_metadata={
-                "branch": head_branch,
-                "source": "reconcile_merged_cleanups",
-                "ownership_checked": True,
-                "after_worktree_removal": after_worktree_removal,
-            },
-        ):
-            api_request("DELETE", url, auth)
-        readback = _probe_remote_branch(h, o, r, auth, head_branch)
-        readback_assessment = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_post_delete_readback(
-            readback
-        )
-        verified = bool(readback_assessment.get("verified_absent"))
-        return {
-            "action": "delete_remote_branch",
-            "branch": head_branch,
-            "success": bool(readback_assessment.get("ok")),
-            "performed": True,
-            "delete_acknowledged": True,
-            "verified_absent": verified,
-            "readback": readback_assessment.get("readback"),
-            "reasons": readback_assessment.get("reasons") or [],
-            "after_worktree_removal": after_worktree_removal,
-            "ownership_reassessed": after_worktree_removal,
-        }
-
     for entry in report.get("entries") or []:
         head_branch = entry.get("head_branch") or ""
         remote_assessment = entry.get("remote_branch") or {}
         local_assessment = entry.get("local_worktree") or {}
-        pr_num = entry.get("pr_number")
-        try:
-            pr_num_int = int(pr_num) if pr_num is not None else None
-        except (TypeError, ValueError):
-            pr_num_int = None
 
-        # #851 lifecycle: when the target worktree is independently safe, remove
+        if remote_assessment.get("safe_to_delete_remote"):
-        # it first so worktree_binding ownership does not permanently strand
+            import urllib.parse
-        # both the worktree and the remote branch. Never skip worktree removal
+
-        # merely because remote delete would be blocked by that binding.
+            pr_num = entry.get("pr_number")
-        # Ownership protection for remote delete remains fail-closed below.
+            try:
-        worktree_removed = False
+                pr_num_int = int(pr_num) if pr_num is not None else None
+            except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                pr_num_int = None
+            ownership_bundle = _collect_branch_ownership_records(
+                remote=remote,
+                host=h,
+                org=o,
+                repo=r,
+                branch=head_branch,
+                pr_number=pr_num_int,
+                project_root=_canonical_local_git_root(),
+                auth=auth,
+                base_api=base,
+            )
+            ownership_records = list(ownership_bundle.get("records") or [])
+            if ownership_bundle.get("inventory_error"):
+                ownership_records.append(
+                    {
+                        "category": (
+                            branch_cleanup_guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_INVENTORY_ERROR
+                        ),
+                        "status": "unknown",
+                        "remote": remote,
+                        "host": h,
+                        "org": o,
+                        "repo": r,
+                        "branch": head_branch,
+                        "reclaim_allowed": False,
+                        "role": "inventory",
+                    }
+                )
+            ownership = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_active_branch_ownership(
+                remote=remote,
+                org=o,
+                repo=r,
+                branch=head_branch,
+                host=h,
+                records=ownership_records,
+            )
+            if ownership.get("block"):
+                actions.append(
+                    {
+                        "action": "delete_remote_branch",
+                        "branch": head_branch,
+                        "success": False,
+                        "performed": False,
+                        "delete_acknowledged": False,
+                        "verified_absent": False,
+                        "blocker_kind": "active_branch_ownership",
+                        "reasons": ownership.get("reasons") or [],
+                        "blocking_categories": ownership.get(
+                            "blocking_categories"
+                        )
+                        or [],
+                    }
+                )
+                continue
+
+            encoded = urllib.parse.quote(head_branch, safe="")
+            url = f"{base}/branches/{encoded}"
+            with _audited(
+                "delete_branch",
+                host=h,
+                remote=remote,
+                org=o,
+                repo=r,
+                target_branch=head_branch,
+                request_metadata={
+                    "branch": head_branch,
+                    "source": "reconcile_merged_cleanups",
+                    "ownership_checked": True,
+                },
+            ):
+                api_request("DELETE", url, auth)
+            readback = _probe_remote_branch(h, o, r, auth, head_branch)
+            readback_assessment = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_post_delete_readback(
+                readback
+            )
+            verified = bool(readback_assessment.get("verified_absent"))
+            actions.append(
+                {
+                    "action": "delete_remote_branch",
+                    "branch": head_branch,
+                    "success": bool(readback_assessment.get("ok")),
+                    "performed": True,
+                    "delete_acknowledged": True,
+                    "verified_absent": verified,
+                    "readback": readback_assessment.get("readback"),
+                    "reasons": readback_assessment.get("reasons") or [],
+                }
+            )
+
         if local_assessment.get("safe_to_remove_worktree"):
             result = merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_local_worktree(
-                project_root,
+                _canonical_local_git_root(),
                 head_branch,
                 worktree_path=local_assessment.get("worktree_path"),
             )
             actions.append({"action": "remove_local_worktree", **result})
-            # Idempotent resume: absent worktree is already gone.
-            msg = (result.get("message") or "").lower()
-            worktree_removed = bool(result.get("success")) or (
-                "not found" in msg
-            )
-
-        if remote_assessment.get("safe_to_delete_remote"):
-            actions.append(
-                _attempt_owned_remote_delete(
-                    head_branch=head_branch,
-                    pr_num_int=pr_num_int,
-                    after_worktree_removal=worktree_removed,
-                )
-            )
 
     for scratch in report.get("reviewer_scratch_entries") or []:
         if not scratch.get("safe_to_remove_worktree"):
             continue
         result = merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_reviewer_scratch_worktree(
-            project_root, scratch.get("worktree_path") or ""
+            _canonical_local_git_root(), scratch.get("worktree_path") or ""
         )
         actions.append({"action": "remove_reviewer_scratch_worktree", **result})
 

issue_lock_provenance.py

@@ -16,13 +16,11 @@ ISSUE_LOCK_FILE = os.environ.get("GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_FILE", "/tmp/gitea_issue_lock
 SOURCE_LOCK_ISSUE = "gitea_lock_issue"
 SOURCE_LOCK_ADOPTION = "gitea_lock_issue_adoption"
 SOURCE_OPERATOR_OVERRIDE = "operator_override"
-SOURCE_RECOVER_DIRTY_ORPHANED = "gitea_recover_dirty_orphaned_issue_worktree"
 
 SANCTIONED_LOCK_SOURCES = frozenset({
     SOURCE_LOCK_ISSUE,
     SOURCE_LOCK_ADOPTION,
     SOURCE_OPERATOR_OVERRIDE,
-    SOURCE_RECOVER_DIRTY_ORPHANED,
 })
 
 _OPERATOR_OVERRIDE_ENV = "GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_OPERATOR_OVERRIDE"

issue_lock_store.py

@@ -169,7 +169,6 @@ def bind_session_lock(
     *,
     expected_generation: int | None = None,
     renewal_sanctioned: bool = False,
-    recovery_sanctioned: bool = False,
 ) -> str:
     """Persist a keyed lock and bind it to the current process session.
 
@@ -214,9 +213,7 @@ def bind_session_lock(
     try:
         with _exclusive_file_lock(sentinel):
             existing = read_lock_file(path)
-            overwrite_block = assess_foreign_lock_overwrite(
+            overwrite_block = assess_foreign_lock_overwrite(existing, record)
-                existing, record, recovery_sanctioned=recovery_sanctioned
-            )
             if overwrite_block:
                 raise RuntimeError(overwrite_block)
             lease_block = assess_same_issue_lease_conflict(
@@ -225,7 +222,6 @@ def bind_session_lock(
                 branch_name=str(record.get("branch_name") or ""),
                 worktree_path=str(record.get("worktree_path") or ""),
                 renewal_sanctioned=renewal_sanctioned,
-                recovery_sanctioned=recovery_sanctioned,
             )
             if lease_block:
                 raise RuntimeError(lease_block)
@@ -384,16 +380,7 @@ def assess_lock_freshness(
     pid = lock_data.get("session_pid")
     if pid is None:
         pid = lock_data.get("pid")
-    pid_missing = pid is None or str(pid).strip() == ""
+    pid_alive = is_process_alive(pid) if pid is not None else False
-    try:
-        pid_int = int(pid) if not pid_missing else None
-        if pid_int is not None and pid_int <= 0:
-            pid_missing = True
-            pid_int = None
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        pid_missing = True
-        pid_int = None
-    pid_alive = is_process_alive(pid_int) if pid_int is not None else False
 
     if expires_at and expires_at <= current:
         return {
@@ -402,36 +389,15 @@ def assess_lock_freshness(
             "stale": True,
             "reason": f"lease expired at {expires_at.isoformat()}",
             "pid_alive": pid_alive,
-            "pid_missing": pid_missing,
         }
 
-    # #860: a PID-less lock must never be considered live merely because
+    if pid is not None and not pid_alive:
-    # expiration / heartbeat fields are absent. Missing PID is insufficient
-    # evidence of a live owner; treat as malformed/stale so recovery routes
-    # can evaluate corroborating pins instead of blocking on a false live flag.
-    if pid_missing:
-        return {
-            "status": "malformed",
-            "live": False,
-            "stale": True,
-            "reason": (
-                "lock has no usable session pid; cannot prove live ownership "
-                "(PID-less locks are never live by missing expiry alone)"
-            ),
-            "pid_alive": False,
-            "pid_missing": True,
-            "heartbeat_at": heartbeat_at.isoformat() if heartbeat_at else None,
-            "expires_at": expires_at.isoformat() if expires_at else None,
-        }
-
-    if pid_int is not None and not pid_alive:
         return {
             "status": "stale",
             "live": False,
             "stale": True,
-            "reason": f"owner pid {pid_int} is not alive",
+            "reason": f"owner pid {pid} is not alive",
             "pid_alive": False,
-            "pid_missing": False,
         }
 
     return {
@@ -440,7 +406,6 @@ def assess_lock_freshness(
         "stale": False,
         "reason": "lock heartbeat and lease are fresh",
         "pid_alive": pid_alive,
-        "pid_missing": False,
         "heartbeat_at": heartbeat_at.isoformat() if heartbeat_at else None,
         "expires_at": expires_at.isoformat() if expires_at else None,
     }
@@ -521,7 +486,6 @@ def assess_same_issue_lease_conflict(
     worktree_path: str,
     operation_type: str = AUTHOR_ISSUE_WORK_LEASE,
     renewal_sanctioned: bool = False,
-    recovery_sanctioned: bool = False,
     now: datetime | None = None,
 ) -> str | None:
     """Return a fail-closed error when a competing live lease blocks acquisition.
@@ -553,8 +517,6 @@ def assess_same_issue_lease_conflict(
         existing_branch == branch_name
         and _same_realpath(str(existing_worktree or ""), worktree_path)
     )
-    if recovery_sanctioned and existing_issue == issue_number and existing_branch == branch_name:
-        return None
     if is_lease_expired(existing_lock, now=now):
         # #760 AC1/AC2: exact-owner renewal is a different disposition from
         # foreign takeover and is evaluated first. Before this, both branches
@@ -585,26 +547,10 @@ def assess_same_issue_lease_conflict(
     )
 
 
-def _lock_claimant(lock: dict[str, Any] | None) -> dict[str, str]:
-    if not isinstance(lock, dict):
-        return {}
-    claimant = lock.get("claimant")
-    if not isinstance(claimant, dict):
-        lease = lock.get("work_lease")
-        claimant = lease.get("claimant") if isinstance(lease, dict) else None
-    if not isinstance(claimant, dict):
-        return {}
-    return {
-        "username": str(claimant.get("username") or ""),
-        "profile": str(claimant.get("profile") or ""),
-    }
-
-
 def assess_foreign_lock_overwrite(
     existing_lock: dict[str, Any] | None,
     incoming_lock: dict[str, Any],
     *,
-    recovery_sanctioned: bool = False,
     now: datetime | None = None,
 ) -> str | None:
     """Block writes that would clobber an unrelated live lease on the same key."""
@@ -619,31 +565,8 @@ def assess_foreign_lock_overwrite(
     )
     if same_issue and same_branch and same_worktree:
         return None
-
-    existing_claimant = _lock_claimant(existing_lock)
-    incoming_claimant = _lock_claimant(incoming_lock)
-    same_claimant = (
-        bool(existing_claimant.get("username"))
-        and existing_claimant.get("username") == incoming_claimant.get("username")
-        and existing_claimant.get("profile") == incoming_claimant.get("profile")
-    )
-
-    if recovery_sanctioned and same_issue and same_branch and same_claimant:
-        return None
-
     if not is_lease_live(existing_lock, now=now):
-        # #860 F8: A non-live or PID-less lock still blocks foreign overwrite
-        # unless same claimant or sanctioned reclaim is proven.
-        if not same_claimant and same_issue:
-            reclaim = assess_expired_lock_reclaim(existing_lock, now=now)
-            if not reclaim.get("reclaim_allowed"):
-                return (
-                    "Refusing foreign overwrite of non-live issue lock "
-                    f"(issue #{existing_lock.get('issue_number')}, owner '{existing_claimant.get('username')}') "
-                    "without sanctioned reclaim proof (fail closed)"
-                )
         return None
-
     return (
         "Refusing to overwrite a live foreign issue lock "
         f"(issue #{existing_lock.get('issue_number')}, "

merged_cleanup_reconcile.py

@@ -566,10 +566,6 @@ def build_pr_cleanup_entry(
         worktree_state=worktree_state,
         active_lock=active_lock,
     )
-    planned = plan_cleanup_execution_order(
-        remote_assessment=remote,
-        local_assessment=local,
-    )
     return {
         "pr_number": pr_number,
         "issue_number": issue_number,
@@ -580,63 +576,9 @@ def build_pr_cleanup_entry(
         "merged": merged,
         "remote_branch": remote,
         "local_worktree": local,
-        # #851: dry-run and execute share the same lifecycle order description.
-        "planned_execution_order": planned,
     }
 
 
-def plan_cleanup_execution_order(
-    *,
-    remote_assessment: dict[str, Any] | None,
-    local_assessment: dict[str, Any] | None,
-) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
-    """Describe independent worktree-then-reassess-then-remote cleanup order (#851).
-
-    Remote ownership protection remains fail-closed at execute time. A worktree
-    that is independently safe to remove is never skipped merely because remote
-    deletion may be blocked by that same ``worktree_binding``.
-    """
-    remote = remote_assessment or {}
-    local = local_assessment or {}
-    steps: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-    worktree_safe = bool(local.get("safe_to_remove_worktree"))
-    remote_safe = bool(remote.get("safe_to_delete_remote"))
-
-    if worktree_safe:
-        steps.append(
-            {
-                "action": "remove_local_worktree",
-                "reason": "independently_safe_to_remove",
-                "phase": 1,
-            }
-        )
-    if remote_safe:
-        if worktree_safe:
-            steps.append(
-                {
-                    "action": "reassess_branch_ownership",
-                    "reason": "after_worktree_removal_clear_worktree_binding",
-                    "phase": 2,
-                }
-            )
-            steps.append(
-                {
-                    "action": "delete_remote_branch",
-                    "reason": "only_if_independently_safe_after_reassessment",
-                    "phase": 3,
-                }
-            )
-        else:
-            steps.append(
-                {
-                    "action": "delete_remote_branch",
-                    "reason": "safe_to_delete_and_no_independent_worktree_removal",
-                    "phase": 1,
-                }
-            )
-    return steps
-
-
 def build_reconciliation_report(
     *,
     project_root: str,

scripts/worktree-start

@@ -43,21 +43,19 @@ repo_root="$(cd "$script_dir/.." && pwd)"
 
 # Enforce issue-linked, traceable branch names (issue → branch → worktree → PR).
 if [[ "$allow_unlinked" -eq 0 ]]; then
-  if [[ "$dry_run" -eq 0 ]] && [[ ! "$branch" =~ ^review/pr-[0-9]+-.+ ]]; then
+  locked_branch=$(python3 -c "
-    locked_branch=$(python3 -c "
 import sys
 sys.path.insert(0, '$repo_root')
 import issue_lock_store
 print(issue_lock_store.resolve_locked_branch_for_session('$branch'))
 ")
-    if [[ -z "$locked_branch" ]]; then
+  if [[ -z "$locked_branch" ]]; then
-      echo "Error: No session issue lock is bound. Call gitea_lock_issue before branch creation (fail closed)." >&2
+    echo "Error: No session issue lock is bound. Call gitea_lock_issue before branch creation (fail closed)." >&2
-      exit 2
+    exit 2
-    fi
+  fi
-    if [[ "$branch" != "$locked_branch" ]]; then
+  if [[ "$branch" != "$locked_branch" ]]; then
-      echo "Error: Requested branch '$branch' does not match locked branch '$locked_branch' (fail closed)." >&2
+    echo "Error: Requested branch '$branch' does not match locked branch '$locked_branch' (fail closed)." >&2
-      exit 2
+    exit 2
-    fi
   fi
 
   if [[ "$branch" =~ ^(fix|feat|docs|chore)/issue-[0-9]+-.+ ]] \

task_capability_map.py

@@ -32,15 +32,6 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.issue.comment",
         "role": "author",
     },
-    # #860: dirty orphaned same-claimant worktree recovery (explicit operation).
-    "recover_dirty_orphaned_issue_worktree": {
-        "permission": "gitea.issue.comment",
-        "role": "author",
-    },
-    "gitea_recover_dirty_orphaned_issue_worktree": {
-        "permission": "gitea.issue.comment",
-        "role": "author",
-    },
     "set_issue_labels": {
         "permission": "gitea.issue.comment",
         "role": "author",
@@ -486,11 +477,6 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
 # merger lease (#763).
 _PREFLIGHT_TASK_TRANSITIONS = frozenset({
     ("review_pr", "acquire_reviewer_pr_lease"),
-    ("work_issue", "lock_issue"),
-    ("work_issue", "recover_dirty_orphaned_issue_worktree"),
-    ("work_issue", "gitea_recover_dirty_orphaned_issue_worktree"),
-    ("work_issue", "commit_files"),
-    ("work_issue", "gitea_commit_files"),
 })
 
 

tests/test_branch_cleanup_guard.py

@@ -1266,378 +1266,6 @@ class TestSecondRemediationIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIn("delete_acknowledged", delete_actions[0])
         self.assertTrue(delete_actions[0].get("verified_absent"))
 
-    def test_issue_851_worktree_removed_when_remote_blocked_only_by_worktree_binding(self):
-        """#851: remote blocked by worktree_binding must not skip safe worktree removal.
-
-        Lifecycle: remove clean owned worktree → reassess ownership → delete
-        remote only if independently safe. Unrelated entries stay untouched.
-        """
-        from mcp_server import gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups
-
-        target_branch = "fix/issue-844-exclude-epic-containers"
-        foreign_branch = "fix/issue-999-unrelated-active"
-        worktree_path = "/tmp/branches/fix-issue-844-exclude-epic-containers"
-        ownership_calls = []
-        remove_calls = []
-        delete_api_calls = []
-
-        def fake_collect(**kwargs):
-            ownership_calls.append(dict(kwargs))
-            # Ownership is reassessed *after* independent worktree removal (#851).
-            # Target worktree is already gone → no worktree_binding remains.
-            # Foreign branch keeps an active author lease → remote delete blocked.
-            if kwargs.get("branch") == foreign_branch:
-                # Match session-bound org/repo + host used by the tool resolve path.
-                return {
-                    "records": [
-                        {
-                            "category": guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_LEASE,
-                            "status": "active",
-                            "remote": kwargs.get("remote") or "prgs",
-                            "host": kwargs.get("host") or "gitea.example.com",
-                            "org": kwargs.get("org") or "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-                            "repo": kwargs.get("repo") or "Gitea-Tools",
-                            "branch": foreign_branch,
-                            "reclaim_allowed": False,
-                        }
-                    ],
-                    "inventory_error": False,
-                }
-            return {"records": [], "inventory_error": False}
-
-        def fake_remove(project_root, branch, worktree_path=None):
-            remove_calls.append(
-                {"branch": branch, "worktree_path": worktree_path}
-            )
-            return {
-                "success": True,
-                "performed": True,
-                "message": f"removed worktree {worktree_path}",
-                "worktree_path": worktree_path,
-            }
-
-        def fake_probe(h, o, r, auth, br):
-            return guard.classify_branch_readback_http_status(
-                404, not_found_scope=guard.NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH
-            )
-
-        def fake_api(method, url, auth, **kwargs):
-            if method == "DELETE":
-                delete_api_calls.append(url)
-            return {}
-
-        report = {
-            "entries": [
-                {
-                    "pr_number": 848,
-                    "head_branch": target_branch,
-                    "remote_branch": {"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
-                    "local_worktree": {
-                        "safe_to_remove_worktree": True,
-                        "worktree_path": worktree_path,
-                    },
-                },
-                {
-                    "pr_number": 999,
-                    "head_branch": foreign_branch,
-                    "remote_branch": {"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
-                    "local_worktree": {
-                        "safe_to_remove_worktree": False,
-                        "worktree_path": None,
-                    },
-                },
-            ],
-            "reviewer_scratch_entries": [],
-        }
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.get_profile",
-            return_value={
-                "profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
-                "role": "reconciler",
-                "allowed_operations": [
-                    "gitea.read",
-                    "gitea.branch.delete",
-                    "gitea.pr.close",
-                ],
-                "forbidden_operations": [],
-            },
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=[]).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.build_reconciliation_report",
-            return_value=report,
-        ).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.discover_reviewer_scratch_worktrees",
-            return_value=[],
-        ).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.audit_reconciliation_mode.check_cleanup_execution_allowed",
-            return_value=(True, []),
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity", return_value=None).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server._collect_branch_ownership_records",
-            side_effect=fake_collect,
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server._probe_remote_branch", side_effect=fake_probe).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_local_worktree",
-            side_effect=fake_remove,
-        ).start()
-        self.mock_api.side_effect = fake_api
-
-        res = gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
-            dry_run=False,
-            execute_confirmed=True,
-            remote="prgs",
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(res.get("performed") or res.get("executed"))
-        actions = res.get("actions") or []
-
-        remove_actions = [
-            a for a in actions if a.get("action") == "remove_local_worktree"
-        ]
-        self.assertEqual(len(remove_actions), 1, actions)
-        self.assertTrue(remove_actions[0].get("success"))
-        self.assertEqual(remove_calls[0]["branch"], target_branch)
-        self.assertEqual(remove_calls[0]["worktree_path"], worktree_path)
-
-        # Target remote delete succeeds after worktree removal + reassessment.
-        target_deletes = [
-            a
-            for a in actions
-            if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"
-            and a.get("branch") == target_branch
-        ]
-        self.assertEqual(len(target_deletes), 1, actions)
-        self.assertTrue(target_deletes[0].get("success"))
-        self.assertTrue(target_deletes[0].get("after_worktree_removal"))
-        self.assertTrue(target_deletes[0].get("ownership_reassessed"))
-        self.assertTrue(target_deletes[0].get("verified_absent"))
-
-        # Foreign branch remains protected (author lease) and is not deleted.
-        foreign_deletes = [
-            a
-            for a in actions
-            if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"
-            and a.get("branch") == foreign_branch
-        ]
-        self.assertEqual(len(foreign_deletes), 1, actions)
-        self.assertFalse(foreign_deletes[0].get("success"))
-        self.assertEqual(
-            foreign_deletes[0].get("blocker_kind"), "active_branch_ownership"
-        )
-        self.assertIn(
-            guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_LEASE,
-            foreign_deletes[0].get("blocking_categories") or [],
-        )
-        # Only the target branch should hit the DELETE API.
-        self.assertEqual(len(delete_api_calls), 1)
-
-        # Ownership collected for target (post-removal) and foreign; worktree
-        # removal happened before target remote delete in the action log.
-        target_idx = next(
-            i
-            for i, a in enumerate(actions)
-            if a.get("action") == "remove_local_worktree"
-        )
-        delete_idx = next(
-            i
-            for i, a in enumerate(actions)
-            if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"
-            and a.get("branch") == target_branch
-            and a.get("success")
-        )
-        self.assertLess(target_idx, delete_idx)
-
-    def test_issue_851_dirty_worktree_not_removed_and_remote_stays_protected(self):
-        """#851: dirty/foreign worktrees remain protected; no unsafe cleanup."""
-        from mcp_server import gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups
-
-        branch = "fix/issue-851-dirty"
-        remove_calls = []
-
-        def fake_collect(**kwargs):
-            return {
-                "records": [
-                    {
-                        "category": guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_WORKTREE_BINDING,
-                        "status": "active",
-                        "remote": kwargs.get("remote") or "prgs",
-                        "host": kwargs.get("host") or "gitea.example.com",
-                        "org": kwargs.get("org") or "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-                        "repo": kwargs.get("repo") or "Gitea-Tools",
-                        "branch": branch,
-                        "reclaim_allowed": False,
-                    }
-                ],
-                "inventory_error": False,
-            }
-
-        report = {
-            "entries": [
-                {
-                    "pr_number": 851,
-                    "head_branch": branch,
-                    "remote_branch": {"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
-                    "local_worktree": {
-                        "safe_to_remove_worktree": False,
-                        "worktree_path": "/tmp/dirty-wt",
-                    },
-                }
-            ],
-            "reviewer_scratch_entries": [],
-        }
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.get_profile",
-            return_value={
-                "profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
-                "role": "reconciler",
-                "allowed_operations": [
-                    "gitea.read",
-                    "gitea.branch.delete",
-                ],
-                "forbidden_operations": [],
-            },
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=[]).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.build_reconciliation_report",
-            return_value=report,
-        ).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.discover_reviewer_scratch_worktrees",
-            return_value=[],
-        ).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.audit_reconciliation_mode.check_cleanup_execution_allowed",
-            return_value=(True, []),
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity", return_value=None).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server._collect_branch_ownership_records",
-            side_effect=fake_collect,
-        ).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_local_worktree",
-            side_effect=lambda *a, **k: remove_calls.append(k) or {
-                "success": True,
-                "performed": True,
-            },
-        ).start()
-        self.mock_api.side_effect = lambda *a, **k: {}
-
-        res = gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
-            dry_run=False,
-            execute_confirmed=True,
-            remote="prgs",
-        )
-        actions = res.get("actions") or []
-        self.assertEqual(remove_calls, [])
-        self.assertFalse(
-            any(a.get("action") == "remove_local_worktree" for a in actions)
-        )
-        deletes = [
-            a for a in actions if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"
-        ]
-        self.assertEqual(len(deletes), 1)
-        self.assertFalse(deletes[0].get("success"))
-        self.assertEqual(deletes[0].get("blocker_kind"), "active_branch_ownership")
-        self.assertIn(
-            guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_WORKTREE_BINDING,
-            deletes[0].get("blocking_categories") or [],
-        )
-
-    def test_issue_851_idempotent_resume_when_worktree_already_absent(self):
-        """#851: partial failures remain resumable and idempotent."""
-        from mcp_server import gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups
-
-        branch = "fix/issue-851-resume"
-        ownership_calls = []
-
-        def fake_collect(**kwargs):
-            ownership_calls.append(kwargs)
-            return {"records": [], "inventory_error": False}
-
-        def fake_remove(project_root, branch, worktree_path=None):
-            return {
-                "success": False,
-                "performed": False,
-                "message": f"worktree not found: {worktree_path}",
-            }
-
-        def fake_probe(h, o, r, auth, br):
-            return guard.classify_branch_readback_http_status(
-                404, not_found_scope=guard.NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH
-            )
-
-        report = {
-            "entries": [
-                {
-                    "pr_number": 851,
-                    "head_branch": branch,
-                    "remote_branch": {"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
-                    "local_worktree": {
-                        "safe_to_remove_worktree": True,
-                        "worktree_path": "/tmp/already-gone",
-                    },
-                }
-            ],
-            "reviewer_scratch_entries": [],
-        }
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.get_profile",
-            return_value={
-                "profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
-                "role": "reconciler",
-                "allowed_operations": [
-                    "gitea.read",
-                    "gitea.branch.delete",
-                ],
-                "forbidden_operations": [],
-            },
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=[]).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.build_reconciliation_report",
-            return_value=report,
-        ).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.discover_reviewer_scratch_worktrees",
-            return_value=[],
-        ).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.audit_reconciliation_mode.check_cleanup_execution_allowed",
-            return_value=(True, []),
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity", return_value=None).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server._collect_branch_ownership_records",
-            side_effect=fake_collect,
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server._probe_remote_branch", side_effect=fake_probe).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_local_worktree",
-            side_effect=fake_remove,
-        ).start()
-        self.mock_api.side_effect = lambda *a, **k: {}
-
-        res = gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
-            dry_run=False,
-            execute_confirmed=True,
-            remote="prgs",
-        )
-        actions = res.get("actions") or []
-        removes = [a for a in actions if a.get("action") == "remove_local_worktree"]
-        deletes = [a for a in actions if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"]
-        self.assertEqual(len(removes), 1)
-        self.assertFalse(removes[0].get("success"))
-        self.assertEqual(len(deletes), 1)
-        self.assertTrue(deletes[0].get("success"))
-        self.assertTrue(deletes[0].get("after_worktree_removal"))
-        self.assertTrue(ownership_calls)
-
 
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":

tests/test_dirty_orphan_worktree_recovery.py

@@ -1,483 +0,0 @@
-"""Synthetic regression coverage for dirty orphaned worktree recovery (#860).
-
-Modeled on the #850 / #855 shape without mutating their real state.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-import shutil
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-from unittest import mock
-
-import dirty_orphan_worktree_recovery as dorec
-import issue_lock_store
-
-
-DEAD_PID = 999_999_999
-LIVE_PID = os.getpid()
-BRANCH = "fix/issue-901-dirty-orphan"
-SOURCE_WT = "/repo/branches/issue-901-dirty-orphan"
-RECOVERY_WT_NAME = "recovery-issue-901-dirty-orphan"
-LOCAL_HEAD = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
-REMOTE_HEAD = "bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"
-OTHER_HEAD = "cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc"
-FP_A = dorec.sha256_bytes(b"dirty-a")
-FP_B = dorec.sha256_bytes(b"dirty-b")
-FP_C = dorec.sha256_bytes(b"dirty-c-conflict")
-
-
-def durable_lock(**overrides):
-    """#850-shaped PID-less malformed same-claimant lock."""
-    lock = {
-        "issue_number": 901,
-        "branch_name": BRANCH,
-        "worktree_path": SOURCE_WT,
-        "remote": "prgs",
-        "org": "Example-Org",
-        "repo": "Example-Repo",
-        # intentionally no pid / session_pid / work_lease expiry
-        "claimant": {"username": "author-user", "profile": "prgs-author"},
-    }
-    lock.update(overrides)
-    return lock
-
-
-def base_kwargs(**overrides):
-    kwargs = {
-        "issue_number": 901,
-        "branch_name": BRANCH,
-        "source_worktree_path": SOURCE_WT,
-        "remote": "prgs",
-        "org": "Example-Org",
-        "repo": "Example-Repo",
-        "identity": "author-user",
-        "profile": "prgs-author",
-        "expected_local_head": LOCAL_HEAD,
-        "expected_remote_head": REMOTE_HEAD,
-        "expected_dirty_fingerprints": {"a.py": FP_A, "b.py": FP_B},
-        "current_branch": BRANCH,
-        "porcelain_status": " M a.py\n M b.py\n",
-        "observed_local_head": LOCAL_HEAD,
-        "observed_remote_head": REMOTE_HEAD,
-        "observed_dirty_fingerprints": {"a.py": FP_A, "b.py": FP_B},
-        "competing_live_locks": [],
-        "competing_live_sessions": [],
-        "workflow_lease_active": False,
-        "workflow_lease_expired": True,
-        "canonical_repo_root": "/repo",
-        "worktree_registered": True,
-        "current_pid": LIVE_PID,
-    }
-    kwargs.update(overrides)
-    return kwargs
-
-
-def assess(lock=None, **overrides):
-    return dorec.assess_dirty_orphan_recovery(
-        durable_lock() if lock is None else lock, **base_kwargs(**overrides)
-    )
-
-
-class FreshnessPidLess(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_pid_less_lock_is_not_live(self):
-        freshness = issue_lock_store.assess_lock_freshness(durable_lock())
-        self.assertFalse(freshness["live"])
-        self.assertTrue(freshness.get("pid_missing"))
-        self.assertEqual(freshness["status"], "malformed")
-
-    def test_pid_less_with_far_future_expiry_still_not_live(self):
-        lock = durable_lock(
-            work_lease={
-                "operation_type": "author_issue_work",
-                "expires_at": "2999-01-01T00:00:00Z",
-                "last_heartbeat_at": "2999-01-01T00:00:00Z",
-            }
-        )
-        freshness = issue_lock_store.assess_lock_freshness(lock)
-        self.assertFalse(freshness["live"])
-        self.assertTrue(freshness.get("pid_missing"))
-
-
-class EligibilityGranted(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_dead_same_claimant_pid_less_dirty(self):
-        result = assess()
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.ELIGIBLE)
-        self.assertTrue(result["eligible"])
-
-    def test_expired_workflow_lease_corroboration(self):
-        result = assess(workflow_lease_active=False, workflow_lease_expired=True)
-        self.assertTrue(result["eligible"])
-
-    def test_older_local_newer_remote_heads(self):
-        result = assess()
-        self.assertTrue(result["evidence"].get("heads_diverged"))
-        self.assertTrue(result["eligible"])
-
-
-class EligibilityRefused(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_active_owner_with_pid(self):
-        lock = durable_lock(pid=LIVE_PID, session_pid=LIVE_PID)
-        result = assess(lock=lock, owner_process_alive_override=True)
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.REFUSED)
-        self.assertFalse(result["eligible"])
-        self.assertTrue(any("alive" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
-
-    def test_foreign_claimant(self):
-        result = assess(identity="other-user")
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.REFUSED)
-        self.assertTrue(any("foreign claimant identity" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
-
-    def test_foreign_profile(self):
-        result = assess(profile="prgs-reviewer")
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.REFUSED)
-
-    def test_fingerprint_mismatch(self):
-        result = assess(observed_dirty_fingerprints={"a.py": "0" * 64, "b.py": FP_B})
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.REFUSED)
-        self.assertTrue(any("fingerprint mismatch" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
-
-    def test_head_mismatch(self):
-        result = assess(observed_local_head=OTHER_HEAD)
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.REFUSED)
-
-    def test_remote_head_mismatch(self):
-        result = assess(observed_remote_head=OTHER_HEAD)
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.REFUSED)
-
-    def test_path_not_under_branches(self):
-        result = assess(
-            source_worktree_path="/tmp/branches/evil",
-            # lock path also changed so worktree agreement holds
-            lock=durable_lock(worktree_path="/tmp/branches/evil"),
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.REFUSED)
-        self.assertTrue(any("canonical branches" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
-
-    def test_unregistered_worktree(self):
-        result = assess(worktree_registered=False)
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.REFUSED)
-
-    def test_active_workflow_lease(self):
-        result = assess(workflow_lease_active=True, workflow_lease_expired=False)
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.REFUSED)
-
-    def test_unsafe_dirty_path_pin(self):
-        result = assess(
-            expected_dirty_fingerprints={"../etc/passwd": FP_A},
-            observed_dirty_fingerprints={"../etc/passwd": FP_A},
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.REFUSED)
-
-    def test_symlink_escape_rejected_by_ancestry(self):
-        ok, reasons = dorec.is_path_under_canonical_branches(
-            "/tmp/branches/evil", canonical_repo_root="/repo"
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(ok)
-        self.assertTrue(reasons)
-
-
-class ConflictDetection(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_overlapping_upstream_change(self):
-        conflicts = dorec.detect_path_conflicts(
-            dirty_paths=["c.py"],
-            local_head_contents={"c.py": b"local-base"},
-            remote_head_contents={"c.py": b"remote-changed"},
-            dirty_contents={"c.py": b"dirty-c-conflict"},
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(len(conflicts), 1)
-        self.assertEqual(conflicts[0]["path"], "c.py")
-
-    def test_unchanged_upstream_no_conflict(self):
-        conflicts = dorec.detect_path_conflicts(
-            dirty_paths=["a.py"],
-            local_head_contents={"a.py": b"same"},
-            remote_head_contents={"a.py": b"same"},
-            dirty_contents={"a.py": b"dirty-a"},
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(conflicts, [])
-
-
-class CrashSafeRecovery(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="dirty-orphan-")
-        self.repo = os.path.join(self.tmp, "repo")
-        self.branches = os.path.join(self.repo, "branches")
-        self.source = os.path.join(self.branches, "issue-901-dirty-orphan")
-        self.recovery = os.path.join(self.branches, RECOVERY_WT_NAME)
-        os.makedirs(self.source, exist_ok=True)
-        os.makedirs(self.branches, exist_ok=True)
-        # seed dirty files in source
-        with open(os.path.join(self.source, "a.py"), "wb") as fh:
-            fh.write(b"dirty-a")
-        with open(os.path.join(self.source, "b.py"), "wb") as fh:
-            fh.write(b"dirty-b")
-        self.journal_dir = os.path.join(self.tmp, "journals")
-        self.lock = durable_lock(worktree_path=self.source)
-        self.assessment = dorec.assess_dirty_orphan_recovery(
-            self.lock,
-            **base_kwargs(
-                source_worktree_path=self.source,
-                canonical_repo_root=self.repo,
-            ),
-        )
-
-        class FakeGit(dorec.GitOps):
-            def __init__(self, recovery_path, head):
-                self.recovery_path = recovery_path
-                self.head = head
-                self.calls = []
-
-            def run(self, args, *, cwd):
-                self.calls.append((args, cwd))
-                if args[:3] == ["git", "worktree", "add"]:
-                    os.makedirs(self.recovery_path, exist_ok=True)
-                    return mock.Mock(returncode=0, stdout="", stderr="")
-                if args[:2] == ["git", "checkout"]:
-                    return mock.Mock(returncode=0, stdout="", stderr="")
-                if args[:2] == ["git", "rev-parse"]:
-                    return mock.Mock(returncode=0, stdout=self.head + "\n", stderr="")
-                return mock.Mock(returncode=0, stdout="", stderr="")
-
-        self.git = FakeGit(self.recovery, REMOTE_HEAD)
-        self.written_locks = []
-
-        def lock_writer(record):
-            self.written_locks.append(record)
-
-        self.lock_writer = lock_writer
-
-    def tearDown(self):
-        shutil.rmtree(self.tmp, ignore_errors=True)
-
-    def _run(self, **overrides):
-        kwargs = {
-            "assessment": self.assessment,
-            "existing_lock": self.lock,
-            "issue_number": 901,
-            "branch_name": BRANCH,
-            "source_worktree_path": self.source,
-            "recovery_worktree_path": self.recovery,
-            "remote": "prgs",
-            "org": "Example-Org",
-            "repo": "Example-Repo",
-            "identity": "author-user",
-            "profile": "prgs-author",
-            "expected_local_head": LOCAL_HEAD,
-            "expected_remote_head": REMOTE_HEAD,
-            "expected_dirty_fingerprints": {"a.py": FP_A, "b.py": FP_B},
-            "dirty_contents": {"a.py": b"dirty-a", "b.py": b"dirty-b"},
-            "local_head_contents": {"a.py": b"base-a", "b.py": b"base-b"},
-            "remote_head_contents": {"a.py": b"base-a", "b.py": b"base-b"},
-            "canonical_repo_root": self.repo,
-            "bind_lock": True,
-            "lock_writer": self.lock_writer,
-            "git_ops": self.git,
-            "journal_dir": self.journal_dir,
-            "session_pid": LIVE_PID,
-        }
-        kwargs.update(overrides)
-        return dorec.run_dirty_orphan_recovery(**kwargs)
-
-    def test_success_preserves_dirty_bytes_and_source(self):
-        result = self._run()
-        self.assertTrue(result["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.RECOVERY_COMPLETED)
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.isdir(self.source))
-        with open(os.path.join(self.source, "a.py"), "rb") as fh:
-            self.assertEqual(fh.read(), b"dirty-a")
-        with open(os.path.join(self.recovery, "a.py"), "rb") as fh:
-            self.assertEqual(fh.read(), b"dirty-a")
-        with open(os.path.join(self.recovery, "b.py"), "rb") as fh:
-            self.assertEqual(fh.read(), b"dirty-b")
-        self.assertEqual(len(self.written_locks), 1)
-        rec = self.written_locks[0]
-        self.assertEqual(rec["session_pid"], LIVE_PID)
-        self.assertTrue(rec["dirty_orphan_recovery"]["recovered"])
-        self.assertTrue(rec["dirty_orphan_recovery"]["source_frozen"])
-
-    def test_conflict_leaves_governed_state(self):
-        result = self._run(
-            expected_dirty_fingerprints={"c.py": FP_C},
-            dirty_contents={"c.py": b"dirty-c-conflict"},
-            local_head_contents={"c.py": b"local-base"},
-            remote_head_contents={"c.py": b"remote-changed"},
-        )
-        # #860 F4: session binding is NOT finalized while conflicts remain
-        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], dorec.CONFLICTS_PRESENT)
-        sidecar = os.path.join(self.recovery, "c.py.recovered-dirty")
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(sidecar))
-        state = os.path.join(
-            self.recovery, dorec.CONFLICT_STATE_DIR, dorec.CONFLICT_STATE_FILE
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(state))
-        with open(state, "r", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
-            payload = json.load(fh)
-        self.assertEqual(payload["resolution"], "author_edit_required")
-
-    def test_interrupt_before_journal_no_artifacts(self):
-        result = self._run(interrupt_after_phase=dorec.PHASE_ELIGIBILITY)
-        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(result["outcome"], "INTERRUPTED")
-        self.assertFalse(os.path.isdir(self.recovery))
-
-    def test_interrupt_after_journal_then_retry_idempotent(self):
-        first = self._run(interrupt_after_phase=dorec.PHASE_JOURNAL_PERSISTED)
-        self.assertEqual(first["outcome"], "INTERRUPTED")
-        self.assertTrue(first["journal"]["artifacts_created"]["journal"])
-        second = self._run()
-        self.assertTrue(second["success"])
-        # source still recoverable
-        with open(os.path.join(self.source, "a.py"), "rb") as fh:
-            self.assertEqual(fh.read(), b"dirty-a")
-
-    def test_interrupt_after_worktree_then_retry(self):
-        first = self._run(interrupt_after_phase=dorec.PHASE_RECOVERY_WORKTREE)
-        self.assertEqual(first["outcome"], "INTERRUPTED")
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.isdir(self.recovery))
-        second = self._run()
-        self.assertTrue(second["success"])
-
-    def test_interrupt_after_binding_then_retry_complete(self):
-        first = self._run(interrupt_after_phase=dorec.PHASE_BINDING)
-        self.assertEqual(first["outcome"], "INTERRUPTED")
-        second = self._run()
-        self.assertTrue(second["success"])
-        # completed journal makes further retries no-ops
-        third = self._run()
-        self.assertEqual(third["outcome"], dorec.RECOVERY_RESUMED)
-
-    def test_source_worktree_never_deleted(self):
-        self._run()
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.isdir(self.source))
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(os.path.join(self.source, "a.py")))
-
-    def test_fingerprint_drift_refuses_without_mutation(self):
-        result = self._run(dirty_contents={"a.py": b"CHANGED", "b.py": b"dirty-b"})
-        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
-        self.assertFalse(os.path.isdir(self.recovery))
-
-
-class SessionBindingPreflight(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_canonical_session_binding_recognized(self):
-        lock = {
-            "worktree_path": "/repo/branches/recovery",
-            "session_pid": LIVE_PID,
-            "dirty_orphan_recovery": {
-                "recovered": True,
-                "conflicts": [],
-                "recovery_worktree_path": "/repo/branches/recovery",
-                "source_worktree_path": SOURCE_WT,
-                "accepted_head": REMOTE_HEAD,
-            },
-        }
-        result = dorec.preflight_recognizes_recovered_provenance(lock)
-        self.assertTrue(result["recognized"])
-
-    def test_conflicts_block_commit_preflight(self):
-        lock = {
-            "worktree_path": "/repo/branches/recovery",
-            "session_pid": LIVE_PID,
-            "dirty_orphan_recovery": {
-                "recovered": True,
-                "conflicts": [{"path": "c.py"}],
-            },
-        }
-        result = dorec.preflight_recognizes_recovered_provenance(lock)
-        self.assertFalse(result["recognized"])
-
-    def test_active_foreign_does_not_mutate(self):
-        # assess-only path: foreign refused before run
-        result = assess(identity="intruder")
-        self.assertFalse(result["eligible"])
-
-
-class JournalSymlinkRefusal(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_symlink_journal_path_refused_on_load(self):
-        tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp()
-        try:
-            real = os.path.join(tmp, "real.json")
-            with open(real, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
-                fh.write("{}")
-            link = os.path.join(tmp, "link.json")
-            os.symlink(real, link)
-            key = "symlink-test"
-            jdir = tmp
-            path = dorec._journal_path(key, journal_dir=jdir)
-            with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as fh:
-                json.dump({"idempotency_key": key}, fh)
-            os.remove(path)
-            os.symlink(real, path)
-            with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
-                dorec.load_journal(key, journal_dir=jdir)
-        finally:
-            shutil.rmtree(tmp, ignore_errors=True)
-
-
-class RealGitMultiWorktreeIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        import subprocess
-        self.tmp = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="git-integration-")
-        self.repo = os.path.join(self.tmp, "repo")
-        os.makedirs(self.repo, exist_ok=True)
-        subprocess.run(["git", "init"], cwd=self.repo, check=True, capture_output=True)
-        subprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.name", "Test User"], cwd=self.repo, check=True)
-        subprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.email", "[email protected]"], cwd=self.repo, check=True)
-        with open(os.path.join(self.repo, "init.txt"), "w") as fh:
-            fh.write("init")
-        subprocess.run(["git", "add", "."], cwd=self.repo, check=True)
-        subprocess.run(["git", "commit", "-m", "init"], cwd=self.repo, check=True)
-        branch = "fix/issue-999-test"
-        subprocess.run(["git", "branch", branch], cwd=self.repo, check=True)
-        self.branches = os.path.join(self.repo, "branches")
-        self.source = os.path.join(self.branches, "issue-999-test")
-        subprocess.run(["git", "worktree", "add", self.source, branch], cwd=self.repo, check=True)
-        self.dirty_path = os.path.join(self.source, "dirty.txt")
-        with open(self.dirty_path, "w") as fh:
-            fh.write("dirty-data")
-
-    def tearDown(self):
-        shutil.rmtree(self.tmp, ignore_errors=True)
-
-    def test_prepare_recovery_worktree_detached_no_exit_128(self):
-        import subprocess
-        head_sha = subprocess.check_output(["git", "rev-parse", "HEAD"], cwd=self.repo, text=True).strip()
-        rec_wt = os.path.join(self.branches, "recovery-issue-999-test")
-        res = dorec.prepare_recovery_worktree(
-            canonical_repo_root=self.repo,
-            recovery_worktree_path=rec_wt,
-            branch_name="fix/issue-999-test",
-            remote_head=head_sha,
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(res["success"], res.get("reasons"))
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.isdir(rec_wt))
-
-    def test_real_lock_rebind_recovery_sanctioned(self):
-        lock_dir = os.path.join(self.tmp, "locks")
-        rec_wt = os.path.join(self.branches, "recovery-issue-999-test")
-        os.makedirs(rec_wt, exist_ok=True)
-        record = {
-            "remote": "prgs",
-            "org": "Example-Org",
-            "repo": "Example-Repo",
-            "issue_number": 999,
-            "branch_name": "fix/issue-999-test",
-            "worktree_path": rec_wt,
-            "claimant": {"username": "author-user", "profile": "prgs-author"},
-        }
-        record_src = dict(record)
-        record_src["worktree_path"] = self.source
-        issue_lock_store.bind_session_lock(record_src, lock_dir=lock_dir)
-        path = issue_lock_store.bind_session_lock(
-            record,
-            lock_dir=lock_dir,
-            recovery_sanctioned=True,
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.isfile(path))
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_lock_store.py

@@ -24,8 +24,6 @@ def _lease(expires_at: str) -> dict:
 
 
 def _lock_record(**overrides) -> dict:
-    # #860: live locks require a usable session pid; PID-less records are never
-    # classified live merely because expiry/heartbeat fields are present.
     record = {
         "issue_number": 420,
         "branch_name": "feat/issue-420-server-code-parity",
@@ -33,8 +31,6 @@ def _lock_record(**overrides) -> dict:
         "org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
         "repo": "Gitea-Tools",
         "worktree_path": "/tmp/wt-420",
-        "session_pid": os.getpid(),
-        "pid": os.getpid(),
         "work_lease": _lease("2999-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
     }
     record.update(overrides)
@@ -92,8 +88,6 @@ class TestIssueLockStore(unittest.TestCase):
         existing = _lock_record(
             branch_name="feat/issue-420-other",
             worktree_path="/tmp/other",
-            session_pid=os.getpid(),
-            pid=os.getpid(),
             work_lease=_lease("2999-01-01T00:00:00Z"),
         )
         path = ils.lock_file_path(

tests/test_merged_cleanup_reconcile.py

@@ -12,59 +12,6 @@ import merged_cleanup_reconcile as mcr  # noqa: E402
 
 
 class TestMergedCleanupAssessment(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_issue_851_plan_order_worktree_then_reassess_then_remote(self):
-        """#851 dry-run plan: remove worktree, reassess ownership, then remote."""
-        plan = mcr.plan_cleanup_execution_order(
-            remote_assessment={"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
-            local_assessment={"safe_to_remove_worktree": True},
-        )
-        actions = [s["action"] for s in plan]
-        self.assertEqual(
-            actions,
-            [
-                "remove_local_worktree",
-                "reassess_branch_ownership",
-                "delete_remote_branch",
-            ],
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(plan[0]["phase"], 1)
-        self.assertEqual(plan[-1]["phase"], 3)
-        self.assertIn("independently_safe", plan[0]["reason"])
-        self.assertIn("reassessment", plan[-1]["reason"])
-
-    def test_issue_851_plan_remote_only_when_worktree_not_safe(self):
-        plan = mcr.plan_cleanup_execution_order(
-            remote_assessment={"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
-            local_assessment={"safe_to_remove_worktree": False},
-        )
-        self.assertEqual([s["action"] for s in plan], ["delete_remote_branch"])
-        self.assertNotIn("reassess_branch_ownership", [s["action"] for s in plan])
-
-    def test_issue_851_plan_worktree_only_when_remote_not_safe(self):
-        plan = mcr.plan_cleanup_execution_order(
-            remote_assessment={"safe_to_delete_remote": False},
-            local_assessment={"safe_to_remove_worktree": True},
-        )
-        self.assertEqual([s["action"] for s in plan], ["remove_local_worktree"])
-
-    def test_issue_851_entry_includes_planned_execution_order(self):
-        entry = mcr.build_pr_cleanup_entry(
-            pr={
-                "number": 848,
-                "title": "Closes #844",
-                "body": "",
-                "merged_at": "2026-07-23T00:00:00Z",
-                "head": {"ref": "fix/issue-844-x", "sha": "a" * 40},
-            },
-            project_root="/tmp/not-a-real-root",
-            open_pr_heads=set(),
-            remote_branch_exists=True,
-            head_on_master=True,
-            delete_capability_allowed=True,
-        )
-        self.assertIn("planned_execution_order", entry)
-        self.assertIsInstance(entry["planned_execution_order"], list)
-
     def test_extract_linked_issue_from_closes(self):
         issue = mcr.extract_linked_issue(
             "feat: cleanup (Closes #269)",

tests/test_webui_policy_visibility.py

@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+"""Tests for the read-only workflow policy/guardrail visibility view (#646).
+
+Covers issue #646 acceptance criteria:
+
+1. Console lists major guardrails with source pointers.
+2. Secrets redacted.
+3. Tests ensure sample secrets never appear.
+4. Docs explain read-only nature (asserted here for the page copy; the doc
+   itself is covered by inspection).
+"""
+
+import json
+import sys
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+from webui import console_redaction
+from webui import policy_inventory
+from webui.app import create_app
+from webui.policy_inventory import (
+    PolicyEntry,
+    PolicyInventorySnapshot,
+    SourcePointer,
+    load_policy_inventory,
+    snapshot_to_dict,
+)
+from webui.policy_views import render_policy_page
+
+
+def _entry(key, category, *, active=None, error=None):
+    return PolicyEntry(
+        key=key,
+        title=key.replace("_", " ").title(),
+        category=category,
+        summary=f"summary for {key}",
+        sources=(SourcePointer("src", f"{key}.py", "module"),),
+        active=active,
+        documented_default=None,
+        diff=None,
+        error=error,
+    )
+
+
+def _snapshot(entries):
+    return PolicyInventorySnapshot(
+        schema_version=1,
+        read_only=True,
+        note="read-only projection",
+        entries=tuple(entries),
+        categories=tuple(dict.fromkeys(e.category for e in entries)),
+        build_errors=(),
+    )
+
+# The guardrail categories issue #646 names as in-scope.
+_EXPECTED_CATEGORIES = {
+    "role_separation",
+    "lease_rules",
+    "worktree_rules",
+    "merge_confirmation",
+    "redaction",
+    "contamination",
+    "allocator_policy",
+    "audit_logging",
+    "mutation_gating",
+}
+
+
+class TestPolicyInventoryModel(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_major_guardrails_present(self):
+        snapshot = load_policy_inventory()
+        categories = {e.category for e in snapshot.entries}
+        self.assertEqual(_EXPECTED_CATEGORIES, categories)
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(len(snapshot.entries), len(_EXPECTED_CATEGORIES))
+
+    def test_every_guardrail_has_source_pointers(self):
+        # AC1: source attribution (file/module/doc) for every guardrail.
+        snapshot = load_policy_inventory()
+        for entry in snapshot.entries:
+            with self.subTest(entry=entry.key):
+                self.assertTrue(entry.sources, "guardrail must carry source pointers")
+                for source in entry.sources:
+                    self.assertTrue(source.path)
+                    self.assertIn(source.kind, {"module", "doc", "script", "config"})
+
+    def test_diff_reported_where_documented_default_declared(self):
+        snapshot = load_policy_inventory()
+        checked_any = False
+        for entry in snapshot.entries:
+            if entry.documented_default is None:
+                self.assertIsNone(entry.diff)
+                continue
+            checked_any = True
+            self.assertIsNotNone(entry.diff)
+            self.assertEqual(
+                entry.diff["status"],
+                "matches_documented_default",
+                f"{entry.key} drifted from its documented default: {entry.diff}",
+            )
+        self.assertTrue(checked_any, "at least one guardrail should declare a default")
+
+    def test_live_projections_populate_active(self):
+        snapshot = load_policy_inventory()
+        by_key = {e.key: e for e in snapshot.entries}
+        for key in ("role_separation", "redaction", "audit_logging"):
+            self.assertIsNone(by_key[key].error, f"{key} projection failed")
+            self.assertIsInstance(by_key[key].active, dict)
+
+    def test_build_entry_is_fail_soft_on_projection_error(self):
+        def _boom():
+            raise RuntimeError("projection exploded")
+
+        row = (
+            "redaction",
+            "Secret redaction",
+            "redaction",
+            "summary",
+            (SourcePointer("x", "webui/console_redaction.py", "module"),),
+            _boom,
+            {"redact_before_persist": True},
+        )
+        entry = policy_inventory._build_entry(row)
+        self.assertIsNone(entry.active)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(entry.error)
+        self.assertEqual(entry.diff["status"], "active_unavailable")
+
+
+class TestPolicyRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_real_snapshot_has_no_secret_shapes(self):
+        # AC3: the real emitted payload never carries a known secret shape.
+        payload = snapshot_to_dict(load_policy_inventory())
+        self.assertEqual(console_redaction.scan_for_secrets(payload), [])
+
+    def test_planted_keychain_secret_is_redacted(self):
+        # AC2/AC3: a secret planted in an active projection is masked before emit.
+        snapshot = _snapshot([
+            _entry(
+                "redaction",
+                "redaction",
+                active={"leaked": "keychain:prgs-author-super-secret", "roles": ["author"]},
+            )
+        ])
+        payload = snapshot_to_dict(snapshot)
+        blob = json.dumps(payload)
+        self.assertNotIn("keychain:prgs-author-super-secret", blob)
+        self.assertEqual(console_redaction.scan_for_secrets(payload), [])
+
+    def test_planted_credential_assignment_is_redacted(self):
+        snapshot = _snapshot([
+            _entry(
+                "audit_logging",
+                "audit_logging",
+                active={"leaked": "token=abcd1234efgh5678", "append_only": True},
+            )
+        ])
+        payload = snapshot_to_dict(snapshot)
+        blob = json.dumps(payload)
+        self.assertNotIn("abcd1234efgh5678", blob)
+        self.assertEqual(console_redaction.scan_for_secrets(payload), [])
+
+
+class TestPolicyRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
+
+    def test_policy_html_lists_guardrails_with_sources(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/policy")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
+        text = response.text
+        self.assertIn("Workflow policy", text)
+        self.assertIn("Role separation and RBAC", text)
+        self.assertIn("Source pointers", text)
+        self.assertIn("task_capability_map.py", text)
+        self.assertIn("docs/safety-model.md", text)
+
+    def test_policy_html_states_read_only(self):
+        # AC4: the page explains its read-only nature.
+        text = self.client.get("/policy").text
+        self.assertIn("read-only", text.lower())
+        self.assertNotIn("<form", text.lower())
+
+    def test_policy_html_has_no_secret_shapes(self):
+        text = self.client.get("/policy").text
+        self.assertEqual(console_redaction.scan_for_secrets(text), [])
+
+    def test_api_v1_policy_returns_inventory(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/api/v1/policy")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
+        data = response.json()
+        self.assertEqual(data["schema_version"], policy_inventory.SCHEMA_VERSION)
+        self.assertTrue(data["read_only"])
+        self.assertEqual(data["entry_count"], len(data["entries"]))
+        self.assertEqual(set(data["categories"]), _EXPECTED_CATEGORIES)
+
+    def test_policy_is_read_only_no_post(self):
+        # AC4 / non-goal: no mutation endpoint.
+        response = self.client.post("/policy")
+        self.assertIn(response.status_code, (404, 405))
+
+    def test_nav_links_policy(self):
+        text = self.client.get("/").text
+        self.assertIn('href="/policy"', text)
+
+
+class TestPolicyViewFailSoft(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_page_renders_when_a_projection_errors(self):
+        snapshot = _snapshot([
+            _entry("role_separation", "role_separation", error="active projection unavailable: boom"),
+            _entry("redaction", "redaction", active={"redact_before_persist": True}),
+        ])
+        page = render_policy_page(snapshot)
+        # The errored guardrail surfaces its error; other guardrails still render.
+        self.assertIn("Active value unavailable", page)
+        self.assertIn("Redaction", page)
+        self.assertIn("Workflow policy", page)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_webui_shell.py

@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-"""Tests for the Phase 1 operator console application shell (#638)."""
-import sys
-import unittest
-from pathlib import Path
-
-sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
-
-from starlette.routing import Route
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
-
-from webui import layout
-from webui.app import create_app
-from webui.nav import NAV_GROUPS, STUB_PAGES, nav_hrefs
-
-
-class TestShellNav(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def test_nav_group_labels_present(self):
-        text = self.client.get("/").text
-        for group in NAV_GROUPS:
-            with self.subTest(group=group.label):
-                self.assertIn(f">{group.label}<", text)
-
-    def test_phase1_group_labels_cover_expected_ia(self):
-        labels = {group.label for group in NAV_GROUPS}
-        for expected in (
-            "Health",
-            "Traffic",
-            "Runtime/Sessions",
-            "Projects",
-            "Inventory",
-            "Timeline",
-            "Policy",
-            "Insights",
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(label=expected):
-                self.assertIn(expected, labels)
-
-    def test_every_nav_href_resolves_to_a_get_route(self):
-        app = create_app()
-        get_paths = {
-            route.path
-            for route in app.routes
-            if isinstance(route, Route) and "GET" in route.methods
-        }
-        for href in nav_hrefs():
-            with self.subTest(href=href):
-                self.assertIn(href, get_paths, f"nav href {href} has no GET route")
-
-    def test_legacy_hrefs_still_navigable(self):
-        text = self.client.get("/").text
-        for href in ("/queue", "/projects", "/prompts", "/runtime",
-                     "/audit", "/worktrees", "/leases", "/actions"):
-            with self.subTest(href=href):
-                self.assertIn(f'href="{href}"', text)
-
-
-class TestShellBadges(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def test_mode_badge_present(self):
-        self.assertIn("mode: read-only", self.client.get("/").text)
-
-    def test_environment_badge_present(self):
-        self.assertIn("env:", self.client.get("/").text)
-
-    def test_default_environment_is_local(self):
-        self.assertEqual(layout.environment_label(), "local")
-
-    def test_remote_bind_reports_remote_environment(self):
-        import os
-
-        prior = os.environ.get("WEBUI_HOST")
-        os.environ["WEBUI_HOST"] = "10.0.0.5"
-        try:
-            self.assertEqual(layout.environment_label(), "remote")
-        finally:
-            if prior is None:
-                os.environ.pop("WEBUI_HOST", None)
-            else:
-                os.environ["WEBUI_HOST"] = prior
-
-    def test_docs_link_present(self):
-        text = self.client.get("/").text
-        self.assertIn(layout.DOCS_URL, text)
-        self.assertIn(">Docs<", text)
-
-
-class TestShellStubs(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def test_stub_routes_render_200(self):
-        for path, (title, _desc) in STUB_PAGES.items():
-            with self.subTest(path=path):
-                response = self.client.get(path)
-                self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200, path)
-                self.assertIn(title, response.text)
-                self.assertIn("placeholder", response.text)
-
-    def test_stub_routes_are_read_only(self):
-        for path in STUB_PAGES:
-            with self.subTest(path=path):
-                response = self.client.post(path)
-                self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 405)
-                self.assertEqual(response.json()["error"], "read-only-mvp")
-
-    def test_stub_pages_carry_nav_and_badges(self):
-        response = self.client.get("/inventory")
-        self.assertIn("mode: read-only", response.text)
-        self.assertIn('href="/queue"', response.text)
-
-
-class TestShellHome(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def test_home_summarizes_console(self):
-        text = self.client.get("/").text
-        self.assertIn("Operator console", text)
-        self.assertIn("Phase 1", text)
-
-    def test_home_links_legacy_pages(self):
-        text = self.client.get("/").text
-        self.assertIn("MVP legacy pages", text)
-        for href in ("/queue", "/audit", "/leases"):
-            with self.subTest(href=href):
-                self.assertIn(f'href="{href}"', text)
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

webui/app.py

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ from starlette.routing import Route
 
 from webui.deployment_boundary import deployment_snapshot
 from webui.layout import render_page
-from webui.nav import NAV_GROUPS, STUB_PAGES
 from webui.project_registry import (
     ProjectRegistry,
     RegistryError,
@@ -46,7 +45,8 @@ from webui.worktree_scanner import load_hygiene_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as wo
 from webui.worktree_views import render_worktrees_page
 from webui.runtime_health import load_runtime_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as runtime_snapshot_to_dict
 from webui.runtime_views import render_runtime_page
-from webui.timeline import load_timeline, snapshot_to_dict as timeline_snapshot_to_dict
+from webui.policy_inventory import load_policy_inventory, snapshot_to_dict as policy_snapshot_to_dict
+from webui.policy_views import render_policy_page
 from webui.system_health import (
     API_PATH as SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH,
     load_system_health,
@@ -67,62 +67,25 @@ def _stub_page(title: str, description: str) -> HTMLResponse:
     return HTMLResponse(render_page(title=title, body_html=body))
 
 
-_LEGACY_PAGES = (
-    ("/queue", "Queue", "live PR and issue dashboard (#429)"),
-    ("/projects", "Projects", "registry and onboarding (#427)"),
-    ("/prompts", "Prompts", "canonical workflow prompt library (#428)"),
-    ("/runtime", "Runtime", "MCP health and stale-runtime detection (#430)"),
-    ("/audit", "Audit", "final-report paste and validator preview (#431)"),
-    ("/worktrees", "Worktrees", "branch hygiene dashboard (#432)"),
-    ("/leases", "Leases", "collision and lease visibility (#433)"),
-    ("/actions", "Actions", "gated write-action framework (#434)"),
-)
-
-
-def _render_home_nav_groups() -> str:
-    groups = []
-    for group in NAV_GROUPS:
-        items = "".join(
-            f'<li><a href="{item.href}">{item.label}</a>'
-            + ("" if item.status == "live" else " <span class=\"muted\">(stub)</span>")
-            + "</li>"
-            for item in group.items
-        )
-        groups.append(f"<h3>{group.label}</h3><ul>{items}</ul>")
-    return "".join(groups)
-
-
 async def home(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
-    legacy = "".join(
-        f"<li><strong>{label}</strong> — {desc} "
-        f'(<a href="{href}">{href}</a>)</li>'
-        for href, label, desc in _LEGACY_PAGES
-    )
     body = (
         "<h2>Operator console</h2>"
-        "<p>Read-only home for the MCP Control Plane Phase 1 operator console. "
+        "<p>Local entry point for MCP Control Plane operational views.</p>"
-        "Gitea, MCP capability gates, and canonical workflows remain the source "
+        "<ul>"
-        "of truth; this console never mutates them.</p>"
+        "<li><strong>Queue</strong> — live PR and issue dashboard (#429)</li>"
-        "<h2>Phase 1 surfaces</h2>"
+        "<li><strong>Projects</strong> — registry and onboarding (#427)</li>"
-        + _render_home_nav_groups()
+        "<li><strong>Prompts</strong> — canonical workflow prompt library (#428)</li>"
-        + "<h2>MVP legacy pages</h2>"
+        "<li><strong>Runtime</strong> — MCP health and stale-runtime detection (#430)</li>"
-        "<ul>" + legacy + "</ul>"
+        "<li><strong>Policy</strong> — workflow guardrail configuration visibility (#646)</li>"
+        "<li><strong>Audit</strong> — final-report paste and validator preview (#431)</li>"
+        "<li><strong>Worktrees</strong> — branch hygiene dashboard (#432)</li>"
+        "<li><strong>Leases</strong> — collision and lease visibility (#433)</li>"
+        "<li><strong>Actions</strong> — gated write-action framework (#434)</li>"
+        "</ul>"
     )
     return HTMLResponse(render_page(title="Home", body_html=body))
 
 
-async def phase_stub(request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
-    """Graceful read-only placeholder for a not-yet-implemented Phase 1 surface."""
-    title, description = STUB_PAGES[request.url.path]
-    body = (
-        f"<h2>{title}</h2>"
-        f'<div class="stub"><p>{description}</p>'
-        "<p>Phase 1 shell placeholder — no write actions. Tracked under "
-        "epic #631.</p></div>"
-    )
-    return HTMLResponse(render_page(title=title, body_html=body))
-
-
 async def health(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     """Liveness only — deliberately cheap, runs no dependency probe (#634).
 
@@ -283,6 +246,17 @@ async def api_runtime(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     return JSONResponse(runtime_snapshot_to_dict(load_runtime_snapshot()))
 
 
+async def policy(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
+    snapshot = load_policy_inventory()
+    return HTMLResponse(
+        render_page(title="Policy", body_html=render_policy_page(snapshot))
+    )
+
+
+async def api_v1_policy(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
+    return JSONResponse(policy_snapshot_to_dict(load_policy_inventory()))
+
+
 async def _parse_audit_form(request: Request) -> tuple[str, str | None]:
     if request.method == "GET":
         return "", None
@@ -450,104 +424,6 @@ async def api_console_security_model(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     })
 
 
-def _query_int(request: Request, key: str) -> int | None:
-    """Parse an optional integer query parameter; None when absent/invalid."""
-    raw = request.query_params.get(key)
-    if raw is None or not str(raw).strip():
-        return None
-    try:
-        return int(str(raw).strip())
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        return None
-
-
-def _derive_remote(host: str) -> str:
-    """Map a Gitea host to its known short remote name (control-plane scope key)."""
-    text = (host or "").lower()
-    if "prgs" in text:
-        return "prgs"
-    if "dadeschools" in text:
-        return "dadeschools"
-    return text.split(".")[0] if text else ""
-
-
-def _timeline_comment_source(host: str, org: str, repo: str):
-    """Build a fail-soft CTH-comment fetcher for one repo, or None when offline.
-
-    Returns a callable ``(kind, number) -> list[comment]``. Credentials or
-    network failures raise inside the callable so ``load_timeline`` degrades the
-    handoff source rather than the whole timeline. Offline test mode yields no
-    live source so the handoff section reports ``not run``.
-    """
-    import os
-
-    from gitea_auth import api_fetch_page, get_auth_header, repo_api_url
-
-    offline = (os.environ.get("WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE") or "").strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes"}
-    if offline:
-        return None
-    auth = get_auth_header(host)
-    if not auth:
-        return None
-
-    def _fetch(kind: str, number: int) -> list:
-        segment = "pulls" if kind == "pr" else "issues"
-        url = f"{repo_api_url(host, org, repo)}/{segment}/{int(number)}/comments"
-        comments: list = []
-        page = 1
-        while page <= 20:
-            raw, meta = api_fetch_page(url, auth, page=page, limit=50)
-            comments.extend(raw)
-            if bool(meta["is_final_page"]):
-                break
-            page += 1
-        return comments
-
-    return _fetch
-
-
-async def api_v1_timeline(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
-    """Read-only workflow-event timeline (#637). Filter by issue/PR/session."""
-    from webui.queue_loader import _host_from_url  # host normalisation helper
-
-    registry, error = _load_project_registry()
-    if error is not None:
-        return JSONResponse(error.to_dict(), status_code=500)
-    project = registry.projects[0] if registry.projects else None
-
-    org = request.query_params.get("org") or (project.gitea_owner if project else "")
-    repo = request.query_params.get("repo") or (project.repo_name if project else "")
-    host = _host_from_url(project.remote_host) if project else ""
-    remote = request.query_params.get("remote") or _derive_remote(host)
-
-    if not (remote and org and repo):
-        return JSONResponse(
-            {
-                "error": "timeline_scope_unresolved",
-                "detail": "no project in registry and no remote/org/repo query params provided",
-            },
-            status_code=400,
-        )
-
-    comment_source = _timeline_comment_source(host, org, repo) if (host and org and repo) else None
-
-    snapshot = load_timeline(
-        remote=remote,
-        org=org,
-        repo=repo,
-        issue=_query_int(request, "issue"),
-        pr=_query_int(request, "pr"),
-        session=(request.query_params.get("session") or None),
-        limit=_query_int(request, "limit"),
-        offset=_query_int(request, "offset"),
-        comment_source=comment_source,
-    )
-    # A filter no surviving source can carry is refused, not answered empty:
-    # a 200 with zero events would tell the operator no such activity exists.
-    status_code = 200 if snapshot.ok else 422
-    return JSONResponse(timeline_snapshot_to_dict(snapshot), status_code=status_code)
-
-
 async def method_not_allowed(request: Request, _exc: Exception) -> Response:
     path = request.url.path
     if path in _AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS and request.method == "POST":
@@ -587,7 +463,8 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
             Route("/api/prompts", api_prompts, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/runtime", runtime, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/api/runtime", api_runtime, methods=["GET"]),
-            Route("/api/v1/timeline", api_v1_timeline, methods=["GET"]),
+            Route("/policy", policy, methods=["GET"]),
+            Route("/api/v1/policy", api_v1_policy, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/audit", audit, methods=["GET", "POST"]),
             Route("/api/audit", api_audit, methods=["GET", "POST"]),
             Route("/worktrees", worktrees, methods=["GET"]),
@@ -611,10 +488,6 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
                 api_console_security_model,
                 methods=["GET"],
             ),
-            *[
-                Route(path, phase_stub, methods=["GET"])
-                for path in STUB_PAGES
-            ],
         ],
         exception_handlers={405: method_not_allowed},
     )

webui/layout.py

@@ -2,66 +2,29 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import os
+NAV_ITEMS = (
-
+    ("/", "Home"),
-from webui.nav import NAV_GROUPS
+    ("/queue", "Queue"),
+    ("/projects", "Projects"),
+    ("/prompts", "Prompts"),
+    ("/runtime", "Runtime"),
+    ("/policy", "Policy"),
+    ("/audit", "Audit"),
+    ("/worktrees", "Worktrees"),
+    ("/leases", "Leases"),
+    ("/actions", "Actions"),
+)
 
 MVP_NOTICE = (
     "Read-only MVP — Gitea, MCP tools, and canonical workflows remain the "
     "source of truth. No mutation endpoints."
 )
 
-# Canonical docs entry point surfaced from the shell header (#638).
-DOCS_URL = (
-    "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/src/branch/"
-    "master/docs/webui-local-dev.md"
-)
-
-_LOCAL_HOSTS = frozenset({"", "127.0.0.1", "localhost", "::1"})
-
-
-def environment_label() -> str:
-    """Classify the serving environment as ``local`` or ``remote`` (#638).
-
-    Derived from the same ``WEBUI_HOST`` default the app binds to; loopback
-    hosts are ``local``, anything else is ``remote``. Read-only signal only.
-    """
-    host = (os.environ.get("WEBUI_HOST", "127.0.0.1") or "").strip().lower()
-    return "local" if host in _LOCAL_HOSTS else "remote"
-
-
-def _render_nav() -> str:
-    groups_html = []
-    for group in NAV_GROUPS:
-        links = "".join(
-            f'<a href="{item.href}"'
-            + (' class="nav-stub"' if item.status == "stub" else "")
-            + f'>{item.label}</a>'
-            for item in group.items
-        )
-        groups_html.append(
-            '<div class="nav-group">'
-            f'<span class="nav-group-label">{group.label}</span>'
-            f'<span class="nav-group-links">{links}</span>'
-            "</div>"
-        )
-    return "".join(groups_html)
-
-
-def _render_badges() -> str:
-    env = environment_label()
-    return (
-        '<div class="header-badges">'
-        f'<span class="badge env-badge env-{env}">env: {env}</span>'
-        '<span class="badge mode-badge">mode: read-only</span>'
-        f'<a class="badge docs-link" href="{DOCS_URL}">Docs</a>'
-        "</div>"
-    )
-
 
 def render_page(*, title: str, body_html: str, extra_head: str = "") -> str:
-    nav_links = _render_nav()
+    nav_links = "".join(
-    header_badges = _render_badges()
+        f'<a href="{href}">{label}</a>' for href, label in NAV_ITEMS
+    )
     return f"""<!DOCTYPE html>
 <html lang="en">
 <head>
@@ -91,58 +54,21 @@ def render_page(*, title: str, body_html: str, extra_head: str = "") -> str:
       padding: 0.75rem 1.25rem;
     }}
     header h1 {{
-      margin: 0;
+      margin: 0 0 0.5rem;
       font-size: 1.1rem;
       font-weight: 600;
     }}
-    .header-top {{
-      display: flex;
-      flex-wrap: wrap;
-      align-items: center;
-      justify-content: space-between;
-      gap: 0.5rem 1rem;
-      margin-bottom: 0.6rem;
-    }}
-    .header-badges {{ display: inline-flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 0.4rem; }}
-    .env-badge.env-local {{ color: #8fd19e; border-color: #3d6b4a; }}
-    .env-badge.env-remote {{ color: #e0c27a; border-color: #6b5730; }}
-    .mode-badge {{ color: #9ec8f0; border-color: #3d5f7a; }}
-    a.docs-link {{
-      color: var(--accent);
-      border-color: var(--accent);
-      text-decoration: none;
-      text-transform: none;
-    }}
-    a.docs-link:hover {{ filter: brightness(1.12); }}
     nav {{
       display: flex;
       flex-wrap: wrap;
-      gap: 0.5rem 1.25rem;
+      gap: 0.75rem 1rem;
     }}
-    .nav-group {{
-      display: flex;
-      flex-direction: column;
-      gap: 0.15rem;
-    }}
-    .nav-group-label {{
-      font-size: 0.68rem;
-      text-transform: uppercase;
-      letter-spacing: 0.04em;
-      color: var(--muted);
-    }}
-    .nav-group-links {{ display: inline-flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 0.6rem; }}
     nav a {{
       color: var(--accent);
       text-decoration: none;
       font-size: 0.9rem;
     }}
     nav a:hover {{ text-decoration: underline; }}
-    nav a.nav-stub {{ color: var(--muted); }}
-    nav a.nav-stub::after {{
-      content: " ·stub";
-      font-size: 0.7rem;
-      color: var(--muted);
-    }}
     main {{
       max-width: 52rem;
       margin: 0 auto;
@@ -241,10 +167,7 @@ def render_page(*, title: str, body_html: str, extra_head: str = "") -> str:
 </head>
 <body>
   <header>
-    <div class="header-top">
+    <h1>MCP Control Plane</h1>
-      <h1>MCP Control Plane</h1>
-      {header_badges}
-    </div>
     <nav>{nav_links}</nav>
   </header>
   <main>

webui/nav.py

@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-"""Navigation IA for the Phase 1 operator console shell (#638).
-
-Single source of truth for the console navigation so ``webui/layout.py`` and
-the ``webui/app.py`` route table stay aligned with epic #631. Read-only: every
-destination is a GET view or a Phase 1 placeholder. No mutation links.
-
-Nav groups follow the #631 Phase 1 information architecture: Health, Traffic,
-Runtime/Sessions, Projects, Inventory, Timeline, Policy (placeholder), and
-Insights (placeholder). Later-phase surfaces are declared as ``stub`` items and
-backed by ``STUB_PAGES`` so their nav links resolve to a graceful placeholder
-instead of a 404.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class NavItem:
-    """A single navigation destination.
-
-    ``status`` is ``"live"`` for implemented views and ``"stub"`` for Phase 1
-    placeholders whose backing view lands in a later child issue.
-    """
-
-    href: str
-    label: str
-    status: str = "live"
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class NavGroup:
-    label: str
-    items: tuple[NavItem, ...]
-
-
-NAV_GROUPS: tuple[NavGroup, ...] = (
-    NavGroup("Health", (
-        NavItem("/health", "Liveness"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Traffic", (
-        NavItem("/queue", "Queue"),
-        NavItem("/leases", "Leases"),
-        NavItem("/actions", "Actions"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Runtime/Sessions", (
-        NavItem("/runtime", "Runtime health"),
-        NavItem("/sessions", "Sessions", "stub"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Projects", (
-        NavItem("/projects", "Projects"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Inventory", (
-        NavItem("/inventory", "Inventory", "stub"),
-        NavItem("/worktrees", "Worktrees"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Timeline", (
-        NavItem("/timeline", "Timeline", "stub"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Policy", (
-        NavItem("/policy", "Policy", "stub"),
-        NavItem("/prompts", "Prompts"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Insights", (
-        NavItem("/insights", "Insights", "stub"),
-        NavItem("/audit", "Audit"),
-    )),
-)
-
-
-# Phase 1 placeholder destinations whose backing views land in later child
-# issues of epic #631. Each maps a path to (title, description). Routes are
-# registered so nav links resolve to a graceful, read-only stub page.
-STUB_PAGES: dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {
-    "/sessions": (
-        "Sessions",
-        "Active session, capability, and role inventory. Backed by the unified "
-        "inventory API (#636) once it lands.",
-    ),
-    "/inventory": (
-        "Inventory",
-        "Unified sessions, leases, locks, namespaces, and worktree inventory. "
-        "Backed by the Phase 1 inventory API (#636).",
-    ),
-    "/timeline": (
-        "Timeline",
-        "Workflow event timeline across issues and PRs. A later Phase 1 surface.",
-    ),
-    "/policy": (
-        "Policy",
-        "Capability and role policy surface. Placeholder until a later phase.",
-    ),
-    "/insights": (
-        "Insights",
-        "Aggregate operational insights and trends. Placeholder until a later "
-        "phase.",
-    ),
-}
-
-
-def iter_nav_items():
-    """Yield every ``NavItem`` across all groups in declared order."""
-    for group in NAV_GROUPS:
-        for item in group.items:
-            yield item
-
-
-def nav_hrefs() -> tuple[str, ...]:
-    """Return every navigation href in declared order."""
-    return tuple(item.href for item in iter_nav_items())

webui/policy_inventory.py

@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+"""Read-only workflow policy and guardrail inventory for the web UI (#646).
+
+Policy and guardrails live in code, profiles, docs, and skills. An operator
+cannot *see* the active workflow policy configuration from the console without
+reading the repository tree. This module projects the major guardrails into a
+redacted, machine-readable inventory with source attribution (file / module /
+doc), so the console can render them as HTML tables with source pointers.
+
+Design constraints (Phase 3, #646):
+
+- **Read-only projection.** Nothing here edits policy or exposes a toggle that
+  could weaken a gate. It reports what is already enforced elsewhere.
+- **Source attribution without secrets.** Every guardrail carries pointers to
+  the file/module/doc that owns it. Live values are compact summaries derived
+  from the safe policy accessors that already exist (``rbac_matrix``,
+  ``redaction_policy``, ``audit_policy``); raw regex, tokens, and endpoints are
+  never embedded.
+- **Redact before emit.** ``snapshot_to_dict`` runs the whole payload through
+  ``console_redaction.redact_payload`` so a planted or accidental secret in any
+  projected value degrades to the placeholder rather than reaching a client.
+- **Fail soft.** A projection that raises is recorded as a per-entry error and
+  never takes the page down; a guardrail is still listed with its sources.
+- **Diff vs documented defaults where feasible.** When a guardrail declares a
+  documented invariant, the active projection is compared against it and the
+  result is reported; otherwise the diff is explicitly ``None`` with a reason.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Any, Callable
+
+from webui import console_audit
+from webui import console_authz
+from webui import console_redaction
+
+SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
+
+READ_ONLY_NOTE = (
+    "Read-only projection of guardrails enforced in code, profiles, docs, and "
+    "skills. This view never edits policy and exposes no gate-weakening toggle."
+)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class SourcePointer:
+    """Where a guardrail is defined. Attribution only — never a secret."""
+
+    label: str
+    path: str
+    kind: str  # "module" | "doc" | "script" | "config"
+    anchor: str | None = None
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "label": self.label,
+            "path": self.path,
+            "kind": self.kind,
+            "anchor": self.anchor,
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class PolicyEntry:
+    key: str
+    title: str
+    category: str
+    summary: str
+    sources: tuple[SourcePointer, ...]
+    active: dict[str, Any] | None
+    documented_default: dict[str, Any] | None
+    diff: dict[str, Any] | None
+    error: str | None = None
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "key": self.key,
+            "title": self.title,
+            "category": self.category,
+            "summary": self.summary,
+            "sources": [s.to_dict() for s in self.sources],
+            "active": self.active,
+            "documented_default": self.documented_default,
+            "diff": self.diff,
+            "error": self.error,
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class PolicyInventorySnapshot:
+    schema_version: int
+    read_only: bool
+    note: str
+    entries: tuple[PolicyEntry, ...]
+    categories: tuple[str, ...]
+    build_errors: tuple[str, ...]
+
+
+def _diff_active_vs_default(
+    active: dict[str, Any] | None,
+    documented_default: dict[str, Any] | None,
+) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    """Compare only the keys the documented default declares.
+
+    Returns ``None`` when no documented default is declared (diff not feasible)
+    or when the active projection is unavailable. Otherwise reports, per
+    declared key, whether the active value matches the documented invariant.
+    """
+    if not documented_default:
+        return None
+    if not active:
+        return {"status": "active_unavailable", "checked": {}}
+    checked: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    matches = True
+    for key, expected in documented_default.items():
+        observed = active.get(key)
+        ok = observed == expected
+        matches = matches and ok
+        checked[key] = {"expected": expected, "observed": observed, "matches": ok}
+    return {
+        "status": "matches_documented_default" if matches else "drift_detected",
+        "checked": checked,
+    }
+
+
+# ── Live projections (compact, safe, fail-soft) ──────────────────────────────
+# Each returns a small dict of already-safe machine values. They are module
+# level so tests can substitute one to prove the redaction pass runs.
+
+
+def _project_role_separation() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    matrix = console_authz.rbac_matrix()
+    return {
+        "model_version": matrix.get("model_version"),
+        "active_phase": matrix.get("active_phase"),
+        "roles": [r.get("role") for r in matrix.get("roles", [])],
+        "privileged_action_count": len(matrix.get("privileged_actions", [])),
+        "default_decision": matrix.get("default_decision"),
+        "execution_enabled": matrix.get("execution_enabled"),
+    }
+
+
+def _project_redaction() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    policy = console_redaction.redaction_policy()
+    return {
+        "policy_version": policy.get("policy_version"),
+        "placeholder": policy.get("placeholder"),
+        "applies_to": policy.get("applies_to"),
+        "console_detector_count": len(policy.get("console_rules", [])),
+        "redact_before_persist": policy.get("redact_before_persist"),
+        "failure_mode": policy.get("failure_mode"),
+    }
+
+
+def _project_audit() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    policy = console_audit.audit_policy()
+    return {
+        "schema_version": policy.get("schema_version"),
+        "required_field_count": len(policy.get("required_fields", [])),
+        "results": policy.get("results"),
+        "retention_defaults_days": policy.get("retention_defaults_days"),
+        "append_only": policy.get("append_only"),
+        "redact_before_persist": policy.get("redact_before_persist"),
+        "enabled": policy.get("enabled"),
+    }
+
+
+def _static(value: dict[str, Any]) -> Callable[[], dict[str, Any]]:
+    return lambda: dict(value)
+
+
+# ── Guardrail catalog ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# One row per major guardrail. ``project`` yields the active value (may raise;
+# caught per entry). ``documented_default`` drives the feasible diff.
+
+_CatalogRow = tuple[
+    str,
+    str,
+    str,
+    str,
+    tuple[SourcePointer, ...],
+    Callable[[], dict[str, Any]] | None,
+    dict[str, Any] | None,
+]
+
+_CATALOG: tuple[_CatalogRow, ...] = (
+    (
+        "role_separation",
+        "Role separation and RBAC",
+        "role_separation",
+        "Author, reviewer, merger, and reconciler capabilities are disjoint and "
+        "role-exclusive; self-review and self-merge are always blocked. The "
+        "console RBAC model defaults to deny.",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("task capability map", "task_capability_map.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("role/namespace gate", "role_namespace_gate.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("console RBAC", "webui/console_authz.py", "module"),
+        ),
+        _project_role_separation,
+        {"default_decision": "deny", "execution_enabled": False},
+    ),
+    (
+        "lease_rules",
+        "Issue and PR lease lifecycle",
+        "lease_rules",
+        "Durable work is claimed through issue locks and control-plane leases "
+        "with freshness, expiry, and dead-session recovery; abandoned or stale "
+        "claims are reclaimed only through the sanctioned recovery path.",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("issue lock store", "issue_lock_store.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("branch cleanup guard", "branch_cleanup_guard.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("safety model §5", "docs/safety-model.md", "doc", "5-mutation-gating"),
+        ),
+        None,
+        None,
+    ),
+    (
+        "worktree_rules",
+        "Author worktree binding",
+        "worktree_rules",
+        "Author mutations require a validated worktree under branches/ derived "
+        "from the active issue lock; silent fallback to the stable control "
+        "checkout or master is forbidden (#618).",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("author worktree gate", "author_mutation_worktree.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("worktree bootstrap", "scripts/worktree-start", "script"),
+            SourcePointer("workflow scope guard", "workflow_scope_guard.py", "module"),
+        ),
+        None,
+        None,
+    ),
+    (
+        "merge_confirmation",
+        "Explicit merge confirmation",
+        "merge_confirmation",
+        "A merge fails closed unless the caller passes the exact confirmation "
+        "phrase for that PR; reviewing never implies merging.",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("merge path", "merge_pr.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("merge tool gate", "gitea_mcp_server.py", "module"),
+        ),
+        _static({"required_confirmation_format": "MERGE PR <n>", "auto_merge": False}),
+        {"auto_merge": False},
+    ),
+    (
+        "redaction",
+        "Secret redaction",
+        "redaction",
+        "Every console surface runs the shared gitea_audit pass then console "
+        "patterns before any payload, HTML, log line, or audit record leaves "
+        "the server; unredactable values fail closed to the placeholder.",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("console redaction", "webui/console_redaction.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("shared redaction", "gitea_audit.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("safety model §3", "docs/safety-model.md", "doc", "3-secret-redaction"),
+        ),
+        _project_redaction,
+        {"redact_before_persist": True},
+    ),
+    (
+        "contamination",
+        "Contamination containment",
+        "contamination",
+        "A session contaminated by a direct stable-branch push or a manual MCP "
+        "daemon kill is blocked from review, merge, close, and completion "
+        "mutations until cleared (reconciler-exempt).",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("contamination gates", "gitea_mcp_server.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("stable-branch audit", "workflow_scope_guard.py", "module"),
+        ),
+        None,
+        None,
+    ),
+    (
+        "allocator_policy",
+        "Work allocation policy",
+        "allocator_policy",
+        "Workers do not self-select exclusive work; the controller-owned "
+        "allocator ranks the complete queue by priority then PRs-before-issues "
+        "then ascending number, honoring dependency edges and foreign claims.",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("allocator", "gitea_mcp_server.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("safety model §5", "docs/safety-model.md", "doc", "5-mutation-gating"),
+        ),
+        _static(
+            {
+                "self_select_exclusive_work": False,
+                "ranking": "priority desc, PRs before issues, number asc",
+                "respects_dependency_edges": True,
+                "respects_foreign_claims": True,
+            }
+        ),
+        {"self_select_exclusive_work": False},
+    ),
+    (
+        "audit_logging",
+        "Audit logging",
+        "audit_logging",
+        "Console intent and authorization outcomes are recorded to an "
+        "append-only, redact-before-persist audit log; MCP mutations are "
+        "recorded by gitea_audit and correlated by request id.",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("console audit", "webui/console_audit.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("MCP audit", "gitea_audit.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("safety model §1", "docs/safety-model.md", "doc", "1-audit-logging-and-confirmation"),
+        ),
+        _project_audit,
+        {"append_only": True, "redact_before_persist": True},
+    ),
+    (
+        "mutation_gating",
+        "Mutation gating and master parity",
+        "mutation_gating",
+        "Mutations fail closed while the running server is stale relative to "
+        "master, and every mutation is preceded by identity and capability "
+        "resolution in a fixed pre-flight order.",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("mutation gate", "gitea_mcp_server.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("safety model §5", "docs/safety-model.md", "doc", "5-mutation-gating"),
+        ),
+        _static(
+            {
+                "stale_runtime_blocks_mutations": True,
+                "preflight_order": "whoami -> resolve_task_capability -> mutation",
+            }
+        ),
+        {"stale_runtime_blocks_mutations": True},
+    ),
+)
+
+
+def _build_entry(row: _CatalogRow) -> PolicyEntry:
+    key, title, category, summary, sources, project, documented_default = row
+    active: dict[str, Any] | None = None
+    error: str | None = None
+    if project is not None:
+        try:
+            active = project()
+        except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — fail soft; never take the page down
+            active = None
+            error = f"active projection unavailable: {exc}"
+    diff = _diff_active_vs_default(active, documented_default)
+    return PolicyEntry(
+        key=key,
+        title=title,
+        category=category,
+        summary=summary,
+        sources=sources,
+        active=active,
+        documented_default=documented_default,
+        diff=diff,
+        error=error,
+    )
+
+
+def load_policy_inventory() -> PolicyInventorySnapshot:
+    """Build the read-only guardrail inventory. Never raises for one bad entry."""
+    entries: list[PolicyEntry] = []
+    build_errors: list[str] = []
+    for row in _CATALOG:
+        try:
+            entries.append(_build_entry(row))
+        except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — one row must not break the rest
+            build_errors.append(f"{row[0]}: {exc}")
+    categories = tuple(dict.fromkeys(e.category for e in entries))
+    return PolicyInventorySnapshot(
+        schema_version=SCHEMA_VERSION,
+        read_only=True,
+        note=READ_ONLY_NOTE,
+        entries=tuple(entries),
+        categories=categories,
+        build_errors=tuple(build_errors),
+    )
+
+
+def snapshot_to_dict(snapshot: PolicyInventorySnapshot) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Serialize the snapshot, redacting the entire payload before it is emitted."""
+    payload = {
+        "schema_version": snapshot.schema_version,
+        "read_only": snapshot.read_only,
+        "note": snapshot.note,
+        "categories": list(snapshot.categories),
+        "entry_count": len(snapshot.entries),
+        "entries": [entry.to_dict() for entry in snapshot.entries],
+        "build_errors": list(snapshot.build_errors),
+    }
+    return console_redaction.redact_payload(payload)

webui/policy_views.py

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+"""HTML views for the workflow policy and guardrail inventory (#646)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import html
+import json
+
+from webui.policy_inventory import PolicyEntry, PolicyInventorySnapshot
+
+
+def _source_pointer(source) -> str:
+    path = source.path
+    if source.anchor:
+        path = f"{path}#{source.anchor}"
+    return (
+        f"<li>{html.escape(source.label)} — "
+        f"<code>{html.escape(path)}</code> "
+        f"<span class='muted'>({html.escape(source.kind)})</span></li>"
+    )
+
+
+def _active_block(entry: PolicyEntry) -> str:
+    if entry.error:
+        return (
+            "<p class='muted'><strong>Active value unavailable:</strong> "
+            f"{html.escape(entry.error)}</p>"
+        )
+    if not entry.active:
+        return "<p class='muted'>No live projection for this guardrail.</p>"
+    pretty = json.dumps(entry.active, indent=2, sort_keys=True, default=str)
+    return f"<pre class='prompt-text'>{html.escape(pretty)}</pre>"
+
+
+def _diff_block(entry: PolicyEntry) -> str:
+    if entry.diff is None:
+        if entry.documented_default is None:
+            return "<p class='muted'>Diff vs documented default: not feasible (no declared default).</p>"
+        return "<p class='muted'>Diff vs documented default: unavailable.</p>"
+    status = entry.diff.get("status", "unknown")
+    badge = "badge-claimed" if status == "matches_documented_default" else "badge-blocked"
+    rows = []
+    for key, cell in (entry.diff.get("checked") or {}).items():
+        marker = "✓" if cell.get("matches") else "✗"
+        rows.append(
+            "<tr>"
+            f"<td><code>{html.escape(str(key))}</code></td>"
+            f"<td><code>{html.escape(str(cell.get('expected')))}</code></td>"
+            f"<td><code>{html.escape(str(cell.get('observed')))}</code></td>"
+            f"<td>{marker}</td>"
+            "</tr>"
+        )
+    table = ""
+    if rows:
+        table = (
+            "<table class='detail'><thead><tr>"
+            "<th>Key</th><th>Documented</th><th>Active</th><th>Match</th>"
+            "</tr></thead><tbody>"
+            f"{''.join(rows)}</tbody></table>"
+        )
+    return (
+        f"<p class='meta'>Diff vs documented default: "
+        f"<span class='badge {badge}'>{html.escape(status)}</span></p>"
+        f"{table}"
+    )
+
+
+def _entry_card(entry: PolicyEntry) -> str:
+    sources = "".join(_source_pointer(s) for s in entry.sources)
+    return (
+        "<div class='prompt-card'>"
+        f"<h3>{html.escape(entry.title)} "
+        f"<span class='badge'>{html.escape(entry.category)}</span></h3>"
+        f"<p>{html.escape(entry.summary)}</p>"
+        "<p class='meta'><strong>Source pointers</strong></p>"
+        f"<ul>{sources}</ul>"
+        "<p class='meta'><strong>Active configuration</strong></p>"
+        f"{_active_block(entry)}"
+        f"{_diff_block(entry)}"
+        "</div>"
+    )
+
+
+def render_policy_page(snapshot: PolicyInventorySnapshot) -> str:
+    categories = ", ".join(html.escape(c) for c in snapshot.categories) or "none"
+    cards = "".join(_entry_card(e) for e in snapshot.entries)
+    build_errors = ""
+    if snapshot.build_errors:
+        items = "".join(
+            f"<li>{html.escape(err)}</li>" for err in snapshot.build_errors
+        )
+        build_errors = (
+            "<div class='stub'><p><strong>Some guardrails could not be built:"
+            f"</strong></p><ul>{items}</ul></div>"
+        )
+    return (
+        "<h2>Workflow policy &amp; guardrails</h2>"
+        f"<p class='muted'>{html.escape(snapshot.note)}</p>"
+        f"<p class='meta'>Schema v{snapshot.schema_version} · "
+        f"{len(snapshot.entries)} guardrails · categories: {categories}</p>"
+        f"{build_errors}"
+        f"{cards}"
+        "<p class='muted'>This page is read-only. It reports enforced policy "
+        "and never edits or weakens a gate. Secret values are redacted.</p>"
+    )

webui/timeline.py

@@ -1,906 +0,0 @@
-"""Workflow-event and conversation timeline model (#637, Phase 1).
-
-Operators cannot browse a unified timeline of workflow events, decisions,
-tool calls, and handoffs: the evidence is scattered across control-plane
-events, Gitea canonical handoff comments, and local logs. This module defines
-one durable, versioned event schema and per-source adapters that normalise
-those scattered records into a single ``WorkflowEvent`` stream, plus a
-read-only query layer (filter by issue / PR / session, stable ordering,
-pagination) that the ``/api/v1/timeline`` route serves.
-
-Design rules honoured here:
-
-- **Read-only.** Sources are read; nothing is mutated. The control-plane
-  database is opened through a ``mode=ro`` URI so a missing or unwritable DB
-  degrades to a reason instead of creating directories or running migrations.
-- **Fail-soft per source.** An unavailable source degrades to a status with a
-  reason rather than raising, and a source that could not run is never
-  rendered as an empty-and-healthy timeline.
-- **Answerable filters only.** Each source declares which filter dimensions it
-  can actually answer. A filter dimension no source that ran can carry is
-  refused with an explicit reason rather than silently matching nothing: an
-  empty page from an unanswerable filter reads to an operator as "no such
-  activity", which is a different — and false — statement.
-- **Redaction at the boundary, fail closed.** Every free-text field (event
-  messages, redacted tool arguments, decision/proof text) is run through the
-  console redaction policy before it leaves this module, and *before* any
-  structured value is derived from it — evidence references are extracted from
-  redacted text, then independently revalidated before serialization. An
-  unredactable value becomes the placeholder, and a value that cannot be proven
-  safe is dropped — an unredacted payload is never emitted, and a generation
-  error never drops raw data to a caller or a log.
-- **Stable ordering.** Events sort by ``(timestamp, source_rank, event_key)``
-  with a deterministic tiebreak, so pagination is stable across calls and
-  events with equal or missing timestamps keep a fixed order.
-
-Non-goals (from the issue): no full chat replay, no mutation of historical
-events, no unredacted tool-argument storage.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import re
-import sqlite3
-from dataclasses import dataclass, replace
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any, Callable, Iterable
-
-import control_plane_db
-from webui import console_redaction
-
-# The schema is versioned so consumers can branch on shape. Bump on any
-# breaking change to WorkflowEvent's serialized form.
-TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
-
-# Known event sources and their deterministic ordering rank. When two events
-# carry the same timestamp, the source rank breaks the tie before the
-# per-source event key, so a control-plane event and a handoff comment minted
-# in the same second always sort in a fixed order.
-SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE = "control_plane"
-SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF = "gitea_handoff"
-_SOURCE_RANK = {
-    SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE: 0,
-    SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF: 1,
-}
-
-# The filter dimensions the query layer accepts.
-FILTER_ISSUE = "issue"
-FILTER_PR = "pr"
-FILTER_SESSION = "session"
-
-# Which dimensions each source can actually answer. This is a property of the
-# underlying records, not of the query code: the control-plane ``events`` table
-# is (event_id, work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at) and carries no
-# session identity at all, so no control-plane event can ever match a session
-# filter. A CTH handoff comment can declare its session as a field, so the
-# handoff source answers all three. Filtering on a dimension the surviving
-# sources cannot carry is refused in ``load_timeline`` rather than answered
-# with an empty page.
-_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {
-    SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE: (FILTER_ISSUE, FILTER_PR),
-    SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF: (FILTER_ISSUE, FILTER_PR, FILTER_SESSION),
-}
-
-# Why a source cannot answer a dimension, for the refusal reason an operator reads.
-_SOURCE_FILTER_LIMITS: dict[tuple[str, str], str] = {
-    (SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE, FILTER_SESSION): (
-        "control-plane events carry no session identity "
-        "(the events table has no session column)"
-    ),
-}
-
-# A timestamp far in the future so events with no parseable timestamp sort
-# last (after everything real) instead of first, without raising.
-_MISSING_TS_SORT = "9999-12-31T23:59:59Z"
-
-
-def _parse_ts(value: str | None) -> str | None:
-    """Normalise a timestamp to ``...Z`` UTC, or None when unparseable."""
-    if not value:
-        return None
-    text = str(value).strip()
-    if not text:
-        return None
-    candidate = text[:-1] + "+00:00" if text.endswith("Z") else text
-    try:
-        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(candidate)
-    except ValueError:
-        return None
-    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
-        parsed = parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
-
-
-def _redact(value: Any) -> Any:
-    """Redact a single free-text field, failing closed to the placeholder."""
-    if value is None:
-        return None
-    return console_redaction.redact_text(str(value))
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class WorkflowEvent:
-    """One normalised timeline event.
-
-    Every field is optional except ``source``/``event_type``/``event_key``
-    because sources carry different subsets. The class is frozen so an adapted
-    event is an immutable record; a consumer that needs a variant builds a new
-    one rather than mutating history.
-    """
-
-    source: str
-    event_type: str
-    event_key: str
-    timestamp: str | None = None
-    actor: str | None = None
-    role: str | None = None
-    issue_number: int | None = None
-    pr_number: int | None = None
-    session_id: str | None = None
-    tool_name: str | None = None
-    decision: str | None = None
-    message: str | None = None
-    correlation_id: str | None = None
-    evidence_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
-    sensitive: bool = False
-
-    def sort_key(self) -> tuple[str, int, str]:
-        return (
-            self.timestamp or _MISSING_TS_SORT,
-            _SOURCE_RANK.get(self.source, 99),
-            self.event_key,
-        )
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "source": self.source,
-            "event_type": self.event_type,
-            "event_key": self.event_key,
-            "timestamp": self.timestamp,
-            "actor": self.actor,
-            "role": self.role,
-            "issue_number": self.issue_number,
-            "pr_number": self.pr_number,
-            "session_id": self.session_id,
-            "tool_name": self.tool_name,
-            "decision": self.decision,
-            "message": self.message,
-            "correlation_id": self.correlation_id,
-            "evidence_refs": list(self.evidence_refs),
-            "sensitive": self.sensitive,
-        }
-
-
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-# Adapters — pure functions from a source's raw records to WorkflowEvents.     #
-# Each is total: a malformed record is skipped, never raised on.               #
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-# Event types whose payload is treated as sensitive and always redaction-hard
-# (they can carry lease/session provenance or tool arguments).
-_SENSITIVE_EVENT_HINTS = ("lease", "capability", "token", "auth", "secret")
-
-# Reference tokens (issue/PR/comment ids) and SHAs parsed out of proof text.
-_EVIDENCE_REF_RE = re.compile(r"(?:#|PR\s*#?|issue\s*#?|comment\s*#?)(\d+)", re.IGNORECASE)
-
-# A commit reference is only recognised when the text *declares* it as one.
-# A bare lowercase hex run is not evidence of anything: at 40 characters it is
-# exactly the shape of a Gitea personal access token, and at 7 it also matches
-# ordinary words such as "defaced". Requiring an anchoring keyword keeps real
-# references ("commit abc1234", "at head a209756...", "base caaae9b6") usable
-# while refusing to lift an undeclared secret-shaped run out of free text.
-_SHA_RE = re.compile(
-    r"(?i:\b(?:commit|sha|head|base|parent|revision|rev|merge[- ]base)\b[\s:=@#]*)"
-    r"([0-9a-f]{7,40})\b"
-)
-
-# Shapes a serialized evidence reference is allowed to take. Anything else is
-# dropped rather than emitted.
-_REF_ISSUE_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^#[0-9]{1,9}$")
-_REF_SHA_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{7,40}$")
-
-# A long undelimited hex run with no declaring context is treated as credential
-# material wherever it appears, never as an identifier.
-_BARE_SECRET_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{32,}$")
-
-# An event type reads like an identifier, but a stored one is externally
-# influenced: any producer that writes the control-plane ``events`` table
-# chooses the string. It reaches ``to_dict`` verbatim, so it is validated here
-# rather than trusted because of where it came from.
-_CP_EVENT_TYPE_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9._:+-]{0,63}$")
-
-# Emitted in place of a value that cannot be proven safe. Deliberately not a
-# plausible workflow type: an unsafe value is refused, never quietly rewritten
-# into a different valid-looking one that would misdescribe the record.
-UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE = "unsafe:redacted"
-
-# Emitted for a CTH heading that is not a declared member of ``CTH_TYPES``. The
-# contract is enforced on write (``format_cth_body``) and on assess; the read
-# path the timeline uses enforces it too rather than assuming it was.
-UNKNOWN_HANDOFF_EVENT_TYPE = "handoff:unrecognized"
-
-# A source record id is a plain integer in both sources it comes from: the
-# control-plane ``events`` primary key and a Gitea comment id. ``event_key`` is
-# serialized verbatim and is the pagination tiebreak, so anything else is
-# refused rather than interpolated into it.
-_RECORD_ID_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[0-9]{1,19}$")
-
-
-def _kind_to_numbers(kind: str | None, number: int | None) -> tuple[int | None, int | None]:
-    """Map a control-plane work-item (kind, number) to (issue_no, pr_no)."""
-    if number is None:
-        return (None, None)
-    if kind == "pr":
-        return (None, int(number))
-    if kind == "issue":
-        return (int(number), None)
-    return (None, None)
-
-
-def _correlation_for(kind: str | None, number: int | None) -> str | None:
-    if number is None or kind not in ("issue", "pr"):
-        return None
-    return f"{kind}#{number}"
-
-
-def _extract_evidence_refs(*texts: str | None) -> tuple[str, ...]:
-    """Extract issue/PR and declared-commit references from **redacted** text.
-
-    Callers must pass text that has already been through :func:`_redact`; this
-    function derives a structured field from its input, so extracting ahead of
-    redaction would republish whatever redaction was about to remove. Every
-    reference is revalidated by :func:`_validated_evidence_refs` before it is
-    serialized.
-    """
-    refs: list[str] = []
-    for text in texts:
-        if not text:
-            continue
-        for match in _EVIDENCE_REF_RE.finditer(text):
-            token = f"#{match.group(1)}"
-            if token not in refs:
-                refs.append(token)
-        for match in _SHA_RE.finditer(text):
-            token = match.group(1)
-            if token not in refs:
-                refs.append(token)
-    return tuple(refs)
-
-
-def _validated_evidence_refs(refs: Iterable[str]) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...], bool]:
-    """Independently revalidate references immediately before serialization.
-
-    Extraction is not trusted on its own. A reference survives only when it has
-    a known reference shape and is unchanged by a second redaction pass — a
-    value the redaction policy would alter is credential material that must not
-    be emitted as a structured field. A full 40-character SHA stays usable
-    because extraction only accepts a hex run the source text explicitly
-    declared as a commit. Returns ``(safe_refs, dropped_any)``; ``dropped_any``
-    marks the event sensitive so the drop is visible rather than silent.
-    """
-    safe: list[str] = []
-    dropped = False
-    for ref in refs or ():
-        try:
-            token = str(ref).strip()
-            if not token:
-                continue
-            recognised = bool(_REF_ISSUE_SHAPE.match(token) or _REF_SHA_SHAPE.match(token))
-            if not recognised:
-                dropped = True
-                continue
-            if _redact(token) != token:
-                dropped = True
-                continue
-            if token not in safe:
-                safe.append(token)
-        except Exception:
-            # Fail closed: a reference that cannot be proven safe is dropped.
-            dropped = True
-            continue
-    return (tuple(safe), dropped)
-
-
-def _safe_session_id(value: Any) -> str | None:
-    """Return a session identifier only when it is safe to emit.
-
-    The value is authoritative source data — a session the record names for
-    itself — but it is still free text. It is dropped when redaction alters it
-    or when it is a bare secret-shaped hex run, so a credential parked in a
-    session field can never reach the payload or be echoed back by a filter.
-    """
-    if value is None:
-        return None
-    text = str(value).strip()
-    if not text:
-        return None
-    if _BARE_SECRET_SHAPE.match(text):
-        return None
-    return text if _redact(text) == text else None
-
-
-def _safe_record_id(value: Any) -> str | None:
-    """Return a source record id only when it is a plain numeric identifier.
-
-    ``event_key`` is serialized verbatim and is the deterministic pagination
-    tiebreak, so an id is interpolated into it only when it has the shape both
-    real sources actually produce. A record whose identity cannot be trusted is
-    refused by the caller rather than keyed on.
-    """
-    if value is None or isinstance(value, bool):
-        return None
-    if isinstance(value, int):
-        return str(value)
-    text = str(value).strip()
-    return text if _RECORD_ID_SHAPE.match(text) else None
-
-
-def _safe_cp_event_type(value: Any) -> tuple[str, bool]:
-    """Validate a stored control-plane event type. Returns ``(type, unsafe)``.
-
-    The stored value is externally influenced — whichever producer wrote the
-    ``events`` row chose the string — and ``to_dict`` serializes it verbatim, so
-    it passes a boundary of its own instead of relying on the one ``message``
-    passes. A value survives only when it is an ordinary identifier, is not a
-    bare secret-shaped hex run, and is unchanged by a redaction pass. Anything
-    else fails closed to :data:`UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE`: the record stays visible as
-    an audit entry, but the value itself is never republished — not verbatim,
-    not partially sanitized, and not rewritten into some other valid-looking
-    type that would misdescribe what happened.
-    """
-    text = ("" if value is None else str(value)).strip()
-    if not text:
-        return ("", False)
-    if _BARE_SECRET_SHAPE.match(text):
-        return (UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE, True)
-    if not _CP_EVENT_TYPE_SHAPE.match(text):
-        return (UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE, True)
-    if _redact(text) != text:
-        return (UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE, True)
-    return (text, False)
-
-
-def _safe_echo(value: Any) -> Any:
-    """Guard a scalar that is echoed back rather than derived from a record.
-
-    Query scope and filter values are caller-supplied and are reflected in the
-    response so an operator can see what was asked. Reflection is still
-    emission: a value redaction would alter, or a bare secret-shaped hex run, is
-    replaced by the placeholder instead of being echoed verbatim. Ordinary
-    scope and filter values pass through untouched.
-    """
-    if value is None or isinstance(value, (int, bool)):
-        return value
-    text = str(value)
-    if _BARE_SECRET_SHAPE.match(text.strip()):
-        return console_redaction.REDACTED
-    return _redact(text)
-
-
-def adapt_cp_events(rows: Iterable[dict[str, Any]]) -> list[WorkflowEvent]:
-    """Adapt control-plane ``events`` rows (joined to work_items) into events.
-
-    Each row is expected to carry ``event_id``, ``event_type``, ``message``,
-    ``created_at`` and the joined work-item ``kind``/``number``. Rows missing
-    an id or type are skipped so a partially written table never raises.
-    """
-    events: list[WorkflowEvent] = []
-    for row in rows or []:
-        try:
-            event_id = _safe_record_id(row.get("event_id"))
-            raw_event_type = (row.get("event_type") or "").strip()
-            if event_id is None or not raw_event_type:
-                continue
-            # The stored type is source data, not a trusted constant: validate
-            # it before it is serialized, exactly as `message` below is redacted
-            # before it is serialized.
-            event_type, event_type_unsafe = _safe_cp_event_type(raw_event_type)
-            kind = row.get("kind")
-            number = row.get("number")
-            issue_no, pr_no = _kind_to_numbers(kind, number)
-            sensitive = event_type_unsafe or any(
-                hint in raw_event_type.lower() for hint in _SENSITIVE_EVENT_HINTS
-            )
-            events.append(
-                WorkflowEvent(
-                    source=SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE,
-                    event_type=event_type,
-                    event_key=f"cp:{event_id}",
-                    timestamp=_parse_ts(row.get("created_at")),
-                    issue_number=issue_no,
-                    pr_number=pr_no,
-                    # No session_id: the control-plane events table is
-                    # (event_id, work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at)
-                    # and records no session. Inventing one from the work item
-                    # or the message text would be a guess, so this source
-                    # declares the session dimension unsupported instead
-                    # (_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT) and the query layer refuses a
-                    # session filter it cannot honestly answer.
-                    message=_redact(row.get("message")),
-                    correlation_id=_correlation_for(kind, number),
-                    sensitive=sensitive,
-                )
-            )
-        except Exception:
-            # A single malformed row must not sink the whole adaptation.
-            continue
-    return events
-
-
-def adapt_cth_comments(
-    comments: Iterable[dict[str, Any]],
-    *,
-    kind: str,
-    number: int,
-) -> list[WorkflowEvent]:
-    """Adapt Gitea Canonical Thread Handoff (CTH) comments into events.
-
-    Only comments that parse as a CTH (``canonical_thread_handoff.parse_cth_comment``)
-    become events; ordinary comments are ignored. ``kind``/``number`` scope the
-    events to the issue or PR the comments belong to.
-    """
-    # Imported lazily so this module has no import-time dependency on the
-    # handoff parser when only the control-plane adapter is used.
-    from canonical_thread_handoff import is_known_cth_type, parse_cth_comment
-
-    # ``kind``/``number`` are interpolated into event_key and correlation_id, so
-    # they are normalised once here. A scope this adapter cannot express is
-    # refused outright rather than serialized into an identifier.
-    kind = (kind or "").strip().lower()
-    if kind not in ("issue", "pr"):
-        return []
-    try:
-        number = int(number)
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        return []
-
-    issue_no, pr_no = _kind_to_numbers(kind, number)
-    correlation = _correlation_for(kind, number)
-    events: list[WorkflowEvent] = []
-    for comment in comments or []:
-        try:
-            body = comment.get("body") or ""
-            parsed = parse_cth_comment(body)
-            if not parsed:
-                continue
-            fields = parsed.get("fields") or {}
-            cth_type = parsed.get("cth_type") or ""
-            comment_id = _safe_record_id(comment.get("id"))
-            if comment_id is None:
-                continue
-            # The CTH heading is free text: the parser accepts whatever follows
-            # "## CTH:", and only the write and assess paths check it against
-            # the contract. Check it here too — an unrecognised heading is
-            # reported as such rather than serialized into event_type, so
-            # arbitrary, malformed, or secret-shaped heading content has no way
-            # through. Declared types are preserved exactly.
-            cth_type_known = is_known_cth_type(cth_type)
-            # Redaction runs first, and every derived value is taken from the
-            # redacted text — deriving evidence refs from the raw proof would
-            # re-emit exactly what redaction was about to remove.
-            decision = _redact(fields.get("decision"))
-            proof = _redact(fields.get("proof"))
-            next_action = _redact(fields.get("next action"))
-            refs, refs_dropped = _validated_evidence_refs(
-                _extract_evidence_refs(proof, decision)
-            )
-            events.append(
-                WorkflowEvent(
-                    source=SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF,
-                    event_type=(
-                        f"handoff:{cth_type.strip()}"
-                        if cth_type_known
-                        else UNKNOWN_HANDOFF_EVENT_TYPE
-                    ),
-                    event_key=f"cth:{kind}:{number}:{comment_id}",
-                    timestamp=_parse_ts(comment.get("created_at")),
-                    actor=_redact((comment.get("user") or {}).get("login")),
-                    role=_redact(fields.get("next owner")),
-                    issue_number=issue_no,
-                    pr_number=pr_no,
-                    # A CTH names its own session when the producer records one;
-                    # it is read from that declared field, never inferred from
-                    # unrelated text.
-                    session_id=_safe_session_id(fields.get("session")),
-                    decision=decision,
-                    message=next_action or _redact(fields.get("status")),
-                    correlation_id=correlation,
-                    evidence_refs=refs,
-                    sensitive=refs_dropped or not cth_type_known,
-                )
-            )
-        except Exception:
-            continue
-    return events
-
-
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-# Read-only control-plane event source.                                       #
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-_CP_EVENTS_QUERY = """
-SELECT e.event_id   AS event_id,
-       e.event_type AS event_type,
-       e.message    AS message,
-       e.created_at AS created_at,
-       w.kind       AS kind,
-       w.number     AS number
-FROM events e
-JOIN work_items w ON e.work_item_id = w.work_item_id
-WHERE w.remote = ? AND w.org = ? AND w.repo = ?
-"""
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class SourceStatus:
-    """Fail-soft status for one timeline source.
-
-    ``supported_filters`` states which filter dimensions this source's records
-    can carry; ``unsupported_filters`` names the requested dimensions it cannot,
-    so an operator can see *why* a source contributed nothing rather than being
-    left to read an empty list as an absence of activity.
-    """
-
-    name: str
-    ok: bool
-    reason: str | None = None
-    count: int = 0
-    supported_filters: tuple[str, ...] = ()
-    unsupported_filters: tuple[str, ...] = ()
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "name": self.name,
-            "ok": self.ok,
-            "reason": self.reason,
-            "count": self.count,
-            "supported_filters": list(self.supported_filters),
-            "unsupported_filters": list(self.unsupported_filters),
-        }
-
-
-def _cp_status(*, ok: bool, reason: str | None = None, count: int = 0) -> SourceStatus:
-    return SourceStatus(
-        SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE,
-        ok=ok,
-        # A failure reason is serialized like any other field and is often an
-        # exception string carrying a path or a transport error, so it crosses
-        # the redaction boundary too. Static reasons pass through unchanged.
-        reason=_redact(reason),
-        count=count,
-        supported_filters=_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT[SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE],
-    )
-
-
-def _handoff_status(*, ok: bool, reason: str | None = None, count: int = 0) -> SourceStatus:
-    return SourceStatus(
-        SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF,
-        ok=ok,
-        # Same boundary as the control-plane status: this reason can quote an
-        # error raised by a live authenticated fetch.
-        reason=_redact(reason),
-        count=count,
-        supported_filters=_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT[SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF],
-    )
-
-
-def read_cp_events(
-    *,
-    remote: str,
-    org: str,
-    repo: str,
-    db_path: str | None = None,
-) -> tuple[list[WorkflowEvent], SourceStatus]:
-    """Read scoped control-plane events read-only. Never creates the DB.
-
-    Opens the SQLite file through a ``mode=ro`` URI: a health/timeline read
-    must never create directories or run the schema migration that
-    ``ControlPlaneDB()`` performs on construction. A missing or unreadable DB
-    degrades to a status with a reason.
-    """
-    path = (db_path or control_plane_db.default_db_path()).strip()
-    conn: sqlite3.Connection | None = None
-    try:
-        conn = sqlite3.connect(f"file:{path}?mode=ro", uri=True)
-        conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
-        cursor = conn.execute(_CP_EVENTS_QUERY, (remote, org, repo))
-        rows = [dict(r) for r in cursor.fetchall()]
-    except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
-        return ([], _cp_status(ok=False, reason=f"control-plane DB unavailable: {exc}"))
-    except sqlite3.Error as exc:
-        return ([], _cp_status(ok=False, reason=f"control-plane read failed: {exc}"))
-    finally:
-        if conn is not None:
-            conn.close()
-    events = adapt_cp_events(rows)
-    return (events, _cp_status(ok=True, count=len(events)))
-
-
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-# Filter, sort, paginate.                                                     #
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-
-def filter_events(
-    events: Iterable[WorkflowEvent],
-    *,
-    issue: int | None = None,
-    pr: int | None = None,
-    session: str | None = None,
-) -> list[WorkflowEvent]:
-    """Filter events by issue number, PR number, and/or session id.
-
-    Filters are conjunctive. A filter that names a dimension an event does not
-    carry excludes that event (an issue filter excludes PR-only events).
-    """
-    out: list[WorkflowEvent] = []
-    for ev in events:
-        if issue is not None and ev.issue_number != issue:
-            continue
-        if pr is not None and ev.pr_number != pr:
-            continue
-        if session is not None and ev.session_id != session:
-            continue
-        out.append(ev)
-    return out
-
-
-def sort_events(events: Iterable[WorkflowEvent]) -> list[WorkflowEvent]:
-    """Return events in stable timeline order (ascending)."""
-    return sorted(events, key=lambda ev: ev.sort_key())
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class TimelinePage:
-    """One page of the sorted, filtered timeline."""
-
-    events: tuple[WorkflowEvent, ...]
-    total: int
-    limit: int
-    offset: int
-
-    @property
-    def next_offset(self) -> int | None:
-        nxt = self.offset + len(self.events)
-        return nxt if nxt < self.total else None
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "events": [ev.to_dict() for ev in self.events],
-            "pagination": {
-                "total": self.total,
-                "limit": self.limit,
-                "offset": self.offset,
-                "returned": len(self.events),
-                "next_offset": self.next_offset,
-                "has_more": self.next_offset is not None,
-            },
-        }
-
-
-_MAX_LIMIT = 500
-_DEFAULT_LIMIT = 50
-
-
-def _coerce_bounds(limit: int | None, offset: int | None) -> tuple[int, int]:
-    try:
-        lim = int(limit) if limit is not None else _DEFAULT_LIMIT
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        lim = _DEFAULT_LIMIT
-    try:
-        off = int(offset) if offset is not None else 0
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        off = 0
-    lim = max(1, min(lim, _MAX_LIMIT))
-    off = max(0, off)
-    return (lim, off)
-
-
-def paginate(events: list[WorkflowEvent], *, limit: int | None, offset: int | None) -> TimelinePage:
-    lim, off = _coerce_bounds(limit, offset)
-    window = events[off : off + lim]
-    return TimelinePage(events=tuple(window), total=len(events), limit=lim, offset=off)
-
-
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-# Composition — load_timeline aggregates all sources, fail-soft.              #
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-# A comment source is a callable that, given (kind, number), returns the raw
-# Gitea comment list for that issue/PR. The route supplies a live fail-soft
-# fetcher; tests supply a fixture. When None, the handoff source is reported as
-# not-run (never silently empty-and-healthy).
-CommentSource = Callable[[str, int], list[dict[str, Any]]]
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class TimelineSnapshot:
-    """One answered timeline query.
-
-    ``ok`` is False when the query could not be answered as asked — currently
-    when a requested filter dimension no surviving source can carry was
-    supplied. The page is then empty *and* the snapshot says so, because an
-    ``ok`` empty page is a claim that no such activity exists.
-    """
-
-    schema_version: int
-    remote: str
-    org: str
-    repo: str
-    filters: dict[str, Any]
-    page: TimelinePage
-    sources: tuple[SourceStatus, ...]
-    ok: bool = True
-    error: dict[str, Any] | None = None
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "ok": self.ok,
-            "error": self.error,
-            "schema_version": self.schema_version,
-            # Scope and filters are echoed caller input, not derived record
-            # data. Reflecting a value is still emitting it, so both cross the
-            # same boundary; ordinary scope and filter values are unchanged.
-            "scope": {
-                "remote": _safe_echo(self.remote),
-                "org": _safe_echo(self.org),
-                "repo": _safe_echo(self.repo),
-            },
-            "filters": {key: _safe_echo(value) for key, value in self.filters.items()},
-            "sources": [s.to_dict() for s in self.sources],
-            **self.page.to_dict(),
-        }
-
-
-def _unanswerable_reasons(
-    statuses: Iterable[SourceStatus], unanswerable: Iterable[str]
-) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
-    """Explain, per source, why each unanswerable dimension went unanswered."""
-    out: list[dict[str, str]] = []
-    for status in statuses:
-        for dim in unanswerable:
-            if dim not in status.supported_filters:
-                reason = _SOURCE_FILTER_LIMITS.get(
-                    (status.name, dim), f"this source's records carry no {dim} identity"
-                )
-            elif not status.ok:
-                reason = (
-                    f"this source can carry {dim} but did not run: "
-                    f"{status.reason or 'unavailable'}"
-                )
-            else:
-                continue
-            out.append({"source": status.name, "filter": dim, "reason": reason})
-    return out
-
-
-def load_timeline(
-    *,
-    remote: str,
-    org: str,
-    repo: str,
-    issue: int | None = None,
-    pr: int | None = None,
-    session: str | None = None,
-    limit: int | None = None,
-    offset: int | None = None,
-    db_path: str | None = None,
-    comment_source: CommentSource | None = None,
-) -> TimelineSnapshot:
-    """Aggregate every timeline source into one filtered, paginated snapshot.
-
-    Sources are read independently and fail soft: an unavailable source
-    contributes a ``SourceStatus`` with ``ok=False`` and a reason, and never
-    collapses the whole timeline. The handoff source only runs when a specific
-    issue or PR is requested (a handoff comment belongs to one thread) and a
-    ``comment_source`` is available; otherwise it is reported as ``not run``
-    rather than as an empty-and-healthy source.
-
-    A filter dimension that no surviving source can carry — a ``session``
-    filter when the only source that ran is the control plane, whose events
-    record no session — is refused with ``ok=False`` and a structured error
-    instead of being answered with an empty page.
-    """
-    all_events: list[WorkflowEvent] = []
-    statuses: list[SourceStatus] = []
-
-    cp_events, cp_status = read_cp_events(remote=remote, org=org, repo=repo, db_path=db_path)
-    all_events.extend(cp_events)
-    statuses.append(cp_status)
-
-    # Gitea handoff comments are thread-scoped: only fetch when the caller
-    # narrowed to one issue or PR, and only when a source was provided.
-    handoff_target: tuple[str, int] | None = None
-    if pr is not None:
-        handoff_target = ("pr", pr)
-    elif issue is not None:
-        handoff_target = ("issue", issue)
-
-    if handoff_target is None:
-        statuses.append(
-            _handoff_status(
-                ok=False,
-                reason="not run: handoff comments are thread-scoped; filter by issue or pr to include them",
-            )
-        )
-    elif comment_source is None:
-        statuses.append(
-            _handoff_status(
-                ok=False,
-                reason="not run: no comment source configured for this timeline read",
-            )
-        )
-    else:
-        kind, number = handoff_target
-        try:
-            comments = comment_source(kind, number) or []
-            handoff_events = adapt_cth_comments(comments, kind=kind, number=number)
-            all_events.extend(handoff_events)
-            statuses.append(_handoff_status(ok=True, count=len(handoff_events)))
-        except Exception as exc:  # fail soft: a fetch/parse error degrades this source only
-            statuses.append(_handoff_status(ok=False, reason=f"handoff source failed: {exc}"))
-
-    requested = tuple(
-        name
-        for name, value in ((FILTER_ISSUE, issue), (FILTER_PR, pr), (FILTER_SESSION, session))
-        if value is not None
-    )
-    statuses = [
-        replace(
-            status,
-            unsupported_filters=tuple(
-                dim for dim in requested if dim not in status.supported_filters
-            ),
-        )
-        for status in statuses
-    ]
-    filters = {"issue": issue, "pr": pr, "session": session}
-
-    # A dimension is answerable only if a source that actually ran can carry it.
-    # If none can, refuse: an empty page would assert "no such activity", which
-    # is a claim this timeline is not in a position to make.
-    answerable: set[str] = set()
-    for status in statuses:
-        if status.ok:
-            answerable.update(status.supported_filters)
-    unanswerable = tuple(dim for dim in requested if dim not in answerable)
-
-    if unanswerable:
-        return TimelineSnapshot(
-            schema_version=TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
-            remote=remote,
-            org=org,
-            repo=repo,
-            filters=filters,
-            page=paginate([], limit=limit, offset=offset),
-            sources=tuple(statuses),
-            ok=False,
-            error={
-                "code": "filter_not_supported",
-                "unsupported_filters": list(unanswerable),
-                "detail": (
-                    "no timeline source that ran can answer "
-                    + ", ".join(f"'{dim}'" for dim in unanswerable)
-                    + "; the result is refused rather than returned empty"
-                ),
-                "sources": _unanswerable_reasons(statuses, unanswerable),
-            },
-        )
-
-    filtered = filter_events(all_events, issue=issue, pr=pr, session=session)
-    ordered = sort_events(filtered)
-    page = paginate(ordered, limit=limit, offset=offset)
-
-    return TimelineSnapshot(
-        schema_version=TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
-        remote=remote,
-        org=org,
-        repo=repo,
-        filters=filters,
-        page=page,
-        sources=tuple(statuses),
-    )
-
-
-def snapshot_to_dict(snapshot: TimelineSnapshot) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return snapshot.to_dict()