Merge branch 'master' into feat/issue-646-policy-guardrail-visibility

Clarify that Policy is live (not a Phase 1 placeholder) in shell docs and
nav module docstring. Strengthen the Policy nav graduation test to assert
status=live and absence of the nav-stub CSS class.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

docs/sanctioned-restart-controls.md

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+# Sanctioned restart and graceful reload controls (#642)
+
+Sessions used to recover MCP connectivity by killing the host daemon
+(`pkill -f mcp_server.py`, #630). That is forbidden and stays forbidden: it
+kills every namespace on the host, contaminates whichever session survives, and
+leaves no audit trail. This document describes the sanctioned replacement,
+implemented in `webui/sanctioned_restart.py`.
+
+## What the console will and will not do
+
+The console **never** restarts anything. It authorizes an intent, records it,
+and hands off to a host supervisor. There is no code path in which the console
+sends a signal, spawns a process, or renders a kill command — a regression test
+asserts the module contains no `subprocess`, `signal`, `os.kill`, `os.system`,
+or `popen` reference, and that no returned payload contains a kill command.
+
+## Operations
+
+| Mode | Action | Minimum role | Behaviour |
+|------|--------|--------------|-----------|
+| `reload` | `system.reload_namespace` | controller | Host supervisor reloads the namespace in place, draining in-flight requests. |
+| `restart` | `system.restart_namespace` | admin | Host supervisor restarts the namespace. In-flight requests are lost. |
+
+Scope is always exactly one namespace. A fleet-wide restart is an explicit
+non-goal: `all`, `*`, `fleet`, and an empty scope are refused with
+`fleet_scope_not_permitted`, because that is precisely the blast radius the
+forbidden kill already had. An unrecognised namespace is refused rather than
+passed through to the host.
+
+## The gate sequence
+
+`assess_restart_request()` applies every gate in order and reports the first
+failure with a stable reason code:
+
+| Order | Gate | Reason code on failure |
+|-------|------|------------------------|
+| 1 | Mode is `restart` or `reload` | `unknown_mode` |
+| 2 | Scope is a single known namespace | `fleet_scope_not_permitted`, `unknown_namespace` |
+| 3 | Principal holds the required console role | `unauthorized` |
+| 4 | Confirmation phrase supplied | `confirmation_required` |
+| 5 | Confirmation names this namespace and mode | `confirmation_mismatch` |
+| 6 | Out-of-band operator authorization present | `operator_authorization_missing` |
+| 7 | Runtime is not contaminated | `contaminated_runtime` |
+| 8 | Host restart hook configured | `restart_hook_not_configured` |
+
+Passing every gate yields `host_action_required`, never "restarted".
+
+### Confirmation binds the namespace
+
+The required phrase is `"<mode> <namespace>"` — for example
+`restart gitea-author`. Binding the namespace into the phrase is the point: a
+confirmation typed for one namespace cannot be replayed against another.
+
+### Operator authorization is not self-assertable
+
+Host daemon maintenance is authorized out of band through
+`GITEA_OPERATOR_DAEMON_MAINTENANCE_AUTHORIZATION`, read from the process
+environment and nowhere else (#630; #710 finding F1). A worker session cannot
+set an environment variable for an already-running daemon, so this cannot be
+faked the way a tool argument could.
+
+### The host hook
+
+`GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK` holds an opaque reference the *host* resolves —
+a supervisor label such as a launchd job name, never a command line. With no
+hook configured the request is refused; the console does not fall back to a
+process kill. The value is read server-side and never rendered to a client.
+
+## Manual kill remains contamination
+
+`classify_restart_command()` classifies an operator-proposed recovery command.
+A manual `pkill`/`kill`/`killall` of the MCP daemon is contamination, not a
+restart: it returns `clean_claim_allowed: false` and builds a durable
+contamination marker (redacted command only, never secrets) naming
+`system.restart_namespace` as the sanctioned alternative.
+
+A live, uncleared contamination marker also blocks a restart. This is stricter
+than #630's task-scoped gate, which deliberately lets a contaminated worker keep
+commenting and handing off: restarting a contaminated runtime would launder the
+contamination rather than resolve it. Clear the marker through the reconciler
+path first.
+
+## Post-restart health verification
+
+After the host supervisor acts, `verify_post_restart_health()` decides whether
+the session may claim to be clean:
+
+| Status | Meaning | Clean claim |
+|--------|---------|-------------|
+| `clean` | Required tool callable, proven through the live client namespace | Allowed |
+| `unproven` | Reported healthy without live client-namespace evidence | Refused |
+| `unhealthy` | Probe failed | Refused |
+
+Only `probe_source=client_namespace` evidence clears a session. Static tool
+registration is not proof, and neither is an offline subprocess probe — an IDE
+client can hold a registered tool list while live calls fail with
+`client is closing: EOF` (see
+[`mcp-namespace-health.md`](mcp-namespace-health.md)).
+
+## Audit
+
+Every attempt — allowed or denied — is recorded through
+`webui.console_audit` with actor, target namespace, mode, result, and reason
+code, and is redacted before it is persisted. `system.restart_namespace` is
+break-glass, so its records are retained for 730 days. Records carry
+`process_kill_executed: false`, which is a fact about the code path rather than
+a claim: no such path exists.
+
+## Environment variables
+
+| Variable | Purpose |
+|----------|---------|
+| `GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK` | Host supervisor reference; absent means restart is refused. |
+| `GITEA_OPERATOR_DAEMON_MAINTENANCE_AUTHORIZATION` | Out-of-band operator authorization reference. |
+| `WEBUI_AUDIT_LOG` | Console audit sink; absent means records are built but not persisted. |
+
+## Non-goals
+
+* No unrestricted `kill` from the UI, in any role, in any phase.
+* No fleet-wide restart.
+* No silent auto-restart loop: every attempt is confirmed and audited.
+* This does not implement the Phase 1 health API (#634).

docs/webui-authz-audit.md

@@ -91,6 +91,8 @@ already define, and a regression test asserts each mapping matches.
 | `close_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.close` | Yes | No | No | 3 |
 | `merge_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.merge` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
 | `delete_branch` | admin | destructive | `gitea.branch.delete` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
+| `system.reload_namespace` | controller | privileged | `runtime.reload_namespace` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
+| `system.restart_namespace` | admin | destructive | `runtime.restart_namespace` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 2 |
 
 **Dual control** means the acting principal may not be the sole authority: a
 second distinct principal must confirm. **Break-glass** means the action is
@@ -102,6 +104,13 @@ honouring it.
 `delete_branch` is admin-only rather than controller because it is the one
 irreversible action in the set.
 
+`system.restart_namespace` is admin-only for the same reason: restarting a
+namespace drops every in-flight request on it. `system.reload_namespace` drains
+first, so it is privileged but not destructive. Neither action is ever executed
+by the console — both hand off to a host supervisor, and neither exposes a raw
+process kill. See
+[`sanctioned-restart-controls.md`](sanctioned-restart-controls.md) (#642).
+
 ### Authorization decision
 
 `authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=False)` returns a decision
@@ -199,8 +208,8 @@ breaking the request it describes.
 | Class | Applies to | Default |
 |-------|-----------|---------|
 | `standard` | Routine gated writes | 90 days |
-| `privileged` | `review_pr`, `close_pr`, and any unclassifiable action | 365 days |
-| `break_glass` | `merge_pr`, `delete_branch` | 730 days |
+| `privileged` | `review_pr`, `close_pr`, `system.reload_namespace`, and any unclassifiable action | 365 days |
+| `break_glass` | `merge_pr`, `delete_branch`, `system.restart_namespace` | 730 days |
 
 Each record carries its own class, day count, and computed `expires_at`, so
 retention is auditable per record rather than inferred from file age. An

docs/webui-local-dev.md

@@ -66,6 +66,8 @@ status, onboarding checklist state, and the fail-closed error payloads (#635).
 | `/api/prompts` | JSON prompt export with workflow hashes |
 | `/runtime` | MCP runtime health and stale detection (#430) |
 | `/api/runtime` | JSON runtime health export |
+| `/policy` | Workflow policy and guardrail configuration visibility (#646) |
+| `/api/v1/policy` | Versioned JSON guardrail inventory (redacted, read-only) |
 | `/audit` | Report audit paste + validator preview (#431) |
 | `/api/audit` | JSON validator preview (POST `report_text`, optional `task_kind`) |
 | `/worktrees` | Worktree hygiene dashboard (#432) |
@@ -78,7 +80,6 @@ status, onboarding checklist state, and the fail-closed error payloads (#635).
 | `/sessions` | Phase 1 shell stub — session inventory (backed by #636) |
 | `/inventory` | Phase 1 shell stub — unified inventory (backed by #636) |
 | `/timeline` | Phase 1 shell stub — workflow event timeline |
-| `/policy` | Phase 1 shell stub — capability/role policy placeholder |
 | `/insights` | Phase 1 shell stub — operational insights placeholder |
 
 Most routes are GET-only. POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE return `405` with
@@ -239,12 +240,25 @@ health, workflow/schema SHA-256 hashes, and stale-runtime warnings when the
 checkout is behind merged safety-gate changes. Restart guidance links to #420;
 no tokens or MCP restart actions are exposed.
 
+## Policy & guardrail visibility (#646)
+
+`/policy` (HTML) and `/api/v1/policy` (JSON) surface a **read-only** projection
+of the major workflow guardrails — role separation/RBAC, lease lifecycle,
+author worktree binding, merge confirmation, secret redaction, contamination
+containment, allocator policy, audit logging, and mutation gating. Each entry
+carries source pointers to the file/module/doc that owns it, a compact active
+value derived from the existing safe policy accessors, and — where a documented
+default is declared — a diff of active vs documented. The whole payload is run
+through the console redaction pass before it is emitted, so a planted or
+accidental secret degrades to the placeholder rather than reaching a client.
+The view never edits policy and exposes no gate-weakening toggle.
+
 ## Application shell — Phase 1 (#638)
 
 The console shell (`webui/layout.py`) renders a grouped navigation driven by a
 single nav-config module, `webui/nav.py`. Nav groups follow the epic #631
 Phase 1 information architecture: **Health, Traffic, Runtime/Sessions,
-Projects, Inventory, Timeline, Policy** (placeholder), and **Insights**
+Projects, Inventory, Timeline, Policy** (live via #646), and **Insights**
 (placeholder). Live views and Phase 1 placeholders (`stub`) are declared in one
 place so the layout and the route table cannot drift.
 
@@ -254,10 +268,10 @@ a **mode: read-only** badge — plus a **Docs** link to this document. No
 privileged action controls are present in the Phase 1 shell.
 
 Not-yet-implemented surfaces (`/sessions`, `/inventory`, `/timeline`,
-`/policy`, `/insights`) resolve to graceful read-only stub pages instead of
-404s; their backing views land in later child issues of #631 (the inventory
-surfaces are backed by #636). Mutating methods on stub routes still fail closed
-with `read-only-mvp`.
+`/insights`) resolve to graceful read-only stub pages instead of 404s; their
+backing views land in later child issues of #631 (the inventory surfaces are
+backed by #636). `/policy` is a live read-only surface (#646), not a stub.
+Mutating methods on stub routes still fail closed with `read-only-mvp`.
 
 ## System-health dashboard (#639)
 

task_capability_map.py

@@ -363,6 +363,21 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "role": "controller",
     },
 
+    # #642: sanctioned host-daemon lifecycle controls. Deliberately *not* a
+    # ``gitea.*`` operation — restarting an MCP namespace is a host action, not
+    # a Gitea API call, and no configured Gitea profile should be able to
+    # satisfy it by accident. Authority comes from the console RBAC model plus
+    # out-of-band operator authorization (#630); these entries exist so the
+    # console cannot invent an authority the capability layer never declared.
+    "restart_namespace": {
+        "permission": "runtime.restart_namespace",
+        "role": "controller",
+    },
+    "reload_namespace": {
+        "permission": "runtime.reload_namespace",
+        "role": "controller",
+    },
+
     # #601 first-class lease lifecycle — inspect/list need read; mutations gate on
     # ownership in the control-plane DB (not a separate Gitea write permission).
     "list_workflow_leases": {

tests/test_webui_policy_visibility.py

@@ -0,0 +1,243 @@
+"""Tests for the read-only workflow policy/guardrail visibility view (#646).
+
+Covers issue #646 acceptance criteria:
+
+1. Console lists major guardrails with source pointers.
+2. Secrets redacted.
+3. Tests ensure sample secrets never appear.
+4. Docs explain read-only nature (asserted here for the page copy; the doc
+   itself is covered by inspection).
+"""
+
+import json
+import sys
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+from webui import console_redaction
+from webui import policy_inventory
+from webui.app import create_app
+from webui.policy_inventory import (
+    PolicyEntry,
+    PolicyInventorySnapshot,
+    SourcePointer,
+    load_policy_inventory,
+    snapshot_to_dict,
+)
+from webui.policy_views import render_policy_page
+
+
+def _entry(key, category, *, active=None, error=None):
+    return PolicyEntry(
+        key=key,
+        title=key.replace("_", " ").title(),
+        category=category,
+        summary=f"summary for {key}",
+        sources=(SourcePointer("src", f"{key}.py", "module"),),
+        active=active,
+        documented_default=None,
+        diff=None,
+        error=error,
+    )
+
+
+def _snapshot(entries):
+    return PolicyInventorySnapshot(
+        schema_version=1,
+        read_only=True,
+        note="read-only projection",
+        entries=tuple(entries),
+        categories=tuple(dict.fromkeys(e.category for e in entries)),
+        build_errors=(),
+    )
+
+# The guardrail categories issue #646 names as in-scope.
+_EXPECTED_CATEGORIES = {
+    "role_separation",
+    "lease_rules",
+    "worktree_rules",
+    "merge_confirmation",
+    "redaction",
+    "contamination",
+    "allocator_policy",
+    "audit_logging",
+    "mutation_gating",
+}
+
+
+class TestPolicyInventoryModel(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_major_guardrails_present(self):
+        snapshot = load_policy_inventory()
+        categories = {e.category for e in snapshot.entries}
+        self.assertEqual(_EXPECTED_CATEGORIES, categories)
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(len(snapshot.entries), len(_EXPECTED_CATEGORIES))
+
+    def test_every_guardrail_has_source_pointers(self):
+        # AC1: source attribution (file/module/doc) for every guardrail.
+        snapshot = load_policy_inventory()
+        for entry in snapshot.entries:
+            with self.subTest(entry=entry.key):
+                self.assertTrue(entry.sources, "guardrail must carry source pointers")
+                for source in entry.sources:
+                    self.assertTrue(source.path)
+                    self.assertIn(source.kind, {"module", "doc", "script", "config"})
+
+    def test_diff_reported_where_documented_default_declared(self):
+        snapshot = load_policy_inventory()
+        checked_any = False
+        for entry in snapshot.entries:
+            if entry.documented_default is None:
+                self.assertIsNone(entry.diff)
+                continue
+            checked_any = True
+            self.assertIsNotNone(entry.diff)
+            self.assertEqual(
+                entry.diff["status"],
+                "matches_documented_default",
+                f"{entry.key} drifted from its documented default: {entry.diff}",
+            )
+        self.assertTrue(checked_any, "at least one guardrail should declare a default")
+
+    def test_live_projections_populate_active(self):
+        snapshot = load_policy_inventory()
+        by_key = {e.key: e for e in snapshot.entries}
+        for key in ("role_separation", "redaction", "audit_logging"):
+            self.assertIsNone(by_key[key].error, f"{key} projection failed")
+            self.assertIsInstance(by_key[key].active, dict)
+
+    def test_build_entry_is_fail_soft_on_projection_error(self):
+        def _boom():
+            raise RuntimeError("projection exploded")
+
+        row = (
+            "redaction",
+            "Secret redaction",
+            "redaction",
+            "summary",
+            (SourcePointer("x", "webui/console_redaction.py", "module"),),
+            _boom,
+            {"redact_before_persist": True},
+        )
+        entry = policy_inventory._build_entry(row)
+        self.assertIsNone(entry.active)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(entry.error)
+        self.assertEqual(entry.diff["status"], "active_unavailable")
+
+
+class TestPolicyRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_real_snapshot_has_no_secret_shapes(self):
+        # AC3: the real emitted payload never carries a known secret shape.
+        payload = snapshot_to_dict(load_policy_inventory())
+        self.assertEqual(console_redaction.scan_for_secrets(payload), [])
+
+    def test_planted_keychain_secret_is_redacted(self):
+        # AC2/AC3: a secret planted in an active projection is masked before emit.
+        snapshot = _snapshot([
+            _entry(
+                "redaction",
+                "redaction",
+                active={"leaked": "keychain:prgs-author-super-secret", "roles": ["author"]},
+            )
+        ])
+        payload = snapshot_to_dict(snapshot)
+        blob = json.dumps(payload)
+        self.assertNotIn("keychain:prgs-author-super-secret", blob)
+        self.assertEqual(console_redaction.scan_for_secrets(payload), [])
+
+    def test_planted_credential_assignment_is_redacted(self):
+        snapshot = _snapshot([
+            _entry(
+                "audit_logging",
+                "audit_logging",
+                active={"leaked": "token=abcd1234efgh5678", "append_only": True},
+            )
+        ])
+        payload = snapshot_to_dict(snapshot)
+        blob = json.dumps(payload)
+        self.assertNotIn("abcd1234efgh5678", blob)
+        self.assertEqual(console_redaction.scan_for_secrets(payload), [])
+
+    def test_planted_secret_is_redacted_in_html_emit(self):
+        # AC2/AC3: HTML emit path runs redaction before rendering HTML cards.
+        snapshot = _snapshot([
+            _entry(
+                "redaction",
+                "redaction",
+                active={"leaked": "keychain:prgs-author-super-secret", "roles": ["author"]},
+            )
+        ])
+        html_output = render_policy_page(snapshot)
+        self.assertNotIn("keychain:prgs-author-super-secret", html_output)
+        self.assertEqual(console_redaction.scan_for_secrets(html_output), [])
+
+
+class TestPolicyRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
+
+    def test_policy_html_lists_guardrails_with_sources(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/policy")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
+        text = response.text
+        self.assertIn("Workflow policy", text)
+        self.assertIn("Role separation and RBAC", text)
+        self.assertIn("Source pointers", text)
+        self.assertIn("task_capability_map.py", text)
+        self.assertIn("docs/safety-model.md", text)
+
+    def test_policy_html_states_read_only(self):
+        # AC4: the page explains its read-only nature.
+        text = self.client.get("/policy").text
+        self.assertIn("read-only", text.lower())
+        self.assertNotIn("<form", text.lower())
+
+    def test_policy_html_has_no_secret_shapes(self):
+        text = self.client.get("/policy").text
+        self.assertEqual(console_redaction.scan_for_secrets(text), [])
+
+    def test_api_v1_policy_returns_inventory(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/api/v1/policy")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
+        data = response.json()
+        self.assertEqual(data["schema_version"], policy_inventory.SCHEMA_VERSION)
+        self.assertTrue(data["read_only"])
+        self.assertEqual(data["entry_count"], len(data["entries"]))
+        self.assertEqual(set(data["categories"]), _EXPECTED_CATEGORIES)
+
+    def test_policy_is_read_only_no_post(self):
+        # AC4 / non-goal: no mutation endpoint.
+        response = self.client.post("/policy")
+        self.assertIn(response.status_code, (404, 405))
+
+    def test_nav_links_policy(self):
+        # Policy is graduated live: not in STUB_PAGES and not labeled ·stub in nav.
+        from webui.nav import STUB_PAGES, iter_nav_items
+
+        self.assertNotIn("/policy", STUB_PAGES)
+        policy_items = [i for i in iter_nav_items() if i.href == "/policy"]
+        self.assertEqual(len(policy_items), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(policy_items[0].status, "live")
+        text = self.client.get("/").text
+        self.assertIn('href="/policy">Policy</a>', text)
+        self.assertNotIn('href="/policy" class="nav-stub"', text)
+
+
+class TestPolicyViewFailSoft(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_page_renders_when_a_projection_errors(self):
+        snapshot = _snapshot([
+            _entry("role_separation", "role_separation", error="active projection unavailable: boom"),
+            _entry("redaction", "redaction", active={"redact_before_persist": True}),
+        ])
+        page = render_policy_page(snapshot)
+        # The errored guardrail surfaces its error; other guardrails still render.
+        self.assertIn("Active value unavailable", page)
+        self.assertIn("Redaction", page)
+        self.assertIn("Workflow policy", page)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_webui_sanctioned_restart.py

@@ -0,0 +1,502 @@
+"""Sanctioned restart / graceful reload control tests (#642).
+
+Acceptance criteria under test:
+
+1. The sanctioned restart path is implemented behind gates (capability,
+   confirmation, operator authorization, host hook).
+2. Manual ``pkill`` stays forbidden and is classified as contamination.
+3. Post-restart mutations require clean health/session proof.
+4. Authorized restart preview, unauthorized deny, contamination classification.
+5. No entry point exposes a raw kill.
+"""
+
+import json
+import os
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+
+import mcp_namespace_health
+import runtime_recovery_guard
+from task_capability_map import TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP
+from webui import console_audit, console_authz, gated_actions, sanctioned_restart
+
+NAMESPACE = "gitea-author"
+
+# An operator-authorized, hook-configured host. Passed explicitly so no test
+# depends on (or mutates) the real process environment.
+READY_ENV = {
+    sanctioned_restart.RESTART_HOOK_ENV: "launchd:cc.prgs.gitea-author",
+    runtime_recovery_guard.OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION_ENV: "ops-ticket-4821",
+}
+
+
+def admin(subject: str = "[email protected]") -> console_authz.Principal:
+    return console_authz.Principal(
+        subject=subject,
+        role=console_authz.ADMIN,
+        identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
+        authenticated=True,
+    )
+
+
+def viewer() -> console_authz.Principal:
+    return console_authz.Principal(
+        subject="[email protected]",
+        role=console_authz.VIEWER,
+        identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
+        authenticated=True,
+    )
+
+
+class TestCapabilityWiring(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC1: authority is declared, not invented by the console."""
+
+    def test_actions_resolve_through_the_capability_map(self):
+        for action_id in (
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE,
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
+                action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
+                self.assertIsNotNone(action)
+                self.assertIn(action.task_key, TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP)
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    action.mcp_permission,
+                    TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP[action.task_key]["permission"],
+                )
+
+    def test_restart_permission_is_not_a_gitea_operation(self):
+        """No configured Gitea profile should satisfy a host restart."""
+        permission = TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP["restart_namespace"]["permission"]
+        self.assertFalse(permission.startswith("gitea."))
+
+    def test_restart_is_destructive_dual_control_break_glass(self):
+        action = console_authz.get_action(
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(action.action_class, console_authz.CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE)
+        self.assertEqual(action.minimum_role, console_authz.ADMIN)
+        self.assertTrue(action.dual_control)
+        self.assertTrue(action.break_glass)
+        self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
+
+    def test_reload_is_privileged_but_not_destructive(self):
+        action = console_authz.get_action(
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(action.action_class, console_authz.CLASS_PRIVILEGED)
+        self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
+
+
+class TestPreview(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC4: an authorized preview renders the plan without executing it."""
+
+    def test_preview_lists_the_mutation_ledger(self):
+        preview = sanctioned_restart.build_restart_preview(
+            NAMESPACE, principal=admin(), env=READY_ENV
+        )
+        steps = [entry["step"] for entry in preview["mutation_ledger"]]
+        self.assertEqual(
+            steps, ["quiesce", "host_restart_hook", "health_recheck", "audit"]
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(preview["scope_valid"])
+        self.assertTrue(preview["post_restart_verification_required"])
+
+    def test_reload_preview_drains_instead_of_restarting(self):
+        preview = sanctioned_restart.build_restart_preview(
+            NAMESPACE, sanctioned_restart.MODE_RELOAD,
+            principal=admin(), env=READY_ENV,
+        )
+        steps = [entry["step"] for entry in preview["mutation_ledger"]]
+        self.assertIn("host_graceful_reload", steps)
+        self.assertNotIn("host_restart_hook", steps)
+
+    def test_preview_never_enables_execution(self):
+        preview = sanctioned_restart.build_restart_preview(
+            NAMESPACE, principal=admin(), env=READY_ENV
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(preview["execution_enabled"])
+        self.assertFalse(preview["authorization"]["execution_enabled"])
+
+    def test_confirmation_phrase_binds_the_namespace(self):
+        self.assertTrue(
+            sanctioned_restart.confirmation_matches(
+                NAMESPACE, sanctioned_restart.MODE_RESTART,
+                "restart gitea-author",
+            )
+        )
+        # A phrase typed for one namespace must not authorize another.
+        self.assertFalse(
+            sanctioned_restart.confirmation_matches(
+                "gitea-merger", sanctioned_restart.MODE_RESTART,
+                "restart gitea-author",
+            )
+        )
+
+
+class TestGates(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC1/AC4: every gate denies with a stable reason code."""
+
+    def _assess(self, **kwargs):
+        params = {
+            "principal": admin(),
+            "confirmation": f"restart {NAMESPACE}",
+            "env": READY_ENV,
+        }
+        params.update(kwargs)
+        namespace = params.pop("namespace", NAMESPACE)
+        mode = params.pop("mode", sanctioned_restart.MODE_RESTART)
+        return sanctioned_restart.assess_restart_request(
+            namespace, mode, **params
+        )
+
+    def test_authorized_confirmed_request_passes_every_gate(self):
+        result = self._assess()
+        self.assertTrue(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED
+        )
+
+    def test_passing_every_gate_is_not_an_execution_grant(self):
+        """An allowed request still never lets the console touch the process."""
+        result = self._assess()
+        self.assertTrue(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["execution_enabled"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["console_executes"])
+
+    def test_unauthorized_principal_is_denied(self):
+        result = self._assess(principal=viewer())
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNAUTHORIZED
+        )
+
+    def test_anonymous_principal_is_denied(self):
+        result = self._assess(principal=None)
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNAUTHORIZED
+        )
+
+    def test_missing_confirmation_is_denied(self):
+        result = self._assess(confirmation=None)
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISSING
+        )
+
+    def test_confirmation_for_another_namespace_is_denied(self):
+        result = self._assess(confirmation="restart gitea-merger")
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISMATCH
+        )
+
+    def test_missing_operator_authorization_is_denied(self):
+        env = {sanctioned_restart.RESTART_HOOK_ENV: "launchd:cc.prgs.author"}
+        result = self._assess(env=env)
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"],
+            sanctioned_restart.DENY_OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION,
+        )
+
+    def test_missing_host_hook_is_denied_without_kill_fallback(self):
+        env = {
+            runtime_recovery_guard.OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION_ENV: "ops-ticket-1",
+        }
+        result = self._assess(env=env)
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_HOOK_NOT_CONFIGURED
+        )
+
+    def test_fleet_scope_is_refused(self):
+        for scope in ("all", "*", "fleet"):
+            with self.subTest(scope=scope):
+                result = self._assess(
+                    namespace=scope, confirmation=f"restart {scope}"
+                )
+                self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_FLEET_SCOPE
+                )
+
+    def test_unknown_namespace_is_refused(self):
+        result = self._assess(
+            namespace="gitea-nope", confirmation="restart gitea-nope"
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNKNOWN_NAMESPACE
+        )
+
+    def test_unknown_mode_is_refused(self):
+        result = self._assess(mode="obliterate")
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE
+        )
+
+    def test_live_contamination_marker_blocks_restart(self):
+        marker = runtime_recovery_guard.build_contamination_record(
+            reason_class=runtime_recovery_guard.REASON_MANUAL_DAEMON_KILL,
+            command_redacted="pkill -f mcp_server.py",
+        )
+        result = self._assess(contamination_marker=marker)
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_CONTAMINATED_RUNTIME
+        )
+
+    def test_reconciler_cleared_marker_no_longer_blocks(self):
+        marker = runtime_recovery_guard.build_contamination_record(
+            reason_class=runtime_recovery_guard.REASON_MANUAL_DAEMON_KILL,
+            command_redacted="pkill -f mcp_server.py",
+        )
+        marker = dict(marker, cleared_by_reconciler=True)
+        result = self._assess(contamination_marker=marker)
+        self.assertTrue(result["allowed"])
+
+
+class TestExecutionNeverKills(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC5: no path exposes or runs a raw process kill."""
+
+    def test_authorized_execution_defers_to_the_host_supervisor(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.execute_restart(
+            NAMESPACE,
+            principal=admin(),
+            confirmation=f"restart {NAMESPACE}",
+            env=READY_ENV,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["process_kill_executed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["outcome"], sanctioned_restart.ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED
+        )
+
+    def test_denied_execution_reports_the_refusing_gate(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.execute_restart(
+            NAMESPACE, principal=viewer(), confirmation=f"restart {NAMESPACE}",
+            env=READY_ENV,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["outcome"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNAUTHORIZED
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["process_kill_executed"])
+
+    def test_module_never_spawns_a_process(self):
+        path = os.path.join(
+            os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))),
+            "webui", "sanctioned_restart.py",
+        )
+        with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            source = handle.read()
+        for forbidden in (
+            "import subprocess", "import signal", "os.kill", "os.system",
+            "popen",
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(forbidden=forbidden):
+                self.assertNotIn(forbidden, source.lower())
+
+    def test_no_surface_returns_a_kill_command(self):
+        payloads = [
+            sanctioned_restart.build_restart_preview(
+                NAMESPACE, principal=admin(), env=READY_ENV
+            ),
+            sanctioned_restart.restart_policy(),
+            sanctioned_restart.execute_restart(
+                NAMESPACE, principal=admin(),
+                confirmation=f"restart {NAMESPACE}", env=READY_ENV,
+            ),
+        ]
+        for payload in payloads:
+            rendered = json.dumps(payload, default=str).lower()
+            self.assertNotIn("kill -9", rendered)
+            self.assertNotIn("pkill -f", rendered)
+
+    def test_policy_declares_no_raw_kill_and_no_silent_restart(self):
+        policy = sanctioned_restart.restart_policy()
+        self.assertFalse(policy["raw_kill_exposed"])
+        self.assertFalse(policy["console_executes_process_kill"])
+        self.assertFalse(policy["fleet_scope_permitted"])
+        self.assertFalse(policy["silent_auto_restart_permitted"])
+        self.assertTrue(policy["audit_required"])
+
+
+class TestContaminationClassification(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC2: manual pkill is contamination, and it blocks clean claims."""
+
+    def test_manual_daemon_pkill_is_contamination(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command(
+            "pkill -f mcp_server.py"
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["contamination"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+        self.assertIsNotNone(result["contamination_marker"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["sanctioned_alternative"],
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
+        )
+
+    def test_broad_process_kill_is_contamination(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command("killall -9 Python")
+        self.assertTrue(result["contamination"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+
+    def test_marker_names_the_sanctioned_alternative(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command(
+            "pkill -f mcp_server.py"
+        )
+        marker = result["contamination_marker"]
+        self.assertIn(
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE, marker["detail"]
+        )
+
+    def test_benign_command_is_not_contamination(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command("git status")
+        self.assertFalse(result["contamination"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+
+    def test_no_command_is_not_contamination(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command(None)
+        self.assertFalse(result["contamination"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+
+
+class TestPostRestartHealth(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC3: a clean post-restart claim needs live client-namespace proof."""
+
+    def test_live_client_probe_clears_the_session(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.verify_post_restart_health(
+            NAMESPACE,
+            probe_result={"success": True},
+            probe_source=mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_CLIENT,
+            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
+            required_tool="gitea_whoami",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(result["status"], sanctioned_restart.HEALTH_CLEAN)
+        self.assertTrue(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["mutations_allowed"])
+
+    def test_offline_probe_does_not_clear_the_session(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.verify_post_restart_health(
+            NAMESPACE,
+            probe_result={"success": True},
+            probe_source=mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_OFFLINE,
+            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
+            required_tool="gitea_whoami",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["mutations_allowed"])
+
+    def test_failed_probe_is_unhealthy(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.verify_post_restart_health(
+            NAMESPACE,
+            probe_result={"success": False, "error": "client is closing: EOF"},
+            probe_source=mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_CLIENT,
+            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
+            required_tool="gitea_whoami",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(result["status"], sanctioned_restart.HEALTH_UNHEALTHY)
+        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+
+    def test_static_registration_alone_never_clears_the_session(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.verify_post_restart_health(
+            NAMESPACE,
+            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
+            required_tool="gitea_whoami",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+
+
+class TestAuditEmission(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Every restart attempt is audited with actor, target, and result."""
+
+    def _run(self, principal, sink):
+        prior = os.environ.get(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV)
+        os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = sink
+        try:
+            return sanctioned_restart.execute_restart(
+                NAMESPACE,
+                principal=principal,
+                confirmation=f"restart {NAMESPACE}",
+                env=READY_ENV,
+                request_id="req-642",
+            )
+        finally:
+            if prior is None:
+                os.environ.pop(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV, None)
+            else:
+                os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = prior
+
+    def test_allowed_attempt_is_written_with_actor_and_target(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "audit.jsonl")
+            result = self._run(admin(), sink)
+            self.assertTrue(result["audit"]["written"])
+            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                record = json.loads(handle.read().strip())
+        self.assertEqual(
+            record["action"], sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(record["target"]["namespace"], NAMESPACE)
+        self.assertEqual(record["target"]["mode"], "restart")
+        self.assertEqual(record["result"], console_audit.RESULT_ALLOWED)
+        self.assertEqual(record["actor"]["subject"], "[email protected]")
+        self.assertFalse(record["metadata"]["process_kill_executed"])
+
+    def test_denied_attempt_is_audited_too(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "audit.jsonl")
+            self._run(viewer(), sink)
+            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                record = json.loads(handle.read().strip())
+        self.assertEqual(record["result"], console_audit.RESULT_DENIED)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            record["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNAUTHORIZED
+        )
+
+    def test_restart_audit_uses_break_glass_retention(self):
+        action = console_authz.get_action(
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            console_audit.retention_class_for(action),
+            console_audit.RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS,
+        )
+
+
+class TestRegistrySurface(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC5: the console surfaces the control, still disabled, with no kill."""
+
+    def test_registry_exposes_both_actions_disabled(self):
+        registry = gated_actions.load_action_registry()
+        for action_id in (
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE,
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
+                action = registry.get(action_id)
+                self.assertIsNotNone(action)
+                self.assertFalse(action.enabled)
+
+    def test_registry_preview_names_the_namespace_target(self):
+        preview = gated_actions.preview_action(
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE, namespace=NAMESPACE
+        )
+        target = preview["mutation_ledger"][0]["target"]
+        self.assertIn(NAMESPACE, target)
+        self.assertFalse(preview["enabled"])
+
+    def test_registry_attempt_fails_closed(self):
+        result = gated_actions.attempt_action(
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE, namespace=NAMESPACE
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

webui/app.py

@@ -46,6 +46,8 @@ from webui.worktree_scanner import load_hygiene_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as wo
 from webui.worktree_views import render_worktrees_page
 from webui.runtime_health import load_runtime_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as runtime_snapshot_to_dict
 from webui.runtime_views import render_runtime_page
+from webui.policy_inventory import load_policy_inventory, snapshot_to_dict as policy_snapshot_to_dict
+from webui.policy_views import render_policy_page
 from webui.timeline import load_timeline, snapshot_to_dict as timeline_snapshot_to_dict
 from webui.system_health import (
     API_PATH as SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH,
@@ -302,6 +304,17 @@ async def api_runtime(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     return JSONResponse(runtime_snapshot_to_dict(load_runtime_snapshot()))
 
 
+async def policy(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
+    snapshot = load_policy_inventory()
+    return HTMLResponse(
+        render_page(title="Policy", body_html=render_policy_page(snapshot))
+    )
+
+
+async def api_v1_policy(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
+    return JSONResponse(policy_snapshot_to_dict(load_policy_inventory()))
+
+
 async def _parse_audit_form(request: Request) -> tuple[str, str | None]:
     if request.method == "GET":
         return "", None
@@ -607,6 +620,8 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
             Route("/api/prompts", api_prompts, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/runtime", runtime, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/api/runtime", api_runtime, methods=["GET"]),
+            Route("/policy", policy, methods=["GET"]),
+            Route("/api/v1/policy", api_v1_policy, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/api/v1/timeline", api_v1_timeline, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/audit", audit, methods=["GET", "POST"]),
             Route("/api/audit", api_audit, methods=["GET", "POST"]),

webui/console_authz.py

@@ -236,6 +236,34 @@ _ACTION_SPECS: tuple[ConsoleAction, ...] = (
         phase=3,
         summary="Remove a remote feature branch.",
     ),
+    # #642: sanctioned daemon lifecycle. These exist so operators have an
+    # audited path off `pkill -f mcp_server.py` (#630). Restart drops every
+    # in-flight request on a namespace, so it carries the same dual-control and
+    # break-glass weight as a merge; reload drains first and is privileged but
+    # not destructive. Neither ever exposes a raw kill: execution is handed to
+    # a host supervisor by ``webui.sanctioned_restart``.
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="system.reload_namespace",
+        task_key="reload_namespace",
+        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
+        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=2,
+        summary="Gracefully reload one MCP namespace via the host supervisor.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="system.restart_namespace",
+        task_key="restart_namespace",
+        action_class=CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE,
+        minimum_role=ADMIN,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=True,
+        break_glass=True,
+        phase=2,
+        summary="Restart one MCP namespace via the host supervisor.",
+    ),
 )
 
 ACTIONS: dict[str, ConsoleAction] = {a.action_id: a for a in _ACTION_SPECS}

webui/gated_actions.py

@@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ def _format_target(action_id: str, params: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
         )
     if action_id == "create_issue":
         return f"issue {params.get('title', '?')!r}"
+    if action_id in {"system.restart_namespace", "system.reload_namespace"}:
+        return f"MCP namespace {params.get('namespace', '?')!r}"
     return "unspecified"
 
 
@@ -165,6 +167,17 @@ def build_action_registry() -> ActionRegistry:
          "gitea_create_issue_comment", "Post a PR review thread comment."),
         ("close_pr", "Close PR", "close_pr", "gitea_edit_pr",
          "Close a pull request without merge."),
+        # #642: the sanctioned replacement for the forbidden manual daemon-kill
+        # recovery path (#630). The "tool" is a host supervisor hook, not an MCP
+        # call — the console never signals a process. Preview and gating live in
+        # ``webui.sanctioned_restart``; these stay disabled like every other
+        # registry entry.
+        ("system.reload_namespace", "Reload MCP namespace", "reload_namespace",
+         "host.supervisor_reload",
+         "Gracefully reload one MCP namespace via the host supervisor."),
+        ("system.restart_namespace", "Restart MCP namespace",
+         "restart_namespace", "host.supervisor_restart",
+         "Restart one MCP namespace via the host supervisor."),
     )
     actions = tuple(
         GatedAction(

webui/nav.py

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ the ``webui/app.py`` route table stay aligned with epic #631. Read-only: every
 destination is a GET view or a Phase 1 placeholder. No mutation links.
 
 Nav groups follow the #631 Phase 1 information architecture: Health, Traffic,
-Runtime/Sessions, Projects, Inventory, Timeline, Policy (placeholder), and
+Runtime/Sessions, Projects, Inventory, Timeline, Policy (live via #646), and
 Insights (placeholder). Later-phase surfaces are declared as ``stub`` items and
 backed by ``STUB_PAGES`` so their nav links resolve to a graceful placeholder
 instead of a 404.
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ NAV_GROUPS: tuple[NavGroup, ...] = (
         NavItem("/timeline", "Timeline", "stub"),
     )),
     NavGroup("Policy", (
-        NavItem("/policy", "Policy", "stub"),
+        NavItem("/policy", "Policy"),
         NavItem("/prompts", "Prompts"),
     )),
     NavGroup("Insights", (
@@ -88,10 +88,6 @@ STUB_PAGES: dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {
         "Timeline",
         "Workflow event timeline across issues and PRs. A later Phase 1 surface.",
     ),
-    "/policy": (
-        "Policy",
-        "Capability and role policy surface. Placeholder until a later phase.",
-    ),
     "/insights": (
         "Insights",
         "Aggregate operational insights and trends. Placeholder until a later "

webui/policy_inventory.py

@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+"""Read-only workflow policy and guardrail inventory for the web UI (#646).
+
+Policy and guardrails live in code, profiles, docs, and skills. An operator
+cannot *see* the active workflow policy configuration from the console without
+reading the repository tree. This module projects the major guardrails into a
+redacted, machine-readable inventory with source attribution (file / module /
+doc), so the console can render them as HTML tables with source pointers.
+
+Design constraints (Phase 3, #646):
+
+- **Read-only projection.** Nothing here edits policy or exposes a toggle that
+  could weaken a gate. It reports what is already enforced elsewhere.
+- **Source attribution without secrets.** Every guardrail carries pointers to
+  the file/module/doc that owns it. Live values are compact summaries derived
+  from the safe policy accessors that already exist (``rbac_matrix``,
+  ``redaction_policy``, ``audit_policy``); raw regex, tokens, and endpoints are
+  never embedded.
+- **Redact before emit.** ``snapshot_to_dict`` runs the whole payload through
+  ``console_redaction.redact_payload`` so a planted or accidental secret in any
+  projected value degrades to the placeholder rather than reaching a client.
+- **Fail soft.** A projection that raises is recorded as a per-entry error and
+  never takes the page down; a guardrail is still listed with its sources.
+- **Diff vs documented defaults where feasible.** When a guardrail declares a
+  documented invariant, the active projection is compared against it and the
+  result is reported; otherwise the diff is explicitly ``None`` with a reason.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Any, Callable
+
+from webui import console_audit
+from webui import console_authz
+from webui import console_redaction
+
+SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
+
+READ_ONLY_NOTE = (
+    "Read-only projection of guardrails enforced in code, profiles, docs, and "
+    "skills. This view never edits policy and exposes no gate-weakening toggle."
+)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class SourcePointer:
+    """Where a guardrail is defined. Attribution only — never a secret."""
+
+    label: str
+    path: str
+    kind: str  # "module" | "doc" | "script" | "config"
+    anchor: str | None = None
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "label": self.label,
+            "path": self.path,
+            "kind": self.kind,
+            "anchor": self.anchor,
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class PolicyEntry:
+    key: str
+    title: str
+    category: str
+    summary: str
+    sources: tuple[SourcePointer, ...]
+    active: dict[str, Any] | None
+    documented_default: dict[str, Any] | None
+    diff: dict[str, Any] | None
+    error: str | None = None
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "key": self.key,
+            "title": self.title,
+            "category": self.category,
+            "summary": self.summary,
+            "sources": [s.to_dict() for s in self.sources],
+            "active": self.active,
+            "documented_default": self.documented_default,
+            "diff": self.diff,
+            "error": self.error,
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class PolicyInventorySnapshot:
+    schema_version: int
+    read_only: bool
+    note: str
+    entries: tuple[PolicyEntry, ...]
+    categories: tuple[str, ...]
+    build_errors: tuple[str, ...]
+
+
+def _diff_active_vs_default(
+    active: dict[str, Any] | None,
+    documented_default: dict[str, Any] | None,
+) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    """Compare only the keys the documented default declares.
+
+    Returns ``None`` when no documented default is declared (diff not feasible)
+    or when the active projection is unavailable. Otherwise reports, per
+    declared key, whether the active value matches the documented invariant.
+    """
+    if not documented_default:
+        return None
+    if not active:
+        return {"status": "active_unavailable", "checked": {}}
+    checked: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    matches = True
+    for key, expected in documented_default.items():
+        observed = active.get(key)
+        ok = observed == expected
+        matches = matches and ok
+        checked[key] = {"expected": expected, "observed": observed, "matches": ok}
+    return {
+        "status": "matches_documented_default" if matches else "drift_detected",
+        "checked": checked,
+    }
+
+
+# ── Live projections (compact, safe, fail-soft) ──────────────────────────────
+# Each returns a small dict of already-safe machine values. They are module
+# level so tests can substitute one to prove the redaction pass runs.
+
+
+def _project_role_separation() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    matrix = console_authz.rbac_matrix()
+    return {
+        "model_version": matrix.get("model_version"),
+        "active_phase": matrix.get("active_phase"),
+        "roles": [r.get("role") for r in matrix.get("roles", [])],
+        "privileged_action_count": len(matrix.get("privileged_actions", [])),
+        "default_decision": matrix.get("default_decision"),
+        "execution_enabled": matrix.get("execution_enabled"),
+    }
+
+
+def _project_redaction() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    policy = console_redaction.redaction_policy()
+    return {
+        "policy_version": policy.get("policy_version"),
+        "placeholder": policy.get("placeholder"),
+        "applies_to": policy.get("applies_to"),
+        "console_detector_count": len(policy.get("console_rules", [])),
+        "redact_before_persist": policy.get("redact_before_persist"),
+        "failure_mode": policy.get("failure_mode"),
+    }
+
+
+def _project_audit() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    policy = console_audit.audit_policy()
+    return {
+        "schema_version": policy.get("schema_version"),
+        "required_field_count": len(policy.get("required_fields", [])),
+        "results": policy.get("results"),
+        "retention_defaults_days": policy.get("retention_defaults_days"),
+        "append_only": policy.get("append_only"),
+        "redact_before_persist": policy.get("redact_before_persist"),
+        "enabled": policy.get("enabled"),
+    }
+
+
+def _static(value: dict[str, Any]) -> Callable[[], dict[str, Any]]:
+    return lambda: dict(value)
+
+
+# ── Guardrail catalog ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# One row per major guardrail. ``project`` yields the active value (may raise;
+# caught per entry). ``documented_default`` drives the feasible diff.
+
+_CatalogRow = tuple[
+    str,
+    str,
+    str,
+    str,
+    tuple[SourcePointer, ...],
+    Callable[[], dict[str, Any]] | None,
+    dict[str, Any] | None,
+]
+
+_CATALOG: tuple[_CatalogRow, ...] = (
+    (
+        "role_separation",
+        "Role separation and RBAC",
+        "role_separation",
+        "Author, reviewer, merger, and reconciler capabilities are disjoint and "
+        "role-exclusive; self-review and self-merge are always blocked. The "
+        "console RBAC model defaults to deny.",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("task capability map", "task_capability_map.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("role/namespace gate", "role_namespace_gate.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("console RBAC", "webui/console_authz.py", "module"),
+        ),
+        _project_role_separation,
+        {"default_decision": "deny", "execution_enabled": False},
+    ),
+    (
+        "lease_rules",
+        "Issue and PR lease lifecycle",
+        "lease_rules",
+        "Durable work is claimed through issue locks and control-plane leases "
+        "with freshness, expiry, and dead-session recovery; abandoned or stale "
+        "claims are reclaimed only through the sanctioned recovery path.",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("issue lock store", "issue_lock_store.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("branch cleanup guard", "branch_cleanup_guard.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("safety model §5", "docs/safety-model.md", "doc", "5-mutation-gating"),
+        ),
+        None,
+        None,
+    ),
+    (
+        "worktree_rules",
+        "Author worktree binding",
+        "worktree_rules",
+        "Author mutations require a validated worktree under branches/ derived "
+        "from the active issue lock; silent fallback to the stable control "
+        "checkout or master is forbidden (#618).",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("author worktree gate", "author_mutation_worktree.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("worktree bootstrap", "scripts/worktree-start", "script"),
+            SourcePointer("workflow scope guard", "workflow_scope_guard.py", "module"),
+        ),
+        None,
+        None,
+    ),
+    (
+        "merge_confirmation",
+        "Explicit merge confirmation",
+        "merge_confirmation",
+        "A merge fails closed unless the caller passes the exact confirmation "
+        "phrase for that PR; reviewing never implies merging.",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("merge path", "merge_pr.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("merge tool gate", "gitea_mcp_server.py", "module"),
+        ),
+        _static({"required_confirmation_format": "MERGE PR <n>", "auto_merge": False}),
+        {"auto_merge": False},
+    ),
+    (
+        "redaction",
+        "Secret redaction",
+        "redaction",
+        "Every console surface runs the shared gitea_audit pass then console "
+        "patterns before any payload, HTML, log line, or audit record leaves "
+        "the server; unredactable values fail closed to the placeholder.",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("console redaction", "webui/console_redaction.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("shared redaction", "gitea_audit.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("safety model §3", "docs/safety-model.md", "doc", "3-secret-redaction"),
+        ),
+        _project_redaction,
+        {"redact_before_persist": True},
+    ),
+    (
+        "contamination",
+        "Contamination containment",
+        "contamination",
+        "A session contaminated by a direct stable-branch push or a manual MCP "
+        "daemon kill is blocked from review, merge, close, and completion "
+        "mutations until cleared (reconciler-exempt).",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("contamination gates", "gitea_mcp_server.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("stable-branch audit", "workflow_scope_guard.py", "module"),
+        ),
+        None,
+        None,
+    ),
+    (
+        "allocator_policy",
+        "Work allocation policy",
+        "allocator_policy",
+        "Workers do not self-select exclusive work; the controller-owned "
+        "allocator ranks the complete queue by priority then PRs-before-issues "
+        "then ascending number, honoring dependency edges and foreign claims.",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("allocator", "gitea_mcp_server.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("safety model §5", "docs/safety-model.md", "doc", "5-mutation-gating"),
+        ),
+        _static(
+            {
+                "self_select_exclusive_work": False,
+                "ranking": "priority desc, PRs before issues, number asc",
+                "respects_dependency_edges": True,
+                "respects_foreign_claims": True,
+            }
+        ),
+        {"self_select_exclusive_work": False},
+    ),
+    (
+        "audit_logging",
+        "Audit logging",
+        "audit_logging",
+        "Console intent and authorization outcomes are recorded to an "
+        "append-only, redact-before-persist audit log; MCP mutations are "
+        "recorded by gitea_audit and correlated by request id.",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("console audit", "webui/console_audit.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("MCP audit", "gitea_audit.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("safety model §1", "docs/safety-model.md", "doc", "1-audit-logging-and-confirmation"),
+        ),
+        _project_audit,
+        {"append_only": True, "redact_before_persist": True},
+    ),
+    (
+        "mutation_gating",
+        "Mutation gating and master parity",
+        "mutation_gating",
+        "Mutations fail closed while the running server is stale relative to "
+        "master, and every mutation is preceded by identity and capability "
+        "resolution in a fixed pre-flight order.",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("mutation gate", "gitea_mcp_server.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("safety model §5", "docs/safety-model.md", "doc", "5-mutation-gating"),
+        ),
+        _static(
+            {
+                "stale_runtime_blocks_mutations": True,
+                "preflight_order": "whoami -> resolve_task_capability -> mutation",
+            }
+        ),
+        {"stale_runtime_blocks_mutations": True},
+    ),
+)
+
+
+def _build_entry(row: _CatalogRow) -> PolicyEntry:
+    key, title, category, summary, sources, project, documented_default = row
+    active: dict[str, Any] | None = None
+    error: str | None = None
+    if project is not None:
+        try:
+            active = project()
+        except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — fail soft; never take the page down
+            active = None
+            error = f"active projection unavailable: {exc}"
+    diff = _diff_active_vs_default(active, documented_default)
+    return PolicyEntry(
+        key=key,
+        title=title,
+        category=category,
+        summary=summary,
+        sources=sources,
+        active=active,
+        documented_default=documented_default,
+        diff=diff,
+        error=error,
+    )
+
+
+def load_policy_inventory() -> PolicyInventorySnapshot:
+    """Build the read-only guardrail inventory. Never raises for one bad entry."""
+    entries: list[PolicyEntry] = []
+    build_errors: list[str] = []
+    for row in _CATALOG:
+        try:
+            entries.append(_build_entry(row))
+        except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — one row must not break the rest
+            build_errors.append(f"{row[0]}: {exc}")
+    categories = tuple(dict.fromkeys(e.category for e in entries))
+    return PolicyInventorySnapshot(
+        schema_version=SCHEMA_VERSION,
+        read_only=True,
+        note=READ_ONLY_NOTE,
+        entries=tuple(entries),
+        categories=categories,
+        build_errors=tuple(build_errors),
+    )
+
+
+def snapshot_to_dict(snapshot: PolicyInventorySnapshot) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Serialize the snapshot, redacting the entire payload before it is emitted."""
+    payload = {
+        "schema_version": snapshot.schema_version,
+        "read_only": snapshot.read_only,
+        "note": snapshot.note,
+        "categories": list(snapshot.categories),
+        "entry_count": len(snapshot.entries),
+        "entries": [entry.to_dict() for entry in snapshot.entries],
+        "build_errors": list(snapshot.build_errors),
+    }
+    return console_redaction.redact_payload(payload)

webui/policy_views.py

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+"""HTML views for the workflow policy and guardrail inventory (#646)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import html
+import json
+from typing import Any
+
+from webui import console_redaction
+from webui.policy_inventory import (
+    PolicyEntry,
+    PolicyInventorySnapshot,
+    SourcePointer,
+    snapshot_to_dict,
+)
+
+
+def _source_pointer(source: dict[str, Any] | SourcePointer) -> str:
+    if isinstance(source, dict):
+        label = str(source.get("label") or "")
+        path = str(source.get("path") or "")
+        anchor = source.get("anchor")
+        kind = str(source.get("kind") or "")
+    else:
+        label = source.label
+        path = source.path
+        anchor = source.anchor
+        kind = source.kind
+
+    if anchor:
+        path = f"{path}#{anchor}"
+    return (
+        f"<li>{html.escape(label)} — "
+        f"<code>{html.escape(path)}</code> "
+        f"<span class='muted'>({html.escape(kind)})</span></li>"
+    )
+
+
+def _active_block(entry: dict[str, Any] | PolicyEntry) -> str:
+    error = entry.get("error") if isinstance(entry, dict) else entry.error
+    active = entry.get("active") if isinstance(entry, dict) else entry.active
+    if error:
+        return (
+            "<p class='muted'><strong>Active value unavailable:</strong> "
+            f"{html.escape(error)}</p>"
+        )
+    if not active:
+        return "<p class='muted'>No live projection for this guardrail.</p>"
+    pretty = json.dumps(active, indent=2, sort_keys=True, default=str)
+    return f"<pre class='prompt-text'>{html.escape(pretty)}</pre>"
+
+
+def _diff_block(entry: dict[str, Any] | PolicyEntry) -> str:
+    diff = entry.get("diff") if isinstance(entry, dict) else entry.diff
+    documented_default = entry.get("documented_default") if isinstance(entry, dict) else entry.documented_default
+    if diff is None:
+        if documented_default is None:
+            return "<p class='muted'>Diff vs documented default: not feasible (no declared default).</p>"
+        return "<p class='muted'>Diff vs documented default: unavailable.</p>"
+    status = str(diff.get("status") if isinstance(diff, dict) else "unknown")
+    badge = "badge-claimed" if status == "matches_documented_default" else "badge-blocked"
+    rows = []
+    checked = diff.get("checked") if isinstance(diff, dict) else {}
+    if isinstance(checked, dict):
+        for key, cell in checked.items():
+            cell_dict = cell if isinstance(cell, dict) else {}
+            marker = "✓" if cell_dict.get("matches") else "✗"
+            rows.append(
+                "<tr>"
+                f"<td><code>{html.escape(str(key))}</code></td>"
+                f"<td><code>{html.escape(str(cell_dict.get('expected')))}</code></td>"
+                f"<td><code>{html.escape(str(cell_dict.get('observed')))}</code></td>"
+                f"<td>{marker}</td>"
+                "</tr>"
+            )
+    table = ""
+    if rows:
+        table = (
+            "<table class='detail'><thead><tr>"
+            "<th>Key</th><th>Documented</th><th>Active</th><th>Match</th>"
+            "</tr></thead><tbody>"
+            f"{''.join(rows)}</tbody></table>"
+        )
+    return (
+        f"<p class='meta'>Diff vs documented default: "
+        f"<span class='badge {badge}'>{html.escape(status)}</span></p>"
+        f"{table}"
+    )
+
+
+def _entry_card(entry: dict[str, Any] | PolicyEntry) -> str:
+    title = str(entry.get("title") if isinstance(entry, dict) else entry.title)
+    category = str(entry.get("category") if isinstance(entry, dict) else entry.category)
+    summary = str(entry.get("summary") if isinstance(entry, dict) else entry.summary)
+    sources_data = entry.get("sources", []) if isinstance(entry, dict) else entry.sources
+
+    sources = "".join(_source_pointer(s) for s in sources_data)
+    return (
+        "<div class='prompt-card'>"
+        f"<h3>{html.escape(title)} "
+        f"<span class='badge'>{html.escape(category)}</span></h3>"
+        f"<p>{html.escape(summary)}</p>"
+        "<p class='meta'><strong>Source pointers</strong></p>"
+        f"<ul>{sources}</ul>"
+        "<p class='meta'><strong>Active configuration</strong></p>"
+        f"{_active_block(entry)}"
+        f"{_diff_block(entry)}"
+        "</div>"
+    )
+
+
+def render_policy_page(snapshot: PolicyInventorySnapshot | dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    if isinstance(snapshot, PolicyInventorySnapshot):
+        payload = snapshot_to_dict(snapshot)
+    elif isinstance(snapshot, dict):
+        payload = console_redaction.redact_payload(snapshot)
+    else:
+        payload = {}
+
+    categories_list = payload.get("categories") or []
+    categories = ", ".join(html.escape(str(c)) for c in categories_list) or "none"
+    entries_list = payload.get("entries") or []
+    cards = "".join(_entry_card(e) for e in entries_list)
+    build_errors = ""
+    errors_list = payload.get("build_errors") or []
+    if errors_list:
+        items = "".join(
+            f"<li>{html.escape(str(err))}</li>" for err in errors_list
+        )
+        build_errors = (
+            "<div class='stub'><p><strong>Some guardrails could not be built:"
+            f"</strong></p><ul>{items}</ul></div>"
+        )
+    note = str(payload.get("note") or "")
+    schema_version = payload.get("schema_version") or 1
+    return (
+        "<h2>Workflow policy &amp; guardrails</h2>"
+        f"<p class='muted'>{html.escape(note)}</p>"
+        f"<p class='meta'>Schema v{schema_version} · "
+        f"{len(entries_list)} guardrails · categories: {categories}</p>"
+        f"{build_errors}"
+        f"{cards}"
+        "<p class='muted'>This page is read-only. It reports enforced policy "
+        "and never edits or weakens a gate. Secret values are redacted.</p>"
+    )

webui/sanctioned_restart.py

@@ -0,0 +1,613 @@
+"""Sanctioned MCP restart and graceful reload controls (#642, Phase 2).
+
+Sessions have historically recovered MCP connectivity by killing the host
+daemon (``pkill -f mcp_server.py``, #630). That path stays forbidden: it kills
+every namespace on the host, contaminates the surviving session, and leaves no
+audit trail. This module is the sanctioned replacement.
+
+A restart is modelled as a *gated action*, never as a command:
+
+1. **Capability** — the console action resolves through ``console_authz``
+   against ``task_capability_map``, so the console cannot invent an authority
+   the MCP layer does not already define.
+2. **Preview** — :func:`build_restart_preview` renders a mutation ledger and
+   the exact confirmation phrase. It never returns a shell command.
+3. **Confirmation** — the operator echoes a phrase naming the exact namespace
+   and mode. A phrase for one namespace never authorizes another.
+4. **Operator authorization** — host daemon maintenance is authorized out of
+   band through the environment (#630, and #710 finding F1: a worker session
+   cannot set an env var for an already-running daemon, so this cannot be
+   self-asserted the way a tool argument could).
+5. **Execution** — :func:`execute_restart` never spawns a process. Once every
+   gate passes it hands the request to the configured host-managed restart
+   hook; with no hook configured it fails closed.
+6. **Health recheck** — :func:`verify_post_restart_health` requires live
+   client-namespace probe evidence before any post-restart clean claim.
+
+Manual ``pkill`` remains forbidden and is classified as contamination by
+:func:`classify_restart_command`, which blocks clean claims (#630 AC3).
+
+This module performs no I/O beyond reading its own environment configuration,
+imports no MCP client, and holds no credential.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+from typing import Any
+
+import mcp_namespace_health
+import runtime_recovery_guard
+from webui import console_audit, console_authz
+
+# --- Operations -------------------------------------------------------------
+
+MODE_RESTART = "restart"
+MODE_RELOAD = "reload"
+MODES: tuple[str, ...] = (MODE_RESTART, MODE_RELOAD)
+
+ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE = "system.restart_namespace"
+ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE = "system.reload_namespace"
+
+ACTION_FOR_MODE: dict[str, str] = {
+    MODE_RESTART: ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
+    MODE_RELOAD: ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE,
+}
+
+# Namespaces the console may target. An unlisted name fails closed rather than
+# being passed through to a host hook.
+KNOWN_NAMESPACES: tuple[str, ...] = tuple(
+    sorted(
+        set(mcp_namespace_health.DEFAULT_NAMESPACES)
+        | {"gitea-author", "gitea-reviewer", "gitea-merger",
+           "gitea-reconciler", "gitea-controller"}
+    )
+)
+
+# Scope tokens that would mean "everything at once". Explicit non-goal: the
+# console never offers a fleet-wide restart, because that is the blast radius
+# `pkill -f mcp_server.py` already had.
+_FLEET_TOKENS = frozenset({"*", "all", "fleet", "any", ""})
+
+# --- Environment configuration ----------------------------------------------
+# Read server-side only; the value is an opaque host hook reference (e.g. a
+# launchd label), never a command line, and is never rendered to a client.
+RESTART_HOOK_ENV = "GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK"
+
+# --- Reason codes -----------------------------------------------------------
+
+DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE = "unknown_mode"
+DENY_UNKNOWN_NAMESPACE = "unknown_namespace"
+DENY_FLEET_SCOPE = "fleet_scope_not_permitted"
+DENY_UNAUTHORIZED = "unauthorized"
+DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISSING = "confirmation_required"
+DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISMATCH = "confirmation_mismatch"
+DENY_OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION = "operator_authorization_missing"
+DENY_HOOK_NOT_CONFIGURED = "restart_hook_not_configured"
+DENY_CONTAMINATED_RUNTIME = "contaminated_runtime"
+
+ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED = "host_action_required"
+
+# Post-restart verification outcomes.
+HEALTH_CLEAN = "clean"
+HEALTH_UNPROVEN = "unproven"
+HEALTH_UNHEALTHY = "unhealthy"
+
+
+def _clean(value: Any) -> str:
+    return str(value or "").strip()
+
+
+# --- Mutation ledger --------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RestartLedgerEntry:
+    """One planned step, shown before anything is asked of the host."""
+
+    sequence: int
+    step: str
+    summary: str
+    executes_process_kill: bool = False
+
+
+def _mutation_ledger(namespace: str, mode: str) -> tuple[RestartLedgerEntry, ...]:
+    if mode == MODE_RELOAD:
+        middle = RestartLedgerEntry(
+            sequence=2,
+            step="host_graceful_reload",
+            summary=(
+                f"Ask the configured host supervisor to reload {namespace} "
+                "in place, draining in-flight requests. The console does not "
+                "signal the process itself."
+            ),
+        )
+    else:
+        middle = RestartLedgerEntry(
+            sequence=2,
+            step="host_restart_hook",
+            summary=(
+                f"Ask the configured host supervisor to restart {namespace}. "
+                "The console never sends a signal and never runs a kill."
+            ),
+        )
+    return (
+        RestartLedgerEntry(
+            sequence=1,
+            step="quiesce",
+            summary=(
+                f"Stop admitting new gated mutations for {namespace} and "
+                "record the intent before anything restarts."
+            ),
+        ),
+        middle,
+        RestartLedgerEntry(
+            sequence=3,
+            step="health_recheck",
+            summary=(
+                f"Re-probe {namespace} through the live client namespace and "
+                "prove the required tool is callable again."
+            ),
+        ),
+        RestartLedgerEntry(
+            sequence=4,
+            step="audit",
+            summary=(
+                "Append actor, target namespace, mode, and result to the "
+                "console audit log."
+            ),
+        ),
+    )
+
+
+# --- Confirmation -----------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def confirmation_phrase(namespace: str, mode: str) -> str:
+    """Exact phrase an operator must echo, naming the namespace and mode.
+
+    Binding the namespace into the phrase is the point: a confirmation typed
+    for ``gitea-author`` cannot be replayed against ``gitea-merger``.
+    """
+    return f"{_clean(mode)} {_clean(namespace)}"
+
+
+def confirmation_matches(
+    namespace: str, mode: str, confirmation: str | None
+) -> bool:
+    """Compare *confirmation* to the required phrase (exact, whitespace-trimmed)."""
+    return _clean(confirmation) == confirmation_phrase(namespace, mode)
+
+
+# --- Scope validation -------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _validate_scope(namespace: str, mode: str) -> tuple[str, str] | None:
+    """Return ``(reason_code, detail)`` when the scope is refused."""
+    ns = _clean(namespace)
+    md = _clean(mode)
+
+    if md not in MODES:
+        return (
+            DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE,
+            f"Mode {md!r} is not one of {', '.join(MODES)}.",
+        )
+    if ns.lower() in _FLEET_TOKENS:
+        return (
+            DENY_FLEET_SCOPE,
+            (
+                "Fleet-wide restart is an explicit non-goal: it reproduces the "
+                "blast radius of `pkill -f mcp_server.py` (#630). Restart one "
+                "namespace at a time."
+            ),
+        )
+    if ns not in KNOWN_NAMESPACES:
+        return (
+            DENY_UNKNOWN_NAMESPACE,
+            f"Namespace {ns!r} is not a known MCP namespace.",
+        )
+    return None
+
+
+# --- Host hook --------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def restart_hook(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Report the configured host-managed restart hook.
+
+    The hook is a reference the *host* resolves (a supervisor label), not a
+    command this process runs. ``configured=False`` fails restart closed.
+    """
+    source = env if env is not None else os.environ
+    reference = _clean(source.get(RESTART_HOOK_ENV))
+    return {
+        "configured": bool(reference),
+        "reference": reference or None,
+        "source": RESTART_HOOK_ENV if reference else None,
+        "self_assertable": False,
+        "console_executes_process": False,
+    }
+
+
+# --- Preview ----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def build_restart_preview(
+    namespace: str,
+    mode: str = MODE_RESTART,
+    *,
+    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
+    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Render the dry-run preview for a restart/reload request.
+
+    Read-only: no authorization is granted, no host is contacted, and the
+    result never contains a shell command.
+    """
+    ns = _clean(namespace)
+    md = _clean(mode)
+    action_id = ACTION_FOR_MODE.get(md, ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE)
+    action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
+    decision = console_authz.authorize(action_id, principal)
+    scope_error = _validate_scope(ns, md)
+    hook = restart_hook(env)
+    operator = runtime_recovery_guard.operator_authorization(env)
+
+    return {
+        "action_id": action_id,
+        "namespace": ns,
+        "mode": md,
+        "scope_valid": scope_error is None,
+        "scope_reason_code": scope_error[0] if scope_error else None,
+        "scope_detail": scope_error[1] if scope_error else None,
+        "required_role": action.minimum_role if action else None,
+        "required_permission": action.mcp_permission if action else None,
+        "action_class": action.action_class if action else None,
+        "dual_control": action.dual_control if action else True,
+        "break_glass": action.break_glass if action else True,
+        "requires_confirmation": True,
+        "confirmation_phrase": confirmation_phrase(ns, md),
+        "mutation_ledger": [asdict(entry) for entry in _mutation_ledger(ns, md)],
+        "authorization": decision.to_dict(),
+        "operator_authorization": operator,
+        "restart_hook": hook,
+        "execution_enabled": False,
+        "raw_process_kill_exposed": False,
+        "known_namespaces": list(KNOWN_NAMESPACES),
+        "post_restart_verification_required": True,
+    }
+
+
+# --- Gate -------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def assess_restart_request(
+    namespace: str,
+    mode: str = MODE_RESTART,
+    *,
+    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
+    confirmation: str | None = None,
+    contamination_marker: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Decide whether a restart request may proceed to the host hook.
+
+    Every gate must pass. The first failure wins and is reported with a stable
+    reason code; a pass never means "restarted", only "may be handed to the
+    configured host hook".
+    """
+    ns = _clean(namespace)
+    md = _clean(mode)
+    action_id = ACTION_FOR_MODE.get(md, ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE)
+    preview = build_restart_preview(ns, md, principal=principal, env=env)
+
+    def refuse(reason_code: str, detail: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "allowed": False,
+            "gates_passed": False,
+            "reason_code": reason_code,
+            "detail": detail,
+            "action_id": action_id,
+            "namespace": ns,
+            "mode": md,
+            "preview": preview,
+            "execution_enabled": False,
+        }
+
+    scope_error = _validate_scope(ns, md)
+    if scope_error is not None:
+        return refuse(*scope_error)
+
+    # Authority is checked as an authorization decision, not an execution
+    # grant. ``for_execution=True`` asks "may the console perform this write?",
+    # and the answer here is permanently no: step 2 of the ledger is a request
+    # to the host supervisor, so the console's Phase 2 execution gate is not
+    # the relevant gate. Every branch below keeps ``execution_enabled`` False
+    # and :func:`execute_restart` never touches a process.
+    decision = console_authz.authorize(action_id, principal)
+    if not decision.allowed:
+        return refuse(DENY_UNAUTHORIZED, decision.detail)
+
+    if not _clean(confirmation):
+        return refuse(
+            DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISSING,
+            (
+                "Type the confirmation phrase "
+                f"{preview['confirmation_phrase']!r} to proceed."
+            ),
+        )
+    if not confirmation_matches(ns, md, confirmation):
+        return refuse(
+            DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISMATCH,
+            (
+                "Confirmation does not name this namespace and mode; expected "
+                f"{preview['confirmation_phrase']!r}."
+            ),
+        )
+
+    operator = preview["operator_authorization"]
+    if not operator["authorized"]:
+        return refuse(
+            DENY_OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION,
+            (
+                "Host daemon maintenance requires out-of-band operator "
+                "authorization via "
+                f"{runtime_recovery_guard.OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION_ENV}."
+            ),
+        )
+
+    # #630's task-scoped gate deliberately lets a contaminated worker keep
+    # commenting and handing off. Restart is stricter and unconditional: a
+    # runtime already contaminated by a manual kill must be reconciled before
+    # it is restarted again, or the restart just launders the contamination.
+    if contamination_marker and not contamination_marker.get(
+        "cleared_by_reconciler"
+    ):
+        return refuse(
+            DENY_CONTAMINATED_RUNTIME,
+            (
+                "A live contamination marker is present; clear it through the "
+                "reconciler path before restarting."
+            ),
+        )
+
+    hook = preview["restart_hook"]
+    if not hook["configured"]:
+        return refuse(
+            DENY_HOOK_NOT_CONFIGURED,
+            (
+                "No host-managed restart hook is configured "
+                f"({RESTART_HOOK_ENV}). The console will not fall back to a "
+                "process kill."
+            ),
+        )
+
+    return {
+        "allowed": True,
+        "gates_passed": True,
+        "reason_code": ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED,
+        "detail": (
+            "Every gate passed. The restart must be performed by the "
+            "configured host supervisor; the console does not signal the "
+            "process."
+        ),
+        "action_id": action_id,
+        "namespace": ns,
+        "mode": md,
+        "preview": preview,
+        "execution_enabled": False,
+        "console_executes": False,
+        "console_active_phase": console_authz.ACTIVE_PHASE,
+    }
+
+
+# --- Execution --------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def execute_restart(
+    namespace: str,
+    mode: str = MODE_RESTART,
+    *,
+    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
+    confirmation: str | None = None,
+    contamination_marker: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+    request_id: str | None = None,
+    session_id: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Run every gate, audit the outcome, and hand off to the host.
+
+    This function never spawns a process, never sends a signal, and never
+    builds a command line. ``success`` is False in both directions: a refused
+    request is refused, and an authorized request still requires the host
+    supervisor to act.
+    """
+    assessment = assess_restart_request(
+        namespace,
+        mode,
+        principal=principal,
+        confirmation=confirmation,
+        contamination_marker=contamination_marker,
+        env=env,
+    )
+    action_id = assessment["action_id"]
+    allowed = assessment["allowed"]
+
+    audit = console_audit.record_event(
+        action_id=action_id,
+        result=(
+            console_audit.RESULT_ALLOWED if allowed
+            else console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
+        ),
+        principal=principal,
+        target={"namespace": assessment["namespace"], "mode": assessment["mode"]},
+        reason_code=assessment["reason_code"],
+        detail=assessment["detail"],
+        request_id=request_id,
+        session_id=session_id,
+        metadata={
+            "gates_passed": assessment["gates_passed"],
+            "process_kill_executed": False,
+            "post_restart_verification_required": True,
+        },
+    )
+
+    return {
+        "success": False,
+        "outcome": (
+            ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED if allowed else assessment["reason_code"]
+        ),
+        "allowed": allowed,
+        "detail": assessment["detail"],
+        "namespace": assessment["namespace"],
+        "mode": assessment["mode"],
+        "action_id": action_id,
+        "process_kill_executed": False,
+        "host_hook": assessment["preview"]["restart_hook"],
+        "next_action": (
+            "Have the host supervisor perform the restart, then call "
+            "verify_post_restart_health with live client-namespace evidence "
+            "before claiming a clean session."
+            if allowed
+            else assessment["detail"]
+        ),
+        "assessment": assessment,
+        "audit": audit,
+    }
+
+
+# --- Contamination classification -------------------------------------------
+
+
+def classify_restart_command(
+    command: str | None,
+    *,
+    mcp_pids: list[Any] | tuple[Any, ...] | None = None,
+    session_id: str | None = None,
+    remote: str | None = None,
+    role: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Classify an operator-proposed recovery command (#630 AC2).
+
+    A manual ``pkill``/``kill`` of the MCP daemon is contamination, not a
+    restart. When contaminating, a durable marker is returned so downstream
+    gated mutations and clean claims fail closed.
+    """
+    classification = runtime_recovery_guard.classify_recovery_command(
+        command, mcp_pids=mcp_pids
+    )
+    contaminating = bool(classification.get("contamination"))
+
+    marker = None
+    if contaminating:
+        marker = runtime_recovery_guard.build_contamination_record(
+            reason_class=(
+                classification.get("reason_class")
+                or runtime_recovery_guard.REASON_MANUAL_DAEMON_KILL
+            ),
+            command_redacted=classification.get("redacted_command"),
+            session_id=session_id,
+            remote=remote,
+            role=role,
+            detail=(
+                "Manual daemon kill is forbidden; use the sanctioned "
+                f"{ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE} gated action instead."
+            ),
+        )
+
+    return {
+        "contamination": contaminating,
+        "sanctioned": not contaminating and not classification.get("process_kill"),
+        "clean_claim_allowed": not contaminating,
+        "reason_class": classification.get("reason_class"),
+        "redacted_command": classification.get("redacted_command"),
+        "classification": classification,
+        "contamination_marker": marker,
+        "sanctioned_alternative": ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
+    }
+
+
+# --- Post-restart health verification ---------------------------------------
+
+
+def verify_post_restart_health(
+    namespace: str,
+    *,
+    probe_result: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    probe_source: str | None = None,
+    registered_tools: list[str] | tuple[str, ...] | None = None,
+    required_tool: str | None = None,
+    profile: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Require live proof a namespace is callable before any clean claim (AC3).
+
+    Static registration is not proof and neither is an offline subprocess
+    probe: only ``probe_source=client_namespace`` evidence can clear a
+    post-restart session for mutations.
+    """
+    ns = _clean(namespace)
+    health = mcp_namespace_health.classify_namespace_probe(
+        ns,
+        required_tool=required_tool,
+        registered_tools=registered_tools,
+        probe_result=probe_result,
+        profile=profile,
+        probe_source=probe_source,
+    )
+    healthy = bool(health.get("healthy"))
+    proven = bool(health.get("ide_namespace_proven"))
+
+    if healthy and proven:
+        status = HEALTH_CLEAN
+    elif healthy:
+        status = HEALTH_UNPROVEN
+    else:
+        status = HEALTH_UNHEALTHY
+
+    reasons = list(health.get("reasons") or [])
+    if status == HEALTH_UNPROVEN:
+        reasons.append(
+            "Namespace reported healthy without live client-namespace "
+            "evidence; a post-restart clean claim requires "
+            f"probe_source={mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_CLIENT!r}."
+        )
+
+    return {
+        "namespace": ns,
+        "status": status,
+        "healthy": healthy,
+        "ide_namespace_proven": proven,
+        "clean_claim_allowed": status == HEALTH_CLEAN,
+        "mutations_allowed": status == HEALTH_CLEAN,
+        "reasons": reasons,
+        "health": health,
+    }
+
+
+# --- Policy surface ---------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def restart_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Machine-readable description of the sanctioned restart contract."""
+    return {
+        "policy_version": 1,
+        "modes": list(MODES),
+        "actions": [ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE, ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE],
+        "known_namespaces": list(KNOWN_NAMESPACES),
+        "fleet_scope_permitted": False,
+        "console_executes_process_kill": False,
+        "raw_kill_exposed": False,
+        "requires_confirmation": True,
+        "confirmation_binds_namespace": True,
+        "operator_authorization_env": (
+            runtime_recovery_guard.OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION_ENV
+        ),
+        "restart_hook_env": RESTART_HOOK_ENV,
+        "manual_kill_classified_as": runtime_recovery_guard.CONTAMINATION_KIND,
+        "post_restart_clean_claim_requires": (
+            mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_CLIENT
+        ),
+        "audit_required": True,
+        "silent_auto_restart_permitted": False,
+    }