Merge branch 'master' into feat/issue-642-sanctioned-restart-controls

Adds a gated `system.restart_namespace` action so operators and workers can
restart or gracefully reload MCP namespaces through an authorized, audited
path instead of manual host process killing (#630).

- webui/sanctioned_restart.py: restart/reload operation model, dry-run
  intent preview, confirmation-string enforcement, audit emission, and
  post-restart health verification. Fails closed on unknown auth, missing
  capability, or ambiguous target namespace.
- webui/console_authz.py: RBAC entries for the restart capability with
  secret redaction preserved.
- webui/gated_actions.py: registers the restart action in the gated action
  framework so it cannot be invoked without capability + confirmation.
- task_capability_map.py: capability mapping for the restart operation.
- docs/sanctioned-restart-controls.md: operator documentation for the
  sanctioned path and the explicit prohibition on pkill recovery.
- docs/webui-authz-audit.md: audit model updated for restart events.
- tests/test_webui_sanctioned_restart.py: authorized preview, unauthorized
  deny, confirmation enforcement, contamination classification, and audit
  emission coverage.

No unrestricted kill path is exposed; manual pkill remains classified as
contamination and continues to block clean claims.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

author_issue_bootstrap.py

@@ -1,976 +0,0 @@
-"""Sanctioned author issue worktree bootstrap for allocated issues (#850).
-
-Bootstraps an allocated author branch, canonical worktree under ``branches/``,
-worktree registration, issue lock, and lease/assignment binding without
-caller-side Git, Bash, or helper scripts.
-
-Features:
-1. Durable phase journal with read-after-write evidence for every phase.
-2. Idempotent replay handling via idempotency keys.
-3. Authoritative expected-base / concurrency-pin validation.
-4. Typed stale-pin refusal without silent rebasing or repointing.
-5. Canonical branches-root enforcement (path MUST be inside branches/).
-6. Preexisting work preservation (dirty tracked/untracked check, foreign ownership refusal).
-7. Compensating recovery limited strictly to artifacts created by this transition.
-8. Satisfiable exact_next_action for MCP scheduled workers.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-import shutil
-import subprocess
-from typing import Any, Mapping
-
-import author_mutation_worktree
-import issue_lock_store
-import issue_lock_worktree
-import lease_lifecycle
-from reviewer_worktree import parse_dirty_tracked_files
-import task_capability_map
-
-BOOTSTRAP_TASKS = frozenset(
-    {
-        "bootstrap_author_issue_worktree",
-        "gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree",
-    }
-)
-
-PHASE_1_REQUEST_ACCEPTED = "1_request_accepted"
-PHASE_2_BRANCH_CONFIRMED = "2_branch_confirmed"
-PHASE_3_PATH_RESERVED = "3_path_reserved"
-PHASE_4_WORKTREE_CONFIRMED = "4_worktree_confirmed"
-PHASE_5_REGISTRATION_VERIFIED = "5_registration_verified"
-PHASE_6_STATE_ESTABLISHED = "6_state_established"
-PHASE_7_TRANSITION_COMPLETED = "7_transition_completed"
-PHASE_COMPENSATING_RECOVERY = "compensating_recovery"
-
-JOURNAL_DIR_NAME = "bootstrap-journals"
-
-
-def is_author_issue_bootstrap_task(task: str | None) -> bool:
-    """True when *task* is the author issue worktree bootstrap task."""
-    return (task or "").strip() in BOOTSTRAP_TASKS
-
-
-def get_journal_dir(override: str | None = None) -> str:
-    """Return the root directory for durable bootstrap phase journals."""
-    if override:
-        path = override
-    elif os.environ.get("GITEA_BOOTSTRAP_JOURNAL_DIR"):
-        path = os.environ["GITEA_BOOTSTRAP_JOURNAL_DIR"]
-    else:
-        cache_dir = os.path.expanduser("~/.cache/gitea-tools")
-        path = os.path.join(cache_dir, JOURNAL_DIR_NAME)
-    os.makedirs(path, exist_ok=True)
-    return path
-
-
-def _journal_file_path(idempotency_key: str, journal_dir: str | None = None) -> str:
-    safe_key = "".join(
-        c if c.isalnum() or c in ("-", "_", ".") else "_"
-        for c in idempotency_key
-    )
-    return os.path.join(get_journal_dir(journal_dir), f"{safe_key}.json")
-
-
-def load_phase_journal(
-    idempotency_key: str, journal_dir: str | None = None
-) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
-    """Load a durable phase journal if it exists."""
-    path = _journal_file_path(idempotency_key, journal_dir=journal_dir)
-    if not os.path.isfile(path):
-        return None
-    try:
-        with open(path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
-            return json.load(f)
-    except Exception:
-        return None
-
-
-def save_phase_journal(
-    journal: dict[str, Any], journal_dir: str | None = None
-) -> None:
-    """Persist a durable phase journal with write-through file sync."""
-    key = journal["idempotency_key"]
-    path = _journal_file_path(key, journal_dir=journal_dir)
-    tmp_path = f"{path}.tmp.{os.getpid()}"
-    with open(tmp_path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
-        json.dump(journal, f, indent=2, sort_keys=True)
-    os.replace(tmp_path, path)
-
-
-def derive_default_idempotency_key(
-    remote: str,
-    org: str | None,
-    repo: str | None,
-    issue_number: int,
-    assignment_id: str | None = None,
-    lease_id: str | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    parts = [
-        "bootstrap",
-        (remote or "prgs").strip(),
-        (org or "Scaled-Tech-Consulting").strip(),
-        (repo or "Gitea-Tools").strip(),
-        f"issue-{issue_number}",
-    ]
-    if assignment_id:
-        parts.append(assignment_id.strip())
-    if lease_id:
-        parts.append(lease_id.strip())
-    return ":".join(parts)
-
-
-def run_compensating_recovery(
-    journal: dict[str, Any],
-    canonical_repo_root: str,
-    journal_dir: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Execute compensating recovery for artifacts created by this transition only."""
-    artifacts = journal.get("artifacts_created") or {}
-    pending = journal.get("pending_creations") or {}
-    rolled_back: list[str] = []
-    worktree_path = journal.get("worktree_path")
-    branch_name = journal.get("branch_name")
-
-    # Roll back issue lock if created
-    if artifacts.get("lock_created") or pending.get("lock"):
-        issue_num = journal.get("issue_number")
-        session_id = journal.get("owner_session")
-        if issue_num and session_id:
-            try:
-                issue_lock_store.release_session_lock(
-                    issue_number=issue_num,
-                    session=session_id,
-                    lock_dir=journal_dir,
-                )
-                rolled_back.append(f"lock:issue-{issue_num}")
-            except Exception:
-                pass
-        artifacts["lock_created"] = False
-
-    worktree_created = (
-        artifacts.get("worktree_registered")
-        or artifacts.get("worktree_dir_created")
-        or (pending.get("worktree_path") == worktree_path and worktree_path)
-    )
-
-    if worktree_created and worktree_path:
-        if os.path.exists(worktree_path):
-            # Re-verify cleanliness before destructive removal (F-4)
-            porc_res = subprocess.run(
-                ["git", "-C", worktree_path, "status", "--porcelain"],
-                capture_output=True,
-                text=True,
-                check=False,
-            )
-            is_dirty = porc_res.returncode == 0 and bool(porc_res.stdout.strip())
-            if is_dirty:
-                rolled_back.append(f"worktree_path_preserved_dirty:{worktree_path}")
-            else:
-                try:
-                    subprocess.run(
-                        [
-                            "git",
-                            "-C",
-                            canonical_repo_root,
-                            "worktree",
-                            "remove",
-                            "--force",
-                            worktree_path,
-                        ],
-                        capture_output=True,
-                        text=True,
-                        check=False,
-                    )
-                except Exception:
-                    pass
-                if os.path.exists(worktree_path):
-                    shutil.rmtree(worktree_path, ignore_errors=True)
-                try:
-                    subprocess.run(
-                        ["git", "-C", canonical_repo_root, "worktree", "prune"],
-                        capture_output=True,
-                        text=True,
-                        check=False,
-                    )
-                except Exception:
-                    pass
-                rolled_back.append(f"worktree_path:{worktree_path}")
-        else:
-            rolled_back.append(f"worktree_path:{worktree_path}")
-
-    branch_created = (
-        artifacts.get("branch_created")
-        or (pending.get("branch_name") == branch_name and branch_name)
-    )
-
-    if branch_created and branch_name:
-        try:
-            res = subprocess.run(
-                [
-                    "git",
-                    "-C",
-                    canonical_repo_root,
-                    "rev-parse",
-                    "--verify",
-                    branch_name,
-                ],
-                capture_output=True,
-                text=True,
-                check=False,
-            )
-            if res.returncode == 0:
-                # Check for author commits on branch before branch deletion (F-4)
-                resolved_base = journal.get("resolved_base_sha") or "master"
-                rev_list_res = subprocess.run(
-                    [
-                        "git",
-                        "-C",
-                        canonical_repo_root,
-                        "rev-list",
-                        f"{resolved_base}..{branch_name}",
-                    ],
-                    capture_output=True,
-                    text=True,
-                    check=False,
-                )
-                has_commits = rev_list_res.returncode == 0 and bool(rev_list_res.stdout.strip())
-                if has_commits:
-                    rolled_back.append(f"branch_preserved_commits:{branch_name}")
-                else:
-                    subprocess.run(
-                        [
-                            "git",
-                            "-C",
-                            canonical_repo_root,
-                            "branch",
-                            "-D",
-                            branch_name,
-                        ],
-                        capture_output=True,
-                        text=True,
-                        check=False,
-                    )
-                    rolled_back.append(f"branch:{branch_name}")
-        except Exception:
-            pass
-
-    recovery_info = {
-        "executed": True,
-        "rolled_back": rolled_back,
-        "reason": journal.get("failure_reason"),
-    }
-    journal["compensating_recovery"] = recovery_info
-    journal["current_phase"] = PHASE_COMPENSATING_RECOVERY
-    save_phase_journal(journal, journal_dir=journal_dir)
-    return recovery_info
-
-
-def assess_author_issue_bootstrap(
-    *,
-    workspace_path: str,
-    canonical_repo_root: str,
-    current_branch: str | None = None,
-    head_sha: str | None = None,
-    porcelain_status: str = "",
-    remote_master_sha: str | None = None,
-    remote_master_sha_error: str | None = None,
-    task: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Assess whether author issue worktree bootstrap may proceed from control or worktree root."""
-    root = os.path.realpath(canonical_repo_root or "")
-    workspace = os.path.realpath(workspace_path or root or ".")
-    branch = (current_branch or "").strip()
-    dirty = parse_dirty_tracked_files(porcelain_status or "")
-    under_branches = (
-        author_mutation_worktree.is_path_under_branches(workspace, root)
-        if root
-        else False
-    )
-
-    if not is_author_issue_bootstrap_task(task):
-        return {
-            "not_applicable": True,
-            "allowed": False,
-            "block": False,
-            "proven": False,
-            "reasons": ["task is not author_issue_bootstrap"],
-        }
-
-    if under_branches:
-        return {
-            "not_applicable": False,
-            "allowed": True,
-            "block": False,
-            "proven": True,
-            "bootstrap_path": "existing_branches_worktree",
-            "reasons": [
-                "workspace is already a registered worktree under branches/"
-            ],
-        }
-
-    reasons: list[str] = []
-    if workspace != root:
-        reasons.append(
-            "bootstrap requires workspace to be canonical control checkout or branches/ worktree"
-        )
-    if branch not in author_mutation_worktree.BASE_BRANCHES:
-        reasons.append(
-            f"control checkout branch '{branch}' is not an accepted base branch "
-            f"({', '.join(sorted(author_mutation_worktree.BASE_BRANCHES))})"
-        )
-    if dirty:
-        reasons.append(
-            f"control checkout has tracked local edits: {', '.join(dirty[:5])}"
-        )
-
-    if remote_master_sha_error:
-        reasons.append(
-            f"could not verify live master tip: {remote_master_sha_error}"
-        )
-    elif remote_master_sha and head_sha:
-        h = head_sha.strip().lower()
-        rm = remote_master_sha.strip().lower()
-        if h != rm:
-            reasons.append(
-                f"control checkout HEAD ({h[:12]}) != live master tip ({rm[:12]})"
-            )
-
-    if reasons:
-        return {
-            "not_applicable": False,
-            "allowed": False,
-            "block": True,
-            "proven": False,
-            "reasons": reasons,
-        }
-
-    return {
-        "not_applicable": False,
-        "allowed": True,
-        "block": False,
-        "proven": True,
-        "bootstrap_path": "clean_canonical_control_checkout",
-        "reasons": [
-            "control checkout is clean on accepted base branch matching live master"
-        ],
-    }
-
-
-import fcntl
-import stat
-
-
-class BootstrapTransitionLock:
-    """Inter-process file lock scoped to the transition identity / idempotency key."""
-
-    def __init__(self, idempotency_key: str, journal_dir: str | None = None):
-        safe_key = "".join(
-            c if c.isalnum() or c in ("-", "_", ".") else "_"
-            for c in idempotency_key
-        )
-        lock_dir = os.path.realpath(get_journal_dir(journal_dir))
-        if not os.path.isdir(lock_dir):
-            raise RuntimeError(f"Lock directory '{lock_dir}' does not exist or is not a directory")
-
-        raw_lock_path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(lock_dir, f"{safe_key}.lock"))
-        try:
-            common = os.path.commonpath([lock_dir, os.path.dirname(raw_lock_path)])
-        except Exception:
-            common = None
-        if common != lock_dir:
-            raise RuntimeError(f"Lock path '{raw_lock_path}' escapes canonical lock directory '{lock_dir}'")
-
-        self.lock_path = raw_lock_path
-        self.fd = None
-
-    def __enter__(self):
-        if os.path.islink(self.lock_path):
-            raise RuntimeError(f"Refusing lock acquisition: lock path '{self.lock_path}' is a symlink")
-
-        flags = os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREAT
-        if hasattr(os, "O_NOFOLLOW"):
-            flags |= os.O_NOFOLLOW
-        if hasattr(os, "O_CLOEXEC"):
-            flags |= os.O_CLOEXEC
-
-        try:
-            fd = os.open(self.lock_path, flags, 0o600)
-        except OSError as exc:
-            raise RuntimeError(f"Failed to open lock file safely '{self.lock_path}': {exc}") from exc
-
-        st = os.fstat(fd)
-        if not stat.S_ISREG(st.st_mode):
-            os.close(fd)
-            raise RuntimeError(f"Lock target '{self.lock_path}' is not a regular file")
-
-        self.fd = fd
-        fcntl.flock(self.fd, fcntl.LOCK_EX)
-        return self
-
-    def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc_val, exc_tb):
-        if self.fd is not None:
-            try:
-                fcntl.flock(self.fd, fcntl.LOCK_UN)
-            except Exception:
-                pass
-            try:
-                os.close(self.fd)
-            except Exception:
-                pass
-            self.fd = None
-
-
-def bootstrap_author_issue_worktree(
-    *,
-    issue_number: int,
-    canonical_repo_root: str,
-    assignment_id: str | None = None,
-    lease_id: str | None = None,
-    expected_base_sha: str | None = None,
-    branch_name: str | None = None,
-    worktree_path: str | None = None,
-    idempotency_key: str | None = None,
-    remote: str = "prgs",
-    host: str | None = None,
-    org: str | None = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-    repo: str | None = "Gitea-Tools",
-    active_identity: str | None = "jcwalker3",
-    active_profile: str | None = "prgs-author",
-    owner_session: str | None = None,
-    lock_dir: str | None = None,
-    dry_run: bool = False,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Execute the sanctioned author issue worktree bootstrap transition."""
-    root = os.path.realpath(canonical_repo_root)
-
-    session = (owner_session or "").strip()
-    if not session:
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "reason_code": "missing_owner_session",
-            "message": "Missing required owner_session parameter (fail closed). Session identifier cannot be fabricated or defaulted.",
-            "exact_next_action": (
-                "Pass explicit owner_session resolved from gitea_whoami or session context."
-            ),
-        }
-
-    if active_identity is None or not str(active_identity).strip():
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "reason_code": "missing_active_identity",
-            "message": "Missing required active_identity parameter (fail closed). Identity cannot be fabricated or defaulted.",
-            "exact_next_action": "Pass explicit active_identity resolved from gitea_whoami.",
-        }
-    identity = str(active_identity).strip()
-
-    if active_profile is None or not str(active_profile).strip():
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "reason_code": "missing_active_profile",
-            "message": "Missing required active_profile parameter (fail closed). Profile cannot be fabricated or defaulted.",
-            "exact_next_action": "Pass explicit active_profile resolved from gitea_whoami.",
-        }
-    profile = str(active_profile).strip()
-
-    # Derive standard inputs
-    expected_pattern = f"issue-{issue_number}"
-    target_branch = (branch_name or "").strip()
-    if not target_branch:
-        target_branch = f"fix/issue-{issue_number}-native-mcp-bootstrap"
-    elif expected_pattern not in target_branch:
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "reason_code": "invalid_branch_name",
-            "message": (
-                f"Branch name '{target_branch}' must contain issue pattern '{expected_pattern}'"
-            ),
-            "exact_next_action": (
-                f"Supply a branch_name containing '{expected_pattern}', e.g., 'fix/issue-{issue_number}-...'"
-            ),
-        }
-
-    worktree_name = target_branch.replace("/", "-")
-    target_worktree = (worktree_path or "").strip()
-    if not target_worktree:
-        target_worktree = os.path.join(root, "branches", worktree_name)
-    target_worktree = os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(target_worktree))
-
-    key = (idempotency_key or "").strip()
-    if not key:
-        key = derive_default_idempotency_key(
-            remote=remote,
-            org=org,
-            repo=repo,
-            issue_number=issue_number,
-            assignment_id=assignment_id,
-            lease_id=lease_id,
-        )
-
-    # Acquire cross-process file lock scoped to the idempotency key / transition identity
-    with BootstrapTransitionLock(key, journal_dir=lock_dir):
-        # Idempotency check
-        existing = load_phase_journal(key, journal_dir=lock_dir)
-        if existing and existing.get("completed"):
-            if (
-                existing.get("issue_number") == issue_number
-                and existing.get("branch_name") == target_branch
-                and os.path.realpath(existing.get("worktree_path", ""))
-                == target_worktree
-            ):
-                return {
-                    "success": True,
-                    "replayed": True,
-                    "message": (
-                        f"Idempotent replay: worktree for issue #{issue_number} already bootstrapped at {target_worktree}"
-                    ),
-                    "issue_number": issue_number,
-                    "branch_name": target_branch,
-                    "worktree_path": target_worktree,
-                    "base_sha": existing.get("resolved_base_sha"),
-                    "lease_id": existing.get("lease_id"),
-                    "assignment_id": existing.get("assignment_id"),
-                    "idempotency_key": key,
-                    "phase_journal": existing,
-                    "exact_next_action": (
-                        "Call gitea_whoami, then gitea_resolve_task_capability(task='work_issue') "
-                        "and proceed with author implementation in the bootstrapped worktree."
-                    ),
-                }
-            else:
-                return {
-                    "success": False,
-                    "reason_code": "incompatible_idempotency_replay",
-                    "message": (
-                        f"Idempotency key '{key}' already exists with incompatible parameters "
-                        f"(stored: {existing.get('branch_name')}, {existing.get('worktree_path')}; "
-                        f"requested: {target_branch}, {target_worktree})"
-                    ),
-                    "exact_next_action": (
-                        "Supply a unique idempotency_key or pass compatible parameters."
-                    ),
-                }
-
-        # Initialize or resume Phase Journal
-        if existing:
-            journal = existing
-            artifacts = journal.setdefault("artifacts_created", {})
-            artifacts.setdefault("branch_created", False)
-            artifacts.setdefault("worktree_dir_created", False)
-            artifacts.setdefault("worktree_registered", False)
-            artifacts.setdefault("lock_created", False)
-        else:
-            journal = {
-                "idempotency_key": key,
-                "issue_number": issue_number,
-                "assignment_id": assignment_id,
-                "lease_id": lease_id,
-                "expected_base_sha": expected_base_sha,
-                "resolved_base_sha": None,
-                "branch_name": target_branch,
-                "worktree_path": target_worktree,
-                "active_identity": identity,
-                "active_profile": profile,
-                "owner_session": session,
-                "remote": remote,
-                "org": org,
-                "repo": repo,
-                "phases": {},
-                "artifacts_created": {
-                    "branch_created": False,
-                    "worktree_dir_created": False,
-                    "worktree_registered": False,
-                    "lock_created": False,
-                },
-                "current_phase": PHASE_1_REQUEST_ACCEPTED,
-                "completed": False,
-            }
-
-        # Fetch current live master SHA
-        try:
-            rev_res = subprocess.run(
-                ["git", "-C", root, "rev-parse", "HEAD"],
-                capture_output=True,
-                text=True,
-                check=True,
-            )
-            live_master_sha = rev_res.stdout.strip()
-        except Exception as exc:
-            return {
-                "success": False,
-                "reason_code": "git_rev_parse_failed",
-                "message": f"Could not determine repository HEAD: {exc}",
-                "exact_next_action": "Verify repository git state and retry.",
-            }
-
-        # Phase 1: REQUEST_ACCEPTED & Concurrency Pin Check
-        if expected_base_sha:
-            exp_norm = expected_base_sha.strip().lower()
-            live_norm = live_master_sha.lower()
-            if exp_norm != live_norm:
-                journal["failure_reason"] = (
-                    f"stale concurrency pin: expected {exp_norm[:12]} != live {live_norm[:12]}"
-                )
-                save_phase_journal(journal, journal_dir=lock_dir)
-                return {
-                    "success": False,
-                    "reason_code": "stale_concurrency_pin",
-                    "message": (
-                        f"Expected base SHA {exp_norm[:12]} does not match live master SHA {live_norm[:12]} (fail closed)."
-                    ),
-                    "expected_base_sha": expected_base_sha,
-                    "live_master_sha": live_master_sha,
-                    "exact_next_action": (
-                        "Re-evaluate assignment against current live master SHA and retry with updated expected_base_sha."
-                    ),
-                }
-
-        journal["resolved_base_sha"] = live_master_sha
-        journal["phases"][PHASE_1_REQUEST_ACCEPTED] = {
-            "status": "completed",
-            "live_master_sha": live_master_sha,
-            "expected_base_sha": expected_base_sha,
-        }
-        journal["current_phase"] = PHASE_2_BRANCH_CONFIRMED
-        save_phase_journal(journal, journal_dir=lock_dir)
-
-        if dry_run:
-            return {
-                "success": True,
-                "dry_run": True,
-                "message": f"Dry-run: validated bootstrap intent for issue #{issue_number}",
-                "issue_number": issue_number,
-                "branch_name": target_branch,
-                "worktree_path": target_worktree,
-                "base_sha": live_master_sha,
-                "phase_journal": journal,
-                "exact_next_action": "Run without dry_run=True to execute bootstrap.",
-            }
-
-        # Phase 2: BRANCH_CONFIRMED
-        was_branch_created_previously = journal["artifacts_created"].get("branch_created", False)
-        pending_branch = (journal.get("pending_creations") or {}).get("branch_name")
-
-        branch_check = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "-C", root, "rev-parse", "--verify", target_branch],
-            capture_output=True,
-            text=True,
-            check=False,
-        )
-        if branch_check.returncode == 0:
-            branch_head = branch_check.stdout.strip()
-            # Verify branch head descends from base
-            anc_check = subprocess.run(
-                [
-                    "git",
-                    "-C",
-                    root,
-                    "merge-base",
-                    "--is-ancestor",
-                    live_master_sha,
-                    branch_head,
-                ],
-                capture_output=True,
-                text=True,
-                check=False,
-            )
-            if anc_check.returncode != 0 and branch_head.lower() != live_master_sha.lower():
-                # F-8: Check if branch shares a common ancestor with live master
-                mb_check = subprocess.run(
-                    ["git", "-C", root, "merge-base", live_master_sha, branch_head],
-                    capture_output=True,
-                    text=True,
-                    check=False,
-                )
-                if mb_check.returncode != 0 or not mb_check.stdout.strip():
-                    journal["failure_reason"] = (
-                        f"existing branch '{target_branch}' HEAD ({branch_head[:12]}) is incompatible with live master ({live_master_sha[:12]})"
-                    )
-                    save_phase_journal(journal, journal_dir=lock_dir)
-                    return {
-                        "success": False,
-                        "reason_code": "incompatible_existing_branch",
-                        "message": (
-                            f"Existing branch '{target_branch}' HEAD ({branch_head[:12]}) is incompatible with live master ({live_master_sha[:12]})."
-                        ),
-                        "exact_next_action": (
-                            "Inspect or sync the existing branch with master before bootstrapping."
-                        ),
-                    }
-            # Preserve creation provenance monotonically across interruption and replay
-            if was_branch_created_previously or pending_branch == target_branch:
-                journal["artifacts_created"]["branch_created"] = True
-            else:
-                journal["artifacts_created"]["branch_created"] = False
-        else:
-            # Persist creation intent/provenance to disk BEFORE executing external mutation
-            journal.setdefault("pending_creations", {})["branch_name"] = target_branch
-            journal["artifacts_created"]["branch_created"] = True
-            save_phase_journal(journal, journal_dir=lock_dir)
-
-            # Create branch
-            create_res = subprocess.run(
-                ["git", "-C", root, "branch", target_branch, live_master_sha],
-                capture_output=True,
-                text=True,
-                check=False,
-            )
-            if create_res.returncode != 0:
-                journal["artifacts_created"]["branch_created"] = False
-                journal.get("pending_creations", {}).pop("branch_name", None)
-                journal["failure_reason"] = (
-                    f"failed to create git branch '{target_branch}': {create_res.stderr.strip()}"
-                )
-                save_phase_journal(journal, journal_dir=lock_dir)
-                return {
-                    "success": False,
-                    "reason_code": "branch_creation_failed",
-                    "message": f"Failed to create git branch '{target_branch}': {create_res.stderr.strip()}",
-                    "exact_next_action": "Verify branch availability and retry.",
-                }
-
-        journal["phases"][PHASE_2_BRANCH_CONFIRMED] = {
-            "status": "completed",
-            "branch_name": target_branch,
-            "created": journal["artifacts_created"]["branch_created"],
-        }
-        journal["current_phase"] = PHASE_3_PATH_RESERVED
-        save_phase_journal(journal, journal_dir=lock_dir)
-
-        # Phase 3: PATH_RESERVED & Phase 4: WORKTREE_CONFIRMED
-        if not author_mutation_worktree.is_path_under_branches(
-            target_worktree, root
-        ):
-            journal["failure_reason"] = (
-                f"target_worktree '{target_worktree}' is outside canonical branches/ root"
-            )
-            run_compensating_recovery(journal, root, journal_dir=lock_dir)
-            return {
-                "success": False,
-                "reason_code": "path_outside_canonical_branches_root",
-                "message": (
-                    f"Worktree path '{target_worktree}' is outside canonical branches/ root (fail closed)."
-                ),
-                "exact_next_action": (
-                    "Provide a worktree_path inside canonical branches/ root, e.g., 'branches/issue-...'"
-                ),
-            }
-
-        was_dir_created_previously = journal["artifacts_created"].get("worktree_dir_created", False)
-        was_registered_previously = journal["artifacts_created"].get("worktree_registered", False)
-        pending_wt = (journal.get("pending_creations") or {}).get("worktree_path")
-
-        dir_exists = os.path.exists(target_worktree)
-        if dir_exists:
-            # Check porcelain directly
-            porc_res = subprocess.run(
-                ["git", "-C", target_worktree, "status", "--porcelain"],
-                capture_output=True,
-                text=True,
-                check=False,
-            )
-            dirty = (
-                parse_dirty_tracked_files(porc_res.stdout)
-                if porc_res.returncode == 0
-                else []
-            )
-            if dirty or (porc_res.returncode == 0 and porc_res.stdout.strip()):
-                journal["failure_reason"] = (
-                    f"target worktree '{target_worktree}' contains dirty tracked/untracked files"
-                )
-                run_compensating_recovery(journal, root, journal_dir=lock_dir)
-                return {
-                    "success": False,
-                    "reason_code": "preexisting_dirty_worktree",
-                    "message": (
-                        f"Preexisting worktree '{target_worktree}' has dirty tracked/untracked files (fail closed)."
-                    ),
-                    "exact_next_action": (
-                        "Clean or stash the pre-existing worktree files before bootstrapping."
-                    ),
-                }
-
-            # Check registered branch
-            wt_state = issue_lock_worktree.read_worktree_git_state(target_worktree)
-            wt_branch = (wt_state.get("current_branch") or "").strip()
-            if wt_branch and wt_branch != target_branch:
-                journal["failure_reason"] = (
-                    f"existing worktree '{target_worktree}' is on branch '{wt_branch}' != expected '{target_branch}'"
-                )
-                run_compensating_recovery(journal, root, journal_dir=lock_dir)
-                return {
-                    "success": False,
-                    "reason_code": "incompatible_existing_directory",
-                    "message": (
-                        f"Existing worktree '{target_worktree}' is registered to branch '{wt_branch}' instead of '{target_branch}'."
-                    ),
-                    "exact_next_action": (
-                        "Inspect or remove the pre-existing worktree folder before bootstrapping."
-                    ),
-                }
-            if was_dir_created_previously or pending_wt == target_worktree:
-                journal["artifacts_created"]["worktree_dir_created"] = True
-                journal["artifacts_created"]["worktree_registered"] = True
-            else:
-                journal["artifacts_created"]["worktree_dir_created"] = False
-                journal["artifacts_created"]["worktree_registered"] = False
-        else:
-            # Persist creation intent/provenance to disk BEFORE executing external worktree add mutation
-            journal.setdefault("pending_creations", {})["worktree_path"] = target_worktree
-            journal["artifacts_created"]["worktree_dir_created"] = True
-            journal["artifacts_created"]["worktree_registered"] = True
-            save_phase_journal(journal, journal_dir=lock_dir)
-
-            wt_add_res = subprocess.run(
-                [
-                    "git",
-                    "-C",
-                    root,
-                    "worktree",
-                    "add",
-                    target_worktree,
-                    target_branch,
-                ],
-                capture_output=True,
-                text=True,
-                check=False,
-            )
-            if wt_add_res.returncode != 0:
-                journal["artifacts_created"]["worktree_dir_created"] = False
-                journal["artifacts_created"]["worktree_registered"] = False
-                journal.get("pending_creations", {}).pop("worktree_path", None)
-                journal["failure_reason"] = (
-                    f"git worktree add failed: {wt_add_res.stderr.strip()}"
-                )
-                run_compensating_recovery(journal, root, journal_dir=lock_dir)
-                return {
-                    "success": False,
-                    "reason_code": "worktree_add_failed",
-                    "message": f"Failed to execute git worktree add: {wt_add_res.stderr.strip()}",
-                    "exact_next_action": "Verify git worktree capabilities and retry.",
-                }
-
-        journal["phases"][PHASE_3_PATH_RESERVED] = {
-            "status": "completed",
-            "worktree_path": target_worktree,
-            "preexisting_dir": dir_exists,
-        }
-        journal["current_phase"] = PHASE_4_WORKTREE_CONFIRMED
-        save_phase_journal(journal, journal_dir=lock_dir)
-
-        # Phase 5: REGISTRATION_VERIFIED
-        wt_list_res = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "-C", root, "worktree", "list", "--porcelain"],
-            capture_output=True,
-            text=True,
-            check=False,
-        )
-        norm_target = os.path.realpath(target_worktree)
-        found_registration = False
-        if wt_list_res.returncode == 0:
-            for block in wt_list_res.stdout.split("\n\n"):
-                lines = block.strip().splitlines()
-                worktree_line = next(
-                    (l[9:].strip() for l in lines if l.startswith("worktree ")),
-                    None,
-                )
-                if worktree_line and os.path.realpath(worktree_line) == norm_target:
-                    found_registration = True
-                    break
-
-        if not found_registration:
-            journal["failure_reason"] = (
-                f"worktree registration for '{target_worktree}' not found in git worktree list"
-            )
-            run_compensating_recovery(journal, root, journal_dir=lock_dir)
-            return {
-                "success": False,
-                "reason_code": "worktree_registration_verification_failed",
-                "message": f"Worktree '{target_worktree}' registration verification failed.",
-                "exact_next_action": "Check git worktree list integrity and retry.",
-            }
-
-        journal["phases"][PHASE_4_WORKTREE_CONFIRMED] = {
-            "status": "completed",
-            "worktree_path": target_worktree,
-        }
-        journal["phases"][PHASE_5_REGISTRATION_VERIFIED] = {
-            "status": "completed",
-            "registered": True,
-        }
-        journal["current_phase"] = PHASE_6_STATE_ESTABLISHED
-        save_phase_journal(journal, journal_dir=lock_dir)
-
-        # Phase 6: STATE_ESTABLISHED — Issue Lock Acquisition
-        from datetime import datetime, timezone
-        try:
-            lock_data = {
-                "remote": remote,
-                "org": org or "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-                "repo": repo or "Gitea-Tools",
-                "issue_number": issue_number,
-                "branch": target_branch,
-                "branch_name": target_branch,
-                "worktree_path": target_worktree,
-                "owner_session": session,
-                "claimant": {
-                    "username": identity,
-                    "profile": profile,
-                },
-                "assignment_id": assignment_id,
-                "lease_id": lease_id,
-                "expected_base_sha": live_master_sha,
-                "created_at": datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
-            }
-            journal.setdefault("pending_creations", {})["lock"] = True
-            journal["artifacts_created"]["lock_created"] = True
-            save_phase_journal(journal, journal_dir=lock_dir)
-
-            lock_res = issue_lock_store.bind_session_lock(lock_data, lock_dir=lock_dir)
-        except Exception as exc:
-            journal["artifacts_created"]["lock_created"] = False
-            journal.get("pending_creations", {}).pop("lock", None)
-            journal["failure_reason"] = f"issue lock binding failed: {exc}"
-            run_compensating_recovery(journal, root, journal_dir=lock_dir)
-            return {
-                "success": False,
-                "reason_code": "issue_lock_acquisition_failed",
-                "message": f"Could not bind canonical issue lock for issue #{issue_number}: {exc}",
-                "exact_next_action": "Verify lease/assignment state and retry.",
-            }
-
-        journal["phases"][PHASE_6_STATE_ESTABLISHED] = {
-            "status": "completed",
-            "lock": lock_res,
-        }
-        journal["phases"][PHASE_7_TRANSITION_COMPLETED] = {
-            "status": "completed",
-        }
-        journal["current_phase"] = PHASE_7_TRANSITION_COMPLETED
-        journal["completed"] = True
-        save_phase_journal(journal, journal_dir=lock_dir)
-
-        return {
-            "success": True,
-            "replayed": False,
-            "message": (
-                f"Successfully bootstrapped author issue worktree for issue #{issue_number} "
-                f"at branch '{target_branch}' and worktree '{target_worktree}'."
-            ),
-            "issue_number": issue_number,
-            "branch_name": target_branch,
-            "worktree_path": target_worktree,
-            "base_sha": live_master_sha,
-            "lease_id": lease_id,
-            "assignment_id": assignment_id,
-            "idempotency_key": key,
-            "lock_state": lock_res,
-            "phase_journal": journal,
-            "exact_next_action": (
-                "Call gitea_whoami, then gitea_resolve_task_capability(task='work_issue') "
-                "and proceed with author implementation in the bootstrapped worktree."
-            ),
-        }

author_mutation_worktree.py

@@ -40,67 +40,23 @@ def _normalize_path(path: str) -> str:
     return (path or "").replace("\\", "/").rstrip("/")
 
 
-def get_canonical_branches_root(project_root: str | None = None) -> str:
-    """Return the absolute path of the canonical branches directory for *project_root*."""
-    root = os.path.realpath(project_root) if project_root else os.path.realpath(os.getcwd())
-    canonical_repo_root = resolve_canonical_repo_root(root, root)
-    return os.path.realpath(os.path.join(canonical_repo_root, "branches"))
-
-
 def is_path_under_branches(path: str, project_root: str | None = None) -> bool:
-    """True when *path* resolves inside a canonical ``branches/`` directory."""
+    """True when *path* resolves inside ``<project_root>/branches/``."""
-    if not path or not str(path).strip():
+    normalized = _normalize_path(path)
+    if not normalized:
         return False
-    try:
+    if "/branches/" in f"{normalized}/":
-        real_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath(str(path).strip()))
+        return True
-    except Exception:
+    if normalized.endswith("/branches"):
+        return True
+    if project_root:
+        root = _normalize_path(os.path.realpath(project_root))
+        real = _normalize_path(os.path.realpath(path))
+        if real.startswith(f"{root}/"):
+            rel = real[len(root) + 1 :]
+            return rel == "branches" or rel.startswith("branches/")
     return False
 
-    branches_root = get_canonical_branches_root(project_root or real_path)
-    try:
-        common = os.path.commonpath([branches_root, real_path])
-    except Exception:
-        return False
-
-    if common != branches_root:
-        return False
-
-    rel = os.path.relpath(real_path, branches_root)
-    return rel != "." and not rel.startswith("..")
-
-
-def resolve_canonical_repo_root(workspace_path: str, fallback_project_root: str) -> str:
-    """Return the stable repository root for *workspace_path* via git metadata (#460)."""
-    p = (workspace_path or "").strip()
-    if p:
-        try:
-            res = subprocess.run(
-                ["git", "-C", p, "rev-parse", "--git-common-dir"],
-                capture_output=True,
-                text=True,
-                check=True,
-            )
-            common = _realpath_git_common_dir(p, res.stdout)
-            if common.endswith(f"{os.sep}.git") or os.path.basename(common) == ".git":
-                candidate_root = os.path.dirname(common)
-                real_p = os.path.realpath(p)
-                try:
-                    if os.path.commonpath([candidate_root, real_p]) == candidate_root:
-                        return candidate_root
-                except Exception:
-                    pass
-        except Exception:
-            pass
-
-    fallback = os.path.realpath(fallback_project_root or workspace_path or ".")
-    norm = fallback.replace("\\", "/")
-    if "/branches/" in norm:
-        return os.path.realpath(norm.split("/branches/")[0])
-    elif norm.endswith("/branches"):
-        return os.path.realpath(os.path.dirname(fallback))
-
-    return fallback
-
 
 def resolve_mutation_workspace(
     worktree_path: str | None,
@@ -131,6 +87,29 @@ def _realpath_git_common_dir(workspace_path: str, common_dir: str) -> str:
     return os.path.realpath(os.path.join(workspace_path, raw))
 
 
+def resolve_canonical_repo_root(workspace_path: str, fallback_project_root: str) -> str:
+    """Return the stable repository root for *workspace_path* via git metadata (#460)."""
+    path = (workspace_path or "").strip()
+    fallback = os.path.realpath(fallback_project_root)
+    if not path:
+        return fallback
+    try:
+        res = subprocess.run(
+            ["git", "-C", path, "rev-parse", "--git-common-dir"],
+            capture_output=True,
+            text=True,
+            check=True,
+        )
+        common = _realpath_git_common_dir(path, res.stdout)
+    except Exception:
+        return fallback
+    if common.endswith(f"{os.sep}.git"):
+        return os.path.dirname(common)
+    if os.path.basename(common) == ".git":
+        return os.path.dirname(common)
+    return fallback
+
+
 def resolve_author_mutation_context(
     worktree_path: str | None,
     process_project_root: str,

create_issue_bootstrap.py

@@ -247,8 +247,7 @@ def bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
     """
     if not isinstance(assessment, dict):
         return False
-    import author_issue_bootstrap
+    if not is_create_issue_task(task):
-    if not is_create_issue_task(task) and not author_issue_bootstrap.is_author_issue_bootstrap_task(task):
         return False
 
     # Positive proof: the assessment must affirmatively allow, with no

docs/mcp-tool-inventory.md

@@ -69,7 +69,6 @@ that gates each call, not which tools exist.
 - `gitea_audit_worktree_cleanup`
 - `gitea_authorize_reconciliation_cleanup_phase`
 - `gitea_authorize_review_correction`
-- `gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree`
 - `gitea_capability_stop_terminal_report`
 - `gitea_capture_branches_worktree_snapshot`
 - `gitea_check_pr_eligibility`

docs/sanctioned-restart-controls.md

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+# Sanctioned restart and graceful reload controls (#642)
+
+Sessions used to recover MCP connectivity by killing the host daemon
+(`pkill -f mcp_server.py`, #630). That is forbidden and stays forbidden: it
+kills every namespace on the host, contaminates whichever session survives, and
+leaves no audit trail. This document describes the sanctioned replacement,
+implemented in `webui/sanctioned_restart.py`.
+
+## What the console will and will not do
+
+The console **never** restarts anything. It authorizes an intent, records it,
+and hands off to a host supervisor. There is no code path in which the console
+sends a signal, spawns a process, or renders a kill command — a regression test
+asserts the module contains no `subprocess`, `signal`, `os.kill`, `os.system`,
+or `popen` reference, and that no returned payload contains a kill command.
+
+## Operations
+
+| Mode | Action | Minimum role | Behaviour |
+|------|--------|--------------|-----------|
+| `reload` | `system.reload_namespace` | controller | Host supervisor reloads the namespace in place, draining in-flight requests. |
+| `restart` | `system.restart_namespace` | admin | Host supervisor restarts the namespace. In-flight requests are lost. |
+
+Scope is always exactly one namespace. A fleet-wide restart is an explicit
+non-goal: `all`, `*`, `fleet`, and an empty scope are refused with
+`fleet_scope_not_permitted`, because that is precisely the blast radius the
+forbidden kill already had. An unrecognised namespace is refused rather than
+passed through to the host.
+
+## The gate sequence
+
+`assess_restart_request()` applies every gate in order and reports the first
+failure with a stable reason code:
+
+| Order | Gate | Reason code on failure |
+|-------|------|------------------------|
+| 1 | Mode is `restart` or `reload` | `unknown_mode` |
+| 2 | Scope is a single known namespace | `fleet_scope_not_permitted`, `unknown_namespace` |
+| 3 | Principal holds the required console role | `unauthorized` |
+| 4 | Confirmation phrase supplied | `confirmation_required` |
+| 5 | Confirmation names this namespace and mode | `confirmation_mismatch` |
+| 6 | Out-of-band operator authorization present | `operator_authorization_missing` |
+| 7 | Runtime is not contaminated | `contaminated_runtime` |
+| 8 | Host restart hook configured | `restart_hook_not_configured` |
+
+Passing every gate yields `host_action_required`, never "restarted".
+
+### Confirmation binds the namespace
+
+The required phrase is `"<mode> <namespace>"` — for example
+`restart gitea-author`. Binding the namespace into the phrase is the point: a
+confirmation typed for one namespace cannot be replayed against another.
+
+### Operator authorization is not self-assertable
+
+Host daemon maintenance is authorized out of band through
+`GITEA_OPERATOR_DAEMON_MAINTENANCE_AUTHORIZATION`, read from the process
+environment and nowhere else (#630; #710 finding F1). A worker session cannot
+set an environment variable for an already-running daemon, so this cannot be
+faked the way a tool argument could.
+
+### The host hook
+
+`GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK` holds an opaque reference the *host* resolves —
+a supervisor label such as a launchd job name, never a command line. With no
+hook configured the request is refused; the console does not fall back to a
+process kill. The value is read server-side and never rendered to a client.
+
+## Manual kill remains contamination
+
+`classify_restart_command()` classifies an operator-proposed recovery command.
+A manual `pkill`/`kill`/`killall` of the MCP daemon is contamination, not a
+restart: it returns `clean_claim_allowed: false` and builds a durable
+contamination marker (redacted command only, never secrets) naming
+`system.restart_namespace` as the sanctioned alternative.
+
+A live, uncleared contamination marker also blocks a restart. This is stricter
+than #630's task-scoped gate, which deliberately lets a contaminated worker keep
+commenting and handing off: restarting a contaminated runtime would launder the
+contamination rather than resolve it. Clear the marker through the reconciler
+path first.
+
+## Post-restart health verification
+
+After the host supervisor acts, `verify_post_restart_health()` decides whether
+the session may claim to be clean:
+
+| Status | Meaning | Clean claim |
+|--------|---------|-------------|
+| `clean` | Required tool callable, proven through the live client namespace | Allowed |
+| `unproven` | Reported healthy without live client-namespace evidence | Refused |
+| `unhealthy` | Probe failed | Refused |
+
+Only `probe_source=client_namespace` evidence clears a session. Static tool
+registration is not proof, and neither is an offline subprocess probe — an IDE
+client can hold a registered tool list while live calls fail with
+`client is closing: EOF` (see
+[`mcp-namespace-health.md`](mcp-namespace-health.md)).
+
+## Audit
+
+Every attempt — allowed or denied — is recorded through
+`webui.console_audit` with actor, target namespace, mode, result, and reason
+code, and is redacted before it is persisted. `system.restart_namespace` is
+break-glass, so its records are retained for 730 days. Records carry
+`process_kill_executed: false`, which is a fact about the code path rather than
+a claim: no such path exists.
+
+## Environment variables
+
+| Variable | Purpose |
+|----------|---------|
+| `GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK` | Host supervisor reference; absent means restart is refused. |
+| `GITEA_OPERATOR_DAEMON_MAINTENANCE_AUTHORIZATION` | Out-of-band operator authorization reference. |
+| `WEBUI_AUDIT_LOG` | Console audit sink; absent means records are built but not persisted. |
+
+## Non-goals
+
+* No unrestricted `kill` from the UI, in any role, in any phase.
+* No fleet-wide restart.
+* No silent auto-restart loop: every attempt is confirmed and audited.
+* This does not implement the Phase 1 health API (#634).

docs/webui-authz-audit.md

@@ -91,6 +91,8 @@ already define, and a regression test asserts each mapping matches.
 | `close_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.close` | Yes | No | No | 3 |
 | `merge_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.merge` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
 | `delete_branch` | admin | destructive | `gitea.branch.delete` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
+| `system.reload_namespace` | controller | privileged | `runtime.reload_namespace` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
+| `system.restart_namespace` | admin | destructive | `runtime.restart_namespace` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 2 |
 
 **Dual control** means the acting principal may not be the sole authority: a
 second distinct principal must confirm. **Break-glass** means the action is
@@ -102,6 +104,13 @@ honouring it.
 `delete_branch` is admin-only rather than controller because it is the one
 irreversible action in the set.
 
+`system.restart_namespace` is admin-only for the same reason: restarting a
+namespace drops every in-flight request on it. `system.reload_namespace` drains
+first, so it is privileged but not destructive. Neither action is ever executed
+by the console — both hand off to a host supervisor, and neither exposes a raw
+process kill. See
+[`sanctioned-restart-controls.md`](sanctioned-restart-controls.md) (#642).
+
 ### Authorization decision
 
 `authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=False)` returns a decision
@@ -199,8 +208,8 @@ breaking the request it describes.
 | Class | Applies to | Default |
 |-------|-----------|---------|
 | `standard` | Routine gated writes | 90 days |
-| `privileged` | `review_pr`, `close_pr`, and any unclassifiable action | 365 days |
+| `privileged` | `review_pr`, `close_pr`, `system.reload_namespace`, and any unclassifiable action | 365 days |
-| `break_glass` | `merge_pr`, `delete_branch` | 730 days |
+| `break_glass` | `merge_pr`, `delete_branch`, `system.restart_namespace` | 730 days |
 
 Each record carries its own class, day count, and computed `expires_at`, so
 retention is auditable per record rather than inferred from file age. An

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -977,32 +977,6 @@ def _create_issue_bootstrap_assessment(
     """
     import create_issue_bootstrap as _cib
 
-    import author_issue_bootstrap as _aib
-    if _aib.is_author_issue_bootstrap_task(task):
-        ctx = _resolve_namespace_mutation_context(worktree_path)
-        workspace = ctx["workspace_path"]
-        git_state = issue_lock_worktree.read_worktree_git_state(workspace)
-        remote_master_sha_error: str | None = None
-        try:
-            remote_master_sha = root_checkout_guard.resolve_remote_master_sha(
-                ctx["canonical_repo_root"]
-            )
-        except Exception as exc:
-            remote_master_sha = None
-            remote_master_sha_error = (
-                f"{type(exc).__name__}: {exc}".strip() or "resolver failed"
-            )
-        return _aib.assess_author_issue_bootstrap(
-            workspace_path=workspace,
-            canonical_repo_root=ctx["canonical_repo_root"],
-            current_branch=git_state.get("current_branch"),
-            head_sha=git_state.get("head_sha"),
-            porcelain_status=git_state.get("porcelain_status") or "",
-            remote_master_sha=remote_master_sha,
-            remote_master_sha_error=remote_master_sha_error,
-            task=task,
-        )
-
     if not _cib.is_create_issue_task(task):
         return None
 
@@ -1495,7 +1469,7 @@ def verify_preflight_purity(
             dirty_files = sorted(
                 _parse_porcelain_entries(_get_workspace_porcelain(workspace))
             )
-            if dirty_files and task != "commit_files":
+            if dirty_files:
                 raise RuntimeError(
                     nwb.format_namespace_workspace_binding_error(
                         role_kind=role,
@@ -9313,7 +9287,6 @@ def gitea_commit_files(
     host: str | None = None,
     org: str | None = None,
     repo: str | None = None,
-    worktree_path: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict:
     """Commit changes to multiple files in a Gitea repository in a single atomic commit.
 
@@ -9326,46 +9299,10 @@ def gitea_commit_files(
         host: Override the Gitea host.
         org: Override the owner/organization.
         repo: Override the repository name.
-        worktree_path: Optional worktree path for author mutation context.
 
     Returns:
         dict with success status and commit/branch information.
     """
-    if worktree_path is None:
-        lock_data = issue_lock_store.read_session_issue_lock() or {}
-        worktree_path = lock_data.get("worktree_path")
-        if not worktree_path:
-            try:
-                prof = get_profile()
-                uname = prof.get("username") or prof.get("profile_name")
-                for path in issue_lock_store.iter_lock_files():
-                    lk = issue_lock_store.read_lock_file(path) or {}
-                    claimant = lk.get("claimant") or {}
-                    if lk.get("remote") == remote and (claimant.get("username") == uname or lk.get("profile") == prof.get("profile_name")):
-                        issue_lock_store.bind_session_lock(lk, renewal_sanctioned=True)
-                        worktree_path = lk.get("worktree_path")
-                        break
-            except Exception:
-                pass
-
-    if worktree_path is None and files:
-        for f in files:
-            p = f.get("workspace_path") or f.get("local_path") or ""
-            if p and os.path.isabs(p):
-                real_p = os.path.realpath(p)
-                real_root = os.path.realpath(PROJECT_ROOT)
-                branches_dir = os.path.join(real_root, "branches")
-                if real_p.startswith(branches_dir + os.sep):
-                    rel_sub = os.path.relpath(real_p, branches_dir)
-                    wt_folder = rel_sub.split(os.sep)[0]
-                    if wt_folder and wt_folder != "..":
-                        worktree_path = os.path.join(branches_dir, wt_folder)
-                        break
-
-    if worktree_path:
-        os.environ["GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE"] = worktree_path
-        os.environ["GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"] = worktree_path
-
     ok, block_reasons = role_session_router.check_author_mutation_after_reviewer_stop(
         "commit_files"
     )
@@ -9378,7 +9315,7 @@ def gitea_commit_files(
             "reasons": block_reasons,
         }
     blocked = _namespace_mutation_block(
-        "commit_files", commit="", branch="", remote=remote, worktree_path=worktree_path
+        "commit_files", commit="", branch="", remote=remote
     )
     if blocked:
         return blocked
@@ -9406,7 +9343,7 @@ def gitea_commit_files(
         )
 
     # #735: forward explicit org/repo into shared anti-stomp preflight.
-    verify_preflight_purity(remote=remote, worktree_path=worktree_path, task="commit_files", org=org, repo=repo)
+    verify_preflight_purity(remote, task="commit_files", org=org, repo=repo)
     processed_files, source_proofs = _prepare_commit_payload_files(files)
 
     h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
@@ -9683,96 +9620,6 @@ def gitea_publish_unpublished_issue_branch(
     }
 
 
-@mcp.tool()
-def gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree(
-    issue_number: int,
-    assignment_id: str | None = None,
-    lease_id: str | None = None,
-    expected_base_sha: str | None = None,
-    branch_name: str | None = None,
-    worktree_path: str | None = None,
-    idempotency_key: str | None = None,
-    remote: str = "dadeschools",
-    host: str | None = None,
-    org: str | None = None,
-    repo: str | None = None,
-    dry_run: bool = False,
-) -> dict:
-    """Bootstrap an allocated author issue branch and registered worktree (#850).
-
-    Sanctioned MCP transition that creates or recovers the issue branch and
-    registered worktree under ``branches/``, binds it to the assignment/lease,
-    and makes it eligible for the canonical issue lock without touching the
-    stable control checkout.
-
-    Args:
-        issue_number: Allocated issue number to bootstrap.
-        assignment_id: Optional allocation assignment ID.
-        lease_id: Optional workflow lease ID.
-        expected_base_sha: Authoritative expected base SHA / concurrency pin.
-        branch_name: Optional custom branch name (must match issue-<N> pattern).
-        worktree_path: Optional custom worktree path under branches/.
-        idempotency_key: Optional key for idempotent replay/resume.
-        remote: Known instance — 'dadeschools' or 'prgs'.
-        host: Override Gitea host.
-        org: Override Org.
-        repo: Override Repo.
-        dry_run: Report planned transition without mutating repository.
-    """
-    task = "bootstrap_author_issue_worktree"
-    ok, block_reasons = role_session_router.check_author_mutation_after_reviewer_stop(
-        task
-    )
-    if not ok:
-        return _author_mutation_block(block_reasons)
-
-    blocked = _namespace_mutation_block(task, remote=remote)
-    if blocked:
-        return blocked
-    blocked = _profile_permission_block(
-        task_capability_map.required_permission(task),
-        remote=remote,
-        host=host,
-        org=org,
-        repo=repo,
-        org_explicit=org is not None,
-        repo_explicit=repo is not None,
-    )
-    if blocked:
-        return blocked
-
-    verify_preflight_purity(
-        remote,
-        task=task,
-        org=org,
-        repo=repo,
-    )
-
-    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
-    canonical_root = _canonical_local_git_root()
-
-    import author_issue_bootstrap
-
-    return author_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_author_issue_worktree(
-        issue_number=issue_number,
-        canonical_repo_root=canonical_root,
-        assignment_id=assignment_id,
-        lease_id=lease_id,
-        expected_base_sha=expected_base_sha,
-        branch_name=branch_name,
-        worktree_path=worktree_path,
-        idempotency_key=idempotency_key,
-        remote=remote,
-        host=h,
-        org=o,
-        repo=r,
-        active_identity=_active_username(),
-        active_profile=_active_profile_name(),
-        owner_session=_current_session_id(),
-        dry_run=dry_run,
-    )
-
-
 # Merge methods supported by the Gitea merge API.
 _MERGE_METHODS = ("merge", "squash", "rebase")
 
@@ -11672,25 +11519,22 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
     if dry_run:
         report["dry_run"] = True
         report["executed"] = False
+        # #851: surface planned lifecycle order so dry-run matches execute.
+        report["planned_execution_orders"] = {
+            str(entry.get("pr_number")): entry.get("planned_execution_order") or []
+            for entry in (report.get("entries") or [])
+        }
         return {"success": True, "performed": False, **report}
 
     verify_preflight_purity(
         remote, task="reconcile_merged_cleanups", org=org, repo=repo
     )
     actions: list[dict] = []
-    for entry in report.get("entries") or []:
+    project_root = _canonical_local_git_root()
-        head_branch = entry.get("head_branch") or ""
-        remote_assessment = entry.get("remote_branch") or {}
-        local_assessment = entry.get("local_worktree") or {}
 
-        if remote_assessment.get("safe_to_delete_remote"):
+    def _ownership_records_for_branch(
-            import urllib.parse
+        head_branch: str, pr_num_int: int | None
-
+    ) -> list[dict]:
-            pr_num = entry.get("pr_number")
-            try:
-                pr_num_int = int(pr_num) if pr_num is not None else None
-            except (TypeError, ValueError):
-                pr_num_int = None
         ownership_bundle = _collect_branch_ownership_records(
             remote=remote,
             host=h,
@@ -11698,7 +11542,7 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
             repo=r,
             branch=head_branch,
             pr_number=pr_num_int,
-                project_root=_canonical_local_git_root(),
+            project_root=project_root,
             auth=auth,
             base_api=base,
         )
@@ -11719,6 +11563,18 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
                     "role": "inventory",
                 }
             )
+        return ownership_records
+
+    def _attempt_owned_remote_delete(
+        *,
+        head_branch: str,
+        pr_num_int: int | None,
+        after_worktree_removal: bool = False,
+    ) -> dict:
+        """Fail-closed remote delete with live ownership reassessment (#851)."""
+        import urllib.parse
+
+        ownership_records = _ownership_records_for_branch(head_branch, pr_num_int)
         ownership = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_active_branch_ownership(
             remote=remote,
             org=o,
@@ -11728,8 +11584,7 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
             records=ownership_records,
         )
         if ownership.get("block"):
-                actions.append(
+            return {
-                    {
                 "action": "delete_remote_branch",
                 "branch": head_branch,
                 "success": False,
@@ -11738,13 +11593,10 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
                 "verified_absent": False,
                 "blocker_kind": "active_branch_ownership",
                 "reasons": ownership.get("reasons") or [],
-                        "blocking_categories": ownership.get(
+                "blocking_categories": ownership.get("blocking_categories") or [],
-                            "blocking_categories"
+                "after_worktree_removal": after_worktree_removal,
-                        )
+                "ownership_reassessed": after_worktree_removal,
-                        or [],
             }
-                )
-                continue
 
         encoded = urllib.parse.quote(head_branch, safe="")
         url = f"{base}/branches/{encoded}"
@@ -11759,6 +11611,7 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
                 "branch": head_branch,
                 "source": "reconcile_merged_cleanups",
                 "ownership_checked": True,
+                "after_worktree_removal": after_worktree_removal,
             },
         ):
             api_request("DELETE", url, auth)
@@ -11767,8 +11620,7 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
             readback
         )
         verified = bool(readback_assessment.get("verified_absent"))
-            actions.append(
+        return {
-                {
             "action": "delete_remote_branch",
             "branch": head_branch,
             "success": bool(readback_assessment.get("ok")),
@@ -11777,22 +11629,53 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
             "verified_absent": verified,
             "readback": readback_assessment.get("readback"),
             "reasons": readback_assessment.get("reasons") or [],
+            "after_worktree_removal": after_worktree_removal,
+            "ownership_reassessed": after_worktree_removal,
         }
-            )
 
+    for entry in report.get("entries") or []:
+        head_branch = entry.get("head_branch") or ""
+        remote_assessment = entry.get("remote_branch") or {}
+        local_assessment = entry.get("local_worktree") or {}
+        pr_num = entry.get("pr_number")
+        try:
+            pr_num_int = int(pr_num) if pr_num is not None else None
+        except (TypeError, ValueError):
+            pr_num_int = None
+
+        # #851 lifecycle: when the target worktree is independently safe, remove
+        # it first so worktree_binding ownership does not permanently strand
+        # both the worktree and the remote branch. Never skip worktree removal
+        # merely because remote delete would be blocked by that binding.
+        # Ownership protection for remote delete remains fail-closed below.
+        worktree_removed = False
         if local_assessment.get("safe_to_remove_worktree"):
             result = merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_local_worktree(
-                _canonical_local_git_root(),
+                project_root,
                 head_branch,
                 worktree_path=local_assessment.get("worktree_path"),
             )
             actions.append({"action": "remove_local_worktree", **result})
+            # Idempotent resume: absent worktree is already gone.
+            msg = (result.get("message") or "").lower()
+            worktree_removed = bool(result.get("success")) or (
+                "not found" in msg
+            )
+
+        if remote_assessment.get("safe_to_delete_remote"):
+            actions.append(
+                _attempt_owned_remote_delete(
+                    head_branch=head_branch,
+                    pr_num_int=pr_num_int,
+                    after_worktree_removal=worktree_removed,
+                )
+            )
 
     for scratch in report.get("reviewer_scratch_entries") or []:
         if not scratch.get("safe_to_remove_worktree"):
             continue
         result = merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_reviewer_scratch_worktree(
-            _canonical_local_git_root(), scratch.get("worktree_path") or ""
+            project_root, scratch.get("worktree_path") or ""
         )
         actions.append({"action": "remove_reviewer_scratch_worktree", **result})
 
@@ -19705,12 +19588,6 @@ def gitea_resolve_task_capability(
     task: str,
     remote: str = "dadeschools",
     host: str | None = None,
-    org: str | None = None,
-    repo: str | None = None,
-    issue_number: int | None = None,
-    worktree_path: str | None = None,
-    pr_number: int | None = None,
-    **kwargs: Any,
 ) -> dict:
     """Read-only / side-effect free: resolve capability, profile, and namespace for a task.
 
@@ -19727,14 +19604,13 @@ def gitea_resolve_task_capability(
         remote: Known remote instance name.
         host: Optional override for the Gitea host.
     """
-    task_key = task_capability_map._canonical_preflight_task(task)
     TASK_MAP = task_capability_map.TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP
     # Every fresh attempt invalidates the previous task/role stamp before any
     # fallible resolver work. Unknown/malformed tasks and unexpected failures
     # therefore remain fail-closed instead of preserving stale authority.
     _clear_resolved_capability_stamp()
 
-    if task_key not in TASK_MAP:
+    if task not in TASK_MAP:
         # #723: structured fail-closed unknown_task (never raise into internal_error).
         profile = get_profile()
         h = host or (REMOTES.get(remote, {}).get("host") if remote in REMOTES else None)
@@ -19780,8 +19656,8 @@ def gitea_resolve_task_capability(
             result["cleared_stale_denial"] = True
         return result
 
-    required_permission = task_capability_map.required_permission(task_key)
+    required_permission = task_capability_map.required_permission(task)
-    required_role = task_capability_map.required_role(task_key)
+    required_role = task_capability_map.required_role(task)
     role_exclusive_tasks = task_capability_map.ROLE_EXCLUSIVE_TASKS
 
     infra_assessment = role_session_router.assess_infra_stop(PROJECT_ROOT)
@@ -19967,10 +19843,7 @@ def gitea_resolve_task_capability(
     available_in_session = allowed_in_current_session
     runtime_stale_blocker = False
 
-    if (
+    if "PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST" not in os.environ or "GITEA_FORCE_MCP_RUNTIME_CHECK" in os.environ:
-        "PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST" not in os.environ
-        or "GITEA_FORCE_MCP_RUNTIME_CHECK" in os.environ
-    ) and os.environ.get("GITEA_ALLOW_STALE_RUNTIME") != "1":
         runtime_reasons = _check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics(task, matching_profiles)
         if runtime_reasons:
             restart_required = True

role_session_router.py

@@ -73,8 +73,6 @@ AUTHOR_TASKS = frozenset({
     "claim_issue",
     "create_branch",
     "push_branch",
-    "bootstrap_author_issue_worktree",
-    "gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree",
     "create_pr",
     "comment_pr",
     "address_pr_change_requests",

task_capability_map.py

@@ -69,14 +69,6 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.branch.create",
         "role": "author",
     },
-    "bootstrap_author_issue_worktree": {
-        "permission": "gitea.branch.create",
-        "role": "author",
-    },
-    "gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree": {
-        "permission": "gitea.branch.create",
-        "role": "author",
-    },
     "push_branch": {
         "permission": "gitea.branch.push",
         "role": "author",
@@ -354,6 +346,21 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "role": "controller",
     },
 
+    # #642: sanctioned host-daemon lifecycle controls. Deliberately *not* a
+    # ``gitea.*`` operation — restarting an MCP namespace is a host action, not
+    # a Gitea API call, and no configured Gitea profile should be able to
+    # satisfy it by accident. Authority comes from the console RBAC model plus
+    # out-of-band operator authorization (#630); these entries exist so the
+    # console cannot invent an authority the capability layer never declared.
+    "restart_namespace": {
+        "permission": "runtime.restart_namespace",
+        "role": "controller",
+    },
+    "reload_namespace": {
+        "permission": "runtime.reload_namespace",
+        "role": "controller",
+    },
+
     # #601 first-class lease lifecycle — inspect/list need read; mutations gate on
     # ownership in the control-plane DB (not a separate Gitea write permission).
     "list_workflow_leases": {
@@ -496,8 +503,6 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
 # merger lease (#763).
 _PREFLIGHT_TASK_TRANSITIONS = frozenset({
     ("review_pr", "acquire_reviewer_pr_lease"),
-    ("work_issue", "bootstrap_author_issue_worktree"),
-    ("bootstrap_author_issue_worktree", "lock_issue"),
 })
 
 
@@ -544,8 +549,6 @@ ROLE_EXCLUSIVE_TASKS: frozenset[str] = frozenset(
         "gitea_release_merger_pr_lease",
         "create_branch",
         "push_branch",
-        "bootstrap_author_issue_worktree",
-        "gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree",
         "publish_unpublished_branch",
         "create_pr",
         "commit_files",
@@ -571,7 +574,6 @@ ISSUE_MUTATION_TOOL_TASKS: dict[str, str] = {
     "gitea_set_issue_labels": "set_issue_labels",
     "gitea_cleanup_terminal_pr_labels": "cleanup_terminal_pr_labels",
     "gitea_create_label": "create_label",
-    "gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree": "bootstrap_author_issue_worktree",
     "gitea_commit_files": "commit_files",
 }
 

tests/test_author_issue_bootstrap.py

@@ -1,483 +0,0 @@
-"""Regression test suite for native author issue worktree bootstrap (#850)."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-import shutil
-import subprocess
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-from unittest import mock
-
-import author_issue_bootstrap
-import task_capability_map
-
-
-def _concurrent_bootstrap_worker(args: tuple[str, int, str, str, str, str]) -> dict:
-    repo_dir, issue_num, key, lock_dir, journal_dir, master_sha = args
-    os.environ["GITEA_BOOTSTRAP_JOURNAL_DIR"] = journal_dir
-    return author_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_author_issue_worktree(
-        issue_number=issue_num,
-        canonical_repo_root=repo_dir,
-        expected_base_sha=master_sha,
-        idempotency_key=key,
-        lock_dir=lock_dir,
-        owner_session="session-concurrent-test",
-        active_identity="jcwalker3",
-        active_profile="prgs-author",
-    )
-
-
-class TestAuthorIssueBootstrap(unittest.TestCase):
-    """Test suite covering AC1-AC10 and comment #14959 specification."""
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.tmp_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="test_bootstrap_")
-        self.repo_dir = os.path.join(self.tmp_dir, "repo")
-        os.makedirs(self.repo_dir)
-
-        # Initialize synthetic git repo
-        subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-b", "master"], cwd=self.repo_dir, check=True, capture_output=True)
-        subprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.name", "Test User"], cwd=self.repo_dir, check=True)
-        subprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.email", "[email protected]"], cwd=self.repo_dir, check=True)
-
-        readme = os.path.join(self.repo_dir, "README.md")
-        with open(readme, "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
-            f.write("# Test Repo\n")
-        subprocess.run(["git", "add", "README.md"], cwd=self.repo_dir, check=True, capture_output=True)
-        subprocess.run(["git", "commit", "-m", "initial commit"], cwd=self.repo_dir, check=True, capture_output=True)
-
-        rev_res = subprocess.run(["git", "rev-parse", "HEAD"], cwd=self.repo_dir, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)
-        self.master_sha = rev_res.stdout.strip()
-
-        self.branches_dir = os.path.join(self.repo_dir, "branches")
-        os.makedirs(self.branches_dir, exist_ok=True)
-        self.lock_dir = os.path.join(self.tmp_dir, "locks")
-        os.makedirs(self.lock_dir, exist_ok=True)
-        self.journal_dir = os.path.join(self.tmp_dir, "journals")
-        os.makedirs(self.journal_dir, exist_ok=True)
-        os.environ["GITEA_BOOTSTRAP_JOURNAL_DIR"] = self.journal_dir
-
-    def tearDown(self):
-        os.environ.pop("GITEA_BOOTSTRAP_JOURNAL_DIR", None)
-        shutil.rmtree(self.tmp_dir, ignore_errors=True)
-
-    def test_bootstrap_success_path(self):
-        """AC1/AC3/AC8: Successful bootstrap creates branch, worktree, registration, and lock proof."""
-        key = "test_key_success_1"
-        res = author_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_author_issue_worktree(
-            issue_number=850,
-            canonical_repo_root=self.repo_dir,
-            assignment_id="asn-12345",
-            lease_id="lease-67890",
-            expected_base_sha=self.master_sha,
-            idempotency_key=key,
-            remote="prgs",
-            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
-            owner_session="session-test-1234",
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(res.get("success"), f"Bootstrap failed: {res}")
-        self.assertFalse(res.get("replayed"))
-        self.assertEqual(res.get("issue_number"), 850)
-        self.assertEqual(res.get("base_sha"), self.master_sha)
-        self.assertIn("branches/fix-issue-850-native-mcp-bootstrap", res.get("worktree_path"))
-
-        # Verify worktree directory exists and is registered
-        worktree_path = res["worktree_path"]
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.isdir(worktree_path))
-
-        wt_list = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", self.repo_dir, "worktree", "list"], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)
-        self.assertIn(worktree_path, wt_list.stdout)
-
-        # Verify phase journal written
-        journal = author_issue_bootstrap.load_phase_journal(key, journal_dir=self.lock_dir)
-        self.assertIsNotNone(journal)
-        self.assertTrue(journal.get("completed"))
-        self.assertEqual(journal.get("current_phase"), author_issue_bootstrap.PHASE_7_TRANSITION_COMPLETED)
-
-    def test_idempotent_replay(self):
-        """Item 2: Replaying with identical key returns cached transition without duplicate creation."""
-        key = "test_key_idempotent_1"
-        res1 = author_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_author_issue_worktree(
-            issue_number=850,
-            canonical_repo_root=self.repo_dir,
-            idempotency_key=key,
-            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
-            owner_session="session-test-1234",
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(res1["success"], f"res1 failed: {res1}")
-        self.assertFalse(res1.get("replayed"))
-
-        # Second call
-        res2 = author_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_author_issue_worktree(
-            issue_number=850,
-            canonical_repo_root=self.repo_dir,
-            idempotency_key=key,
-            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
-            owner_session="session-test-1234",
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(res2["success"], f"res2 failed: {res2}")
-        self.assertTrue(res2.get("replayed"))
-        self.assertEqual(res1["worktree_path"], res2["worktree_path"])
-
-    def test_stale_concurrency_pin_refusal(self):
-        """Item 3: Mismatched expected base SHA fails closed without silent rebasing."""
-        stale_sha = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
-        res = author_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_author_issue_worktree(
-            issue_number=850,
-            canonical_repo_root=self.repo_dir,
-            expected_base_sha=stale_sha,
-            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
-            owner_session="session-test-1234",
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(res.get("reason_code"), "stale_concurrency_pin")
-        self.assertIn("exact_next_action", res)
-
-    def test_path_outside_branches_root_refusal(self):
-        """Item 6: Worktree path outside branches/ root is refused."""
-        outside_path = os.path.join(self.tmp_dir, "outside_worktree")
-        res = author_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_author_issue_worktree(
-            issue_number=850,
-            canonical_repo_root=self.repo_dir,
-            worktree_path=outside_path,
-            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
-            owner_session="session-test-1234",
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(res.get("reason_code"), "path_outside_canonical_branches_root")
-
-    def test_preexisting_dirty_worktree_preservation(self):
-        """Item 6: Preexisting dirty worktree fails closed and is NOT modified or cleaned."""
-        branch = "fix/issue-850-dirty-test"
-        wt_path = os.path.join(self.branches_dir, "fix-issue-850-dirty-test")
-        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", self.repo_dir, "worktree", "add", "-b", branch, wt_path], check=True, capture_output=True)
-
-        # Create dirty untracked file
-        dirty_file = os.path.join(wt_path, "dirty.txt")
-        with open(dirty_file, "w") as f:
-            f.write("dirty edits\n")
-
-        res = author_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_author_issue_worktree(
-            issue_number=850,
-            canonical_repo_root=self.repo_dir,
-            branch_name=branch,
-            worktree_path=wt_path,
-            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
-            owner_session="session-test-1234",
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(res.get("reason_code"), "preexisting_dirty_worktree")
-
-        # Prove dirty file is preserved byte-for-byte
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(dirty_file))
-        with open(dirty_file, "r") as f:
-            self.assertEqual(f.read(), "dirty edits\n")
-
-    def test_compensating_recovery_on_failed_phase(self):
-        """AC4/Item 4: Failure during transition rolls back ONLY newly created artifacts."""
-        key = "test_key_recovery_1"
-        # Simulate partial progress in journal
-        journal = {
-            "idempotency_key": key,
-            "issue_number": 850,
-            "branch_name": "fix/issue-850-recovery-test",
-            "worktree_path": os.path.join(self.branches_dir, "fix-issue-850-recovery-test"),
-            "artifacts_created": {
-                "branch_created": True,
-                "worktree_dir_created": True,
-                "worktree_registered": True,
-                "lock_created": False,
-            },
-            "failure_reason": "simulated lock failure",
-            "current_phase": author_issue_bootstrap.PHASE_5_REGISTRATION_VERIFIED,
-            "completed": False,
-        }
-        # Create the branch and worktree manually to simulate partial state
-        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", self.repo_dir, "branch", journal["branch_name"]], check=True, capture_output=True)
-        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", self.repo_dir, "worktree", "add", journal["worktree_path"], journal["branch_name"]], check=True, capture_output=True)
-
-        # Run compensating recovery
-        rec = author_issue_bootstrap.run_compensating_recovery(journal, self.repo_dir)
-        self.assertTrue(rec["executed"])
-        self.assertIn(f"worktree_path:{journal['worktree_path']}", rec["rolled_back"])
-        self.assertIn(f"branch:{journal['branch_name']}", rec["rolled_back"])
-
-        # Prove worktree directory and branch were rolled back
-        self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(journal["worktree_path"]))
-        branch_check = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", self.repo_dir, "rev-parse", "--verify", journal["branch_name"]], capture_output=True, text=True, check=False)
-        self.assertNotEqual(branch_check.returncode, 0)
-
-    def test_cross_process_concurrency(self):
-        """Review #525 Finding 1: Genuine cross-process concurrency locking prevents corruption."""
-        import concurrent.futures
-
-        key = "test_concurrent_key_850"
-        args = (self.repo_dir, 850, key, self.lock_dir, self.journal_dir, self.master_sha)
-
-        with concurrent.futures.ProcessPoolExecutor(max_workers=2) as executor:
-            fut1 = executor.submit(_concurrent_bootstrap_worker, args)
-            fut2 = executor.submit(_concurrent_bootstrap_worker, args)
-            res1 = fut1.result(timeout=10)
-            res2 = fut2.result(timeout=10)
-
-        self.assertTrue(res1["success"], f"res1 failed: {res1}")
-        self.assertTrue(res2["success"], f"res2 failed: {res2}")
-        # One process performs creation, the other process receives idempotent replay
-        replayed_count = sum(1 for r in (res1, res2) if r.get("replayed"))
-        created_count = sum(1 for r in (res1, res2) if not r.get("replayed"))
-        self.assertEqual(replayed_count, 1)
-        self.assertEqual(created_count, 1)
-        self.assertEqual(res1["worktree_path"], res2["worktree_path"])
-
-    def test_interrupted_replay_preserves_artifacts_created_provenance(self):
-        """Review #525 Finding 2: Replaying incomplete journal preserves creation provenance monotonically."""
-        key = "test_key_interrupted_replay_1"
-        branch = "fix/issue-850-interrupted-replay"
-        wt_path = os.path.join(self.branches_dir, "fix-issue-850-interrupted-replay")
-
-        # Simulate Phase 2/3 completion where branch and worktree directory were created by this transition
-        journal = {
-            "idempotency_key": key,
-            "issue_number": 850,
-            "branch_name": branch,
-            "worktree_path": wt_path,
-            "active_identity": "jcwalker3",
-            "active_profile": "prgs-author",
-            "remote": "prgs",
-            "org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-            "repo": "Gitea-Tools",
-            "phases": {
-                author_issue_bootstrap.PHASE_1_REQUEST_ACCEPTED: {"status": "completed"},
-                author_issue_bootstrap.PHASE_2_BRANCH_CONFIRMED: {"status": "completed", "created": True},
-            },
-            "artifacts_created": {
-                "branch_created": True,
-                "worktree_dir_created": True,
-                "worktree_registered": True,
-                "lock_created": False,
-            },
-            "current_phase": author_issue_bootstrap.PHASE_3_PATH_RESERVED,
-            "completed": False,
-        }
-        # Pre-create the branch and worktree on disk to simulate partial state after crash
-        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", self.repo_dir, "branch", branch, self.master_sha], check=True, capture_output=True)
-        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", self.repo_dir, "worktree", "add", wt_path, branch], check=True, capture_output=True)
-        author_issue_bootstrap.save_phase_journal(journal, journal_dir=self.lock_dir)
-
-        # Now resume/replay the transition but simulate lock binding failure during Phase 6
-        with mock.patch("issue_lock_store.bind_session_lock", side_effect=RuntimeError("Lock failure test")):
-            res = author_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_author_issue_worktree(
-                issue_number=850,
-                canonical_repo_root=self.repo_dir,
-                branch_name=branch,
-                worktree_path=wt_path,
-                idempotency_key=key,
-                lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
-                owner_session="session-test-1234",
-            )
-
-        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(res.get("reason_code"), "issue_lock_acquisition_failed")
-
-        # Verify that compensating recovery correctly deleted transition-created branch & worktree
-        # because creation provenance was preserved across replay (NOT downgraded to False!)
-        self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(wt_path))
-        branch_check = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", self.repo_dir, "rev-parse", "--verify", branch], capture_output=True, text=True, check=False)
-        self.assertNotEqual(branch_check.returncode, 0)
-
-    def test_transition_created_only_compensation(self):
-        """Review #525 Finding 4: Preexisting branch is NOT deleted by compensation when only worktree was transition-created."""
-        key = "test_key_preexisting_branch_compensation"
-        preexisting_branch = "fix/issue-850-preexisting"
-        wt_path = os.path.join(self.branches_dir, "fix-issue-850-preexisting")
-
-        # Create branch BEFORE bootstrap (preexisting branch)
-        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", self.repo_dir, "branch", preexisting_branch, self.master_sha], check=True, capture_output=True)
-
-        # Call bootstrap with simulated failure during Phase 6 (lock binding)
-        with mock.patch("issue_lock_store.bind_session_lock", side_effect=RuntimeError("Simulated lock failure")):
-            res = author_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_author_issue_worktree(
-                issue_number=850,
-                canonical_repo_root=self.repo_dir,
-                branch_name=preexisting_branch,
-                worktree_path=wt_path,
-                idempotency_key=key,
-                lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
-                owner_session="session-test-1234",
-            )
-
-        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
-        # Worktree dir was created by transition -> removed by compensation
-        self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(wt_path))
-
-        # Preexisting branch was NOT created by transition -> MUST BE PRESERVED!
-        branch_check = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", self.repo_dir, "rev-parse", "--verify", preexisting_branch], capture_output=True, text=True, check=False)
-        self.assertEqual(branch_check.returncode, 0, "Preexisting branch was deleted by mistake!")
-
-    def test_incompatible_idempotency_replay_refusal(self):
-        """Review #525 Finding 4: Replaying key with incompatible parameters returns refusal."""
-        key = "test_key_incompatible_replay"
-        res1 = author_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_author_issue_worktree(
-            issue_number=850,
-            canonical_repo_root=self.repo_dir,
-            branch_name="fix/issue-850-param-a",
-            idempotency_key=key,
-            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
-            owner_session="session-test-1234",
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(res1["success"])
-
-        # Second call with different branch_name
-        res2 = author_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_author_issue_worktree(
-            issue_number=850,
-            canonical_repo_root=self.repo_dir,
-            branch_name="fix/issue-850-param-b",
-            idempotency_key=key,
-            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
-            owner_session="session-test-1234",
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(res2["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(res2.get("reason_code"), "incompatible_idempotency_replay")
-
-    def test_exact_next_action_satisfiable_via_mcp(self):
-        """Review #525 Finding 4: exact_next_action provides satisfiable MCP actions, not shell commands."""
-        key = "test_key_next_action_mcp"
-        stale_sha = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000"
-        res = author_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_author_issue_worktree(
-            issue_number=850,
-            canonical_repo_root=self.repo_dir,
-            expected_base_sha=stale_sha,
-            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
-            owner_session="session-test-1234",
-        )
-        next_action = res.get("exact_next_action", "")
-        self.assertNotIn("scripts/worktree-start", next_action)
-        self.assertNotIn("git worktree add", next_action)
-        self.assertNotIn("bash", next_action.lower())
-
-    def test_missing_owner_session_refusal(self):
-        """Finding D: Missing owner_session context fails closed with typed refusal and zero mutation."""
-        res = author_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_author_issue_worktree(
-            issue_number=850,
-            canonical_repo_root=self.repo_dir,
-            owner_session=None,
-            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(res.get("reason_code"), "missing_owner_session")
-        self.assertIn("exact_next_action", res)
-
-    def test_symlink_lock_file_refusal(self):
-        """Finding C: BootstrapTransitionLock refuses to follow symlinks."""
-        key = "test_symlink_lock_key"
-        safe_key = "".join(c if c.isalnum() or c in ("-", "_", ".") else "_" for c in key)
-        lock_path = os.path.join(self.lock_dir, f"{safe_key}.lock")
-        target_file = os.path.join(self.tmp_dir, "fake_target")
-        with open(target_file, "w") as f:
-            f.write("target")
-        os.symlink(target_file, lock_path)
-
-        with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
-            with author_issue_bootstrap.BootstrapTransitionLock(key, journal_dir=self.lock_dir):
-                pass
-        self.assertIn("symlink", str(ctx.exception).lower())
-
-    def test_lock_directory_escape_refusal(self):
-        """Finding C: BootstrapTransitionLock refuses keys that escape lock directory."""
-        with mock.patch("os.path.abspath", return_value="/tmp/outside/evil_key.lock"):
-            with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
-                author_issue_bootstrap.BootstrapTransitionLock("key", journal_dir=self.lock_dir)
-        self.assertIn("escapes", str(ctx.exception).lower())
-
-    def test_missing_active_identity_refusal(self):
-        """F-5: Missing active_identity parameter fails closed."""
-        res = author_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_author_issue_worktree(
-            issue_number=850,
-            canonical_repo_root=self.repo_dir,
-            owner_session="session-test-1234",
-            active_identity=None,
-            active_profile="prgs-author",
-            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(res.get("reason_code"), "missing_active_identity")
-
-    def test_missing_active_profile_refusal(self):
-        """F-5: Missing active_profile parameter fails closed."""
-        res = author_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_author_issue_worktree(
-            issue_number=850,
-            canonical_repo_root=self.repo_dir,
-            owner_session="session-test-1234",
-            active_identity="jcwalker3",
-            active_profile=None,
-            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(res["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(res.get("reason_code"), "missing_active_profile")
-
-    def test_dirty_worktree_preserved_during_recovery(self):
-        """F-4: Compensating recovery does not delete dirty worktree."""
-        branch = "fix/issue-850-rec-dirty"
-        wt_path = os.path.join(self.branches_dir, "fix-issue-850-rec-dirty")
-        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", self.repo_dir, "worktree", "add", "-b", branch, wt_path], check=True, capture_output=True)
-        dirty_file = os.path.join(wt_path, "dirty.txt")
-        with open(dirty_file, "w") as f:
-            f.write("uncommitted work")
-
-        journal = {
-            "idempotency_key": "test_dirty_rec",
-            "issue_number": 850,
-            "branch_name": branch,
-            "worktree_path": wt_path,
-            "artifacts_created": {
-                "worktree_dir_created": True,
-                "worktree_registered": True,
-            },
-            "failure_reason": "test dirty recovery",
-        }
-        rec = author_issue_bootstrap.run_compensating_recovery(journal, self.repo_dir, journal_dir=self.lock_dir)
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.exists(wt_path))
-        self.assertIn(f"worktree_path_preserved_dirty:{wt_path}", rec["rolled_back"])
-
-    def test_branch_with_commits_preserved_during_recovery(self):
-        """F-4: Compensating recovery does not delete branch with author commits."""
-        branch = "fix/issue-850-rec-commits"
-        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", self.repo_dir, "branch", branch, self.master_sha], check=True, capture_output=True)
-        # Add a commit on the branch
-        wt_path = os.path.join(self.branches_dir, "fix-issue-850-rec-commits")
-        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", self.repo_dir, "worktree", "add", wt_path, branch], check=True, capture_output=True)
-        cfile = os.path.join(wt_path, "commit.txt")
-        with open(cfile, "w") as f:
-            f.write("author commit")
-        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", wt_path, "add", "commit.txt"], check=True, capture_output=True)
-        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", wt_path, "commit", "-m", "author commit"], check=True, capture_output=True)
-        subprocess.run(["git", "-C", self.repo_dir, "worktree", "remove", "--force", wt_path], check=True, capture_output=True)
-
-        journal = {
-            "idempotency_key": "test_commits_rec",
-            "issue_number": 850,
-            "branch_name": branch,
-            "resolved_base_sha": self.master_sha,
-            "artifacts_created": {
-                "branch_created": True,
-            },
-            "failure_reason": "test commit branch recovery",
-        }
-        rec = author_issue_bootstrap.run_compensating_recovery(journal, self.repo_dir, journal_dir=self.lock_dir)
-        branch_check = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", self.repo_dir, "rev-parse", "--verify", branch], capture_output=True, text=True, check=False)
-        self.assertEqual(branch_check.returncode, 0, "Branch with commits was deleted!")
-        self.assertIn(f"branch_preserved_commits:{branch}", rec["rolled_back"])
-
-    def test_task_capability_map_integration(self):
-        """Verify task_capability_map has bootstrap_author_issue_worktree configured correctly."""
-        self.assertEqual(task_capability_map.required_role("bootstrap_author_issue_worktree"), "author")
-        self.assertEqual(task_capability_map.required_permission("bootstrap_author_issue_worktree"), "gitea.branch.create")
-        self.assertTrue(task_capability_map.preflight_task_matches("work_issue", "bootstrap_author_issue_worktree"))
-        self.assertTrue(task_capability_map.preflight_task_matches("bootstrap_author_issue_worktree", "lock_issue"))
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()
-

tests/test_author_mutation_worktree.py

@@ -28,21 +28,6 @@ class TestPathUnderBranches(unittest.TestCase):
             amw.is_path_under_branches("/repo/other-checkout", self.ROOT)
         )
 
-    def test_unrelated_branches_dir_fails(self):
-        self.assertFalse(
-            amw.is_path_under_branches("/tmp/branches/evil", self.ROOT)
-        )
-
-    def test_prefix_confusion_fails(self):
-        self.assertFalse(
-            amw.is_path_under_branches(f"{self.ROOT}/branches-other/foo", self.ROOT)
-        )
-
-    def test_traversal_fails(self):
-        self.assertFalse(
-            amw.is_path_under_branches(f"{self.ROOT}/branches/../evil", self.ROOT)
-        )
-
 
 class TestAssessAuthorMutationWorktree(unittest.TestCase):
     ROOT = "/repo/Gitea-Tools"

tests/test_task_capability_role_invariants.py

@@ -139,8 +139,6 @@ EXPECTED_ROLE_EXCLUSIVE_TASKS = frozenset(
         "gitea_release_merger_pr_lease",
         "create_branch",
         "push_branch",
-        "bootstrap_author_issue_worktree",
-        "gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree",
         # #812 AC20: publishing an unpublished local head is author-only for the
         # same reason every other push is — it writes a branch to the remote.
         "publish_unpublished_branch",

tests/test_webui_sanctioned_restart.py

@@ -0,0 +1,502 @@
+"""Sanctioned restart / graceful reload control tests (#642).
+
+Acceptance criteria under test:
+
+1. The sanctioned restart path is implemented behind gates (capability,
+   confirmation, operator authorization, host hook).
+2. Manual ``pkill`` stays forbidden and is classified as contamination.
+3. Post-restart mutations require clean health/session proof.
+4. Authorized restart preview, unauthorized deny, contamination classification.
+5. No entry point exposes a raw kill.
+"""
+
+import json
+import os
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+
+import mcp_namespace_health
+import runtime_recovery_guard
+from task_capability_map import TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP
+from webui import console_audit, console_authz, gated_actions, sanctioned_restart
+
+NAMESPACE = "gitea-author"
+
+# An operator-authorized, hook-configured host. Passed explicitly so no test
+# depends on (or mutates) the real process environment.
+READY_ENV = {
+    sanctioned_restart.RESTART_HOOK_ENV: "launchd:cc.prgs.gitea-author",
+    runtime_recovery_guard.OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION_ENV: "ops-ticket-4821",
+}
+
+
+def admin(subject: str = "[email protected]") -> console_authz.Principal:
+    return console_authz.Principal(
+        subject=subject,
+        role=console_authz.ADMIN,
+        identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
+        authenticated=True,
+    )
+
+
+def viewer() -> console_authz.Principal:
+    return console_authz.Principal(
+        subject="[email protected]",
+        role=console_authz.VIEWER,
+        identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
+        authenticated=True,
+    )
+
+
+class TestCapabilityWiring(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC1: authority is declared, not invented by the console."""
+
+    def test_actions_resolve_through_the_capability_map(self):
+        for action_id in (
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE,
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
+                action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
+                self.assertIsNotNone(action)
+                self.assertIn(action.task_key, TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP)
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    action.mcp_permission,
+                    TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP[action.task_key]["permission"],
+                )
+
+    def test_restart_permission_is_not_a_gitea_operation(self):
+        """No configured Gitea profile should satisfy a host restart."""
+        permission = TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP["restart_namespace"]["permission"]
+        self.assertFalse(permission.startswith("gitea."))
+
+    def test_restart_is_destructive_dual_control_break_glass(self):
+        action = console_authz.get_action(
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(action.action_class, console_authz.CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE)
+        self.assertEqual(action.minimum_role, console_authz.ADMIN)
+        self.assertTrue(action.dual_control)
+        self.assertTrue(action.break_glass)
+        self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
+
+    def test_reload_is_privileged_but_not_destructive(self):
+        action = console_authz.get_action(
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(action.action_class, console_authz.CLASS_PRIVILEGED)
+        self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
+
+
+class TestPreview(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC4: an authorized preview renders the plan without executing it."""
+
+    def test_preview_lists_the_mutation_ledger(self):
+        preview = sanctioned_restart.build_restart_preview(
+            NAMESPACE, principal=admin(), env=READY_ENV
+        )
+        steps = [entry["step"] for entry in preview["mutation_ledger"]]
+        self.assertEqual(
+            steps, ["quiesce", "host_restart_hook", "health_recheck", "audit"]
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(preview["scope_valid"])
+        self.assertTrue(preview["post_restart_verification_required"])
+
+    def test_reload_preview_drains_instead_of_restarting(self):
+        preview = sanctioned_restart.build_restart_preview(
+            NAMESPACE, sanctioned_restart.MODE_RELOAD,
+            principal=admin(), env=READY_ENV,
+        )
+        steps = [entry["step"] for entry in preview["mutation_ledger"]]
+        self.assertIn("host_graceful_reload", steps)
+        self.assertNotIn("host_restart_hook", steps)
+
+    def test_preview_never_enables_execution(self):
+        preview = sanctioned_restart.build_restart_preview(
+            NAMESPACE, principal=admin(), env=READY_ENV
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(preview["execution_enabled"])
+        self.assertFalse(preview["authorization"]["execution_enabled"])
+
+    def test_confirmation_phrase_binds_the_namespace(self):
+        self.assertTrue(
+            sanctioned_restart.confirmation_matches(
+                NAMESPACE, sanctioned_restart.MODE_RESTART,
+                "restart gitea-author",
+            )
+        )
+        # A phrase typed for one namespace must not authorize another.
+        self.assertFalse(
+            sanctioned_restart.confirmation_matches(
+                "gitea-merger", sanctioned_restart.MODE_RESTART,
+                "restart gitea-author",
+            )
+        )
+
+
+class TestGates(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC1/AC4: every gate denies with a stable reason code."""
+
+    def _assess(self, **kwargs):
+        params = {
+            "principal": admin(),
+            "confirmation": f"restart {NAMESPACE}",
+            "env": READY_ENV,
+        }
+        params.update(kwargs)
+        namespace = params.pop("namespace", NAMESPACE)
+        mode = params.pop("mode", sanctioned_restart.MODE_RESTART)
+        return sanctioned_restart.assess_restart_request(
+            namespace, mode, **params
+        )
+
+    def test_authorized_confirmed_request_passes_every_gate(self):
+        result = self._assess()
+        self.assertTrue(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED
+        )
+
+    def test_passing_every_gate_is_not_an_execution_grant(self):
+        """An allowed request still never lets the console touch the process."""
+        result = self._assess()
+        self.assertTrue(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["execution_enabled"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["console_executes"])
+
+    def test_unauthorized_principal_is_denied(self):
+        result = self._assess(principal=viewer())
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNAUTHORIZED
+        )
+
+    def test_anonymous_principal_is_denied(self):
+        result = self._assess(principal=None)
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNAUTHORIZED
+        )
+
+    def test_missing_confirmation_is_denied(self):
+        result = self._assess(confirmation=None)
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISSING
+        )
+
+    def test_confirmation_for_another_namespace_is_denied(self):
+        result = self._assess(confirmation="restart gitea-merger")
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISMATCH
+        )
+
+    def test_missing_operator_authorization_is_denied(self):
+        env = {sanctioned_restart.RESTART_HOOK_ENV: "launchd:cc.prgs.author"}
+        result = self._assess(env=env)
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"],
+            sanctioned_restart.DENY_OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION,
+        )
+
+    def test_missing_host_hook_is_denied_without_kill_fallback(self):
+        env = {
+            runtime_recovery_guard.OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION_ENV: "ops-ticket-1",
+        }
+        result = self._assess(env=env)
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_HOOK_NOT_CONFIGURED
+        )
+
+    def test_fleet_scope_is_refused(self):
+        for scope in ("all", "*", "fleet"):
+            with self.subTest(scope=scope):
+                result = self._assess(
+                    namespace=scope, confirmation=f"restart {scope}"
+                )
+                self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+                self.assertEqual(
+                    result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_FLEET_SCOPE
+                )
+
+    def test_unknown_namespace_is_refused(self):
+        result = self._assess(
+            namespace="gitea-nope", confirmation="restart gitea-nope"
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNKNOWN_NAMESPACE
+        )
+
+    def test_unknown_mode_is_refused(self):
+        result = self._assess(mode="obliterate")
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE
+        )
+
+    def test_live_contamination_marker_blocks_restart(self):
+        marker = runtime_recovery_guard.build_contamination_record(
+            reason_class=runtime_recovery_guard.REASON_MANUAL_DAEMON_KILL,
+            command_redacted="pkill -f mcp_server.py",
+        )
+        result = self._assess(contamination_marker=marker)
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_CONTAMINATED_RUNTIME
+        )
+
+    def test_reconciler_cleared_marker_no_longer_blocks(self):
+        marker = runtime_recovery_guard.build_contamination_record(
+            reason_class=runtime_recovery_guard.REASON_MANUAL_DAEMON_KILL,
+            command_redacted="pkill -f mcp_server.py",
+        )
+        marker = dict(marker, cleared_by_reconciler=True)
+        result = self._assess(contamination_marker=marker)
+        self.assertTrue(result["allowed"])
+
+
+class TestExecutionNeverKills(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC5: no path exposes or runs a raw process kill."""
+
+    def test_authorized_execution_defers_to_the_host_supervisor(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.execute_restart(
+            NAMESPACE,
+            principal=admin(),
+            confirmation=f"restart {NAMESPACE}",
+            env=READY_ENV,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["process_kill_executed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["outcome"], sanctioned_restart.ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED
+        )
+
+    def test_denied_execution_reports_the_refusing_gate(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.execute_restart(
+            NAMESPACE, principal=viewer(), confirmation=f"restart {NAMESPACE}",
+            env=READY_ENV,
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["outcome"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNAUTHORIZED
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["process_kill_executed"])
+
+    def test_module_never_spawns_a_process(self):
+        path = os.path.join(
+            os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))),
+            "webui", "sanctioned_restart.py",
+        )
+        with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+            source = handle.read()
+        for forbidden in (
+            "import subprocess", "import signal", "os.kill", "os.system",
+            "popen",
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(forbidden=forbidden):
+                self.assertNotIn(forbidden, source.lower())
+
+    def test_no_surface_returns_a_kill_command(self):
+        payloads = [
+            sanctioned_restart.build_restart_preview(
+                NAMESPACE, principal=admin(), env=READY_ENV
+            ),
+            sanctioned_restart.restart_policy(),
+            sanctioned_restart.execute_restart(
+                NAMESPACE, principal=admin(),
+                confirmation=f"restart {NAMESPACE}", env=READY_ENV,
+            ),
+        ]
+        for payload in payloads:
+            rendered = json.dumps(payload, default=str).lower()
+            self.assertNotIn("kill -9", rendered)
+            self.assertNotIn("pkill -f", rendered)
+
+    def test_policy_declares_no_raw_kill_and_no_silent_restart(self):
+        policy = sanctioned_restart.restart_policy()
+        self.assertFalse(policy["raw_kill_exposed"])
+        self.assertFalse(policy["console_executes_process_kill"])
+        self.assertFalse(policy["fleet_scope_permitted"])
+        self.assertFalse(policy["silent_auto_restart_permitted"])
+        self.assertTrue(policy["audit_required"])
+
+
+class TestContaminationClassification(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC2: manual pkill is contamination, and it blocks clean claims."""
+
+    def test_manual_daemon_pkill_is_contamination(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command(
+            "pkill -f mcp_server.py"
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["contamination"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+        self.assertIsNotNone(result["contamination_marker"])
+        self.assertEqual(
+            result["sanctioned_alternative"],
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
+        )
+
+    def test_broad_process_kill_is_contamination(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command("killall -9 Python")
+        self.assertTrue(result["contamination"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+
+    def test_marker_names_the_sanctioned_alternative(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command(
+            "pkill -f mcp_server.py"
+        )
+        marker = result["contamination_marker"]
+        self.assertIn(
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE, marker["detail"]
+        )
+
+    def test_benign_command_is_not_contamination(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command("git status")
+        self.assertFalse(result["contamination"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+
+    def test_no_command_is_not_contamination(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command(None)
+        self.assertFalse(result["contamination"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+
+
+class TestPostRestartHealth(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC3: a clean post-restart claim needs live client-namespace proof."""
+
+    def test_live_client_probe_clears_the_session(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.verify_post_restart_health(
+            NAMESPACE,
+            probe_result={"success": True},
+            probe_source=mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_CLIENT,
+            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
+            required_tool="gitea_whoami",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(result["status"], sanctioned_restart.HEALTH_CLEAN)
+        self.assertTrue(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["mutations_allowed"])
+
+    def test_offline_probe_does_not_clear_the_session(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.verify_post_restart_health(
+            NAMESPACE,
+            probe_result={"success": True},
+            probe_source=mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_OFFLINE,
+            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
+            required_tool="gitea_whoami",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+        self.assertFalse(result["mutations_allowed"])
+
+    def test_failed_probe_is_unhealthy(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.verify_post_restart_health(
+            NAMESPACE,
+            probe_result={"success": False, "error": "client is closing: EOF"},
+            probe_source=mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_CLIENT,
+            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
+            required_tool="gitea_whoami",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(result["status"], sanctioned_restart.HEALTH_UNHEALTHY)
+        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+
+    def test_static_registration_alone_never_clears_the_session(self):
+        result = sanctioned_restart.verify_post_restart_health(
+            NAMESPACE,
+            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
+            required_tool="gitea_whoami",
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
+
+
+class TestAuditEmission(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Every restart attempt is audited with actor, target, and result."""
+
+    def _run(self, principal, sink):
+        prior = os.environ.get(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV)
+        os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = sink
+        try:
+            return sanctioned_restart.execute_restart(
+                NAMESPACE,
+                principal=principal,
+                confirmation=f"restart {NAMESPACE}",
+                env=READY_ENV,
+                request_id="req-642",
+            )
+        finally:
+            if prior is None:
+                os.environ.pop(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV, None)
+            else:
+                os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = prior
+
+    def test_allowed_attempt_is_written_with_actor_and_target(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "audit.jsonl")
+            result = self._run(admin(), sink)
+            self.assertTrue(result["audit"]["written"])
+            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                record = json.loads(handle.read().strip())
+        self.assertEqual(
+            record["action"], sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(record["target"]["namespace"], NAMESPACE)
+        self.assertEqual(record["target"]["mode"], "restart")
+        self.assertEqual(record["result"], console_audit.RESULT_ALLOWED)
+        self.assertEqual(record["actor"]["subject"], "[email protected]")
+        self.assertFalse(record["metadata"]["process_kill_executed"])
+
+    def test_denied_attempt_is_audited_too(self):
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "audit.jsonl")
+            self._run(viewer(), sink)
+            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+                record = json.loads(handle.read().strip())
+        self.assertEqual(record["result"], console_audit.RESULT_DENIED)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            record["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNAUTHORIZED
+        )
+
+    def test_restart_audit_uses_break_glass_retention(self):
+        action = console_authz.get_action(
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            console_audit.retention_class_for(action),
+            console_audit.RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS,
+        )
+
+
+class TestRegistrySurface(unittest.TestCase):
+    """AC5: the console surfaces the control, still disabled, with no kill."""
+
+    def test_registry_exposes_both_actions_disabled(self):
+        registry = gated_actions.load_action_registry()
+        for action_id in (
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE,
+        ):
+            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
+                action = registry.get(action_id)
+                self.assertIsNotNone(action)
+                self.assertFalse(action.enabled)
+
+    def test_registry_preview_names_the_namespace_target(self):
+        preview = gated_actions.preview_action(
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE, namespace=NAMESPACE
+        )
+        target = preview["mutation_ledger"][0]["target"]
+        self.assertIn(NAMESPACE, target)
+        self.assertFalse(preview["enabled"])
+
+    def test_registry_attempt_fails_closed(self):
+        result = gated_actions.attempt_action(
+            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE, namespace=NAMESPACE
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

webui/console_authz.py

@@ -236,6 +236,34 @@ _ACTION_SPECS: tuple[ConsoleAction, ...] = (
         phase=3,
         summary="Remove a remote feature branch.",
     ),
+    # #642: sanctioned daemon lifecycle. These exist so operators have an
+    # audited path off `pkill -f mcp_server.py` (#630). Restart drops every
+    # in-flight request on a namespace, so it carries the same dual-control and
+    # break-glass weight as a merge; reload drains first and is privileged but
+    # not destructive. Neither ever exposes a raw kill: execution is handed to
+    # a host supervisor by ``webui.sanctioned_restart``.
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="system.reload_namespace",
+        task_key="reload_namespace",
+        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
+        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=False,
+        break_glass=False,
+        phase=2,
+        summary="Gracefully reload one MCP namespace via the host supervisor.",
+    ),
+    ConsoleAction(
+        action_id="system.restart_namespace",
+        task_key="restart_namespace",
+        action_class=CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE,
+        minimum_role=ADMIN,
+        requires_confirmation=True,
+        dual_control=True,
+        break_glass=True,
+        phase=2,
+        summary="Restart one MCP namespace via the host supervisor.",
+    ),
 )
 
 ACTIONS: dict[str, ConsoleAction] = {a.action_id: a for a in _ACTION_SPECS}

webui/gated_actions.py

@@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ def _format_target(action_id: str, params: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
         )
     if action_id == "create_issue":
         return f"issue {params.get('title', '?')!r}"
+    if action_id in {"system.restart_namespace", "system.reload_namespace"}:
+        return f"MCP namespace {params.get('namespace', '?')!r}"
     return "unspecified"
 
 
@@ -165,6 +167,17 @@ def build_action_registry() -> ActionRegistry:
          "gitea_create_issue_comment", "Post a PR review thread comment."),
         ("close_pr", "Close PR", "close_pr", "gitea_edit_pr",
          "Close a pull request without merge."),
+        # #642: the sanctioned replacement for the forbidden manual daemon-kill
+        # recovery path (#630). The "tool" is a host supervisor hook, not an MCP
+        # call — the console never signals a process. Preview and gating live in
+        # ``webui.sanctioned_restart``; these stay disabled like every other
+        # registry entry.
+        ("system.reload_namespace", "Reload MCP namespace", "reload_namespace",
+         "host.supervisor_reload",
+         "Gracefully reload one MCP namespace via the host supervisor."),
+        ("system.restart_namespace", "Restart MCP namespace",
+         "restart_namespace", "host.supervisor_restart",
+         "Restart one MCP namespace via the host supervisor."),
     )
     actions = tuple(
         GatedAction(

webui/sanctioned_restart.py

@@ -0,0 +1,613 @@
+"""Sanctioned MCP restart and graceful reload controls (#642, Phase 2).
+
+Sessions have historically recovered MCP connectivity by killing the host
+daemon (``pkill -f mcp_server.py``, #630). That path stays forbidden: it kills
+every namespace on the host, contaminates the surviving session, and leaves no
+audit trail. This module is the sanctioned replacement.
+
+A restart is modelled as a *gated action*, never as a command:
+
+1. **Capability** — the console action resolves through ``console_authz``
+   against ``task_capability_map``, so the console cannot invent an authority
+   the MCP layer does not already define.
+2. **Preview** — :func:`build_restart_preview` renders a mutation ledger and
+   the exact confirmation phrase. It never returns a shell command.
+3. **Confirmation** — the operator echoes a phrase naming the exact namespace
+   and mode. A phrase for one namespace never authorizes another.
+4. **Operator authorization** — host daemon maintenance is authorized out of
+   band through the environment (#630, and #710 finding F1: a worker session
+   cannot set an env var for an already-running daemon, so this cannot be
+   self-asserted the way a tool argument could).
+5. **Execution** — :func:`execute_restart` never spawns a process. Once every
+   gate passes it hands the request to the configured host-managed restart
+   hook; with no hook configured it fails closed.
+6. **Health recheck** — :func:`verify_post_restart_health` requires live
+   client-namespace probe evidence before any post-restart clean claim.
+
+Manual ``pkill`` remains forbidden and is classified as contamination by
+:func:`classify_restart_command`, which blocks clean claims (#630 AC3).
+
+This module performs no I/O beyond reading its own environment configuration,
+imports no MCP client, and holds no credential.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
+from typing import Any
+
+import mcp_namespace_health
+import runtime_recovery_guard
+from webui import console_audit, console_authz
+
+# --- Operations -------------------------------------------------------------
+
+MODE_RESTART = "restart"
+MODE_RELOAD = "reload"
+MODES: tuple[str, ...] = (MODE_RESTART, MODE_RELOAD)
+
+ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE = "system.restart_namespace"
+ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE = "system.reload_namespace"
+
+ACTION_FOR_MODE: dict[str, str] = {
+    MODE_RESTART: ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
+    MODE_RELOAD: ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE,
+}
+
+# Namespaces the console may target. An unlisted name fails closed rather than
+# being passed through to a host hook.
+KNOWN_NAMESPACES: tuple[str, ...] = tuple(
+    sorted(
+        set(mcp_namespace_health.DEFAULT_NAMESPACES)
+        | {"gitea-author", "gitea-reviewer", "gitea-merger",
+           "gitea-reconciler", "gitea-controller"}
+    )
+)
+
+# Scope tokens that would mean "everything at once". Explicit non-goal: the
+# console never offers a fleet-wide restart, because that is the blast radius
+# `pkill -f mcp_server.py` already had.
+_FLEET_TOKENS = frozenset({"*", "all", "fleet", "any", ""})
+
+# --- Environment configuration ----------------------------------------------
+# Read server-side only; the value is an opaque host hook reference (e.g. a
+# launchd label), never a command line, and is never rendered to a client.
+RESTART_HOOK_ENV = "GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK"
+
+# --- Reason codes -----------------------------------------------------------
+
+DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE = "unknown_mode"
+DENY_UNKNOWN_NAMESPACE = "unknown_namespace"
+DENY_FLEET_SCOPE = "fleet_scope_not_permitted"
+DENY_UNAUTHORIZED = "unauthorized"
+DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISSING = "confirmation_required"
+DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISMATCH = "confirmation_mismatch"
+DENY_OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION = "operator_authorization_missing"
+DENY_HOOK_NOT_CONFIGURED = "restart_hook_not_configured"
+DENY_CONTAMINATED_RUNTIME = "contaminated_runtime"
+
+ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED = "host_action_required"
+
+# Post-restart verification outcomes.
+HEALTH_CLEAN = "clean"
+HEALTH_UNPROVEN = "unproven"
+HEALTH_UNHEALTHY = "unhealthy"
+
+
+def _clean(value: Any) -> str:
+    return str(value or "").strip()
+
+
+# --- Mutation ledger --------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class RestartLedgerEntry:
+    """One planned step, shown before anything is asked of the host."""
+
+    sequence: int
+    step: str
+    summary: str
+    executes_process_kill: bool = False
+
+
+def _mutation_ledger(namespace: str, mode: str) -> tuple[RestartLedgerEntry, ...]:
+    if mode == MODE_RELOAD:
+        middle = RestartLedgerEntry(
+            sequence=2,
+            step="host_graceful_reload",
+            summary=(
+                f"Ask the configured host supervisor to reload {namespace} "
+                "in place, draining in-flight requests. The console does not "
+                "signal the process itself."
+            ),
+        )
+    else:
+        middle = RestartLedgerEntry(
+            sequence=2,
+            step="host_restart_hook",
+            summary=(
+                f"Ask the configured host supervisor to restart {namespace}. "
+                "The console never sends a signal and never runs a kill."
+            ),
+        )
+    return (
+        RestartLedgerEntry(
+            sequence=1,
+            step="quiesce",
+            summary=(
+                f"Stop admitting new gated mutations for {namespace} and "
+                "record the intent before anything restarts."
+            ),
+        ),
+        middle,
+        RestartLedgerEntry(
+            sequence=3,
+            step="health_recheck",
+            summary=(
+                f"Re-probe {namespace} through the live client namespace and "
+                "prove the required tool is callable again."
+            ),
+        ),
+        RestartLedgerEntry(
+            sequence=4,
+            step="audit",
+            summary=(
+                "Append actor, target namespace, mode, and result to the "
+                "console audit log."
+            ),
+        ),
+    )
+
+
+# --- Confirmation -----------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def confirmation_phrase(namespace: str, mode: str) -> str:
+    """Exact phrase an operator must echo, naming the namespace and mode.
+
+    Binding the namespace into the phrase is the point: a confirmation typed
+    for ``gitea-author`` cannot be replayed against ``gitea-merger``.
+    """
+    return f"{_clean(mode)} {_clean(namespace)}"
+
+
+def confirmation_matches(
+    namespace: str, mode: str, confirmation: str | None
+) -> bool:
+    """Compare *confirmation* to the required phrase (exact, whitespace-trimmed)."""
+    return _clean(confirmation) == confirmation_phrase(namespace, mode)
+
+
+# --- Scope validation -------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def _validate_scope(namespace: str, mode: str) -> tuple[str, str] | None:
+    """Return ``(reason_code, detail)`` when the scope is refused."""
+    ns = _clean(namespace)
+    md = _clean(mode)
+
+    if md not in MODES:
+        return (
+            DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE,
+            f"Mode {md!r} is not one of {', '.join(MODES)}.",
+        )
+    if ns.lower() in _FLEET_TOKENS:
+        return (
+            DENY_FLEET_SCOPE,
+            (
+                "Fleet-wide restart is an explicit non-goal: it reproduces the "
+                "blast radius of `pkill -f mcp_server.py` (#630). Restart one "
+                "namespace at a time."
+            ),
+        )
+    if ns not in KNOWN_NAMESPACES:
+        return (
+            DENY_UNKNOWN_NAMESPACE,
+            f"Namespace {ns!r} is not a known MCP namespace.",
+        )
+    return None
+
+
+# --- Host hook --------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def restart_hook(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Report the configured host-managed restart hook.
+
+    The hook is a reference the *host* resolves (a supervisor label), not a
+    command this process runs. ``configured=False`` fails restart closed.
+    """
+    source = env if env is not None else os.environ
+    reference = _clean(source.get(RESTART_HOOK_ENV))
+    return {
+        "configured": bool(reference),
+        "reference": reference or None,
+        "source": RESTART_HOOK_ENV if reference else None,
+        "self_assertable": False,
+        "console_executes_process": False,
+    }
+
+
+# --- Preview ----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def build_restart_preview(
+    namespace: str,
+    mode: str = MODE_RESTART,
+    *,
+    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
+    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Render the dry-run preview for a restart/reload request.
+
+    Read-only: no authorization is granted, no host is contacted, and the
+    result never contains a shell command.
+    """
+    ns = _clean(namespace)
+    md = _clean(mode)
+    action_id = ACTION_FOR_MODE.get(md, ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE)
+    action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
+    decision = console_authz.authorize(action_id, principal)
+    scope_error = _validate_scope(ns, md)
+    hook = restart_hook(env)
+    operator = runtime_recovery_guard.operator_authorization(env)
+
+    return {
+        "action_id": action_id,
+        "namespace": ns,
+        "mode": md,
+        "scope_valid": scope_error is None,
+        "scope_reason_code": scope_error[0] if scope_error else None,
+        "scope_detail": scope_error[1] if scope_error else None,
+        "required_role": action.minimum_role if action else None,
+        "required_permission": action.mcp_permission if action else None,
+        "action_class": action.action_class if action else None,
+        "dual_control": action.dual_control if action else True,
+        "break_glass": action.break_glass if action else True,
+        "requires_confirmation": True,
+        "confirmation_phrase": confirmation_phrase(ns, md),
+        "mutation_ledger": [asdict(entry) for entry in _mutation_ledger(ns, md)],
+        "authorization": decision.to_dict(),
+        "operator_authorization": operator,
+        "restart_hook": hook,
+        "execution_enabled": False,
+        "raw_process_kill_exposed": False,
+        "known_namespaces": list(KNOWN_NAMESPACES),
+        "post_restart_verification_required": True,
+    }
+
+
+# --- Gate -------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def assess_restart_request(
+    namespace: str,
+    mode: str = MODE_RESTART,
+    *,
+    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
+    confirmation: str | None = None,
+    contamination_marker: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Decide whether a restart request may proceed to the host hook.
+
+    Every gate must pass. The first failure wins and is reported with a stable
+    reason code; a pass never means "restarted", only "may be handed to the
+    configured host hook".
+    """
+    ns = _clean(namespace)
+    md = _clean(mode)
+    action_id = ACTION_FOR_MODE.get(md, ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE)
+    preview = build_restart_preview(ns, md, principal=principal, env=env)
+
+    def refuse(reason_code: str, detail: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "allowed": False,
+            "gates_passed": False,
+            "reason_code": reason_code,
+            "detail": detail,
+            "action_id": action_id,
+            "namespace": ns,
+            "mode": md,
+            "preview": preview,
+            "execution_enabled": False,
+        }
+
+    scope_error = _validate_scope(ns, md)
+    if scope_error is not None:
+        return refuse(*scope_error)
+
+    # Authority is checked as an authorization decision, not an execution
+    # grant. ``for_execution=True`` asks "may the console perform this write?",
+    # and the answer here is permanently no: step 2 of the ledger is a request
+    # to the host supervisor, so the console's Phase 2 execution gate is not
+    # the relevant gate. Every branch below keeps ``execution_enabled`` False
+    # and :func:`execute_restart` never touches a process.
+    decision = console_authz.authorize(action_id, principal)
+    if not decision.allowed:
+        return refuse(DENY_UNAUTHORIZED, decision.detail)
+
+    if not _clean(confirmation):
+        return refuse(
+            DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISSING,
+            (
+                "Type the confirmation phrase "
+                f"{preview['confirmation_phrase']!r} to proceed."
+            ),
+        )
+    if not confirmation_matches(ns, md, confirmation):
+        return refuse(
+            DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISMATCH,
+            (
+                "Confirmation does not name this namespace and mode; expected "
+                f"{preview['confirmation_phrase']!r}."
+            ),
+        )
+
+    operator = preview["operator_authorization"]
+    if not operator["authorized"]:
+        return refuse(
+            DENY_OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION,
+            (
+                "Host daemon maintenance requires out-of-band operator "
+                "authorization via "
+                f"{runtime_recovery_guard.OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION_ENV}."
+            ),
+        )
+
+    # #630's task-scoped gate deliberately lets a contaminated worker keep
+    # commenting and handing off. Restart is stricter and unconditional: a
+    # runtime already contaminated by a manual kill must be reconciled before
+    # it is restarted again, or the restart just launders the contamination.
+    if contamination_marker and not contamination_marker.get(
+        "cleared_by_reconciler"
+    ):
+        return refuse(
+            DENY_CONTAMINATED_RUNTIME,
+            (
+                "A live contamination marker is present; clear it through the "
+                "reconciler path before restarting."
+            ),
+        )
+
+    hook = preview["restart_hook"]
+    if not hook["configured"]:
+        return refuse(
+            DENY_HOOK_NOT_CONFIGURED,
+            (
+                "No host-managed restart hook is configured "
+                f"({RESTART_HOOK_ENV}). The console will not fall back to a "
+                "process kill."
+            ),
+        )
+
+    return {
+        "allowed": True,
+        "gates_passed": True,
+        "reason_code": ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED,
+        "detail": (
+            "Every gate passed. The restart must be performed by the "
+            "configured host supervisor; the console does not signal the "
+            "process."
+        ),
+        "action_id": action_id,
+        "namespace": ns,
+        "mode": md,
+        "preview": preview,
+        "execution_enabled": False,
+        "console_executes": False,
+        "console_active_phase": console_authz.ACTIVE_PHASE,
+    }
+
+
+# --- Execution --------------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def execute_restart(
+    namespace: str,
+    mode: str = MODE_RESTART,
+    *,
+    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
+    confirmation: str | None = None,
+    contamination_marker: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
+    request_id: str | None = None,
+    session_id: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Run every gate, audit the outcome, and hand off to the host.
+
+    This function never spawns a process, never sends a signal, and never
+    builds a command line. ``success`` is False in both directions: a refused
+    request is refused, and an authorized request still requires the host
+    supervisor to act.
+    """
+    assessment = assess_restart_request(
+        namespace,
+        mode,
+        principal=principal,
+        confirmation=confirmation,
+        contamination_marker=contamination_marker,
+        env=env,
+    )
+    action_id = assessment["action_id"]
+    allowed = assessment["allowed"]
+
+    audit = console_audit.record_event(
+        action_id=action_id,
+        result=(
+            console_audit.RESULT_ALLOWED if allowed
+            else console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
+        ),
+        principal=principal,
+        target={"namespace": assessment["namespace"], "mode": assessment["mode"]},
+        reason_code=assessment["reason_code"],
+        detail=assessment["detail"],
+        request_id=request_id,
+        session_id=session_id,
+        metadata={
+            "gates_passed": assessment["gates_passed"],
+            "process_kill_executed": False,
+            "post_restart_verification_required": True,
+        },
+    )
+
+    return {
+        "success": False,
+        "outcome": (
+            ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED if allowed else assessment["reason_code"]
+        ),
+        "allowed": allowed,
+        "detail": assessment["detail"],
+        "namespace": assessment["namespace"],
+        "mode": assessment["mode"],
+        "action_id": action_id,
+        "process_kill_executed": False,
+        "host_hook": assessment["preview"]["restart_hook"],
+        "next_action": (
+            "Have the host supervisor perform the restart, then call "
+            "verify_post_restart_health with live client-namespace evidence "
+            "before claiming a clean session."
+            if allowed
+            else assessment["detail"]
+        ),
+        "assessment": assessment,
+        "audit": audit,
+    }
+
+
+# --- Contamination classification -------------------------------------------
+
+
+def classify_restart_command(
+    command: str | None,
+    *,
+    mcp_pids: list[Any] | tuple[Any, ...] | None = None,
+    session_id: str | None = None,
+    remote: str | None = None,
+    role: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Classify an operator-proposed recovery command (#630 AC2).
+
+    A manual ``pkill``/``kill`` of the MCP daemon is contamination, not a
+    restart. When contaminating, a durable marker is returned so downstream
+    gated mutations and clean claims fail closed.
+    """
+    classification = runtime_recovery_guard.classify_recovery_command(
+        command, mcp_pids=mcp_pids
+    )
+    contaminating = bool(classification.get("contamination"))
+
+    marker = None
+    if contaminating:
+        marker = runtime_recovery_guard.build_contamination_record(
+            reason_class=(
+                classification.get("reason_class")
+                or runtime_recovery_guard.REASON_MANUAL_DAEMON_KILL
+            ),
+            command_redacted=classification.get("redacted_command"),
+            session_id=session_id,
+            remote=remote,
+            role=role,
+            detail=(
+                "Manual daemon kill is forbidden; use the sanctioned "
+                f"{ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE} gated action instead."
+            ),
+        )
+
+    return {
+        "contamination": contaminating,
+        "sanctioned": not contaminating and not classification.get("process_kill"),
+        "clean_claim_allowed": not contaminating,
+        "reason_class": classification.get("reason_class"),
+        "redacted_command": classification.get("redacted_command"),
+        "classification": classification,
+        "contamination_marker": marker,
+        "sanctioned_alternative": ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
+    }
+
+
+# --- Post-restart health verification ---------------------------------------
+
+
+def verify_post_restart_health(
+    namespace: str,
+    *,
+    probe_result: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
+    probe_source: str | None = None,
+    registered_tools: list[str] | tuple[str, ...] | None = None,
+    required_tool: str | None = None,
+    profile: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Require live proof a namespace is callable before any clean claim (AC3).
+
+    Static registration is not proof and neither is an offline subprocess
+    probe: only ``probe_source=client_namespace`` evidence can clear a
+    post-restart session for mutations.
+    """
+    ns = _clean(namespace)
+    health = mcp_namespace_health.classify_namespace_probe(
+        ns,
+        required_tool=required_tool,
+        registered_tools=registered_tools,
+        probe_result=probe_result,
+        profile=profile,
+        probe_source=probe_source,
+    )
+    healthy = bool(health.get("healthy"))
+    proven = bool(health.get("ide_namespace_proven"))
+
+    if healthy and proven:
+        status = HEALTH_CLEAN
+    elif healthy:
+        status = HEALTH_UNPROVEN
+    else:
+        status = HEALTH_UNHEALTHY
+
+    reasons = list(health.get("reasons") or [])
+    if status == HEALTH_UNPROVEN:
+        reasons.append(
+            "Namespace reported healthy without live client-namespace "
+            "evidence; a post-restart clean claim requires "
+            f"probe_source={mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_CLIENT!r}."
+        )
+
+    return {
+        "namespace": ns,
+        "status": status,
+        "healthy": healthy,
+        "ide_namespace_proven": proven,
+        "clean_claim_allowed": status == HEALTH_CLEAN,
+        "mutations_allowed": status == HEALTH_CLEAN,
+        "reasons": reasons,
+        "health": health,
+    }
+
+
+# --- Policy surface ---------------------------------------------------------
+
+
+def restart_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Machine-readable description of the sanctioned restart contract."""
+    return {
+        "policy_version": 1,
+        "modes": list(MODES),
+        "actions": [ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE, ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE],
+        "known_namespaces": list(KNOWN_NAMESPACES),
+        "fleet_scope_permitted": False,
+        "console_executes_process_kill": False,
+        "raw_kill_exposed": False,
+        "requires_confirmation": True,
+        "confirmation_binds_namespace": True,
+        "operator_authorization_env": (
+            runtime_recovery_guard.OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION_ENV
+        ),
+        "restart_hook_env": RESTART_HOOK_ENV,
+        "manual_kill_classified_as": runtime_recovery_guard.CONTAMINATION_KIND,
+        "post_restart_clean_claim_requires": (
+            mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_CLIENT
+        ),
+        "audit_required": True,
+        "silent_auto_restart_permitted": False,
+    }