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jcwalker3andClaude Opus 4.8
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# ADR: MCP Control Plane Web Console architecture and information architecture
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- **Status:** Proposed (documentation only; blocks no code, gates every #631 child)
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- **Date:** 2026-07-22
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- **Tracking issue:** [#632](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/632) — architecture and information architecture (Phase 1)
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- **Parent epic:** [#631](https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/issues/631) — MCP Control Plane Web Console
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- **Foundation (closed, extend — do not recreate):** #425 tracker and children #426 skeleton, #427 projects, #428 prompts, #429 queue, #430 runtime, #431 audit paste, #432 worktrees, #433 leases, #434 gated actions, #435 auth/deployment boundary, #436 tests/CI
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- **Related:** `mcp-allocator-control-plane-observability-adr.md`, `mcp-stable-control-runtime-policy-adr.md`, `control-plane-db-substrate.md`, `../safety-model.md`, `../tool-boundaries.md`, `../credential-isolation.md`, `../webui-local-dev.md`, `../webui-deployment.md`
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## 1. Context
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The MVP web UI shipped under `webui/` as a read-only Starlette application with ten operator routes and a JSON export beside most of them. It is a working foundation, not the console product described by epic #631, and it carries no durable architecture record: no layer contract, no authority boundary, no API versioning rule, no page map, and no statement of which phase may open a write path.
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Twenty children (#632–#651) hang off #631. Without one architecture document each implementer re-derives boundaries, and the most likely failure is not a bad view — it is a privileged action wired into the browser before the authorization and audit model of #633 exists.
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This ADR is the single retrievable design source for the console. It decides structure only. It implements no UI, no API, and no change to deployment topology.
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## 2. Decision summary (core)
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| Layer | Owns | Must not |
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|-------|------|----------|
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| **Browser UI** | Rendering, navigation, operator affordances | Hold tokens, call Gitea/providers directly, or execute an action the server did not gate |
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| **HTTP route layer** (`webui/app.py`) | Versioned routing, authentication, authorization, redaction boundary, audit emission | Contain domain logic or reach past a loader to a raw credential |
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| **Domain loaders** (`webui/*_loader.py`, `*_scanner.py`, `runtime_health.py`, `project_registry.py`) | Assembling read models from authoritative sources | Mutate anything, or emit unredacted secrets across the boundary |
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| **Gitea** | Durable work record: issues, PRs, comments, reviews, labels, merges | Be the concurrency lock under multi-session load |
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| **Control-plane DB** | Sessions, assignment, leases, heartbeats, events | Replace Gitea history |
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| **MCP tools / capability gates** | Mutation authorization | Be re-implemented, mirrored, or bypassed by console code |
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| **External providers** (Sentry/GlitchTip, AI providers) | Incident and usage data | Assign work or mutate Gitea outside the #612 bridge |
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**One-liner:** **Gitea records. The DB coordinates. MCP tools authorize. The console projects state and executes only capability-checked, audited actions. Providers observe.**
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## 3. Console surface today versus target
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`webui/app.py` currently registers these routes (see `../webui-local-dev.md` for the operator-facing table): `/`, `/health`, `/queue`, `/projects`, `/projects/{id}`, `/prompts`, `/runtime`, `/audit`, `/worktrees`, `/leases`, `/actions`, and the unversioned exports `/api/queue`, `/api/projects`, `/api/prompts`, `/api/runtime`, `/api/audit`, `/api/worktrees`, `/api/leases`, `/api/actions`, `/api/actions/{id}/preview`, `/api/actions/{id}/attempt`.
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Every one of these is **retained and evolved**. No child issue may recreate a route from scratch; each states in its PR which MVP surface it extends and what it changes.
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## 4. Authority boundaries
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### 4.1 Gitea (durable record)
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Authoritative for issue and PR identity and state, comments, reviews and verdicts, labels, merges, and branch refs. When the console and Gitea disagree about durable state, Gitea wins and the console view is refreshed — never the reverse.
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### 4.2 Control-plane DB (coordination)
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Authoritative for live coordination: which session holds which assignment or lease, heartbeat freshness, expiry, and the allocation event log. The console reads it; only allocator and lease tools write it.
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### 4.3 MCP capability gates (authorization)
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`task_capability_map.py` and `gitea_resolve_task_capability` remain the only authority that decides whether a mutation may run. The console asks; it never answers. A console action that cannot name the MCP tool it delegates to is not an action — it is a defect.
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### 4.4 Filesystem and git (local state)
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Issue lock files, `branches/` worktrees, and registered git worktrees are read through existing scanners. The console never deletes, rebinds, or force-clears local state outside a Phase 2 gated action.
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### 4.5 Providers (observe only)
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Sentry/GlitchTip and AI providers are read surfaces. The #612 incident bridge is the only path that turns an observation into Gitea work.
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## 5. Request flow and the redaction boundary
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```text
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browser ──HTTP──> route layer ──> domain loader ──> Gitea REST
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│ ├──> control-plane DB
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│ ├──> filesystem / git
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│ └──> providers
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│
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[redaction boundary]
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│
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audit event
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```
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| Stage | May hold credentials | Emits |
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|-------|----------------------|-------|
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| Loader → route layer | yes (server-side, via `gitea_auth`) | domain objects |
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| Route layer → browser | **no** | redacted DTOs, HTML |
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Two invariants govern the boundary and are non-negotiable for every child:
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1. **No secrets to the browser.** Tokens, keychain identifiers, Authorization headers, raw provider endpoints, and credential-bearing URLs are redacted by default, consistent with `../safety-model.md` §3 and `../credential-isolation.md`. Serializers redact; templates do not sanitize after the fact.
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2. **No ungated mutations.** A write reaches an authoritative system only by delegating to an MCP tool that passed its own capability gate. HTML forms and JSON endpoints are transport, never authority.
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## 6. API naming and versioning
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**Decision:** all console APIs added from Phase 1 onward are served under `/api/v1/...`.
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- Nouns are plural and hierarchical: `/api/v1/inventory/leases`, `/api/v1/system/health`.
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- Read endpoints are `GET` and side-effect free.
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- Phase 2 action endpoints are `POST /api/v1/actions/{action_id}/preview` and `POST /api/v1/actions/{action_id}/execute`; `preview` stays side-effect free and returns a mutation ledger.
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- The existing unversioned MVP exports remain as **compatibility aliases** for the whole of Phase 1 so the current operator flow never breaks. They may be retired no earlier than Phase 2, and only after the replacing `v1` route ships and `../webui-local-dev.md` records the swap.
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- A breaking change to a `v1` payload requires `/api/v2/...`, not an in-place edit.
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- Every JSON payload carries enough provenance for an auditor to tell where the data came from — at minimum the source system and whether the inventory was complete, matching the pagination-proof habit the MVP queue export already established.
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## 7. Page map
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| Page | Purpose | Owning child | Evolves |
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|------|---------|--------------|---------|
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| `/` | Console shell, navigation, next-safe-action summary | #638 | MVP `/` (#426) |
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| `/system` | System-health dashboard | #639 | new, backed by #634 |
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| `/traffic` | Workflow traffic control, queues, blockers | #640 | MVP `/queue` (#429) |
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| `/runtime` | Runtime and session view | #641 | MVP `/runtime` (#430) |
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| `/projects`, `/projects/{id}` | Project registry and onboarding | #635 | MVP `/projects` (#427) |
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| `/inventory` | Sessions, leases, locks, worktrees in one surface | #636 | MVP `/leases` (#433) + `/worktrees` (#432) |
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| `/timeline` | Workflow events and conversation timeline | #637 | new |
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| `/actions` | Gated action registry, preview, execution | #642, #643, #644 | MVP `/actions` (#434) |
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| `/gitea` | Issue and PR linkage console | #645 | new |
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| `/policy` | Guardrail visibility, then versioned editing | #646, #647 | new |
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| `/notifications` | Human-attention routing | #648 | new |
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| `/observability` | Sentry/GlitchTip correlation and durable issue creation | #649 | new |
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| `/providers` | AI-provider connections and insights | #650 | new |
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| `/analytics` | Usage, token cost, latency, workflow performance | #651 | new |
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| `/audit` | Final-report validator preview and audit log | #431 foundation, extended by #633 | MVP `/audit` (#431) |
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| `/prompts`, `/prompts/{id}` | Canonical prompt library | #638 | MVP `/prompts` (#428) |
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| `/health` | Liveness and deployment metadata | #634 | MVP `/health` (#435) |
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## 8. Component ownership for every epic child
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Each #631 child maps to at least one architectural component defined above.
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| Child | Capability area | Primary component | Phase |
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|-------|-----------------|-------------------|-------|
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| #632 | Architecture and information architecture | this ADR | 1 |
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| #633 | Authorization, RBAC, secret redaction, audit and retention | route layer + redaction boundary (§5) | 1 |
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| #634 | Read-only system-health API | `/api/v1/system/health` + health loader | 1 |
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| #635 | Project registry API evolution | `/api/v1/projects` + `project_registry.py` | 1 |
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| #636 | Session, lease, lock, worktree inventory API | `/api/v1/inventory/*` + `lease_loader.py`, `worktree_scanner.py` | 1 |
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| #637 | Workflow-event and conversation timeline model | `/api/v1/events` + control-plane DB event log | 1 |
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| #638 | Application shell evolution | browser UI layer + `layout.py` | 1 |
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| #639 | System-health dashboard | `/system` page over #634 | 1 |
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| #640 | Workflow traffic-control view | `/traffic` page over the queue loader | 1 |
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| #641 | Runtime and session view | `/runtime` page over `runtime_health.py` | 1 |
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| #642 | Sanctioned restart and graceful reload controls | gated action framework, restart class | 2 |
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| #643 | Requests, intent preview, authorization, workflow initiation | `/api/v1/actions/*` execute path | 2 |
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| #644 | Stale-runtime recovery, worktree rebinding, reconciliation controls | gated actions over filesystem/git authority | 2 |
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| #645 | Gitea issue and PR linkage console | `/gitea` page over Gitea authority | 3 |
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| #646 | Workflow policy and guardrail visibility | `/policy` read view over the capability map | 3 |
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| #647 | Versioned policy editing, validation, simulation, approval, rollback | `/policy` write path, gated | 3 |
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| #648 | Notifications and human-attention routing | notification component over the event model | 3 |
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| #649 | Sentry/GlitchTip connections, correlation, durable issue creation | provider layer + #612 incident bridge | 4 |
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| #650 | AI-provider connections and operational insights | provider layer | 4 |
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| #651 | Model usage, token cost, latency, workflow analytics | analytics component over the event model | 4 |
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Related but **outside** this epic: #667 (restart status, impact preview, and approval controls) belongs to the #655 restart-governance umbrella and must reuse the #642 action class rather than adding a second restart surface.
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## 9. Phase gates
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| Phase | May ship | Entry condition |
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|-------|----------|-----------------|
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| **1 — read-only visibility** | `GET` pages and `GET /api/v1/...` | this ADR accepted |
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| **2 — controlled actions** | gated `POST` action execution | #633 authorization, RBAC, and audit model landed |
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| **3 — orchestration and policy** | linkage, policy visibility, versioned policy editing | Phase 1 inventory plus the Phase 2 action framework |
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| **4 — insights** | provider correlation, analytics | evidence-backed sources from Phases 1–3 |
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Phase 1 must not open a mutation endpoint, and the read-only guard that returns `405 read-only-mvp` stays in force until the Phase 2 entry condition is met. A phase is not entered by exception; if a control is urgent, the entry condition is what gets prioritized.
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## 10. Security and workflow safety
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- **Fail closed** on unknown authentication, missing RBAC mapping, or ambiguous lease ownership. An unknown state renders as blocked, never as permitted.
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- **Redact by default**, per §5.
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- **Every privileged action** requires a resolved capability, an explicit operator confirmation, and a durable audit event naming actor, action, target, and outcome.
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- **Contamination surfaces.** Session contamination — including a manually killed MCP daemon (#630) — must be shown and must block clean claims rather than being silently repaired.
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- **Deployment boundary unchanged.** Loopback by default, with the existing refusal of public binds (#435). This ADR documents that target; it does not widen it.
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## 11. Forbidden paths
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These are rejected designs, not preferences:
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1. **Raw provider incidents as work.** The allocator never receives an unclassified Sentry/GlitchTip incident; only the #612 bridge turns an observation into a Gitea issue.
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2. **Browser-held tokens.** No credential, keychain identifier, or Authorization header is ever sent to the browser or embedded in a client bundle.
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3. **Process-kill recovery.** The console must not expose `pkill`, process-identifier termination, or any host process kill as a recovery affordance (#630). Restart is the sanctioned, operator-owned path of #642 and the #655 umbrella.
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4. **Ungated browser mutations.** No review, approval, merge, close, or comment may originate from the browser without passing an MCP capability gate.
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5. **Policy invented in the console.** The console projects policy from the capability map and canonical workflows; it never encodes a second copy.
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6. **Recreating MVP scope.** Re-implementing a #426–#436 surface without an explicit evolve-or-extend statement is out of bounds.
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## 12. Approval checklist (readable without chat history)
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A controller can accept or reject this ADR against these six points alone:
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1. Layers and their owners are defined (§2) and each authority is named (§4).
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2. The redaction boundary and the two invariants are stated (§5).
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3. API versioning is decided, including what happens to the existing unversioned routes (§6).
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4. A page map exists and names an owning child for every page (§7).
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5. Every #631 child maps to at least one component and one phase (§8).
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6. Phase gates and forbidden paths are explicit (§9, §11).
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## 13. Open questions and follow-ups
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Unresolved choices are recorded here rather than settled by implication. Each needs its own durable issue before the phase that depends on it:
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- **Authentication mechanism.** Whether the console authenticates via an access proxy (Cloudflare Access or equivalent) or an application-level session is deferred to #633. This ADR requires only that it fail closed.
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- **Event model substrate.** Whether the #637 timeline reads the control-plane event log directly or through a projection is deferred to #637.
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- **CI path filter coverage.** `webui/ci_paths.py` triggers the web UI suite on `webui/`, `tests/test_webui_*`, and `docs/webui*`. This ADR lives under `docs/architecture/`, so editing it alone does not trigger that gate; the accompanying `tests/test_webui_architecture_docs.py` does run in the full suite. Widening the filter is a small follow-up, deliberately not bundled into a documentation-only change.
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- **Retention.** Audit-event retention duration is owned by #633.
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## 14. Acceptance
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Accepting this ADR means:
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- Phase 1 children may proceed against the layers, page map, and API rules above.
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- Phase 2 children may not open a write path until #633 lands.
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- Any deviation is recorded as an amendment to this file with its own issue reference, not as an undocumented divergence in code.
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# Web console authorization, RBAC, redaction, and audit model (#633)
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**Phase 1. Read-only. This document defines the model that future console
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writes must pass through; it enables none of them.**
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The MVP deployment boundary ([`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md), #435)
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documents internal-only serving and states plainly that MVP authentication is
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*none* — protection comes from network placement. That is adequate while every
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route is a GET, and inadequate the moment a gated write ships. This document
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and the three modules it describes land **before** any write exists, so no
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Phase 2 action can be added without an authority to check it against.
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| Concern | Module |
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|---------|--------|
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| Identity, roles, authorization decision | `webui/console_authz.py` |
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| Secret redaction for every surface | `webui/console_redaction.py` |
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| Audit event schema, retention, sink | `webui/console_audit.py` |
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| Machine-readable publication | `GET /api/console/security-model` |
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Two invariants hold everywhere and are non-negotiable for every child of #631:
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1. **No secrets reach the browser.** Credentials are resolved server-side and
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redacted before any payload, page, log line, or audit record leaves.
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2. **No ungated mutations.** Authorization is necessary but never sufficient;
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execution stays disabled until the Phase 2 framework ships.
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## Identity sources
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The console performs *authorization*. Authentication is delegated, because a
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console that mints its own sessions is a credential store, and this one must
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not be.
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| Source | Mode value | Authenticated | Shared host | Phase |
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|--------|-----------|---------------|-------------|-------|
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| None | `none` (default) | No — anonymous, capped at `viewer` | No | 1 |
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| Local dev | `local-dev` / `local_dev` | Yes, **asserted not verified** | No | 1 |
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| Access proxy | `access-proxy` / `access_proxy` | Yes, asserted by trusted proxy | Yes | 2 |
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Selected by `WEBUI_AUTH_MODE`. An unrecognised value falls back to `none`
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rather than erroring open.
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**Access-proxy mode** reads the subject from the
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`Cf-Access-Authenticated-User-Email` header, set by Cloudflare Access, WARP, or
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an equivalent org portal that terminates authentication in front of the
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console. If the header is absent the request did not traverse the proxy, so the
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principal degrades to anonymous — it is never trusted by default.
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The **role is always server-side configuration**, never a client assertion. It
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comes from `WEBUI_ROLE_MAP`, a JSON object of subject → role:
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```json
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{"[email protected]": "operator", "[email protected]": "controller"}
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```
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An unmapped subject gets `viewer`. Malformed JSON yields an empty map, so
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everyone gets `viewer` — a parse failure loses authority rather than granting
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it.
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Full SSO is explicitly a non-goal of this issue.
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## Role matrix
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Four roles, ordered least to most authority. Each role inherits every lower
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role's actions; the table states the *minimum* rank required.
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| Role | Authority |
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||||||
|
|------|-----------|
|
||||||
|
| `viewer` | Read every console view. No write, ever, in any phase. |
|
||||||
|
| `operator` | Viewer, plus author-class work: claim, comment, open a PR. |
|
||||||
|
| `controller` | Operator, plus reviewer/merger-class decisions on a PR. |
|
||||||
|
| `admin` | Controller, plus destructive and policy-editing actions. |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
`viewer` holds the empty write set by construction, and a test asserts it stays
|
||||||
|
empty.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Privileged actions
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Every console action maps to a `task_key` in `task_capability_map.py`, the same
|
||||||
|
single source of truth `gitea_resolve_task_capability` and the MCP tool gates
|
||||||
|
use. The console therefore cannot invent an authority the MCP layer does not
|
||||||
|
already define, and a regression test asserts each mapping matches.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| Action | Minimum role | Class | MCP permission | Confirm | Dual control | Break-glass | Phase |
|
||||||
|
|--------|--------------|-------|----------------|---------|--------------|-------------|-------|
|
||||||
|
| `claim_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
|
||||||
|
| `comment_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
|
||||||
|
| `create_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.create` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
|
||||||
|
| `comment_pr` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.pr.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
|
||||||
|
| `create_pr` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.pr.create` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
|
||||||
|
| `review_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.review` | Yes | No | No | 3 |
|
||||||
|
| `close_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.close` | Yes | No | No | 3 |
|
||||||
|
| `merge_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.merge` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
|
||||||
|
| `delete_branch` | admin | destructive | `gitea.branch.delete` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**Dual control** means the acting principal may not be the sole authority: a
|
||||||
|
second distinct principal must confirm. **Break-glass** means the action is
|
||||||
|
expected to be unavailable in normal operation and its use is retained for two
|
||||||
|
years. Both are declared here and enforced by the Phase 2 framework; Phase 1
|
||||||
|
records the requirement on every decision so the framework cannot ship without
|
||||||
|
honouring it.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
`delete_branch` is admin-only rather than controller because it is the one
|
||||||
|
irreversible action in the set.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Authorization decision
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
`authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=False)` returns a decision
|
||||||
|
record and **denies by default**. The deny reasons are closed and enumerated:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| Reason code | Meaning |
|
||||||
|
|-------------|---------|
|
||||||
|
| `unknown_action` | No such console action is registered. |
|
||||||
|
| `unauthenticated` | The principal is anonymous. |
|
||||||
|
| `unknown_role` | The role is not in the matrix. |
|
||||||
|
| `insufficient_role` | The role ranks below the action's minimum. |
|
||||||
|
| `phase_not_active` | Execution requested for an action whose phase is not open. |
|
||||||
|
| `allowed_preview_only` | Authorized — preview only, execution still disabled. |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
There is no implicit allow branch. Even the allow result reports
|
||||||
|
`execution_enabled: false` while the console is in Phase 1, so no caller can
|
||||||
|
read an allow as permission to mutate.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Secret redaction
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
One pass applies to **API payloads, rendered HTML, server logs, and audit
|
||||||
|
records** — the four surfaces where a credential could escape.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Redaction reuses `gitea_audit.redact` rather than forking it: that remains the
|
||||||
|
authority for secret-looking dict keys, `Authorization` material, and raw URLs.
|
||||||
|
The console layer then applies its own patterns:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Each rule below matches an *assignment form*: the named key, followed by `=` or
|
||||||
|
`:`, followed by the value. The keys are listed bare rather than spelled out as
|
||||||
|
complete assignments, because this document is itself scanned by
|
||||||
|
`scan_for_secrets` — writing the examples in full assignment form would make the
|
||||||
|
documentation trip the very detectors it documents.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| Rule | Catches (as an assignment) |
|
||||||
|
|------|----------------------------|
|
||||||
|
| `credential_assignment` | `token`, `password`, `passwd`, `secret`, `api_key`, `access_key`, `client_secret`, `private_key` |
|
||||||
|
| `credential_env_assignment` | `GITEA_TOKEN`, `GITEA_PASS`, `GITEA_PASSWORD` and suffixed variants |
|
||||||
|
| `keychain_reference` | `keychain:` entry references |
|
||||||
|
| `keychain_command` | macOS `security` keychain lookups (`find-generic-password`, `find-internet-password`) |
|
||||||
|
| `private_key_block` | PEM `BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY` blocks |
|
||||||
|
| `json_web_token` | Three-segment `eyJ...` JWTs |
|
||||||
|
| `bearer_credential` | `Bearer` / `Basic` credentials |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Assignments keep the key and replace only the value, so an operator can still
|
||||||
|
see *what* was removed. Two behaviours are deliberate:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Fail closed.** A value that cannot be redacted becomes `[REDACTED]`
|
||||||
|
outright rather than being emitted raw. Redaction never raises.
|
||||||
|
- **Redact before persist.** `console_audit.build_event` redacts before
|
||||||
|
serialization, and `write_event` re-scans and **drops** any record that still
|
||||||
|
trips a detector. An unredacted record is never durable.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
`scan_for_secrets` is the assertion helper: it returns the detector names still
|
||||||
|
matching a payload, and already-redacted hits are not findings. Tests use it to
|
||||||
|
prove the published policy, the security-model endpoint, and this document
|
||||||
|
itself carry no secret material.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Audit event schema
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
`gitea_audit` records MCP-side *mutations* — which profile and Gitea user
|
||||||
|
performed which tool call. It has no console actor, no identity source, no
|
||||||
|
correlation identifier, and no retention class, and an authorization **denial**
|
||||||
|
is not a mutation, so it would never appear there at all. The console record is
|
||||||
|
additive, not a replacement: a Phase 2 action emits both, joined on
|
||||||
|
`correlation.request_id`.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Required fields, all asserted by tests so an edit cannot quietly drop one:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| Field | Content |
|
||||||
|
|-------|---------|
|
||||||
|
| `schema_version` | Currently `1`. |
|
||||||
|
| `event_id` | Unique per record. |
|
||||||
|
| `timestamp` | Timezone-aware ISO-8601, UTC. |
|
||||||
|
| `actor` | `subject`, `role`, `identity_source`, `authenticated`. |
|
||||||
|
| `action` | Console action id. |
|
||||||
|
| `action_class` | `gated_write`, `privileged`, `destructive`, or `unknown`. |
|
||||||
|
| `target` | `{kind, ref}`, e.g. `{"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"}`. |
|
||||||
|
| `result` | `allowed`, `denied`, `previewed`, `failed`, `succeeded`. |
|
||||||
|
| `reason_code` | The authorization reason code above. |
|
||||||
|
| `correlation` | `request_id`, `session_id`, `mcp_task`, `mcp_permission`. |
|
||||||
|
| `retention` | `class`, `days`, `expires_at`. |
|
||||||
|
| `redacted` | Always `true`; records are redacted at build time. |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
An unrecognised `result` degrades to `failed` rather than being stored
|
||||||
|
verbatim.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The sink is an append-only JSON Lines file named by
|
||||||
|
`WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG`. It is **off by default**: with the variable unset,
|
||||||
|
events are still built — so callers and tests exercise the schema — but nothing
|
||||||
|
is written. Auditing never raises; a failed write returns `False` rather than
|
||||||
|
breaking the request it describes.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Retention
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| Class | Applies to | Default |
|
||||||
|
|-------|-----------|---------|
|
||||||
|
| `standard` | Routine gated writes | 90 days |
|
||||||
|
| `privileged` | `review_pr`, `close_pr`, and any unclassifiable action | 365 days |
|
||||||
|
| `break_glass` | `merge_pr`, `delete_branch` | 730 days |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Each record carries its own class, day count, and computed `expires_at`, so
|
||||||
|
retention is auditable per record rather than inferred from file age. An
|
||||||
|
**unknown action is retained as privileged, not standard** — for a safety
|
||||||
|
control the conservative direction is to keep the record longer.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Nothing in this module updates or deletes. Expiry is enforced by an
|
||||||
|
operator-run policy against `expires_at`, never by the console silently
|
||||||
|
rewriting its own history.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Phase 2 integration
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Phase 2 opens gated writes. It must reuse this model rather than introduce a
|
||||||
|
second one. The integration points are already wired and observable:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **`GET /api/actions/{action_id}/preview`** attaches an `authorization` block
|
||||||
|
to the existing preview payload and records a `previewed` audit event.
|
||||||
|
- **`POST /api/actions/{action_id}/attempt`** attaches the same block and
|
||||||
|
records a `denied` event. The terminal outcome is unchanged — the MVP
|
||||||
|
registry in `webui/gated_actions.py` still fails closed for every action — so
|
||||||
|
Phase 1 cannot loosen anything. Phase 2 enforces on this same decision
|
||||||
|
instead of adding a parallel check.
|
||||||
|
- **`GET /api/console/security-model`** publishes the RBAC matrix, redaction
|
||||||
|
policy, and audit policy as JSON for operators and tests.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
To open Phase 2, a child issue must: raise `ACTIVE_PHASE`, implement the
|
||||||
|
confirmation and dual-control flow the matrix already declares, emit a
|
||||||
|
`succeeded` or `failed` record alongside the `gitea_audit` mutation record, and
|
||||||
|
keep `viewer` unable to reach any of it. Turning on execution without the
|
||||||
|
confirmation flow contradicts a declared requirement and is a review failure,
|
||||||
|
not a shortcut.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Local-dev mode
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
`WEBUI_AUTH_MODE=local-dev` reads the principal straight from the environment:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| Variable | Purpose |
|
||||||
|
|----------|---------|
|
||||||
|
| `WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT` | Subject string; absent ⇒ anonymous |
|
||||||
|
| `WEBUI_DEV_ROLE` | One of `viewer`, `operator`, `controller`, `admin`; unrecognised ⇒ `viewer` |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**INSECURE — this mode is for loopback development only.** The subject and role
|
||||||
|
are *asserted by the developer running the process and verified by nothing*.
|
||||||
|
Anyone able to set an environment variable on the host is an `admin`, and
|
||||||
|
anyone able to reach the port inherits that principal. It provides no
|
||||||
|
authentication whatsoever; it exists so Phase 2 authorization paths can be
|
||||||
|
exercised without standing up a proxy.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Never enable local-dev mode on a non-loopback bind. Combining it with
|
||||||
|
`WEBUI_ALLOW_PUBLIC_BIND=1` or `WEBUI_ALLOW_REMOTE_BIND=1` publishes an
|
||||||
|
unauthenticated admin console.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
For anything beyond a laptop use `access-proxy` mode behind Cloudflare Access,
|
||||||
|
WARP, or a VPN, as [`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md) requires.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
### Probe authentication
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
`WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH=1` declares that non-public probes should require an
|
||||||
|
authenticated principal. It is **opt-in**: the default is off so the MVP
|
||||||
|
`/health` contract is unchanged.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
**This flag is declarative in Phase 1 and enforces nothing today.**
|
||||||
|
`console_authz.probe_auth_required()` reports the operator's intent, and no
|
||||||
|
route consults it — setting the variable does not currently change the
|
||||||
|
behaviour of `/health` or any other endpoint. It is published here so the Phase
|
||||||
|
2 action framework has a declared policy to honour rather than inventing a
|
||||||
|
second one, exactly as `ACTIVE_PHASE` gates execution while the matrix is
|
||||||
|
already declared. A regression test pins this "declared, not enforced" status,
|
||||||
|
so wiring it later is a deliberate change rather than a silent one.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Until Phase 2 wires it, probe protection rests on network placement alone, as
|
||||||
|
[`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md) (#435) states.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Environment variables
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
| Variable | Default | Purpose |
|
||||||
|
|----------|---------|---------|
|
||||||
|
| `WEBUI_AUTH_MODE` | `none` | Identity source selection |
|
||||||
|
| `WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT` | unset | Local-dev subject (insecure) |
|
||||||
|
| `WEBUI_DEV_ROLE` | `viewer` | Local-dev role (insecure) |
|
||||||
|
| `WEBUI_ROLE_MAP` | unset | JSON subject → role map |
|
||||||
|
| `WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH` | unset | Require auth for non-public probes |
|
||||||
|
| `WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG` | unset | Append-only audit sink path |
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
All are read server-side only. None is ever rendered into a page or returned by
|
||||||
|
an API.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
## Non-goals
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- No full SSO product; authentication stays delegated to the proxy.
|
||||||
|
- No browser-initiated merges or approvals in any phase covered here.
|
||||||
|
- No tokens in the frontend, in browser storage, or in committed config.
|
||||||
@@ -7,7 +7,10 @@ only.
|
|||||||
## MVP deployment model
|
## MVP deployment model
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
- **Default bind:** `127.0.0.1:8765` (`WEBUI_HOST` / `WEBUI_PORT`)
|
- **Default bind:** `127.0.0.1:8765` (`WEBUI_HOST` / `WEBUI_PORT`)
|
||||||
- **Authentication:** none in MVP — protection comes from network placement
|
- **Authentication:** none in MVP — protection comes from network placement.
|
||||||
|
The authorization, RBAC, redaction, and audit model that future gated writes
|
||||||
|
must pass through is defined in
|
||||||
|
[`webui-authz-audit.md`](webui-authz-audit.md) (#633).
|
||||||
- **Mutations:** read-only routes; gated write actions remain disabled (#434)
|
- **Mutations:** read-only routes; gated write actions remain disabled (#434)
|
||||||
- **Secrets:** resolved server-side via `gitea_auth` / `GITEA_MCP_CONFIG`; never
|
- **Secrets:** resolved server-side via `gitea_auth` / `GITEA_MCP_CONFIG`; never
|
||||||
embedded in HTML, JavaScript, or browser storage
|
embedded in HTML, JavaScript, or browser storage
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -37,6 +37,12 @@ Optional environment variables:
|
|||||||
See [webui-deployment.md](webui-deployment.md) for internal-only serving,
|
See [webui-deployment.md](webui-deployment.md) for internal-only serving,
|
||||||
Cloudflare Access/WARP/VPN guidance, and unsafe bind overrides (#435).
|
Cloudflare Access/WARP/VPN guidance, and unsafe bind overrides (#435).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
See
|
||||||
|
[architecture/webui-control-plane-console-architecture-adr.md](architecture/webui-control-plane-console-architecture-adr.md)
|
||||||
|
for the console architecture: layer and authority boundaries, the redaction
|
||||||
|
boundary, `/api/v1/...` versioning, the target page map, and the phase gates
|
||||||
|
that govern when a write path may open (#632, epic #631).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Routes (MVP)
|
## Routes (MVP)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
| Path | Description |
|
| Path | Description |
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,149 @@
|
|||||||
|
"""Documentation acceptance for the web console architecture ADR (#632 / epic #631).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Enforces the acceptance criteria of issue #632:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* AC1 — the ADR exists and covers layers, authority, phases, API versioning,
|
||||||
|
and a page map.
|
||||||
|
* AC2 — every #631 child (#632–#651) maps to at least one architectural
|
||||||
|
component.
|
||||||
|
* AC3 — the closed MVP (#425–#436) is stated as foundation, not recreated.
|
||||||
|
* AC4 — forbidden paths are explicit: raw provider incidents as work,
|
||||||
|
browser-held tokens, process-kill recovery.
|
||||||
|
* AC5 — a controller can approve the document without reading chat history.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Plus the linkage requirement: ``docs/webui-local-dev.md`` cross-links the ADR.
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
from pathlib import Path
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
REPO_ROOT = Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent
|
||||||
|
ADR = (
|
||||||
|
REPO_ROOT
|
||||||
|
/ "docs"
|
||||||
|
/ "architecture"
|
||||||
|
/ "webui-control-plane-console-architecture-adr.md"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
ADR_BASENAME = "webui-control-plane-console-architecture-adr.md"
|
||||||
|
LOCAL_DEV = REPO_ROOT / "docs" / "webui-local-dev.md"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# Epic #631 children, phases 1-4 (twenty capability areas).
|
||||||
|
EPIC_CHILDREN = tuple(f"#{number}" for number in range(632, 652))
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def _read(path: Path) -> str:
|
||||||
|
assert path.is_file(), f"missing {path.relative_to(REPO_ROOT)}"
|
||||||
|
return path.read_text(encoding="utf-8")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_ac1_adr_exists_with_required_sections():
|
||||||
|
text = _read(ADR)
|
||||||
|
lower = text.lower()
|
||||||
|
assert text.lstrip().startswith("#"), "ADR lacks a title"
|
||||||
|
assert "#631" in text and "#632" in text
|
||||||
|
for heading in (
|
||||||
|
"## 2. Decision summary",
|
||||||
|
"## 4. Authority boundaries",
|
||||||
|
"## 5. Request flow and the redaction boundary",
|
||||||
|
"## 6. API naming and versioning",
|
||||||
|
"## 7. Page map",
|
||||||
|
"## 8. Component ownership",
|
||||||
|
"## 9. Phase gates",
|
||||||
|
"## 11. Forbidden paths",
|
||||||
|
):
|
||||||
|
assert heading in text, f"ADR must contain section {heading!r}"
|
||||||
|
assert "browser ui" in lower and "domain loader" in lower
|
||||||
|
assert "control-plane db" in lower and "capability gate" in lower
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_ac1_api_versioning_is_decided_including_legacy_routes():
|
||||||
|
text = _read(ADR)
|
||||||
|
assert "/api/v1/" in text, "ADR must decide the versioned API prefix"
|
||||||
|
assert "/api/v2/" in text, "ADR must state how breaking changes are handled"
|
||||||
|
lower = text.lower()
|
||||||
|
assert "compatibility alias" in lower, (
|
||||||
|
"ADR must say what happens to the existing unversioned MVP exports"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_ac1_page_map_covers_mvp_routes():
|
||||||
|
text = _read(ADR)
|
||||||
|
for route in ("`/`", "`/health`", "`/projects`", "`/prompts`", "`/runtime`",
|
||||||
|
"`/audit`", "`/actions`"):
|
||||||
|
assert route in text, f"page map must account for MVP route {route}"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_ac2_every_epic_child_maps_to_a_component():
|
||||||
|
text = _read(ADR)
|
||||||
|
ownership = text.split("## 8. Component ownership", 1)[-1].split("## 9.", 1)[0]
|
||||||
|
missing = [child for child in EPIC_CHILDREN if child not in ownership]
|
||||||
|
assert not missing, (
|
||||||
|
f"epic #631 children without an architectural component: {missing}"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_ac2_every_child_row_declares_a_phase():
|
||||||
|
text = _read(ADR)
|
||||||
|
ownership = text.split("## 8. Component ownership", 1)[-1].split("## 9.", 1)[0]
|
||||||
|
for child in EPIC_CHILDREN:
|
||||||
|
row = next(
|
||||||
|
(line for line in ownership.splitlines() if line.startswith(f"| {child} ")),
|
||||||
|
None,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
assert row is not None, f"no ownership row for {child}"
|
||||||
|
assert row.rstrip().endswith(("| 1 |", "| 2 |", "| 3 |", "| 4 |")), (
|
||||||
|
f"ownership row for {child} must end with its phase: {row!r}"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_ac3_mvp_is_foundation_not_recreated():
|
||||||
|
text = _read(ADR)
|
||||||
|
assert "#425" in text and "#436" in text
|
||||||
|
lower = text.lower()
|
||||||
|
assert "do not recreate" in lower or "recreating mvp scope" in lower
|
||||||
|
assert "retained and evolved" in lower
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_ac4_forbidden_paths_are_explicit():
|
||||||
|
text = _read(ADR)
|
||||||
|
forbidden = text.split("## 11. Forbidden paths", 1)[-1].split("## 12.", 1)[0]
|
||||||
|
lower = forbidden.lower()
|
||||||
|
assert "raw provider incidents" in lower and "#612" in forbidden
|
||||||
|
assert "browser-held tokens" in lower
|
||||||
|
assert "process-kill recovery" in lower and "#630" in forbidden
|
||||||
|
assert "ungated browser mutations" in lower
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_ac5_approval_checklist_is_self_contained():
|
||||||
|
text = _read(ADR)
|
||||||
|
assert "## 12. Approval checklist" in text
|
||||||
|
checklist = text.split("## 12. Approval checklist", 1)[-1].split("## 13.", 1)[0]
|
||||||
|
for marker in ("1.", "2.", "3.", "4.", "5.", "6."):
|
||||||
|
assert marker in checklist, f"approval checklist missing item {marker}"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_adr_states_the_two_boundary_invariants():
|
||||||
|
text = _read(ADR)
|
||||||
|
lower = text.lower()
|
||||||
|
assert "no secrets to the browser" in lower
|
||||||
|
assert "no ungated mutations" in lower
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_open_questions_are_recorded_not_implied():
|
||||||
|
text = _read(ADR)
|
||||||
|
assert "## 13. Open questions and follow-ups" in text
|
||||||
|
section = text.split("## 13. Open questions and follow-ups", 1)[-1]
|
||||||
|
assert "#633" in section, "deferred authorization work must name its issue"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_local_dev_doc_cross_links_the_adr():
|
||||||
|
text = _read(LOCAL_DEV)
|
||||||
|
assert ADR_BASENAME in text, (
|
||||||
|
"docs/webui-local-dev.md must cross-link the console architecture ADR "
|
||||||
|
"(issue #632 scope)"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_docs_do_not_embed_secrets():
|
||||||
|
for path in (ADR, LOCAL_DEV):
|
||||||
|
text = _read(path)
|
||||||
|
for marker in ("ghp_", "BEGIN PRIVATE KEY", "Authorization: Bearer"):
|
||||||
|
assert marker not in text, f"{path.name} contains {marker!r}"
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,703 @@
|
|||||||
|
"""Console authorization, redaction, and audit model tests (#633).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Covers each acceptance criterion and each required test named in the issue:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
* AC1 — RBAC matrix and privileged-action list.
|
||||||
|
* AC2 — redaction rules, unit-tested against sample payloads.
|
||||||
|
* AC3 — audit event schema with required fields and retention defaults.
|
||||||
|
* AC4 — Phase 2 integration points.
|
||||||
|
* AC5 — local-dev mode with explicit insecurity warnings.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Required tests: redaction units (token, keychain, password patterns),
|
||||||
|
default-deny for unauthenticated write stubs, and audit record creation for a
|
||||||
|
simulated privileged preview.
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import datetime
|
||||||
|
import json
|
||||||
|
import os
|
||||||
|
import pathlib
|
||||||
|
import sys
|
||||||
|
import tempfile
|
||||||
|
import unittest
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
from starlette.testclient import TestClient
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
sys.path.insert(0, str(pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]))
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
from task_capability_map import TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP # noqa: E402
|
||||||
|
from webui import console_audit, console_authz # noqa: E402
|
||||||
|
from webui.app import create_app # noqa: E402
|
||||||
|
from webui.console_redaction import ( # noqa: E402
|
||||||
|
REDACTED,
|
||||||
|
redact_payload,
|
||||||
|
redact_text,
|
||||||
|
redaction_policy,
|
||||||
|
scan_for_secrets,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DOCS = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "docs"
|
||||||
|
AUTHZ_DOC = DOCS / "webui-authz-audit.md"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def _principal(role: str) -> console_authz.Principal:
|
||||||
|
return console_authz.Principal(
|
||||||
|
subject=f"{role}@example.com",
|
||||||
|
role=role,
|
||||||
|
identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
|
||||||
|
authenticated=True,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
class TestRoleMatrix(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||||
|
"""AC1 — the written RBAC matrix and privileged-action list."""
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_roles_are_ordered_least_to_most_authority(self):
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(
|
||||||
|
console_authz.ROLE_ORDER,
|
||||||
|
("viewer", "operator", "controller", "admin"),
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_every_role_has_a_description(self):
|
||||||
|
for role in console_authz.ROLE_ORDER:
|
||||||
|
with self.subTest(role=role):
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(console_authz.ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS[role].strip())
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_higher_roles_inherit_lower_role_actions(self):
|
||||||
|
matrix = {
|
||||||
|
entry["role"]: set(entry["permitted_actions"])
|
||||||
|
for entry in console_authz.rbac_matrix()["roles"]
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
for lower, higher in zip(
|
||||||
|
console_authz.ROLE_ORDER, console_authz.ROLE_ORDER[1:]
|
||||||
|
):
|
||||||
|
with self.subTest(lower=lower, higher=higher):
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(matrix[lower].issubset(matrix[higher]))
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_viewer_holds_no_write_action(self):
|
||||||
|
matrix = {
|
||||||
|
entry["role"]: set(entry["permitted_actions"])
|
||||||
|
for entry in console_authz.rbac_matrix()["roles"]
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(matrix["viewer"], set())
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_privileged_action_list_is_non_empty_and_classified(self):
|
||||||
|
privileged = console_authz.privileged_actions()
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(privileged)
|
||||||
|
ids = {action.action_id for action in privileged}
|
||||||
|
# Merge and branch deletion are the canonical privileged pair.
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn("merge_pr", ids)
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn("delete_branch", ids)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_merge_and_delete_require_dual_control_and_break_glass(self):
|
||||||
|
for action_id in ("merge_pr", "delete_branch"):
|
||||||
|
with self.subTest(action=action_id):
|
||||||
|
action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(action.dual_control)
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(action.break_glass)
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_every_write_action_requires_confirmation(self):
|
||||||
|
for action in console_authz.ACTIONS.values():
|
||||||
|
with self.subTest(action=action.action_id):
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_delete_branch_is_admin_only(self):
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(
|
||||||
|
console_authz.get_action("delete_branch").minimum_role,
|
||||||
|
console_authz.ADMIN,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_actions_map_to_real_mcp_capability_vocabulary(self):
|
||||||
|
"""The console must not invent an authority the MCP layer lacks."""
|
||||||
|
for action in console_authz.ACTIONS.values():
|
||||||
|
with self.subTest(action=action.action_id):
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn(action.task_key, TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(
|
||||||
|
action.mcp_permission,
|
||||||
|
TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP[action.task_key]["permission"],
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(
|
||||||
|
action.mcp_role,
|
||||||
|
TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP[action.task_key]["role"],
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_matrix_declares_deny_by_default_and_execution_disabled(self):
|
||||||
|
matrix = console_authz.rbac_matrix()
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(matrix["default_decision"], "deny")
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(matrix["execution_enabled"])
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
class TestAuthorizeDefaultDeny(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||||
|
"""Fail-closed behaviour of the authorization decision."""
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_anonymous_is_denied_every_action(self):
|
||||||
|
for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
with self.subTest(action=action_id):
|
||||||
|
decision = console_authz.authorize(action_id)
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(
|
||||||
|
decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_unknown_action_is_denied(self):
|
||||||
|
decision = console_authz.authorize(
|
||||||
|
"not_a_real_action", _principal("admin")
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_unknown_role_is_denied(self):
|
||||||
|
rogue = console_authz.Principal(
|
||||||
|
subject="[email protected]",
|
||||||
|
role="superuser",
|
||||||
|
identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
|
||||||
|
authenticated=True,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
decision = console_authz.authorize("comment_issue", rogue)
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_insufficient_role_is_denied(self):
|
||||||
|
decision = console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("operator"))
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(
|
||||||
|
decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_sufficient_role_allows_preview_only(self):
|
||||||
|
decision = console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("controller"))
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(decision.allowed)
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(decision.execution_enabled)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_execution_is_refused_while_phase_is_not_active(self):
|
||||||
|
decision = console_authz.authorize(
|
||||||
|
"merge_pr", _principal("controller"), for_execution=True
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(
|
||||||
|
decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_allowed_decision_never_reports_execution_enabled(self):
|
||||||
|
for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
with self.subTest(action=action_id):
|
||||||
|
decision = console_authz.authorize(
|
||||||
|
action_id, _principal("admin")
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(decision.execution_enabled)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
class TestIdentityResolution(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||||
|
"""AC5 — identity sources, including the insecure local-dev mode."""
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_no_auth_mode_yields_anonymous_viewer(self):
|
||||||
|
principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(env={})
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(principal.identity_source, console_authz.IDENTITY_NONE)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_local_dev_mode_warns_that_identity_is_unverified(self):
|
||||||
|
principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
|
||||||
|
env={
|
||||||
|
console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local-dev",
|
||||||
|
console_authz.DEV_SUBJECT_ENV: "[email protected]",
|
||||||
|
console_authz.DEV_ROLE_ENV: "admin",
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(principal.authenticated)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(principal.role, "admin")
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(principal.warnings)
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn("asserted", " ".join(principal.warnings).lower())
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_local_dev_without_subject_falls_back_to_anonymous(self):
|
||||||
|
principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
|
||||||
|
env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local-dev"}
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_local_dev_unknown_role_degrades_to_viewer(self):
|
||||||
|
principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
|
||||||
|
env={
|
||||||
|
console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local_dev",
|
||||||
|
console_authz.DEV_SUBJECT_ENV: "[email protected]",
|
||||||
|
console_authz.DEV_ROLE_ENV: "root",
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_access_proxy_without_header_fails_closed(self):
|
||||||
|
"""A proxy-mode request that did not traverse the proxy is anonymous."""
|
||||||
|
principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
|
||||||
|
headers={},
|
||||||
|
env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy"},
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_access_proxy_role_comes_from_server_config_not_client(self):
|
||||||
|
env = {
|
||||||
|
console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy",
|
||||||
|
console_authz.ROLE_MAP_ENV: json.dumps(
|
||||||
|
{"[email protected]": "controller"}
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
|
||||||
|
headers={
|
||||||
|
console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]",
|
||||||
|
"x-role": "admin", # client-supplied role must be ignored
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
env=env,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(principal.role, "controller")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_access_proxy_unmapped_subject_defaults_to_viewer(self):
|
||||||
|
principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
|
||||||
|
headers={
|
||||||
|
console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]"
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy"},
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_malformed_role_map_does_not_raise_and_denies(self):
|
||||||
|
principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
|
||||||
|
headers={console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]"},
|
||||||
|
env={
|
||||||
|
console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy",
|
||||||
|
console_authz.ROLE_MAP_ENV: "{not json",
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_probe_auth_is_opt_in(self):
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(console_authz.probe_auth_required(env={}))
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(
|
||||||
|
console_authz.probe_auth_required(
|
||||||
|
env={console_authz.REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV: "1"}
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_probe_auth_is_declared_but_not_yet_enforced(self):
|
||||||
|
"""Phase 1 declares the probe-auth policy; no route enforces it yet.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The flag exists so the Phase 2 action framework has a declared policy
|
||||||
|
to honour instead of inventing a second one. Pinning the current
|
||||||
|
not-enforced status here means wiring it later is a deliberate change
|
||||||
|
that updates this test and the documentation together, rather than a
|
||||||
|
silent behaviour shift. The documentation must say so plainly, because
|
||||||
|
an operator who sets the variable believing it protects a probe is
|
||||||
|
worse off than one who knows it does not.
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
import inspect
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
from webui import app as webui_app
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
source = inspect.getsource(webui_app)
|
||||||
|
self.assertNotIn(
|
||||||
|
"probe_auth_required",
|
||||||
|
source,
|
||||||
|
msg=(
|
||||||
|
"webui.app now consults probe_auth_required, so probe auth is "
|
||||||
|
"no longer merely declared. Update the 'Probe authentication' "
|
||||||
|
"section of docs/webui-authz-audit.md, which states it "
|
||||||
|
"enforces nothing, and replace this test with real "
|
||||||
|
"enforcement coverage."
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn(
|
||||||
|
"enforces nothing today",
|
||||||
|
AUTHZ_DOC.read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
class TestRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||||
|
"""AC2 — required redaction units: token, keychain, password patterns."""
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_token_assignment_is_redacted(self):
|
||||||
|
out = redact_text("GITEA_TOKEN=abcd1234efgh5678ijkl")
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
|
||||||
|
self.assertNotIn("abcd1234efgh5678ijkl", out)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_password_assignment_is_redacted(self):
|
||||||
|
out = redact_text("password: hunter2supersecret")
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
|
||||||
|
self.assertNotIn("hunter2supersecret", out)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_keychain_reference_is_redacted(self):
|
||||||
|
out = redact_text("keychain:gitea-prgs-token")
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
|
||||||
|
self.assertNotIn("gitea-prgs-token", out)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_keychain_command_is_redacted(self):
|
||||||
|
out = redact_text("security find-generic-password -s gitea -w")
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
|
||||||
|
self.assertNotIn("find-generic-password -s gitea", out)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_bearer_credential_is_redacted(self):
|
||||||
|
out = redact_text("Authorization: Bearer abcdef1234567890abcdef")
|
||||||
|
self.assertNotIn("abcdef1234567890abcdef", out)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_jwt_is_redacted(self):
|
||||||
|
token = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxIn0.abcdefghijklmnop"
|
||||||
|
out = redact_text(f"session={token}")
|
||||||
|
self.assertNotIn(token, out)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_private_key_block_is_redacted(self):
|
||||||
|
pem = (
|
||||||
|
"-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
|
||||||
|
"MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAsecretmaterial\n"
|
||||||
|
"-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
out = redact_text(pem)
|
||||||
|
self.assertNotIn("MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAsecretmaterial", out)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_api_key_assignment_is_redacted(self):
|
||||||
|
out = redact_text('api_key = "sk-live-9f8e7d6c5b4a3210"')
|
||||||
|
self.assertNotIn("sk-live-9f8e7d6c5b4a3210", out)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_nested_payload_is_redacted_recursively(self):
|
||||||
|
payload = {
|
||||||
|
"token": "abc123456789",
|
||||||
|
"nested": {"note": "password=letmein12345"},
|
||||||
|
"list": ["keychain:some-entry"],
|
||||||
|
"safe": "plain text",
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
out = redact_payload(payload)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(out["token"], REDACTED)
|
||||||
|
self.assertNotIn("letmein12345", json.dumps(out))
|
||||||
|
self.assertNotIn("some-entry", json.dumps(out))
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(out["safe"], "plain text")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_scan_reports_findings_before_and_none_after(self):
|
||||||
|
dirty = "password: hunter2supersecret"
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(scan_for_secrets(dirty))
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(redact_text(dirty)), [])
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_non_strings_pass_through_untouched(self):
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(redact_text(42), 42)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(
|
||||||
|
redact_payload({"n": 1, "b": True}), {"n": 1, "b": True}
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_policy_is_documented_and_declares_redact_before_persist(self):
|
||||||
|
policy = redaction_policy()
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(policy["redact_before_persist"])
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn("audit_records", policy["applies_to"])
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(policy["console_rules"])
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_policy_statement_contains_no_secret_material(self):
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(redaction_policy()), [])
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
class TestAuditSchema(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||||
|
"""AC3 — audit event schema, required fields, and retention defaults."""
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def _event(self, action_id="merge_pr", **kwargs):
|
||||||
|
return console_audit.build_event(
|
||||||
|
action_id=action_id,
|
||||||
|
result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
|
||||||
|
decision=console_authz.authorize(action_id, _principal("operator")),
|
||||||
|
target={"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
|
||||||
|
request_id="req-test",
|
||||||
|
**kwargs,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_every_required_field_is_present(self):
|
||||||
|
event = self._event()
|
||||||
|
for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_FIELDS:
|
||||||
|
with self.subTest(field=field):
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn(field, event)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_actor_carries_who_and_how_they_were_identified(self):
|
||||||
|
event = self._event()
|
||||||
|
for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS:
|
||||||
|
with self.subTest(field=field):
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn(field, event["actor"])
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_correlation_ids_are_present(self):
|
||||||
|
event = self._event()
|
||||||
|
for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS:
|
||||||
|
with self.subTest(field=field):
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn(field, event["correlation"])
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(event["correlation"]["request_id"], "req-test")
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(event["correlation"]["mcp_task"], "merge_pr")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_timestamp_is_timezone_aware_utc_iso8601(self):
|
||||||
|
now = datetime.datetime(
|
||||||
|
2026, 7, 22, 10, 16, 42, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
event = self._event(now=now)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(event["timestamp"], "2026-07-22T10:16:42+00:00")
|
||||||
|
parsed = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(event["timestamp"])
|
||||||
|
self.assertIsNotNone(parsed.tzinfo)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_retention_defaults_by_class(self):
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(
|
||||||
|
console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_STANDARD], 90
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(
|
||||||
|
console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_PRIVILEGED],
|
||||||
|
365,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(
|
||||||
|
console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS],
|
||||||
|
730,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_break_glass_action_retains_longest(self):
|
||||||
|
event = self._event("merge_pr")
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(
|
||||||
|
event["retention"]["class"], console_audit.RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_routine_write_uses_standard_retention(self):
|
||||||
|
event = self._event("comment_issue")
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(
|
||||||
|
event["retention"]["class"], console_audit.RETENTION_STANDARD
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_unknown_action_retains_as_privileged_not_standard(self):
|
||||||
|
"""Conservative direction: keep an unclassifiable record longer."""
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(
|
||||||
|
console_audit.retention_class_for(None),
|
||||||
|
console_audit.RETENTION_PRIVILEGED,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_retention_expiry_matches_declared_days(self):
|
||||||
|
now = datetime.datetime(2026, 7, 22, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)
|
||||||
|
event = self._event("comment_issue", now=now)
|
||||||
|
expires = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(
|
||||||
|
event["retention"]["expires_at"]
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual((expires - now).days, 90)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_invalid_result_degrades_to_failed(self):
|
||||||
|
event = console_audit.build_event(action_id="merge_pr", result="banana")
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(event["result"], console_audit.RESULT_FAILED)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_denied_result_is_representable(self):
|
||||||
|
"""An authorization denial has no MCP-side mutation record."""
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn(console_audit.RESULT_DENIED, console_audit.RESULTS)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_event_is_redacted_before_it_is_returned(self):
|
||||||
|
event = console_audit.build_event(
|
||||||
|
action_id="merge_pr",
|
||||||
|
result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
|
||||||
|
detail="failed with token=abcdef1234567890",
|
||||||
|
metadata={"password": "hunter2supersecret"},
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
serialized = json.dumps(event)
|
||||||
|
self.assertNotIn("abcdef1234567890", serialized)
|
||||||
|
self.assertNotIn("hunter2supersecret", serialized)
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(event["redacted"])
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_audit_policy_reports_schema_and_retention(self):
|
||||||
|
policy = console_audit.audit_policy()
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(policy["append_only"])
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(policy["redact_before_persist"])
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(
|
||||||
|
policy["retention_defaults_days"], console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
class TestAuditSink(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||||
|
"""Append-only persistence behaviour."""
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_write_is_a_noop_when_sink_is_unconfigured(self):
|
||||||
|
saved = os.environ.pop(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV, None)
|
||||||
|
try:
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(console_audit.audit_enabled())
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(console_audit.write_event({"schema_version": 1}))
|
||||||
|
finally:
|
||||||
|
if saved is not None:
|
||||||
|
os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = saved
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_records_append_one_json_line_each(self):
|
||||||
|
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
|
||||||
|
sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
|
||||||
|
for _ in range(3):
|
||||||
|
event = console_audit.build_event(
|
||||||
|
action_id="merge_pr", result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(console_audit.write_event(event, path=sink))
|
||||||
|
with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
|
||||||
|
lines = [json.loads(line) for line in handle if line.strip()]
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(len(lines), 3)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(len({line["event_id"] for line in lines}), 3)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_a_record_that_still_carries_a_secret_is_not_persisted(self):
|
||||||
|
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
|
||||||
|
sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
|
||||||
|
leaky = {
|
||||||
|
"schema_version": 1,
|
||||||
|
"detail": "password: hunter2supersecret",
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(console_audit.write_event(leaky, path=sink))
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(sink))
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_write_never_raises_on_a_bad_path(self):
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(
|
||||||
|
console_audit.write_event(
|
||||||
|
{"schema_version": 1}, path="/nonexistent-dir/audit.jsonl"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_simulated_privileged_preview_creates_an_audit_record(self):
|
||||||
|
"""Required test: audit record creation for a privileged preview."""
|
||||||
|
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
|
||||||
|
sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
|
||||||
|
os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = sink
|
||||||
|
try:
|
||||||
|
decision = console_authz.authorize(
|
||||||
|
"merge_pr", _principal("controller")
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
outcome = console_audit.record_event(
|
||||||
|
action_id="merge_pr",
|
||||||
|
result=console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED,
|
||||||
|
decision=decision,
|
||||||
|
target={"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
|
||||||
|
request_id="req-preview",
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
finally:
|
||||||
|
os.environ.pop(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV, None)
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(outcome["written"])
|
||||||
|
with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
|
||||||
|
record = json.loads(handle.read().strip())
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(record["action"], "merge_pr")
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(record["result"], console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(record["action_class"], "privileged")
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(record["decision"]["allowed"])
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(record["decision"]["execution_enabled"])
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(record["actor"]["role"], "controller")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_decision_block_survives_redaction(self):
|
||||||
|
"""Regression: naming it 'authorization' collided with a secret hint.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
``gitea_audit._SECRET_KEY_HINTS`` contains "authorization" (for the
|
||||||
|
HTTP header), so a block under that key was replaced wholesale by the
|
||||||
|
placeholder and the record lost its decision entirely.
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
event = console_audit.build_event(
|
||||||
|
action_id="merge_pr",
|
||||||
|
result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
|
||||||
|
decision=console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("admin")),
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
self.assertIsInstance(event["decision"], dict)
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn("allowed", event["decision"])
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
class TestConsoleRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||||
|
"""AC4 — the wired Phase 2 integration points, still fail-closed."""
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def setUp(self):
|
||||||
|
self.client = TestClient(create_app(bind_host="127.0.0.1"))
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_unauthenticated_write_stub_is_denied(self):
|
||||||
|
"""Required test: default-deny for unauthenticated write stubs."""
|
||||||
|
response = self.client.post(
|
||||||
|
"/api/actions/merge_pr/attempt", json={"pr_number": 99}
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)
|
||||||
|
body = response.json()
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(body["success"])
|
||||||
|
authorization = body["authorization"]
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(authorization["allowed"])
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(
|
||||||
|
authorization["reason_code"], console_authz.DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(authorization["execution_enabled"])
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_preview_reports_an_authorization_decision(self):
|
||||||
|
response = self.client.get("/api/actions/merge_pr/preview?pr_number=7")
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
|
||||||
|
authorization = response.json()["authorization"]
|
||||||
|
self.assertFalse(authorization["allowed"])
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(authorization["dual_control"])
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(authorization["required_role"], "controller")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_unknown_action_preview_still_404s(self):
|
||||||
|
response = self.client.get("/api/actions/no_such_action/preview")
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 404)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_security_model_endpoint_publishes_all_three_policies(self):
|
||||||
|
response = self.client.get("/api/console/security-model")
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
|
||||||
|
body = response.json()
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn("rbac", body)
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn("redaction", body)
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn("audit", body)
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(body["rbac"]["default_decision"], "deny")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_security_model_endpoint_leaks_no_secrets(self):
|
||||||
|
response = self.client.get("/api/console/security-model")
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(response.json()), [])
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_security_model_rejects_writes(self):
|
||||||
|
response = self.client.post("/api/console/security-model", json={})
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 405)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_existing_read_routes_are_unaffected(self):
|
||||||
|
for path in ("/", "/health", "/actions", "/api/actions"):
|
||||||
|
with self.subTest(path=path):
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(self.client.get(path).status_code, 200)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
class TestAuthzAuditDoc(unittest.TestCase):
|
||||||
|
"""The model must be written down, not only coded."""
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@classmethod
|
||||||
|
def setUpClass(cls):
|
||||||
|
cls.text = (
|
||||||
|
AUTHZ_DOC.read_text(encoding="utf-8") if AUTHZ_DOC.exists() else ""
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_doc_exists(self):
|
||||||
|
self.assertTrue(AUTHZ_DOC.exists(), f"missing {AUTHZ_DOC}")
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_doc_covers_each_required_section(self):
|
||||||
|
for heading in (
|
||||||
|
"Identity sources",
|
||||||
|
"Role matrix",
|
||||||
|
"Privileged actions",
|
||||||
|
"Secret redaction",
|
||||||
|
"Audit event schema",
|
||||||
|
"Retention",
|
||||||
|
"Phase 2 integration",
|
||||||
|
"Local-dev mode",
|
||||||
|
):
|
||||||
|
with self.subTest(heading=heading):
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn(heading, self.text)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_doc_names_every_role(self):
|
||||||
|
for role in console_authz.ROLE_ORDER:
|
||||||
|
with self.subTest(role=role):
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn(role, self.text)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_doc_names_every_console_action(self):
|
||||||
|
for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
|
||||||
|
with self.subTest(action=action_id):
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn(action_id, self.text)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_doc_states_retention_defaults(self):
|
||||||
|
for days in console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS.values():
|
||||||
|
with self.subTest(days=days):
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn(str(days), self.text)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_doc_warns_local_dev_is_insecure(self):
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn("INSECURE", self.text.upper())
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_doc_states_default_deny(self):
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn("deny", self.text.lower())
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_doc_contains_no_secret_material(self):
|
||||||
|
self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(self.text), [])
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def test_deployment_doc_links_to_the_model(self):
|
||||||
|
deployment = (DOCS / "webui-deployment.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
|
||||||
|
self.assertIn("webui-authz-audit", deployment)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if __name__ == "__main__": # pragma: no cover
|
||||||
|
unittest.main()
|
||||||
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
from __future__ import annotations
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import uuid
|
||||||
from datetime import datetime, timezone
|
from datetime import datetime, timezone
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
from starlette.applications import Starlette
|
from starlette.applications import Starlette
|
||||||
@@ -19,6 +20,9 @@ from final_report_validator import FINAL_REPORT_TASK_KINDS
|
|||||||
|
|
||||||
from webui.gated_actions import attempt_action, load_action_registry, preview_action
|
from webui.gated_actions import attempt_action, load_action_registry, preview_action
|
||||||
from webui.gated_action_views import render_actions_page
|
from webui.gated_action_views import render_actions_page
|
||||||
|
from webui import console_audit
|
||||||
|
from webui.console_authz import authorize, rbac_matrix, resolve_principal
|
||||||
|
from webui.console_redaction import redaction_policy
|
||||||
from webui.audit_validator import audit_report, audit_to_dict
|
from webui.audit_validator import audit_report, audit_to_dict
|
||||||
from webui.audit_views import render_audit_page
|
from webui.audit_views import render_audit_page
|
||||||
from webui.lease_loader import load_lease_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as lease_snapshot_to_dict
|
from webui.lease_loader import load_lease_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as lease_snapshot_to_dict
|
||||||
@@ -215,6 +219,49 @@ async def api_actions(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
|
|||||||
return JSONResponse(load_action_registry().to_dict())
|
return JSONResponse(load_action_registry().to_dict())
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def _request_id() -> str:
|
||||||
|
return f"req-{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def _audit_target(action_id: str, params: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
|
||||||
|
"""Describe the action target for the audit record (never secrets)."""
|
||||||
|
if "pr_number" in params:
|
||||||
|
return {"kind": "pr", "ref": f"#{params['pr_number']}"}
|
||||||
|
if "issue_number" in params:
|
||||||
|
return {"kind": "issue", "ref": f"#{params['issue_number']}"}
|
||||||
|
if "branch_name" in params:
|
||||||
|
return {"kind": "branch", "ref": str(params["branch_name"])}
|
||||||
|
return {"kind": "unspecified", "ref": action_id}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def _authorize_request(
|
||||||
|
request: Request,
|
||||||
|
action_id: str,
|
||||||
|
params: dict[str, object],
|
||||||
|
*,
|
||||||
|
for_execution: bool,
|
||||||
|
result: str,
|
||||||
|
) -> dict[str, object]:
|
||||||
|
"""Resolve principal, decide, and audit. Returns the decision payload.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Phase 1 records the decision rather than enforcing it as the terminal
|
||||||
|
outcome: ``webui.gated_actions`` already fails closed for every action, so
|
||||||
|
this layer cannot loosen anything. Phase 2 enforces on this same decision.
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
principal = resolve_principal(headers=dict(request.headers))
|
||||||
|
decision = authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=for_execution)
|
||||||
|
console_audit.record_event(
|
||||||
|
action_id=action_id,
|
||||||
|
result=result,
|
||||||
|
decision=decision,
|
||||||
|
principal=principal,
|
||||||
|
target=_audit_target(action_id, params),
|
||||||
|
request_id=_request_id(),
|
||||||
|
detail=decision.detail,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
return decision.to_dict()
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
async def api_action_preview(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
|
async def api_action_preview(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
|
||||||
action_id = request.path_params["action_id"]
|
action_id = request.path_params["action_id"]
|
||||||
params = dict(request.query_params)
|
params = dict(request.query_params)
|
||||||
@@ -224,6 +271,13 @@ async def api_action_preview(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
|
|||||||
result = preview_action(action_id, **params)
|
result = preview_action(action_id, **params)
|
||||||
if "error" in result:
|
if "error" in result:
|
||||||
return JSONResponse(result, status_code=404)
|
return JSONResponse(result, status_code=404)
|
||||||
|
result["authorization"] = _authorize_request(
|
||||||
|
request,
|
||||||
|
action_id,
|
||||||
|
params,
|
||||||
|
for_execution=False,
|
||||||
|
result=console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
return JSONResponse(result)
|
return JSONResponse(result)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -237,10 +291,31 @@ async def api_action_attempt(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
|
|||||||
if not isinstance(body, dict):
|
if not isinstance(body, dict):
|
||||||
body = {}
|
body = {}
|
||||||
result = attempt_action(action_id, **body)
|
result = attempt_action(action_id, **body)
|
||||||
|
authorization = _authorize_request(
|
||||||
|
request,
|
||||||
|
action_id,
|
||||||
|
body,
|
||||||
|
for_execution=True,
|
||||||
|
result=(
|
||||||
|
console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
|
||||||
|
if not result.get("success")
|
||||||
|
else console_audit.RESULT_ALLOWED
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
result["authorization"] = authorization
|
||||||
status = 403 if not result.get("success") else 200
|
status = 403 if not result.get("success") else 200
|
||||||
return JSONResponse(result, status_code=status)
|
return JSONResponse(result, status_code=status)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
async def api_console_security_model(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
|
||||||
|
"""Read-only publication of the #633 authorization/redaction/audit model."""
|
||||||
|
return JSONResponse({
|
||||||
|
"rbac": rbac_matrix(),
|
||||||
|
"redaction": redaction_policy(),
|
||||||
|
"audit": console_audit.audit_policy(),
|
||||||
|
})
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
async def method_not_allowed(request: Request, _exc: Exception) -> Response:
|
async def method_not_allowed(request: Request, _exc: Exception) -> Response:
|
||||||
path = request.url.path
|
path = request.url.path
|
||||||
if path in _AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS and request.method == "POST":
|
if path in _AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS and request.method == "POST":
|
||||||
@@ -291,6 +366,11 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
|
|||||||
methods=["POST"],
|
methods=["POST"],
|
||||||
),
|
),
|
||||||
Route("/api/leases", api_leases, methods=["GET"]),
|
Route("/api/leases", api_leases, methods=["GET"]),
|
||||||
|
Route(
|
||||||
|
"/api/console/security-model",
|
||||||
|
api_console_security_model,
|
||||||
|
methods=["GET"],
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
],
|
],
|
||||||
exception_handlers={405: method_not_allowed},
|
exception_handlers={405: method_not_allowed},
|
||||||
)
|
)
|
||||||
|
|||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
|
|||||||
|
"""Console audit event schema, retention, and append-only sink (#633).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
``gitea_audit`` records MCP-side *mutations*: which profile and Gitea user
|
||||||
|
performed which tool call. It carries no console actor, no identity source, no
|
||||||
|
correlation identifier, and no retention class, so it cannot answer the
|
||||||
|
question #633 exists to answer — *who sat at the console, what did they
|
||||||
|
attempt, and was it authorized?* An authorization denial is not a mutation and
|
||||||
|
would never appear there at all.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
This module adds the console-side record. It does not replace ``gitea_audit``:
|
||||||
|
when a Phase 2 action eventually reaches MCP, both fire, correlated by
|
||||||
|
``correlation.request_id``.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Design constraints:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Redact before persist.** Every record passes through
|
||||||
|
``webui.console_redaction.redact_payload`` before serialization, so an
|
||||||
|
unredacted field is never durable.
|
||||||
|
- **Append-only.** Records are appended as JSON lines. Nothing here updates or
|
||||||
|
deletes; retention is metadata on each record, enforced by an operator-run
|
||||||
|
policy, never by silent rewriting.
|
||||||
|
- **Never raises.** Auditing must not break the request it describes. A failed
|
||||||
|
write returns ``False``.
|
||||||
|
- **Off by default.** With ``WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG`` unset, events are still
|
||||||
|
*built* (so callers and tests see the schema) but nothing is written.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
A record looks like this (synthetic values):
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
{"schema_version": 1, "event_id": "evt-0001",
|
||||||
|
"timestamp": "2026-07-22T10:16:42+00:00",
|
||||||
|
"actor": {"subject": "[email protected]", "role": "operator",
|
||||||
|
"identity_source": "access_proxy", "authenticated": true},
|
||||||
|
"action": "merge_pr", "action_class": "privileged",
|
||||||
|
"target": {"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
|
||||||
|
"result": "denied", "reason_code": "insufficient_role",
|
||||||
|
"correlation": {"request_id": "req-abc", "session_id": null,
|
||||||
|
"mcp_task": "merge_pr", "mcp_permission": "gitea.pr.merge"},
|
||||||
|
"retention": {"class": "privileged", "days": 365,
|
||||||
|
"expires_at": "2027-07-22T10:16:42+00:00"},
|
||||||
|
"redacted": true}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Timestamps are timezone-aware ISO-8601 in UTC.
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import datetime
|
||||||
|
import json
|
||||||
|
import os
|
||||||
|
import uuid
|
||||||
|
from typing import Any
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
from webui import console_authz
|
||||||
|
from webui.console_redaction import redact_payload, scan_for_secrets
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
AUDIT_LOG_ENV = "WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# Result vocabulary. ``denied`` is the one ``gitea_audit`` has no equivalent
|
||||||
|
# for: an authorization refusal never reaches the MCP layer.
|
||||||
|
RESULT_ALLOWED = "allowed"
|
||||||
|
RESULT_DENIED = "denied"
|
||||||
|
RESULT_PREVIEWED = "previewed"
|
||||||
|
RESULT_FAILED = "failed"
|
||||||
|
RESULT_SUCCEEDED = "succeeded"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RESULTS = frozenset(
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
RESULT_ALLOWED,
|
||||||
|
RESULT_DENIED,
|
||||||
|
RESULT_PREVIEWED,
|
||||||
|
RESULT_FAILED,
|
||||||
|
RESULT_SUCCEEDED,
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# Retention classes and default lifetimes in days. Privileged and break-glass
|
||||||
|
# records outlive routine ones because they are what an incident review needs.
|
||||||
|
RETENTION_STANDARD = "standard"
|
||||||
|
RETENTION_PRIVILEGED = "privileged"
|
||||||
|
RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS = "break_glass"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
RETENTION_DAYS: dict[str, int] = {
|
||||||
|
RETENTION_STANDARD: 90,
|
||||||
|
RETENTION_PRIVILEGED: 365,
|
||||||
|
RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS: 730,
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# Fields every record must carry. Asserted by the test suite so a future edit
|
||||||
|
# cannot quietly drop one.
|
||||||
|
REQUIRED_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
|
||||||
|
"schema_version",
|
||||||
|
"event_id",
|
||||||
|
"timestamp",
|
||||||
|
"actor",
|
||||||
|
"action",
|
||||||
|
"action_class",
|
||||||
|
"target",
|
||||||
|
"result",
|
||||||
|
"reason_code",
|
||||||
|
"correlation",
|
||||||
|
"retention",
|
||||||
|
"redacted",
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
|
||||||
|
"subject",
|
||||||
|
"role",
|
||||||
|
"identity_source",
|
||||||
|
"authenticated",
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
|
||||||
|
"request_id",
|
||||||
|
"session_id",
|
||||||
|
"mcp_task",
|
||||||
|
"mcp_permission",
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def audit_log_path() -> str | None:
|
||||||
|
"""Configured sink path, or ``None`` when console auditing is off."""
|
||||||
|
return (os.environ.get(AUDIT_LOG_ENV) or "").strip() or None
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def audit_enabled() -> bool:
|
||||||
|
return audit_log_path() is not None
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def retention_class_for(action: console_authz.ConsoleAction | None) -> str:
|
||||||
|
"""Classify retention from the action, defaulting to the longest-lived.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
An unknown action is treated as privileged rather than standard: for a
|
||||||
|
safety control the conservative direction is to keep the record longer.
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
if action is None:
|
||||||
|
return RETENTION_PRIVILEGED
|
||||||
|
if action.break_glass:
|
||||||
|
return RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS
|
||||||
|
if action.privileged:
|
||||||
|
return RETENTION_PRIVILEGED
|
||||||
|
return RETENTION_STANDARD
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def _retention_block(
|
||||||
|
retention_class: str, now: datetime.datetime
|
||||||
|
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||||
|
days = RETENTION_DAYS.get(
|
||||||
|
retention_class, RETENTION_DAYS[RETENTION_PRIVILEGED]
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
return {
|
||||||
|
"class": retention_class,
|
||||||
|
"days": days,
|
||||||
|
"expires_at": (now + datetime.timedelta(days=days)).isoformat(),
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def build_event(
|
||||||
|
*,
|
||||||
|
action_id: str,
|
||||||
|
result: str,
|
||||||
|
decision: console_authz.AuthorizationDecision | None = None,
|
||||||
|
principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
|
||||||
|
target: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||||
|
reason_code: str | None = None,
|
||||||
|
request_id: str | None = None,
|
||||||
|
session_id: str | None = None,
|
||||||
|
detail: str | None = None,
|
||||||
|
metadata: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
|
||||||
|
now: datetime.datetime | None = None,
|
||||||
|
event_id: str | None = None,
|
||||||
|
) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||||
|
"""Build one redacted, JSON-able console audit record.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Redaction runs here rather than at write time so an in-memory record handed
|
||||||
|
to a template or an API response is already clean.
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
ts = now or datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc)
|
||||||
|
action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
|
||||||
|
who = principal or (
|
||||||
|
decision.principal if decision else console_authz.ANONYMOUS
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
resolved_result = result if result in RESULTS else RESULT_FAILED
|
||||||
|
resolved_reason = reason_code or (
|
||||||
|
decision.reason_code if decision else "unspecified"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
retention_class = retention_class_for(action)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
event: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||||
|
"schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
|
||||||
|
"event_id": event_id or f"evt-{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
|
||||||
|
"timestamp": ts.isoformat(),
|
||||||
|
"actor": who.to_dict(),
|
||||||
|
"action": action_id,
|
||||||
|
"action_class": action.action_class if action else "unknown",
|
||||||
|
"target": dict(target or {}),
|
||||||
|
"result": resolved_result,
|
||||||
|
"reason_code": resolved_reason,
|
||||||
|
"correlation": {
|
||||||
|
"request_id": request_id,
|
||||||
|
"session_id": session_id,
|
||||||
|
"mcp_task": action.task_key if action else None,
|
||||||
|
"mcp_permission": action.mcp_permission if action else None,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
"retention": _retention_block(retention_class, ts),
|
||||||
|
"redacted": True,
|
||||||
|
"detail": detail,
|
||||||
|
"metadata": dict(metadata or {}),
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
if decision is not None:
|
||||||
|
# Deliberately *not* named "authorization": ``gitea_audit`` treats that
|
||||||
|
# substring as a secret key hint (it matches the HTTP Authorization
|
||||||
|
# header) and would replace this whole block with the placeholder.
|
||||||
|
event["decision"] = {
|
||||||
|
"allowed": decision.allowed,
|
||||||
|
"required_role": decision.required_role,
|
||||||
|
"requires_confirmation": decision.requires_confirmation,
|
||||||
|
"dual_control": decision.dual_control,
|
||||||
|
"break_glass": decision.break_glass,
|
||||||
|
"execution_enabled": decision.execution_enabled,
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
redacted = redact_payload(event)
|
||||||
|
if not isinstance(redacted, dict): # pragma: no cover - defensive
|
||||||
|
return {"schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION, "redacted": True}
|
||||||
|
return redacted
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def write_event(event: dict[str, Any], path: str | None = None) -> bool:
|
||||||
|
"""Append *event* as one JSON line. Never raises.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Returns ``True`` when a line was written, ``False`` when auditing is off or
|
||||||
|
the write failed. A record that still trips a secret detector is dropped
|
||||||
|
rather than persisted.
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
sink = path or audit_log_path()
|
||||||
|
if not sink:
|
||||||
|
return False
|
||||||
|
try:
|
||||||
|
if scan_for_secrets(event):
|
||||||
|
return False
|
||||||
|
line = json.dumps(event, default=str, sort_keys=True)
|
||||||
|
with open(sink, "a", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
|
||||||
|
handle.write(line + "\n")
|
||||||
|
return True
|
||||||
|
except Exception:
|
||||||
|
return False
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def record_event(**kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||||
|
"""Build and persist one record; return the record either way.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Callers get the record back so it can be surfaced in a response or a test
|
||||||
|
regardless of whether a sink is configured.
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
event = build_event(**kwargs)
|
||||||
|
written = write_event(event)
|
||||||
|
return {"event": event, "written": written}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def audit_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||||
|
"""Machine-readable audit schema and retention defaults (never secrets)."""
|
||||||
|
return {
|
||||||
|
"schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
|
||||||
|
"required_fields": list(REQUIRED_FIELDS),
|
||||||
|
"required_actor_fields": list(REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS),
|
||||||
|
"required_correlation_fields": list(REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS),
|
||||||
|
"results": sorted(RESULTS),
|
||||||
|
"retention_defaults_days": dict(RETENTION_DAYS),
|
||||||
|
"sink_env": AUDIT_LOG_ENV,
|
||||||
|
"enabled": audit_enabled(),
|
||||||
|
"append_only": True,
|
||||||
|
"redact_before_persist": True,
|
||||||
|
"timestamp_format": "ISO-8601, timezone-aware, UTC",
|
||||||
|
"relationship_to_mcp_audit": (
|
||||||
|
"webui.console_audit records console intent and authorization "
|
||||||
|
"outcomes; gitea_audit records MCP mutations. A Phase 2 action "
|
||||||
|
"emits both, correlated by correlation.request_id."
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,537 @@
|
|||||||
|
"""Console authorization and RBAC model (#633, Phase 1).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The read-only MVP (#426–#436) ships with no authentication: protection comes
|
||||||
|
from network placement alone (#435). That is adequate while every route is a
|
||||||
|
GET, and inadequate the moment Phase 2 wires a gated write. This module is the
|
||||||
|
authorization model those writes must go through, landed *before* any of them
|
||||||
|
exists so no write can be added without an authority to check against.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Phase 1 scope is the model itself: identity resolution, the role matrix, the
|
||||||
|
privileged-action list, and a fail-closed :func:`authorize`. It deliberately
|
||||||
|
does **not** enable any write. ``webui.gated_actions`` stays globally disabled,
|
||||||
|
so an allow decision here is necessary but never sufficient.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Two invariants hold for every caller:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Default deny.** An unrecognised action, an unknown role, or an absent
|
||||||
|
principal denies. There is no implicit allow branch and no "unless" clause.
|
||||||
|
- **Authorization is not execution.** :func:`authorize` returns a decision
|
||||||
|
record. It never calls MCP, never mutates, and never consults credentials.
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import json
|
||||||
|
import os
|
||||||
|
from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
|
||||||
|
from typing import Any
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
from task_capability_map import required_permission, required_role
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# --- Roles ------------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||||
|
# Ordered least to most authority. Higher ranks inherit every lower rank's
|
||||||
|
# permitted actions; the matrix below is expressed as a minimum required rank.
|
||||||
|
VIEWER = "viewer"
|
||||||
|
OPERATOR = "operator"
|
||||||
|
CONTROLLER = "controller"
|
||||||
|
ADMIN = "admin"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROLE_ORDER: tuple[str, ...] = (VIEWER, OPERATOR, CONTROLLER, ADMIN)
|
||||||
|
_ROLE_RANK: dict[str, int] = {role: idx for idx, role in enumerate(ROLE_ORDER)}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS: dict[str, str] = {
|
||||||
|
VIEWER: "Read every console view. No write, ever, in any phase.",
|
||||||
|
OPERATOR: "Viewer, plus author-class work: claim, comment, open a PR.",
|
||||||
|
CONTROLLER: "Operator, plus reviewer/merger-class decisions on a PR.",
|
||||||
|
ADMIN: "Controller, plus destructive and policy-editing actions.",
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# --- Identity sources -------------------------------------------------------
|
||||||
|
IDENTITY_NONE = "none"
|
||||||
|
IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV = "local_dev"
|
||||||
|
IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY = "access_proxy"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
IDENTITY_SOURCES: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {
|
||||||
|
IDENTITY_NONE: {
|
||||||
|
"description": (
|
||||||
|
"No authentication configured. Every request is anonymous and "
|
||||||
|
"capped at viewer. This is the MVP default and the only mode "
|
||||||
|
"whose safety rests entirely on network placement (#435)."
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
"authenticated": False,
|
||||||
|
"safe_for_shared_host": False,
|
||||||
|
"phase_available": 1,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV: {
|
||||||
|
"description": (
|
||||||
|
"Developer-supplied principal read from the environment. INSECURE: "
|
||||||
|
"the subject and role are asserted, never verified. Loopback only."
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
"authenticated": True,
|
||||||
|
"safe_for_shared_host": False,
|
||||||
|
"phase_available": 1,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY: {
|
||||||
|
"description": (
|
||||||
|
"Subject asserted by a trusted access proxy (Cloudflare Access, "
|
||||||
|
"WARP, or an org VPN portal) via a verified request header. The "
|
||||||
|
"proxy performs authentication; the console performs authorization."
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
"authenticated": True,
|
||||||
|
"safe_for_shared_host": True,
|
||||||
|
"phase_available": 2,
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# Environment configuration. All are read server-side and never rendered.
|
||||||
|
AUTH_MODE_ENV = "WEBUI_AUTH_MODE"
|
||||||
|
DEV_SUBJECT_ENV = "WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT"
|
||||||
|
DEV_ROLE_ENV = "WEBUI_DEV_ROLE"
|
||||||
|
ROLE_MAP_ENV = "WEBUI_ROLE_MAP"
|
||||||
|
REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV = "WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH"
|
||||||
|
ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER = "cf-access-authenticated-user-email"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# --- Action classes ---------------------------------------------------------
|
||||||
|
CLASS_READ = "read"
|
||||||
|
CLASS_WRITE = "gated_write"
|
||||||
|
CLASS_PRIVILEGED = "privileged"
|
||||||
|
CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE = "destructive"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# --- Privileged action list -------------------------------------------------
|
||||||
|
# ``task_key`` ties each console action back to ``task_capability_map``, so the
|
||||||
|
# console cannot invent an authority the MCP layer does not already define.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@dataclass(frozen=True)
|
||||||
|
class ConsoleAction:
|
||||||
|
"""One console action and the authority required to invoke it."""
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
action_id: str
|
||||||
|
task_key: str
|
||||||
|
action_class: str
|
||||||
|
minimum_role: str
|
||||||
|
requires_confirmation: bool
|
||||||
|
dual_control: bool
|
||||||
|
break_glass: bool
|
||||||
|
phase: int
|
||||||
|
summary: str
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@property
|
||||||
|
def mcp_permission(self) -> str:
|
||||||
|
return required_permission(self.task_key)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@property
|
||||||
|
def mcp_role(self) -> str:
|
||||||
|
return required_role(self.task_key)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@property
|
||||||
|
def privileged(self) -> bool:
|
||||||
|
return self.action_class in {CLASS_PRIVILEGED, CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||||
|
data = asdict(self)
|
||||||
|
data["mcp_permission"] = self.mcp_permission
|
||||||
|
data["mcp_role"] = self.mcp_role
|
||||||
|
data["privileged"] = self.privileged
|
||||||
|
return data
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
_ACTION_SPECS: tuple[ConsoleAction, ...] = (
|
||||||
|
ConsoleAction(
|
||||||
|
action_id="claim_issue",
|
||||||
|
task_key="claim_issue",
|
||||||
|
action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
|
||||||
|
minimum_role=OPERATOR,
|
||||||
|
requires_confirmation=True,
|
||||||
|
dual_control=False,
|
||||||
|
break_glass=False,
|
||||||
|
phase=2,
|
||||||
|
summary="Apply status:in-progress to an issue.",
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
ConsoleAction(
|
||||||
|
action_id="comment_issue",
|
||||||
|
task_key="comment_issue",
|
||||||
|
action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
|
||||||
|
minimum_role=OPERATOR,
|
||||||
|
requires_confirmation=True,
|
||||||
|
dual_control=False,
|
||||||
|
break_glass=False,
|
||||||
|
phase=2,
|
||||||
|
summary="Post an issue comment.",
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
ConsoleAction(
|
||||||
|
action_id="create_issue",
|
||||||
|
task_key="create_issue",
|
||||||
|
action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
|
||||||
|
minimum_role=OPERATOR,
|
||||||
|
requires_confirmation=True,
|
||||||
|
dual_control=False,
|
||||||
|
break_glass=False,
|
||||||
|
phase=2,
|
||||||
|
summary="Open a new tracking issue.",
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
ConsoleAction(
|
||||||
|
action_id="comment_pr",
|
||||||
|
task_key="comment_pr",
|
||||||
|
action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
|
||||||
|
minimum_role=OPERATOR,
|
||||||
|
requires_confirmation=True,
|
||||||
|
dual_control=False,
|
||||||
|
break_glass=False,
|
||||||
|
phase=2,
|
||||||
|
summary="Post a PR thread comment.",
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
ConsoleAction(
|
||||||
|
action_id="create_pr",
|
||||||
|
task_key="create_pr",
|
||||||
|
action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
|
||||||
|
minimum_role=OPERATOR,
|
||||||
|
requires_confirmation=True,
|
||||||
|
dual_control=False,
|
||||||
|
break_glass=False,
|
||||||
|
phase=2,
|
||||||
|
summary="Open a PR from a locked feature branch.",
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
ConsoleAction(
|
||||||
|
action_id="review_pr",
|
||||||
|
task_key="review_pr",
|
||||||
|
action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
|
||||||
|
minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
|
||||||
|
requires_confirmation=True,
|
||||||
|
dual_control=False,
|
||||||
|
break_glass=False,
|
||||||
|
phase=3,
|
||||||
|
summary="Submit an approve / request-changes verdict.",
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
ConsoleAction(
|
||||||
|
action_id="close_pr",
|
||||||
|
task_key="close_pr",
|
||||||
|
action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
|
||||||
|
minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
|
||||||
|
requires_confirmation=True,
|
||||||
|
dual_control=False,
|
||||||
|
break_glass=False,
|
||||||
|
phase=3,
|
||||||
|
summary="Close a pull request without merging.",
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
ConsoleAction(
|
||||||
|
action_id="merge_pr",
|
||||||
|
task_key="merge_pr",
|
||||||
|
action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
|
||||||
|
minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
|
||||||
|
requires_confirmation=True,
|
||||||
|
dual_control=True,
|
||||||
|
break_glass=True,
|
||||||
|
phase=3,
|
||||||
|
summary="Merge an approved pull request.",
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
ConsoleAction(
|
||||||
|
action_id="delete_branch",
|
||||||
|
task_key="delete_branch",
|
||||||
|
action_class=CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE,
|
||||||
|
minimum_role=ADMIN,
|
||||||
|
requires_confirmation=True,
|
||||||
|
dual_control=True,
|
||||||
|
break_glass=True,
|
||||||
|
phase=3,
|
||||||
|
summary="Remove a remote feature branch.",
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ACTIONS: dict[str, ConsoleAction] = {a.action_id: a for a in _ACTION_SPECS}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def privileged_actions() -> tuple[ConsoleAction, ...]:
|
||||||
|
"""Actions requiring dual control, break-glass, or controller+ authority."""
|
||||||
|
return tuple(a for a in _ACTION_SPECS if a.privileged)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def get_action(action_id: str) -> ConsoleAction | None:
|
||||||
|
return ACTIONS.get(action_id)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# --- Principals -------------------------------------------------------------
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@dataclass(frozen=True)
|
||||||
|
class Principal:
|
||||||
|
"""Who is making a request, and how strongly that is known."""
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
subject: str
|
||||||
|
role: str
|
||||||
|
identity_source: str
|
||||||
|
authenticated: bool
|
||||||
|
warnings: tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@property
|
||||||
|
def rank(self) -> int:
|
||||||
|
return _ROLE_RANK.get(self.role, -1)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||||
|
return {
|
||||||
|
"subject": self.subject,
|
||||||
|
"role": self.role,
|
||||||
|
"identity_source": self.identity_source,
|
||||||
|
"authenticated": self.authenticated,
|
||||||
|
"warnings": list(self.warnings),
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
ANONYMOUS = Principal(
|
||||||
|
subject="anonymous",
|
||||||
|
role=VIEWER,
|
||||||
|
identity_source=IDENTITY_NONE,
|
||||||
|
authenticated=False,
|
||||||
|
warnings=("No authentication configured; capped at viewer.",),
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def auth_mode(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> str:
|
||||||
|
"""Resolve the configured identity source, defaulting to ``none``."""
|
||||||
|
source = env if env is not None else os.environ
|
||||||
|
raw = (source.get(AUTH_MODE_ENV) or "").strip().lower().replace("-", "_")
|
||||||
|
if raw in IDENTITY_SOURCES:
|
||||||
|
return raw
|
||||||
|
return IDENTITY_NONE
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def _role_map(env: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, str]:
|
||||||
|
"""Parse ``WEBUI_ROLE_MAP`` (JSON subject→role). Invalid config yields {}."""
|
||||||
|
raw = (env.get(ROLE_MAP_ENV) or "").strip()
|
||||||
|
if not raw:
|
||||||
|
return {}
|
||||||
|
try:
|
||||||
|
parsed = json.loads(raw)
|
||||||
|
except Exception:
|
||||||
|
return {}
|
||||||
|
if not isinstance(parsed, dict):
|
||||||
|
return {}
|
||||||
|
return {
|
||||||
|
str(k): str(v).strip().lower()
|
||||||
|
for k, v in parsed.items()
|
||||||
|
if str(v).strip().lower() in _ROLE_RANK
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def resolve_principal(
|
||||||
|
headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
|
||||||
|
env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
|
||||||
|
) -> Principal:
|
||||||
|
"""Resolve the requesting principal. Unknown or unconfigured → anonymous.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Never raises and never trusts a client-supplied role: the role always comes
|
||||||
|
from server-side configuration keyed by the resolved subject.
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
source_env = dict(env) if env is not None else dict(os.environ)
|
||||||
|
lowered = {str(k).lower(): str(v) for k, v in (headers or {}).items()}
|
||||||
|
mode = auth_mode(source_env)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if mode == IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV:
|
||||||
|
subject = (source_env.get(DEV_SUBJECT_ENV) or "").strip()
|
||||||
|
if not subject:
|
||||||
|
return ANONYMOUS
|
||||||
|
role = (source_env.get(DEV_ROLE_ENV) or VIEWER).strip().lower()
|
||||||
|
if role not in _ROLE_RANK:
|
||||||
|
role = VIEWER
|
||||||
|
return Principal(
|
||||||
|
subject=subject,
|
||||||
|
role=role,
|
||||||
|
identity_source=IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV,
|
||||||
|
authenticated=True,
|
||||||
|
warnings=(
|
||||||
|
"local-dev identity is asserted, not verified; never use "
|
||||||
|
"outside loopback.",
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if mode == IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY:
|
||||||
|
subject = (lowered.get(ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER) or "").strip()
|
||||||
|
if not subject:
|
||||||
|
# Proxy mode with no proxy header means the request did not
|
||||||
|
# traverse the proxy. Fail closed rather than trust it.
|
||||||
|
return ANONYMOUS
|
||||||
|
role = _role_map(source_env).get(subject, VIEWER)
|
||||||
|
return Principal(
|
||||||
|
subject=subject,
|
||||||
|
role=role,
|
||||||
|
identity_source=IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
|
||||||
|
authenticated=True,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return ANONYMOUS
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def probe_auth_required(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> bool:
|
||||||
|
"""Whether non-public probes must be authenticated. Default False.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
#633 requires the console to *fail closed on missing auth for non-public
|
||||||
|
health probes if configured*. The default stays off so the MVP ``/health``
|
||||||
|
contract is unchanged; an operator opts in explicitly.
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
source = env if env is not None else os.environ
|
||||||
|
return (source.get(REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV) or "").strip().lower() in {
|
||||||
|
"1",
|
||||||
|
"true",
|
||||||
|
"yes",
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# --- Authorization ----------------------------------------------------------
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION = "unknown_action"
|
||||||
|
DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED = "unauthenticated"
|
||||||
|
DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE = "insufficient_role"
|
||||||
|
DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE = "unknown_role"
|
||||||
|
DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE = "phase_not_active"
|
||||||
|
ALLOW_PREVIEW = "allowed_preview_only"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# Phase 1 is the only active console phase. Phase 2 opens gated writes and is
|
||||||
|
# gated on this model landing; nothing here enables it.
|
||||||
|
ACTIVE_PHASE = 1
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@dataclass(frozen=True)
|
||||||
|
class AuthorizationDecision:
|
||||||
|
"""Result of an authorization check. Never an execution grant."""
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
allowed: bool
|
||||||
|
reason_code: str
|
||||||
|
detail: str
|
||||||
|
action_id: str
|
||||||
|
principal: Principal
|
||||||
|
required_role: str | None = None
|
||||||
|
action_class: str | None = None
|
||||||
|
requires_confirmation: bool = False
|
||||||
|
dual_control: bool = False
|
||||||
|
break_glass: bool = False
|
||||||
|
execution_enabled: bool = False
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||||
|
return {
|
||||||
|
"allowed": self.allowed,
|
||||||
|
"reason_code": self.reason_code,
|
||||||
|
"detail": self.detail,
|
||||||
|
"action_id": self.action_id,
|
||||||
|
"principal": self.principal.to_dict(),
|
||||||
|
"required_role": self.required_role,
|
||||||
|
"action_class": self.action_class,
|
||||||
|
"requires_confirmation": self.requires_confirmation,
|
||||||
|
"dual_control": self.dual_control,
|
||||||
|
"break_glass": self.break_glass,
|
||||||
|
"execution_enabled": self.execution_enabled,
|
||||||
|
"active_phase": ACTIVE_PHASE,
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def authorize(
|
||||||
|
action_id: str,
|
||||||
|
principal: Principal | None = None,
|
||||||
|
*,
|
||||||
|
for_execution: bool = False,
|
||||||
|
) -> AuthorizationDecision:
|
||||||
|
"""Decide whether *principal* may invoke *action_id*. Deny by default.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
``for_execution`` distinguishes a read-only preview from a real invocation.
|
||||||
|
Even an allowed decision reports ``execution_enabled=False`` while the
|
||||||
|
console is in Phase 1, so no caller can read an allow as permission to
|
||||||
|
mutate.
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
who = principal if principal is not None else ANONYMOUS
|
||||||
|
action = get_action(action_id)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if action is None:
|
||||||
|
return AuthorizationDecision(
|
||||||
|
allowed=False,
|
||||||
|
reason_code=DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION,
|
||||||
|
detail=f"No console action registered as {action_id!r}.",
|
||||||
|
action_id=action_id,
|
||||||
|
principal=who,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
base: dict[str, Any] = {
|
||||||
|
"action_id": action_id,
|
||||||
|
"principal": who,
|
||||||
|
"required_role": action.minimum_role,
|
||||||
|
"action_class": action.action_class,
|
||||||
|
"requires_confirmation": action.requires_confirmation,
|
||||||
|
"dual_control": action.dual_control,
|
||||||
|
"break_glass": action.break_glass,
|
||||||
|
"execution_enabled": False,
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if not who.authenticated:
|
||||||
|
return AuthorizationDecision(
|
||||||
|
allowed=False,
|
||||||
|
reason_code=DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED,
|
||||||
|
detail=(
|
||||||
|
"Write actions require an authenticated principal; this "
|
||||||
|
"request is anonymous."
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
**base,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if who.rank < 0:
|
||||||
|
return AuthorizationDecision(
|
||||||
|
allowed=False,
|
||||||
|
reason_code=DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE,
|
||||||
|
detail=f"Role {who.role!r} is not in the console role matrix.",
|
||||||
|
**base,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if who.rank < _ROLE_RANK[action.minimum_role]:
|
||||||
|
return AuthorizationDecision(
|
||||||
|
allowed=False,
|
||||||
|
reason_code=DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE,
|
||||||
|
detail=(
|
||||||
|
f"Action {action_id!r} requires {action.minimum_role!r}; "
|
||||||
|
f"principal holds {who.role!r}."
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
**base,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
if for_execution and action.phase > ACTIVE_PHASE:
|
||||||
|
return AuthorizationDecision(
|
||||||
|
allowed=False,
|
||||||
|
reason_code=DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE,
|
||||||
|
detail=(
|
||||||
|
f"Action {action_id!r} belongs to phase {action.phase}; the "
|
||||||
|
f"console is in phase {ACTIVE_PHASE}. Execution is not wired."
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
**base,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
return AuthorizationDecision(
|
||||||
|
allowed=True,
|
||||||
|
reason_code=ALLOW_PREVIEW,
|
||||||
|
detail=(
|
||||||
|
"Principal holds the required role. Preview only — execution "
|
||||||
|
"remains disabled until the Phase 2 action framework ships."
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
**base,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def rbac_matrix() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||||
|
"""Machine-readable RBAC matrix and privileged-action list."""
|
||||||
|
return {
|
||||||
|
"model_version": 1,
|
||||||
|
"active_phase": ACTIVE_PHASE,
|
||||||
|
"roles": [
|
||||||
|
{
|
||||||
|
"role": role,
|
||||||
|
"rank": _ROLE_RANK[role],
|
||||||
|
"description": ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS[role],
|
||||||
|
"permitted_actions": sorted(
|
||||||
|
a.action_id
|
||||||
|
for a in _ACTION_SPECS
|
||||||
|
if _ROLE_RANK[role] >= _ROLE_RANK[a.minimum_role]
|
||||||
|
),
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
|
for role in ROLE_ORDER
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
"identity_sources": IDENTITY_SOURCES,
|
||||||
|
"actions": [a.to_dict() for a in _ACTION_SPECS],
|
||||||
|
"privileged_actions": [a.action_id for a in privileged_actions()],
|
||||||
|
"default_decision": "deny",
|
||||||
|
"execution_enabled": False,
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
@@ -0,0 +1,169 @@
|
|||||||
|
"""Secret redaction policy for every console surface (#633).
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
The MVP already redacts MCP-side mutation records through ``gitea_audit``.
|
||||||
|
This module is the console-facing policy: one redaction pass applied to API
|
||||||
|
payloads, rendered HTML, log lines, and audit records *before* they leave the
|
||||||
|
server or reach persistent storage.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Design constraints:
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
- **Reuse, never fork.** ``gitea_audit.redact`` remains the authority for
|
||||||
|
secret-looking dict keys, ``Authorization`` material, and raw URLs. This
|
||||||
|
module runs that pass first and then applies console-specific patterns for
|
||||||
|
keychain references, key/value assignments, private-key blocks, and JWTs.
|
||||||
|
- **Never raises.** Redaction is a safety control; a malformed payload must
|
||||||
|
degrade to a redacted placeholder rather than propagate an exception.
|
||||||
|
- **Redact before persist.** ``webui.console_audit`` calls this module before
|
||||||
|
writing, so an unredacted record is never durable.
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
from __future__ import annotations
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import json
|
||||||
|
import re
|
||||||
|
from typing import Any
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
import gitea_audit
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
REDACTED = gitea_audit.REDACTED
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# Console-specific patterns applied after the shared ``gitea_audit`` pass.
|
||||||
|
# Each keeps the identifying key so an operator can still tell *what* was
|
||||||
|
# removed, and replaces only the secret run itself.
|
||||||
|
_KEYCHAIN_REF = re.compile(r"(?i)\bkeychain:[\w.\-/@]+")
|
||||||
|
_KEYCHAIN_CMD = re.compile(
|
||||||
|
r"(?i)\bsecurity\s+find-(?:generic|internet)-password\b[^\n]*"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
_ASSIGNMENT = re.compile(
|
||||||
|
r"(?i)\b(token|password|passwd|secret|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key|"
|
||||||
|
r"client[_-]?secret|private[_-]?key)\b(\s*[:=]\s*)"
|
||||||
|
r"(\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|\S+)"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
_ENV_ASSIGNMENT = re.compile(
|
||||||
|
r"(?i)\b(GITEA_(?:TOKEN|PASS|PASSWORD)[A-Z0-9_]*)(\s*=\s*)"
|
||||||
|
r"(\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|\S+)"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK = re.compile(
|
||||||
|
r"-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----.*?-----END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----",
|
||||||
|
re.S,
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
_JWT = re.compile(
|
||||||
|
r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\b"
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
# Shapes that mean a payload still carries a secret. ``scan_for_secrets`` uses
|
||||||
|
# these to assert a surface is clean.
|
||||||
|
_DETECTORS: tuple[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]], ...] = (
|
||||||
|
("keychain_reference", _KEYCHAIN_REF),
|
||||||
|
("keychain_command", _KEYCHAIN_CMD),
|
||||||
|
("credential_assignment", _ASSIGNMENT),
|
||||||
|
("credential_env_assignment", _ENV_ASSIGNMENT),
|
||||||
|
("private_key_block", _PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK),
|
||||||
|
("json_web_token", _JWT),
|
||||||
|
("bearer_credential", re.compile(r"(?i)\b(?:bearer|basic)\s+\S{8,}")),
|
||||||
|
)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def _mask_assignment(match: re.Match[str]) -> str:
|
||||||
|
"""Keep the key and separator, replace the value."""
|
||||||
|
return f"{match.group(1)}{match.group(2)}{REDACTED}"
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def redact_text(text: Any) -> Any:
|
||||||
|
"""Redact secret material from a single string.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Non-strings are returned unchanged so this is safe to map over mixed
|
||||||
|
payloads. Runs the shared ``gitea_audit`` pass first, then the
|
||||||
|
console-specific patterns.
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
|
||||||
|
return text
|
||||||
|
try:
|
||||||
|
out = gitea_audit.redact(text)
|
||||||
|
if not isinstance(out, str): # defensive; redact() returns str for str
|
||||||
|
return REDACTED
|
||||||
|
out = _PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK.sub(f"{REDACTED}_PRIVATE_KEY", out)
|
||||||
|
out = _ENV_ASSIGNMENT.sub(_mask_assignment, out)
|
||||||
|
out = _ASSIGNMENT.sub(_mask_assignment, out)
|
||||||
|
out = _KEYCHAIN_CMD.sub(f"{REDACTED}_KEYCHAIN_COMMAND", out)
|
||||||
|
out = _KEYCHAIN_REF.sub(f"{REDACTED}_KEYCHAIN_REF", out)
|
||||||
|
out = _JWT.sub(f"{REDACTED}_JWT", out)
|
||||||
|
return out
|
||||||
|
except Exception:
|
||||||
|
# Fail closed: an unredactable string is dropped rather than emitted raw.
|
||||||
|
return REDACTED
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def redact_payload(value: Any) -> Any:
|
||||||
|
"""Recursively redact a JSON-able payload for any console surface.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Secret-looking dict keys are replaced wholesale by the shared
|
||||||
|
``gitea_audit`` policy; every remaining string is run through
|
||||||
|
:func:`redact_text`.
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
try:
|
||||||
|
shared = gitea_audit.redact(value)
|
||||||
|
except Exception:
|
||||||
|
return REDACTED
|
||||||
|
return _walk(shared)
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def _walk(value: Any) -> Any:
|
||||||
|
if isinstance(value, dict):
|
||||||
|
return {k: _walk(v) for k, v in value.items()}
|
||||||
|
if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
|
||||||
|
return [_walk(v) for v in value]
|
||||||
|
if isinstance(value, str):
|
||||||
|
return redact_text(value)
|
||||||
|
return value
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def scan_for_secrets(value: Any) -> list[str]:
|
||||||
|
"""Return detector names that still match *value* after serialization.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
Used to assert an outbound payload or rendered page is clean. An empty
|
||||||
|
list means no known secret shape was found. Already-redacted hits are not
|
||||||
|
findings.
|
||||||
|
"""
|
||||||
|
if isinstance(value, str):
|
||||||
|
text = value
|
||||||
|
else:
|
||||||
|
try:
|
||||||
|
text = json.dumps(value, default=str)
|
||||||
|
except Exception:
|
||||||
|
text = str(value)
|
||||||
|
findings: list[str] = []
|
||||||
|
for name, pattern in _DETECTORS:
|
||||||
|
for match in pattern.finditer(text):
|
||||||
|
if REDACTED in match.group(0):
|
||||||
|
continue
|
||||||
|
findings.append(name)
|
||||||
|
break
|
||||||
|
return findings
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
def redaction_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
|
||||||
|
"""Machine-readable statement of the redaction rules (never secrets)."""
|
||||||
|
return {
|
||||||
|
"policy_version": 1,
|
||||||
|
"applies_to": [
|
||||||
|
"json_api_responses",
|
||||||
|
"rendered_html",
|
||||||
|
"server_logs",
|
||||||
|
"audit_records",
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
"ordering": "shared gitea_audit pass, then console patterns",
|
||||||
|
"redact_before_persist": True,
|
||||||
|
"shared_rules": {
|
||||||
|
"source": "gitea_audit.redact",
|
||||||
|
"secret_key_hints": list(gitea_audit._SECRET_KEY_HINTS),
|
||||||
|
"secret_value_prefixes": list(gitea_audit._SECRET_VALUE_PREFIXES),
|
||||||
|
"urls": "credentials, secret query parameters, and real hosts redacted",
|
||||||
|
},
|
||||||
|
"console_rules": [
|
||||||
|
{"name": name, "pattern": pattern.pattern}
|
||||||
|
for name, pattern in _DETECTORS
|
||||||
|
],
|
||||||
|
"placeholder": REDACTED,
|
||||||
|
"failure_mode": "fail closed — unredactable values become the placeholder",
|
||||||
|
}
|
||||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user