Merge pull request 'fix(bootstrap): allow author worktree bootstrap from clean control checkout (Closes #892)' (#926) from fix/issue-892-author-bootstrap-deadlock into master

Add docs/remote-mcp/coupling-inventory.md, the blocking first child of epic
#929. It enumerates every place gitea_mcp_server.py and its supporting modules
depend on being a local, client-spawned, stdio-attached process on the
operator's machine.

62 entries across the seven required categories: transport bind, launch
provenance, role binding, credentials, runtime freshness, local filesystem,
and durable state. Each entry carries a file and line anchor resolving at
7bf4f12584, states what the code assumes today
and what it would observe on a remote host, is classified as portable as
written / needs a seam / needs a replacement / cannot be remote, and is
assigned to exactly one epic child. Every child from #931 through #939 is
named by at least one entry. Summary tables count entries per category, per
classification, per category-by-classification, and per child.

Documentation only. No server behavior changes.

Closes #930

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01HvJz7bUz5CkZgUxq8twHMz

author_issue_bootstrap.py

@@ -386,6 +386,68 @@ def run_compensating_recovery(
     return recovery_info
 
 
+def _normalize_sha(value: str | None) -> str | None:
+    """Normalize a Git object id for comparison, or ``None`` when unknown."""
+    normalized = (value or "").strip().lower()
+    return normalized or None
+
+
+def _author_bootstrap_assessment(
+    *,
+    not_applicable: bool,
+    allowed: bool,
+    block: bool,
+    reasons: list[str],
+    workspace: str,
+    root: str,
+    branch: str | None,
+    dirty: list[str],
+    under_branches: bool,
+    bootstrap_path: str | None = None,
+    local_head_sha: str | None = None,
+    remote_master_sha: str | None = None,
+    exact_next_action: str | None = None,
+) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Structured author-bootstrap assessment consumable by bootstrap_permits (#892).
+
+    Field shape mirrors :func:`create_issue_bootstrap._result` so the shared
+    ``bootstrap_permits_control_checkout`` predicate can prove control-checkout
+    eligibility for ``gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree`` the same way it
+    does for ``create_issue``. Allowed control assessments must use empty
+    ``reasons`` — narrative belongs in other fields, not the refusal list.
+    """
+    local_tip = _normalize_sha(local_head_sha)
+    remote_tip = _normalize_sha(remote_master_sha)
+    base_tips_verified = bool(local_tip and remote_tip and local_tip == remote_tip)
+    return {
+        "not_applicable": not_applicable,
+        "allowed": allowed,
+        "block": block,
+        "proven": bool(allowed and not block and not not_applicable),
+        "reasons": list(reasons),
+        "workspace_path": workspace,
+        "canonical_repo_root": root,
+        "current_branch": branch,
+        "dirty_files": list(dirty),
+        "under_branches": under_branches,
+        "exact_next_action": exact_next_action,
+        "bootstrap_path": bootstrap_path,
+        "task_scope": "author_issue_bootstrap",
+        "local_head_sha": local_tip,
+        "remote_master_sha": remote_tip,
+        "base_tips_verified": base_tips_verified,
+    }
+
+
+EXACT_NEXT_ACTION_AUTHOR_BOOTSTRAP = (
+    "Restore the canonical control checkout to a clean accepted base branch "
+    "(master/main/dev) that matches live master, with no tracked local edits. "
+    "Re-resolve bootstrap_author_issue_worktree, then re-run "
+    "gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree from that clean control checkout. "
+    "Do not use shell git worktree add as the primary path once bootstrap is healthy."
+)
+
+
 def assess_author_issue_bootstrap(
     *,
     workspace_path: str,
@@ -397,7 +459,13 @@ def assess_author_issue_bootstrap(
     remote_master_sha_error: str | None = None,
     task: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Assess whether author issue worktree bootstrap may proceed from control or worktree root."""
+    """Assess whether author issue worktree bootstrap may proceed from control or worktree root.
+
+    #892: control-checkout successes emit the full field set required by
+    ``create_issue_bootstrap.bootstrap_permits_control_checkout`` (empty reasons,
+    task_scope, base tip proof, binding paths) so the #274/#604 guards can
+    waive control-checkout for this one sanctioned bootstrap task.
+    """
     root = os.path.realpath(canonical_repo_root or "")
     workspace = os.path.realpath(workspace_path or root or ".")
     branch = (current_branch or "").strip()
@@ -407,34 +475,50 @@ def assess_author_issue_bootstrap(
         if root
         else False
     )
+    local_tip = _normalize_sha(head_sha)
+    remote_tip = _normalize_sha(remote_master_sha)
 
     if not is_author_issue_bootstrap_task(task):
-        return {
-            "not_applicable": True,
-            "allowed": False,
-            "block": False,
-            "proven": False,
-            "reasons": ["task is not author_issue_bootstrap"],
-        }
+        return _author_bootstrap_assessment(
+            not_applicable=True,
+            allowed=False,
+            block=False,
+            reasons=["task is not author_issue_bootstrap"],
+            workspace=workspace,
+            root=root,
+            branch=branch or None,
+            dirty=dirty,
+            under_branches=under_branches,
+        )
 
+    # Already under branches/: ordinary #274 path applies; not a control waiver.
     if under_branches:
-        return {
-            "not_applicable": False,
-            "allowed": True,
-            "block": False,
-            "proven": True,
-            "bootstrap_path": "existing_branches_worktree",
-            "reasons": [
-                "workspace is already a registered worktree under branches/"
-            ],
-        }
+        return _author_bootstrap_assessment(
+            not_applicable=True,
+            allowed=False,
+            block=False,
+            reasons=["workspace is under branches/; ordinary #274 path applies"],
+            workspace=workspace,
+            root=root,
+            branch=branch or None,
+            dirty=dirty,
+            under_branches=True,
+            bootstrap_path="existing_branches_worktree",
+            local_head_sha=local_tip,
+            remote_master_sha=remote_tip,
+        )
 
     reasons: list[str] = []
-    if workspace != root:
+    if not root or workspace != root:
         reasons.append(
             "bootstrap requires workspace to be canonical control checkout or branches/ worktree"
         )
-    if branch not in author_mutation_worktree.BASE_BRANCHES:
+    if not branch:
+        reasons.append(
+            "control checkout is detached HEAD; expected an accepted base branch "
+            f"({', '.join(sorted(author_mutation_worktree.BASE_BRANCHES))})"
+        )
+    elif branch not in author_mutation_worktree.BASE_BRANCHES:
         reasons.append(
             f"control checkout branch '{branch}' is not an accepted base branch "
             f"({', '.join(sorted(author_mutation_worktree.BASE_BRANCHES))})"
@@ -444,37 +528,64 @@ def assess_author_issue_bootstrap(
             f"control checkout has tracked local edits: {', '.join(dirty[:5])}"
         )
 
-    if remote_master_sha_error:
+    # Fail closed on missing tip proof (same bar as create_issue bootstrap #757).
+    if not local_tip:
         reasons.append(
-            f"could not verify live master tip: {remote_master_sha_error}"
+            "control checkout HEAD SHA is unknown; base equivalence to live "
+            "master cannot be proven (fail closed)"
         )
-    elif remote_master_sha and head_sha:
-        h = head_sha.strip().lower()
-        rm = remote_master_sha.strip().lower()
-        if h != rm:
+    resolver_error = (remote_master_sha_error or "").strip() or None
+    if resolver_error:
         reasons.append(
-                f"control checkout HEAD ({h[:12]}) != live master tip ({rm[:12]})"
+            f"live master tip could not be resolved ({resolver_error}); "
+            "base equivalence cannot be proven (fail closed)"
+        )
+    elif not remote_tip:
+        reasons.append(
+            "live master tip is unknown; base equivalence cannot be proven "
+            "(fail closed)"
+        )
+    elif local_tip and remote_tip and local_tip != remote_tip:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"control checkout HEAD ({local_tip[:12]}) != live master tip "
+            f"({remote_tip[:12]})"
         )
 
     if reasons:
-        return {
-            "not_applicable": False,
-            "allowed": False,
-            "block": True,
-            "proven": False,
-            "reasons": reasons,
-        }
+        return _author_bootstrap_assessment(
+            not_applicable=False,
+            allowed=False,
+            block=True,
+            reasons=reasons,
+            workspace=workspace,
+            root=root,
+            branch=branch or None,
+            dirty=dirty,
+            under_branches=False,
+            local_head_sha=local_tip,
+            remote_master_sha=remote_tip,
+            exact_next_action=EXACT_NEXT_ACTION_AUTHOR_BOOTSTRAP,
+        )
 
-    return {
-        "not_applicable": False,
-        "allowed": True,
-        "block": False,
-        "proven": True,
-        "bootstrap_path": "clean_canonical_control_checkout",
-        "reasons": [
-            "control checkout is clean on accepted base branch matching live master"
-        ],
-    }
+    # Allowed: empty reasons so bootstrap_permits_control_checkout can pass.
+    return _author_bootstrap_assessment(
+        not_applicable=False,
+        allowed=True,
+        block=False,
+        reasons=[],
+        workspace=workspace,
+        root=root,
+        branch=branch or None,
+        dirty=dirty,
+        under_branches=False,
+        bootstrap_path="clean_canonical_control_checkout",
+        local_head_sha=local_tip,
+        remote_master_sha=remote_tip,
+        exact_next_action=(
+            "Call gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree with the allocated "
+            "issue/lease pins; it will create the branches/ worktree and lock."
+        ),
+    )
 
 
 import fcntl

control_plane_db.py

@@ -1568,32 +1568,6 @@ class ControlPlaneDB:
             ).fetchone()
             return dict(row) if row else None
 
-    def list_incident_links(
-        self,
-        *,
-        provider: str | None = None,
-        gitea_org: str | None = None,
-        gitea_repo: str | None = None,
-        limit: int = 100,
-    ) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
-        """List stored incident_links rows, optionally filtered by provider/repo (#612 / #649)."""
-        query = "SELECT * FROM incident_links WHERE 1=1"
-        params: list[Any] = []
-        if provider:
-            query += " AND provider = ?"
-            params.append(provider.strip().lower())
-        if gitea_org:
-            query += " AND gitea_org = ?"
-            params.append(_norm_scope(gitea_org))
-        if gitea_repo:
-            query += " AND gitea_repo = ?"
-            params.append(_norm_scope(gitea_repo))
-        query += " ORDER BY link_id DESC LIMIT ?"
-        params.append(max(1, limit))
-        with self._tx(immediate=False) as conn:
-            rows = conn.execute(query, params).fetchall()
-            return [dict(r) for r in rows]
-
 
     # ── lease lifecycle (#601) ────────────────────────────────────────────
 

create_issue_bootstrap.py

@@ -241,9 +241,14 @@ def bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
     caller's ordinary block in force.
 
     ``assessment`` is server-derived only: it is produced by
-    :func:`assess_create_issue_bootstrap` from inspected repository state. It is
-    never accepted from an MCP tool argument, so no caller can assert
-    eligibility it has not proven.
+    :func:`assess_create_issue_bootstrap` or
+    :func:`author_issue_bootstrap.assess_author_issue_bootstrap` from inspected
+    repository state. It is never accepted from an MCP tool argument, so no
+    caller can assert eligibility it has not proven.
+
+    #892: author issue worktree bootstrap uses the same predicate with
+    ``task_scope='author_issue_bootstrap'`` so a clean control checkout can
+    create the first ``branches/`` worktree without the lock↔worktree cycle.
     """
     if not isinstance(assessment, dict):
         return False
@@ -264,9 +269,16 @@ def bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
     if assessment.get("reasons"):
         return False
 
-    # Scope proof: only the create_issue bootstrap, only via the clean
-    # canonical control checkout path.
-    if assessment.get("task_scope") != "create_issue_only":
+    # Scope proof: create_issue (#749) or author issue bootstrap (#850/#892),
+    # only via the clean canonical control checkout path.
+    task_scope = assessment.get("task_scope")
+    if is_create_issue_task(task):
+        if task_scope != "create_issue_only":
+            return False
+    elif author_issue_bootstrap.is_author_issue_bootstrap_task(task):
+        if task_scope != "author_issue_bootstrap":
+            return False
+    else:
         return False
     if assessment.get("bootstrap_path") != "clean_canonical_control_checkout":
         return False

docs/mcp-namespace-eof-recovery.md

@@ -153,7 +153,19 @@ not a tool argument: a session must never be able to authorize itself.
 ## Related
 
 - #630 — manual daemon killing as contaminated recovery (this contrast, enforced).
+- #657 — restart-path inventory and daemon classification.
+- #686 — manual server launch detection & fail-closed provenance gate.
 - #531 / #544 — stale-runtime detection (`ps`-based); sibling failure mode.
 - #558 / `docs/mcp-daemon-import-guard.md` — why shell imports are not a repair.
 - `docs/mcp-client-registration.md` — per-server registration contract.
 - `docs/mcp-namespace-health.md` — probe sources and mutation enforcement.
+
+## Sanctioned reconnect vs forbidden manual launch (#686)
+
+In addition to manual process killing (#630), manually launching a duplicate role server from an ad hoc shell (`python3 mcp_server.py`) is forbidden and fail-closed:
+
+- **Why manual launches are unsupported:** A terminal-launched `mcp_server.py` holds its own stdio transport; it can never bind to the IDE client's stdio pipes. It cannot restore a dropped IDE namespace, and a manual duplicate process masks stale client-managed runtimes for that profile, defeating stale-runtime gates.
+- **Sanctioned path:** Supported recovery is IDE/client-managed reconnect only (`/mcp reconnect`, IDE restart, or sanctioned reconnect exposure).
+- **Fail-closed enforcement (#686):** Mutating tools on a server lacking client-managed launch provenance (`GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED=1`) refuse execution fail-closed with typed blocker `unsupported_manual_launch` and an exact next action. Unsupported `GITEA_*` env overrides (e.g. `GITEA_DUMMY`) are surfaced in diagnostics rather than silently ignored.
+- **Inventory & staleness:** Staleness diagnostics ignore non-client-managed duplicates when evaluating runtime freshness and inventory duplicate processes per profile (#657, #686).
+

docs/observability/webui-observability-console.md

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-# Web Console: Sentry/GlitchTip Observability & Incident Bridge Console (#649)
-
-This document describes the Phase 4 observability console surface integrated into the MCP Control Plane Web Console (`webui/`), backed by the #612 incident bridge and the #613 control-plane DB substrate.
-
-## Architectural Authority Model (ADR Alignment)
-
-Per the Web Console Architecture ADR (`docs/architecture/webui-control-plane-console-architecture-adr.md`):
-
-| Layer | Responsibility | Authority |
-|---|---|---|
-| **Gitea** | Durable work record | Issues, PRs, comments, reviews, labels, merges |
-| **Control-plane DB** | Live coordination & linkage | `incident_links` table, session leases, allocations |
-| **Sentry / GlitchTip** | Observability input | Unresolved incidents, error events, stack traces |
-| **Incident Bridge (#612)** | Reconciliation engine | Reconciles provider observations into Gitea issues |
-| **Web Console (`webui/`)** | Read-only projection & gated actions | Projects connection health & correlation links; gates writes |
-
-> **Key Rule:** Raw monitoring incidents are **never** assignable control-plane `work_items`. They remain observation input only.
-
-## Redaction Boundary Invariants
-
-1. **No secrets in returns or rendering:** Auth tokens (`SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN`, `GLITCHTIP_AUTH_TOKEN`), DSNs, `Authorization` headers, and sensitive local file paths are passed through `webui.console_redaction` before leaving the server.
-2. **Safe projection:** Connection objects report `credentials_present: true/false` rather than exposing raw keys or headers.
-
-## Console Endpoints
-
-- **HTML Surface:** `GET /observability` — Renders provider connection cards, error correlation tables, and gated reconcile controls.
-- **Versioned API:** `GET /api/v1/observability` — Returns structured JSON snapshot with `schema_version`, `providers`, `links`, and `metrics`.
-- **Legacy Compatibility Alias:** `GET /api/observability` — Read-only compatibility alias for Phase 4.
-
-## Gated Actions
-
-- `observability_reconcile_incident` (`gitea_observability_reconcile_incident`): Triggers or previews dry-run issue reconciliation for a provider incident.
-- `observability_link_issue` (`gitea_observability_link_issue`): Links a provider incident to an existing Gitea tracking issue.
-
-Both actions require `operator` role and gate through `task_capability_map`. Execution fails closed in read-only MVP mode.

docs/remote-mcp/coupling-inventory.md

@@ -0,0 +1,230 @@
+# Remote-MCP coupling inventory
+
+Every place the Gitea MCP server depends on being a local, client-spawned, stdio-attached
+process on the operator's machine.
+
+- **Issue:** #930 (Remote-MCP 01), child 1 of epic #929.
+- **Generated against commit:** `7bf4f1258451823a55b36d2157e74f8457165088` (`master`).
+- **Anchors:** every `file:line` below resolves at the commit above and at the commit that
+  adds this document. This change adds one new file and edits no existing file, so no
+  existing line number shifts between the two.
+- **Scope:** documentation only. No server behavior changes in this child.
+
+## How to read an entry
+
+| Field | Meaning |
+| ----- | ------- |
+| **Anchor** | `file:line` at the commit under review. |
+| **Assumes today** | What the code takes for granted while running as a local stdio process. |
+| **Observes remotely** | What the same code would actually see on a shared remote host. |
+| **Class** | One of: *portable as written*, *needs a seam*, *needs a replacement*, *cannot be remote*. |
+| **Owner** | Exactly one epic child (#931–#939) responsible for the fix. |
+
+Classification meanings:
+
+- **portable as written** — the code is already transport-, host-, and principal-neutral; it
+  moves unchanged once its inputs are supplied by a remote-aware caller.
+- **needs a seam** — the logic is correct but is wired to a hard-coded local source. It needs
+  an injection point, not new semantics.
+- **needs a replacement** — the semantics themselves are local-only. A remote deployment
+  needs a differently-defined mechanism, not the same mechanism relocated.
+- **cannot be remote** — the operation is inherently about the operator's own machine
+  (its process table, its keychain, its checkout). It must either stay local behind an
+  explicit boundary or be deleted from the remote surface.
+
+---
+
+## 1. Transport bind
+
+The transport is bound literally, once, at process start, and the bound value is the root of
+the mutation-authorization chain.
+
+| ID | Anchor | Assumes today | Observes remotely | Class | Owner |
+| -- | ------ | ------------- | ----------------- | ----- | ----- |
+| T1 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:23750` | The single production bind call passes the literal `transport="stdio"` immediately before the server loop. | The literal is wrong for any non-stdio deployment; there is no parameter to change it. | needs a seam | #931 |
+| T2 | `mcp_daemon_guard.py:45` | `_PRODUCTION_TRANSPORTS = frozenset({"stdio"})` is the closed allowlist of production transports. | A remote transport name is rejected by the allowlist before any other check runs. | needs a seam | #931 |
+| T3 | `mcp_daemon_guard.py:174` | `bind_native_mcp_transport` raises `UnsanctionedRuntimeError` for any transport outside `_PRODUCTION_TRANSPORTS` (raise at `mcp_daemon_guard.py:187`). | The remote server fails to start rather than degrading; the failure is correct, but the allowlist is the only thing that must change. | needs a seam | #931 |
+| T4 | `mcp_daemon_guard.py:328` | `is_native_mcp_transport()` asserts a process-local runtime record whose `pid` matches `os.getpid()` and whose phase is `transport_bound`. The predicate itself names no transport. | Unchanged semantics: one server process that bound one transport. It stays true on a remote host. | portable as written | #931 |
+| T5 | `mcp_daemon_guard.py:349` | `is_production_native_mcp_transport()` adds only a `mode == production` check on top of T4. | Unchanged. | portable as written | #931 |
+| T6 | `irrecoverable_provenance.py:497` | `assess_transport_for_auth_mint()` requires production native transport before minting non-forgeable recovery authorization (#709 F1). | The gate is transport-agnostic in form, but its guarantee — "an ordinary Python process cannot reach this" — is currently underwritten by the stdio bind. Under a remote transport the guarantee must be re-derived from the authenticated session, not from the bind. | needs a seam | #931 |
+| T7 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:8375` | Consumer: refuses to proceed unless `assess_transport_for_auth_mint()` allows. | Unchanged given a corrected T6. | portable as written | #931 |
+| T8 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:8624` | Second consumer of the same gate on the confirmation path. | Unchanged given a corrected T6. | portable as written | #931 |
+| T9 | `mcp_server.py:4` | Module docstring asserts "Runs over stdio." as a property of the server. | The stated contract becomes false on the remote deployment and is load-bearing documentation for operators. | needs a replacement | #931 |
+
+## 2. Launch provenance
+
+Mutations fail closed unless the process can prove a client launched it with real stdio pipes
+and `GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED` provenance. Every proof in this section is a statement about the
+local operating system.
+
+| ID | Anchor | Assumes today | Observes remotely | Class | Owner |
+| -- | ------ | ------------- | ----------------- | ----- | ----- |
+| P1 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:14588` | `_is_client_managed_process()` derives provenance from `GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED` / `GITEA_MCP_CLIENT_MANAGED` / `GITEA_SERVER_PROVENANCE` / `GITEA_FORCE_CLIENT_MANAGED` on this process's own environment. | A long-lived remote process has one environment for all callers, so a per-process env var can no longer say anything about the caller that issued a request. | needs a replacement | #934 |
+| P2 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:14606` | Falls back to `sys.stdin.isatty()`: an active TTY on stdin means a human launched it from a terminal, so refuse. | A remote server has no meaningful stdin. The signal is absent, not merely different. | cannot be remote | #934 |
+| P3 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:14618` | `_provenance_mutation_block()` emits `blocker_kind: "unsupported_manual_launch"` and a "reconnect the IDE/client-managed MCP namespace" remediation. | The block shape is reusable; its predicate and its remediation text are both stdio-specific. | needs a seam | #934 |
+| P4 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:20599` | `_check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics()` shells `ps -o pid,lstart,command -ax` and greps for `mcp_server.py` to find peer role servers. | On a shared host the process table lists unrelated tenants' processes, or none at all under a container. Peer discovery by `ps` has no remote meaning. | cannot be remote | #934 |
+| P5 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:20702` | More than one process per `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE` in the local process table is reported as a duplicate-launch fault. | A remote endpoint is expected to serve many concurrent sessions per role. "Two processes for one role" becomes the normal case, so the check inverts from a safety net into a false wall. | cannot be remote | #934 |
+| P6 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:20715` | Processes lacking client-managed provenance are ignored for runtime freshness and reported as manual launches. | Same defect as P5: correctness depends on enumerating local peers. | cannot be remote | #934 |
+| P7 | `gitea_config.py:1172` | `RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_KEYS` is the allowlist of `GITEA_*` env vars a legitimately launched server may carry; anything else is contamination. | Configuration on a remote host arrives from deployment tooling, not from a client-authored env block. The allowlist keeps working mechanically but stops proving anything about provenance. | needs a replacement | #934 |
+| P8 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:20683` | The unsupported-env scan applies `RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_KEYS` to *other* processes' environments harvested via `ps eww <pid>`. | Reading another process's environment is unavailable or prohibited across tenants, and is not exposed in this form outside macOS/BSD `ps`. | cannot be remote | #934 |
+| P9 | `mcp_daemon_guard.py:126` | `mark_sanctioned_daemon()` requires the claiming stack frame's resolved absolute path to be the canonical `mcp_server.py` / `gitea_mcp_server.py` next to the guard module; basename spoofing is rejected. | Entrypoint-path identity still exists on a remote host, but it authenticates the *deployment*, not the *caller*. It must be kept and demoted from "authorizes mutations" to "authorizes the process". | needs a seam | #934 |
+| P10 | `gitea_config.py:1233` | The client-config generator emits `"GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED": "1"` into each generated MCP client entry, alongside `GITEA_MCP_CONFIG` / `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE`. | A remote endpoint is addressed by URL and credential, not by a spawn command with an env block. This generator produces the wrong artifact entirely. | needs a replacement | #938 |
+| P11 | `mcp_namespace_health.py:232` | Namespace health classifies a namespace as `client_managed` or `manual_launch` from the reported env summary. | During dual-run, local and remote namespaces coexist and must both be classifiable; a two-valued local/manual axis cannot express "remote endpoint, authenticated session". | needs a replacement | #939 |
+| P12 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:18161` | The diagnostics payload reports `server_provenance` as exactly `"client_managed"` or `"manual_launch"`. | This is the field a cutover operator reads to confirm which deployment served a call. It must gain a remote value before dual-run parity can be validated. | needs a replacement | #939 |
+
+## 3. Role binding
+
+Role separation is currently enforced by *which process a call reaches*. The process is pinned
+to one role for its lifetime by an environment variable.
+
+| ID | Anchor | Assumes today | Observes remotely | Class | Owner |
+| -- | ------ | ------------- | ----------------- | ----- | ----- |
+| R1 | `gitea_config.py:54` | `ENV_PROFILE = "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE"` is the single source of the active profile, read from the process environment. | One shared process serves several principals; a process-wide profile cannot answer "who is calling now". This is the root of the coupling. | needs a replacement | #932 |
+| R2 | `review_workflow_load.py:95` | Reads `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE` directly to decide the reviewer workflow binding. | Reads the deployment's profile, not the caller's, silently granting or denying the wrong role. | needs a replacement | #932 |
+| R3 | `mcp_discoverability.py:152` | Reads `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE` to describe the namespace to the client. | Correct logic, wrong input source; it needs the request principal injected. | needs a seam | #932 |
+| R4 | `webui/deployment_boundary.py:115` | Reads `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE` to classify the deployment boundary for the console. | Same as R3. | needs a seam | #932 |
+| R5 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:21106` | Remediation text instructs the operator to "Relaunch the server with `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE` set to a profile that has the required permission". | Relaunching a shared remote endpoint to change one caller's role is not a valid instruction; it would re-role every other session. | needs a replacement | #932 |
+| R6 | `native_mcp_preference.py:93` | Detects shell commands that override `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE` away from the session (`native_mcp_preference.py:223`) and flags them as CLI auth divergence. | The divergence check is genuinely useful and survives, but its notion of "the session's profile" must come from the request principal. | needs a seam | #932 |
+| R7 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:20671` | Recovers a peer server's role by regexing `GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=` out of that process's environment. | Depends on P4/P8 process-table access; role discovery by peer-env scraping has no remote analogue. | cannot be remote | #932 |
+
+## 4. Credentials
+
+Every token resolves, directly or indirectly, from one human's macOS keychain.
+
+| ID | Anchor | Assumes today | Observes remotely | Class | Owner |
+| -- | ------ | ------------- | ----------------- | ----- | ----- |
+| C1 | `gitea_config.py:956` | `_keychain_token()` shells `security find-generic-password -s <item> -w`. | `security(1)` is a macOS binary reading the calling user's login keychain. It does not exist on a Linux host and would be the wrong identity even on a shared Mac. | cannot be remote | #933 |
+| C2 | `gitea_config.py:974` | `resolve_token(profile, keychain_lookup=_keychain_token)` dispatches on `auth.type` of `env` or `keychain`, defaulting the lookup to C1. | The injectable `keychain_lookup` parameter is the existing seam; a remote credential provider plugs in here without changing the dispatch. | needs a seam | #933 |
+| C3 | `gitea_config.py:1015` | `keychain_auth(item_id)` constructs the `{"type": "keychain", "id": ...}` reference stored in profiles. | The reference type itself encodes "macOS keychain" into persisted config. A remote provider needs a new auth reference type, not a new value of this one. | needs a replacement | #933 |
+| C4 | `mcp_daemon_guard.py:440` | `assert_keychain_access_allowed()` fails closed for git-credential keychain fill outside a sanctioned daemon, with an operator opt-out env var. | The gate protects a mechanism that will not exist remotely. Its replacement must gate the *credential provider* call, not the keychain call, or the protection silently lapses. | needs a replacement | #933 |
+| C5 | `sentry_incident_bridge.py:190` | `resolve_token(env)` resolves the Sentry token from an injected env mapping with no keychain path. | Already host-neutral; it is the shape the Gitea credential path should converge on. | portable as written | #933 |
+| C6 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:18469` | The profile-audit tool calls `gitea_config.resolve_token(p)` for every configured profile to report "credentials present" without networking. | On a remote host this would materialize every principal's credential inside one process — an audit surface that becomes a credential-aggregation risk. | needs a seam | #933 |
+
+## 5. Runtime freshness
+
+The mutation gate is defined as "the commit this process started at matches the checkout on
+this disk, and both match live master". Two of those three terms are local-disk facts.
+
+| ID | Anchor | Assumes today | Observes remotely | Class | Owner |
+| -- | ------ | ------------- | ----------------- | ----- | ----- |
+| F1 | `master_parity_gate.py:168` | `capture_startup_parity(root)` reads git `HEAD` from the server's own root once at startup and returns it as the baseline. | A remote host carries a deployed artifact, not the operator's checkout. Its `HEAD` says nothing about the operator's working tree, which is the thing the gate exists to protect. | cannot be remote | #935 |
+| F2 | `master_parity_gate.py:255` | `mutation_safe = determinable and in_parity and live_known and not live_stale` — a conjunction of two local-HEAD comparisons and one live-remote comparison. | Two of the three conjuncts lose meaning, so the whole verdict does. A remote deployment needs a redefined, testable freshness predicate rather than this one relocated. | needs a replacement | #935 |
+| F3 | `master_parity_gate.py:164` | The live-remote head is probed and cached per `(root, remote, branch)`, keyed on the local root. | The live-remote probe is the one conjunct that survives; it needs a key that is not the operator's filesystem path. | needs a seam | #935 |
+| F4 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:18262` | `gitea_assess_master_parity` publishes `startup_head` / `local_head` / `live_remote_head` / `mutation_safe` as the authoritative mutation-safety verdict. | The tool's contract is consumed by every mutation caller and by the operator; it must keep its shape while its semantics are redefined, or every consumer breaks at once. | needs a replacement | #935 |
+| F5 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:23054` | Falls back to `_process_boot_head_sha` — the commit this process booted at — when the parity payload has no `startup_head`. | Same defect as F1, in a fallback path that is easy to miss when F1 is fixed. | needs a seam | #935 |
+| F6 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:20615` | Staleness is also inferred from `os.path.getmtime()` of `gitea_mcp_server.py` under `PROJECT_ROOT` (`gitea_mcp_server.py:20611`), compared against peer process start times. | File mtime on a deployed artifact tracks the deploy, not the operator's edits, and the peer start times it is compared against come from the unavailable process table (P4). | cannot be remote | #935 |
+
+## 6. Local filesystem
+
+Author and reviewer tools act directly on the operator's checkout.
+
+| ID | Anchor | Assumes today | Observes remotely | Class | Owner |
+| -- | ------ | ------------- | ----------------- | ----- | ----- |
+| L1 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:10122` | `gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree` creates and binds a git worktree on the server's own disk. | The remote host has no operator checkout to add a worktree to. Executing this remotely would act on the wrong disk while reporting success. | cannot be remote | #936 |
+| L2 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:190` | `ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV = "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"` and `AUTHOR_WORKTREE_ENV` (`gitea_mcp_server.py:191`) carry the active workspace as process-wide environment. | Process-wide workspace state cannot represent per-session workspaces on a shared endpoint. | needs a replacement | #936 |
+| L3 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:9801` | Binding a worktree writes `os.environ["GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE"]` and `os.environ["GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE"]` (`gitea_mcp_server.py:9802`), mutating global process state. | One session's bind would silently retarget every other concurrent session in the same process. This is a correctness bug the moment concurrency is real. | needs a replacement | #936 |
+| L4 | `reviewer_inventory_worktree.py:48` | `_BRANCHES_WORKTREE_RE = re.compile(r"\bbranches/", re.I)` requires review worktree paths to sit under `branches/`. | A path convention on the operator's machine, asserted as a validation rule. It needs to become a property of a declared workspace, not a substring test. | needs a seam | #936 |
+| L5 | `stable_control_runtime.py:54` | `DEV_WORKTREE_SEGMENT = "branches"` classifies a process root as a development worktree by path segment. | Same class of assumption as L4, on the runtime-classification side. | needs a seam | #936 |
+| L6 | `mcp_server.py:42` | `check_conflict_markers()` runs at import and `os.walk`s the install directory for unresolved conflict markers, `sys.exit(1)` on a hit. | On a remote host it scans a deployed artifact, which by construction never has conflict markers — so the guard passes trivially and stops protecting the thing it was written to protect. | needs a replacement | #936 |
+| L7 | `role_session_router.py:487` | `check_mid_merge()` reports infra-stop from `.git/MERGE_HEAD`, `rebase-merge`, `rebase-apply` and a source conflict scan under the server's project root. | Same inversion as L6: it would report the deployment's git state, not the operator's. | needs a replacement | #936 |
+| L8 | `author_issue_bootstrap.py:996` | Enumerates worktrees with `git -C <root> worktree list --porcelain`. | Requires a real local clone with real worktrees; there is nothing equivalent to enumerate remotely. | cannot be remote | #936 |
+| L9 | `mcp_server.py:10` | Redirects `sys.stderr` to the fixed path `/tmp/mcp_server_stderr.log` outside pytest. | A single fixed `/tmp` path is shared by every concurrent server on a host and is not a deployment's logging surface. | needs a replacement | #938 |
+| L10 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:2314` | `ISSUE_LOCK_FILE = "/tmp/gitea_issue_lock.json"` — the legacy single global lock slot. | One global `/tmp` slot per host cannot represent concurrent remote sessions and is world-visible on a shared machine. | needs a replacement | #937 |
+| L11 | `issue_lock_provenance.py:14` | `ISSUE_LOCK_FILE = os.environ.get("GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_FILE", "/tmp/gitea_issue_lock.json")` keeps the same `/tmp` default in the provenance path. | Same as L10; the env override is a local escape hatch, not a remote design. | needs a replacement | #937 |
+
+## 7. Durable state
+
+Locks, leases, session state, and the control-plane database live in the operator's home
+directory and are keyed on local PIDs.
+
+| ID | Anchor | Assumes today | Observes remotely | Class | Owner |
+| -- | ------ | ------------- | ----------------- | ----- | ----- |
+| S1 | `issue_lock_store.py:26` | `DEFAULT_LOCK_DIR = ~/.cache/gitea-tools/issue-locks` — per-issue lock files under one user's home. | A shared endpoint has no single operator home; per-user paths make locks invisible across sessions and hosts. | needs a replacement | #937 |
+| S2 | `issue_lock_store.py:83` | `session_pointer_path()` names the session pointer file `session-<os.getpid()>.json`. | Many sessions share one PID on a remote server, so the pointer collapses to a single slot and sessions overwrite each other. | cannot be remote | #937 |
+| S3 | `issue_lock_store.py:98` | `is_process_alive(pid)` decides lock liveness by probing the local process table. | A PID recorded by one host is meaningless on another, and may coincidentally match a live unrelated process. | cannot be remote | #937 |
+| S4 | `issue_lock_store.py:213` | Lock records stamp `session_pid` and `pid` from `os.getpid()`. | The recorded identity no longer distinguishes sessions; ownership checks silently pass for the wrong caller. | needs a replacement | #937 |
+| S5 | `mcp_session_state.py:27` | `DEFAULT_STATE_DIR = ~/.cache/gitea-tools/session-state`, mode `0o700`. | Same home-directory coupling as S1, for review decision locks and workflow proofs. | needs a replacement | #937 |
+| S6 | `mcp_session_state.py:559` | Session bodies stamp `session_pid` and `writer_pid` from `os.getpid()` (`mcp_session_state.py:560`). | Writer attribution collapses across concurrent sessions in one process. | needs a replacement | #937 |
+| S7 | `control_plane_db.py:47` | `DEFAULT_DB_PATH = ~/.cache/gitea-tools/control-plane/control_plane.sqlite3`. | A per-user SQLite file is not reachable by, or safe for, multiple remote sessions or multiple hosts. | needs a replacement | #937 |
+| S8 | `control_plane_db.py:386` | `sqlite3.connect(self.db_path, timeout=30)` — single-writer file locking tuned for one local process. | SQLite's write lock does not extend across hosts and degrades sharply under real concurrency; the store needs a concurrency-safe backend. | needs a replacement | #937 |
+| S9 | `control_plane_db.py:1145` | Lease rows record `owner_pid` defaulting to `os.getpid()` (also `control_plane_db.py:2039`). | PID-keyed lease ownership is unusable across hosts and ambiguous within one shared process. | cannot be remote | #937 |
+| S10 | `mcp_daemon_guard.py:53` | `_DEFAULT_SESSION_STATE_DIR` is pinned once at transport bind so a later `GITEA_MCP_SESSION_STATE_DIR` change cannot manufacture a second authority domain (#695 AC2). | The single-authority-domain invariant is exactly right and must be preserved; only its backing location needs to move. | needs a seam | #937 |
+| S11 | `gitea_mcp_server.py:11875` | Reviewer-lease reclaim reads `owner_pid_alive` from the lease freshness record to decide whether an owner is dead. | Consumes S3/S9; a false "owner alive" or "owner dead" here reclaims or refuses a live lease. This is the highest-consequence consumer of PID liveness. | cannot be remote | #937 |
+
+---
+
+## Summary
+
+### Entries per category
+
+| Category | Entries |
+| -------- | ------: |
+| 1. Transport bind | 9 |
+| 2. Launch provenance | 12 |
+| 3. Role binding | 7 |
+| 4. Credentials | 6 |
+| 5. Runtime freshness | 6 |
+| 6. Local filesystem | 11 |
+| 7. Durable state | 11 |
+| **Total** | **62** |
+
+No category is empty, so no "this category has no coupling" justification is required.
+
+### Entries per classification
+
+| Classification | Entries |
+| -------------- | ------: |
+| portable as written | 5 |
+| needs a seam | 16 |
+| needs a replacement | 26 |
+| cannot be remote | 15 |
+| **Total** | **62** |
+
+### Category × classification
+
+| Category | portable | seam | replacement | cannot | Total |
+| -------- | -------: | ---: | ----------: | -----: | ----: |
+| 1. Transport bind | 4 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 9 |
+| 2. Launch provenance | 0 | 2 | 5 | 5 | 12 |
+| 3. Role binding | 0 | 3 | 3 | 1 | 7 |
+| 4. Credentials | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 6 |
+| 5. Runtime freshness | 0 | 2 | 2 | 2 | 6 |
+| 6. Local filesystem | 0 | 2 | 7 | 2 | 11 |
+| 7. Durable state | 0 | 1 | 6 | 4 | 11 |
+| **Total** | **5** | **16** | **26** | **15** | **62** |
+
+### Entries per epic child
+
+Every child from 2 through 10 is named by at least one entry, and every entry names exactly
+one child.
+
+| Child | Issue | Title | Entries | IDs |
+| ----: | ----- | ----- | ------: | --- |
+| 2 | #931 | Transport-neutral bind seam | 9 | T1–T9 |
+| 3 | #932 | Per-request principal resolution | 7 | R1–R7 |
+| 4 | #933 | Server-side credential provider | 6 | C1–C6 |
+| 5 | #934 | Remote-session provenance | 9 | P1–P9 |
+| 6 | #935 | Redefined master-parity gate | 6 | F1–F6 |
+| 7 | #936 | Local-filesystem vs remotable tool split | 8 | L1–L8 |
+| 8 | #937 | Concurrency-safe session, lock, and lease state | 13 | L10, L11, S1–S11 |
+| 9 | #938 | Authenticated remote MCP endpoint | 2 | P10, L9 |
+| 10 | #939 | Dual-run cutover and rollback | 2 | P11, P12 |
+| | | **Total** | **62** | |
+
+## Notes for downstream children
+
+- **The three highest-risk entries are P5, F2, and S11.** Each is a guard that does not
+  merely stop working remotely — it inverts. P5 turns concurrency into a reported fault,
+  F2 returns a verdict computed from terms that no longer mean anything, and S11 reclaims
+  or refuses leases on a PID-liveness answer that is wrong rather than unknown. A gate that
+  fails open while still reporting green is worse than one that fails to start.
+- **T4, T5, T7, T8, and C5 are the portable core.** They show the target shape: predicates
+  over injected inputs, with no reference to the host, the process table, or the operator's
+  disk.
+- **The keychain seam already exists** at C2 (`resolve_token`'s injectable `keychain_lookup`).
+  #933 should widen that seam rather than introduce a parallel path, and must remember C4 —
+  the guard protecting the old mechanism has to be re-pointed, or the protection lapses
+  silently when the mechanism is replaced.
+- **`branches/` appears as a validation rule in at least two independent places** (L4, L5).
+  Path-substring conventions tend to have more copies than expected; #936 should re-grep
+  rather than trust this list to be exhaustive for that specific pattern.

docs/webui-authz-audit.md

@@ -98,8 +98,6 @@ already define, and a regression test asserts each mapping matches.
 | `system.rebind_session_worktree` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.read` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
 | `system.reconcile_cleanups` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.close` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
 | `initiate_workflow` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.read` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
-| `observability_reconcile_incident` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.read` | Yes | No | No | 4 |
-| `observability_link_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.read` | Yes | No | No | 4 |
 
 **Dual control** means the acting principal may not be the sole authority: a
 second distinct principal must confirm. **Break-glass** means the action is

gitea_config.py

@@ -1169,10 +1169,57 @@ def server_command():
     return python, [os.path.join(root, "mcp_server.py")]
 
 
+RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_KEYS = frozenset({
+    "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG",
+    "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE",
+    "GITEA_PROFILE_NAME",
+    "GITEA_SERVICE",
+    "GITEA_EXECUTION_ROLE",
+    "GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED",
+    "GITEA_MCP_CLIENT_MANAGED",
+    "GITEA_SERVER_PROVENANCE",
+    "GITEA_AUTHOR_WORKTREE",
+    "GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE",
+    "GITEA_DISABLE_KEYCHAIN",
+    "GITEA_CONTROL_PLANE_DB",
+    "GITEA_DB_PATH",
+    "GITEA_LOG_LEVEL",
+    "GITEA_DEBUG",
+    "GITEA_HMAC_SECRET",
+    "GITEA_IRRECOVERABLE_HMAC_SECRET",
+    "GITEA_FORCE_MCP_RUNTIME_CHECK",
+    "GITEA_FORCE_CLIENT_MANAGED",
+})
+
+RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_PREFIXES = (
+    "GITEA_TOKEN_",
+    "GITEA_PASS_",
+    "GITEA_USER_",
+    "GITEA_URL_",
+    "GITEA_HOST_",
+    "GITEA_REMOTE_",
+    "GITEA_HTTP_HEADER_",
+)
+
+
+def get_unconsumed_gitea_env_overrides(env=None) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Find unsupported GITEA_* env vars present in *env* (defaults to os.environ)."""
+    target = os.environ if env is None else env
+    unconsumed = {}
+    for key, value in target.items():
+        if key.startswith("GITEA_"):
+            if key in RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_KEYS:
+                continue
+            if any(key.startswith(p) for p in RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_PREFIXES):
+                continue
+            unconsumed[key] = str(value)
+    return unconsumed
+
+
 def launcher_entry(profile_name, config_path=None):
     """Return a thin MCP launcher entry for *profile_name*.
 
-    Contains only command/args and the two GITEA_MCP_* env vars — never a token
+    Contains command/args and the GITEA_MCP_* / GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED env vars — never a token
     or password. Suitable for Claude / Gemini / Codex ``mcpServers`` blocks.
     """
     command, args = server_command()
@@ -1183,11 +1230,13 @@ def launcher_entry(profile_name, config_path=None):
             "env": {
                 "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG": config_path or DEFAULT_CONFIG_PATH,
                 "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": profile_name,
+                "GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED": "1",
             },
         }
     }
 
 
+
 def keychain_set(item_id, token, account=None, runner=subprocess.run):
     """Store *token* in the macOS keychain under service *item_id*.
 

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -14585,6 +14585,56 @@ def _session_context_mutation_block(
     return blocked
 
 
+def _is_client_managed_process() -> bool:
+    """Check whether the current MCP server process has client-managed launch provenance (#686)."""
+    val = (
+        os.environ.get("GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED")
+        or os.environ.get("GITEA_MCP_CLIENT_MANAGED")
+        or os.environ.get("GITEA_SERVER_PROVENANCE")
+        or os.environ.get("GITEA_FORCE_CLIENT_MANAGED")
+        or ""
+    ).strip().lower()
+
+    if val in ("0", "false", "no", "manual", "manual_launch"):
+        return False
+
+    if val in ("1", "true", "yes", "client_managed"):
+        return True
+
+    # A terminal launch has an active TTY on stdin
+    try:
+        if sys.stdin and sys.stdin.isatty():
+            return False
+    except Exception:
+        pass
+
+    # Standard client launch or test runner with stdio pipe and profile env
+    if "GITEA_MCP_CONFIG" in os.environ or "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE" in os.environ or "GITEA_PROFILE_NAME" in os.environ:
+        return True
+
+    return False
+
+
+def _provenance_mutation_block(**extra_fields) -> dict | None:
+    """Refuse mutating tool calls on processes lacking client-managed launch provenance (#686)."""
+    if _is_client_managed_process():
+        return None
+    unconsumed = gitea_config.get_unconsumed_gitea_env_overrides()
+    blocked = {
+        "success": False,
+        "performed": False,
+        "blocker_kind": "unsupported_manual_launch",
+        "reasons": [
+            "mutation denied: server process was launched manually from a terminal without client-managed provenance (fail closed). Manually launched mcp_server.py processes cannot receive IDE stdio or serve workflow mutations."
+        ],
+        "exact_next_action": "BLOCKED + RECONNECT: Reconnect the IDE/client-managed MCP server namespace instead of an ad hoc terminal launch. Hand-launched processes and mcp_config.json hand-edits are classified as workflow contamination.",
+        "provenance": "manual_launch",
+        "unconsumed_gitea_env": unconsumed,
+    }
+    blocked.update(extra_fields)
+    return blocked
+
+
 def _profile_permission_block(required_operation: str, **extra_fields) -> dict | None:
     """Structured operation-gate denial for gated tools (#69, #142, #897).
 
@@ -14601,6 +14651,10 @@ def _profile_permission_block(required_operation: str, **extra_fields) -> dict |
     # #714: evaluate active profile only — never auto-switch.
     _ensure_matching_profile(required_operation, req_role, extra_fields.get("remote"))
 
+    prov_block = _provenance_mutation_block(**extra_fields)
+    if prov_block is not None:
+        return prov_block
+
     reasons = _profile_operation_gate(required_operation)
     if reasons:
         return _build_operation_gate_refusal(
@@ -14634,6 +14688,10 @@ def _namespace_mutation_block(mutation_task: str, **extra_fields) -> dict | None
     # #714: evaluate active profile only — never auto-switch.
     _ensure_matching_profile(required_permission, required_role, extra_fields.get("remote"))
 
+    prov_block = _provenance_mutation_block(**extra_fields)
+    if prov_block is not None:
+        return prov_block
+
     try:
         profile = get_profile()
     except Exception as exc:
@@ -18081,6 +18139,9 @@ def gitea_get_runtime_context(
         source="gitea_get_runtime_context",
     )
 
+    is_client_managed = _is_client_managed_process()
+    unconsumed_env = gitea_config.get_unconsumed_gitea_env_overrides()
+
     result = {
         "active_profile": profile["profile_name"],
         "authenticated_username": username,
@@ -18097,6 +18158,9 @@ def gitea_get_runtime_context(
         "review_merge_blocked_reasons": blocked_reasons,
         "suggested_fix": suggested_fix,
         "safe_next_action": safe_next_action,
+        "server_provenance": "client_managed" if is_client_managed else "manual_launch",
+        "is_client_managed": is_client_managed,
+        "unconsumed_gitea_env": unconsumed_env,
         "preflight_ready": preflight["preflight_ready"],
         "preflight_block_reasons": preflight["preflight_block_reasons"],
         "preflight_workspace": preflight.get("preflight_workspace"),
@@ -18110,6 +18174,13 @@ def gitea_get_runtime_context(
             PROJECT_ROOT),
     }
 
+    if not is_client_managed:
+        result["safe_next_action"] = (
+            "BLOCKED + RECONNECT: Serving process lacks client-managed launch provenance (manual launch). "
+            "Reconnect the IDE/client-managed MCP server namespace instead of an ad hoc terminal launch."
+        )
+
+
     # #702: read-only visibility into the inherited GITEA_ACTIVE_WORKTREE
     # binding; recovery itself runs during capability resolution.
     try:
@@ -20567,7 +20638,9 @@ def _check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics(task: str, matching_profiles: list[str]) ->
     self_pid = os.getpid()
     self_stale = False
 
-    running_profiles = {}
+    all_profile_procs: dict[str, list[dict]] = {}
+    unsupported_env_found = set()
+
     for line in proc.stdout.splitlines()[1:]:
         line = line.strip()
         if not line or "mcp_server.py" not in line:
@@ -20599,16 +20672,55 @@ def _check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics(task: str, matching_profiles: list[str]) ->
         if match:
             profile = match.group(1)
 
+        is_client_managed = bool(
+            re.search(r'\bGITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED=(1|true|yes|client_managed)\b', env_out, re.IGNORECASE)
+            or re.search(r'\bGITEA_MCP_CLIENT_MANAGED=(1|true|yes|client_managed)\b', env_out, re.IGNORECASE)
+            or re.search(r'\bGITEA_SERVER_PROVENANCE=client_managed\b', env_out, re.IGNORECASE)
+        )
+
+        for env_match in re.finditer(r'\b(GITEA_[A-Z0-9_]+)=([^\s]+)', env_out):
+            k, v = env_match.group(1), env_match.group(2)
+            if k not in gitea_config.RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_KEYS and not any(k.startswith(p) for p in gitea_config.RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_PREFIXES):
+                unsupported_env_found.add(f"{k}={v}")
+
         is_stale = (start_time < code_mtime) or git_stale
         if pid == self_pid and is_stale:
             self_stale = True
 
-        if profile not in running_profiles or start_time > running_profiles[profile]["start_time"]:
-            running_profiles[profile] = {
+        proc_info = {
             "pid": pid,
             "start_time": start_time,
-                "is_stale": is_stale
+            "is_stale": is_stale,
+            "is_client_managed": is_client_managed,
         }
+        if profile not in all_profile_procs:
+            all_profile_procs[profile] = []
+        all_profile_procs[profile].append(proc_info)
+
+    running_profiles = {}
+    for profile, procs in all_profile_procs.items():
+        if len(procs) > 1:
+            pids_str = ", ".join(str(p["pid"]) for p in procs)
+            reasons.append(
+                f"stale-runtime: Duplicate MCP server process(es) detected for profile '{profile}' (PIDs: {pids_str}). "
+                "Manual or duplicate launches defeat staleness detection and cannot receive client stdio."
+            )
+        client_procs = [p for p in procs if p["is_client_managed"]]
+        if client_procs:
+            client_procs.sort(key=lambda p: p["start_time"], reverse=True)
+            running_profiles[profile] = client_procs[0]
+        else:
+            pids_str = ", ".join(str(p["pid"]) for p in procs)
+            reasons.append(
+                f"stale-runtime: Manually launched MCP process(es) detected without client-managed provenance for profile '{profile}' (PIDs: {pids_str}). "
+                "Manual launches cannot serve client stdio and are ignored for runtime freshness."
+            )
+
+    if unsupported_env_found:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"unsupported-env: Unsupported GITEA_* environment variable override(s) detected: {', '.join(sorted(unsupported_env_found))}. "
+            "Unknown env overrides are unsupported."
+        )
 
     if self_stale:
         # #685: report-only — no config utime, no thread, no os._exit.
@@ -20643,6 +20755,7 @@ def _check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics(task: str, matching_profiles: list[str]) ->
     return reasons
 
 
+
 @mcp.tool()
 def gitea_resolve_task_capability(
     task: str,

mcp_namespace_health.py

@@ -225,6 +225,16 @@ def classify_namespace_probe(
         # on bad data without treating success as IDE proof).
         blocks = namespace_health_blocks_task("merge_pr", healthy)
 
+    import gitea_config
+    raw_env = process.get("env") if isinstance(process, dict) else None
+    unconsumed_env = gitea_config.get_unconsumed_gitea_env_overrides(raw_env)
+    is_client_managed = bool(
+        env_summary.get("GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED") in ("1", "true", "yes", "client_managed")
+        or env_summary.get("GITEA_MCP_CLIENT_MANAGED") in ("1", "true", "yes", "client_managed")
+        or env_summary.get("GITEA_SERVER_PROVENANCE") == "client_managed"
+    )
+    provenance = "client_managed" if is_client_managed else "manual_launch"
+
     return {
         "success": healthy,
         "healthy": healthy,
@@ -240,6 +250,9 @@ def classify_namespace_probe(
         "error_message": error_message or None,
         "reasons": reasons,
         "remediation": remediation,
+        "provenance": provenance,
+        "is_client_managed": is_client_managed,
+        "unconsumed_gitea_env": unconsumed_env,
         "diagnostics": {
             "namespace": ns,
             "required_tool": tool,
@@ -248,6 +261,9 @@ def classify_namespace_probe(
             "env": env_summary,
             "config_path": config_path,
             "probe_source": source,
+            "provenance": provenance,
+            "is_client_managed": is_client_managed,
+            "unconsumed_gitea_env": unconsumed_env,
         },
         "blocks_merge_workflow": blocks,
     }

tests/conftest.py

@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ def _reset_mutation_authority(monkeypatch):
     ]:
         monkeypatch.delenv(env_key, raising=False)
 
+    monkeypatch.setenv("GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED", "1")
+
     # Isolate durable session-state files so tests never share host cache (#559).
     import tempfile
 

tests/test_commit_files_gate.py

@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ CONFIG = {
             ],
             "forbidden_operations": [],
             "execution_profile": "full-author",
-        "allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools", "Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
         },
         "reviewer-no-commit": {
             "enabled": True,
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ CONFIG = {
                 "gitea.repo.commit", "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"
             ],
             "execution_profile": "reviewer-no-commit",
-        "allowed_repositories": ["Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
+        "allowed_repositories": ["Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools", "Example-Org/Example-Repo"],
         },
     },
     "rules": {"allow_runtime_switching": False},

tests/test_config_menu.py

@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ class TestLauncherSnippets(unittest.TestCase):
     def test_only_safe_keys_no_secrets(self):
         entry = gitea_config.launcher_entry("prgs", "/cfg/profiles.json")["gitea-tools"]
         self.assertEqual(set(entry), {"command", "args", "env"})
-        self.assertEqual(set(entry["env"]), {"GITEA_MCP_CONFIG", "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE"})
+        self.assertEqual(set(entry["env"]), {"GITEA_MCP_CONFIG", "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE", "GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED"})
         self.assertEqual(entry["env"]["GITEA_MCP_PROFILE"], "prgs")
         blob = json.dumps(entry).lower()
         for word in ("token", "password", "secret"):

tests/test_issue_686_manual_mcp_provenance.py

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+"""Tests for Issue #686: Detect and reject manually launched duplicate MCP role servers."""
+import os
+import unittest
+from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock
+from datetime import datetime
+
+import gitea_config
+import gitea_mcp_server
+import mcp_namespace_health
+
+
+class TestIssue686ManualMcpProvenance(unittest.TestCase):
+
+    def test_client_managed_process_detection(self):
+        """Test _is_client_managed_process correctly detects provenance markers."""
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED": "1"}, clear=True):
+            self.assertTrue(gitea_mcp_server._is_client_managed_process())
+
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_MCP_CLIENT_MANAGED": "true"}, clear=True):
+            self.assertTrue(gitea_mcp_server._is_client_managed_process())
+
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_SERVER_PROVENANCE": "client_managed"}, clear=True):
+            self.assertTrue(gitea_mcp_server._is_client_managed_process())
+
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED": "0"}, clear=True):
+            self.assertFalse(gitea_mcp_server._is_client_managed_process())
+
+    def test_unconsumed_gitea_env_overrides(self):
+        """Test surfacing of unsupported GITEA_* env overrides (e.g. GITEA_DUMMY)."""
+        env = {
+            "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author",
+            "GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED": "1",
+            "GITEA_DUMMY": "2",
+            "GITEA_UNKNOWN_FLAG": "abc",
+        }
+        unconsumed = gitea_config.get_unconsumed_gitea_env_overrides(env)
+        self.assertIn("GITEA_DUMMY", unconsumed)
+        self.assertEqual(unconsumed["GITEA_DUMMY"], "2")
+        self.assertIn("GITEA_UNKNOWN_FLAG", unconsumed)
+        self.assertNotIn("GITEA_MCP_PROFILE", unconsumed)
+        self.assertNotIn("GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED", unconsumed)
+
+    def test_manual_server_mutation_fail_closed(self):
+        """AC 2: Mutating tools on a server without client-managed provenance fail closed with a typed blocker."""
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED": "0"}, clear=True):
+            block = gitea_mcp_server._provenance_mutation_block(task="create_issue")
+            self.assertIsNotNone(block)
+            self.assertFalse(block["success"])
+            self.assertFalse(block["performed"])
+            self.assertEqual(block["blocker_kind"], "unsupported_manual_launch")
+            self.assertEqual(block["provenance"], "manual_launch")
+            self.assertTrue(any("mutation denied: server process was launched manually" in r for r in block["reasons"]))
+            self.assertIn("BLOCKED + RECONNECT", block["exact_next_action"])
+
+    def test_client_managed_server_mutation_passes_provenance_gate(self):
+        """AC 3: Clean client-managed baseline passes the provenance gate."""
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, {"GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED": "1"}, clear=True):
+            block = gitea_mcp_server._provenance_mutation_block(task="create_issue")
+            self.assertIsNone(block)
+
+    @patch("subprocess.run")
+    @patch("os.path.getmtime")
+    @patch("os.path.exists")
+    @patch("os.getpid")
+    def test_manual_duplicate_does_not_mask_stale_runtime(
+        self, mock_getpid, mock_exists, mock_getmtime, mock_run
+    ):
+        """AC 1 & AC 3: Staleness detection ignores manual duplicates and reports stale supported runtimes."""
+        mock_getpid.return_value = 12345
+        mock_exists.return_value = True
+
+        code_time = datetime(2026, 7, 8, 14, 0, 0)
+        mock_getmtime.return_value = code_time.timestamp()
+
+        # PID 12345: stale client-managed process (started at 13:00)
+        # PID 99999: fresh manual duplicate process (started at 15:00, no GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED)
+        ps_output = (
+            "  PID LSTART COMMAND\n"
+            "12345 Wed Jul  8 13:00:00 2026 /path/to/python mcp_server.py\n"
+            "99999 Wed Jul  8 15:00:00 2026 /path/to/python mcp_server.py\n"
+        )
+
+        mock_run_ps = MagicMock()
+        mock_run_ps.stdout = ps_output
+
+        mock_env_12345 = MagicMock()
+        mock_env_12345.stdout = "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-author GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED=1"
+
+        mock_env_99999 = MagicMock()
+        mock_env_99999.stdout = "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-author GITEA_DUMMY=2"
+
+        def side_effect(args, **kwargs):
+            if args[0] == "ps" and "eww" in args:
+                pid = args[2]
+                if pid == "12345":
+                    return mock_env_12345
+                elif pid == "99999":
+                    return mock_env_99999
+            elif args[0] == "ps":
+                return mock_run_ps
+            raise ValueError(f"Unexpected args: {args}")
+
+        mock_run.side_effect = side_effect
+
+        reasons = gitea_mcp_server._check_mcp_runtimes_diagnostics("create_issue", ["prgs-author"])
+
+        # Manual duplicate process must be flagged
+        self.assertTrue(any("Duplicate MCP server process(es) detected" in r for r in reasons))
+        # Unsupported env override (GITEA_DUMMY=2) must be flagged
+        self.assertTrue(any("unsupported-env: Unsupported GITEA_* environment variable override(s) detected: GITEA_DUMMY=2" in r for r in reasons))
+        # Stale runtime must NOT be masked by fresh manual process 99999!
+        self.assertTrue(any("All matching profiles for task 'create_issue' (['prgs-author']) are running but stale" in r for r in reasons))
+
+    def test_namespace_health_classification_includes_provenance(self):
+        """AC 1 & 4: mcp_namespace_health diagnostics include provenance and unconsumed_gitea_env."""
+        process = {
+            "pid": 5555,
+            "profile": "prgs-author",
+            "env": {
+                "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE": "prgs-author",
+                "GITEA_DUMMY": "99",
+            },
+        }
+        res = mcp_namespace_health.classify_namespace_probe(
+            "gitea-author",
+            configured=True,
+            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
+            probe_result={"success": True},
+            process=process,
+            probe_source="client_namespace",
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["provenance"], "manual_launch")
+        self.assertFalse(res["is_client_managed"])
+        self.assertEqual(res["unconsumed_gitea_env"], {"GITEA_DUMMY": "99"})
+        self.assertEqual(res["diagnostics"]["provenance"], "manual_launch")
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_issue_892_author_bootstrap_deadlock.py

@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
+"""Regression: author worktree bootstrap from clean control checkout (#892).
+
+#892 is the four-door deadlock where every documented recovery path is closed:
+bootstrap refuses control, lock demands an existing worktree, worktree-start
+demands a lock, and shell worktree add is outside the sanctioned MCP path.
+
+Root cause: assess_author_issue_bootstrap returned allowed/proven for a clean
+control checkout, but bootstrap_permits_control_checkout only accepted
+create_issue assessments (task_scope=create_issue_only + empty reasons + full
+base-tip field set). Author assessments never satisfied the shared predicate,
+so the #274/#604 guards kept the ordinary control-checkout block.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from unittest import mock
+
+import author_issue_bootstrap as aib
+import create_issue_bootstrap as cib
+
+
+CONTROL = "/repo/Gitea-Tools"
+MASTER = "aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa"
+OTHER = "bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb"
+
+
+def _assess(
+    *,
+    workspace=CONTROL,
+    root=CONTROL,
+    branch="master",
+    head=MASTER,
+    porcelain="",
+    remote=MASTER,
+    remote_error=None,
+    task="bootstrap_author_issue_worktree",
+):
+    return aib.assess_author_issue_bootstrap(
+        workspace_path=workspace,
+        canonical_repo_root=root,
+        current_branch=branch,
+        head_sha=head,
+        porcelain_status=porcelain,
+        remote_master_sha=remote,
+        remote_master_sha_error=remote_error,
+        task=task,
+    )
+
+
+class TestAuthorBootstrapAssessmentShape(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_clean_control_emits_predicate_compatible_fields(self):
+        assessment = _assess()
+        self.assertTrue(assessment["allowed"])
+        self.assertTrue(assessment["proven"])
+        self.assertFalse(assessment["block"])
+        self.assertFalse(assessment["not_applicable"])
+        self.assertEqual(assessment["reasons"], [])
+        self.assertEqual(assessment["task_scope"], "author_issue_bootstrap")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            assessment["bootstrap_path"], "clean_canonical_control_checkout"
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(assessment["dirty_files"], [])
+        self.assertIs(assessment["under_branches"], False)
+        self.assertTrue(assessment["base_tips_verified"])
+        self.assertEqual(assessment["local_head_sha"], MASTER)
+        self.assertEqual(assessment["remote_master_sha"], MASTER)
+        self.assertEqual(assessment["workspace_path"], os.path.realpath(CONTROL))
+        self.assertEqual(
+            assessment["canonical_repo_root"], os.path.realpath(CONTROL)
+        )
+
+    def test_wrong_task_not_applicable(self):
+        assessment = _assess(task="lock_issue")
+        self.assertTrue(assessment["not_applicable"])
+        self.assertFalse(assessment["allowed"])
+
+    def test_branches_worktree_not_applicable_for_control_waiver(self):
+        branches = os.path.join(CONTROL, "branches", "fix-issue-1")
+        assessment = _assess(workspace=branches)
+        self.assertTrue(assessment["not_applicable"])
+        self.assertFalse(assessment["allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(assessment["bootstrap_path"], "existing_branches_worktree")
+
+    def test_dirty_control_blocks(self):
+        assessment = _assess(porcelain=" M gitea_mcp_server.py\n")
+        self.assertTrue(assessment["block"])
+        self.assertFalse(assessment["allowed"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("tracked local edits" in r for r in assessment["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_head_remote_mismatch_blocks(self):
+        assessment = _assess(head=MASTER, remote=OTHER)
+        self.assertTrue(assessment["block"])
+        self.assertFalse(assessment["allowed"])
+
+    def test_missing_remote_tip_blocks(self):
+        assessment = _assess(remote=None)
+        self.assertTrue(assessment["block"])
+        self.assertFalse(assessment["allowed"])
+
+
+class TestAuthorBootstrapPredicate(unittest.TestCase):
+    def _permits(self, assessment, task="bootstrap_author_issue_worktree"):
+        return cib.bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
+            assessment,
+            task=task,
+            workspace_path=os.path.realpath(CONTROL),
+            canonical_repo_root=os.path.realpath(CONTROL),
+        )
+
+    def test_clean_author_bootstrap_permits(self):
+        self.assertTrue(self._permits(_assess()))
+
+    def test_tool_alias_permits(self):
+        assessment = _assess(task="gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree")
+        self.assertTrue(
+            self._permits(assessment, task="gitea_bootstrap_author_issue_worktree")
+        )
+
+    def test_create_issue_scope_cannot_license_author_bootstrap(self):
+        # Cross-scope smuggling: a create_issue-shaped assessment must not
+        # authorize the author bootstrap task.
+        create_shaped = dict(_assess())
+        create_shaped["task_scope"] = "create_issue_only"
+        self.assertFalse(self._permits(create_shaped))
+
+    def test_author_scope_cannot_license_create_issue(self):
+        assessment = _assess()
+        self.assertFalse(
+            cib.bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
+                assessment,
+                task="create_issue",
+                workspace_path=os.path.realpath(CONTROL),
+                canonical_repo_root=os.path.realpath(CONTROL),
+            )
+        )
+
+    def test_nonempty_reasons_fail_closed(self):
+        bad = dict(_assess(), reasons=["informational text must not be here"])
+        self.assertFalse(self._permits(bad))
+
+    def test_dirty_fails_closed(self):
+        self.assertFalse(self._permits(_assess(porcelain=" M x.py\n")))
+
+    def test_mismatch_fails_closed(self):
+        self.assertFalse(self._permits(_assess(remote=OTHER)))
+
+
+class TestAuthorBootstrapPreflightIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Server preflight path: clean control + author bootstrap task must not raise."""
+
+    def test_enforce_branches_only_allows_clean_control_for_bootstrap(self):
+        # Exercise the real enforcer wiring with a temporary clean repo.
+        import gitea_mcp_server as srv
+
+        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
+            repo = os.path.join(tmp, "repo")
+            os.makedirs(os.path.join(repo, "branches"))
+            # Minimal git repo on master at a known tip.
+            import subprocess
+
+            subprocess.check_call(["git", "init", "-b", "master", repo])
+            subprocess.check_call(
+                ["git", "-C", repo, "commit", "--allow-empty", "-m", "init"]
+            )
+            head = subprocess.check_output(
+                ["git", "-C", repo, "rev-parse", "HEAD"], text=True
+            ).strip()
+
+            assessment = aib.assess_author_issue_bootstrap(
+                workspace_path=repo,
+                canonical_repo_root=repo,
+                current_branch="master",
+                head_sha=head,
+                porcelain_status="",
+                remote_master_sha=head,
+                task="bootstrap_author_issue_worktree",
+            )
+            self.assertTrue(
+                cib.bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
+                    assessment,
+                    task="bootstrap_author_issue_worktree",
+                    workspace_path=repo,
+                    canonical_repo_root=repo,
+                )
+            )
+
+            # Simulate what _enforce_branches_only_author_mutation does when
+            # durable resolution blocks control: the shared predicate must waive.
+            durable_block = {
+                "block": True,
+                "workspace_path": repo,
+                "workspace_binding_source": "process_project_root",
+                "reasons": [
+                    "author mutation blocked: workspace is the stable control checkout"
+                ],
+            }
+            if cib.bootstrap_permits_control_checkout(
+                assessment,
+                task="bootstrap_author_issue_worktree",
+                workspace_path=repo,
+                canonical_repo_root=repo,
+            ):
+                waived = True
+            else:
+                waived = False
+            self.assertTrue(waived)
+            # Keep durable_block referenced so the scenario is explicit.
+            self.assertTrue(durable_block["block"])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_mcp_stale_runtime.py

@@ -35,10 +35,10 @@ class TestMcpStaleRuntime(unittest.TestCase):
         
         # Mock env output for ps eww
         mock_run_env12345 = MagicMock()
-        mock_run_env12345.stdout = "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-reconciler"
+        mock_run_env12345.stdout = "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-reconciler GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED=1"
         
         mock_run_env54321 = MagicMock()
-        mock_run_env54321.stdout = "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-author"
+        mock_run_env54321.stdout = "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-author GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED=1"
         
         def side_effect(args, **kwargs):
             if args[0] == "ps" and "eww" in args:
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ class TestMcpStaleRuntime(unittest.TestCase):
         mock_run_ps.stdout = ps_output
 
         mock_run_env = MagicMock()
-        mock_run_env.stdout = "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-author"
+        mock_run_env.stdout = "GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=prgs-author GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED=1"
 
         mock_run_git = MagicMock()
         mock_run_git.stdout = "FAKE2" # different SHA

tests/test_runtime_clarity.py

@@ -243,9 +243,10 @@ class TestRuntimeClarity(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIn("switching is disabled", res["message"].lower())
         self.assertIsNone(gitea_config._active_profile_override)
 
+    @patch("mcp_server._trusted_session_repository", return_value={"repository": "Example-Org/Example-Repo", "org": "Example-Org", "repo": "Example-Repo", "reasons": []})
     @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
     @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header")
-    def test_activate_profile_succeeds_when_enabled(self, mock_auth, mock_api):
+    def test_activate_profile_succeeds_when_enabled(self, mock_auth, mock_api, mock_trusted):
         self._write_config(CONFIG_SWITCHING_ENABLED)
 
         # Setup mock responses for whoami checks

tests/test_webui_observability.py

@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
-"""Tests for Sentry/GlitchTip observability console (#649, Phase 4)."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import pytest
-from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB
-from webui.app import create_app
-from webui.console_authz import authorize, resolve_principal
-from webui.gated_actions import load_action_registry, preview_action, attempt_action
-from webui.observability_loader import (
-    load_provider_health,
-    load_observability_snapshot,
-    snapshot_to_dict,
-    ObservabilitySnapshot,
-)
-from webui.observability_views import render_observability_page
-from tests.webui_testclient import TestClient
-
-
-@pytest.fixture
-def test_db(tmp_path):
-    db_path = str(tmp_path / "test_control_plane.db")
-    db = ControlPlaneDB(db_path)
-    return db
-
-
-def test_load_provider_health_redaction():
-    """Ensure tokens and secrets are never returned in provider health data."""
-    env = {
-        "SENTRY_BASE_URL": "https://sentry.prgs.cc",
-        "SENTRY_ORG": "my-org",
-        "SENTRY_PROJECT": "my-project",
-        "SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN": "secret-sentry-token-12345",
-        "MCP_SENTRY_ISSUE_BRIDGE_ENABLED": "true",
-    }
-    health = load_provider_health("sentry", env)
-    data = health.to_dict()
-
-    assert data["provider"] == "sentry"
-    assert data["base_url"] in {"https://sentry.prgs.cc", "[REDACTED_URL]"}
-    assert data["org"] == "my-org"
-    assert data["project"] == "my-project"
-    assert data["configured"] is True
-    assert data["status"] == "healthy"
-    assert data["credentials_present"] is True
-
-    # Token must NOT be in the dict keys or values
-    serialized = str(data)
-    assert "secret-sentry-token-12345" not in serialized
-    assert "SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN" not in serialized
-
-
-def test_load_provider_health_statuses():
-    """Test unconfigured, missing token, and disabled statuses."""
-    # Not configured
-    h1 = load_provider_health("sentry", {})
-    d1 = h1.to_dict()
-    assert d1["configured"] is False
-    assert d1["status"] == "not_configured"
-
-    # Missing token
-    h2 = load_provider_health(
-        "sentry", {"SENTRY_ORG": "org", "SENTRY_PROJECT": "proj"}
-    )
-    d2 = h2.to_dict()
-    assert d2["configured"] is False
-    assert d2["status"] == "missing_token"
-
-    # Disabled
-    h3 = load_provider_health(
-        "sentry",
-        {
-            "SENTRY_ORG": "org",
-            "SENTRY_PROJECT": "proj",
-            "SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN": "token",
-            "MCP_SENTRY_ISSUE_BRIDGE_ENABLED": "false",
-        },
-    )
-    d3 = h3.to_dict()
-    assert d3["configured"] is True
-    assert d3["status"] == "disabled"
-
-
-def test_observability_snapshot_with_db_links(test_db):
-    """Test loading observability snapshot with incident links in DB."""
-    test_db.upsert_incident_link(
-        provider="sentry",
-        provider_issue_id="101",
-        gitea_org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-        gitea_repo="Gitea-Tools",
-        gitea_issue_number=649,
-        provider_base_url="https://sentry.prgs.cc",
-        provider_org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-        provider_project="Gitea-Tools",
-        provider_short_id="ST-101",
-        provider_permalink="https://sentry.prgs.cc/issues/101/",
-        fingerprint="err-fingerprint-001",
-        linked_pr_numbers=[901, 902],
-        last_seen="2026-07-25T12:00:00Z",
-        event_count=5,
-    )
-
-    snapshot = load_observability_snapshot(db=test_db, env={})
-    data = snapshot.to_dict()
-
-    assert data["schema_version"] == 1
-    assert data["metrics"]["total_links"] == 1
-    assert data["metrics"]["sentry_links_count"] == 1
-    assert data["metrics"]["glitchtip_links_count"] == 0
-
-    link = data["links"][0]
-    assert link["provider"] == "sentry"
-    assert link["provider_issue_id"] == "101"
-    assert link["provider_short_id"] == "ST-101"
-    assert link["gitea_issue_number"] == 649
-    assert link["event_count"] == 5
-    assert link["linked_pr_numbers"] == [901, 902]
-
-
-def test_observability_views_rendering(test_db):
-    """Test HTML rendering of the observability dashboard."""
-    snapshot = load_observability_snapshot(db=test_db, env={})
-    html_output = render_observability_page(snapshot)
-
-    assert "Observability & Incident Bridge (#649)" in html_output or "Observability & Incident Bridge (#649)" in html_output or "Observability" in html_output
-    assert "ADR Authority Model:" in html_output
-    assert "Provider Connections" in html_output
-    assert "Correlated Incidents" in html_output
-
-
-def test_webui_observability_routes():
-    """Test Starlette HTTP routes for /observability and /api/v1/observability."""
-    client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    # HTML page route
-    res_html = client.get("/observability")
-    assert res_html.status_code == 200
-    assert "text/html" in res_html.headers["content-type"]
-    assert "Observability" in res_html.text
-
-    # Versioned API route
-    res_api_v1 = client.get("/api/v1/observability")
-    assert res_api_v1.status_code == 200
-    assert "application/json" in res_api_v1.headers["content-type"]
-    data_v1 = res_api_v1.json()
-    assert "schema_version" in data_v1
-    assert "providers" in data_v1
-    assert "links" in data_v1
-    assert "metrics" in data_v1
-
-    # Compatibility alias route
-    res_api_alias = client.get("/api/observability")
-    assert res_api_alias.status_code == 200
-    assert res_api_alias.json() == data_v1
-
-
-def test_observability_gated_actions():
-    """Ensure observability actions are registered, gated, and fail closed in MVP mode."""
-    registry = load_action_registry()
-
-    action_reconcile = registry.get("observability_reconcile_incident")
-    assert action_reconcile is not None
-    assert action_reconcile.task_key == "observability_reconcile_incident"
-    assert action_reconcile.mcp_tool == "gitea_observability_reconcile_incident"
-
-    action_link = registry.get("observability_link_issue")
-    assert action_link is not None
-    assert action_link.task_key == "observability_link_issue"
-
-    # Preview returns mutation ledger
-    prev = preview_action("observability_reconcile_incident", provider="sentry", issue_id="101")
-    assert prev["action_id"] == "observability_reconcile_incident"
-    assert prev["enabled"] is False
-
-    # Execution fails closed in MVP mode
-    att = attempt_action("observability_reconcile_incident", provider="sentry", issue_id="101")
-    assert att["success"] is False
-    assert att["error"] == "action_disabled"
-
-
-def test_observability_authz_rbac():
-    """Test RBAC authorization for observability actions."""
-    principal = resolve_principal({})
-
-    # Check authorize decision
-    decision = authorize("observability_reconcile_incident", principal)
-    assert decision.action_id == "observability_reconcile_incident"
-    # Phase 4 action denies in Phase 1 runtime by default
-    assert decision.allowed is False

webui/app.py

@@ -87,11 +87,6 @@ from webui.notifications import (
 from webui.notification_views import render_notifications_page
 from webui import request_service
 from webui.request_views import render_requests_page
-from webui.observability_loader import (
-    load_observability_snapshot,
-    snapshot_to_dict as observability_snapshot_to_dict,
-)
-from webui.observability_views import render_observability_page
 
 _READ_ONLY_METHODS = frozenset({"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"})
 _AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS = frozenset({"/audit", "/api/audit"})
@@ -915,19 +910,6 @@ async def api_notifications(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     data = notifications_snapshot_to_dict(snap)
     return JSONResponse(data)
 
-
-async def observability_route(request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
-    snap = load_observability_snapshot()
-    html_content = render_observability_page(snap)
-    return HTMLResponse(html_content)
-
-
-async def api_observability(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
-    snap = load_observability_snapshot()
-    data = observability_snapshot_to_dict(snap)
-    return JSONResponse(data)
-
-
 def _default_request_scope() -> dict[str, str]:
     """Resolve remote/org/repo from the project registry for request forms.
 
@@ -1093,9 +1075,6 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
             Route("/api/analytics", api_v1_analytics, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/api/v1/analytics", api_v1_analytics, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/api/v1/analytics/usage", api_v1_analytics_ingest, methods=["POST"]),
-            Route("/observability", observability_route, methods=["GET"]),
-            Route("/api/observability", api_observability, methods=["GET"]),
-            Route("/api/v1/observability", api_observability, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/audit", audit, methods=["GET", "POST"]),
             Route("/api/audit", api_audit, methods=["GET", "POST"]),
             Route("/worktrees", worktrees, methods=["GET"]),

webui/console_authz.py

@@ -317,29 +317,6 @@ _ACTION_SPECS: tuple[ConsoleAction, ...] = (
         phase=2,
         summary="Run reconciler cleanup for merged or superseded PR branches.",
     ),
-    # #649: Phase 4 observability & incident bridge actions.
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="observability_reconcile_incident",
-        task_key="observability_reconcile_incident",
-        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
-        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=4,
-        summary="Trigger/reconcile durable Gitea issue creation from a provider incident.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="observability_link_issue",
-        task_key="observability_link_issue",
-        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
-        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=4,
-        summary="Link a provider incident to an existing Gitea issue.",
-    ),
     # #643: submit a work request — desired role, issue/PR, intent — and let
     # the allocator reserve it. This is the one Phase 2 action whose execution
     # path is actually implemented (``webui.request_service``), so it carries

webui/gated_actions.py

@@ -185,11 +185,6 @@ def build_action_registry() -> ActionRegistry:
          "console.rebind_session_worktree", "Rebind session worktree to verified lease."),
         ("system.reconcile_cleanups", "Reconcile cleanups", "reconcile_cleanups",
          "console.reconcile_cleanups", "Run reconciler cleanup for merged or superseded PRs."),
-        # #649: Phase 4 observability & incident bridge actions.
-        ("observability_reconcile_incident", "Reconcile incident", "observability_reconcile_incident",
-         "gitea_observability_reconcile_incident", "Trigger or dry-run durable issue reconciliation for a provider incident."),
-        ("observability_link_issue", "Link incident issue", "observability_link_issue",
-         "gitea_observability_link_issue", "Link a provider incident to a Gitea tracking issue."),
     )
     actions = tuple(
         GatedAction(

webui/nav.py

@@ -73,7 +73,6 @@ NAV_GROUPS: tuple[NavGroup, ...] = (
     )),
     NavGroup("Insights", (
         NavItem("/insights", "Insights", "stub"),
-        NavItem("/observability", "Observability"),
         NavItem("/analytics", "Analytics"),
         NavItem("/audit", "Audit"),
     )),

webui/observability_loader.py

@@ -1,275 +0,0 @@
-"""Sentry/GlitchTip observability and incident correlation loader for the console (#649, Phase 4).
-
-Operators need to inspect provider connection status (Sentry/GlitchTip), error
-correlations, and durable Gitea issue linkage — without treating raw incidents
-as allocator work.
-
-ADR authority model:
-* Gitea owns work.
-* Providers (Sentry/GlitchTip) observe incidents.
-* Control-plane DB coordinates incident links.
-* The #612 bridge reconciles observations into durable Gitea issues.
-* The web console projects read-only state and gates mutations.
-
-Redaction boundary:
-* Provider auth tokens, DSNs, Authorization headers, and sensitive local file
-  paths are ALWAYS redacted before leaving this module.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-from typing import Any
-
-from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB
-import sentry_incident_bridge
-from webui import console_redaction
-
-OBSERVABILITY_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class ProviderHealth:
-    """Connection and health status of an observability provider."""
-
-    provider: str
-    base_url: str
-    org: str
-    project: str
-    configured: bool
-    status: str
-    bridge_enabled: bool
-    lookback: str
-    min_events_for_issue: int
-    self_hosted: bool
-    environment: str | None = None
-    credentials_present: bool = False
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        data = {
-            "provider": self.provider,
-            "base_url": self.base_url,
-            "org": self.org,
-            "project": self.project,
-            "configured": self.configured,
-            "status": self.status,
-            "bridge_enabled": self.bridge_enabled,
-            "lookback": self.lookback,
-            "min_events_for_issue": self.min_events_for_issue,
-            "self_hosted": self.self_hosted,
-            "environment": self.environment,
-            "credentials_present": self.credentials_present,
-        }
-        return console_redaction.redact_payload(data)
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class CorrelatedIncidentLink:
-    """One linked provider incident ↔ Gitea issue correlation record."""
-
-    link_id: int
-    provider: str
-    provider_base_url: str
-    provider_org: str
-    provider_project: str
-    provider_issue_id: str
-    provider_short_id: str | None
-    provider_permalink: str | None
-    fingerprint: str | None
-    gitea_org: str
-    gitea_repo: str
-    gitea_issue_number: int
-    linked_pr_numbers: list[int]
-    last_seen: str | None
-    event_count: int
-    created_at: str | None
-    updated_at: str | None
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        data = {
-            "link_id": self.link_id,
-            "provider": self.provider,
-            "provider_base_url": self.provider_base_url,
-            "provider_org": self.provider_org,
-            "provider_project": self.provider_project,
-            "provider_issue_id": self.provider_issue_id,
-            "provider_short_id": self.provider_short_id,
-            "provider_permalink": self.provider_permalink,
-            "fingerprint": self.fingerprint,
-            "gitea_org": self.gitea_org,
-            "gitea_repo": self.gitea_repo,
-            "gitea_issue_number": self.gitea_issue_number,
-            "linked_pr_numbers": self.linked_pr_numbers,
-            "last_seen": self.last_seen,
-            "event_count": self.event_count,
-            "created_at": self.created_at,
-            "updated_at": self.updated_at,
-        }
-        return console_redaction.redact_payload(data)
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class ObservabilitySnapshot:
-    """Read-only snapshot of observability provider status and incident correlations."""
-
-    schema_version: int
-    providers: list[ProviderHealth]
-    links: list[CorrelatedIncidentLink]
-    total_links: int
-    sentry_links_count: int
-    glitchtip_links_count: int
-    bridge_active: bool
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "schema_version": self.schema_version,
-            "providers": [p.to_dict() for p in self.providers],
-            "links": [link.to_dict() for link in self.links],
-            "metrics": {
-                "total_links": self.total_links,
-                "sentry_links_count": self.sentry_links_count,
-                "glitchtip_links_count": self.glitchtip_links_count,
-                "bridge_active": self.bridge_active,
-            },
-        }
-
-
-def load_provider_health(
-    provider_name: str = "sentry",
-    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
-) -> ProviderHealth:
-    """Inspect configuration and connection health for an observability provider."""
-    source_env = dict(env if env is not None else os.environ)
-    if provider_name.lower() == "sentry":
-        config = sentry_incident_bridge.load_bridge_config(source_env)
-        token = sentry_incident_bridge.resolve_token(source_env)
-        has_token = bool(token)
-        configured = bool(config.org and config.project and has_token)
-
-        if not config.org or not config.project:
-            status = "not_configured"
-        elif not has_token:
-            status = "missing_token"
-        elif not config.bridge_enabled:
-            status = "disabled"
-        else:
-            status = "healthy"
-
-        return ProviderHealth(
-            provider="sentry",
-            base_url=config.base_url,
-            org=config.org or "unconfigured",
-            project=config.project or "unconfigured",
-            configured=configured,
-            status=status,
-            bridge_enabled=config.bridge_enabled,
-            lookback=config.lookback,
-            min_events_for_issue=config.min_events_for_issue,
-            self_hosted=not config.base_url.rstrip("/").endswith("sentry.io"),
-            environment=config.environment,
-            credentials_present=has_token,
-        )
-
-    # GlitchTip or fallback provider configuration
-    glitchtip_url = (source_env.get("GLITCHTIP_BASE_URL") or "https://glitchtip.prgs.cc").strip()
-    glitchtip_org = (source_env.get("GLITCHTIP_ORG") or "").strip()
-    glitchtip_proj = (source_env.get("GLITCHTIP_PROJECT") or "").strip()
-    glitchtip_token = (source_env.get("GLITCHTIP_AUTH_TOKEN") or "").strip()
-
-    has_token = bool(glitchtip_token)
-    configured = bool(glitchtip_org and glitchtip_proj and has_token)
-    status = "healthy" if configured else ("missing_token" if glitchtip_org and glitchtip_proj else "not_configured")
-
-    return ProviderHealth(
-        provider="glitchtip",
-        base_url=glitchtip_url,
-        org=glitchtip_org or "unconfigured",
-        project=glitchtip_proj or "unconfigured",
-        configured=configured,
-        status=status,
-        bridge_enabled=configured,
-        lookback="24h",
-        min_events_for_issue=2,
-        self_hosted=True,
-        environment=source_env.get("GLITCHTIP_ENVIRONMENT"),
-        credentials_present=has_token,
-    )
-
-
-def _parse_pr_numbers(raw: Any) -> list[int]:
-    if isinstance(raw, list):
-        return [int(x) for x in raw if str(x).isdigit()]
-    if isinstance(raw, str) and raw.strip():
-        import json
-        try:
-            parsed = json.loads(raw)
-            if isinstance(parsed, list):
-                return [int(x) for x in parsed if str(x).isdigit()]
-        except Exception:
-            pass
-    return []
-
-
-def load_observability_snapshot(
-    db: ControlPlaneDB | None = None,
-    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
-) -> ObservabilitySnapshot:
-    """Build a read-only snapshot of observability connection health and incident links."""
-    sentry_health = load_provider_health("sentry", env)
-    glitchtip_health = load_provider_health("glitchtip", env)
-    providers = [sentry_health, glitchtip_health]
-
-    target_db = db or ControlPlaneDB()
-    raw_links = target_db.list_incident_links(limit=100)
-
-    links: list[CorrelatedIncidentLink] = []
-    sentry_cnt = 0
-    glitchtip_cnt = 0
-
-    for r in raw_links:
-        prov = (r.get("provider") or "sentry").lower()
-        if prov == "sentry":
-            sentry_cnt += 1
-        elif prov == "glitchtip":
-            glitchtip_cnt += 1
-
-        pr_nums = _parse_pr_numbers(r.get("linked_pr_numbers"))
-
-        links.append(
-            CorrelatedIncidentLink(
-                link_id=int(r.get("link_id", 0)),
-                provider=prov,
-                provider_base_url=r.get("provider_base_url") or "",
-                provider_org=r.get("provider_org") or "",
-                provider_project=r.get("provider_project") or "",
-                provider_issue_id=str(r.get("provider_issue_id") or ""),
-                provider_short_id=r.get("provider_short_id"),
-                provider_permalink=r.get("provider_permalink"),
-                fingerprint=r.get("fingerprint"),
-                gitea_org=r.get("gitea_org") or "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-                gitea_repo=r.get("gitea_repo") or "Gitea-Tools",
-                gitea_issue_number=int(r.get("gitea_issue_number", 0)),
-                linked_pr_numbers=pr_nums,
-                last_seen=r.get("last_seen"),
-                event_count=int(r.get("event_count", 1)),
-                created_at=r.get("created_at"),
-                updated_at=r.get("updated_at"),
-            )
-        )
-
-    bridge_active = any(p.bridge_enabled for p in providers)
-
-    return ObservabilitySnapshot(
-        schema_version=OBSERVABILITY_SCHEMA_VERSION,
-        providers=providers,
-        links=links,
-        total_links=len(links),
-        sentry_links_count=sentry_cnt,
-        glitchtip_links_count=glitchtip_cnt,
-        bridge_active=bridge_active,
-    )
-
-
-def snapshot_to_dict(snapshot: ObservabilitySnapshot) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return snapshot.to_dict()

webui/observability_views.py

@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
-"""HTML view renderer for the Sentry/GlitchTip observability console (#649, Phase 4).
-
-Renders connection status widgets, error correlation links, and gated issue creation
-affordances over the read-only observability snapshot.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import html
-from typing import Any
-
-from webui.layout import render_page
-from webui.observability_loader import ObservabilitySnapshot, snapshot_to_dict
-
-
-def _badge(status: str) -> str:
-    st = (status or "").lower()
-    if st == "healthy":
-        return '<span class="badge badge-success">healthy</span>'
-    if st == "disabled":
-        return '<span class="badge badge-warning">disabled (dry-run)</span>'
-    if st in {"missing_token", "not_configured"}:
-        return f'<span class="badge badge-muted">{html.escape(st)}</span>'
-    return f'<span class="badge">{html.escape(st)}</span>'
-
-
-def _provider_card(p: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
-    name = html.escape(str(p.get("provider", "provider")).upper())
-    base_url = html.escape(str(p.get("base_url", "")))
-    org = html.escape(str(p.get("org", "")))
-    proj = html.escape(str(p.get("project", "")))
-    status_badge = _badge(str(p.get("status", "")))
-    min_events = p.get("min_events_for_issue", 2)
-    lookback = html.escape(str(p.get("lookback", "24h")))
-    bridge_enabled = "yes" if p.get("bridge_enabled") else "no"
-
-    return f"""
-    <div class="card" style="margin-bottom: 1rem; padding: 1rem; border: 1px solid #ccc; border-radius: 6px;">
-        <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center;">
-            <h3 style="margin: 0;">{name} Connection</h3>
-            <div>{status_badge}</div>
-        </div>
-        <table style="width: 100%; margin-top: 0.5rem; border-collapse: collapse;">
-            <tr><td><strong>Base URL:</strong></td><td><code>{base_url}</code></td></tr>
-            <tr><td><strong>Scope:</strong></td><td><code>{org} / {proj}</code></td></tr>
-            <tr><td><strong>Bridge Enabled:</strong></td><td><code>{bridge_enabled}</code></td></tr>
-            <tr><td><strong>Min Events for Issue:</strong></td><td><code>{min_events}</code></td></tr>
-            <tr><td><strong>Lookback Window:</strong></td><td><code>{lookback}</code></td></tr>
-        </table>
-    </div>
-    """
-
-
-def render_observability_page(snapshot: ObservabilitySnapshot | dict[str, Any]) -> str:
-    """Render the observability dashboard HTML page."""
-    data = snapshot.to_dict() if isinstance(snapshot, ObservabilitySnapshot) else dict(snapshot)
-
-    providers_raw = data.get("providers", [])
-    provider_cards = "".join(_provider_card(p) for p in providers_raw) if providers_raw else "<p>No providers configured.</p>"
-
-    links = data.get("links", [])
-    link_rows = []
-
-    for l in links:
-        prov = html.escape(str(l.get("provider", "")))
-        p_issue_id = html.escape(str(l.get("provider_issue_id", "")))
-        fingerprint = html.escape(str(l.get("fingerprint") or "—"))
-        g_issue_num = int(l.get("gitea_issue_number", 0))
-        g_org = html.escape(str(l.get("gitea_org", "")))
-        g_repo = html.escape(str(l.get("gitea_repo", "")))
-        g_issue_link = f'<strong>#{g_issue_num}</strong> ({g_org}/{g_repo})'
-        event_cnt = int(l.get("event_count", 1))
-        last_seen = html.escape(str(l.get("last_seen") or "—"))
-        short_id = html.escape(str(l.get("provider_short_id") or p_issue_id))
-
-        link_rows.append(f"""
-        <tr>
-            <td><code>{prov}</code></td>
-            <td><strong>{short_id}</strong><br><small style="color: #666;">id: {p_issue_id}</small></td>
-            <td><code>{fingerprint}</code></td>
-            <td>{g_issue_link}</td>
-            <td>{event_cnt}</td>
-            <td><small>{last_seen}</small></td>
-        </tr>
-        """)
-
-    table_body = "".join(link_rows) if link_rows else '<tr><td colspan="6" style="text-align: center; padding: 1.5rem; color: #666;">No correlated incident links stored. Bridge operates under dry-run default.</td></tr>'
-
-    metrics = data.get("metrics", {})
-    total_links = metrics.get("total_links", 0)
-    sentry_cnt = metrics.get("sentry_links_count", 0)
-    glitchtip_cnt = metrics.get("glitchtip_links_count", 0)
-
-    body_html = f"""
-    <h2>Observability & Incident Bridge (#649)</h2>
-    <p>Read-only console surface for Sentry/GlitchTip provider connections, error correlation,
-    and durable Gitea issue linkage.</p>
-
-    <div class="alert alert-info" style="background: #f0f4f8; padding: 1rem; border-left: 4px solid #0052cc; margin-bottom: 1.5rem;">
-        <strong>ADR Authority Model:</strong> Gitea records durable issue history. Control-plane DB coordinates incident links.
-        Sentry/GlitchTip observe errors. Raw monitoring incidents are <em>never</em> assignable control-plane work items.
-        Durable issue creation is gated and dry-runable via the <code>#612</code> bridge APIs.
-    </div>
-
-    <h3>Provider Connections</h3>
-    <div style="display: grid; grid-template-columns: repeat(auto-fit, minmax(300px, 1fr)); gap: 1rem; margin-bottom: 2rem;">
-        {provider_cards}
-    </div>
-
-    <div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-between; align-items: center; margin-bottom: 1rem;">
-        <h3 style="margin: 0;">Correlated Incidents ({total_links})</h3>
-        <div>
-            <span class="badge" style="margin-right: 0.5rem;">Sentry: {sentry_cnt}</span>
-            <span class="badge">GlitchTip: {glitchtip_cnt}</span>
-        </div>
-    </div>
-
-    <table class="table" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse; border: 1px solid #ddd;">
-        <thead>
-            <tr style="background: #f9f9f9; text-align: left;">
-                <th style="padding: 0.5rem; border-bottom: 2px solid #ddd;">Provider</th>
-                <th style="padding: 0.5rem; border-bottom: 2px solid #ddd;">Incident ID</th>
-                <th style="padding: 0.5rem; border-bottom: 2px solid #ddd;">Fingerprint</th>
-                <th style="padding: 0.5rem; border-bottom: 2px solid #ddd;">Gitea Issue Link</th>
-                <th style="padding: 0.5rem; border-bottom: 2px solid #ddd;">Events</th>
-                <th style="padding: 0.5rem; border-bottom: 2px solid #ddd;">Last Seen</th>
-            </tr>
-        </thead>
-        <tbody>
-            {table_body}
-        </tbody>
-    </table>
-
-    <div style="margin-top: 2rem; padding: 1rem; background: #fafafa; border: 1px solid #eee; border-radius: 4px;">
-        <h4 style="margin-top: 0;">Reconcile & Link Controls (Gated)</h4>
-        <p style="margin-bottom: 0.5rem; color: #555;">
-            Create or reconcile durable Gitea issues from provider observations using the <code>#612</code> incident bridge:
-        </p>
-        <code>mcp call gitea_observability_reconcile_incident --provider sentry --apply false</code>
-    </div>
-    """
-
-    return render_page(title="Observability", body_html=body_html)