Merge branch 'master' into feat/issue-636-inventory-api

No content conflicts. Master advanced with the #658 restart coordinator;
inventory API surfaces auto-merge cleanly.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

docs/sanctioned-restart-controls.md

@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-# Sanctioned restart and graceful reload controls (#642)
-
-Sessions used to recover MCP connectivity by killing the host daemon
-(`pkill -f mcp_server.py`, #630). That is forbidden and stays forbidden: it
-kills every namespace on the host, contaminates whichever session survives, and
-leaves no audit trail. This document describes the sanctioned replacement,
-implemented in `webui/sanctioned_restart.py`.
-
-## What the console will and will not do
-
-The console **never** restarts anything. It authorizes an intent, records it,
-and hands off to a host supervisor. There is no code path in which the console
-sends a signal, spawns a process, or renders a kill command — a regression test
-asserts the module contains no `subprocess`, `signal`, `os.kill`, `os.system`,
-or `popen` reference, and that no returned payload contains a kill command.
-
-## Operations
-
-| Mode | Action | Minimum role | Behaviour |
-|------|--------|--------------|-----------|
-| `reload` | `system.reload_namespace` | controller | Host supervisor reloads the namespace in place, draining in-flight requests. |
-| `restart` | `system.restart_namespace` | admin | Host supervisor restarts the namespace. In-flight requests are lost. |
-
-Scope is always exactly one namespace. A fleet-wide restart is an explicit
-non-goal: `all`, `*`, `fleet`, and an empty scope are refused with
-`fleet_scope_not_permitted`, because that is precisely the blast radius the
-forbidden kill already had. An unrecognised namespace is refused rather than
-passed through to the host.
-
-## The gate sequence
-
-`assess_restart_request()` applies every gate in order and reports the first
-failure with a stable reason code:
-
-| Order | Gate | Reason code on failure |
-|-------|------|------------------------|
-| 1 | Mode is `restart` or `reload` | `unknown_mode` |
-| 2 | Scope is a single known namespace | `fleet_scope_not_permitted`, `unknown_namespace` |
-| 3 | Principal holds the required console role | `unauthorized` |
-| 4 | Confirmation phrase supplied | `confirmation_required` |
-| 5 | Confirmation names this namespace and mode | `confirmation_mismatch` |
-| 6 | Out-of-band operator authorization present | `operator_authorization_missing` |
-| 7 | Runtime is not contaminated | `contaminated_runtime` |
-| 8 | Host restart hook configured | `restart_hook_not_configured` |
-
-Passing every gate yields `host_action_required`, never "restarted".
-
-### Confirmation binds the namespace
-
-The required phrase is `"<mode> <namespace>"` — for example
-`restart gitea-author`. Binding the namespace into the phrase is the point: a
-confirmation typed for one namespace cannot be replayed against another.
-
-### Operator authorization is not self-assertable
-
-Host daemon maintenance is authorized out of band through
-`GITEA_OPERATOR_DAEMON_MAINTENANCE_AUTHORIZATION`, read from the process
-environment and nowhere else (#630; #710 finding F1). A worker session cannot
-set an environment variable for an already-running daemon, so this cannot be
-faked the way a tool argument could.
-
-### The host hook
-
-`GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK` holds an opaque reference the *host* resolves —
-a supervisor label such as a launchd job name, never a command line. With no
-hook configured the request is refused; the console does not fall back to a
-process kill. The value is read server-side and never rendered to a client.
-
-## Manual kill remains contamination
-
-`classify_restart_command()` classifies an operator-proposed recovery command.
-A manual `pkill`/`kill`/`killall` of the MCP daemon is contamination, not a
-restart: it returns `clean_claim_allowed: false` and builds a durable
-contamination marker (redacted command only, never secrets) naming
-`system.restart_namespace` as the sanctioned alternative.
-
-A live, uncleared contamination marker also blocks a restart. This is stricter
-than #630's task-scoped gate, which deliberately lets a contaminated worker keep
-commenting and handing off: restarting a contaminated runtime would launder the
-contamination rather than resolve it. Clear the marker through the reconciler
-path first.
-
-## Post-restart health verification
-
-After the host supervisor acts, `verify_post_restart_health()` decides whether
-the session may claim to be clean:
-
-| Status | Meaning | Clean claim |
-|--------|---------|-------------|
-| `clean` | Required tool callable, proven through the live client namespace | Allowed |
-| `unproven` | Reported healthy without live client-namespace evidence | Refused |
-| `unhealthy` | Probe failed | Refused |
-
-Only `probe_source=client_namespace` evidence clears a session. Static tool
-registration is not proof, and neither is an offline subprocess probe — an IDE
-client can hold a registered tool list while live calls fail with
-`client is closing: EOF` (see
-[`mcp-namespace-health.md`](mcp-namespace-health.md)).
-
-## Audit
-
-Every attempt — allowed or denied — is recorded through
-`webui.console_audit` with actor, target namespace, mode, result, and reason
-code, and is redacted before it is persisted. `system.restart_namespace` is
-break-glass, so its records are retained for 730 days. Records carry
-`process_kill_executed: false`, which is a fact about the code path rather than
-a claim: no such path exists.
-
-## Environment variables
-
-| Variable | Purpose |
-|----------|---------|
-| `GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK` | Host supervisor reference; absent means restart is refused. |
-| `GITEA_OPERATOR_DAEMON_MAINTENANCE_AUTHORIZATION` | Out-of-band operator authorization reference. |
-| `WEBUI_AUDIT_LOG` | Console audit sink; absent means records are built but not persisted. |
-
-## Non-goals
-
-* No unrestricted `kill` from the UI, in any role, in any phase.
-* No fleet-wide restart.
-* No silent auto-restart loop: every attempt is confirmed and audited.
-* This does not implement the Phase 1 health API (#634).

docs/webui-authz-audit.md

@@ -91,8 +91,6 @@ already define, and a regression test asserts each mapping matches.
 | `close_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.close` | Yes | No | No | 3 |
 | `merge_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.merge` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
 | `delete_branch` | admin | destructive | `gitea.branch.delete` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
-| `system.reload_namespace` | controller | privileged | `runtime.reload_namespace` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
-| `system.restart_namespace` | admin | destructive | `runtime.restart_namespace` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 2 |
 
 **Dual control** means the acting principal may not be the sole authority: a
 second distinct principal must confirm. **Break-glass** means the action is
@@ -104,13 +102,6 @@ honouring it.
 `delete_branch` is admin-only rather than controller because it is the one
 irreversible action in the set.
 
-`system.restart_namespace` is admin-only for the same reason: restarting a
-namespace drops every in-flight request on it. `system.reload_namespace` drains
-first, so it is privileged but not destructive. Neither action is ever executed
-by the console — both hand off to a host supervisor, and neither exposes a raw
-process kill. See
-[`sanctioned-restart-controls.md`](sanctioned-restart-controls.md) (#642).
-
 ### Authorization decision
 
 `authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=False)` returns a decision
@@ -208,8 +199,8 @@ breaking the request it describes.
 | Class | Applies to | Default |
 |-------|-----------|---------|
 | `standard` | Routine gated writes | 90 days |
-| `privileged` | `review_pr`, `close_pr`, `system.reload_namespace`, and any unclassifiable action | 365 days |
+| `privileged` | `review_pr`, `close_pr`, and any unclassifiable action | 365 days |
-| `break_glass` | `merge_pr`, `delete_branch`, `system.restart_namespace` | 730 days |
+| `break_glass` | `merge_pr`, `delete_branch` | 730 days |
 
 Each record carries its own class, day count, and computed `expires_at`, so
 retention is auditable per record rather than inferred from file age. An

docs/webui-local-dev.md

@@ -317,6 +317,53 @@ health, workflow/schema SHA-256 hashes, and stale-runtime warnings when the
 checkout is behind merged safety-gate changes. Restart guidance links to #420;
 no tokens or MCP restart actions are exposed.
 
+## Inventory API (#636)
+
+`GET /api/v1/inventory` returns one versioned, read-only snapshot that unifies
+what the lease (#433), worktree (#432), and runtime (#430) MVP views each show
+separately, so traffic-control and recovery consumers read the same source.
+`GET /api/v1/inventory/{section}` returns a single section under the identical
+schema (`sessions`, `leases`, `locks`, `worktrees`, `namespaces`); an unknown
+section is a `404` with `error: unknown_section`. Both routes are `GET`-only.
+
+Each section carries its own `status` (`ok` / `degraded` / `unavailable`), a
+`reason` when not `ok`, and a `scan_ms`. A subsystem that cannot be read
+degrades to a reasoned section; it never raises and never emits an empty list
+that would read as "nothing is there".
+
+### Field authority
+
+Every section names where its rows came from; authorities are never blended.
+
+| Section | Authority | Source |
+|---|---|---|
+| `sessions` | `control_plane_db` | #613 control-plane DB (`mode=ro`), authoritative for exclusive ownership (#600/#601) |
+| `leases` | `control_plane_db` | #613 control-plane DB; degrades if the `work_items` table is absent |
+| `locks` | `filesystem` | durable per-issue lock files (`issue_lock_store`) |
+| `worktrees` | `filesystem` | registered git worktrees via the #432 hygiene scanner |
+| `namespaces` | `filesystem` | the active profile serving this web process (others are not enumerable) |
+
+The payload restates this map under `field_authority` for machine consumers.
+
+### Ownership safety
+
+`ownership_authority_complete` is true only when every ownership-bearing section
+(`sessions`, `leases`, `locks`) read cleanly. While it is false, nothing is
+reported as unowned and no collision is asserted from a degraded source —
+absence of evidence is reported as absence of evidence, never as free work.
+
+`collisions` surfaces detectable conflicts, each with a `kind` and `severity`:
+`lock-without-worktree`, `duplicate-live-lock`, `live-lock-dead-owner` (unexpired
+lease, dead pid — a #753 recovery candidate that would read as live to a naive
+timestamp check), `stale-lock-dead-owner`, `expired-lock-live-owner` (the
+#635/#760 daemon-pid deadlock), `concurrent-active-lease`, `active-lease-past-expiry`,
+and `orphan-lease`. Collisions are emitted only from sections that read cleanly.
+
+The control-plane DB is opened through a `mode=ro` URI so a read never creates
+or migrates it; paths are collapsed against `$HOME`, URLs lose userinfo and
+query strings, and credential-shaped values are redacted at the boundary. Lease
+steal/release and worktree deletion are Phase 2+ and have no representation here.
+
 ## Workflow-event timeline (#637)
 
 `GET /api/v1/timeline` is a read-only, versioned aggregation of workflow

task_capability_map.py

@@ -355,21 +355,6 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "role": "controller",
     },
 
-    # #642: sanctioned host-daemon lifecycle controls. Deliberately *not* a
-    # ``gitea.*`` operation — restarting an MCP namespace is a host action, not
-    # a Gitea API call, and no configured Gitea profile should be able to
-    # satisfy it by accident. Authority comes from the console RBAC model plus
-    # out-of-band operator authorization (#630); these entries exist so the
-    # console cannot invent an authority the capability layer never declared.
-    "restart_namespace": {
-        "permission": "runtime.restart_namespace",
-        "role": "controller",
-    },
-    "reload_namespace": {
-        "permission": "runtime.reload_namespace",
-        "role": "controller",
-    },
-
     # #601 first-class lease lifecycle — inspect/list need read; mutations gate on
     # ownership in the control-plane DB (not a separate Gitea write permission).
     "list_workflow_leases": {

tests/test_webui_inventory.py

@@ -0,0 +1,468 @@
+"""Tests for the unified web-console inventory API (#636).
+
+Covers the four cases the issue names — empty, populated, partial failure, and
+the no-false-unowned invariant — plus redaction, collision detection, the
+resource-split routes, and read-only guarantees against a real control-plane
+database and real durable lock files.
+"""
+import json
+import os
+import sys
+import tempfile
+import unittest
+from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
+from pathlib import Path
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+import control_plane_db
+from webui.app import create_app
+from webui import inventory
+
+
+def _iso(dt: datetime) -> str:
+    return dt.astimezone(timezone.utc).isoformat()
+
+
+def _write_lock(lock_dir: str, name: str, payload: dict) -> str:
+    path = os.path.join(lock_dir, name)
+    with open(path, "w", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
+        json.dump(payload, handle)
+    return path
+
+
+def _live_lock_payload(
+    *,
+    issue_number: int,
+    branch: str,
+    worktree_path: str,
+    pid: int,
+    username: str = "jcwalker3",
+    profile: str = "prgs-author",
+) -> dict:
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+    future = now + timedelta(hours=2)
+    return {
+        "branch_name": branch,
+        "issue_number": issue_number,
+        "org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+        "repo": "Gitea-Tools",
+        "remote": "prgs",
+        "pid": pid,
+        "session_pid": pid,
+        "lock_generation": 1,
+        "worktree_path": worktree_path,
+        "claimant": {"username": username, "profile": profile},
+        "work_lease": {
+            "branch": branch,
+            "issue_number": issue_number,
+            "operation_type": "author_issue_work",
+            "created_at": _iso(now),
+            "expires_at": _iso(future),
+            "last_heartbeat_at": _iso(now),
+            "claimant": {"username": username, "profile": profile},
+        },
+    }
+
+
+class _FixtureMixin(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
+        self.tmp = self._tmp.name
+        self.lock_dir = os.path.join(self.tmp, "locks")
+        os.makedirs(self.lock_dir, mode=0o700)
+        self.db_path = os.path.join(self.tmp, "control_plane.db")
+        self.addCleanup(self._tmp.cleanup)
+
+    def _seed_db(self) -> control_plane_db.ControlPlaneDB:
+        db = control_plane_db.ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)
+        db.upsert_session(
+            session_id="prgs-author-1",
+            role="author",
+            profile="prgs-author",
+            namespace="gitea-author",
+            pid=os.getpid(),
+        )
+        db.upsert_work_item(
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            kind="issue",
+            number=636,
+        )
+        db.assign_and_lease(
+            session_id="prgs-author-1",
+            role="author",
+            remote="prgs",
+            org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
+            repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            kind="issue",
+            number=636,
+        )
+        return db
+
+
+class TestRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_redact_path_collapses_home(self):
+        home = os.path.expanduser("~")
+        self.assertEqual(
+            inventory.redact_path(f"{home}/Development/Gitea-Tools"),
+            "~/Development/Gitea-Tools",
+        )
+
+    def test_redact_url_strips_userinfo_and_query(self):
+        self.assertEqual(
+            inventory.redact_url("https://user:[email protected]/api?token=abc"),
+            "https://gitea.prgs.cc/api",
+        )
+
+    def test_scrub_drops_credential_keys(self):
+        scrubbed = inventory.scrub(
+            {"token": "abc123", "api_key": "k", "profile": "prgs-author"}
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(scrubbed["token"], "[redacted]")
+        self.assertEqual(scrubbed["api_key"], "[redacted]")
+        self.assertEqual(scrubbed["profile"], "prgs-author")
+
+    def test_scrub_is_recursive_and_never_raises(self):
+        class Weird:
+            def __repr__(self) -> str:
+                return "weird-obj"
+
+        out = inventory.scrub({"nested": [{"password": "p", "obj": Weird()}]})
+        self.assertEqual(out["nested"][0]["password"], "[redacted]")
+        self.assertEqual(out["nested"][0]["obj"], "weird-obj")
+
+
+class TestEmptyInventory(_FixtureMixin):
+    def test_empty_db_and_locks_degrade_without_raising(self):
+        # No DB file, no locks: sessions/leases unavailable, locks ok+empty.
+        snap = inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=self.db_path,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            load_hygiene=lambda: _StubHygiene(entries=()),
+        )
+        sessions = snap.section("sessions")
+        leases = snap.section("leases")
+        locks = snap.section("locks")
+        self.assertEqual(sessions.status, inventory.STATUS_UNAVAILABLE)
+        self.assertEqual(leases.status, inventory.STATUS_UNAVAILABLE)
+        self.assertEqual(locks.status, inventory.STATUS_OK)
+        self.assertEqual(len(locks.items), 0)
+        # Ownership authority is incomplete because the DB is missing.
+        self.assertFalse(snap.ownership_authority_complete)
+        self.assertEqual(snap.collisions, ())
+
+    def test_empty_db_present_but_unpopulated(self):
+        control_plane_db.ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)  # creates schema, no rows
+        snap = inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=self.db_path,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            load_hygiene=lambda: _StubHygiene(entries=()),
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(snap.section("sessions").status, inventory.STATUS_OK)
+        self.assertEqual(len(snap.section("sessions").items), 0)
+        self.assertEqual(snap.section("leases").status, inventory.STATUS_OK)
+        self.assertTrue(snap.ownership_authority_complete)
+
+
+class TestPopulatedInventory(_FixtureMixin):
+    def test_sections_populated_and_correlated(self):
+        self._seed_db()
+        wt = f"{self.tmp}/branches/issue-636-inventory-api"
+        _write_lock(
+            self.lock_dir,
+            "prgs-Scaled-Tech-Consulting-Gitea-Tools-636.json",
+            _live_lock_payload(
+                issue_number=636,
+                branch="feat/issue-636-inventory-api",
+                worktree_path=wt,
+                pid=os.getpid(),
+            ),
+        )
+        hygiene = _StubHygiene(
+            entries=(
+                _StubEntry(
+                    rel_path="branches/issue-636-inventory-api",
+                    branch="feat/issue-636-inventory-api",
+                    classification="active-issue",
+                ),
+            )
+        )
+        snap = inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=self.db_path,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            load_hygiene=lambda: hygiene,
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(snap.ownership_authority_complete)
+        self.assertEqual(len(snap.section("sessions").items), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(len(snap.section("leases").items), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(len(snap.section("locks").items), 1)
+        self.assertEqual(len(snap.section("worktrees").items), 1)
+
+        # The lease, lock, and worktree for #636 correlate onto one row.
+        row = next(r for r in snap.correlations if r["issue_number"] == 636)
+        self.assertEqual(row["branch"], "feat/issue-636-inventory-api")
+        self.assertTrue(row["lock_live"])
+        self.assertEqual(row["worktree_classification"], "active-issue")
+        self.assertEqual(len(row["lease_ids"]), 1)
+        # No collision: live lock, live pid, matching worktree.
+        self.assertEqual(snap.collisions, ())
+
+    def test_serialized_payload_declares_field_authority(self):
+        self._seed_db()
+        snap = inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=self.db_path,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            load_hygiene=lambda: _StubHygiene(entries=()),
+        )
+        payload = inventory.snapshot_to_dict(snap)
+        self.assertEqual(payload["api_version"], "v1")
+        self.assertEqual(payload["schema_version"], 1)
+        self.assertEqual(payload["field_authority"]["sessions"], "control_plane_db")
+        self.assertEqual(payload["field_authority"]["locks"], "filesystem")
+        self.assertIn("sessions", payload["sections"])
+
+
+class TestPartialFailure(_FixtureMixin):
+    def test_worktree_scan_failure_degrades_only_that_section(self):
+        self._seed_db()
+
+        def _boom():
+            raise RuntimeError("git worktree list exploded")
+
+        snap = inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=self.db_path,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            load_hygiene=_boom,
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(
+            snap.section("worktrees").status, inventory.STATUS_UNAVAILABLE
+        )
+        self.assertIn("exploded", snap.section("worktrees").reason)
+        # DB-backed sections still healthy.
+        self.assertEqual(snap.section("sessions").status, inventory.STATUS_OK)
+        self.assertIn("worktrees", snap.degraded_sections)
+
+    def test_degraded_ownership_suppresses_unowned_claim(self):
+        # DB absent → sessions/leases unavailable → ownership incomplete even
+        # though a lock exists and could look "unclaimed" by the DB alone.
+        _write_lock(
+            self.lock_dir,
+            "prgs-Scaled-Tech-Consulting-Gitea-Tools-636.json",
+            _live_lock_payload(
+                issue_number=636,
+                branch="feat/issue-636-inventory-api",
+                worktree_path=f"{self.tmp}/wt",
+                pid=os.getpid(),
+            ),
+        )
+        snap = inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=self.db_path,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            load_hygiene=lambda: _StubHygiene(entries=()),
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(snap.ownership_authority_complete)
+        payload = inventory.snapshot_to_dict(snap)
+        self.assertIn("may be treated as unowned", payload["ownership_note"])
+
+
+class TestCollisionDetection(_FixtureMixin):
+    def test_live_lock_dead_owner_flagged(self):
+        _write_lock(
+            self.lock_dir,
+            "prgs-Scaled-Tech-Consulting-Gitea-Tools-700.json",
+            _live_lock_payload(
+                issue_number=700,
+                branch="feat/issue-700-x",
+                worktree_path=f"{self.tmp}/wt700",
+                pid=999_999_999,  # not a running pid
+            ),
+        )
+        control_plane_db.ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)  # empty but present
+        snap = inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=self.db_path,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            load_hygiene=lambda: _StubHygiene(entries=()),
+        )
+        kinds = {c.kind for c in snap.collisions}
+        self.assertIn("live-lock-dead-owner", kinds)
+        # Also lock-without-worktree, since no worktree carries the branch.
+        self.assertIn("lock-without-worktree", kinds)
+
+    def test_duplicate_live_lock_on_same_branch(self):
+        for issue in (800, 801):
+            _write_lock(
+                self.lock_dir,
+                f"prgs-Scaled-Tech-Consulting-Gitea-Tools-{issue}.json",
+                _live_lock_payload(
+                    issue_number=issue,
+                    branch="feat/issue-800-shared",
+                    worktree_path=f"{self.tmp}/wt{issue}",
+                    pid=os.getpid(),
+                ),
+            )
+        control_plane_db.ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)
+        snap = inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=self.db_path,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            load_hygiene=lambda: _StubHygiene(entries=()),
+        )
+        self.assertIn(
+            "duplicate-live-lock", {c.kind for c in snap.collisions}
+        )
+
+    def test_no_collision_when_sections_degraded(self):
+        # locks ok but worktrees unavailable → lock-without-worktree must NOT
+        # be asserted (a missing scan is not a missing worktree).
+        _write_lock(
+            self.lock_dir,
+            "prgs-Scaled-Tech-Consulting-Gitea-Tools-636.json",
+            _live_lock_payload(
+                issue_number=636,
+                branch="feat/issue-636-inventory-api",
+                worktree_path=f"{self.tmp}/wt",
+                pid=os.getpid(),
+            ),
+        )
+        control_plane_db.ControlPlaneDB(self.db_path)
+
+        def _boom():
+            raise RuntimeError("scan down")
+
+        snap = inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=self.db_path,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            load_hygiene=_boom,
+        )
+        self.assertNotIn(
+            "lock-without-worktree", {c.kind for c in snap.collisions}
+        )
+
+
+class TestSectionInclude(_FixtureMixin):
+    def test_include_restricts_scanned_sections(self):
+        self._seed_db()
+        snap = inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=self.db_path,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            include=("locks",),
+        )
+        self.assertIsNotNone(snap.section("locks"))
+        self.assertIsNone(snap.section("sessions"))
+        self.assertIsNone(snap.section("worktrees"))
+
+
+class TestRoutes(_FixtureMixin):
+    def setUp(self) -> None:
+        super().setUp()
+        # Point the loaders at the fixture DB and lock dir via env, and stub
+        # the worktree scan so the route does not shell out to git.
+        self._prev_env = {
+            "GITEA_CONTROL_PLANE_DB": os.environ.get("GITEA_CONTROL_PLANE_DB"),
+            "GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR": os.environ.get("GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR"),
+            "WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE": os.environ.get("WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE"),
+        }
+        os.environ["GITEA_CONTROL_PLANE_DB"] = self.db_path
+        os.environ["GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_DIR"] = self.lock_dir
+        os.environ["WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE"] = "1"
+        self._seed_db()
+        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
+
+    def tearDown(self) -> None:
+        for key, value in self._prev_env.items():
+            if value is None:
+                os.environ.pop(key, None)
+            else:
+                os.environ[key] = value
+
+    def test_inventory_route_returns_versioned_payload(self):
+        resp = self.client.get("/api/v1/inventory")
+        self.assertEqual(resp.status_code, 200)
+        body = resp.json()
+        self.assertEqual(body["api_version"], "v1")
+        self.assertIn("sessions", body["sections"])
+        self.assertIn("field_authority", body)
+
+    def test_section_route_restricts_and_labels(self):
+        resp = self.client.get("/api/v1/inventory/locks")
+        self.assertEqual(resp.status_code, 200)
+        body = resp.json()
+        self.assertEqual(body["requested_section"], "locks")
+        self.assertIn("locks", body["sections"])
+        self.assertNotIn("sessions", body["sections"])
+
+    def test_unknown_section_is_404(self):
+        resp = self.client.get("/api/v1/inventory/bogus")
+        self.assertEqual(resp.status_code, 404)
+        self.assertEqual(resp.json()["error"], "unknown_section")
+
+    def test_inventory_route_rejects_post(self):
+        resp = self.client.post("/api/v1/inventory")
+        self.assertEqual(resp.status_code, 405)
+
+
+class TestReadOnly(_FixtureMixin):
+    def test_snapshot_does_not_create_db_file(self):
+        missing = os.path.join(self.tmp, "does-not-exist.db")
+        inventory.load_inventory_snapshot(
+            db_path=missing,
+            lock_dir=self.lock_dir,
+            load_hygiene=lambda: _StubHygiene(entries=()),
+        )
+        self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(missing))
+
+    def test_readonly_connection_refuses_write(self):
+        self._seed_db()
+        conn = inventory._open_readonly(self.db_path)
+        try:
+            with self.assertRaises(Exception):
+                conn.execute(
+                    "INSERT INTO sessions(session_id, role, started_at, "
+                    "last_heartbeat_at, status) VALUES ('x','author',"
+                    "'t','t','active')"
+                )
+                conn.commit()
+        finally:
+            conn.close()
+
+
+# ── lightweight stand-ins for the #432 hygiene snapshot ──────────────────────
+
+
+class _StubEntry:
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        rel_path: str,
+        branch: str | None = None,
+        classification: str = "stale-clean",
+        head_sha: str | None = "abc123",
+        dirty_tracked: int = 0,
+        dirty_untracked: bool = False,
+        detached: bool = False,
+        registered_worktree: bool = True,
+        notes: str = "",
+    ) -> None:
+        self.rel_path = rel_path
+        self.folder_name = rel_path.split("/", 1)[-1]
+        self.branch = branch
+        self.classification = classification
+        self.head_sha = head_sha
+        self.dirty_tracked = dirty_tracked
+        self.dirty_untracked = dirty_untracked
+        self.detached = detached
+        self.registered_worktree = registered_worktree
+        self.notes = notes
+
+
+class _StubHygiene:
+    def __init__(self, *, entries=(), scan_error=None) -> None:
+        self.entries = tuple(entries)
+        self.scan_error = scan_error
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_webui_sanctioned_restart.py

@@ -1,502 +0,0 @@
-"""Sanctioned restart / graceful reload control tests (#642).
-
-Acceptance criteria under test:
-
-1. The sanctioned restart path is implemented behind gates (capability,
-   confirmation, operator authorization, host hook).
-2. Manual ``pkill`` stays forbidden and is classified as contamination.
-3. Post-restart mutations require clean health/session proof.
-4. Authorized restart preview, unauthorized deny, contamination classification.
-5. No entry point exposes a raw kill.
-"""
-
-import json
-import os
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-
-import mcp_namespace_health
-import runtime_recovery_guard
-from task_capability_map import TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP
-from webui import console_audit, console_authz, gated_actions, sanctioned_restart
-
-NAMESPACE = "gitea-author"
-
-# An operator-authorized, hook-configured host. Passed explicitly so no test
-# depends on (or mutates) the real process environment.
-READY_ENV = {
-    sanctioned_restart.RESTART_HOOK_ENV: "launchd:cc.prgs.gitea-author",
-    runtime_recovery_guard.OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION_ENV: "ops-ticket-4821",
-}
-
-
-def admin(subject: str = "[email protected]") -> console_authz.Principal:
-    return console_authz.Principal(
-        subject=subject,
-        role=console_authz.ADMIN,
-        identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
-        authenticated=True,
-    )
-
-
-def viewer() -> console_authz.Principal:
-    return console_authz.Principal(
-        subject="[email protected]",
-        role=console_authz.VIEWER,
-        identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
-        authenticated=True,
-    )
-
-
-class TestCapabilityWiring(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC1: authority is declared, not invented by the console."""
-
-    def test_actions_resolve_through_the_capability_map(self):
-        for action_id in (
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE,
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
-                action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
-                self.assertIsNotNone(action)
-                self.assertIn(action.task_key, TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP)
-                self.assertEqual(
-                    action.mcp_permission,
-                    TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP[action.task_key]["permission"],
-                )
-
-    def test_restart_permission_is_not_a_gitea_operation(self):
-        """No configured Gitea profile should satisfy a host restart."""
-        permission = TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP["restart_namespace"]["permission"]
-        self.assertFalse(permission.startswith("gitea."))
-
-    def test_restart_is_destructive_dual_control_break_glass(self):
-        action = console_authz.get_action(
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(action.action_class, console_authz.CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE)
-        self.assertEqual(action.minimum_role, console_authz.ADMIN)
-        self.assertTrue(action.dual_control)
-        self.assertTrue(action.break_glass)
-        self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
-
-    def test_reload_is_privileged_but_not_destructive(self):
-        action = console_authz.get_action(
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(action.action_class, console_authz.CLASS_PRIVILEGED)
-        self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
-
-
-class TestPreview(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC4: an authorized preview renders the plan without executing it."""
-
-    def test_preview_lists_the_mutation_ledger(self):
-        preview = sanctioned_restart.build_restart_preview(
-            NAMESPACE, principal=admin(), env=READY_ENV
-        )
-        steps = [entry["step"] for entry in preview["mutation_ledger"]]
-        self.assertEqual(
-            steps, ["quiesce", "host_restart_hook", "health_recheck", "audit"]
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(preview["scope_valid"])
-        self.assertTrue(preview["post_restart_verification_required"])
-
-    def test_reload_preview_drains_instead_of_restarting(self):
-        preview = sanctioned_restart.build_restart_preview(
-            NAMESPACE, sanctioned_restart.MODE_RELOAD,
-            principal=admin(), env=READY_ENV,
-        )
-        steps = [entry["step"] for entry in preview["mutation_ledger"]]
-        self.assertIn("host_graceful_reload", steps)
-        self.assertNotIn("host_restart_hook", steps)
-
-    def test_preview_never_enables_execution(self):
-        preview = sanctioned_restart.build_restart_preview(
-            NAMESPACE, principal=admin(), env=READY_ENV
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(preview["execution_enabled"])
-        self.assertFalse(preview["authorization"]["execution_enabled"])
-
-    def test_confirmation_phrase_binds_the_namespace(self):
-        self.assertTrue(
-            sanctioned_restart.confirmation_matches(
-                NAMESPACE, sanctioned_restart.MODE_RESTART,
-                "restart gitea-author",
-            )
-        )
-        # A phrase typed for one namespace must not authorize another.
-        self.assertFalse(
-            sanctioned_restart.confirmation_matches(
-                "gitea-merger", sanctioned_restart.MODE_RESTART,
-                "restart gitea-author",
-            )
-        )
-
-
-class TestGates(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC1/AC4: every gate denies with a stable reason code."""
-
-    def _assess(self, **kwargs):
-        params = {
-            "principal": admin(),
-            "confirmation": f"restart {NAMESPACE}",
-            "env": READY_ENV,
-        }
-        params.update(kwargs)
-        namespace = params.pop("namespace", NAMESPACE)
-        mode = params.pop("mode", sanctioned_restart.MODE_RESTART)
-        return sanctioned_restart.assess_restart_request(
-            namespace, mode, **params
-        )
-
-    def test_authorized_confirmed_request_passes_every_gate(self):
-        result = self._assess()
-        self.assertTrue(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED
-        )
-
-    def test_passing_every_gate_is_not_an_execution_grant(self):
-        """An allowed request still never lets the console touch the process."""
-        result = self._assess()
-        self.assertTrue(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertFalse(result["execution_enabled"])
-        self.assertFalse(result["console_executes"])
-
-    def test_unauthorized_principal_is_denied(self):
-        result = self._assess(principal=viewer())
-        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNAUTHORIZED
-        )
-
-    def test_anonymous_principal_is_denied(self):
-        result = self._assess(principal=None)
-        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNAUTHORIZED
-        )
-
-    def test_missing_confirmation_is_denied(self):
-        result = self._assess(confirmation=None)
-        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISSING
-        )
-
-    def test_confirmation_for_another_namespace_is_denied(self):
-        result = self._assess(confirmation="restart gitea-merger")
-        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISMATCH
-        )
-
-    def test_missing_operator_authorization_is_denied(self):
-        env = {sanctioned_restart.RESTART_HOOK_ENV: "launchd:cc.prgs.author"}
-        result = self._assess(env=env)
-        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["reason_code"],
-            sanctioned_restart.DENY_OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION,
-        )
-
-    def test_missing_host_hook_is_denied_without_kill_fallback(self):
-        env = {
-            runtime_recovery_guard.OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION_ENV: "ops-ticket-1",
-        }
-        result = self._assess(env=env)
-        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_HOOK_NOT_CONFIGURED
-        )
-
-    def test_fleet_scope_is_refused(self):
-        for scope in ("all", "*", "fleet"):
-            with self.subTest(scope=scope):
-                result = self._assess(
-                    namespace=scope, confirmation=f"restart {scope}"
-                )
-                self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-                self.assertEqual(
-                    result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_FLEET_SCOPE
-                )
-
-    def test_unknown_namespace_is_refused(self):
-        result = self._assess(
-            namespace="gitea-nope", confirmation="restart gitea-nope"
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNKNOWN_NAMESPACE
-        )
-
-    def test_unknown_mode_is_refused(self):
-        result = self._assess(mode="obliterate")
-        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE
-        )
-
-    def test_live_contamination_marker_blocks_restart(self):
-        marker = runtime_recovery_guard.build_contamination_record(
-            reason_class=runtime_recovery_guard.REASON_MANUAL_DAEMON_KILL,
-            command_redacted="pkill -f mcp_server.py",
-        )
-        result = self._assess(contamination_marker=marker)
-        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_CONTAMINATED_RUNTIME
-        )
-
-    def test_reconciler_cleared_marker_no_longer_blocks(self):
-        marker = runtime_recovery_guard.build_contamination_record(
-            reason_class=runtime_recovery_guard.REASON_MANUAL_DAEMON_KILL,
-            command_redacted="pkill -f mcp_server.py",
-        )
-        marker = dict(marker, cleared_by_reconciler=True)
-        result = self._assess(contamination_marker=marker)
-        self.assertTrue(result["allowed"])
-
-
-class TestExecutionNeverKills(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC5: no path exposes or runs a raw process kill."""
-
-    def test_authorized_execution_defers_to_the_host_supervisor(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.execute_restart(
-            NAMESPACE,
-            principal=admin(),
-            confirmation=f"restart {NAMESPACE}",
-            env=READY_ENV,
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
-        self.assertFalse(result["process_kill_executed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["outcome"], sanctioned_restart.ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED
-        )
-
-    def test_denied_execution_reports_the_refusing_gate(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.execute_restart(
-            NAMESPACE, principal=viewer(), confirmation=f"restart {NAMESPACE}",
-            env=READY_ENV,
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["outcome"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNAUTHORIZED
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["process_kill_executed"])
-
-    def test_module_never_spawns_a_process(self):
-        path = os.path.join(
-            os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))),
-            "webui", "sanctioned_restart.py",
-        )
-        with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-            source = handle.read()
-        for forbidden in (
-            "import subprocess", "import signal", "os.kill", "os.system",
-            "popen",
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(forbidden=forbidden):
-                self.assertNotIn(forbidden, source.lower())
-
-    def test_no_surface_returns_a_kill_command(self):
-        payloads = [
-            sanctioned_restart.build_restart_preview(
-                NAMESPACE, principal=admin(), env=READY_ENV
-            ),
-            sanctioned_restart.restart_policy(),
-            sanctioned_restart.execute_restart(
-                NAMESPACE, principal=admin(),
-                confirmation=f"restart {NAMESPACE}", env=READY_ENV,
-            ),
-        ]
-        for payload in payloads:
-            rendered = json.dumps(payload, default=str).lower()
-            self.assertNotIn("kill -9", rendered)
-            self.assertNotIn("pkill -f", rendered)
-
-    def test_policy_declares_no_raw_kill_and_no_silent_restart(self):
-        policy = sanctioned_restart.restart_policy()
-        self.assertFalse(policy["raw_kill_exposed"])
-        self.assertFalse(policy["console_executes_process_kill"])
-        self.assertFalse(policy["fleet_scope_permitted"])
-        self.assertFalse(policy["silent_auto_restart_permitted"])
-        self.assertTrue(policy["audit_required"])
-
-
-class TestContaminationClassification(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC2: manual pkill is contamination, and it blocks clean claims."""
-
-    def test_manual_daemon_pkill_is_contamination(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command(
-            "pkill -f mcp_server.py"
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(result["contamination"])
-        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
-        self.assertIsNotNone(result["contamination_marker"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            result["sanctioned_alternative"],
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
-        )
-
-    def test_broad_process_kill_is_contamination(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command("killall -9 Python")
-        self.assertTrue(result["contamination"])
-        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
-
-    def test_marker_names_the_sanctioned_alternative(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command(
-            "pkill -f mcp_server.py"
-        )
-        marker = result["contamination_marker"]
-        self.assertIn(
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE, marker["detail"]
-        )
-
-    def test_benign_command_is_not_contamination(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command("git status")
-        self.assertFalse(result["contamination"])
-        self.assertTrue(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
-
-    def test_no_command_is_not_contamination(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.classify_restart_command(None)
-        self.assertFalse(result["contamination"])
-        self.assertTrue(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
-
-
-class TestPostRestartHealth(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC3: a clean post-restart claim needs live client-namespace proof."""
-
-    def test_live_client_probe_clears_the_session(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.verify_post_restart_health(
-            NAMESPACE,
-            probe_result={"success": True},
-            probe_source=mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_CLIENT,
-            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
-            required_tool="gitea_whoami",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(result["status"], sanctioned_restart.HEALTH_CLEAN)
-        self.assertTrue(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
-        self.assertTrue(result["mutations_allowed"])
-
-    def test_offline_probe_does_not_clear_the_session(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.verify_post_restart_health(
-            NAMESPACE,
-            probe_result={"success": True},
-            probe_source=mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_OFFLINE,
-            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
-            required_tool="gitea_whoami",
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
-        self.assertFalse(result["mutations_allowed"])
-
-    def test_failed_probe_is_unhealthy(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.verify_post_restart_health(
-            NAMESPACE,
-            probe_result={"success": False, "error": "client is closing: EOF"},
-            probe_source=mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_CLIENT,
-            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
-            required_tool="gitea_whoami",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(result["status"], sanctioned_restart.HEALTH_UNHEALTHY)
-        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
-
-    def test_static_registration_alone_never_clears_the_session(self):
-        result = sanctioned_restart.verify_post_restart_health(
-            NAMESPACE,
-            registered_tools=["gitea_whoami"],
-            required_tool="gitea_whoami",
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["clean_claim_allowed"])
-
-
-class TestAuditEmission(unittest.TestCase):
-    """Every restart attempt is audited with actor, target, and result."""
-
-    def _run(self, principal, sink):
-        prior = os.environ.get(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV)
-        os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = sink
-        try:
-            return sanctioned_restart.execute_restart(
-                NAMESPACE,
-                principal=principal,
-                confirmation=f"restart {NAMESPACE}",
-                env=READY_ENV,
-                request_id="req-642",
-            )
-        finally:
-            if prior is None:
-                os.environ.pop(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV, None)
-            else:
-                os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = prior
-
-    def test_allowed_attempt_is_written_with_actor_and_target(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
-            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "audit.jsonl")
-            result = self._run(admin(), sink)
-            self.assertTrue(result["audit"]["written"])
-            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-                record = json.loads(handle.read().strip())
-        self.assertEqual(
-            record["action"], sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(record["target"]["namespace"], NAMESPACE)
-        self.assertEqual(record["target"]["mode"], "restart")
-        self.assertEqual(record["result"], console_audit.RESULT_ALLOWED)
-        self.assertEqual(record["actor"]["subject"], "[email protected]")
-        self.assertFalse(record["metadata"]["process_kill_executed"])
-
-    def test_denied_attempt_is_audited_too(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
-            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "audit.jsonl")
-            self._run(viewer(), sink)
-            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-                record = json.loads(handle.read().strip())
-        self.assertEqual(record["result"], console_audit.RESULT_DENIED)
-        self.assertEqual(
-            record["reason_code"], sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNAUTHORIZED
-        )
-
-    def test_restart_audit_uses_break_glass_retention(self):
-        action = console_authz.get_action(
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            console_audit.retention_class_for(action),
-            console_audit.RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS,
-        )
-
-
-class TestRegistrySurface(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC5: the console surfaces the control, still disabled, with no kill."""
-
-    def test_registry_exposes_both_actions_disabled(self):
-        registry = gated_actions.load_action_registry()
-        for action_id in (
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE,
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
-                action = registry.get(action_id)
-                self.assertIsNotNone(action)
-                self.assertFalse(action.enabled)
-
-    def test_registry_preview_names_the_namespace_target(self):
-        preview = gated_actions.preview_action(
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE, namespace=NAMESPACE
-        )
-        target = preview["mutation_ledger"][0]["target"]
-        self.assertIn(NAMESPACE, target)
-        self.assertFalse(preview["enabled"])
-
-    def test_registry_attempt_fails_closed(self):
-        result = gated_actions.attempt_action(
-            sanctioned_restart.ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE, namespace=NAMESPACE
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(result["success"])
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

webui/app.py

@@ -46,6 +46,11 @@ from webui.worktree_scanner import load_hygiene_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as wo
 from webui.worktree_views import render_worktrees_page
 from webui.runtime_health import load_runtime_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as runtime_snapshot_to_dict
 from webui.runtime_views import render_runtime_page
+from webui.inventory import (
+    SECTION_NAMES as _INVENTORY_SECTIONS,
+    load_inventory_snapshot,
+    snapshot_to_dict as inventory_snapshot_to_dict,
+)
 from webui.timeline import load_timeline, snapshot_to_dict as timeline_snapshot_to_dict
 from webui.system_health import (
     API_PATH as SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH,
@@ -441,6 +446,30 @@ async def api_action_attempt(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     return JSONResponse(result, status_code=status)
 
 
+async def api_inventory(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
+    """Unified read-only session/lease/lock/worktree inventory (#636)."""
+    snapshot = load_inventory_snapshot()
+    return JSONResponse(inventory_snapshot_to_dict(snapshot))
+
+
+async def api_inventory_section(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
+    """Resource-split view: one inventory section under the shared schema."""
+    section = request.path_params["section"]
+    if section not in _INVENTORY_SECTIONS:
+        return JSONResponse(
+            {
+                "error": "unknown_section",
+                "detail": f"no inventory section named {section!r}",
+                "available": sorted(_INVENTORY_SECTIONS),
+            },
+            status_code=404,
+        )
+    snapshot = load_inventory_snapshot(include=(section,))
+    payload = inventory_snapshot_to_dict(snapshot)
+    payload["requested_section"] = section
+    return JSONResponse(payload)
+
+
 async def api_console_security_model(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     """Read-only publication of the #633 authorization/redaction/audit model."""
     return JSONResponse({
@@ -606,6 +635,12 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
                 methods=["POST"],
             ),
             Route("/api/leases", api_leases, methods=["GET"]),
+            Route("/api/v1/inventory", api_inventory, methods=["GET"]),
+            Route(
+                "/api/v1/inventory/{section}",
+                api_inventory_section,
+                methods=["GET"],
+            ),
             Route(
                 "/api/console/security-model",
                 api_console_security_model,

webui/console_authz.py

@@ -236,34 +236,6 @@ _ACTION_SPECS: tuple[ConsoleAction, ...] = (
         phase=3,
         summary="Remove a remote feature branch.",
     ),
-    # #642: sanctioned daemon lifecycle. These exist so operators have an
-    # audited path off `pkill -f mcp_server.py` (#630). Restart drops every
-    # in-flight request on a namespace, so it carries the same dual-control and
-    # break-glass weight as a merge; reload drains first and is privileged but
-    # not destructive. Neither ever exposes a raw kill: execution is handed to
-    # a host supervisor by ``webui.sanctioned_restart``.
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="system.reload_namespace",
-        task_key="reload_namespace",
-        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
-        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=2,
-        summary="Gracefully reload one MCP namespace via the host supervisor.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="system.restart_namespace",
-        task_key="restart_namespace",
-        action_class=CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE,
-        minimum_role=ADMIN,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=True,
-        break_glass=True,
-        phase=2,
-        summary="Restart one MCP namespace via the host supervisor.",
-    ),
 )
 
 ACTIONS: dict[str, ConsoleAction] = {a.action_id: a for a in _ACTION_SPECS}

webui/gated_actions.py

@@ -110,8 +110,6 @@ def _format_target(action_id: str, params: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
         )
     if action_id == "create_issue":
         return f"issue {params.get('title', '?')!r}"
-    if action_id in {"system.restart_namespace", "system.reload_namespace"}:
-        return f"MCP namespace {params.get('namespace', '?')!r}"
     return "unspecified"
 
 
@@ -167,17 +165,6 @@ def build_action_registry() -> ActionRegistry:
          "gitea_create_issue_comment", "Post a PR review thread comment."),
         ("close_pr", "Close PR", "close_pr", "gitea_edit_pr",
          "Close a pull request without merge."),
-        # #642: the sanctioned replacement for the forbidden manual daemon-kill
-        # recovery path (#630). The "tool" is a host supervisor hook, not an MCP
-        # call — the console never signals a process. Preview and gating live in
-        # ``webui.sanctioned_restart``; these stay disabled like every other
-        # registry entry.
-        ("system.reload_namespace", "Reload MCP namespace", "reload_namespace",
-         "host.supervisor_reload",
-         "Gracefully reload one MCP namespace via the host supervisor."),
-        ("system.restart_namespace", "Restart MCP namespace",
-         "restart_namespace", "host.supervisor_restart",
-         "Restart one MCP namespace via the host supervisor."),
     )
     actions = tuple(
         GatedAction(

webui/inventory.py

@@ -0,0 +1,952 @@
+"""Unified session/lease/lock/worktree inventory for the web console (#636).
+
+Leases (#433), worktrees (#432), and runtime (#430) each ship their own MVP
+view, each with its own shape and its own idea of what "owned" means. A
+traffic-control or recovery operator has to read all three and correlate them
+by hand, which is exactly the step that goes wrong under collision pressure.
+
+This module aggregates them into one versioned, read-only snapshot so the
+console, and any worker asking "what is safe to do next", read the same
+inventory from the same authority.
+
+Field authority is explicit and never blended. Every section declares where its
+rows came from:
+
+* ``control_plane_db`` — the #613 substrate: sessions, leases, assignments.
+  Authoritative for *exclusive ownership* (#600/#601).
+* ``filesystem`` — durable per-issue lock files (:mod:`issue_lock_store`) and
+  registered git worktrees. Authoritative for *what exists on this machine*.
+* ``gitea`` — remote issue/PR state, reached only through existing loaders.
+
+Safety invariants:
+
+* **Read-only.** The control-plane database is opened through a ``mode=ro``
+  URI. :class:`control_plane_db.ControlPlaneDB` creates directories and runs
+  migrations in its constructor, which an inventory read must never do, so this
+  module talks to sqlite directly rather than through that class.
+* **Fail-soft, never fail-silent.** A subsystem that cannot be read degrades to
+  a section carrying ``status`` and ``reason``. It never raises, and it never
+  produces an empty list that reads like "nothing is there".
+* **Never invent active ownership.** This is the invariant that matters most.
+  A degraded ownership source sets ``ownership_authority_complete`` false, and
+  while that flag is false no work item is reported unowned and no collision is
+  asserted. Absence of evidence is reported as absence of evidence.
+* **Redaction at the boundary.** Absolute paths are collapsed against the home
+  directory, URLs lose userinfo and query strings, and no credential-shaped
+  value is emitted. No session token exists in these sources and none is read.
+
+Phase 1 is read-only. Lease steal/release and worktree deletion are Phase 2+
+and deliberately have no representation here, not even a disabled one.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import os
+import re
+import sqlite3
+import time
+from dataclasses import dataclass, field
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import Any, Callable
+from urllib.parse import urlparse
+
+import control_plane_db
+import issue_lock_store
+
+SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
+API_VERSION = "v1"
+
+#: Sections whose absence would make an ownership claim unprovable. If any of
+#: these is not ``ok``, the snapshot refuses to describe anything as unowned.
+OWNERSHIP_SECTIONS = ("sessions", "leases", "locks")
+
+SECTION_NAMES = ("sessions", "leases", "locks", "worktrees", "namespaces")
+
+STATUS_OK = "ok"
+STATUS_DEGRADED = "degraded"
+STATUS_UNAVAILABLE = "unavailable"
+
+AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB = "control_plane_db"
+AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM = "filesystem"
+AUTHORITY_GITEA = "gitea"
+
+_CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = re.compile(
+    r"(token|secret|password|passwd|api[_-]?key|authorization|bearer|credential)",
+    re.IGNORECASE,
+)
+_REDACTED = "[redacted]"
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class InventorySection:
+    """One subsystem's contribution, with its authority and health."""
+
+    name: str
+    authority: str
+    status: str
+    items: tuple[dict[str, Any], ...] = ()
+    reason: str | None = None
+    scan_ms: float | None = None
+
+    @property
+    def ok(self) -> bool:
+        return self.status == STATUS_OK
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "name": self.name,
+            "authority": self.authority,
+            "status": self.status,
+            "count": len(self.items),
+            "reason": self.reason,
+            "scan_ms": self.scan_ms,
+            "items": [dict(item) for item in self.items],
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class CollisionSignal:
+    """A detected conflict between two ownership records."""
+
+    kind: str
+    message: str
+    severity: str = "warning"
+    issue_number: int | None = None
+    branch: str | None = None
+    worktree_path: str | None = None
+    session_ids: tuple[str, ...] = ()
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "kind": self.kind,
+            "severity": self.severity,
+            "message": self.message,
+            "issue_number": self.issue_number,
+            "branch": self.branch,
+            "worktree_path": self.worktree_path,
+            "session_ids": list(self.session_ids),
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class InventorySnapshot:
+    """Versioned aggregate of every inventory section."""
+
+    generated_at: str
+    sections: tuple[InventorySection, ...]
+    collisions: tuple[CollisionSignal, ...] = ()
+    correlations: tuple[dict[str, Any], ...] = ()
+    schema_version: int = SCHEMA_VERSION
+    api_version: str = API_VERSION
+    scan_ms: float | None = None
+    _section_index: dict[str, InventorySection] = field(
+        default_factory=dict, repr=False, compare=False
+    )
+
+    def section(self, name: str) -> InventorySection | None:
+        return self._section_index.get(name)
+
+    @property
+    def degraded_sections(self) -> tuple[str, ...]:
+        return tuple(s.name for s in self.sections if not s.ok)
+
+    @property
+    def ownership_authority_complete(self) -> bool:
+        """True only when every ownership-bearing section read cleanly.
+
+        While this is false the snapshot must not describe any work item as
+        unowned: a lease the reader could not load is not an absent lease.
+        """
+        for name in OWNERSHIP_SECTIONS:
+            section = self._section_index.get(name)
+            if section is None or not section.ok:
+                return False
+        return True
+
+    @property
+    def status(self) -> str:
+        if all(s.ok for s in self.sections):
+            return STATUS_OK
+        return STATUS_DEGRADED
+
+
+# ── redaction ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def redact_path(path: str | None) -> str | None:
+    """Collapse an absolute path against ``$HOME`` for browser display."""
+    if not path:
+        return path
+    text = str(path)
+    home = os.path.expanduser("~")
+    if home and home != "/" and text.startswith(home):
+        return "~" + text[len(home) :]
+    return text
+
+
+def redact_url(value: str | None) -> str | None:
+    """Strip userinfo and query string from a URL."""
+    if not value:
+        return value
+    text = str(value)
+    try:
+        parsed = urlparse(text)
+    except ValueError:
+        return _REDACTED
+    if not parsed.scheme or not parsed.netloc:
+        return text
+    netloc = parsed.hostname or ""
+    if parsed.port:
+        netloc = f"{netloc}:{parsed.port}"
+    rebuilt = f"{parsed.scheme}://{netloc}{parsed.path}"
+    return rebuilt.rstrip("/") or rebuilt
+
+
+def scrub(value: Any, *, key: str | None = None) -> Any:
+    """Recursively drop credential-shaped values and redact paths/URLs.
+
+    Never raises: an unexpected object degrades to its ``repr`` rather than
+    propagating out of a read-only view.
+    """
+    if key and _CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE.search(key):
+        return _REDACTED
+    if isinstance(value, dict):
+        return {str(k): scrub(v, key=str(k)) for k, v in value.items()}
+    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
+        return [scrub(v, key=key) for v in value]
+    if isinstance(value, str):
+        if value.startswith(("http://", "https://")):
+            return redact_url(value)
+        if value.startswith("/") or value.startswith("~"):
+            return redact_path(value)
+        return value
+    if isinstance(value, (int, float, bool)) or value is None:
+        return value
+    return repr(value)
+
+
+# ── control-plane database (read-only) ───────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _open_readonly(db_path: str) -> sqlite3.Connection:
+    """Open the control-plane DB without creating or migrating anything."""
+    conn = sqlite3.connect(f"file:{db_path}?mode=ro", uri=True, timeout=5)
+    conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
+    return conn
+
+
+def _table_names(conn: sqlite3.Connection) -> set[str]:
+    rows = conn.execute(
+        "SELECT name FROM sqlite_master WHERE type = 'table'"
+    ).fetchall()
+    return {str(row[0]) for row in rows}
+
+
+def _load_cp_db_sections(
+    *,
+    db_path: str | None = None,
+    limit: int = 200,
+) -> tuple[InventorySection, InventorySection]:
+    """Return the ``sessions`` and ``leases`` sections from the #613 DB."""
+    path = (db_path or control_plane_db.default_db_path()).strip()
+
+    def _both_unavailable(reason: str) -> tuple[InventorySection, InventorySection]:
+        return (
+            InventorySection(
+                name="sessions",
+                authority=AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB,
+                status=STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
+                reason=reason,
+            ),
+            InventorySection(
+                name="leases",
+                authority=AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB,
+                status=STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
+                reason=reason,
+            ),
+        )
+
+    if not path:
+        return _both_unavailable("control-plane database path is not configured")
+    if not os.path.exists(path):
+        return _both_unavailable(
+            f"control-plane database not present at {redact_path(path)}; "
+            "no session or lease authority available"
+        )
+
+    started = time.perf_counter()
+    try:
+        conn = _open_readonly(path)
+    except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+        return _both_unavailable(f"control-plane database could not be opened: {exc}")
+
+    try:
+        tables = _table_names(conn)
+        if "sessions" not in tables or "leases" not in tables:
+            missing = sorted({"sessions", "leases"} - tables)
+            return _both_unavailable(
+                "control-plane database is missing required tables: "
+                + ", ".join(missing)
+            )
+
+        session_rows = [
+            dict(row)
+            for row in conn.execute(
+                "SELECT session_id, role, profile, namespace, pid, started_at,"
+                " last_heartbeat_at, status FROM sessions"
+                " ORDER BY last_heartbeat_at DESC LIMIT ?",
+                (max(1, int(limit)),),
+            ).fetchall()
+        ]
+
+        has_work_items = "work_items" in tables
+        if has_work_items:
+            lease_sql = (
+                "SELECT l.lease_id, l.session_id, l.role, l.phase, l.status,"
+                " l.expires_at, w.remote, w.org, w.repo, w.kind AS work_kind,"
+                " w.number AS work_number, w.state AS work_state,"
+                " s.pid AS session_pid, s.profile AS session_profile,"
+                " s.namespace AS session_namespace, s.status AS session_status"
+                " FROM leases l"
+                " JOIN work_items w ON w.work_item_id = l.work_item_id"
+                " LEFT JOIN sessions s ON s.session_id = l.session_id"
+                " ORDER BY l.expires_at DESC LIMIT ?"
+            )
+        else:
+            lease_sql = (
+                "SELECT l.lease_id, l.session_id, l.role, l.phase, l.status,"
+                " l.expires_at FROM leases l"
+                " ORDER BY l.expires_at DESC LIMIT ?"
+            )
+        lease_rows = [
+            dict(row)
+            for row in conn.execute(lease_sql, (max(1, int(limit)),)).fetchall()
+        ]
+    except sqlite3.Error as exc:
+        return _both_unavailable(f"control-plane database read failed: {exc}")
+    finally:
+        conn.close()
+
+    elapsed = (time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000.0
+    now = datetime.now(timezone.utc)
+
+    sessions = tuple(
+        scrub(
+            {
+                "session_id": row.get("session_id"),
+                "role": row.get("role"),
+                "profile": row.get("profile"),
+                "namespace": row.get("namespace"),
+                "pid": row.get("pid"),
+                "pid_alive": issue_lock_store.is_process_alive(row.get("pid")),
+                "started_at": row.get("started_at"),
+                "last_heartbeat_at": row.get("last_heartbeat_at"),
+                "status": row.get("status"),
+            }
+        )
+        for row in session_rows
+    )
+
+    leases = tuple(
+        scrub(
+            {
+                "lease_id": row.get("lease_id"),
+                "session_id": row.get("session_id"),
+                "role": row.get("role"),
+                "phase": row.get("phase"),
+                "status": row.get("status"),
+                "expires_at": row.get("expires_at"),
+                "expired": _is_expired(row.get("expires_at"), now=now),
+                "remote": row.get("remote"),
+                "org": row.get("org"),
+                "repo": row.get("repo"),
+                "work_kind": row.get("work_kind"),
+                "work_number": row.get("work_number"),
+                "work_state": row.get("work_state"),
+                "session_pid": row.get("session_pid"),
+                "session_profile": row.get("session_profile"),
+                "session_namespace": row.get("session_namespace"),
+                "session_status": row.get("session_status"),
+            }
+        )
+        for row in lease_rows
+    )
+
+    degraded_reason = (
+        None
+        if has_work_items
+        else "work_items table absent; lease rows carry no work linkage"
+    )
+    lease_status = STATUS_OK if has_work_items else STATUS_DEGRADED
+
+    return (
+        InventorySection(
+            name="sessions",
+            authority=AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB,
+            status=STATUS_OK,
+            items=sessions,
+            scan_ms=round(elapsed, 3),
+        ),
+        InventorySection(
+            name="leases",
+            authority=AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB,
+            status=lease_status,
+            items=leases,
+            reason=degraded_reason,
+            scan_ms=round(elapsed, 3),
+        ),
+    )
+
+
+def _is_expired(expires_at: str | None, *, now: datetime) -> bool | None:
+    if not expires_at:
+        return None
+    text = str(expires_at).strip().replace("Z", "+00:00")
+    try:
+        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(text)
+    except ValueError:
+        return None
+    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
+        parsed = parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
+    return parsed <= now
+
+
+# ── durable issue locks (filesystem) ─────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _load_locks_section(*, lock_dir: str | None = None) -> InventorySection:
+    started = time.perf_counter()
+    try:
+        paths = issue_lock_store.iter_lock_files(lock_dir)
+    except OSError as exc:
+        return InventorySection(
+            name="locks",
+            authority=AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+            status=STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
+            reason=f"issue lock directory could not be listed: {exc}",
+        )
+
+    items: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    unreadable = 0
+    for path in paths:
+        try:
+            record = issue_lock_store.read_lock_file(path)
+        except (OSError, ValueError):
+            unreadable += 1
+            continue
+        if not record:
+            unreadable += 1
+            continue
+        try:
+            freshness = issue_lock_store.assess_lock_freshness(record)
+        except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 — a read-only view never raises
+            freshness = {"status": "unknown", "live": False, "stale": False}
+        claimant = record.get("claimant") or (
+            (record.get("work_lease") or {}).get("claimant") or {}
+        )
+        items.append(
+            scrub(
+                {
+                    "issue_number": record.get("issue_number"),
+                    "branch_name": record.get("branch_name"),
+                    "remote": record.get("remote"),
+                    "org": record.get("org"),
+                    "repo": record.get("repo"),
+                    "worktree_path": record.get("worktree_path"),
+                    "pid": record.get("session_pid") or record.get("pid"),
+                    "pid_alive": issue_lock_store.is_process_alive(
+                        record.get("session_pid") or record.get("pid")
+                    ),
+                    "claimant_username": (claimant or {}).get("username"),
+                    "claimant_profile": (claimant or {}).get("profile"),
+                    "lock_generation": record.get("lock_generation"),
+                    "freshness_status": freshness.get("status"),
+                    "live": bool(freshness.get("live")),
+                    "stale": bool(freshness.get("stale")),
+                    "freshness_reason": freshness.get("reason"),
+                    "lock_path": record.get("lock_file_path") or path,
+                }
+            )
+        )
+
+    elapsed = (time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000.0
+    reason = (
+        f"{unreadable} lock file(s) were unreadable and are not represented"
+        if unreadable
+        else None
+    )
+    return InventorySection(
+        name="locks",
+        authority=AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+        status=STATUS_DEGRADED if unreadable else STATUS_OK,
+        items=tuple(items),
+        reason=reason,
+        scan_ms=round(elapsed, 3),
+    )
+
+
+# ── worktrees (filesystem, via the #432 scanner) ─────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _load_worktrees_section(
+    *, load_hygiene: Callable[[], Any] | None = None
+) -> InventorySection:
+    started = time.perf_counter()
+    try:
+        loader = load_hygiene
+        if loader is None:
+            from webui.worktree_scanner import load_hygiene_snapshot
+
+            loader = load_hygiene_snapshot
+        snapshot = loader()
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — fail soft, never fail the request
+        return InventorySection(
+            name="worktrees",
+            authority=AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+            status=STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
+            reason=f"worktree scan failed: {exc}",
+        )
+
+    items = tuple(
+        scrub(
+            {
+                "rel_path": entry.rel_path,
+                "folder_name": entry.folder_name,
+                "classification": entry.classification,
+                "branch": entry.branch,
+                "head_sha": entry.head_sha,
+                "dirty_tracked": entry.dirty_tracked,
+                "dirty_untracked": entry.dirty_untracked,
+                "detached": entry.detached,
+                "registered_worktree": entry.registered_worktree,
+                "notes": entry.notes,
+            }
+        )
+        for entry in snapshot.entries
+    )
+    scan_error = getattr(snapshot, "scan_error", None)
+    elapsed = (time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000.0
+    return InventorySection(
+        name="worktrees",
+        authority=AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+        status=STATUS_DEGRADED if scan_error else STATUS_OK,
+        items=items,
+        reason=scan_error,
+        scan_ms=round(elapsed, 3),
+    )
+
+
+# ── namespaces / capability summary ──────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _load_namespaces_section() -> InventorySection:
+    started = time.perf_counter()
+    try:
+        from gitea_auth import get_profile
+
+        profile = get_profile() or {}
+    except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001
+        return InventorySection(
+            name="namespaces",
+            authority=AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+            status=STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
+            reason=f"active profile could not be resolved: {exc}",
+        )
+
+    allowed = list(profile.get("allowed_operations") or [])
+    forbidden = list(profile.get("forbidden_operations") or [])
+    profile_name = str(profile.get("profile_name") or "")
+
+    namespace = None
+    try:
+        import role_namespace_gate
+
+        namespace = role_namespace_gate.infer_mcp_namespace(profile_name)
+    except Exception:  # noqa: BLE001 — namespace inference is advisory
+        namespace = None
+
+    item = scrub(
+        {
+            "profile_name": profile_name,
+            "role": profile.get("role"),
+            "mcp_namespace": namespace,
+            "allowed_operations": sorted(allowed),
+            "forbidden_operations": sorted(forbidden),
+            "capability_summary": {
+                "can_author": "gitea.pr.create" in allowed,
+                "can_review": "gitea.pr.approve" in allowed,
+                "can_merge": "gitea.pr.merge" in allowed,
+                "can_close_pr": "gitea.pr.close" in allowed,
+            },
+            "active": True,
+        }
+    )
+    elapsed = (time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000.0
+    return InventorySection(
+        name="namespaces",
+        authority=AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+        status=STATUS_OK,
+        items=(item,),
+        reason=(
+            "only the profile serving this web process is observable; other "
+            "namespaces are not enumerable from here"
+        ),
+        scan_ms=round(elapsed, 3),
+    )
+
+
+# ── correlation and collision detection ──────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def _issue_from_branch(branch: str | None) -> int | None:
+    match = re.search(r"issue-(\d+)", str(branch or ""), re.IGNORECASE)
+    return int(match.group(1)) if match else None
+
+
+def correlate(
+    *,
+    leases: InventorySection,
+    locks: InventorySection,
+    worktrees: InventorySection,
+    sessions: InventorySection,
+) -> tuple[tuple[dict[str, Any], ...], tuple[CollisionSignal, ...]]:
+    """Join lease owner ↔ lock ↔ worktree ↔ namespace where evidence allows.
+
+    Correlation rows are emitted from whatever sections did load. Collision
+    signals are only emitted from sections that are ``ok``: a conflict inferred
+    from a partially-read source would be a false accusation.
+    """
+    correlations: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
+    collisions: list[CollisionSignal] = []
+
+    worktree_by_branch: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {}
+    for entry in worktrees.items:
+        branch = (entry.get("branch") or "").strip()
+        if branch:
+            worktree_by_branch.setdefault(branch, entry)
+
+    session_by_id = {
+        str(s.get("session_id")): s for s in sessions.items if s.get("session_id")
+    }
+
+    # Lock-centred rows: a durable lock names an issue, a branch, and a worktree.
+    for lock in locks.items:
+        branch = (lock.get("branch_name") or "").strip()
+        worktree = worktree_by_branch.get(branch)
+        matching_leases = [
+            lease
+            for lease in leases.items
+            if lease.get("work_kind") == "issue"
+            and lease.get("work_number") == lock.get("issue_number")
+        ]
+        correlations.append(
+            {
+                "issue_number": lock.get("issue_number"),
+                "branch": branch or None,
+                "lock_live": bool(lock.get("live")),
+                "lock_claimant": lock.get("claimant_profile"),
+                "lock_pid": lock.get("pid"),
+                "lock_pid_alive": lock.get("pid_alive"),
+                "worktree_rel_path": (worktree or {}).get("rel_path"),
+                "worktree_classification": (worktree or {}).get("classification"),
+                "worktree_registered": (worktree or {}).get("registered_worktree"),
+                "lease_ids": [
+                    lease.get("lease_id")
+                    for lease in matching_leases
+                    if lease.get("lease_id")
+                ],
+                "lease_sessions": [
+                    lease.get("session_id")
+                    for lease in matching_leases
+                    if lease.get("session_id")
+                ],
+            }
+        )
+
+        if locks.ok and worktrees.ok:
+            # A claim whose lease window is still open but has no registered
+            # worktree is an anomaly regardless of whether its pid is alive; a
+            # fully time-expired lease is on its way out and is not flagged.
+            if (
+                lock.get("freshness_status") != "expired"
+                and branch
+                and worktree is None
+            ):
+                collisions.append(
+                    CollisionSignal(
+                        kind="lock-without-worktree",
+                        severity="warning",
+                        issue_number=lock.get("issue_number"),
+                        branch=branch,
+                        worktree_path=lock.get("worktree_path"),
+                        message=(
+                            f"Live lock on issue #{lock.get('issue_number')} names "
+                            f"branch {branch!r} but no registered worktree carries "
+                            "that branch (#404)"
+                        ),
+                    )
+                )
+
+        if locks.ok:
+            # A lock whose recorded pid is gone is held by nobody: a clean #753
+            # dead-session recovery candidate. Subclassify by the lease window,
+            # because the two cases need different operator urgency. When the
+            # window is still open the lock would read as live to a naive
+            # timestamp check even though the owner is dead — the more dangerous
+            # case — so it is flagged distinctly from a fully time-expired lease.
+            if lock.get("pid_alive") is False and lock.get("stale"):
+                if lock.get("freshness_status") == "expired":
+                    collisions.append(
+                        CollisionSignal(
+                            kind="stale-lock-dead-owner",
+                            severity="warning",
+                            issue_number=lock.get("issue_number"),
+                            branch=branch or None,
+                            message=(
+                                f"Lock on issue #{lock.get('issue_number')} is stale "
+                                f"and its recorded pid {lock.get('pid')} is not running "
+                                "(#753 dead-session recovery candidate)"
+                            ),
+                        )
+                    )
+                else:
+                    collisions.append(
+                        CollisionSignal(
+                            kind="live-lock-dead-owner",
+                            severity="warning",
+                            issue_number=lock.get("issue_number"),
+                            branch=branch or None,
+                            message=(
+                                f"Lock on issue #{lock.get('issue_number')} has an "
+                                "unexpired lease but its recorded pid "
+                                f"{lock.get('pid')} is not running; it would read as "
+                                "live to a timestamp check (#753 dead-session recovery "
+                                "candidate)"
+                            ),
+                        )
+                    )
+            # The #635 trap: the lease has expired but the recorded pid is a
+            # still-running daemon, so neither dead-pid reclaim nor exact-owner
+            # renewal applies. This is the collision an operator must see.
+            elif (
+                lock.get("freshness_status") == "expired"
+                and lock.get("pid_alive") is True
+            ):
+                collisions.append(
+                    CollisionSignal(
+                        kind="expired-lock-live-owner",
+                        severity="error",
+                        issue_number=lock.get("issue_number"),
+                        branch=branch or None,
+                        message=(
+                            f"Lock on issue #{lock.get('issue_number')} has an expired "
+                            f"lease but its recorded pid {lock.get('pid')} is still "
+                            "running (daemon-pid deadlock; needs an operator decision, "
+                            "#635/#760)"
+                        ),
+                    )
+                )
+
+    # Two live locks on one branch, or two active leases on one work item.
+    if locks.ok:
+        by_branch: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] = {}
+        for lock in locks.items:
+            if not lock.get("live"):
+                continue
+            branch = (lock.get("branch_name") or "").strip()
+            if branch:
+                by_branch.setdefault(branch, []).append(lock)
+        for branch, entries in sorted(by_branch.items()):
+            if len(entries) > 1:
+                collisions.append(
+                    CollisionSignal(
+                        kind="duplicate-live-lock",
+                        severity="error",
+                        branch=branch,
+                        message=(
+                            f"{len(entries)} live locks name branch {branch!r}: "
+                            "issues "
+                            + ", ".join(
+                                f"#{e.get('issue_number')}" for e in entries
+                            )
+                        ),
+                    )
+                )
+
+    if leases.ok:
+        by_work: dict[tuple[str, int], list[dict[str, Any]]] = {}
+        for lease in leases.items:
+            if str(lease.get("status") or "").lower() != "active":
+                continue
+            kind = str(lease.get("work_kind") or "").strip().lower()
+            number = lease.get("work_number")
+            if not kind or number is None:
+                continue
+            by_work.setdefault((kind, int(number)), []).append(lease)
+        for (kind, number), entries in sorted(by_work.items()):
+            sessions_held = {
+                str(e.get("session_id")) for e in entries if e.get("session_id")
+            }
+            if len(sessions_held) > 1:
+                collisions.append(
+                    CollisionSignal(
+                        kind="concurrent-active-lease",
+                        severity="error",
+                        issue_number=number if kind == "issue" else None,
+                        session_ids=tuple(sorted(sessions_held)),
+                        message=(
+                            f"{len(sessions_held)} sessions hold an active lease on "
+                            f"{kind} #{number}"
+                        ),
+                    )
+                )
+            for entry in entries:
+                if entry.get("expired") is True:
+                    collisions.append(
+                        CollisionSignal(
+                            kind="active-lease-past-expiry",
+                            severity="warning",
+                            issue_number=number if kind == "issue" else None,
+                            session_ids=(
+                                (str(entry.get("session_id")),)
+                                if entry.get("session_id")
+                                else ()
+                            ),
+                            message=(
+                                f"Lease {entry.get('lease_id')} on {kind} #{number} "
+                                "is still marked active past its expiry"
+                            ),
+                        )
+                    )
+
+    # A lease whose owning session is gone is an orphan, not free work.
+    if leases.ok and sessions.ok:
+        for lease in leases.items:
+            if str(lease.get("status") or "").lower() != "active":
+                continue
+            session_id = str(lease.get("session_id") or "")
+            if session_id and session_id not in session_by_id:
+                collisions.append(
+                    CollisionSignal(
+                        kind="orphan-lease",
+                        severity="error",
+                        session_ids=(session_id,),
+                        message=(
+                            f"Active lease {lease.get('lease_id')} names session "
+                            f"{session_id}, which has no session record"
+                        ),
+                    )
+                )
+
+    return tuple(correlations), tuple(collisions)
+
+
+# ── snapshot assembly ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+
+def load_inventory_snapshot(
+    *,
+    db_path: str | None = None,
+    lock_dir: str | None = None,
+    load_hygiene: Callable[[], Any] | None = None,
+    include: tuple[str, ...] | None = None,
+) -> InventorySnapshot:
+    """Build the unified inventory snapshot.
+
+    Every section is loaded independently and fails soft. *include* restricts
+    the sections that are scanned; omitted sections are simply absent rather
+    than reported as empty, so a resource-split request cannot be mistaken for
+    a whole-inventory answer.
+    """
+    started = time.perf_counter()
+    wanted = tuple(include) if include else SECTION_NAMES
+
+    sections: list[InventorySection] = []
+    sessions_section: InventorySection | None = None
+    leases_section: InventorySection | None = None
+
+    if "sessions" in wanted or "leases" in wanted:
+        sessions_section, leases_section = _load_cp_db_sections(db_path=db_path)
+        if "sessions" in wanted:
+            sections.append(sessions_section)
+        if "leases" in wanted:
+            sections.append(leases_section)
+
+    locks_section = (
+        _load_locks_section(lock_dir=lock_dir)
+        if "locks" in wanted
+        else _empty_section("locks", AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM)
+    )
+    if "locks" in wanted:
+        sections.append(locks_section)
+
+    worktrees_section = (
+        _load_worktrees_section(load_hygiene=load_hygiene)
+        if "worktrees" in wanted
+        else _empty_section("worktrees", AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM)
+    )
+    if "worktrees" in wanted:
+        sections.append(worktrees_section)
+
+    if "namespaces" in wanted:
+        sections.append(_load_namespaces_section())
+
+    correlations, collisions = correlate(
+        leases=leases_section or _empty_section("leases", AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB),
+        locks=locks_section,
+        worktrees=worktrees_section,
+        sessions=sessions_section
+        or _empty_section("sessions", AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB),
+    )
+
+    elapsed = (time.perf_counter() - started) * 1000.0
+    index = {section.name: section for section in sections}
+    return InventorySnapshot(
+        generated_at=datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(),
+        sections=tuple(sections),
+        collisions=collisions,
+        correlations=correlations,
+        scan_ms=round(elapsed, 3),
+        _section_index=index,
+    )
+
+
+def _empty_section(name: str, authority: str) -> InventorySection:
+    """A section that was not requested — never a claim that it is empty."""
+    return InventorySection(
+        name=name,
+        authority=authority,
+        status=STATUS_UNAVAILABLE,
+        reason="section not requested in this scan",
+    )
+
+
+def snapshot_to_dict(snapshot: InventorySnapshot) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Serialize the snapshot for the versioned API."""
+    return {
+        "api_version": snapshot.api_version,
+        "schema_version": snapshot.schema_version,
+        "generated_at": snapshot.generated_at,
+        "status": snapshot.status,
+        "scan_ms": snapshot.scan_ms,
+        "ownership_authority_complete": snapshot.ownership_authority_complete,
+        "ownership_note": (
+            "Every ownership source read cleanly; an item absent from leases "
+            "and locks is genuinely unclaimed."
+            if snapshot.ownership_authority_complete
+            else "One or more ownership sources are degraded; nothing in this "
+            "snapshot may be treated as unowned. Collisions are reported only "
+            "from sections that read cleanly."
+        ),
+        "degraded_sections": list(snapshot.degraded_sections),
+        "field_authority": {
+            "sessions": AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB,
+            "leases": AUTHORITY_CONTROL_PLANE_DB,
+            "locks": AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+            "worktrees": AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+            "namespaces": AUTHORITY_FILESYSTEM,
+        },
+        "sections": {section.name: section.to_dict() for section in snapshot.sections},
+        "correlations": [dict(row) for row in snapshot.correlations],
+        "collisions": [signal.to_dict() for signal in snapshot.collisions],
+    }

webui/sanctioned_restart.py

@@ -1,613 +0,0 @@
-"""Sanctioned MCP restart and graceful reload controls (#642, Phase 2).
-
-Sessions have historically recovered MCP connectivity by killing the host
-daemon (``pkill -f mcp_server.py``, #630). That path stays forbidden: it kills
-every namespace on the host, contaminates the surviving session, and leaves no
-audit trail. This module is the sanctioned replacement.
-
-A restart is modelled as a *gated action*, never as a command:
-
-1. **Capability** — the console action resolves through ``console_authz``
-   against ``task_capability_map``, so the console cannot invent an authority
-   the MCP layer does not already define.
-2. **Preview** — :func:`build_restart_preview` renders a mutation ledger and
-   the exact confirmation phrase. It never returns a shell command.
-3. **Confirmation** — the operator echoes a phrase naming the exact namespace
-   and mode. A phrase for one namespace never authorizes another.
-4. **Operator authorization** — host daemon maintenance is authorized out of
-   band through the environment (#630, and #710 finding F1: a worker session
-   cannot set an env var for an already-running daemon, so this cannot be
-   self-asserted the way a tool argument could).
-5. **Execution** — :func:`execute_restart` never spawns a process. Once every
-   gate passes it hands the request to the configured host-managed restart
-   hook; with no hook configured it fails closed.
-6. **Health recheck** — :func:`verify_post_restart_health` requires live
-   client-namespace probe evidence before any post-restart clean claim.
-
-Manual ``pkill`` remains forbidden and is classified as contamination by
-:func:`classify_restart_command`, which blocks clean claims (#630 AC3).
-
-This module performs no I/O beyond reading its own environment configuration,
-imports no MCP client, and holds no credential.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass
-from typing import Any
-
-import mcp_namespace_health
-import runtime_recovery_guard
-from webui import console_audit, console_authz
-
-# --- Operations -------------------------------------------------------------
-
-MODE_RESTART = "restart"
-MODE_RELOAD = "reload"
-MODES: tuple[str, ...] = (MODE_RESTART, MODE_RELOAD)
-
-ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE = "system.restart_namespace"
-ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE = "system.reload_namespace"
-
-ACTION_FOR_MODE: dict[str, str] = {
-    MODE_RESTART: ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
-    MODE_RELOAD: ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE,
-}
-
-# Namespaces the console may target. An unlisted name fails closed rather than
-# being passed through to a host hook.
-KNOWN_NAMESPACES: tuple[str, ...] = tuple(
-    sorted(
-        set(mcp_namespace_health.DEFAULT_NAMESPACES)
-        | {"gitea-author", "gitea-reviewer", "gitea-merger",
-           "gitea-reconciler", "gitea-controller"}
-    )
-)
-
-# Scope tokens that would mean "everything at once". Explicit non-goal: the
-# console never offers a fleet-wide restart, because that is the blast radius
-# `pkill -f mcp_server.py` already had.
-_FLEET_TOKENS = frozenset({"*", "all", "fleet", "any", ""})
-
-# --- Environment configuration ----------------------------------------------
-# Read server-side only; the value is an opaque host hook reference (e.g. a
-# launchd label), never a command line, and is never rendered to a client.
-RESTART_HOOK_ENV = "GITEA_SANCTIONED_RESTART_HOOK"
-
-# --- Reason codes -----------------------------------------------------------
-
-DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE = "unknown_mode"
-DENY_UNKNOWN_NAMESPACE = "unknown_namespace"
-DENY_FLEET_SCOPE = "fleet_scope_not_permitted"
-DENY_UNAUTHORIZED = "unauthorized"
-DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISSING = "confirmation_required"
-DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISMATCH = "confirmation_mismatch"
-DENY_OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION = "operator_authorization_missing"
-DENY_HOOK_NOT_CONFIGURED = "restart_hook_not_configured"
-DENY_CONTAMINATED_RUNTIME = "contaminated_runtime"
-
-ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED = "host_action_required"
-
-# Post-restart verification outcomes.
-HEALTH_CLEAN = "clean"
-HEALTH_UNPROVEN = "unproven"
-HEALTH_UNHEALTHY = "unhealthy"
-
-
-def _clean(value: Any) -> str:
-    return str(value or "").strip()
-
-
-# --- Mutation ledger --------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class RestartLedgerEntry:
-    """One planned step, shown before anything is asked of the host."""
-
-    sequence: int
-    step: str
-    summary: str
-    executes_process_kill: bool = False
-
-
-def _mutation_ledger(namespace: str, mode: str) -> tuple[RestartLedgerEntry, ...]:
-    if mode == MODE_RELOAD:
-        middle = RestartLedgerEntry(
-            sequence=2,
-            step="host_graceful_reload",
-            summary=(
-                f"Ask the configured host supervisor to reload {namespace} "
-                "in place, draining in-flight requests. The console does not "
-                "signal the process itself."
-            ),
-        )
-    else:
-        middle = RestartLedgerEntry(
-            sequence=2,
-            step="host_restart_hook",
-            summary=(
-                f"Ask the configured host supervisor to restart {namespace}. "
-                "The console never sends a signal and never runs a kill."
-            ),
-        )
-    return (
-        RestartLedgerEntry(
-            sequence=1,
-            step="quiesce",
-            summary=(
-                f"Stop admitting new gated mutations for {namespace} and "
-                "record the intent before anything restarts."
-            ),
-        ),
-        middle,
-        RestartLedgerEntry(
-            sequence=3,
-            step="health_recheck",
-            summary=(
-                f"Re-probe {namespace} through the live client namespace and "
-                "prove the required tool is callable again."
-            ),
-        ),
-        RestartLedgerEntry(
-            sequence=4,
-            step="audit",
-            summary=(
-                "Append actor, target namespace, mode, and result to the "
-                "console audit log."
-            ),
-        ),
-    )
-
-
-# --- Confirmation -----------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def confirmation_phrase(namespace: str, mode: str) -> str:
-    """Exact phrase an operator must echo, naming the namespace and mode.
-
-    Binding the namespace into the phrase is the point: a confirmation typed
-    for ``gitea-author`` cannot be replayed against ``gitea-merger``.
-    """
-    return f"{_clean(mode)} {_clean(namespace)}"
-
-
-def confirmation_matches(
-    namespace: str, mode: str, confirmation: str | None
-) -> bool:
-    """Compare *confirmation* to the required phrase (exact, whitespace-trimmed)."""
-    return _clean(confirmation) == confirmation_phrase(namespace, mode)
-
-
-# --- Scope validation -------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def _validate_scope(namespace: str, mode: str) -> tuple[str, str] | None:
-    """Return ``(reason_code, detail)`` when the scope is refused."""
-    ns = _clean(namespace)
-    md = _clean(mode)
-
-    if md not in MODES:
-        return (
-            DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE,
-            f"Mode {md!r} is not one of {', '.join(MODES)}.",
-        )
-    if ns.lower() in _FLEET_TOKENS:
-        return (
-            DENY_FLEET_SCOPE,
-            (
-                "Fleet-wide restart is an explicit non-goal: it reproduces the "
-                "blast radius of `pkill -f mcp_server.py` (#630). Restart one "
-                "namespace at a time."
-            ),
-        )
-    if ns not in KNOWN_NAMESPACES:
-        return (
-            DENY_UNKNOWN_NAMESPACE,
-            f"Namespace {ns!r} is not a known MCP namespace.",
-        )
-    return None
-
-
-# --- Host hook --------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def restart_hook(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Report the configured host-managed restart hook.
-
-    The hook is a reference the *host* resolves (a supervisor label), not a
-    command this process runs. ``configured=False`` fails restart closed.
-    """
-    source = env if env is not None else os.environ
-    reference = _clean(source.get(RESTART_HOOK_ENV))
-    return {
-        "configured": bool(reference),
-        "reference": reference or None,
-        "source": RESTART_HOOK_ENV if reference else None,
-        "self_assertable": False,
-        "console_executes_process": False,
-    }
-
-
-# --- Preview ----------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def build_restart_preview(
-    namespace: str,
-    mode: str = MODE_RESTART,
-    *,
-    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
-    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Render the dry-run preview for a restart/reload request.
-
-    Read-only: no authorization is granted, no host is contacted, and the
-    result never contains a shell command.
-    """
-    ns = _clean(namespace)
-    md = _clean(mode)
-    action_id = ACTION_FOR_MODE.get(md, ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE)
-    action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
-    decision = console_authz.authorize(action_id, principal)
-    scope_error = _validate_scope(ns, md)
-    hook = restart_hook(env)
-    operator = runtime_recovery_guard.operator_authorization(env)
-
-    return {
-        "action_id": action_id,
-        "namespace": ns,
-        "mode": md,
-        "scope_valid": scope_error is None,
-        "scope_reason_code": scope_error[0] if scope_error else None,
-        "scope_detail": scope_error[1] if scope_error else None,
-        "required_role": action.minimum_role if action else None,
-        "required_permission": action.mcp_permission if action else None,
-        "action_class": action.action_class if action else None,
-        "dual_control": action.dual_control if action else True,
-        "break_glass": action.break_glass if action else True,
-        "requires_confirmation": True,
-        "confirmation_phrase": confirmation_phrase(ns, md),
-        "mutation_ledger": [asdict(entry) for entry in _mutation_ledger(ns, md)],
-        "authorization": decision.to_dict(),
-        "operator_authorization": operator,
-        "restart_hook": hook,
-        "execution_enabled": False,
-        "raw_process_kill_exposed": False,
-        "known_namespaces": list(KNOWN_NAMESPACES),
-        "post_restart_verification_required": True,
-    }
-
-
-# --- Gate -------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def assess_restart_request(
-    namespace: str,
-    mode: str = MODE_RESTART,
-    *,
-    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
-    confirmation: str | None = None,
-    contamination_marker: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Decide whether a restart request may proceed to the host hook.
-
-    Every gate must pass. The first failure wins and is reported with a stable
-    reason code; a pass never means "restarted", only "may be handed to the
-    configured host hook".
-    """
-    ns = _clean(namespace)
-    md = _clean(mode)
-    action_id = ACTION_FOR_MODE.get(md, ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE)
-    preview = build_restart_preview(ns, md, principal=principal, env=env)
-
-    def refuse(reason_code: str, detail: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "allowed": False,
-            "gates_passed": False,
-            "reason_code": reason_code,
-            "detail": detail,
-            "action_id": action_id,
-            "namespace": ns,
-            "mode": md,
-            "preview": preview,
-            "execution_enabled": False,
-        }
-
-    scope_error = _validate_scope(ns, md)
-    if scope_error is not None:
-        return refuse(*scope_error)
-
-    # Authority is checked as an authorization decision, not an execution
-    # grant. ``for_execution=True`` asks "may the console perform this write?",
-    # and the answer here is permanently no: step 2 of the ledger is a request
-    # to the host supervisor, so the console's Phase 2 execution gate is not
-    # the relevant gate. Every branch below keeps ``execution_enabled`` False
-    # and :func:`execute_restart` never touches a process.
-    decision = console_authz.authorize(action_id, principal)
-    if not decision.allowed:
-        return refuse(DENY_UNAUTHORIZED, decision.detail)
-
-    if not _clean(confirmation):
-        return refuse(
-            DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISSING,
-            (
-                "Type the confirmation phrase "
-                f"{preview['confirmation_phrase']!r} to proceed."
-            ),
-        )
-    if not confirmation_matches(ns, md, confirmation):
-        return refuse(
-            DENY_CONFIRMATION_MISMATCH,
-            (
-                "Confirmation does not name this namespace and mode; expected "
-                f"{preview['confirmation_phrase']!r}."
-            ),
-        )
-
-    operator = preview["operator_authorization"]
-    if not operator["authorized"]:
-        return refuse(
-            DENY_OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION,
-            (
-                "Host daemon maintenance requires out-of-band operator "
-                "authorization via "
-                f"{runtime_recovery_guard.OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION_ENV}."
-            ),
-        )
-
-    # #630's task-scoped gate deliberately lets a contaminated worker keep
-    # commenting and handing off. Restart is stricter and unconditional: a
-    # runtime already contaminated by a manual kill must be reconciled before
-    # it is restarted again, or the restart just launders the contamination.
-    if contamination_marker and not contamination_marker.get(
-        "cleared_by_reconciler"
-    ):
-        return refuse(
-            DENY_CONTAMINATED_RUNTIME,
-            (
-                "A live contamination marker is present; clear it through the "
-                "reconciler path before restarting."
-            ),
-        )
-
-    hook = preview["restart_hook"]
-    if not hook["configured"]:
-        return refuse(
-            DENY_HOOK_NOT_CONFIGURED,
-            (
-                "No host-managed restart hook is configured "
-                f"({RESTART_HOOK_ENV}). The console will not fall back to a "
-                "process kill."
-            ),
-        )
-
-    return {
-        "allowed": True,
-        "gates_passed": True,
-        "reason_code": ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED,
-        "detail": (
-            "Every gate passed. The restart must be performed by the "
-            "configured host supervisor; the console does not signal the "
-            "process."
-        ),
-        "action_id": action_id,
-        "namespace": ns,
-        "mode": md,
-        "preview": preview,
-        "execution_enabled": False,
-        "console_executes": False,
-        "console_active_phase": console_authz.ACTIVE_PHASE,
-    }
-
-
-# --- Execution --------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def execute_restart(
-    namespace: str,
-    mode: str = MODE_RESTART,
-    *,
-    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
-    confirmation: str | None = None,
-    contamination_marker: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
-    request_id: str | None = None,
-    session_id: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Run every gate, audit the outcome, and hand off to the host.
-
-    This function never spawns a process, never sends a signal, and never
-    builds a command line. ``success`` is False in both directions: a refused
-    request is refused, and an authorized request still requires the host
-    supervisor to act.
-    """
-    assessment = assess_restart_request(
-        namespace,
-        mode,
-        principal=principal,
-        confirmation=confirmation,
-        contamination_marker=contamination_marker,
-        env=env,
-    )
-    action_id = assessment["action_id"]
-    allowed = assessment["allowed"]
-
-    audit = console_audit.record_event(
-        action_id=action_id,
-        result=(
-            console_audit.RESULT_ALLOWED if allowed
-            else console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
-        ),
-        principal=principal,
-        target={"namespace": assessment["namespace"], "mode": assessment["mode"]},
-        reason_code=assessment["reason_code"],
-        detail=assessment["detail"],
-        request_id=request_id,
-        session_id=session_id,
-        metadata={
-            "gates_passed": assessment["gates_passed"],
-            "process_kill_executed": False,
-            "post_restart_verification_required": True,
-        },
-    )
-
-    return {
-        "success": False,
-        "outcome": (
-            ALLOW_HOST_ACTION_REQUIRED if allowed else assessment["reason_code"]
-        ),
-        "allowed": allowed,
-        "detail": assessment["detail"],
-        "namespace": assessment["namespace"],
-        "mode": assessment["mode"],
-        "action_id": action_id,
-        "process_kill_executed": False,
-        "host_hook": assessment["preview"]["restart_hook"],
-        "next_action": (
-            "Have the host supervisor perform the restart, then call "
-            "verify_post_restart_health with live client-namespace evidence "
-            "before claiming a clean session."
-            if allowed
-            else assessment["detail"]
-        ),
-        "assessment": assessment,
-        "audit": audit,
-    }
-
-
-# --- Contamination classification -------------------------------------------
-
-
-def classify_restart_command(
-    command: str | None,
-    *,
-    mcp_pids: list[Any] | tuple[Any, ...] | None = None,
-    session_id: str | None = None,
-    remote: str | None = None,
-    role: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Classify an operator-proposed recovery command (#630 AC2).
-
-    A manual ``pkill``/``kill`` of the MCP daemon is contamination, not a
-    restart. When contaminating, a durable marker is returned so downstream
-    gated mutations and clean claims fail closed.
-    """
-    classification = runtime_recovery_guard.classify_recovery_command(
-        command, mcp_pids=mcp_pids
-    )
-    contaminating = bool(classification.get("contamination"))
-
-    marker = None
-    if contaminating:
-        marker = runtime_recovery_guard.build_contamination_record(
-            reason_class=(
-                classification.get("reason_class")
-                or runtime_recovery_guard.REASON_MANUAL_DAEMON_KILL
-            ),
-            command_redacted=classification.get("redacted_command"),
-            session_id=session_id,
-            remote=remote,
-            role=role,
-            detail=(
-                "Manual daemon kill is forbidden; use the sanctioned "
-                f"{ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE} gated action instead."
-            ),
-        )
-
-    return {
-        "contamination": contaminating,
-        "sanctioned": not contaminating and not classification.get("process_kill"),
-        "clean_claim_allowed": not contaminating,
-        "reason_class": classification.get("reason_class"),
-        "redacted_command": classification.get("redacted_command"),
-        "classification": classification,
-        "contamination_marker": marker,
-        "sanctioned_alternative": ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE,
-    }
-
-
-# --- Post-restart health verification ---------------------------------------
-
-
-def verify_post_restart_health(
-    namespace: str,
-    *,
-    probe_result: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-    probe_source: str | None = None,
-    registered_tools: list[str] | tuple[str, ...] | None = None,
-    required_tool: str | None = None,
-    profile: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Require live proof a namespace is callable before any clean claim (AC3).
-
-    Static registration is not proof and neither is an offline subprocess
-    probe: only ``probe_source=client_namespace`` evidence can clear a
-    post-restart session for mutations.
-    """
-    ns = _clean(namespace)
-    health = mcp_namespace_health.classify_namespace_probe(
-        ns,
-        required_tool=required_tool,
-        registered_tools=registered_tools,
-        probe_result=probe_result,
-        profile=profile,
-        probe_source=probe_source,
-    )
-    healthy = bool(health.get("healthy"))
-    proven = bool(health.get("ide_namespace_proven"))
-
-    if healthy and proven:
-        status = HEALTH_CLEAN
-    elif healthy:
-        status = HEALTH_UNPROVEN
-    else:
-        status = HEALTH_UNHEALTHY
-
-    reasons = list(health.get("reasons") or [])
-    if status == HEALTH_UNPROVEN:
-        reasons.append(
-            "Namespace reported healthy without live client-namespace "
-            "evidence; a post-restart clean claim requires "
-            f"probe_source={mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_CLIENT!r}."
-        )
-
-    return {
-        "namespace": ns,
-        "status": status,
-        "healthy": healthy,
-        "ide_namespace_proven": proven,
-        "clean_claim_allowed": status == HEALTH_CLEAN,
-        "mutations_allowed": status == HEALTH_CLEAN,
-        "reasons": reasons,
-        "health": health,
-    }
-
-
-# --- Policy surface ---------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-def restart_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Machine-readable description of the sanctioned restart contract."""
-    return {
-        "policy_version": 1,
-        "modes": list(MODES),
-        "actions": [ACTION_RESTART_NAMESPACE, ACTION_RELOAD_NAMESPACE],
-        "known_namespaces": list(KNOWN_NAMESPACES),
-        "fleet_scope_permitted": False,
-        "console_executes_process_kill": False,
-        "raw_kill_exposed": False,
-        "requires_confirmation": True,
-        "confirmation_binds_namespace": True,
-        "operator_authorization_env": (
-            runtime_recovery_guard.OPERATOR_AUTHORIZATION_ENV
-        ),
-        "restart_hook_env": RESTART_HOOK_ENV,
-        "manual_kill_classified_as": runtime_recovery_guard.CONTAMINATION_KIND,
-        "post_restart_clean_claim_requires": (
-            mcp_namespace_health.PROBE_SOURCE_CLIENT
-        ),
-        "audit_required": True,
-        "silent_auto_restart_permitted": False,
-    }