chore: merge master into feat/issue-646-policy-guardrail-visibility (base sync)

Phase 3 child of the Web Console epic #631. Operators can now see the active
workflow policy/guardrail configuration from the console instead of reading the
repo tree.

- webui/policy_inventory.py (new): redacted, machine-readable guardrail
  inventory. One row per major guardrail (role separation/RBAC, lease rules,
  worktree binding, merge confirmation, redaction, contamination, allocator
  policy, audit logging, mutation gating) with source pointers (file/module/doc)
  and a compact active projection from the existing safe policy accessors.
  Fail-soft per entry; whole payload run through console_redaction before emit;
  diff vs documented default where feasible.
- webui/policy_views.py (new): HTML cards with source pointers, active config,
  and the documented-default diff; read-only page copy, no forms.
- webui/app.py: register GET /policy and GET /api/v1/policy (additive).
- webui/layout.py: add Policy nav item.
- tests/test_webui_policy_visibility.py (new): guardrail presence + source
  pointers (AC1), redaction incl. planted-secret masking and scan_for_secrets
  (AC2/AC3), read-only page + no-mutation routes (AC4), fail-soft rendering.
- docs/webui-local-dev.md: route table + read-only policy-visibility section.

Read-only throughout; no policy editing, no gate-weakening toggle, secrets
redacted.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

canonical_thread_handoff.py

@@ -46,17 +46,6 @@ _FIELD_RE = re.compile(
 )
 
 
-def is_known_cth_type(value: str | None) -> bool:
-    """True when *value* is a declared member of the :data:`CTH_TYPES` contract.
-
-    ``CTH_TYPES`` is the single authority for what a CTH type may be. The
-    heading a comment carries is free text, so a *read* path that turns a parsed
-    type into something durable — a serialized field, a routing decision — must
-    check membership here rather than trust the parse or keep a list of its own.
-    """
-    return (value or "").strip() in CTH_TYPES
-
-
 def format_cth_body(
     *,
     cth_type: str,
@@ -71,7 +60,7 @@ def format_cth_body(
 ) -> str:
     """Render a canonical CTH comment body."""
     normalized_type = (cth_type or "").strip()
-    if not is_known_cth_type(normalized_type):
+    if normalized_type not in CTH_TYPES:
         raise ValueError(
             f"unknown CTH type '{cth_type}'; expected one of {sorted(CTH_TYPES)}"
         )
@@ -112,12 +101,6 @@ def parse_cth_comment(body: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
         fields[key] = match.group(2).strip()
     return {
         "cth_type": cth_type,
-        # The heading capture is unconstrained free text, so the parse states
-        # whether it satisfies the CTH_TYPES contract instead of leaving every
-        # reader to decide (or forget). Parsing stays total — an unknown type is
-        # still parsed and reported, never raised on — but a reader that turns
-        # the type into a durable value can now tell the two apart.
-        "cth_type_known": is_known_cth_type(cth_type),
         "fields": fields,
         "raw_body": text,
     }
@@ -136,7 +119,7 @@ def assess_cth_comment(body: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
         }
 
     cth_type = parsed.get("cth_type") or ""
-    if not is_known_cth_type(cth_type):
+    if cth_type not in CTH_TYPES:
         reasons.append(
             f"unknown CTH type '{cth_type}'; expected one of {sorted(CTH_TYPES)}"
         )

docs/webui-local-dev.md

@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@ status, onboarding checklist state, and the fail-closed error payloads (#635).
 | `/` | Home / operator overview |
 | `/health` | JSON liveness (`status`, `service`, `mode`, `timestamp`, `uptime_seconds`) |
 | `/api/v1/system/health` | Structured read-only system health (#634) |
-| `/system-health` | System-health dashboard — readiness, version/uptime, dependencies, MCP namespaces, stale-runtime parity (#639) |
 | `/queue` | Live PR and issue queue dashboard (#429) |
 | `/api/queue` | JSON queue export with pagination metadata |
 | `/projects` | Project registry list with status and onboarding progress (#427, #635) |
@@ -66,6 +65,8 @@ status, onboarding checklist state, and the fail-closed error payloads (#635).
 | `/api/prompts` | JSON prompt export with workflow hashes |
 | `/runtime` | MCP runtime health and stale detection (#430) |
 | `/api/runtime` | JSON runtime health export |
+| `/policy` | Workflow policy and guardrail configuration visibility (#646) |
+| `/api/v1/policy` | Versioned JSON guardrail inventory (redacted, read-only) |
 | `/audit` | Report audit paste + validator preview (#431) |
 | `/api/audit` | JSON validator preview (POST `report_text`, optional `task_kind`) |
 | `/worktrees` | Worktree hygiene dashboard (#432) |
@@ -75,11 +76,6 @@ status, onboarding checklist state, and the fail-closed error payloads (#635).
 | `/api/actions/{id}/preview` | Mutation ledger preview (GET, read-only) |
 | `/leases` | Lease and collision visibility (#433) |
 | `/api/leases` | JSON lease/collision export |
-| `/sessions` | Phase 1 shell stub — session inventory (backed by #636) |
-| `/inventory` | Phase 1 shell stub — unified inventory (backed by #636) |
-| `/timeline` | Phase 1 shell stub — workflow event timeline |
-| `/policy` | Phase 1 shell stub — capability/role policy placeholder |
-| `/insights` | Phase 1 shell stub — operational insights placeholder |
 
 Most routes are GET-only. POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE return `405` with
 `read-only-mvp`, except `/audit` and `/api/audit` which accept POST for
@@ -239,56 +235,18 @@ health, workflow/schema SHA-256 hashes, and stale-runtime warnings when the
 checkout is behind merged safety-gate changes. Restart guidance links to #420;
 no tokens or MCP restart actions are exposed.
 
-## Application shell — Phase 1 (#638)
+## Policy & guardrail visibility (#646)
 
-The console shell (`webui/layout.py`) renders a grouped navigation driven by a
+`/policy` (HTML) and `/api/v1/policy` (JSON) surface a **read-only** projection
-single nav-config module, `webui/nav.py`. Nav groups follow the epic #631
+of the major workflow guardrails — role separation/RBAC, lease lifecycle,
-Phase 1 information architecture: **Health, Traffic, Runtime/Sessions,
+author worktree binding, merge confirmation, secret redaction, contamination
-Projects, Inventory, Timeline, Policy** (placeholder), and **Insights**
+containment, allocator policy, audit logging, and mutation gating. Each entry
-(placeholder). Live views and Phase 1 placeholders (`stub`) are declared in one
+carries source pointers to the file/module/doc that owns it, a compact active
-place so the layout and the route table cannot drift.
+value derived from the existing safe policy accessors, and — where a documented
-
+default is declared — a diff of active vs documented. The whole payload is run
-The header carries two read-only status badges — an **environment** badge
+through the console redaction pass before it is emitted, so a planted or
-(`local` for loopback binds, `remote` otherwise, derived from `WEBUI_HOST`) and
+accidental secret degrades to the placeholder rather than reaching a client.
-a **mode: read-only** badge — plus a **Docs** link to this document. No
+The view never edits policy and exposes no gate-weakening toggle.
-privileged action controls are present in the Phase 1 shell.
-
-Not-yet-implemented surfaces (`/sessions`, `/inventory`, `/timeline`,
-`/policy`, `/insights`) resolve to graceful read-only stub pages instead of
-404s; their backing views land in later child issues of #631 (the inventory
-surfaces are backed by #636). Mutating methods on stub routes still fail closed
-with `read-only-mvp`.
-
-## System-health dashboard (#639)
-
-`/system-health` renders the same snapshot the `/api/v1/system/health` API
-returns, so the page and the API can never disagree. Cards: overall readiness,
-stale-runtime parity, version and uptime, dependency probes, MCP namespaces,
-probe errors (only when present), and recovery pointers. `?deep=1` opts into
-the network probe exactly as the API does; the plain page load stays cheap.
-
-Field authority and honesty rules:
-
-* `ready` and `readiness_complete` are shown separately. A snapshot whose
-  required probes never ran is not the same as one that ran them and passed,
-  and the page never collapses the two into an unproven green.
-* A probe that did not run appears under **Not probed**, never as healthy.
-* `stale_runtime.mutation_safe` is displayed verbatim from the API. When the
-  runtime is stale, or when parity is indeterminate, the page warns and does
-  not claim mutation safety.
-* MCP namespaces are reported `unproven`: the web process runs outside the
-  IDE-managed MCP client and cannot prove that path (#543).
-
-Redaction is split by field kind. Free text — probe details, readiness and
-parity reasons, probe errors — passes through `system_health.redact`.
-Structured fields — commit SHAs, probe names, statuses, timestamps — are
-HTML-escaped only, because `redact`'s opaque-token rule matches any run of 32
-or more characters and would otherwise blank every 40-character git SHA, which
-is precisely the evidence the parity view exists to show.
-
-The dashboard is read-only: no restart, reload, or process-kill control. Those
-arrive in Phase 2 (#642). Recovery guidance points at the sanctioned client
-reconnect / operator restart path — never a manual daemon kill (#630).
 
 ## Deployment boundary (#435)
 
@@ -349,108 +307,6 @@ health, workflow/schema SHA-256 hashes, and stale-runtime warnings when the
 checkout is behind merged safety-gate changes. Restart guidance links to #420;
 no tokens or MCP restart actions are exposed.
 
-## Workflow-event timeline (#637)
-
-`GET /api/v1/timeline` is a read-only, versioned aggregation of workflow
-events from every available source into one normalised, filterable stream. It
-is the model layer for the Phase 1 timeline console view (a later child issue
-of #631); this issue ships the schema, adapters, and read API only.
-
-### Schema (versioned)
-
-`webui/timeline.py` declares `TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION` (currently `1`) and the
-frozen `WorkflowEvent` record. Every response carries `schema_version` so a
-consumer can branch on shape. One event:
-
-```json
-{
-  "source": "control_plane",
-  "event_type": "lease.renew",
-  "event_key": "cp:1421",
-  "timestamp": "2026-07-23T02:00:00Z",
-  "actor": null,
-  "role": null,
-  "issue_number": 637,
-  "pr_number": null,
-  "session_id": null,
-  "tool_name": null,
-  "decision": null,
-  "message": "lease renewed",
-  "correlation_id": "issue#637",
-  "evidence_refs": [],
-  "sensitive": true
-}
-```
-
-`event_key` is stable and unique per source (`cp:<event_id>`,
-`cth:<kind>:<number>:<comment_id>`), so pagination and dedup are deterministic.
-
-### Sources and field authority
-
-| Source | Adapter | Authority |
-|---|---|---|
-| Control-plane `events` ⋈ `work_items` | `adapt_cp_events` | `event_type`, `message`, `timestamp`, issue/PR scope come from the CP database, read through a `mode=ro` URI (never creates the DB or runs migrations) |
-| Gitea Canonical Thread Handoff comments | `adapt_cth_comments` | `actor`, `role` (next owner), `decision`, `evidence_refs`, `timestamp` come from the parsed CTH comment body (`canonical_thread_handoff`) |
-
-Handoff comments are thread-scoped: they are only read when the request filters
-by a single `issue` or `pr`. Otherwise the handoff source reports `not run`
-with a reason — it is never rendered as empty-and-healthy. Each source degrades
-independently: an unavailable control-plane DB or a failed comment fetch is a
-`sources[]` entry with `ok:false` and a `reason`, never a dropped timeline.
-
-### Query parameters
-
-`issue`, `pr`, `session` (conjunctive filters); `limit` (default 50, max 500)
-and `offset` for pagination; `remote`, `org`, `repo` to override the default
-registry-project scope. Events sort ascending by
-`(timestamp, source_rank, event_key)`; missing timestamps sort last.
-
-### Filter authority, and refusing what cannot be answered
-
-A filter dimension is only meaningful for a source whose records carry it.
-Each source declares its own support in `_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT` and reports it
-per response as `supported_filters` / `unsupported_filters`:
-
-| Source | issue | pr | session |
-|---|---|---|---|
-| `control_plane` | yes | yes | **no** — the `events` table is `(event_id, work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at)` and records no session |
-| `gitea_handoff` | yes | yes | yes — a CTH comment declares its own `Session:` field |
-
-`session_id` is read only from that declared CTH field. It is never inferred
-from a work item, an actor, or message text, and a value that is
-redaction-altering or bare-secret-shaped is dropped rather than emitted.
-
-When **no source that ran** can carry a requested dimension, the request is
-refused rather than answered: the response is `422` with `ok:false` and a
-structured `error` naming `unsupported_filters` and the per-source reason. A
-`200` with zero events would tell an operator that no such activity exists,
-which is a stronger — and false — claim than "this cannot be answered here".
-A source that *can* answer the dimension and simply matched nothing still
-returns `200` with `ok:true` and an empty page.
-
-### Redaction
-
-Every free-text field (event messages, decision/proof text, roles, actors) is
-passed through the console redaction policy (`webui.console_redaction`, backed
-by `gitea_audit.redact`) before it leaves the module, failing closed to the
-placeholder. No unredacted tool arguments or secrets are ever emitted, and a
-generation error never drops raw data to a caller or a log.
-
-Redaction also runs *before* any structured value is derived from free text.
-`evidence_refs` are extracted from already-redacted proof/decision text, and a
-commit reference is recognised only where the text declares one (`commit`,
-`head`, `base`, `sha`, …). An undeclared 40-character hex run has the exact
-shape of a Gitea access token, so it is never lifted out of prose into a
-structured field. Every reference is then independently revalidated against an
-allowed shape and a second redaction pass immediately before serialization;
-anything unproven is dropped and the event is flagged `sensitive`.
-
-### Tests
-
-```bash
-pytest tests/test_webui_timeline.py -q
-```
-
 ## Tests
 
 ```bash

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -440,32 +440,13 @@ def _session_author_lock_worktree() -> str | None:
 
     Used to derive the author mutation workspace when no explicit
     ``worktree_path`` or env binding is provided. Never invents a path.
-
-    #864: a session pointer whose owner PID is dead and is not this process
-    must not force workspace binding for other issues — rebind is required for
-    that issue, and a stale dead-owner pointer must not poison unrelated work.
     """
     try:
         lock = issue_lock_store.read_session_issue_lock() or {}
     except Exception:
         return None
     path = (lock.get("worktree_path") or "").strip()
-    if not path:
+    return path or None
-        return None
-    pid = lock.get("session_pid")
-    if pid is None:
-        pid = lock.get("pid")
-    try:
-        pid_i = int(pid) if pid is not None else None
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        pid_i = None
-    if (
-        pid_i is not None
-        and pid_i != os.getpid()
-        and not issue_lock_store.is_process_alive(pid_i)
-    ):
-        return None
-    return path
 
 
 def _resolve_preflight_workspace_path(worktree_path: str | None = None) -> str:
@@ -2050,7 +2031,6 @@ import issue_lock_store  # noqa: E402
 import issue_lock_adoption  # noqa: E402
 import issue_lock_recovery  # noqa: E402
 import issue_lock_renewal  # noqa: E402
-import dirty_same_claimant_session_rebind  # noqa: E402  # #864
 import stacked_pr_support  # noqa: E402
 import merge_approval_gate  # noqa: E402
 import review_quarantine  # noqa: E402  # #695 contaminated formal-review quarantine
@@ -4362,263 +4342,6 @@ def gitea_lock_issue(
     return result
 
 
-@mcp.tool()
-def gitea_rebind_dirty_same_claimant_author_session(
-    issue_number: int,
-    branch_name: str,
-    worktree_path: str,
-    old_pid: int,
-    expected_local_head: str,
-    expected_remote_head: str,
-    expected_dirty_paths: list[str],
-    expected_fingerprints: dict,
-    remote: str = "dadeschools",
-    host: str | None = None,
-    org: str | None = None,
-    repo: str | None = None,
-    dry_run: bool = False,
-    authorize_reconciler_execute: bool = False,
-) -> dict:
-    """Rebind a dirty registered issue worktree to this session (#864).
-
-    Sanctioned only when every pin agrees: same claimant, dead old_pid matching
-    the durable lock, matching local/remote heads, exact dirty path set, and
-    per-path sha256 fingerprints. Preserves every tracked/untracked byte.
-    Does not sync remote, create recovery worktrees, clean, reset, or move heads.
-
-    Role gate:
-    * author — must match the lock claimant identity/profile
-    * reconciler — execute only when ``authorize_reconciler_execute=True``
-    * reviewer/merger — always refuse
-
-    ``gitea.issue.comment`` (author map entry) is required for mutation; dry_run
-    still assesses fully but writes nothing. Permission alone is never ownership
-    proof — every pin is re-checked server-side.
-
-    Args:
-        issue_number: Tracking issue number on the durable lock.
-        branch_name: Exact locked branch name.
-        worktree_path: Registered dirty worktree path (must be under branches/).
-        old_pid: Dead owner PID recorded on the lock (must match session_pid/pid).
-        expected_local_head: Full local HEAD sha the caller observed.
-        expected_remote_head: Full remote-tracking HEAD sha the caller observed.
-        expected_dirty_paths: Exact set of dirty relative paths (tracked+untracked).
-        expected_fingerprints: Map of relative path -> sha256 hex of file bytes.
-        remote: Known instance — 'dadeschools' or 'prgs'.
-        host/org/repo: Optional target overrides (validated against binding).
-        dry_run: When true, assess only (no lock/session writes).
-        authorize_reconciler_execute: Reconciler-only execute gate.
-    """
-    role = _profile_role_kind(get_profile())
-    role_norm = (role or "").strip().lower()
-
-    # Permission: authors need comment; dry_run assess is reachable under read
-    # for diagnosis, but execute always needs comment. Reconciler execute also
-    # needs comment when authorized.
-    if dry_run:
-        read_block = _profile_operation_gate("gitea.read")
-        if read_block:
-            return {
-                "success": False,
-                "dry_run": True,
-                "reasons": read_block,
-                "permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.read"),
-            }
-    else:
-        blocked = _profile_permission_block(
-            task_capability_map.required_permission(
-                "rebind_dirty_same_claimant_author_session"
-            ),
-            issue_number=issue_number,
-            remote=remote,
-            host=host,
-            org=org,
-            repo=repo,
-            org_explicit=org is not None,
-            repo_explicit=repo is not None,
-        )
-        if blocked:
-            return blocked
-
-    if role_norm in {"reviewer", "merger"}:
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "dry_run": bool(dry_run),
-            "outcome": dirty_same_claimant_session_rebind.REFUSED,
-            "reasons": [
-                f"role '{role_norm}' cannot rebind dirty same-claimant author "
-                "sessions (fail closed)"
-            ],
-        }
-    if role_norm == "reconciler" and not authorize_reconciler_execute and not dry_run:
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "dry_run": False,
-            "outcome": dirty_same_claimant_session_rebind.REFUSED,
-            "reasons": [
-                "reconciler role requires authorize_reconciler_execute=True "
-                "to execute dirty same-claimant rebind (fail closed)"
-            ],
-        }
-
-    h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
-    try:
-        identity = _authenticated_username(h)
-    except Exception:
-        identity = None
-    profile = get_profile()
-    profile_name = profile.get("profile_name")
-
-    existing = _load_existing_issue_lock(
-        remote=remote, org=o, repo=r, issue_number=issue_number
-    )
-    resolved_wt = os.path.realpath(os.path.abspath((worktree_path or "").strip()))
-    inv = dirty_same_claimant_session_rebind.collect_dirty_inventory(resolved_wt)
-
-    branch_res = subprocess.run(
-        ["git", "-C", resolved_wt, "branch", "--show-current"],
-        capture_output=True,
-        text=True,
-        check=False,
-    )
-    current_branch = (branch_res.stdout or "").strip() or None
-    head_res = subprocess.run(
-        ["git", "-C", resolved_wt, "rev-parse", "HEAD"],
-        capture_output=True,
-        text=True,
-        check=False,
-    )
-    local_head = (head_res.stdout or "").strip() if head_res.returncode == 0 else None
-
-    # Observe remote-tracking head without network when possible.
-    remote_head = None
-    for ref in (
-        f"refs/remotes/origin/{branch_name}",
-        f"origin/{branch_name}",
-        f"refs/remotes/{remote}/{branch_name}",
-        f"{remote}/{branch_name}",
-    ):
-        rh = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "-C", resolved_wt, "rev-parse", "--verify", "--quiet", ref],
-            capture_output=True,
-            text=True,
-            check=False,
-        )
-        if rh.returncode == 0 and (rh.stdout or "").strip():
-            remote_head = (rh.stdout or "").strip()
-            break
-    if remote_head is None:
-        # Fall back to caller's pin only for observation absence — assessment
-        # still requires pin==observed, so missing observation fails closed.
-        remote_head = None
-
-    # Competing live locks (other issues / other worktrees).
-    competing_live = []
-    for entry in issue_lock_store.list_live_locks():
-        competing_live.append(entry)
-
-    # Session pointers that claim this issue lock.
-    competing_sessions = []
-    lock_dir = issue_lock_store.default_lock_dir()
-    lock_path = issue_lock_store.lock_file_path(
-        remote=remote, org=o, repo=r, issue_number=issue_number, lock_dir=lock_dir
-    )
-    try:
-        for name in os.listdir(lock_dir):
-            if not name.startswith("session-") or not name.endswith(".json"):
-                continue
-            ptr = issue_lock_store.read_lock_file(os.path.join(lock_dir, name))
-            if not ptr:
-                continue
-            ptr_lock = str(ptr.get("lock_file_path") or "").strip()
-            if not ptr_lock:
-                continue
-            try:
-                same = os.path.realpath(ptr_lock) == os.path.realpath(lock_path)
-            except OSError:
-                same = ptr_lock == lock_path
-            if not same:
-                continue
-            try:
-                sess_pid = int(str(name)[len("session-") : -len(".json")])
-            except ValueError:
-                sess_pid = ptr.get("pid")
-            competing_sessions.append(
-                {
-                    "pid": sess_pid,
-                    "lock_file_path": ptr_lock,
-                    "live": issue_lock_store.is_process_alive(sess_pid),
-                }
-            )
-    except OSError:
-        pass
-
-    # Best-effort workflow-lease scan: any live lock file whose work_lease is a
-    # non-author workflow lease on this issue/branch counts as active.
-    workflow_lease_active = False
-    for path in issue_lock_store.iter_lock_files(lock_dir):
-        rec = issue_lock_store.read_lock_file(path)
-        if not rec:
-            continue
-        lease = rec.get("work_lease") if isinstance(rec.get("work_lease"), dict) else {}
-        op = str(lease.get("operation_type") or "")
-        if op and op != issue_lock_store.AUTHOR_ISSUE_WORK_LEASE:
-            if rec.get("issue_number") == issue_number or str(
-                rec.get("branch_name") or ""
-            ) == branch_name:
-                if issue_lock_store.is_lease_live(rec):
-                    workflow_lease_active = True
-                    break
-
-    repo_root = _canonical_local_git_root()
-    # permission_allowed reflects profile gate only — never ownership proof.
-    permission_allowed = True
-
-    result = dirty_same_claimant_session_rebind.apply_dirty_same_claimant_session_rebind(
-        remote=remote,
-        org=o,
-        repo=r,
-        issue_number=issue_number,
-        branch_name=branch_name,
-        worktree_path=resolved_wt,
-        claimant_identity=identity,
-        claimant_profile=profile_name,
-        old_pid=old_pid,
-        expected_local_head=expected_local_head,
-        expected_remote_head=expected_remote_head,
-        expected_dirty_paths=list(expected_dirty_paths or []),
-        expected_fingerprints=dict(expected_fingerprints or {}),
-        existing_lock=existing,
-        current_identity=identity,
-        current_profile=profile_name,
-        role_kind=role_norm or role,
-        current_pid=os.getpid(),
-        current_branch=current_branch,
-        local_head=local_head,
-        remote_head=remote_head,
-        dirty_inventory=inv,
-        competing_live_locks=competing_live,
-        competing_sessions=competing_sessions,
-        workflow_lease_active=workflow_lease_active,
-        authorize_reconciler_execute=bool(authorize_reconciler_execute),
-        permission_allowed=permission_allowed,
-        repo_root=repo_root,
-        dry_run=bool(dry_run),
-        lock_dir=lock_dir,
-    )
-    result["observed"] = {
-        "local_head": local_head,
-        "remote_head": remote_head,
-        "current_branch": current_branch,
-        "dirty_paths": inv.get("dirty_paths"),
-        "fingerprints": inv.get("fingerprints"),
-        "identity": identity,
-        "profile": profile_name,
-        "role_kind": role_norm,
-    }
-    return result
-
-
 @mcp.tool()
 def gitea_assess_work_issue_duplicate(
     issue_number: int,
@@ -11519,22 +11242,25 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
     if dry_run:
         report["dry_run"] = True
         report["executed"] = False
-        # #851: surface planned lifecycle order so dry-run matches execute.
-        report["planned_execution_orders"] = {
-            str(entry.get("pr_number")): entry.get("planned_execution_order") or []
-            for entry in (report.get("entries") or [])
-        }
         return {"success": True, "performed": False, **report}
 
     verify_preflight_purity(
         remote, task="reconcile_merged_cleanups", org=org, repo=repo
     )
     actions: list[dict] = []
-    project_root = _canonical_local_git_root()
+    for entry in report.get("entries") or []:
+        head_branch = entry.get("head_branch") or ""
+        remote_assessment = entry.get("remote_branch") or {}
+        local_assessment = entry.get("local_worktree") or {}
 
-    def _ownership_records_for_branch(
+        if remote_assessment.get("safe_to_delete_remote"):
-        head_branch: str, pr_num_int: int | None
+            import urllib.parse
-    ) -> list[dict]:
+
+            pr_num = entry.get("pr_number")
+            try:
+                pr_num_int = int(pr_num) if pr_num is not None else None
+            except (TypeError, ValueError):
+                pr_num_int = None
             ownership_bundle = _collect_branch_ownership_records(
                 remote=remote,
                 host=h,
@@ -11542,7 +11268,7 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
                 repo=r,
                 branch=head_branch,
                 pr_number=pr_num_int,
-            project_root=project_root,
+                project_root=_canonical_local_git_root(),
                 auth=auth,
                 base_api=base,
             )
@@ -11563,18 +11289,6 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
                         "role": "inventory",
                     }
                 )
-        return ownership_records
-
-    def _attempt_owned_remote_delete(
-        *,
-        head_branch: str,
-        pr_num_int: int | None,
-        after_worktree_removal: bool = False,
-    ) -> dict:
-        """Fail-closed remote delete with live ownership reassessment (#851)."""
-        import urllib.parse
-
-        ownership_records = _ownership_records_for_branch(head_branch, pr_num_int)
             ownership = branch_cleanup_guard.assess_active_branch_ownership(
                 remote=remote,
                 org=o,
@@ -11584,7 +11298,8 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
                 records=ownership_records,
             )
             if ownership.get("block"):
-            return {
+                actions.append(
+                    {
                         "action": "delete_remote_branch",
                         "branch": head_branch,
                         "success": False,
@@ -11593,10 +11308,13 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
                         "verified_absent": False,
                         "blocker_kind": "active_branch_ownership",
                         "reasons": ownership.get("reasons") or [],
-                "blocking_categories": ownership.get("blocking_categories") or [],
+                        "blocking_categories": ownership.get(
-                "after_worktree_removal": after_worktree_removal,
+                            "blocking_categories"
-                "ownership_reassessed": after_worktree_removal,
+                        )
+                        or [],
                     }
+                )
+                continue
 
             encoded = urllib.parse.quote(head_branch, safe="")
             url = f"{base}/branches/{encoded}"
@@ -11611,7 +11329,6 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
                     "branch": head_branch,
                     "source": "reconcile_merged_cleanups",
                     "ownership_checked": True,
-                "after_worktree_removal": after_worktree_removal,
                 },
             ):
                 api_request("DELETE", url, auth)
@@ -11620,7 +11337,8 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
                 readback
             )
             verified = bool(readback_assessment.get("verified_absent"))
-        return {
+            actions.append(
+                {
                     "action": "delete_remote_branch",
                     "branch": head_branch,
                     "success": bool(readback_assessment.get("ok")),
@@ -11629,53 +11347,22 @@ def gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
                     "verified_absent": verified,
                     "readback": readback_assessment.get("readback"),
                     "reasons": readback_assessment.get("reasons") or [],
-            "after_worktree_removal": after_worktree_removal,
-            "ownership_reassessed": after_worktree_removal,
                 }
+            )
 
-    for entry in report.get("entries") or []:
-        head_branch = entry.get("head_branch") or ""
-        remote_assessment = entry.get("remote_branch") or {}
-        local_assessment = entry.get("local_worktree") or {}
-        pr_num = entry.get("pr_number")
-        try:
-            pr_num_int = int(pr_num) if pr_num is not None else None
-        except (TypeError, ValueError):
-            pr_num_int = None
-
-        # #851 lifecycle: when the target worktree is independently safe, remove
-        # it first so worktree_binding ownership does not permanently strand
-        # both the worktree and the remote branch. Never skip worktree removal
-        # merely because remote delete would be blocked by that binding.
-        # Ownership protection for remote delete remains fail-closed below.
-        worktree_removed = False
         if local_assessment.get("safe_to_remove_worktree"):
             result = merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_local_worktree(
-                project_root,
+                _canonical_local_git_root(),
                 head_branch,
                 worktree_path=local_assessment.get("worktree_path"),
             )
             actions.append({"action": "remove_local_worktree", **result})
-            # Idempotent resume: absent worktree is already gone.
-            msg = (result.get("message") or "").lower()
-            worktree_removed = bool(result.get("success")) or (
-                "not found" in msg
-            )
-
-        if remote_assessment.get("safe_to_delete_remote"):
-            actions.append(
-                _attempt_owned_remote_delete(
-                    head_branch=head_branch,
-                    pr_num_int=pr_num_int,
-                    after_worktree_removal=worktree_removed,
-                )
-            )
 
     for scratch in report.get("reviewer_scratch_entries") or []:
         if not scratch.get("safe_to_remove_worktree"):
             continue
         result = merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_reviewer_scratch_worktree(
-            project_root, scratch.get("worktree_path") or ""
+            _canonical_local_git_root(), scratch.get("worktree_path") or ""
         )
         actions.append({"action": "remove_reviewer_scratch_worktree", **result})
 
@@ -11911,7 +11598,6 @@ def gitea_audit_worktree_cleanup(
     org: str | None = None,
     repo: str | None = None,
     ttl_hours: float = worktree_cleanup_audit.DEFAULT_TTL_HOURS,
-    merged_pr_limit: int = 200,
 ) -> dict:
     """Read-only: classify every session-owned worktree under ``branches/`` (#401).
 
@@ -11922,26 +11608,17 @@ def gitea_audit_worktree_cleanup(
     the active issue-lock branch is read from the local lock file and treated
     as active work. Deletes nothing and mutates no Gitea state.
 
-    Merged PRs are fetched as well, so an issue worktree can be linked to the
+    Fails closed if the live open-PR list cannot be fetched: without it,
-    PR that owns its branch (#858). Such a worktree only becomes removable
+    removability cannot be proven, so no candidates are returned.
-    when that owning PR is unambiguous and merged, the worktree head is
-    already contained in authoritative master, and nothing else protects it —
-    no open or competing PR, lease, issue lock, live session, dirty file, or
-    protected/control checkout. Anything unproven keeps it classified as
-    active issue work.
-
-    Fails closed if the live open-PR list, the merged-PR list, or the
-    control-plane lease state cannot be read: without them removability
-    cannot be proven, so no candidates are returned.
 
     Args:
         remote: Known instance — 'dadeschools' or 'prgs'.
         host: Override the Gitea host.
         org: Override the owner/organization.
         repo: Override the repository name.
-        ttl_hours: Age (hours) after which a clean conflict-fix worktree
+        ttl_hours: Age (hours) after which a clean issue/conflict-fix
-            becomes stale-removable (default from GITEA_WORKTREE_TTL_HOURS).
+            worktree becomes stale-removable (default from
-        merged_pr_limit: Max closed PRs scanned for merged-PR ownership.
+            GITEA_WORKTREE_TTL_HOURS).
 
     Returns:
         dict with per-worktree classifications, counts, removable
@@ -11977,84 +11654,22 @@ def gitea_audit_worktree_cleanup(
         if (pr.get("head") or {}).get("ref")
     }
 
-    # #858: merged PRs are the ownership evidence that lets a landed issue
-    # worktree stop being reported as active work. Without them the audit can
-    # never agree with the PR-scoped reconciler, so treat a fetch failure the
-    # same way an open-PR fetch failure is treated: fail closed.
-    try:
-        closed_prs = api_get_all(
-            f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/pulls?state=closed", auth, limit=merged_pr_limit
-        )
-    except Exception as exc:
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "performed": False,
-            "open_pr_state_verified": True,
-            "merged_pr_state_verified": False,
-            "reasons": [
-                "could not fetch merged PRs; worktree ownership unverified "
-                f"(fail closed): {_redact(str(exc))}"
-            ],
-        }
-    merged_prs = [pr for pr in closed_prs if (pr.get("merged") or pr.get("merged_at"))]
-    pr_index = worktree_cleanup_audit.build_pr_index(list(open_prs) + merged_prs)
-
-    # #858: the auditor already accepted lease evidence but nothing ever
-    # supplied it, so every worktree looked unleased. Removability is now
-    # reachable for issue worktrees, so authoritative control-plane leases
-    # must be readable or the audit fails closed.
-    db, lease_errs = _control_plane_db_or_error()
-    if db is None:
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "performed": False,
-            "open_pr_state_verified": True,
-            "merged_pr_state_verified": True,
-            "lease_state_verified": False,
-            "reasons": [
-                "could not read control-plane leases; worktree protection "
-                "unverified (fail closed)",
-                *lease_errs,
-            ],
-        }
-    lease_result = lease_lifecycle.list_active_leases(
-        db, remote=remote, org=o, repo=r, include_non_active=False, limit=500
-    )
-    leased_issue_numbers: set[int] = set()
-    live_session_paths: set[str] = set()
-    for lease in lease_result.get("leases") or []:
-        if lease.get("work_kind") == "issue" and lease.get("work_number") is not None:
-            try:
-                leased_issue_numbers.add(int(lease["work_number"]))
-            except (TypeError, ValueError):
-                pass
-        if lease.get("worktree_path"):
-            live_session_paths.add(str(lease["worktree_path"]))
-
     active_issue_branches: set[str] = set()
     lock = merged_cleanup_reconcile.read_issue_lock(ISSUE_LOCK_FILE)
     if lock and lock.get("branch_name"):
         active_issue_branches.add(str(lock["branch_name"]).strip())
 
-    master_ref = f"{remote}/master" if remote in REMOTES else "origin/master"
     report = worktree_cleanup_audit.audit_branches_directory(
         _canonical_local_git_root(),
         open_pr_branches=open_pr_branches,
         active_issue_branches=active_issue_branches,
         now=datetime.now(timezone.utc),
         ttl_hours=ttl_hours,
-        pr_index=pr_index,
-        leased_issue_numbers=leased_issue_numbers,
-        live_session_paths=live_session_paths,
-        master_ref=master_ref,
     )
     return {
         "success": True,
         "performed": False,
         "open_pr_state_verified": True,
-        "merged_pr_state_verified": True,
-        "lease_state_verified": True,
-        "master_ref": master_ref,
         "task_mode": "work-issue",
         **report,
     }

issue_lock_provenance.py

@@ -16,16 +16,11 @@ ISSUE_LOCK_FILE = os.environ.get("GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_FILE", "/tmp/gitea_issue_lock
 SOURCE_LOCK_ISSUE = "gitea_lock_issue"
 SOURCE_LOCK_ADOPTION = "gitea_lock_issue_adoption"
 SOURCE_OPERATOR_OVERRIDE = "operator_override"
-# #864: dirty-preserving same-claimant author-session rebind (dead owner PID).
-SOURCE_DIRTY_SAME_CLAIMANT_REBIND = (
-    "gitea_rebind_dirty_same_claimant_author_session"
-)
 
 SANCTIONED_LOCK_SOURCES = frozenset({
     SOURCE_LOCK_ISSUE,
     SOURCE_LOCK_ADOPTION,
     SOURCE_OPERATOR_OVERRIDE,
-    SOURCE_DIRTY_SAME_CLAIMANT_REBIND,
 })
 
 _OPERATOR_OVERRIDE_ENV = "GITEA_ISSUE_LOCK_OPERATOR_OVERRIDE"

merged_cleanup_reconcile.py

@@ -566,10 +566,6 @@ def build_pr_cleanup_entry(
         worktree_state=worktree_state,
         active_lock=active_lock,
     )
-    planned = plan_cleanup_execution_order(
-        remote_assessment=remote,
-        local_assessment=local,
-    )
     return {
         "pr_number": pr_number,
         "issue_number": issue_number,
@@ -580,63 +576,9 @@ def build_pr_cleanup_entry(
         "merged": merged,
         "remote_branch": remote,
         "local_worktree": local,
-        # #851: dry-run and execute share the same lifecycle order description.
-        "planned_execution_order": planned,
     }
 
 
-def plan_cleanup_execution_order(
-    *,
-    remote_assessment: dict[str, Any] | None,
-    local_assessment: dict[str, Any] | None,
-) -> list[dict[str, Any]]:
-    """Describe independent worktree-then-reassess-then-remote cleanup order (#851).
-
-    Remote ownership protection remains fail-closed at execute time. A worktree
-    that is independently safe to remove is never skipped merely because remote
-    deletion may be blocked by that same ``worktree_binding``.
-    """
-    remote = remote_assessment or {}
-    local = local_assessment or {}
-    steps: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
-    worktree_safe = bool(local.get("safe_to_remove_worktree"))
-    remote_safe = bool(remote.get("safe_to_delete_remote"))
-
-    if worktree_safe:
-        steps.append(
-            {
-                "action": "remove_local_worktree",
-                "reason": "independently_safe_to_remove",
-                "phase": 1,
-            }
-        )
-    if remote_safe:
-        if worktree_safe:
-            steps.append(
-                {
-                    "action": "reassess_branch_ownership",
-                    "reason": "after_worktree_removal_clear_worktree_binding",
-                    "phase": 2,
-                }
-            )
-            steps.append(
-                {
-                    "action": "delete_remote_branch",
-                    "reason": "only_if_independently_safe_after_reassessment",
-                    "phase": 3,
-                }
-            )
-        else:
-            steps.append(
-                {
-                    "action": "delete_remote_branch",
-                    "reason": "safe_to_delete_and_no_independent_worktree_removal",
-                    "phase": 1,
-                }
-            )
-    return steps
-
-
 def build_reconciliation_report(
     *,
     project_root: str,

task_capability_map.py

@@ -32,17 +32,6 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.issue.comment",
         "role": "author",
     },
-    # #864: dirty-preserving same-claimant author-session rebind (dead owner PID).
-    # Author MCP tool path. Reconciler execute is gated inside the tool via
-    # authorize_reconciler_execute + role_kind checks (not this map entry).
-    "rebind_dirty_same_claimant_author_session": {
-        "permission": "gitea.issue.comment",
-        "role": "author",
-    },
-    "gitea_rebind_dirty_same_claimant_author_session": {
-        "permission": "gitea.issue.comment",
-        "role": "author",
-    },
     "set_issue_labels": {
         "permission": "gitea.issue.comment",
         "role": "author",

tests/test_branch_cleanup_guard.py

@@ -1266,378 +1266,6 @@ class TestSecondRemediationIntegration(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIn("delete_acknowledged", delete_actions[0])
         self.assertTrue(delete_actions[0].get("verified_absent"))
 
-    def test_issue_851_worktree_removed_when_remote_blocked_only_by_worktree_binding(self):
-        """#851: remote blocked by worktree_binding must not skip safe worktree removal.
-
-        Lifecycle: remove clean owned worktree → reassess ownership → delete
-        remote only if independently safe. Unrelated entries stay untouched.
-        """
-        from mcp_server import gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups
-
-        target_branch = "fix/issue-844-exclude-epic-containers"
-        foreign_branch = "fix/issue-999-unrelated-active"
-        worktree_path = "/tmp/branches/fix-issue-844-exclude-epic-containers"
-        ownership_calls = []
-        remove_calls = []
-        delete_api_calls = []
-
-        def fake_collect(**kwargs):
-            ownership_calls.append(dict(kwargs))
-            # Ownership is reassessed *after* independent worktree removal (#851).
-            # Target worktree is already gone → no worktree_binding remains.
-            # Foreign branch keeps an active author lease → remote delete blocked.
-            if kwargs.get("branch") == foreign_branch:
-                # Match session-bound org/repo + host used by the tool resolve path.
-                return {
-                    "records": [
-                        {
-                            "category": guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_LEASE,
-                            "status": "active",
-                            "remote": kwargs.get("remote") or "prgs",
-                            "host": kwargs.get("host") or "gitea.example.com",
-                            "org": kwargs.get("org") or "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-                            "repo": kwargs.get("repo") or "Gitea-Tools",
-                            "branch": foreign_branch,
-                            "reclaim_allowed": False,
-                        }
-                    ],
-                    "inventory_error": False,
-                }
-            return {"records": [], "inventory_error": False}
-
-        def fake_remove(project_root, branch, worktree_path=None):
-            remove_calls.append(
-                {"branch": branch, "worktree_path": worktree_path}
-            )
-            return {
-                "success": True,
-                "performed": True,
-                "message": f"removed worktree {worktree_path}",
-                "worktree_path": worktree_path,
-            }
-
-        def fake_probe(h, o, r, auth, br):
-            return guard.classify_branch_readback_http_status(
-                404, not_found_scope=guard.NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH
-            )
-
-        def fake_api(method, url, auth, **kwargs):
-            if method == "DELETE":
-                delete_api_calls.append(url)
-            return {}
-
-        report = {
-            "entries": [
-                {
-                    "pr_number": 848,
-                    "head_branch": target_branch,
-                    "remote_branch": {"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
-                    "local_worktree": {
-                        "safe_to_remove_worktree": True,
-                        "worktree_path": worktree_path,
-                    },
-                },
-                {
-                    "pr_number": 999,
-                    "head_branch": foreign_branch,
-                    "remote_branch": {"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
-                    "local_worktree": {
-                        "safe_to_remove_worktree": False,
-                        "worktree_path": None,
-                    },
-                },
-            ],
-            "reviewer_scratch_entries": [],
-        }
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.get_profile",
-            return_value={
-                "profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
-                "role": "reconciler",
-                "allowed_operations": [
-                    "gitea.read",
-                    "gitea.branch.delete",
-                    "gitea.pr.close",
-                ],
-                "forbidden_operations": [],
-            },
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=[]).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.build_reconciliation_report",
-            return_value=report,
-        ).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.discover_reviewer_scratch_worktrees",
-            return_value=[],
-        ).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.audit_reconciliation_mode.check_cleanup_execution_allowed",
-            return_value=(True, []),
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity", return_value=None).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server._collect_branch_ownership_records",
-            side_effect=fake_collect,
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server._probe_remote_branch", side_effect=fake_probe).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_local_worktree",
-            side_effect=fake_remove,
-        ).start()
-        self.mock_api.side_effect = fake_api
-
-        res = gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
-            dry_run=False,
-            execute_confirmed=True,
-            remote="prgs",
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(res.get("performed") or res.get("executed"))
-        actions = res.get("actions") or []
-
-        remove_actions = [
-            a for a in actions if a.get("action") == "remove_local_worktree"
-        ]
-        self.assertEqual(len(remove_actions), 1, actions)
-        self.assertTrue(remove_actions[0].get("success"))
-        self.assertEqual(remove_calls[0]["branch"], target_branch)
-        self.assertEqual(remove_calls[0]["worktree_path"], worktree_path)
-
-        # Target remote delete succeeds after worktree removal + reassessment.
-        target_deletes = [
-            a
-            for a in actions
-            if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"
-            and a.get("branch") == target_branch
-        ]
-        self.assertEqual(len(target_deletes), 1, actions)
-        self.assertTrue(target_deletes[0].get("success"))
-        self.assertTrue(target_deletes[0].get("after_worktree_removal"))
-        self.assertTrue(target_deletes[0].get("ownership_reassessed"))
-        self.assertTrue(target_deletes[0].get("verified_absent"))
-
-        # Foreign branch remains protected (author lease) and is not deleted.
-        foreign_deletes = [
-            a
-            for a in actions
-            if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"
-            and a.get("branch") == foreign_branch
-        ]
-        self.assertEqual(len(foreign_deletes), 1, actions)
-        self.assertFalse(foreign_deletes[0].get("success"))
-        self.assertEqual(
-            foreign_deletes[0].get("blocker_kind"), "active_branch_ownership"
-        )
-        self.assertIn(
-            guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_AUTHOR_LEASE,
-            foreign_deletes[0].get("blocking_categories") or [],
-        )
-        # Only the target branch should hit the DELETE API.
-        self.assertEqual(len(delete_api_calls), 1)
-
-        # Ownership collected for target (post-removal) and foreign; worktree
-        # removal happened before target remote delete in the action log.
-        target_idx = next(
-            i
-            for i, a in enumerate(actions)
-            if a.get("action") == "remove_local_worktree"
-        )
-        delete_idx = next(
-            i
-            for i, a in enumerate(actions)
-            if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"
-            and a.get("branch") == target_branch
-            and a.get("success")
-        )
-        self.assertLess(target_idx, delete_idx)
-
-    def test_issue_851_dirty_worktree_not_removed_and_remote_stays_protected(self):
-        """#851: dirty/foreign worktrees remain protected; no unsafe cleanup."""
-        from mcp_server import gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups
-
-        branch = "fix/issue-851-dirty"
-        remove_calls = []
-
-        def fake_collect(**kwargs):
-            return {
-                "records": [
-                    {
-                        "category": guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_WORKTREE_BINDING,
-                        "status": "active",
-                        "remote": kwargs.get("remote") or "prgs",
-                        "host": kwargs.get("host") or "gitea.example.com",
-                        "org": kwargs.get("org") or "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
-                        "repo": kwargs.get("repo") or "Gitea-Tools",
-                        "branch": branch,
-                        "reclaim_allowed": False,
-                    }
-                ],
-                "inventory_error": False,
-            }
-
-        report = {
-            "entries": [
-                {
-                    "pr_number": 851,
-                    "head_branch": branch,
-                    "remote_branch": {"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
-                    "local_worktree": {
-                        "safe_to_remove_worktree": False,
-                        "worktree_path": "/tmp/dirty-wt",
-                    },
-                }
-            ],
-            "reviewer_scratch_entries": [],
-        }
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.get_profile",
-            return_value={
-                "profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
-                "role": "reconciler",
-                "allowed_operations": [
-                    "gitea.read",
-                    "gitea.branch.delete",
-                ],
-                "forbidden_operations": [],
-            },
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=[]).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.build_reconciliation_report",
-            return_value=report,
-        ).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.discover_reviewer_scratch_worktrees",
-            return_value=[],
-        ).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.audit_reconciliation_mode.check_cleanup_execution_allowed",
-            return_value=(True, []),
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity", return_value=None).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server._collect_branch_ownership_records",
-            side_effect=fake_collect,
-        ).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_local_worktree",
-            side_effect=lambda *a, **k: remove_calls.append(k) or {
-                "success": True,
-                "performed": True,
-            },
-        ).start()
-        self.mock_api.side_effect = lambda *a, **k: {}
-
-        res = gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
-            dry_run=False,
-            execute_confirmed=True,
-            remote="prgs",
-        )
-        actions = res.get("actions") or []
-        self.assertEqual(remove_calls, [])
-        self.assertFalse(
-            any(a.get("action") == "remove_local_worktree" for a in actions)
-        )
-        deletes = [
-            a for a in actions if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"
-        ]
-        self.assertEqual(len(deletes), 1)
-        self.assertFalse(deletes[0].get("success"))
-        self.assertEqual(deletes[0].get("blocker_kind"), "active_branch_ownership")
-        self.assertIn(
-            guard.OWNERSHIP_CATEGORY_WORKTREE_BINDING,
-            deletes[0].get("blocking_categories") or [],
-        )
-
-    def test_issue_851_idempotent_resume_when_worktree_already_absent(self):
-        """#851: partial failures remain resumable and idempotent."""
-        from mcp_server import gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups
-
-        branch = "fix/issue-851-resume"
-        ownership_calls = []
-
-        def fake_collect(**kwargs):
-            ownership_calls.append(kwargs)
-            return {"records": [], "inventory_error": False}
-
-        def fake_remove(project_root, branch, worktree_path=None):
-            return {
-                "success": False,
-                "performed": False,
-                "message": f"worktree not found: {worktree_path}",
-            }
-
-        def fake_probe(h, o, r, auth, br):
-            return guard.classify_branch_readback_http_status(
-                404, not_found_scope=guard.NOT_FOUND_SCOPE_BRANCH
-            )
-
-        report = {
-            "entries": [
-                {
-                    "pr_number": 851,
-                    "head_branch": branch,
-                    "remote_branch": {"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
-                    "local_worktree": {
-                        "safe_to_remove_worktree": True,
-                        "worktree_path": "/tmp/already-gone",
-                    },
-                }
-            ],
-            "reviewer_scratch_entries": [],
-        }
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.get_profile",
-            return_value={
-                "profile_name": "prgs-reconciler",
-                "role": "reconciler",
-                "allowed_operations": [
-                    "gitea.read",
-                    "gitea.branch.delete",
-                ],
-                "forbidden_operations": [],
-            },
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server.api_get_all", return_value=[]).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.build_reconciliation_report",
-            return_value=report,
-        ).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.discover_reviewer_scratch_worktrees",
-            return_value=[],
-        ).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.audit_reconciliation_mode.check_cleanup_execution_allowed",
-            return_value=(True, []),
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server.verify_preflight_purity", return_value=None).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server._collect_branch_ownership_records",
-            side_effect=fake_collect,
-        ).start()
-        patch("mcp_server._probe_remote_branch", side_effect=fake_probe).start()
-        patch(
-            "mcp_server.merged_cleanup_reconcile.remove_local_worktree",
-            side_effect=fake_remove,
-        ).start()
-        self.mock_api.side_effect = lambda *a, **k: {}
-
-        res = gitea_reconcile_merged_cleanups(
-            dry_run=False,
-            execute_confirmed=True,
-            remote="prgs",
-        )
-        actions = res.get("actions") or []
-        removes = [a for a in actions if a.get("action") == "remove_local_worktree"]
-        deletes = [a for a in actions if a.get("action") == "delete_remote_branch"]
-        self.assertEqual(len(removes), 1)
-        self.assertFalse(removes[0].get("success"))
-        self.assertEqual(len(deletes), 1)
-        self.assertTrue(deletes[0].get("success"))
-        self.assertTrue(deletes[0].get("after_worktree_removal"))
-        self.assertTrue(ownership_calls)
-
 
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":

tests/test_issue_858_audit_merged_pr_aware.py

@@ -1,551 +0,0 @@
-"""Merged-PR awareness for the worktree cleanup audit (#858).
-
-Before #858 an ``issue_work`` worktree could never leave ``active_issue_work``:
-the audit had no PR linkage at all (``pr_number`` was structurally ``None``)
-and its only route to ``clean_stale_removable`` was a TTL derived from a
-``last_used_at`` that nothing ever populated. A merged, clean, unprotected
-worktree was therefore reported as active work forever, disagreeing with the
-PR-scoped reconciler.
-
-These tests use fabricated temporary repositories and synthetic PR records
-only. Nothing here removes a worktree or deletes a branch.
-"""
-
-import os
-import subprocess
-import sys
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-from unittest.mock import patch
-
-sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
-
-import merged_cleanup_reconcile as mcr  # noqa: E402
-import worktree_cleanup_audit as wca  # noqa: E402
-
-
-MERGED_BRANCH = "feat/issue-777-timeline"
-MERGED_PATH = "/repo/branches/issue-777-timeline"
-HEAD_SHA = "a" * 40
-
-
-def _pr(number, branch, *, merged=True, sha=HEAD_SHA, state=None):
-    """Synthetic Gitea PR payload."""
-    return {
-        "number": number,
-        "head": {"ref": branch, "sha": sha},
-        "merged_at": "2026-07-24T01:00:00Z" if merged else None,
-        "state": state or ("closed" if merged else "open"),
-    }
-
-
-def _porcelain(*entries):
-    out = []
-    for path, branch, sha in entries:
-        out.append(f"worktree {path}")
-        out.append(f"HEAD {sha}")
-        if branch is None:
-            out.append("detached")
-        else:
-            out.append(f"branch refs/heads/{branch}")
-        out.append("")
-    return "\n".join(out)
-
-
-class _AuditHarness(unittest.TestCase):
-    """Runs audit_branches_directory over a fabricated worktree listing."""
-
-    PORCELAIN = _porcelain(
-        ("/repo", "master", "f" * 40),
-        (MERGED_PATH, MERGED_BRANCH, HEAD_SHA),
-    )
-
-    def run_audit(self, *, dirty_paths=(), contained=True, **kwargs):
-        def fake_dirty(path):
-            if path in dirty_paths:
-                return {"exists": True, "dirty": True, "dirty_files": [" M x.py"]}
-            return {"exists": True, "dirty": False, "dirty_files": []}
-
-        with patch.object(
-            wca, "list_worktrees",
-            return_value=wca.parse_worktree_porcelain(self.PORCELAIN),
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "read_worktree_dirty", side_effect=fake_dirty
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "git_worktree_list", return_value="(mocked)"
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "is_head_ancestor_of_ref", return_value=contained
-        ):
-            report = wca.audit_branches_directory("/repo", **kwargs)
-        return {wt["path"]: wt for wt in report["worktrees"]}, report
-
-    def merged_audit(self, **kwargs):
-        kwargs.setdefault("pr_index", wca.build_pr_index([_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH)]))
-        kwargs.setdefault("master_ref", "prgs/master")
-        return self.run_audit(**kwargs)
-
-
-class TestMergedWorktreeBecomesRemovable(_AuditHarness):
-    def test_clean_merged_issue_worktree_is_linked_and_removable(self):
-        by_path, report = self.merged_audit()
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE)
-        self.assertTrue(entry["removable"])
-        self.assertEqual(entry["merged_pr_linkage"]["status"], wca.LINKAGE_MERGED)
-        self.assertEqual(entry["merged_pr_cleanup"]["block_reasons"], [])
-        self.assertIn(MERGED_PATH, [c["path"] for c in report["removable_candidates"]])
-
-    def test_pr_number_populated_from_authoritative_linkage(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit()
-        self.assertEqual(by_path[MERGED_PATH]["pr_number"], 849)
-
-    def test_regression_without_pr_evidence_stays_active_issue_work(self):
-        """The pre-#858 behaviour, still correct when no PR state is supplied."""
-        by_path, _ = self.run_audit()
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-        self.assertIsNone(entry["pr_number"])
-
-
-class TestProtectiveSignalsSurvive(_AuditHarness):
-    def test_open_pr_worktree_is_not_removable(self):
-        index = wca.build_pr_index([_pr(900, MERGED_BRANCH, merged=False)])
-        by_path, _ = self.run_audit(
-            pr_index=index,
-            master_ref="prgs/master",
-            open_pr_branches={MERGED_BRANCH},
-        )
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_OPEN_PR)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-        # linkage still reports the owning PR, it just is not merge proof
-        self.assertEqual(entry["merged_pr_linkage"]["status"], wca.LINKAGE_OPEN)
-        self.assertEqual(entry["pr_number"], 900)
-
-    def test_dirty_tracked_worktree_is_not_removable(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit(dirty_paths=(MERGED_PATH,))
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_DIRTY_LOCAL)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-        self.assertIn(
-            "worktree has uncommitted changes",
-            entry["merged_pr_cleanup"]["block_reasons"],
-        )
-
-    def test_untracked_only_worktree_is_not_removable(self):
-        """``git status --porcelain`` reports untracked files as dirty too."""
-        def untracked(path):
-            if path == MERGED_PATH:
-                return {"exists": True, "dirty": True, "dirty_files": ["?? scratch.txt"]}
-            return {"exists": True, "dirty": False, "dirty_files": []}
-
-        with patch.object(
-            wca, "list_worktrees",
-            return_value=wca.parse_worktree_porcelain(self.PORCELAIN),
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "read_worktree_dirty", side_effect=untracked
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "git_worktree_list", return_value="(mocked)"
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "is_head_ancestor_of_ref", return_value=True
-        ):
-            report = wca.audit_branches_directory(
-                "/repo",
-                pr_index=wca.build_pr_index([_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH)]),
-                master_ref="prgs/master",
-            )
-        entry = {wt["path"]: wt for wt in report["worktrees"]}[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_DIRTY_LOCAL)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-
-    def test_active_lease_by_issue_number_is_protective(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit(leased_issue_numbers={777})
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertTrue(entry["has_active_lease"])
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-
-    def test_active_lease_by_branch_is_protective(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit(leased_branches={MERGED_BRANCH})
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertTrue(entry["has_active_lease"])
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-
-    def test_active_issue_lock_is_protective(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit(active_issue_branches={MERGED_BRANCH})
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertTrue(entry["has_active_issue_lock"])
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-
-    def test_live_session_worktree_is_protective(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit(live_session_paths={MERGED_PATH})
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertTrue(entry["has_live_session"])
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-
-    def test_head_not_contained_in_master_is_not_removable(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit(contained=False)
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-        self.assertIn(
-            "worktree head is not contained in authoritative master "
-            "(unmerged commits remain)",
-            entry["merged_pr_cleanup"]["block_reasons"],
-        )
-
-    def test_unknown_containment_fails_closed(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit(contained=None)
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-        self.assertIn(
-            "containment of the worktree head in master is unknown",
-            entry["merged_pr_cleanup"]["block_reasons"],
-        )
-
-    def test_missing_master_ref_fails_closed(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.run_audit(
-            pr_index=wca.build_pr_index([_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH)])
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(by_path[MERGED_PATH]["removable"])
-
-    def test_unmerged_owning_pr_is_not_removable(self):
-        index = wca.build_pr_index([_pr(901, MERGED_BRANCH, merged=False)])
-        by_path, _ = self.run_audit(pr_index=index, master_ref="prgs/master")
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-        self.assertIn(
-            "owning PR #901 is not merged",
-            entry["merged_pr_cleanup"]["block_reasons"],
-        )
-
-    def test_control_checkout_is_never_removable(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.merged_audit()
-        control = by_path["/repo"]
-        self.assertTrue(control["is_protected"])
-        self.assertEqual(control["classification"], wca.CLASS_UNSAFE_UNKNOWN)
-        self.assertFalse(control["removable"])
-
-    def test_control_checkout_not_removable_even_if_linked_and_merged(self):
-        """A merged PR on the control checkout must not unlock removal."""
-        porcelain = _porcelain(("/repo", MERGED_BRANCH, HEAD_SHA))
-        with patch.object(
-            wca, "list_worktrees", return_value=wca.parse_worktree_porcelain(porcelain)
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "read_worktree_dirty",
-            return_value={"exists": True, "dirty": False, "dirty_files": []},
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "git_worktree_list", return_value="(mocked)"
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "is_head_ancestor_of_ref", return_value=True
-        ):
-            report = wca.audit_branches_directory(
-                "/repo",
-                pr_index=wca.build_pr_index([_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH)]),
-                master_ref="prgs/master",
-            )
-        entry = report["worktrees"][0]
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_UNSAFE_UNKNOWN)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-
-
-class TestAmbiguousLinkageFailsClosed(_AuditHarness):
-    def test_competing_prs_on_one_branch_fail_closed(self):
-        index = wca.build_pr_index(
-            [_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH), _pr(860, MERGED_BRANCH)]
-        )
-        by_path, _ = self.run_audit(pr_index=index, master_ref="prgs/master")
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertEqual(entry["merged_pr_linkage"]["status"], wca.LINKAGE_AMBIGUOUS)
-        self.assertIsNone(entry["pr_number"])
-        self.assertEqual(entry["classification"], wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-
-    def test_merged_plus_open_pr_on_one_branch_fails_closed(self):
-        index = wca.build_pr_index(
-            [_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH), _pr(861, MERGED_BRANCH, merged=False)]
-        )
-        by_path, _ = self.run_audit(pr_index=index, master_ref="prgs/master")
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertEqual(entry["merged_pr_linkage"]["status"], wca.LINKAGE_AMBIGUOUS)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-
-    def test_no_owning_pr_fails_closed(self):
-        by_path, _ = self.run_audit(
-            pr_index=wca.build_pr_index([_pr(849, "feat/other-branch")]),
-            master_ref="prgs/master",
-        )
-        entry = by_path[MERGED_PATH]
-        self.assertEqual(entry["merged_pr_linkage"]["status"], wca.LINKAGE_NONE)
-        self.assertFalse(entry["removable"])
-
-    def test_malformed_pr_records_are_dropped_not_guessed(self):
-        index = wca.build_pr_index(
-            [
-                {"number": None, "head": {"ref": MERGED_BRANCH}},
-                {"number": 5, "head": {}},
-                {"number": "not-an-int", "head": {"ref": MERGED_BRANCH}},
-            ]
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(index, {})
-        self.assertEqual(
-            wca.resolve_owning_pr(branch=MERGED_BRANCH, pr_index=index)["status"],
-            wca.LINKAGE_NONE,
-        )
-
-    def test_detached_worktree_has_no_branch_linkage(self):
-        self.assertEqual(
-            wca.resolve_owning_pr(branch=None, pr_index={})["status"],
-            wca.LINKAGE_UNKNOWN,
-        )
-
-
-class TestUnrelatedClassificationsUnchanged(unittest.TestCase):
-    """Non-issue_work worktrees keep their pre-#858 classifications."""
-
-    PORCELAIN = _porcelain(
-        ("/repo", "master", "f" * 40),
-        ("/repo/branches/review-pr42", "review-pr42", "2" * 40),
-        ("/repo/branches/baseline-master-x", "baseline-master-x", "3" * 40),
-        ("/repo/branches/conflict-fix-pr50", "conflict-fix-pr50", "4" * 40),
-        ("/repo/branches/review-pr99", None, "5" * 40),
-    )
-
-    def _audit(self, **kwargs):
-        with patch.object(
-            wca, "list_worktrees",
-            return_value=wca.parse_worktree_porcelain(self.PORCELAIN),
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "read_worktree_dirty",
-            return_value={"exists": True, "dirty": False, "dirty_files": []},
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "git_worktree_list", return_value="(mocked)"
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "is_head_ancestor_of_ref", return_value=True
-        ):
-            report = wca.audit_branches_directory("/repo", **kwargs)
-        return {wt["path"]: wt for wt in report["worktrees"]}
-
-    def test_classifications_identical_with_and_without_pr_evidence(self):
-        without = self._audit()
-        with_evidence = self._audit(
-            pr_index=wca.build_pr_index([_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH)]),
-            master_ref="prgs/master",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            {p: e["classification"] for p, e in without.items()},
-            {p: e["classification"] for p, e in with_evidence.items()},
-        )
-
-    def test_lease_on_issue_does_not_capture_similarly_named_scratch_trees(self):
-        """A lease on issue 777 protects issue work, not baseline/review trees."""
-        porcelain = _porcelain(
-            ("/repo/branches/baseline-master-issue-777", "baseline-issue-777", "7" * 40),
-            ("/repo/branches/issue-777-timeline", MERGED_BRANCH, HEAD_SHA),
-        )
-        with patch.object(
-            wca, "list_worktrees", return_value=wca.parse_worktree_porcelain(porcelain)
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "read_worktree_dirty",
-            return_value={"exists": True, "dirty": False, "dirty_files": []},
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "git_worktree_list", return_value="(mocked)"
-        ), patch.object(
-            wca, "is_head_ancestor_of_ref", return_value=True
-        ):
-            report = wca.audit_branches_directory(
-                "/repo",
-                pr_index=wca.build_pr_index([_pr(849, MERGED_BRANCH)]),
-                master_ref="prgs/master",
-                leased_issue_numbers={777},
-            )
-        by_path = {wt["path"]: wt for wt in report["worktrees"]}
-
-        baseline = by_path["/repo/branches/baseline-master-issue-777"]
-        self.assertFalse(baseline["has_active_lease"])
-        self.assertEqual(baseline["classification"], wca.CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE)
-
-        issue_work = by_path["/repo/branches/issue-777-timeline"]
-        self.assertTrue(issue_work["has_active_lease"])
-        self.assertFalse(issue_work["removable"])
-
-    def test_review_and_baseline_still_removable(self):
-        by_path = self._audit(
-            pr_index=wca.build_pr_index([]), master_ref="prgs/master"
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            by_path["/repo/branches/review-pr42"]["classification"],
-            wca.CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            by_path["/repo/branches/baseline-master-x"]["classification"],
-            wca.CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            by_path["/repo/branches/review-pr99"]["classification"],
-            wca.CLASS_DETACHED_REVIEW_LEFTOVER,
-        )
-
-    def test_conflict_fix_ttl_behaviour_unchanged(self):
-        """conflict_fix still needs only TTL expiry; #858 did not touch it."""
-        self.assertEqual(
-            wca.classify_worktree(
-                workflow_type=wca.WORKFLOW_CONFLICT_FIX,
-                is_dirty=False,
-                ttl_expired=True,
-            ),
-            wca.CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            wca.classify_worktree(
-                workflow_type=wca.WORKFLOW_CONFLICT_FIX,
-                is_dirty=False,
-                ttl_expired=False,
-            ),
-            wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK,
-        )
-
-    def test_issue_work_ttl_alone_no_longer_grants_removal(self):
-        """Age is not landing proof: TTL alone must not reclaim issue work."""
-        self.assertEqual(
-            wca.classify_worktree(
-                workflow_type=wca.WORKFLOW_ISSUE_WORK,
-                is_dirty=False,
-                ttl_expired=True,
-            ),
-            wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK,
-        )
-
-
-class TestAssessorPerformsNoDeletion(_AuditHarness):
-    def test_audit_never_removes_a_worktree(self):
-        with patch.object(wca, "remove_worktree") as removal:
-            self.merged_audit()
-        removal.assert_not_called()
-
-    def test_audit_shells_out_to_no_destructive_git_command(self):
-        seen = []
-        real_run = subprocess.run
-
-        def recording_run(cmd, *args, **kwargs):
-            seen.append(cmd)
-            return real_run(["true"], *args, **kwargs)
-
-        with patch.object(subprocess, "run", side_effect=recording_run):
-            wca.audit_branches_directory("/nonexistent-repo-for-audit")
-
-        joined = [" ".join(c) if isinstance(c, list) else str(c) for c in seen]
-        for cmd in joined:
-            self.assertNotIn("worktree remove", cmd)
-            self.assertNotIn("branch -D", cmd)
-            self.assertNotIn("push", cmd)
-
-
-class TestAgreementWithPrScopedReconciler(unittest.TestCase):
-    """The audit and merged_cleanup_reconcile must agree on identical input.
-
-    Uses a real throwaway git repository so containment is computed by git
-    rather than asserted. Nothing outside the temporary directory is touched.
-    """
-
-    def _git(self, *args):
-        subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "-C", self.root, *args],
-            check=True,
-            capture_output=True,
-            text=True,
-        )
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
-        self.root = os.path.realpath(self._tmp.name)
-        self._git("init", "-b", "master", ".")
-        self._git("config", "user.email", "[email protected]")
-        self._git("config", "user.name", "Test")
-        with open(os.path.join(self.root, "seed.txt"), "w") as fh:
-            fh.write("seed\n")
-        self._git("add", "seed.txt")
-        self._git("commit", "-m", "seed")
-
-        self.branch = "feat/issue-777-timeline"
-        self._git("checkout", "-b", self.branch)
-        with open(os.path.join(self.root, "feature.txt"), "w") as fh:
-            fh.write("feature\n")
-        self._git("add", "feature.txt")
-        self._git("commit", "-m", "feature")
-        self.head_sha = subprocess.run(
-            ["git", "-C", self.root, "rev-parse", "HEAD"],
-            capture_output=True, text=True, check=True,
-        ).stdout.strip()
-        self._git("checkout", "master")
-        self._git("merge", "--no-ff", "-m", "merge feature", self.branch)
-
-        self.worktree = os.path.join(self.root, "branches", "issue-777-timeline")
-        self._git("worktree", "add", self.worktree, self.branch)
-
-    def tearDown(self):
-        self._tmp.cleanup()
-
-    def _pr_index(self):
-        return wca.build_pr_index(
-            [
-                {
-                    "number": 849,
-                    "head": {"ref": self.branch, "sha": self.head_sha},
-                    "merged_at": "2026-07-24T01:00:00Z",
-                }
-            ]
-        )
-
-    def _audit_entry(self):
-        report = wca.audit_branches_directory(
-            self.root, pr_index=self._pr_index(), master_ref="master"
-        )
-        return next(wt for wt in report["worktrees"] if wt["path"] == self.worktree)
-
-    def _reconciler_entry(self):
-        return mcr.assess_local_worktree_cleanup(
-            pr_number=849,
-            head_branch=self.branch,
-            merged=True,
-            worktree_state=mcr.resolve_cleanup_worktree_state(
-                project_root=self.root,
-                head_branch=self.branch,
-                issue_number=777,
-                pr_head_sha=self.head_sha,
-                target_ref="master",
-            ),
-            active_lock=False,
-        )
-
-    def test_both_assessors_agree_the_worktree_is_safe(self):
-        audit_entry = self._audit_entry()
-        reconciler = self._reconciler_entry()
-
-        self.assertTrue(reconciler["safe_to_remove_worktree"], reconciler)
-        self.assertTrue(audit_entry["removable"], audit_entry)
-        self.assertEqual(audit_entry["pr_number"], reconciler["pr_number"])
-        self.assertEqual(audit_entry["merged_pr_cleanup"]["block_reasons"], [])
-        self.assertEqual(reconciler["block_reasons"], [])
-
-    def test_both_assessors_agree_a_dirty_worktree_is_unsafe(self):
-        with open(os.path.join(self.worktree, "feature.txt"), "a") as fh:
-            fh.write("local edit\n")
-
-        audit_entry = self._audit_entry()
-        reconciler = self._reconciler_entry()
-
-        self.assertFalse(audit_entry["removable"])
-        self.assertFalse(reconciler["safe_to_remove_worktree"])
-
-    def test_worktree_still_present_after_audit(self):
-        self._audit_entry()
-        self.assertTrue(os.path.isdir(self.worktree))
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

tests/test_merged_cleanup_reconcile.py

@@ -12,59 +12,6 @@ import merged_cleanup_reconcile as mcr  # noqa: E402
 
 
 class TestMergedCleanupAssessment(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_issue_851_plan_order_worktree_then_reassess_then_remote(self):
-        """#851 dry-run plan: remove worktree, reassess ownership, then remote."""
-        plan = mcr.plan_cleanup_execution_order(
-            remote_assessment={"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
-            local_assessment={"safe_to_remove_worktree": True},
-        )
-        actions = [s["action"] for s in plan]
-        self.assertEqual(
-            actions,
-            [
-                "remove_local_worktree",
-                "reassess_branch_ownership",
-                "delete_remote_branch",
-            ],
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(plan[0]["phase"], 1)
-        self.assertEqual(plan[-1]["phase"], 3)
-        self.assertIn("independently_safe", plan[0]["reason"])
-        self.assertIn("reassessment", plan[-1]["reason"])
-
-    def test_issue_851_plan_remote_only_when_worktree_not_safe(self):
-        plan = mcr.plan_cleanup_execution_order(
-            remote_assessment={"safe_to_delete_remote": True},
-            local_assessment={"safe_to_remove_worktree": False},
-        )
-        self.assertEqual([s["action"] for s in plan], ["delete_remote_branch"])
-        self.assertNotIn("reassess_branch_ownership", [s["action"] for s in plan])
-
-    def test_issue_851_plan_worktree_only_when_remote_not_safe(self):
-        plan = mcr.plan_cleanup_execution_order(
-            remote_assessment={"safe_to_delete_remote": False},
-            local_assessment={"safe_to_remove_worktree": True},
-        )
-        self.assertEqual([s["action"] for s in plan], ["remove_local_worktree"])
-
-    def test_issue_851_entry_includes_planned_execution_order(self):
-        entry = mcr.build_pr_cleanup_entry(
-            pr={
-                "number": 848,
-                "title": "Closes #844",
-                "body": "",
-                "merged_at": "2026-07-23T00:00:00Z",
-                "head": {"ref": "fix/issue-844-x", "sha": "a" * 40},
-            },
-            project_root="/tmp/not-a-real-root",
-            open_pr_heads=set(),
-            remote_branch_exists=True,
-            head_on_master=True,
-            delete_capability_allowed=True,
-        )
-        self.assertIn("planned_execution_order", entry)
-        self.assertIsInstance(entry["planned_execution_order"], list)
-
     def test_extract_linked_issue_from_closes(self):
         issue = mcr.extract_linked_issue(
             "feat: cleanup (Closes #269)",

tests/test_webui_policy_visibility.py

@@ -0,0 +1,222 @@
+"""Tests for the read-only workflow policy/guardrail visibility view (#646).
+
+Covers issue #646 acceptance criteria:
+
+1. Console lists major guardrails with source pointers.
+2. Secrets redacted.
+3. Tests ensure sample secrets never appear.
+4. Docs explain read-only nature (asserted here for the page copy; the doc
+   itself is covered by inspection).
+"""
+
+import json
+import sys
+import unittest
+from pathlib import Path
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+from starlette.testclient import TestClient
+
+from webui import console_redaction
+from webui import policy_inventory
+from webui.app import create_app
+from webui.policy_inventory import (
+    PolicyEntry,
+    PolicyInventorySnapshot,
+    SourcePointer,
+    load_policy_inventory,
+    snapshot_to_dict,
+)
+from webui.policy_views import render_policy_page
+
+
+def _entry(key, category, *, active=None, error=None):
+    return PolicyEntry(
+        key=key,
+        title=key.replace("_", " ").title(),
+        category=category,
+        summary=f"summary for {key}",
+        sources=(SourcePointer("src", f"{key}.py", "module"),),
+        active=active,
+        documented_default=None,
+        diff=None,
+        error=error,
+    )
+
+
+def _snapshot(entries):
+    return PolicyInventorySnapshot(
+        schema_version=1,
+        read_only=True,
+        note="read-only projection",
+        entries=tuple(entries),
+        categories=tuple(dict.fromkeys(e.category for e in entries)),
+        build_errors=(),
+    )
+
+# The guardrail categories issue #646 names as in-scope.
+_EXPECTED_CATEGORIES = {
+    "role_separation",
+    "lease_rules",
+    "worktree_rules",
+    "merge_confirmation",
+    "redaction",
+    "contamination",
+    "allocator_policy",
+    "audit_logging",
+    "mutation_gating",
+}
+
+
+class TestPolicyInventoryModel(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_major_guardrails_present(self):
+        snapshot = load_policy_inventory()
+        categories = {e.category for e in snapshot.entries}
+        self.assertEqual(_EXPECTED_CATEGORIES, categories)
+        self.assertGreaterEqual(len(snapshot.entries), len(_EXPECTED_CATEGORIES))
+
+    def test_every_guardrail_has_source_pointers(self):
+        # AC1: source attribution (file/module/doc) for every guardrail.
+        snapshot = load_policy_inventory()
+        for entry in snapshot.entries:
+            with self.subTest(entry=entry.key):
+                self.assertTrue(entry.sources, "guardrail must carry source pointers")
+                for source in entry.sources:
+                    self.assertTrue(source.path)
+                    self.assertIn(source.kind, {"module", "doc", "script", "config"})
+
+    def test_diff_reported_where_documented_default_declared(self):
+        snapshot = load_policy_inventory()
+        checked_any = False
+        for entry in snapshot.entries:
+            if entry.documented_default is None:
+                self.assertIsNone(entry.diff)
+                continue
+            checked_any = True
+            self.assertIsNotNone(entry.diff)
+            self.assertEqual(
+                entry.diff["status"],
+                "matches_documented_default",
+                f"{entry.key} drifted from its documented default: {entry.diff}",
+            )
+        self.assertTrue(checked_any, "at least one guardrail should declare a default")
+
+    def test_live_projections_populate_active(self):
+        snapshot = load_policy_inventory()
+        by_key = {e.key: e for e in snapshot.entries}
+        for key in ("role_separation", "redaction", "audit_logging"):
+            self.assertIsNone(by_key[key].error, f"{key} projection failed")
+            self.assertIsInstance(by_key[key].active, dict)
+
+    def test_build_entry_is_fail_soft_on_projection_error(self):
+        def _boom():
+            raise RuntimeError("projection exploded")
+
+        row = (
+            "redaction",
+            "Secret redaction",
+            "redaction",
+            "summary",
+            (SourcePointer("x", "webui/console_redaction.py", "module"),),
+            _boom,
+            {"redact_before_persist": True},
+        )
+        entry = policy_inventory._build_entry(row)
+        self.assertIsNone(entry.active)
+        self.assertIsNotNone(entry.error)
+        self.assertEqual(entry.diff["status"], "active_unavailable")
+
+
+class TestPolicyRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_real_snapshot_has_no_secret_shapes(self):
+        # AC3: the real emitted payload never carries a known secret shape.
+        payload = snapshot_to_dict(load_policy_inventory())
+        self.assertEqual(console_redaction.scan_for_secrets(payload), [])
+
+    def test_planted_keychain_secret_is_redacted(self):
+        # AC2/AC3: a secret planted in an active projection is masked before emit.
+        snapshot = _snapshot([
+            _entry(
+                "redaction",
+                "redaction",
+                active={"leaked": "keychain:prgs-author-super-secret", "roles": ["author"]},
+            )
+        ])
+        payload = snapshot_to_dict(snapshot)
+        blob = json.dumps(payload)
+        self.assertNotIn("keychain:prgs-author-super-secret", blob)
+        self.assertEqual(console_redaction.scan_for_secrets(payload), [])
+
+    def test_planted_credential_assignment_is_redacted(self):
+        snapshot = _snapshot([
+            _entry(
+                "audit_logging",
+                "audit_logging",
+                active={"leaked": "token=abcd1234efgh5678", "append_only": True},
+            )
+        ])
+        payload = snapshot_to_dict(snapshot)
+        blob = json.dumps(payload)
+        self.assertNotIn("abcd1234efgh5678", blob)
+        self.assertEqual(console_redaction.scan_for_secrets(payload), [])
+
+
+class TestPolicyRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
+
+    def test_policy_html_lists_guardrails_with_sources(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/policy")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
+        text = response.text
+        self.assertIn("Workflow policy", text)
+        self.assertIn("Role separation and RBAC", text)
+        self.assertIn("Source pointers", text)
+        self.assertIn("task_capability_map.py", text)
+        self.assertIn("docs/safety-model.md", text)
+
+    def test_policy_html_states_read_only(self):
+        # AC4: the page explains its read-only nature.
+        text = self.client.get("/policy").text
+        self.assertIn("read-only", text.lower())
+        self.assertNotIn("<form", text.lower())
+
+    def test_policy_html_has_no_secret_shapes(self):
+        text = self.client.get("/policy").text
+        self.assertEqual(console_redaction.scan_for_secrets(text), [])
+
+    def test_api_v1_policy_returns_inventory(self):
+        response = self.client.get("/api/v1/policy")
+        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
+        data = response.json()
+        self.assertEqual(data["schema_version"], policy_inventory.SCHEMA_VERSION)
+        self.assertTrue(data["read_only"])
+        self.assertEqual(data["entry_count"], len(data["entries"]))
+        self.assertEqual(set(data["categories"]), _EXPECTED_CATEGORIES)
+
+    def test_policy_is_read_only_no_post(self):
+        # AC4 / non-goal: no mutation endpoint.
+        response = self.client.post("/policy")
+        self.assertIn(response.status_code, (404, 405))
+
+    def test_nav_links_policy(self):
+        text = self.client.get("/").text
+        self.assertIn('href="/policy"', text)
+
+
+class TestPolicyViewFailSoft(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_page_renders_when_a_projection_errors(self):
+        snapshot = _snapshot([
+            _entry("role_separation", "role_separation", error="active projection unavailable: boom"),
+            _entry("redaction", "redaction", active={"redact_before_persist": True}),
+        ])
+        page = render_policy_page(snapshot)
+        # The errored guardrail surfaces its error; other guardrails still render.
+        self.assertIn("Active value unavailable", page)
+        self.assertIn("Redaction", page)
+        self.assertIn("Workflow policy", page)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_webui_shell.py

@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-"""Tests for the Phase 1 operator console application shell (#638)."""
-import sys
-import unittest
-from pathlib import Path
-
-sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
-
-from starlette.routing import Route
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
-
-from webui import layout
-from webui.app import create_app
-from webui.nav import NAV_GROUPS, STUB_PAGES, nav_hrefs
-
-
-class TestShellNav(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def test_nav_group_labels_present(self):
-        text = self.client.get("/").text
-        for group in NAV_GROUPS:
-            with self.subTest(group=group.label):
-                self.assertIn(f">{group.label}<", text)
-
-    def test_phase1_group_labels_cover_expected_ia(self):
-        labels = {group.label for group in NAV_GROUPS}
-        for expected in (
-            "Health",
-            "Traffic",
-            "Runtime/Sessions",
-            "Projects",
-            "Inventory",
-            "Timeline",
-            "Policy",
-            "Insights",
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(label=expected):
-                self.assertIn(expected, labels)
-
-    def test_every_nav_href_resolves_to_a_get_route(self):
-        app = create_app()
-        get_paths = {
-            route.path
-            for route in app.routes
-            if isinstance(route, Route) and "GET" in route.methods
-        }
-        for href in nav_hrefs():
-            with self.subTest(href=href):
-                self.assertIn(href, get_paths, f"nav href {href} has no GET route")
-
-    def test_legacy_hrefs_still_navigable(self):
-        text = self.client.get("/").text
-        for href in ("/queue", "/projects", "/prompts", "/runtime",
-                     "/audit", "/worktrees", "/leases", "/actions"):
-            with self.subTest(href=href):
-                self.assertIn(f'href="{href}"', text)
-
-
-class TestShellBadges(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def test_mode_badge_present(self):
-        self.assertIn("mode: read-only", self.client.get("/").text)
-
-    def test_environment_badge_present(self):
-        self.assertIn("env:", self.client.get("/").text)
-
-    def test_default_environment_is_local(self):
-        self.assertEqual(layout.environment_label(), "local")
-
-    def test_remote_bind_reports_remote_environment(self):
-        import os
-
-        prior = os.environ.get("WEBUI_HOST")
-        os.environ["WEBUI_HOST"] = "10.0.0.5"
-        try:
-            self.assertEqual(layout.environment_label(), "remote")
-        finally:
-            if prior is None:
-                os.environ.pop("WEBUI_HOST", None)
-            else:
-                os.environ["WEBUI_HOST"] = prior
-
-    def test_docs_link_present(self):
-        text = self.client.get("/").text
-        self.assertIn(layout.DOCS_URL, text)
-        self.assertIn(">Docs<", text)
-
-
-class TestShellStubs(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def test_stub_routes_render_200(self):
-        for path, (title, _desc) in STUB_PAGES.items():
-            with self.subTest(path=path):
-                response = self.client.get(path)
-                self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200, path)
-                self.assertIn(title, response.text)
-                self.assertIn("placeholder", response.text)
-
-    def test_stub_routes_are_read_only(self):
-        for path in STUB_PAGES:
-            with self.subTest(path=path):
-                response = self.client.post(path)
-                self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 405)
-                self.assertEqual(response.json()["error"], "read-only-mvp")
-
-    def test_stub_pages_carry_nav_and_badges(self):
-        response = self.client.get("/inventory")
-        self.assertIn("mode: read-only", response.text)
-        self.assertIn('href="/queue"', response.text)
-
-
-class TestShellHome(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def test_home_summarizes_console(self):
-        text = self.client.get("/").text
-        self.assertIn("Operator console", text)
-        self.assertIn("Phase 1", text)
-
-    def test_home_links_legacy_pages(self):
-        text = self.client.get("/").text
-        self.assertIn("MVP legacy pages", text)
-        for href in ("/queue", "/audit", "/leases"):
-            with self.subTest(href=href):
-                self.assertIn(f'href="{href}"', text)
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

tests/test_webui_system_health_dashboard.py

@@ -1,345 +0,0 @@
-"""Tests for the system-health dashboard view (#639).
-
-Covers the acceptance criteria directly: the page renders the health DTO
-fields (AC1), degraded dependencies are visible (AC2), stale runtime is warned
-prominently and never rendered as mutation-safe (AC3), healthy and degraded
-fixtures both render (AC4), and the shell carries a nav entry (AC5).
-"""
-import sys
-import unittest
-from pathlib import Path
-
-sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
-
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
-
-from webui.app import create_app
-from webui.deployment_boundary import scan_text_for_client_secrets
-from webui.layout import render_page
-from webui.nav import iter_nav_items
-from webui.system_health import (
-    STATUS_DEGRADED,
-    STATUS_DOWN,
-    STATUS_OK,
-    STATUS_SKIPPED,
-    STATUS_UNPROVEN,
-    DependencyProbe,
-    StaleRuntime,
-    SystemHealthSnapshot,
-    VersionInfo,
-)
-from webui.system_health_views import render_system_health_page
-
-DASHBOARD_PATH = "/system-health"
-
-
-def _version(*, known: bool = True) -> VersionInfo:
-    return VersionInfo(
-        git_sha="1c455b6ec0f9cb761fe6248de68c17e061fb5ecd" if known else None,
-        git_describe="v0.4.1-12-g1c455b6" if known else None,
-        control_plane_schema_version=4 if known else None,
-        python_version="3.13.1",
-        known=known,
-    )
-
-
-def _parity(*, stale: bool = False, determinable: bool = True) -> StaleRuntime:
-    if stale:
-        return StaleRuntime(
-            daemon_head="aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa",
-            checkout_head="bbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbbb",
-            remote_head="cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc",
-            stale=True,
-            determinable=True,
-            mutation_safe=False,
-            reasons=("runtime, checkout, and remote commits disagree",),
-        )
-    if not determinable:
-        return StaleRuntime(
-            daemon_head=None,
-            checkout_head=None,
-            remote_head=None,
-            stale=False,
-            determinable=False,
-            mutation_safe=False,
-            reasons=("local checkout HEAD could not be read",),
-        )
-    return StaleRuntime(
-        daemon_head="1c455b6ec0f9cb761fe6248de68c17e061fb5ecd",
-        checkout_head="1c455b6ec0f9cb761fe6248de68c17e061fb5ecd",
-        remote_head="1c455b6ec0f9cb761fe6248de68c17e061fb5ecd",
-        stale=False,
-        determinable=True,
-        mutation_safe=True,
-        reasons=(),
-    )
-
-
-def _snapshot(
-    *,
-    status: str = STATUS_OK,
-    ready: bool = True,
-    readiness_complete: bool = True,
-    readiness_reasons: tuple[str, ...] = (),
-    dependencies: tuple[DependencyProbe, ...] | None = None,
-    parity: StaleRuntime | None = None,
-    namespaces: tuple[dict, ...] = (),
-    probe_errors: tuple[str, ...] = (),
-    version_known: bool = True,
-) -> SystemHealthSnapshot:
-    if dependencies is None:
-        dependencies = (
-            DependencyProbe(
-                name="control_plane_db",
-                kind="sqlite",
-                status=STATUS_OK,
-                detail="schema version 4",
-                required=True,
-                latency_ms=1.25,
-                metadata={"schema_version": 4},
-            ),
-        )
-    return SystemHealthSnapshot(
-        status=status,
-        ready=ready,
-        readiness_complete=readiness_complete,
-        readiness_reasons=readiness_reasons,
-        service="mcp-control-plane-webui",
-        mode="read-only",
-        version=_version(known=version_known),
-        started_at="2026-07-23T19:50:47+00:00",
-        uptime_seconds=3661.5,
-        timestamp="2026-07-23T20:51:48+00:00",
-        deep_probes_requested=False,
-        dependencies=dependencies,
-        mcp_namespaces=namespaces,
-        stale_runtime=parity if parity is not None else _parity(),
-        probe_errors=probe_errors,
-    )
-
-
-class TestHealthyRender(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC1 / AC4 — every health DTO field reaches the page."""
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.html = render_system_health_page(_snapshot())
-
-    def test_readiness_fields_render(self):
-        self.assertIn("System health", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("Ready", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("mcp-control-plane-webui", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("read-only", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("2026-07-23T20:51:48+00:00", self.html)
-
-    def test_version_and_uptime_render(self):
-        self.assertIn("1c455b6ec0f9cb761fe6248de68c17e061fb5ecd", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("v0.4.1-12-g1c455b6", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("3.13.1", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("3661.500s", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("1.02h", self.html)
-
-    def test_dependency_row_renders_with_latency(self):
-        self.assertIn("control_plane_db", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("sqlite", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("schema version 4", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("1.2 ms", self.html)
-
-    def test_healthy_page_shows_no_stale_warning(self):
-        self.assertNotIn("Stale runtime:", self.html)
-        self.assertNotIn("Staleness", self.html)
-
-    def test_unknown_version_is_labelled_not_faked(self):
-        html = render_system_health_page(_snapshot(version_known=False))
-        self.assertIn("unknown", html)
-        self.assertIn("unresolved", html)
-
-
-class TestDegradedRender(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC2 — a degraded or unrun dependency is visible, not swallowed."""
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.deps = (
-            DependencyProbe(
-                name="control_plane_db",
-                kind="sqlite",
-                status=STATUS_OK,
-                detail="schema version 4",
-                required=True,
-                latency_ms=0.9,
-            ),
-            DependencyProbe(
-                name="repository",
-                kind="git",
-                status=STATUS_DOWN,
-                detail="repository root is not a git checkout",
-                required=True,
-                latency_ms=4.0,
-            ),
-            DependencyProbe(
-                name="gitea",
-                kind="http",
-                status=STATUS_SKIPPED,
-                detail="deep probe not requested",
-                required=False,
-            ),
-        )
-        self.html = render_system_health_page(
-            _snapshot(
-                status=STATUS_DEGRADED,
-                ready=False,
-                readiness_complete=False,
-                readiness_reasons=("required dependency 'repository' is down",),
-                dependencies=self.deps,
-            )
-        )
-
-    def test_degraded_banner_names_the_dependency(self):
-        self.assertIn("Degraded dependencies:", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("repository", self.html)
-
-    def test_not_run_probe_is_reported_separately(self):
-        self.assertIn("Not probed:", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("gitea", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("not counted", self.html)
-
-    def test_not_ready_headline_and_reason(self):
-        self.assertIn("Not ready", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("required dependency 'repository' is down", self.html)
-
-    def test_degraded_status_badge_present(self):
-        self.assertIn("badge-health-degraded", self.html)
-        self.assertIn("badge-health-down", self.html)
-
-    def test_ready_but_incomplete_is_not_shown_as_plain_ready(self):
-        html = render_system_health_page(
-            _snapshot(ready=True, readiness_complete=False)
-        )
-        self.assertIn("Ready (incomplete evidence)", html)
-
-
-class TestStaleRuntimeWarning(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC3 — staleness is prominent and never claims mutation safety."""
-
-    def test_stale_runtime_warns_and_denies_mutation_safety(self):
-        html = render_system_health_page(_snapshot(parity=_parity(stale=True)))
-        self.assertIn("Stale runtime:", html)
-        self.assertIn("do not treat this runtime as mutation-safe", html)
-        self.assertIn("<tr><th>Mutation safe</th><td>False</td></tr>", html)
-
-    def test_indeterminate_parity_is_not_reported_safe(self):
-        html = render_system_health_page(
-            _snapshot(parity=_parity(determinable=False))
-        )
-        self.assertIn("Staleness", html)
-        self.assertIn("<tr><th>Mutation safe</th><td>False</td></tr>", html)
-        self.assertIn("<tr><th>Determinable</th><td>False</td></tr>", html)
-
-    def test_healthy_parity_reports_mutation_safe_true(self):
-        html = render_system_health_page(_snapshot())
-        self.assertIn("<tr><th>Mutation safe</th><td>True</td></tr>", html)
-
-
-class TestNamespacesAndErrors(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_unproven_namespace_rows_render(self):
-        html = render_system_health_page(
-            _snapshot(
-                namespaces=(
-                    {
-                        "namespace": "gitea-author",
-                        "required_tool": "gitea_lock_issue",
-                        "status": STATUS_UNPROVEN,
-                        "ide_namespace_proven": False,
-                        "reason": "the web console cannot invoke the IDE-managed MCP client",
-                    },
-                )
-            )
-        )
-        self.assertIn("gitea-author", html)
-        self.assertIn("gitea_lock_issue", html)
-        self.assertIn("badge-health-unproven", html)
-
-    def test_no_namespaces_degrades_gracefully(self):
-        html = render_system_health_page(_snapshot(namespaces=()))
-        self.assertIn("No MCP namespaces are declared.", html)
-
-    def test_probe_errors_render_when_present(self):
-        html = render_system_health_page(
-            _snapshot(probe_errors=("probe raised: disk offline",))
-        )
-        self.assertIn("Probe errors", html)
-        self.assertIn("disk offline", html)
-
-    def test_probe_error_card_absent_when_clean(self):
-        self.assertNotIn("Probe errors", render_system_health_page(_snapshot()))
-
-
-class TestReadOnlyAndRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_no_restart_or_kill_controls(self):
-        html = render_system_health_page(_snapshot())
-        self.assertNotIn("<button", html)
-        self.assertNotIn("<form", html)
-        self.assertNotIn("pkill", html)
-        self.assertIn("read-only", html)
-
-    def test_recovery_points_at_sanctioned_path(self):
-        html = render_system_health_page(_snapshot())
-        self.assertIn("Reconnect the MCP client", html)
-        self.assertIn("Never kill the daemon process manually", html)
-
-    def test_secret_shaped_detail_is_redacted(self):
-        leaky = DependencyProbe(
-            name="gitea",
-            kind="http",
-            status=STATUS_DOWN,
-            detail="auth failed for token=ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789",
-            required=False,
-            latency_ms=12.0,
-        )
-        html = render_system_health_page(_snapshot(dependencies=(leaky,)))
-        self.assertNotIn("ghp_ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789", html)
-
-    def test_html_in_detail_is_escaped(self):
-        hostile = DependencyProbe(
-            name="repository",
-            kind="git",
-            status=STATUS_DOWN,
-            detail="<script>alert(1)</script>",
-            required=True,
-        )
-        html = render_system_health_page(_snapshot(dependencies=(hostile,)))
-        self.assertNotIn("<script>", html)
-        self.assertIn("&lt;script&gt;", html)
-
-
-class TestNavAndRoute(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC5 — the shell links the dashboard, and the route serves it."""
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def test_nav_contains_system_health(self):
-        self.assertIn(
-            (DASHBOARD_PATH, "System health"),
-            [(item.href, item.label) for item in iter_nav_items()],
-        )
-
-    def test_rendered_shell_links_dashboard(self):
-        page = render_page(title="Home", body_html="<p>x</p>")
-        self.assertIn(f'href="{DASHBOARD_PATH}"', page)
-
-    def test_route_renders_dashboard(self):
-        response = self.client.get(DASHBOARD_PATH)
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
-        self.assertIn("System health", response.text)
-        self.assertIn("Stale-runtime parity", response.text)
-
-    def test_route_is_read_only(self):
-        self.assertEqual(self.client.post(DASHBOARD_PATH).status_code, 405)
-
-    def test_live_page_leaks_no_client_secret(self):
-        findings = scan_text_for_client_secrets(self.client.get(DASHBOARD_PATH).text)
-        self.assertEqual(findings, [])
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover
-    unittest.main()

tests/test_worktree_cleanup_audit.py

@@ -134,35 +134,13 @@ class TestClassification(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual(cls, wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_OPEN_PR)
         self.assertFalse(wca.is_removable(cls))
 
-    def test_stale_clean_issue_worktree_needs_merged_pr_proof(self):
+    def test_stale_clean_issue_worktree_removable(self):
-        # Scenario 5 (#858): age is not proof that the branch landed, so a
+        # Scenario 5: clean issue worktree, TTL expired, no lock -> removable.
-        # TTL-expired issue worktree stays active work. Only authoritative
-        # merged-PR evidence makes it removable, which is what keeps a
-        # worktree holding unmerged commits from being reclaimed by age.
         cls = wca.classify_worktree(
             workflow_type=wca.WORKFLOW_ISSUE_WORK,
             is_dirty=False,
             ttl_expired=True,
         )
-        self.assertEqual(cls, wca.CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK)
-        self.assertFalse(wca.is_removable(cls))
-
-        cls = wca.classify_worktree(
-            workflow_type=wca.WORKFLOW_ISSUE_WORK,
-            is_dirty=False,
-            ttl_expired=True,
-            merged_pr_cleanup={"proven": True},
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(cls, wca.CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE)
-        self.assertTrue(wca.is_removable(cls))
-
-    def test_stale_clean_conflict_fix_worktree_removable(self):
-        # conflict_fix keeps the original TTL rule; #858 changed issue work only.
-        cls = wca.classify_worktree(
-            workflow_type=wca.WORKFLOW_CONFLICT_FIX,
-            is_dirty=False,
-            ttl_expired=True,
-        )
         self.assertEqual(cls, wca.CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE)
         self.assertTrue(wca.is_removable(cls))
 

webui/app.py

@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ from starlette.routing import Route
 
 from webui.deployment_boundary import deployment_snapshot
 from webui.layout import render_page
-from webui.nav import NAV_GROUPS, STUB_PAGES
 from webui.project_registry import (
     ProjectRegistry,
     RegistryError,
@@ -46,14 +45,14 @@ from webui.worktree_scanner import load_hygiene_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as wo
 from webui.worktree_views import render_worktrees_page
 from webui.runtime_health import load_runtime_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as runtime_snapshot_to_dict
 from webui.runtime_views import render_runtime_page
-from webui.timeline import load_timeline, snapshot_to_dict as timeline_snapshot_to_dict
+from webui.policy_inventory import load_policy_inventory, snapshot_to_dict as policy_snapshot_to_dict
+from webui.policy_views import render_policy_page
 from webui.system_health import (
     API_PATH as SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH,
     load_system_health,
     process_uptime,
     snapshot_to_dict as system_health_to_dict,
 )
-from webui.system_health_views import render_system_health_page
 
 _READ_ONLY_METHODS = frozenset({"GET", "HEAD", "OPTIONS"})
 _AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS = frozenset({"/audit", "/api/audit"})
@@ -68,62 +67,25 @@ def _stub_page(title: str, description: str) -> HTMLResponse:
     return HTMLResponse(render_page(title=title, body_html=body))
 
 
-_LEGACY_PAGES = (
-    ("/queue", "Queue", "live PR and issue dashboard (#429)"),
-    ("/projects", "Projects", "registry and onboarding (#427)"),
-    ("/prompts", "Prompts", "canonical workflow prompt library (#428)"),
-    ("/runtime", "Runtime", "MCP health and stale-runtime detection (#430)"),
-    ("/audit", "Audit", "final-report paste and validator preview (#431)"),
-    ("/worktrees", "Worktrees", "branch hygiene dashboard (#432)"),
-    ("/leases", "Leases", "collision and lease visibility (#433)"),
-    ("/actions", "Actions", "gated write-action framework (#434)"),
-)
-
-
-def _render_home_nav_groups() -> str:
-    groups = []
-    for group in NAV_GROUPS:
-        items = "".join(
-            f'<li><a href="{item.href}">{item.label}</a>'
-            + ("" if item.status == "live" else " <span class=\"muted\">(stub)</span>")
-            + "</li>"
-            for item in group.items
-        )
-        groups.append(f"<h3>{group.label}</h3><ul>{items}</ul>")
-    return "".join(groups)
-
-
 async def home(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
-    legacy = "".join(
-        f"<li><strong>{label}</strong> — {desc} "
-        f'(<a href="{href}">{href}</a>)</li>'
-        for href, label, desc in _LEGACY_PAGES
-    )
     body = (
         "<h2>Operator console</h2>"
-        "<p>Read-only home for the MCP Control Plane Phase 1 operator console. "
+        "<p>Local entry point for MCP Control Plane operational views.</p>"
-        "Gitea, MCP capability gates, and canonical workflows remain the source "
+        "<ul>"
-        "of truth; this console never mutates them.</p>"
+        "<li><strong>Queue</strong> — live PR and issue dashboard (#429)</li>"
-        "<h2>Phase 1 surfaces</h2>"
+        "<li><strong>Projects</strong> — registry and onboarding (#427)</li>"
-        + _render_home_nav_groups()
+        "<li><strong>Prompts</strong> — canonical workflow prompt library (#428)</li>"
-        + "<h2>MVP legacy pages</h2>"
+        "<li><strong>Runtime</strong> — MCP health and stale-runtime detection (#430)</li>"
-        "<ul>" + legacy + "</ul>"
+        "<li><strong>Policy</strong> — workflow guardrail configuration visibility (#646)</li>"
+        "<li><strong>Audit</strong> — final-report paste and validator preview (#431)</li>"
+        "<li><strong>Worktrees</strong> — branch hygiene dashboard (#432)</li>"
+        "<li><strong>Leases</strong> — collision and lease visibility (#433)</li>"
+        "<li><strong>Actions</strong> — gated write-action framework (#434)</li>"
+        "</ul>"
     )
     return HTMLResponse(render_page(title="Home", body_html=body))
 
 
-async def phase_stub(request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
-    """Graceful read-only placeholder for a not-yet-implemented Phase 1 surface."""
-    title, description = STUB_PAGES[request.url.path]
-    body = (
-        f"<h2>{title}</h2>"
-        f'<div class="stub"><p>{description}</p>'
-        "<p>Phase 1 shell placeholder — no write actions. Tracked under "
-        "epic #631.</p></div>"
-    )
-    return HTMLResponse(render_page(title=title, body_html=body))
-
-
 async def health(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     """Liveness only — deliberately cheap, runs no dependency probe (#634).
 
@@ -162,24 +124,6 @@ async def api_system_health(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     return JSONResponse(payload, status_code=200 if snapshot.ready else 503)
 
 
-async def system_health(request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
-    """Read-only system-health dashboard (#639).
-
-    Shares the #634 snapshot loader with the JSON API so the page can never
-    disagree with it. `?deep=1` opts into the network probe exactly as the API
-    does; the default page load stays cheap. The response is always 200: this
-    is an operator view that must render the degraded state, not withhold it.
-    """
-    deep = _truthy_flag(request.query_params.get("deep"))
-    snapshot = load_system_health(deep=deep)
-    return HTMLResponse(
-        render_page(
-            title="System health",
-            body_html=render_system_health_page(snapshot),
-        )
-    )
-
-
 async def queue(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
     snapshot = load_queue_snapshot()
     return HTMLResponse(render_page(title="Queue", body_html=render_queue_page(snapshot)))
@@ -302,6 +246,17 @@ async def api_runtime(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     return JSONResponse(runtime_snapshot_to_dict(load_runtime_snapshot()))
 
 
+async def policy(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
+    snapshot = load_policy_inventory()
+    return HTMLResponse(
+        render_page(title="Policy", body_html=render_policy_page(snapshot))
+    )
+
+
+async def api_v1_policy(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
+    return JSONResponse(policy_snapshot_to_dict(load_policy_inventory()))
+
+
 async def _parse_audit_form(request: Request) -> tuple[str, str | None]:
     if request.method == "GET":
         return "", None
@@ -469,104 +424,6 @@ async def api_console_security_model(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     })
 
 
-def _query_int(request: Request, key: str) -> int | None:
-    """Parse an optional integer query parameter; None when absent/invalid."""
-    raw = request.query_params.get(key)
-    if raw is None or not str(raw).strip():
-        return None
-    try:
-        return int(str(raw).strip())
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        return None
-
-
-def _derive_remote(host: str) -> str:
-    """Map a Gitea host to its known short remote name (control-plane scope key)."""
-    text = (host or "").lower()
-    if "prgs" in text:
-        return "prgs"
-    if "dadeschools" in text:
-        return "dadeschools"
-    return text.split(".")[0] if text else ""
-
-
-def _timeline_comment_source(host: str, org: str, repo: str):
-    """Build a fail-soft CTH-comment fetcher for one repo, or None when offline.
-
-    Returns a callable ``(kind, number) -> list[comment]``. Credentials or
-    network failures raise inside the callable so ``load_timeline`` degrades the
-    handoff source rather than the whole timeline. Offline test mode yields no
-    live source so the handoff section reports ``not run``.
-    """
-    import os
-
-    from gitea_auth import api_fetch_page, get_auth_header, repo_api_url
-
-    offline = (os.environ.get("WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE") or "").strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes"}
-    if offline:
-        return None
-    auth = get_auth_header(host)
-    if not auth:
-        return None
-
-    def _fetch(kind: str, number: int) -> list:
-        segment = "pulls" if kind == "pr" else "issues"
-        url = f"{repo_api_url(host, org, repo)}/{segment}/{int(number)}/comments"
-        comments: list = []
-        page = 1
-        while page <= 20:
-            raw, meta = api_fetch_page(url, auth, page=page, limit=50)
-            comments.extend(raw)
-            if bool(meta["is_final_page"]):
-                break
-            page += 1
-        return comments
-
-    return _fetch
-
-
-async def api_v1_timeline(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
-    """Read-only workflow-event timeline (#637). Filter by issue/PR/session."""
-    from webui.queue_loader import _host_from_url  # host normalisation helper
-
-    registry, error = _load_project_registry()
-    if error is not None:
-        return JSONResponse(error.to_dict(), status_code=500)
-    project = registry.projects[0] if registry.projects else None
-
-    org = request.query_params.get("org") or (project.gitea_owner if project else "")
-    repo = request.query_params.get("repo") or (project.repo_name if project else "")
-    host = _host_from_url(project.remote_host) if project else ""
-    remote = request.query_params.get("remote") or _derive_remote(host)
-
-    if not (remote and org and repo):
-        return JSONResponse(
-            {
-                "error": "timeline_scope_unresolved",
-                "detail": "no project in registry and no remote/org/repo query params provided",
-            },
-            status_code=400,
-        )
-
-    comment_source = _timeline_comment_source(host, org, repo) if (host and org and repo) else None
-
-    snapshot = load_timeline(
-        remote=remote,
-        org=org,
-        repo=repo,
-        issue=_query_int(request, "issue"),
-        pr=_query_int(request, "pr"),
-        session=(request.query_params.get("session") or None),
-        limit=_query_int(request, "limit"),
-        offset=_query_int(request, "offset"),
-        comment_source=comment_source,
-    )
-    # A filter no surviving source can carry is refused, not answered empty:
-    # a 200 with zero events would tell the operator no such activity exists.
-    status_code = 200 if snapshot.ok else 422
-    return JSONResponse(timeline_snapshot_to_dict(snapshot), status_code=status_code)
-
-
 async def method_not_allowed(request: Request, _exc: Exception) -> Response:
     path = request.url.path
     if path in _AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS and request.method == "POST":
@@ -590,7 +447,6 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
             Route("/", home, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/health", health, methods=["GET"]),
             Route(SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH, api_system_health, methods=["GET"]),
-            Route("/system-health", system_health, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/queue", queue, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/api/queue", api_queue, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/projects", projects, methods=["GET"]),
@@ -607,7 +463,8 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
             Route("/api/prompts", api_prompts, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/runtime", runtime, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/api/runtime", api_runtime, methods=["GET"]),
-            Route("/api/v1/timeline", api_v1_timeline, methods=["GET"]),
+            Route("/policy", policy, methods=["GET"]),
+            Route("/api/v1/policy", api_v1_policy, methods=["GET"]),
             Route("/audit", audit, methods=["GET", "POST"]),
             Route("/api/audit", api_audit, methods=["GET", "POST"]),
             Route("/worktrees", worktrees, methods=["GET"]),
@@ -631,10 +488,6 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
                 api_console_security_model,
                 methods=["GET"],
             ),
-            *[
-                Route(path, phase_stub, methods=["GET"])
-                for path in STUB_PAGES
-            ],
         ],
         exception_handlers={405: method_not_allowed},
     )

webui/layout.py

@@ -2,66 +2,29 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import os
+NAV_ITEMS = (
-
+    ("/", "Home"),
-from webui.nav import NAV_GROUPS
+    ("/queue", "Queue"),
+    ("/projects", "Projects"),
+    ("/prompts", "Prompts"),
+    ("/runtime", "Runtime"),
+    ("/policy", "Policy"),
+    ("/audit", "Audit"),
+    ("/worktrees", "Worktrees"),
+    ("/leases", "Leases"),
+    ("/actions", "Actions"),
+)
 
 MVP_NOTICE = (
     "Read-only MVP — Gitea, MCP tools, and canonical workflows remain the "
     "source of truth. No mutation endpoints."
 )
 
-# Canonical docs entry point surfaced from the shell header (#638).
-DOCS_URL = (
-    "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/src/branch/"
-    "master/docs/webui-local-dev.md"
-)
-
-_LOCAL_HOSTS = frozenset({"", "127.0.0.1", "localhost", "::1"})
-
-
-def environment_label() -> str:
-    """Classify the serving environment as ``local`` or ``remote`` (#638).
-
-    Derived from the same ``WEBUI_HOST`` default the app binds to; loopback
-    hosts are ``local``, anything else is ``remote``. Read-only signal only.
-    """
-    host = (os.environ.get("WEBUI_HOST", "127.0.0.1") or "").strip().lower()
-    return "local" if host in _LOCAL_HOSTS else "remote"
-
-
-def _render_nav() -> str:
-    groups_html = []
-    for group in NAV_GROUPS:
-        links = "".join(
-            f'<a href="{item.href}"'
-            + (' class="nav-stub"' if item.status == "stub" else "")
-            + f'>{item.label}</a>'
-            for item in group.items
-        )
-        groups_html.append(
-            '<div class="nav-group">'
-            f'<span class="nav-group-label">{group.label}</span>'
-            f'<span class="nav-group-links">{links}</span>'
-            "</div>"
-        )
-    return "".join(groups_html)
-
-
-def _render_badges() -> str:
-    env = environment_label()
-    return (
-        '<div class="header-badges">'
-        f'<span class="badge env-badge env-{env}">env: {env}</span>'
-        '<span class="badge mode-badge">mode: read-only</span>'
-        f'<a class="badge docs-link" href="{DOCS_URL}">Docs</a>'
-        "</div>"
-    )
-
 
 def render_page(*, title: str, body_html: str, extra_head: str = "") -> str:
-    nav_links = _render_nav()
+    nav_links = "".join(
-    header_badges = _render_badges()
+        f'<a href="{href}">{label}</a>' for href, label in NAV_ITEMS
+    )
     return f"""<!DOCTYPE html>
 <html lang="en">
 <head>
@@ -91,58 +54,21 @@ def render_page(*, title: str, body_html: str, extra_head: str = "") -> str:
       padding: 0.75rem 1.25rem;
     }}
     header h1 {{
-      margin: 0;
+      margin: 0 0 0.5rem;
       font-size: 1.1rem;
       font-weight: 600;
     }}
-    .header-top {{
-      display: flex;
-      flex-wrap: wrap;
-      align-items: center;
-      justify-content: space-between;
-      gap: 0.5rem 1rem;
-      margin-bottom: 0.6rem;
-    }}
-    .header-badges {{ display: inline-flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 0.4rem; }}
-    .env-badge.env-local {{ color: #8fd19e; border-color: #3d6b4a; }}
-    .env-badge.env-remote {{ color: #e0c27a; border-color: #6b5730; }}
-    .mode-badge {{ color: #9ec8f0; border-color: #3d5f7a; }}
-    a.docs-link {{
-      color: var(--accent);
-      border-color: var(--accent);
-      text-decoration: none;
-      text-transform: none;
-    }}
-    a.docs-link:hover {{ filter: brightness(1.12); }}
     nav {{
       display: flex;
       flex-wrap: wrap;
-      gap: 0.5rem 1.25rem;
+      gap: 0.75rem 1rem;
     }}
-    .nav-group {{
-      display: flex;
-      flex-direction: column;
-      gap: 0.15rem;
-    }}
-    .nav-group-label {{
-      font-size: 0.68rem;
-      text-transform: uppercase;
-      letter-spacing: 0.04em;
-      color: var(--muted);
-    }}
-    .nav-group-links {{ display: inline-flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 0.6rem; }}
     nav a {{
       color: var(--accent);
       text-decoration: none;
       font-size: 0.9rem;
     }}
     nav a:hover {{ text-decoration: underline; }}
-    nav a.nav-stub {{ color: var(--muted); }}
-    nav a.nav-stub::after {{
-      content: " ·stub";
-      font-size: 0.7rem;
-      color: var(--muted);
-    }}
     main {{
       max-width: 52rem;
       margin: 0 auto;
@@ -236,34 +162,12 @@ def render_page(*, title: str, body_html: str, extra_head: str = "") -> str:
     .badge-in-review {{ color: #9ec8f0; border-color: #3d5f7a; }}
     .badge-duplicate {{ color: #e0c27a; border-color: #6b5730; }}
     .badge-stale {{ color: #c9b8e8; border-color: #5a4a78; }}
-    .badge-health-ok {{ color: #8fd19e; border-color: #3d6b4a; }}
-    .badge-health-degraded {{ color: #e0c27a; border-color: #6b5730; }}
-    .badge-health-down {{ color: #f0a8a8; border-color: #7a3b3b; }}
-    .badge-health-skipped {{ color: var(--muted); }}
-    .badge-health-unproven {{ color: #c9b8e8; border-color: #5a4a78; }}
-    .health-card {{
-      margin: 1.25rem 0;
-      padding: 0.85rem 1rem 1rem;
-      border: 1px solid var(--border);
-      border-radius: 8px;
-      background: var(--surface);
-    }}
-    .health-card h3 {{ margin: 0 0 0.5rem; font-size: 1.05rem; }}
-    .health-card h4 {{ margin: 1rem 0 0.35rem; font-size: 0.92rem; color: var(--muted); }}
-    .health-headline {{ color: var(--text); font-size: 1rem; margin: 0 0 0.5rem; }}
-    .health-degraded {{ border-left-color: #e0c27a; }}
-    .health-stale {{ border-left-color: #f0a8a8; }}
-    ul.reasons {{ margin: 0.35rem 0; padding-left: 1.15rem; color: var(--muted); font-size: 0.9rem; }}
-    ul.reasons li {{ margin-bottom: 0.3rem; }}
   </style>
   {extra_head}
 </head>
 <body>
   <header>
-    <div class="header-top">
     <h1>MCP Control Plane</h1>
-      {header_badges}
-    </div>
     <nav>{nav_links}</nav>
   </header>
   <main>

webui/nav.py

@@ -1,112 +0,0 @@
-"""Navigation IA for the Phase 1 operator console shell (#638).
-
-Single source of truth for the console navigation so ``webui/layout.py`` and
-the ``webui/app.py`` route table stay aligned with epic #631. Read-only: every
-destination is a GET view or a Phase 1 placeholder. No mutation links.
-
-Nav groups follow the #631 Phase 1 information architecture: Health, Traffic,
-Runtime/Sessions, Projects, Inventory, Timeline, Policy (placeholder), and
-Insights (placeholder). Later-phase surfaces are declared as ``stub`` items and
-backed by ``STUB_PAGES`` so their nav links resolve to a graceful placeholder
-instead of a 404.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class NavItem:
-    """A single navigation destination.
-
-    ``status`` is ``"live"`` for implemented views and ``"stub"`` for Phase 1
-    placeholders whose backing view lands in a later child issue.
-    """
-
-    href: str
-    label: str
-    status: str = "live"
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class NavGroup:
-    label: str
-    items: tuple[NavItem, ...]
-
-
-NAV_GROUPS: tuple[NavGroup, ...] = (
-    NavGroup("Health", (
-        NavItem("/health", "Liveness"),
-        NavItem("/system-health", "System health"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Traffic", (
-        NavItem("/queue", "Queue"),
-        NavItem("/leases", "Leases"),
-        NavItem("/actions", "Actions"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Runtime/Sessions", (
-        NavItem("/runtime", "Runtime health"),
-        NavItem("/sessions", "Sessions", "stub"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Projects", (
-        NavItem("/projects", "Projects"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Inventory", (
-        NavItem("/inventory", "Inventory", "stub"),
-        NavItem("/worktrees", "Worktrees"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Timeline", (
-        NavItem("/timeline", "Timeline", "stub"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Policy", (
-        NavItem("/policy", "Policy", "stub"),
-        NavItem("/prompts", "Prompts"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Insights", (
-        NavItem("/insights", "Insights", "stub"),
-        NavItem("/audit", "Audit"),
-    )),
-)
-
-
-# Phase 1 placeholder destinations whose backing views land in later child
-# issues of epic #631. Each maps a path to (title, description). Routes are
-# registered so nav links resolve to a graceful, read-only stub page.
-STUB_PAGES: dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {
-    "/sessions": (
-        "Sessions",
-        "Active session, capability, and role inventory. Backed by the unified "
-        "inventory API (#636) once it lands.",
-    ),
-    "/inventory": (
-        "Inventory",
-        "Unified sessions, leases, locks, namespaces, and worktree inventory. "
-        "Backed by the Phase 1 inventory API (#636).",
-    ),
-    "/timeline": (
-        "Timeline",
-        "Workflow event timeline across issues and PRs. A later Phase 1 surface.",
-    ),
-    "/policy": (
-        "Policy",
-        "Capability and role policy surface. Placeholder until a later phase.",
-    ),
-    "/insights": (
-        "Insights",
-        "Aggregate operational insights and trends. Placeholder until a later "
-        "phase.",
-    ),
-}
-
-
-def iter_nav_items():
-    """Yield every ``NavItem`` across all groups in declared order."""
-    for group in NAV_GROUPS:
-        for item in group.items:
-            yield item
-
-
-def nav_hrefs() -> tuple[str, ...]:
-    """Return every navigation href in declared order."""
-    return tuple(item.href for item in iter_nav_items())

webui/policy_inventory.py

@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
+"""Read-only workflow policy and guardrail inventory for the web UI (#646).
+
+Policy and guardrails live in code, profiles, docs, and skills. An operator
+cannot *see* the active workflow policy configuration from the console without
+reading the repository tree. This module projects the major guardrails into a
+redacted, machine-readable inventory with source attribution (file / module /
+doc), so the console can render them as HTML tables with source pointers.
+
+Design constraints (Phase 3, #646):
+
+- **Read-only projection.** Nothing here edits policy or exposes a toggle that
+  could weaken a gate. It reports what is already enforced elsewhere.
+- **Source attribution without secrets.** Every guardrail carries pointers to
+  the file/module/doc that owns it. Live values are compact summaries derived
+  from the safe policy accessors that already exist (``rbac_matrix``,
+  ``redaction_policy``, ``audit_policy``); raw regex, tokens, and endpoints are
+  never embedded.
+- **Redact before emit.** ``snapshot_to_dict`` runs the whole payload through
+  ``console_redaction.redact_payload`` so a planted or accidental secret in any
+  projected value degrades to the placeholder rather than reaching a client.
+- **Fail soft.** A projection that raises is recorded as a per-entry error and
+  never takes the page down; a guardrail is still listed with its sources.
+- **Diff vs documented defaults where feasible.** When a guardrail declares a
+  documented invariant, the active projection is compared against it and the
+  result is reported; otherwise the diff is explicitly ``None`` with a reason.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from dataclasses import dataclass
+from typing import Any, Callable
+
+from webui import console_audit
+from webui import console_authz
+from webui import console_redaction
+
+SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
+
+READ_ONLY_NOTE = (
+    "Read-only projection of guardrails enforced in code, profiles, docs, and "
+    "skills. This view never edits policy and exposes no gate-weakening toggle."
+)
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class SourcePointer:
+    """Where a guardrail is defined. Attribution only — never a secret."""
+
+    label: str
+    path: str
+    kind: str  # "module" | "doc" | "script" | "config"
+    anchor: str | None = None
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "label": self.label,
+            "path": self.path,
+            "kind": self.kind,
+            "anchor": self.anchor,
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class PolicyEntry:
+    key: str
+    title: str
+    category: str
+    summary: str
+    sources: tuple[SourcePointer, ...]
+    active: dict[str, Any] | None
+    documented_default: dict[str, Any] | None
+    diff: dict[str, Any] | None
+    error: str | None = None
+
+    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
+        return {
+            "key": self.key,
+            "title": self.title,
+            "category": self.category,
+            "summary": self.summary,
+            "sources": [s.to_dict() for s in self.sources],
+            "active": self.active,
+            "documented_default": self.documented_default,
+            "diff": self.diff,
+            "error": self.error,
+        }
+
+
+@dataclass(frozen=True)
+class PolicyInventorySnapshot:
+    schema_version: int
+    read_only: bool
+    note: str
+    entries: tuple[PolicyEntry, ...]
+    categories: tuple[str, ...]
+    build_errors: tuple[str, ...]
+
+
+def _diff_active_vs_default(
+    active: dict[str, Any] | None,
+    documented_default: dict[str, Any] | None,
+) -> dict[str, Any] | None:
+    """Compare only the keys the documented default declares.
+
+    Returns ``None`` when no documented default is declared (diff not feasible)
+    or when the active projection is unavailable. Otherwise reports, per
+    declared key, whether the active value matches the documented invariant.
+    """
+    if not documented_default:
+        return None
+    if not active:
+        return {"status": "active_unavailable", "checked": {}}
+    checked: dict[str, Any] = {}
+    matches = True
+    for key, expected in documented_default.items():
+        observed = active.get(key)
+        ok = observed == expected
+        matches = matches and ok
+        checked[key] = {"expected": expected, "observed": observed, "matches": ok}
+    return {
+        "status": "matches_documented_default" if matches else "drift_detected",
+        "checked": checked,
+    }
+
+
+# ── Live projections (compact, safe, fail-soft) ──────────────────────────────
+# Each returns a small dict of already-safe machine values. They are module
+# level so tests can substitute one to prove the redaction pass runs.
+
+
+def _project_role_separation() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    matrix = console_authz.rbac_matrix()
+    return {
+        "model_version": matrix.get("model_version"),
+        "active_phase": matrix.get("active_phase"),
+        "roles": [r.get("role") for r in matrix.get("roles", [])],
+        "privileged_action_count": len(matrix.get("privileged_actions", [])),
+        "default_decision": matrix.get("default_decision"),
+        "execution_enabled": matrix.get("execution_enabled"),
+    }
+
+
+def _project_redaction() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    policy = console_redaction.redaction_policy()
+    return {
+        "policy_version": policy.get("policy_version"),
+        "placeholder": policy.get("placeholder"),
+        "applies_to": policy.get("applies_to"),
+        "console_detector_count": len(policy.get("console_rules", [])),
+        "redact_before_persist": policy.get("redact_before_persist"),
+        "failure_mode": policy.get("failure_mode"),
+    }
+
+
+def _project_audit() -> dict[str, Any]:
+    policy = console_audit.audit_policy()
+    return {
+        "schema_version": policy.get("schema_version"),
+        "required_field_count": len(policy.get("required_fields", [])),
+        "results": policy.get("results"),
+        "retention_defaults_days": policy.get("retention_defaults_days"),
+        "append_only": policy.get("append_only"),
+        "redact_before_persist": policy.get("redact_before_persist"),
+        "enabled": policy.get("enabled"),
+    }
+
+
+def _static(value: dict[str, Any]) -> Callable[[], dict[str, Any]]:
+    return lambda: dict(value)
+
+
+# ── Guardrail catalog ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+# One row per major guardrail. ``project`` yields the active value (may raise;
+# caught per entry). ``documented_default`` drives the feasible diff.
+
+_CatalogRow = tuple[
+    str,
+    str,
+    str,
+    str,
+    tuple[SourcePointer, ...],
+    Callable[[], dict[str, Any]] | None,
+    dict[str, Any] | None,
+]
+
+_CATALOG: tuple[_CatalogRow, ...] = (
+    (
+        "role_separation",
+        "Role separation and RBAC",
+        "role_separation",
+        "Author, reviewer, merger, and reconciler capabilities are disjoint and "
+        "role-exclusive; self-review and self-merge are always blocked. The "
+        "console RBAC model defaults to deny.",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("task capability map", "task_capability_map.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("role/namespace gate", "role_namespace_gate.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("console RBAC", "webui/console_authz.py", "module"),
+        ),
+        _project_role_separation,
+        {"default_decision": "deny", "execution_enabled": False},
+    ),
+    (
+        "lease_rules",
+        "Issue and PR lease lifecycle",
+        "lease_rules",
+        "Durable work is claimed through issue locks and control-plane leases "
+        "with freshness, expiry, and dead-session recovery; abandoned or stale "
+        "claims are reclaimed only through the sanctioned recovery path.",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("issue lock store", "issue_lock_store.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("branch cleanup guard", "branch_cleanup_guard.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("safety model §5", "docs/safety-model.md", "doc", "5-mutation-gating"),
+        ),
+        None,
+        None,
+    ),
+    (
+        "worktree_rules",
+        "Author worktree binding",
+        "worktree_rules",
+        "Author mutations require a validated worktree under branches/ derived "
+        "from the active issue lock; silent fallback to the stable control "
+        "checkout or master is forbidden (#618).",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("author worktree gate", "author_mutation_worktree.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("worktree bootstrap", "scripts/worktree-start", "script"),
+            SourcePointer("workflow scope guard", "workflow_scope_guard.py", "module"),
+        ),
+        None,
+        None,
+    ),
+    (
+        "merge_confirmation",
+        "Explicit merge confirmation",
+        "merge_confirmation",
+        "A merge fails closed unless the caller passes the exact confirmation "
+        "phrase for that PR; reviewing never implies merging.",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("merge path", "merge_pr.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("merge tool gate", "gitea_mcp_server.py", "module"),
+        ),
+        _static({"required_confirmation_format": "MERGE PR <n>", "auto_merge": False}),
+        {"auto_merge": False},
+    ),
+    (
+        "redaction",
+        "Secret redaction",
+        "redaction",
+        "Every console surface runs the shared gitea_audit pass then console "
+        "patterns before any payload, HTML, log line, or audit record leaves "
+        "the server; unredactable values fail closed to the placeholder.",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("console redaction", "webui/console_redaction.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("shared redaction", "gitea_audit.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("safety model §3", "docs/safety-model.md", "doc", "3-secret-redaction"),
+        ),
+        _project_redaction,
+        {"redact_before_persist": True},
+    ),
+    (
+        "contamination",
+        "Contamination containment",
+        "contamination",
+        "A session contaminated by a direct stable-branch push or a manual MCP "
+        "daemon kill is blocked from review, merge, close, and completion "
+        "mutations until cleared (reconciler-exempt).",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("contamination gates", "gitea_mcp_server.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("stable-branch audit", "workflow_scope_guard.py", "module"),
+        ),
+        None,
+        None,
+    ),
+    (
+        "allocator_policy",
+        "Work allocation policy",
+        "allocator_policy",
+        "Workers do not self-select exclusive work; the controller-owned "
+        "allocator ranks the complete queue by priority then PRs-before-issues "
+        "then ascending number, honoring dependency edges and foreign claims.",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("allocator", "gitea_mcp_server.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("safety model §5", "docs/safety-model.md", "doc", "5-mutation-gating"),
+        ),
+        _static(
+            {
+                "self_select_exclusive_work": False,
+                "ranking": "priority desc, PRs before issues, number asc",
+                "respects_dependency_edges": True,
+                "respects_foreign_claims": True,
+            }
+        ),
+        {"self_select_exclusive_work": False},
+    ),
+    (
+        "audit_logging",
+        "Audit logging",
+        "audit_logging",
+        "Console intent and authorization outcomes are recorded to an "
+        "append-only, redact-before-persist audit log; MCP mutations are "
+        "recorded by gitea_audit and correlated by request id.",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("console audit", "webui/console_audit.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("MCP audit", "gitea_audit.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("safety model §1", "docs/safety-model.md", "doc", "1-audit-logging-and-confirmation"),
+        ),
+        _project_audit,
+        {"append_only": True, "redact_before_persist": True},
+    ),
+    (
+        "mutation_gating",
+        "Mutation gating and master parity",
+        "mutation_gating",
+        "Mutations fail closed while the running server is stale relative to "
+        "master, and every mutation is preceded by identity and capability "
+        "resolution in a fixed pre-flight order.",
+        (
+            SourcePointer("mutation gate", "gitea_mcp_server.py", "module"),
+            SourcePointer("safety model §5", "docs/safety-model.md", "doc", "5-mutation-gating"),
+        ),
+        _static(
+            {
+                "stale_runtime_blocks_mutations": True,
+                "preflight_order": "whoami -> resolve_task_capability -> mutation",
+            }
+        ),
+        {"stale_runtime_blocks_mutations": True},
+    ),
+)
+
+
+def _build_entry(row: _CatalogRow) -> PolicyEntry:
+    key, title, category, summary, sources, project, documented_default = row
+    active: dict[str, Any] | None = None
+    error: str | None = None
+    if project is not None:
+        try:
+            active = project()
+        except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — fail soft; never take the page down
+            active = None
+            error = f"active projection unavailable: {exc}"
+    diff = _diff_active_vs_default(active, documented_default)
+    return PolicyEntry(
+        key=key,
+        title=title,
+        category=category,
+        summary=summary,
+        sources=sources,
+        active=active,
+        documented_default=documented_default,
+        diff=diff,
+        error=error,
+    )
+
+
+def load_policy_inventory() -> PolicyInventorySnapshot:
+    """Build the read-only guardrail inventory. Never raises for one bad entry."""
+    entries: list[PolicyEntry] = []
+    build_errors: list[str] = []
+    for row in _CATALOG:
+        try:
+            entries.append(_build_entry(row))
+        except Exception as exc:  # noqa: BLE001 — one row must not break the rest
+            build_errors.append(f"{row[0]}: {exc}")
+    categories = tuple(dict.fromkeys(e.category for e in entries))
+    return PolicyInventorySnapshot(
+        schema_version=SCHEMA_VERSION,
+        read_only=True,
+        note=READ_ONLY_NOTE,
+        entries=tuple(entries),
+        categories=categories,
+        build_errors=tuple(build_errors),
+    )
+
+
+def snapshot_to_dict(snapshot: PolicyInventorySnapshot) -> dict[str, Any]:
+    """Serialize the snapshot, redacting the entire payload before it is emitted."""
+    payload = {
+        "schema_version": snapshot.schema_version,
+        "read_only": snapshot.read_only,
+        "note": snapshot.note,
+        "categories": list(snapshot.categories),
+        "entry_count": len(snapshot.entries),
+        "entries": [entry.to_dict() for entry in snapshot.entries],
+        "build_errors": list(snapshot.build_errors),
+    }
+    return console_redaction.redact_payload(payload)

webui/policy_views.py

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+"""HTML views for the workflow policy and guardrail inventory (#646)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import html
+import json
+
+from webui.policy_inventory import PolicyEntry, PolicyInventorySnapshot
+
+
+def _source_pointer(source) -> str:
+    path = source.path
+    if source.anchor:
+        path = f"{path}#{source.anchor}"
+    return (
+        f"<li>{html.escape(source.label)} — "
+        f"<code>{html.escape(path)}</code> "
+        f"<span class='muted'>({html.escape(source.kind)})</span></li>"
+    )
+
+
+def _active_block(entry: PolicyEntry) -> str:
+    if entry.error:
+        return (
+            "<p class='muted'><strong>Active value unavailable:</strong> "
+            f"{html.escape(entry.error)}</p>"
+        )
+    if not entry.active:
+        return "<p class='muted'>No live projection for this guardrail.</p>"
+    pretty = json.dumps(entry.active, indent=2, sort_keys=True, default=str)
+    return f"<pre class='prompt-text'>{html.escape(pretty)}</pre>"
+
+
+def _diff_block(entry: PolicyEntry) -> str:
+    if entry.diff is None:
+        if entry.documented_default is None:
+            return "<p class='muted'>Diff vs documented default: not feasible (no declared default).</p>"
+        return "<p class='muted'>Diff vs documented default: unavailable.</p>"
+    status = entry.diff.get("status", "unknown")
+    badge = "badge-claimed" if status == "matches_documented_default" else "badge-blocked"
+    rows = []
+    for key, cell in (entry.diff.get("checked") or {}).items():
+        marker = "✓" if cell.get("matches") else "✗"
+        rows.append(
+            "<tr>"
+            f"<td><code>{html.escape(str(key))}</code></td>"
+            f"<td><code>{html.escape(str(cell.get('expected')))}</code></td>"
+            f"<td><code>{html.escape(str(cell.get('observed')))}</code></td>"
+            f"<td>{marker}</td>"
+            "</tr>"
+        )
+    table = ""
+    if rows:
+        table = (
+            "<table class='detail'><thead><tr>"
+            "<th>Key</th><th>Documented</th><th>Active</th><th>Match</th>"
+            "</tr></thead><tbody>"
+            f"{''.join(rows)}</tbody></table>"
+        )
+    return (
+        f"<p class='meta'>Diff vs documented default: "
+        f"<span class='badge {badge}'>{html.escape(status)}</span></p>"
+        f"{table}"
+    )
+
+
+def _entry_card(entry: PolicyEntry) -> str:
+    sources = "".join(_source_pointer(s) for s in entry.sources)
+    return (
+        "<div class='prompt-card'>"
+        f"<h3>{html.escape(entry.title)} "
+        f"<span class='badge'>{html.escape(entry.category)}</span></h3>"
+        f"<p>{html.escape(entry.summary)}</p>"
+        "<p class='meta'><strong>Source pointers</strong></p>"
+        f"<ul>{sources}</ul>"
+        "<p class='meta'><strong>Active configuration</strong></p>"
+        f"{_active_block(entry)}"
+        f"{_diff_block(entry)}"
+        "</div>"
+    )
+
+
+def render_policy_page(snapshot: PolicyInventorySnapshot) -> str:
+    categories = ", ".join(html.escape(c) for c in snapshot.categories) or "none"
+    cards = "".join(_entry_card(e) for e in snapshot.entries)
+    build_errors = ""
+    if snapshot.build_errors:
+        items = "".join(
+            f"<li>{html.escape(err)}</li>" for err in snapshot.build_errors
+        )
+        build_errors = (
+            "<div class='stub'><p><strong>Some guardrails could not be built:"
+            f"</strong></p><ul>{items}</ul></div>"
+        )
+    return (
+        "<h2>Workflow policy &amp; guardrails</h2>"
+        f"<p class='muted'>{html.escape(snapshot.note)}</p>"
+        f"<p class='meta'>Schema v{snapshot.schema_version} · "
+        f"{len(snapshot.entries)} guardrails · categories: {categories}</p>"
+        f"{build_errors}"
+        f"{cards}"
+        "<p class='muted'>This page is read-only. It reports enforced policy "
+        "and never edits or weakens a gate. Secret values are redacted.</p>"
+    )

webui/system_health_views.py

@@ -1,307 +0,0 @@
-"""HTML views for the system-health dashboard (#639).
-
-Renders the read-only :class:`~webui.system_health.SystemHealthSnapshot`
-produced by the Phase 1 system-health API (#634). The page offers no restart,
-reload, or process-kill control: those are Phase 2 work, and manual process
-kills are the contamination path #630 exists to prevent.
-
-Every free-text field passes through :func:`webui.system_health.redact` before
-it reaches HTML, so a probe detail that captured a token or a credentialed URL
-cannot leak through the dashboard even though the API redacts it already.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import html
-
-from webui.system_health import (
-    STATUS_DEGRADED,
-    STATUS_DOWN,
-    STATUS_OK,
-    STATUS_SKIPPED,
-    STATUS_UNPROVEN,
-    DependencyProbe,
-    SystemHealthSnapshot,
-    redact,
-)
-
-_STATUS_BADGE_CLASS = {
-    STATUS_OK: "badge-health-ok",
-    STATUS_DEGRADED: "badge-health-degraded",
-    STATUS_DOWN: "badge-health-down",
-    STATUS_SKIPPED: "badge-health-skipped",
-    STATUS_UNPROVEN: "badge-health-unproven",
-}
-
-
-def _safe(value: object) -> str:
-    """Escape free text for HTML after redacting anything secret-shaped.
-
-    Use this for every value that can carry arbitrary text — probe details,
-    reasons, probe errors — because those are where a credential could ride
-    along.
-    """
-    return html.escape(redact(str(value)))
-
-
-def _esc(value: object) -> str:
-    """Escape a structured field for HTML without redacting it.
-
-    Commit SHAs, probe names, statuses, and timestamps are enumerated or
-    machine-generated, never credential-bearing. They must not go through
-    :func:`redact`: its opaque-token rule matches any 32-plus-character run,
-    so a 40-character git SHA would render as ``[redacted]`` and the parity
-    view — the one thing an operator reads this page for — would be blank.
-    """
-    return html.escape(str(value))
-
-
-def _status_badge(status: str) -> str:
-    css = _STATUS_BADGE_CLASS.get(status, "badge-health-unproven")
-    return f'<span class="badge {css}">{_esc(status)}</span>'
-
-
-def _reason_list(reasons: tuple[str, ...], *, empty: str) -> str:
-    if not reasons:
-        return f"<p class='muted'>{html.escape(empty)}</p>"
-    items = "".join(f"<li>{_safe(reason)}</li>" for reason in reasons)
-    return f"<ul class='reasons'>{items}</ul>"
-
-
-def _readiness_card(snapshot: SystemHealthSnapshot) -> str:
-    """Overall readiness.
-
-    ``ready`` and ``readiness_complete`` are shown separately on purpose: a
-    snapshot whose required probes never ran is not the same as one that ran
-    them and passed, and collapsing the two would render an unproven green.
-    """
-    if snapshot.ready and snapshot.readiness_complete:
-        headline = "Ready"
-    elif snapshot.ready:
-        headline = "Ready (incomplete evidence)"
-    else:
-        headline = "Not ready"
-
-    return (
-        "<section class='health-card'>"
-        f"<h3>Readiness {_status_badge(snapshot.status)}</h3>"
-        f"<p class='health-headline'>{html.escape(headline)}</p>"
-        "<table class='detail'>"
-        f"<tr><th>Service</th><td><code>{_esc(snapshot.service)}</code></td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Mode</th><td>{_esc(snapshot.mode)}</td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Ready</th><td>{_esc(snapshot.ready)}</td></tr>"
-        "<tr><th>Readiness evidence complete</th>"
-        f"<td>{_esc(snapshot.readiness_complete)}</td></tr>"
-        "<tr><th>Deep probes requested</th>"
-        f"<td>{_esc(snapshot.deep_probes_requested)}</td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Observed at</th><td><code>{_esc(snapshot.timestamp)}</code></td></tr>"
-        "</table>"
-        "<h4>Readiness reasons</h4>"
-        f"{_reason_list(snapshot.readiness_reasons, empty='No readiness objections recorded.')}"
-        "</section>"
-    )
-
-
-def _version_card(snapshot: SystemHealthSnapshot) -> str:
-    version = snapshot.version
-    uptime_hours = snapshot.uptime_seconds / 3600.0
-    known = (
-        "resolved"
-        if version.known
-        else "unresolved — version fields could not be read from the checkout"
-    )
-    schema = version.control_plane_schema_version
-    return (
-        "<section class='health-card'>"
-        "<h3>Version and uptime</h3>"
-        "<table class='detail'>"
-        f"<tr><th>Git SHA</th><td><code>{_esc(version.git_sha or 'unknown')}</code></td></tr>"
-        "<tr><th>Git describe</th>"
-        f"<td><code>{_esc(version.git_describe or 'unknown')}</code></td></tr>"
-        "<tr><th>Control-plane schema</th>"
-        f"<td>{_esc(schema if schema is not None else 'unknown')}</td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Python</th><td><code>{_esc(version.python_version)}</code></td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Version status</th><td>{html.escape(known)}</td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Started at</th><td><code>{_esc(snapshot.started_at)}</code></td></tr>"
-        "<tr><th>Uptime</th>"
-        f"<td>{snapshot.uptime_seconds:.3f}s ({uptime_hours:.2f}h)</td></tr>"
-        "</table>"
-        "</section>"
-    )
-
-
-def _dependency_rows(probes: tuple[DependencyProbe, ...]) -> str:
-    if not probes:
-        return "<p class='muted'>No dependency probes were reported.</p>"
-    rows = []
-    for probe in probes:
-        latency = (
-            f"{probe.latency_ms:.1f} ms" if probe.latency_ms is not None else "n/a"
-        )
-        rows.append(
-            "<tr>"
-            f"<td><code>{_esc(probe.name)}</code></td>"
-            f"<td>{_esc(probe.kind)}</td>"
-            f"<td>{_status_badge(probe.status)}</td>"
-            f"<td>{_esc('required' if probe.required else 'optional')}</td>"
-            f"<td>{html.escape(latency)}</td>"
-            f"<td>{_safe(probe.detail)}</td>"
-            "</tr>"
-        )
-    return (
-        "<table class='registry'><thead><tr>"
-        "<th>Dependency</th><th>Kind</th><th>Status</th><th>Requirement</th>"
-        "<th>Latency</th><th>Detail</th>"
-        "</tr></thead><tbody>"
-        f"{''.join(rows)}</tbody></table>"
-    )
-
-
-def _dependency_card(snapshot: SystemHealthSnapshot) -> str:
-    degraded = [probe for probe in snapshot.dependencies if probe.ran and not probe.healthy]
-    not_run = [probe for probe in snapshot.dependencies if not probe.ran]
-
-    banner = ""
-    if degraded:
-        names = ", ".join(sorted(probe.name for probe in degraded))
-        banner += (
-            "<div class='stub health-degraded'><p><strong>Degraded dependencies:</strong> "
-            f"{_esc(names)}</p></div>"
-        )
-    if not_run:
-        names = ", ".join(sorted(probe.name for probe in not_run))
-        banner += (
-            "<div class='stub'><p><strong>Not probed:</strong> "
-            f"{_esc(names)} — these contribute no evidence and are not counted "
-            "as healthy.</p></div>"
-        )
-
-    return (
-        "<section class='health-card'>"
-        "<h3>Dependencies</h3>"
-        f"{banner}"
-        f"{_dependency_rows(snapshot.dependencies)}"
-        "<p class='muted'>Details are redacted at the API boundary and again "
-        "before rendering; credentials are never displayed.</p>"
-        "</section>"
-    )
-
-
-def _namespace_card(snapshot: SystemHealthSnapshot) -> str:
-    if not snapshot.mcp_namespaces:
-        body = "<p class='muted'>No MCP namespaces are declared.</p>"
-    else:
-        rows = []
-        for entry in snapshot.mcp_namespaces:
-            rows.append(
-                "<tr>"
-                f"<td><code>{_esc(entry.get('namespace'))}</code></td>"
-                f"<td><code>{_esc(entry.get('required_tool'))}</code></td>"
-                f"<td>{_status_badge(str(entry.get('status') or STATUS_UNPROVEN))}</td>"
-                f"<td>{_esc(entry.get('ide_namespace_proven'))}</td>"
-                f"<td>{_safe(entry.get('reason'))}</td>"
-                "</tr>"
-            )
-        body = (
-            "<table class='registry'><thead><tr>"
-            "<th>Namespace</th><th>Required tool</th><th>Status</th>"
-            "<th>IDE-proven</th><th>Reason</th>"
-            "</tr></thead><tbody>"
-            f"{''.join(rows)}</tbody></table>"
-        )
-    return (
-        "<section class='health-card'>"
-        "<h3>MCP namespaces</h3>"
-        f"{body}"
-        "<p class='muted'>The web process runs outside the IDE-managed MCP "
-        "client, so namespace health is reported as unproven rather than "
-        "guessed (#543).</p>"
-        "</section>"
-    )
-
-
-def _stale_runtime_card(snapshot: SystemHealthSnapshot) -> str:
-    stale = snapshot.stale_runtime
-    if stale.stale:
-        warning = (
-            "<div class='stub health-stale'><p><strong>Stale runtime:</strong> "
-            "the running code, the checkout, and the remote-tracking commit "
-            "disagree. Capability gates may be evaluating obsolete code — "
-            "do not treat this runtime as mutation-safe.</p></div>"
-        )
-    elif not stale.determinable:
-        warning = (
-            "<div class='stub health-stale'><p><strong>Staleness "
-            "indeterminate:</strong> parity could not be proven, so this "
-            "runtime is not reported as mutation-safe.</p></div>"
-        )
-    else:
-        warning = ""
-
-    return (
-        "<section class='health-card'>"
-        "<h3>Stale-runtime parity</h3>"
-        f"{warning}"
-        "<table class='detail'>"
-        "<tr><th>Daemon head</th>"
-        f"<td><code>{_esc(stale.daemon_head or 'unknown')}</code></td></tr>"
-        "<tr><th>Checkout head</th>"
-        f"<td><code>{_esc(stale.checkout_head or 'unknown')}</code></td></tr>"
-        "<tr><th>Remote head</th>"
-        f"<td><code>{_esc(stale.remote_head or 'unknown')}</code></td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Stale</th><td>{_esc(stale.stale)}</td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Determinable</th><td>{_esc(stale.determinable)}</td></tr>"
-        f"<tr><th>Mutation safe</th><td>{_esc(stale.mutation_safe)}</td></tr>"
-        "</table>"
-        f"{_reason_list(stale.reasons, empty='Runtime, checkout, and remote agree.')}"
-        "</section>"
-    )
-
-
-def _probe_error_card(snapshot: SystemHealthSnapshot) -> str:
-    if not snapshot.probe_errors:
-        return ""
-    return (
-        "<section class='health-card'>"
-        "<h3>Probe errors</h3>"
-        f"{_reason_list(snapshot.probe_errors, empty='')}"
-        "</section>"
-    )
-
-
-def _recovery_card() -> str:
-    """Sanctioned recovery pointers only — never a manual process kill (#630)."""
-    return (
-        "<section class='health-card'>"
-        "<h3>Recovery</h3>"
-        "<p class='muted'>This dashboard is read-only. Restart and reload "
-        "controls arrive in Phase 2 (#642); until then recovery runs through "
-        "the sanctioned client reconnect / operator restart path.</p>"
-        "<ul class='reasons'>"
-        "<li><a href='/runtime'>Runtime and session view</a> — active profile, "
-        "workflow hashes, and shell health.</li>"
-        "<li>Reconnect the MCP client from the IDE, then re-run the blocked "
-        "cycle. Never kill the daemon process manually: unmanaged kills are "
-        "recorded as runtime contamination (#630).</li>"
-        "<li>See <code>docs/webui-local-dev.md</code> for the documented "
-        "recovery sequence.</li>"
-        "</ul>"
-        "</section>"
-    )
-
-
-def render_system_health_page(snapshot: SystemHealthSnapshot) -> str:
-    """Render the full system-health dashboard body."""
-    return (
-        "<h2>System health</h2>"
-        "<p class='meta'>Read-only view of the Phase 1 system-health API "
-        "(<code>/api/v1/system/health</code>). Reload this page to refresh; "
-        "nothing here polls or mutates on your behalf.</p>"
-        f"{_readiness_card(snapshot)}"
-        f"{_stale_runtime_card(snapshot)}"
-        f"{_version_card(snapshot)}"
-        f"{_dependency_card(snapshot)}"
-        f"{_namespace_card(snapshot)}"
-        f"{_probe_error_card(snapshot)}"
-        f"{_recovery_card()}"
-    )

webui/timeline.py

@@ -1,906 +0,0 @@
-"""Workflow-event and conversation timeline model (#637, Phase 1).
-
-Operators cannot browse a unified timeline of workflow events, decisions,
-tool calls, and handoffs: the evidence is scattered across control-plane
-events, Gitea canonical handoff comments, and local logs. This module defines
-one durable, versioned event schema and per-source adapters that normalise
-those scattered records into a single ``WorkflowEvent`` stream, plus a
-read-only query layer (filter by issue / PR / session, stable ordering,
-pagination) that the ``/api/v1/timeline`` route serves.
-
-Design rules honoured here:
-
-- **Read-only.** Sources are read; nothing is mutated. The control-plane
-  database is opened through a ``mode=ro`` URI so a missing or unwritable DB
-  degrades to a reason instead of creating directories or running migrations.
-- **Fail-soft per source.** An unavailable source degrades to a status with a
-  reason rather than raising, and a source that could not run is never
-  rendered as an empty-and-healthy timeline.
-- **Answerable filters only.** Each source declares which filter dimensions it
-  can actually answer. A filter dimension no source that ran can carry is
-  refused with an explicit reason rather than silently matching nothing: an
-  empty page from an unanswerable filter reads to an operator as "no such
-  activity", which is a different — and false — statement.
-- **Redaction at the boundary, fail closed.** Every free-text field (event
-  messages, redacted tool arguments, decision/proof text) is run through the
-  console redaction policy before it leaves this module, and *before* any
-  structured value is derived from it — evidence references are extracted from
-  redacted text, then independently revalidated before serialization. An
-  unredactable value becomes the placeholder, and a value that cannot be proven
-  safe is dropped — an unredacted payload is never emitted, and a generation
-  error never drops raw data to a caller or a log.
-- **Stable ordering.** Events sort by ``(timestamp, source_rank, event_key)``
-  with a deterministic tiebreak, so pagination is stable across calls and
-  events with equal or missing timestamps keep a fixed order.
-
-Non-goals (from the issue): no full chat replay, no mutation of historical
-events, no unredacted tool-argument storage.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import re
-import sqlite3
-from dataclasses import dataclass, replace
-from datetime import datetime, timezone
-from typing import Any, Callable, Iterable
-
-import control_plane_db
-from webui import console_redaction
-
-# The schema is versioned so consumers can branch on shape. Bump on any
-# breaking change to WorkflowEvent's serialized form.
-TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
-
-# Known event sources and their deterministic ordering rank. When two events
-# carry the same timestamp, the source rank breaks the tie before the
-# per-source event key, so a control-plane event and a handoff comment minted
-# in the same second always sort in a fixed order.
-SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE = "control_plane"
-SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF = "gitea_handoff"
-_SOURCE_RANK = {
-    SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE: 0,
-    SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF: 1,
-}
-
-# The filter dimensions the query layer accepts.
-FILTER_ISSUE = "issue"
-FILTER_PR = "pr"
-FILTER_SESSION = "session"
-
-# Which dimensions each source can actually answer. This is a property of the
-# underlying records, not of the query code: the control-plane ``events`` table
-# is (event_id, work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at) and carries no
-# session identity at all, so no control-plane event can ever match a session
-# filter. A CTH handoff comment can declare its session as a field, so the
-# handoff source answers all three. Filtering on a dimension the surviving
-# sources cannot carry is refused in ``load_timeline`` rather than answered
-# with an empty page.
-_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = {
-    SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE: (FILTER_ISSUE, FILTER_PR),
-    SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF: (FILTER_ISSUE, FILTER_PR, FILTER_SESSION),
-}
-
-# Why a source cannot answer a dimension, for the refusal reason an operator reads.
-_SOURCE_FILTER_LIMITS: dict[tuple[str, str], str] = {
-    (SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE, FILTER_SESSION): (
-        "control-plane events carry no session identity "
-        "(the events table has no session column)"
-    ),
-}
-
-# A timestamp far in the future so events with no parseable timestamp sort
-# last (after everything real) instead of first, without raising.
-_MISSING_TS_SORT = "9999-12-31T23:59:59Z"
-
-
-def _parse_ts(value: str | None) -> str | None:
-    """Normalise a timestamp to ``...Z`` UTC, or None when unparseable."""
-    if not value:
-        return None
-    text = str(value).strip()
-    if not text:
-        return None
-    candidate = text[:-1] + "+00:00" if text.endswith("Z") else text
-    try:
-        parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(candidate)
-    except ValueError:
-        return None
-    if parsed.tzinfo is None:
-        parsed = parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
-    return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z")
-
-
-def _redact(value: Any) -> Any:
-    """Redact a single free-text field, failing closed to the placeholder."""
-    if value is None:
-        return None
-    return console_redaction.redact_text(str(value))
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class WorkflowEvent:
-    """One normalised timeline event.
-
-    Every field is optional except ``source``/``event_type``/``event_key``
-    because sources carry different subsets. The class is frozen so an adapted
-    event is an immutable record; a consumer that needs a variant builds a new
-    one rather than mutating history.
-    """
-
-    source: str
-    event_type: str
-    event_key: str
-    timestamp: str | None = None
-    actor: str | None = None
-    role: str | None = None
-    issue_number: int | None = None
-    pr_number: int | None = None
-    session_id: str | None = None
-    tool_name: str | None = None
-    decision: str | None = None
-    message: str | None = None
-    correlation_id: str | None = None
-    evidence_refs: tuple[str, ...] = ()
-    sensitive: bool = False
-
-    def sort_key(self) -> tuple[str, int, str]:
-        return (
-            self.timestamp or _MISSING_TS_SORT,
-            _SOURCE_RANK.get(self.source, 99),
-            self.event_key,
-        )
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "source": self.source,
-            "event_type": self.event_type,
-            "event_key": self.event_key,
-            "timestamp": self.timestamp,
-            "actor": self.actor,
-            "role": self.role,
-            "issue_number": self.issue_number,
-            "pr_number": self.pr_number,
-            "session_id": self.session_id,
-            "tool_name": self.tool_name,
-            "decision": self.decision,
-            "message": self.message,
-            "correlation_id": self.correlation_id,
-            "evidence_refs": list(self.evidence_refs),
-            "sensitive": self.sensitive,
-        }
-
-
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-# Adapters — pure functions from a source's raw records to WorkflowEvents.     #
-# Each is total: a malformed record is skipped, never raised on.               #
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-# Event types whose payload is treated as sensitive and always redaction-hard
-# (they can carry lease/session provenance or tool arguments).
-_SENSITIVE_EVENT_HINTS = ("lease", "capability", "token", "auth", "secret")
-
-# Reference tokens (issue/PR/comment ids) and SHAs parsed out of proof text.
-_EVIDENCE_REF_RE = re.compile(r"(?:#|PR\s*#?|issue\s*#?|comment\s*#?)(\d+)", re.IGNORECASE)
-
-# A commit reference is only recognised when the text *declares* it as one.
-# A bare lowercase hex run is not evidence of anything: at 40 characters it is
-# exactly the shape of a Gitea personal access token, and at 7 it also matches
-# ordinary words such as "defaced". Requiring an anchoring keyword keeps real
-# references ("commit abc1234", "at head a209756...", "base caaae9b6") usable
-# while refusing to lift an undeclared secret-shaped run out of free text.
-_SHA_RE = re.compile(
-    r"(?i:\b(?:commit|sha|head|base|parent|revision|rev|merge[- ]base)\b[\s:=@#]*)"
-    r"([0-9a-f]{7,40})\b"
-)
-
-# Shapes a serialized evidence reference is allowed to take. Anything else is
-# dropped rather than emitted.
-_REF_ISSUE_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^#[0-9]{1,9}$")
-_REF_SHA_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{7,40}$")
-
-# A long undelimited hex run with no declaring context is treated as credential
-# material wherever it appears, never as an identifier.
-_BARE_SECRET_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{32,}$")
-
-# An event type reads like an identifier, but a stored one is externally
-# influenced: any producer that writes the control-plane ``events`` table
-# chooses the string. It reaches ``to_dict`` verbatim, so it is validated here
-# rather than trusted because of where it came from.
-_CP_EVENT_TYPE_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9._:+-]{0,63}$")
-
-# Emitted in place of a value that cannot be proven safe. Deliberately not a
-# plausible workflow type: an unsafe value is refused, never quietly rewritten
-# into a different valid-looking one that would misdescribe the record.
-UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE = "unsafe:redacted"
-
-# Emitted for a CTH heading that is not a declared member of ``CTH_TYPES``. The
-# contract is enforced on write (``format_cth_body``) and on assess; the read
-# path the timeline uses enforces it too rather than assuming it was.
-UNKNOWN_HANDOFF_EVENT_TYPE = "handoff:unrecognized"
-
-# A source record id is a plain integer in both sources it comes from: the
-# control-plane ``events`` primary key and a Gitea comment id. ``event_key`` is
-# serialized verbatim and is the pagination tiebreak, so anything else is
-# refused rather than interpolated into it.
-_RECORD_ID_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[0-9]{1,19}$")
-
-
-def _kind_to_numbers(kind: str | None, number: int | None) -> tuple[int | None, int | None]:
-    """Map a control-plane work-item (kind, number) to (issue_no, pr_no)."""
-    if number is None:
-        return (None, None)
-    if kind == "pr":
-        return (None, int(number))
-    if kind == "issue":
-        return (int(number), None)
-    return (None, None)
-
-
-def _correlation_for(kind: str | None, number: int | None) -> str | None:
-    if number is None or kind not in ("issue", "pr"):
-        return None
-    return f"{kind}#{number}"
-
-
-def _extract_evidence_refs(*texts: str | None) -> tuple[str, ...]:
-    """Extract issue/PR and declared-commit references from **redacted** text.
-
-    Callers must pass text that has already been through :func:`_redact`; this
-    function derives a structured field from its input, so extracting ahead of
-    redaction would republish whatever redaction was about to remove. Every
-    reference is revalidated by :func:`_validated_evidence_refs` before it is
-    serialized.
-    """
-    refs: list[str] = []
-    for text in texts:
-        if not text:
-            continue
-        for match in _EVIDENCE_REF_RE.finditer(text):
-            token = f"#{match.group(1)}"
-            if token not in refs:
-                refs.append(token)
-        for match in _SHA_RE.finditer(text):
-            token = match.group(1)
-            if token not in refs:
-                refs.append(token)
-    return tuple(refs)
-
-
-def _validated_evidence_refs(refs: Iterable[str]) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...], bool]:
-    """Independently revalidate references immediately before serialization.
-
-    Extraction is not trusted on its own. A reference survives only when it has
-    a known reference shape and is unchanged by a second redaction pass — a
-    value the redaction policy would alter is credential material that must not
-    be emitted as a structured field. A full 40-character SHA stays usable
-    because extraction only accepts a hex run the source text explicitly
-    declared as a commit. Returns ``(safe_refs, dropped_any)``; ``dropped_any``
-    marks the event sensitive so the drop is visible rather than silent.
-    """
-    safe: list[str] = []
-    dropped = False
-    for ref in refs or ():
-        try:
-            token = str(ref).strip()
-            if not token:
-                continue
-            recognised = bool(_REF_ISSUE_SHAPE.match(token) or _REF_SHA_SHAPE.match(token))
-            if not recognised:
-                dropped = True
-                continue
-            if _redact(token) != token:
-                dropped = True
-                continue
-            if token not in safe:
-                safe.append(token)
-        except Exception:
-            # Fail closed: a reference that cannot be proven safe is dropped.
-            dropped = True
-            continue
-    return (tuple(safe), dropped)
-
-
-def _safe_session_id(value: Any) -> str | None:
-    """Return a session identifier only when it is safe to emit.
-
-    The value is authoritative source data — a session the record names for
-    itself — but it is still free text. It is dropped when redaction alters it
-    or when it is a bare secret-shaped hex run, so a credential parked in a
-    session field can never reach the payload or be echoed back by a filter.
-    """
-    if value is None:
-        return None
-    text = str(value).strip()
-    if not text:
-        return None
-    if _BARE_SECRET_SHAPE.match(text):
-        return None
-    return text if _redact(text) == text else None
-
-
-def _safe_record_id(value: Any) -> str | None:
-    """Return a source record id only when it is a plain numeric identifier.
-
-    ``event_key`` is serialized verbatim and is the deterministic pagination
-    tiebreak, so an id is interpolated into it only when it has the shape both
-    real sources actually produce. A record whose identity cannot be trusted is
-    refused by the caller rather than keyed on.
-    """
-    if value is None or isinstance(value, bool):
-        return None
-    if isinstance(value, int):
-        return str(value)
-    text = str(value).strip()
-    return text if _RECORD_ID_SHAPE.match(text) else None
-
-
-def _safe_cp_event_type(value: Any) -> tuple[str, bool]:
-    """Validate a stored control-plane event type. Returns ``(type, unsafe)``.
-
-    The stored value is externally influenced — whichever producer wrote the
-    ``events`` row chose the string — and ``to_dict`` serializes it verbatim, so
-    it passes a boundary of its own instead of relying on the one ``message``
-    passes. A value survives only when it is an ordinary identifier, is not a
-    bare secret-shaped hex run, and is unchanged by a redaction pass. Anything
-    else fails closed to :data:`UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE`: the record stays visible as
-    an audit entry, but the value itself is never republished — not verbatim,
-    not partially sanitized, and not rewritten into some other valid-looking
-    type that would misdescribe what happened.
-    """
-    text = ("" if value is None else str(value)).strip()
-    if not text:
-        return ("", False)
-    if _BARE_SECRET_SHAPE.match(text):
-        return (UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE, True)
-    if not _CP_EVENT_TYPE_SHAPE.match(text):
-        return (UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE, True)
-    if _redact(text) != text:
-        return (UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE, True)
-    return (text, False)
-
-
-def _safe_echo(value: Any) -> Any:
-    """Guard a scalar that is echoed back rather than derived from a record.
-
-    Query scope and filter values are caller-supplied and are reflected in the
-    response so an operator can see what was asked. Reflection is still
-    emission: a value redaction would alter, or a bare secret-shaped hex run, is
-    replaced by the placeholder instead of being echoed verbatim. Ordinary
-    scope and filter values pass through untouched.
-    """
-    if value is None or isinstance(value, (int, bool)):
-        return value
-    text = str(value)
-    if _BARE_SECRET_SHAPE.match(text.strip()):
-        return console_redaction.REDACTED
-    return _redact(text)
-
-
-def adapt_cp_events(rows: Iterable[dict[str, Any]]) -> list[WorkflowEvent]:
-    """Adapt control-plane ``events`` rows (joined to work_items) into events.
-
-    Each row is expected to carry ``event_id``, ``event_type``, ``message``,
-    ``created_at`` and the joined work-item ``kind``/``number``. Rows missing
-    an id or type are skipped so a partially written table never raises.
-    """
-    events: list[WorkflowEvent] = []
-    for row in rows or []:
-        try:
-            event_id = _safe_record_id(row.get("event_id"))
-            raw_event_type = (row.get("event_type") or "").strip()
-            if event_id is None or not raw_event_type:
-                continue
-            # The stored type is source data, not a trusted constant: validate
-            # it before it is serialized, exactly as `message` below is redacted
-            # before it is serialized.
-            event_type, event_type_unsafe = _safe_cp_event_type(raw_event_type)
-            kind = row.get("kind")
-            number = row.get("number")
-            issue_no, pr_no = _kind_to_numbers(kind, number)
-            sensitive = event_type_unsafe or any(
-                hint in raw_event_type.lower() for hint in _SENSITIVE_EVENT_HINTS
-            )
-            events.append(
-                WorkflowEvent(
-                    source=SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE,
-                    event_type=event_type,
-                    event_key=f"cp:{event_id}",
-                    timestamp=_parse_ts(row.get("created_at")),
-                    issue_number=issue_no,
-                    pr_number=pr_no,
-                    # No session_id: the control-plane events table is
-                    # (event_id, work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at)
-                    # and records no session. Inventing one from the work item
-                    # or the message text would be a guess, so this source
-                    # declares the session dimension unsupported instead
-                    # (_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT) and the query layer refuses a
-                    # session filter it cannot honestly answer.
-                    message=_redact(row.get("message")),
-                    correlation_id=_correlation_for(kind, number),
-                    sensitive=sensitive,
-                )
-            )
-        except Exception:
-            # A single malformed row must not sink the whole adaptation.
-            continue
-    return events
-
-
-def adapt_cth_comments(
-    comments: Iterable[dict[str, Any]],
-    *,
-    kind: str,
-    number: int,
-) -> list[WorkflowEvent]:
-    """Adapt Gitea Canonical Thread Handoff (CTH) comments into events.
-
-    Only comments that parse as a CTH (``canonical_thread_handoff.parse_cth_comment``)
-    become events; ordinary comments are ignored. ``kind``/``number`` scope the
-    events to the issue or PR the comments belong to.
-    """
-    # Imported lazily so this module has no import-time dependency on the
-    # handoff parser when only the control-plane adapter is used.
-    from canonical_thread_handoff import is_known_cth_type, parse_cth_comment
-
-    # ``kind``/``number`` are interpolated into event_key and correlation_id, so
-    # they are normalised once here. A scope this adapter cannot express is
-    # refused outright rather than serialized into an identifier.
-    kind = (kind or "").strip().lower()
-    if kind not in ("issue", "pr"):
-        return []
-    try:
-        number = int(number)
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        return []
-
-    issue_no, pr_no = _kind_to_numbers(kind, number)
-    correlation = _correlation_for(kind, number)
-    events: list[WorkflowEvent] = []
-    for comment in comments or []:
-        try:
-            body = comment.get("body") or ""
-            parsed = parse_cth_comment(body)
-            if not parsed:
-                continue
-            fields = parsed.get("fields") or {}
-            cth_type = parsed.get("cth_type") or ""
-            comment_id = _safe_record_id(comment.get("id"))
-            if comment_id is None:
-                continue
-            # The CTH heading is free text: the parser accepts whatever follows
-            # "## CTH:", and only the write and assess paths check it against
-            # the contract. Check it here too — an unrecognised heading is
-            # reported as such rather than serialized into event_type, so
-            # arbitrary, malformed, or secret-shaped heading content has no way
-            # through. Declared types are preserved exactly.
-            cth_type_known = is_known_cth_type(cth_type)
-            # Redaction runs first, and every derived value is taken from the
-            # redacted text — deriving evidence refs from the raw proof would
-            # re-emit exactly what redaction was about to remove.
-            decision = _redact(fields.get("decision"))
-            proof = _redact(fields.get("proof"))
-            next_action = _redact(fields.get("next action"))
-            refs, refs_dropped = _validated_evidence_refs(
-                _extract_evidence_refs(proof, decision)
-            )
-            events.append(
-                WorkflowEvent(
-                    source=SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF,
-                    event_type=(
-                        f"handoff:{cth_type.strip()}"
-                        if cth_type_known
-                        else UNKNOWN_HANDOFF_EVENT_TYPE
-                    ),
-                    event_key=f"cth:{kind}:{number}:{comment_id}",
-                    timestamp=_parse_ts(comment.get("created_at")),
-                    actor=_redact((comment.get("user") or {}).get("login")),
-                    role=_redact(fields.get("next owner")),
-                    issue_number=issue_no,
-                    pr_number=pr_no,
-                    # A CTH names its own session when the producer records one;
-                    # it is read from that declared field, never inferred from
-                    # unrelated text.
-                    session_id=_safe_session_id(fields.get("session")),
-                    decision=decision,
-                    message=next_action or _redact(fields.get("status")),
-                    correlation_id=correlation,
-                    evidence_refs=refs,
-                    sensitive=refs_dropped or not cth_type_known,
-                )
-            )
-        except Exception:
-            continue
-    return events
-
-
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-# Read-only control-plane event source.                                       #
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-_CP_EVENTS_QUERY = """
-SELECT e.event_id   AS event_id,
-       e.event_type AS event_type,
-       e.message    AS message,
-       e.created_at AS created_at,
-       w.kind       AS kind,
-       w.number     AS number
-FROM events e
-JOIN work_items w ON e.work_item_id = w.work_item_id
-WHERE w.remote = ? AND w.org = ? AND w.repo = ?
-"""
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class SourceStatus:
-    """Fail-soft status for one timeline source.
-
-    ``supported_filters`` states which filter dimensions this source's records
-    can carry; ``unsupported_filters`` names the requested dimensions it cannot,
-    so an operator can see *why* a source contributed nothing rather than being
-    left to read an empty list as an absence of activity.
-    """
-
-    name: str
-    ok: bool
-    reason: str | None = None
-    count: int = 0
-    supported_filters: tuple[str, ...] = ()
-    unsupported_filters: tuple[str, ...] = ()
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "name": self.name,
-            "ok": self.ok,
-            "reason": self.reason,
-            "count": self.count,
-            "supported_filters": list(self.supported_filters),
-            "unsupported_filters": list(self.unsupported_filters),
-        }
-
-
-def _cp_status(*, ok: bool, reason: str | None = None, count: int = 0) -> SourceStatus:
-    return SourceStatus(
-        SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE,
-        ok=ok,
-        # A failure reason is serialized like any other field and is often an
-        # exception string carrying a path or a transport error, so it crosses
-        # the redaction boundary too. Static reasons pass through unchanged.
-        reason=_redact(reason),
-        count=count,
-        supported_filters=_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT[SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE],
-    )
-
-
-def _handoff_status(*, ok: bool, reason: str | None = None, count: int = 0) -> SourceStatus:
-    return SourceStatus(
-        SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF,
-        ok=ok,
-        # Same boundary as the control-plane status: this reason can quote an
-        # error raised by a live authenticated fetch.
-        reason=_redact(reason),
-        count=count,
-        supported_filters=_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT[SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF],
-    )
-
-
-def read_cp_events(
-    *,
-    remote: str,
-    org: str,
-    repo: str,
-    db_path: str | None = None,
-) -> tuple[list[WorkflowEvent], SourceStatus]:
-    """Read scoped control-plane events read-only. Never creates the DB.
-
-    Opens the SQLite file through a ``mode=ro`` URI: a health/timeline read
-    must never create directories or run the schema migration that
-    ``ControlPlaneDB()`` performs on construction. A missing or unreadable DB
-    degrades to a status with a reason.
-    """
-    path = (db_path or control_plane_db.default_db_path()).strip()
-    conn: sqlite3.Connection | None = None
-    try:
-        conn = sqlite3.connect(f"file:{path}?mode=ro", uri=True)
-        conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
-        cursor = conn.execute(_CP_EVENTS_QUERY, (remote, org, repo))
-        rows = [dict(r) for r in cursor.fetchall()]
-    except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
-        return ([], _cp_status(ok=False, reason=f"control-plane DB unavailable: {exc}"))
-    except sqlite3.Error as exc:
-        return ([], _cp_status(ok=False, reason=f"control-plane read failed: {exc}"))
-    finally:
-        if conn is not None:
-            conn.close()
-    events = adapt_cp_events(rows)
-    return (events, _cp_status(ok=True, count=len(events)))
-
-
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-# Filter, sort, paginate.                                                     #
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-
-def filter_events(
-    events: Iterable[WorkflowEvent],
-    *,
-    issue: int | None = None,
-    pr: int | None = None,
-    session: str | None = None,
-) -> list[WorkflowEvent]:
-    """Filter events by issue number, PR number, and/or session id.
-
-    Filters are conjunctive. A filter that names a dimension an event does not
-    carry excludes that event (an issue filter excludes PR-only events).
-    """
-    out: list[WorkflowEvent] = []
-    for ev in events:
-        if issue is not None and ev.issue_number != issue:
-            continue
-        if pr is not None and ev.pr_number != pr:
-            continue
-        if session is not None and ev.session_id != session:
-            continue
-        out.append(ev)
-    return out
-
-
-def sort_events(events: Iterable[WorkflowEvent]) -> list[WorkflowEvent]:
-    """Return events in stable timeline order (ascending)."""
-    return sorted(events, key=lambda ev: ev.sort_key())
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class TimelinePage:
-    """One page of the sorted, filtered timeline."""
-
-    events: tuple[WorkflowEvent, ...]
-    total: int
-    limit: int
-    offset: int
-
-    @property
-    def next_offset(self) -> int | None:
-        nxt = self.offset + len(self.events)
-        return nxt if nxt < self.total else None
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "events": [ev.to_dict() for ev in self.events],
-            "pagination": {
-                "total": self.total,
-                "limit": self.limit,
-                "offset": self.offset,
-                "returned": len(self.events),
-                "next_offset": self.next_offset,
-                "has_more": self.next_offset is not None,
-            },
-        }
-
-
-_MAX_LIMIT = 500
-_DEFAULT_LIMIT = 50
-
-
-def _coerce_bounds(limit: int | None, offset: int | None) -> tuple[int, int]:
-    try:
-        lim = int(limit) if limit is not None else _DEFAULT_LIMIT
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        lim = _DEFAULT_LIMIT
-    try:
-        off = int(offset) if offset is not None else 0
-    except (TypeError, ValueError):
-        off = 0
-    lim = max(1, min(lim, _MAX_LIMIT))
-    off = max(0, off)
-    return (lim, off)
-
-
-def paginate(events: list[WorkflowEvent], *, limit: int | None, offset: int | None) -> TimelinePage:
-    lim, off = _coerce_bounds(limit, offset)
-    window = events[off : off + lim]
-    return TimelinePage(events=tuple(window), total=len(events), limit=lim, offset=off)
-
-
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-# Composition — load_timeline aggregates all sources, fail-soft.              #
-# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- #
-
-# A comment source is a callable that, given (kind, number), returns the raw
-# Gitea comment list for that issue/PR. The route supplies a live fail-soft
-# fetcher; tests supply a fixture. When None, the handoff source is reported as
-# not-run (never silently empty-and-healthy).
-CommentSource = Callable[[str, int], list[dict[str, Any]]]
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class TimelineSnapshot:
-    """One answered timeline query.
-
-    ``ok`` is False when the query could not be answered as asked — currently
-    when a requested filter dimension no surviving source can carry was
-    supplied. The page is then empty *and* the snapshot says so, because an
-    ``ok`` empty page is a claim that no such activity exists.
-    """
-
-    schema_version: int
-    remote: str
-    org: str
-    repo: str
-    filters: dict[str, Any]
-    page: TimelinePage
-    sources: tuple[SourceStatus, ...]
-    ok: bool = True
-    error: dict[str, Any] | None = None
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "ok": self.ok,
-            "error": self.error,
-            "schema_version": self.schema_version,
-            # Scope and filters are echoed caller input, not derived record
-            # data. Reflecting a value is still emitting it, so both cross the
-            # same boundary; ordinary scope and filter values are unchanged.
-            "scope": {
-                "remote": _safe_echo(self.remote),
-                "org": _safe_echo(self.org),
-                "repo": _safe_echo(self.repo),
-            },
-            "filters": {key: _safe_echo(value) for key, value in self.filters.items()},
-            "sources": [s.to_dict() for s in self.sources],
-            **self.page.to_dict(),
-        }
-
-
-def _unanswerable_reasons(
-    statuses: Iterable[SourceStatus], unanswerable: Iterable[str]
-) -> list[dict[str, str]]:
-    """Explain, per source, why each unanswerable dimension went unanswered."""
-    out: list[dict[str, str]] = []
-    for status in statuses:
-        for dim in unanswerable:
-            if dim not in status.supported_filters:
-                reason = _SOURCE_FILTER_LIMITS.get(
-                    (status.name, dim), f"this source's records carry no {dim} identity"
-                )
-            elif not status.ok:
-                reason = (
-                    f"this source can carry {dim} but did not run: "
-                    f"{status.reason or 'unavailable'}"
-                )
-            else:
-                continue
-            out.append({"source": status.name, "filter": dim, "reason": reason})
-    return out
-
-
-def load_timeline(
-    *,
-    remote: str,
-    org: str,
-    repo: str,
-    issue: int | None = None,
-    pr: int | None = None,
-    session: str | None = None,
-    limit: int | None = None,
-    offset: int | None = None,
-    db_path: str | None = None,
-    comment_source: CommentSource | None = None,
-) -> TimelineSnapshot:
-    """Aggregate every timeline source into one filtered, paginated snapshot.
-
-    Sources are read independently and fail soft: an unavailable source
-    contributes a ``SourceStatus`` with ``ok=False`` and a reason, and never
-    collapses the whole timeline. The handoff source only runs when a specific
-    issue or PR is requested (a handoff comment belongs to one thread) and a
-    ``comment_source`` is available; otherwise it is reported as ``not run``
-    rather than as an empty-and-healthy source.
-
-    A filter dimension that no surviving source can carry — a ``session``
-    filter when the only source that ran is the control plane, whose events
-    record no session — is refused with ``ok=False`` and a structured error
-    instead of being answered with an empty page.
-    """
-    all_events: list[WorkflowEvent] = []
-    statuses: list[SourceStatus] = []
-
-    cp_events, cp_status = read_cp_events(remote=remote, org=org, repo=repo, db_path=db_path)
-    all_events.extend(cp_events)
-    statuses.append(cp_status)
-
-    # Gitea handoff comments are thread-scoped: only fetch when the caller
-    # narrowed to one issue or PR, and only when a source was provided.
-    handoff_target: tuple[str, int] | None = None
-    if pr is not None:
-        handoff_target = ("pr", pr)
-    elif issue is not None:
-        handoff_target = ("issue", issue)
-
-    if handoff_target is None:
-        statuses.append(
-            _handoff_status(
-                ok=False,
-                reason="not run: handoff comments are thread-scoped; filter by issue or pr to include them",
-            )
-        )
-    elif comment_source is None:
-        statuses.append(
-            _handoff_status(
-                ok=False,
-                reason="not run: no comment source configured for this timeline read",
-            )
-        )
-    else:
-        kind, number = handoff_target
-        try:
-            comments = comment_source(kind, number) or []
-            handoff_events = adapt_cth_comments(comments, kind=kind, number=number)
-            all_events.extend(handoff_events)
-            statuses.append(_handoff_status(ok=True, count=len(handoff_events)))
-        except Exception as exc:  # fail soft: a fetch/parse error degrades this source only
-            statuses.append(_handoff_status(ok=False, reason=f"handoff source failed: {exc}"))
-
-    requested = tuple(
-        name
-        for name, value in ((FILTER_ISSUE, issue), (FILTER_PR, pr), (FILTER_SESSION, session))
-        if value is not None
-    )
-    statuses = [
-        replace(
-            status,
-            unsupported_filters=tuple(
-                dim for dim in requested if dim not in status.supported_filters
-            ),
-        )
-        for status in statuses
-    ]
-    filters = {"issue": issue, "pr": pr, "session": session}
-
-    # A dimension is answerable only if a source that actually ran can carry it.
-    # If none can, refuse: an empty page would assert "no such activity", which
-    # is a claim this timeline is not in a position to make.
-    answerable: set[str] = set()
-    for status in statuses:
-        if status.ok:
-            answerable.update(status.supported_filters)
-    unanswerable = tuple(dim for dim in requested if dim not in answerable)
-
-    if unanswerable:
-        return TimelineSnapshot(
-            schema_version=TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
-            remote=remote,
-            org=org,
-            repo=repo,
-            filters=filters,
-            page=paginate([], limit=limit, offset=offset),
-            sources=tuple(statuses),
-            ok=False,
-            error={
-                "code": "filter_not_supported",
-                "unsupported_filters": list(unanswerable),
-                "detail": (
-                    "no timeline source that ran can answer "
-                    + ", ".join(f"'{dim}'" for dim in unanswerable)
-                    + "; the result is refused rather than returned empty"
-                ),
-                "sources": _unanswerable_reasons(statuses, unanswerable),
-            },
-        )
-
-    filtered = filter_events(all_events, issue=issue, pr=pr, session=session)
-    ordered = sort_events(filtered)
-    page = paginate(ordered, limit=limit, offset=offset)
-
-    return TimelineSnapshot(
-        schema_version=TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION,
-        remote=remote,
-        org=org,
-        repo=repo,
-        filters=filters,
-        page=page,
-        sources=tuple(statuses),
-    )
-
-
-def snapshot_to_dict(snapshot: TimelineSnapshot) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    return snapshot.to_dict()

worktree_cleanup_audit.py

@@ -34,11 +34,7 @@ import subprocess
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 from typing import Any
 
-from merged_cleanup_reconcile import (
+from merged_cleanup_reconcile import branch_worktree_folder, read_local_worktree_state
-    branch_worktree_folder,
-    is_head_ancestor_of_ref,
-    read_local_worktree_state,
-)
 from reviewer_worktree import parse_dirty_tracked_files, REVIEW_WORKTREE_RE
 
 PROTECTED_BRANCHES = frozenset({"master", "main", "dev"})
@@ -71,14 +67,6 @@ REMOVABLE_CLASSES = frozenset(
     {CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE, CLASS_DETACHED_REVIEW_LEFTOVER}
 )
 
-# Merged-PR linkage outcomes for issue worktrees (#858). Only ``LINKAGE_MERGED``
-# is ownership proof; every other outcome leaves the worktree protected.
-LINKAGE_MERGED = "merged_pr"
-LINKAGE_OPEN = "open_pr"
-LINKAGE_NONE = "no_owning_pr"
-LINKAGE_AMBIGUOUS = "ambiguous"
-LINKAGE_UNKNOWN = "unknown"
-
 _ISSUE_REF_RE = re.compile(r"issue-(\d+)", re.IGNORECASE)
 _ISSUE_BRANCH_PREFIXES = ("feat/", "fix/", "docs/", "chore/")
 
@@ -181,186 +169,6 @@ def is_ttl_expired(
     return (now_dt - last).total_seconds() > ttl_hours * 3600.0
 
 
-def build_pr_index(prs: list[dict[str, Any]] | None) -> dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]]:
-    """Index PR records by head branch for deterministic worktree linkage (#858).
-
-    Accepts Gitea PR payloads (``head`` as a dict) and pre-flattened records
-    (``head_branch``/``head_sha``). Records without a usable head branch or
-    number are dropped rather than guessed at, so a branch is only ever linked
-    to a PR the caller actually proved.
-    """
-    index: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] = {}
-    for pr in prs or []:
-        head = pr.get("head")
-        if isinstance(head, dict):
-            head_branch = head.get("ref")
-            head_sha = head.get("sha")
-        else:
-            head_branch = pr.get("head_branch") or (head if isinstance(head, str) else None)
-            head_sha = pr.get("head_sha")
-        number = pr.get("number")
-        if not head_branch or number is None:
-            continue
-        try:
-            pr_number = int(number)
-        except (TypeError, ValueError):
-            continue
-        index.setdefault(str(head_branch).strip(), []).append(
-            {
-                "pr_number": pr_number,
-                "head_branch": str(head_branch).strip(),
-                "head_sha": head_sha,
-                "merged": bool(pr.get("merged") or pr.get("merged_at")),
-                "state": pr.get("state"),
-            }
-        )
-    return index
-
-
-def resolve_owning_pr(
-    *,
-    branch: str | None,
-    pr_index: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] | None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Resolve the single PR that owns ``branch``, failing closed when unclear.
-
-    Ownership is only ``LINKAGE_MERGED`` when exactly one PR claims the branch
-    and that PR is merged. Several distinct PRs on one branch is a competing
-    claim (``LINKAGE_AMBIGUOUS``), and a still-open owner is reported as
-    ``LINKAGE_OPEN`` — both keep the worktree protected while still exposing
-    the PR number the audit resolved.
-    """
-    if pr_index is None:
-        return {
-            "status": LINKAGE_UNKNOWN,
-            "pr_number": None,
-            "candidate_pr_numbers": [],
-            "reasons": ["live PR state was not supplied; ownership unproven"],
-        }
-    branch_name = (branch or "").strip()
-    if not branch_name:
-        return {
-            "status": LINKAGE_UNKNOWN,
-            "pr_number": None,
-            "candidate_pr_numbers": [],
-            "reasons": ["worktree has no attached branch; ownership unproven"],
-        }
-
-    candidates = list(pr_index.get(branch_name) or [])
-    numbers = sorted({c["pr_number"] for c in candidates})
-    if not candidates:
-        return {
-            "status": LINKAGE_NONE,
-            "pr_number": None,
-            "candidate_pr_numbers": [],
-            "reasons": [f"no PR claims branch '{branch_name}'"],
-        }
-    if len(numbers) > 1:
-        return {
-            "status": LINKAGE_AMBIGUOUS,
-            "pr_number": None,
-            "candidate_pr_numbers": numbers,
-            "reasons": [
-                f"branch '{branch_name}' is claimed by competing PRs {numbers}; "
-                "ownership is ambiguous"
-            ],
-        }
-
-    owner = candidates[0]
-    pr_number = owner["pr_number"]
-    if owner.get("head_branch") != branch_name:
-        return {
-            "status": LINKAGE_UNKNOWN,
-            "pr_number": pr_number,
-            "candidate_pr_numbers": numbers,
-            "reasons": [
-                f"PR #{pr_number} head branch '{owner.get('head_branch')}' does not "
-                f"match worktree branch '{branch_name}'"
-            ],
-        }
-    if not owner.get("merged"):
-        return {
-            "status": LINKAGE_OPEN,
-            "pr_number": pr_number,
-            "candidate_pr_numbers": numbers,
-            "pr_head_sha": owner.get("head_sha"),
-            "reasons": [f"owning PR #{pr_number} is not merged"],
-        }
-    return {
-        "status": LINKAGE_MERGED,
-        "pr_number": pr_number,
-        "candidate_pr_numbers": numbers,
-        "pr_head_sha": owner.get("head_sha"),
-        "reasons": [],
-    }
-
-
-def assess_merged_pr_worktree_cleanup(
-    *,
-    linkage: dict[str, Any] | None,
-    head_sha: str | None,
-    head_in_master: bool | None,
-    is_dirty: bool,
-    has_open_pr: bool,
-    has_active_lease: bool,
-    has_active_issue_lock: bool,
-    is_protected: bool,
-    has_live_session: bool = False,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Decide whether a merged issue worktree satisfies the full cleanup policy.
-
-    Every condition must be independently proven: conclusive merged-PR
-    ownership, agreement between the worktree branch and the PR head branch,
-    containment of the worktree head in authoritative master (which is what
-    proves no unmerged commits remain), absence of any open/competing PR,
-    lease, issue lock, or live session, a clean tree, and a worktree that is
-    not the protected control checkout. Anything unknown blocks.
-    """
-    link = linkage or {
-        "status": LINKAGE_UNKNOWN,
-        "pr_number": None,
-        "reasons": ["no linkage assessment supplied"],
-    }
-    status = link.get("status")
-    reasons: list[str] = []
-
-    if status != LINKAGE_MERGED:
-        reasons.extend(
-            link.get("reasons") or ["owning PR could not be conclusively identified"]
-        )
-    if is_protected:
-        reasons.append("worktree is protected or the stable control checkout")
-    if is_dirty:
-        reasons.append("worktree has uncommitted changes")
-    if has_open_pr:
-        reasons.append("worktree branch has an open PR")
-    if has_active_lease:
-        reasons.append("worktree has an active lease")
-    if has_active_issue_lock:
-        reasons.append("an active issue lock references this branch")
-    if has_live_session:
-        reasons.append("a live process or session is using this worktree")
-    if not head_sha:
-        reasons.append("worktree head sha is unknown")
-    if head_in_master is None:
-        reasons.append("containment of the worktree head in master is unknown")
-    elif not head_in_master:
-        reasons.append(
-            "worktree head is not contained in authoritative master "
-            "(unmerged commits remain)"
-        )
-
-    proven = not reasons
-    return {
-        "linkage_status": status,
-        "pr_number": link.get("pr_number"),
-        "pr_head_sha": link.get("pr_head_sha"),
-        "head_in_master": head_in_master,
-        "proven": proven,
-        "block_reasons": reasons,
-    }
-
-
 def classify_worktree(
     *,
     workflow_type: str,
@@ -373,8 +181,6 @@ def classify_worktree(
     ttl_expired: bool = False,
     is_protected: bool = False,
     metadata_known: bool = True,
-    merged_pr_cleanup: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-    has_live_session: bool = False,
 ) -> str:
     """Classify a worktree, safety-first: any preservation signal wins.
 
@@ -393,8 +199,6 @@ def classify_worktree(
         return CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK  # never auto-deleted (criterion 8)
     if has_active_issue_lock:
         return CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK
-    if has_live_session:
-        return CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK  # a live session still owns this tree
     if not metadata_known or workflow_type == WORKFLOW_UNKNOWN:
         return CLASS_UNSAFE_UNKNOWN  # never auto-deleted without proof
 
@@ -403,15 +207,7 @@ def classify_worktree(
         if is_detached or branch_gone:
             return CLASS_DETACHED_REVIEW_LEFTOVER
         return CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE
-    if workflow_type == WORKFLOW_ISSUE_WORK:
+    # issue_work / conflict_fix: only removable once the TTL has expired.
-        # #858: an issue worktree becomes removable only on authoritative
-        # merged-PR evidence satisfying the whole cleanup policy. Age alone
-        # never proves the branch landed, so TTL cannot qualify one by itself
-        # — otherwise a worktree holding unmerged commits would be reclaimed.
-        if (merged_pr_cleanup or {}).get("proven"):
-            return CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE
-        return CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK
-    # conflict_fix: only removable once the TTL has expired.
     if ttl_expired:
         return CLASS_CLEAN_STALE_REMOVABLE
     return CLASS_ACTIVE_ISSUE_WORK
@@ -604,20 +400,6 @@ def remove_worktree(project_root: str, path: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
     }
 
 
-def head_contained_in_ref(
-    project_root: str, head_sha: str | None, ref: str | None
-) -> bool | None:
-    """Return True when ``head_sha`` is already contained in ``ref``.
-
-    Shares :mod:`merged_cleanup_reconcile`'s ancestry check so the audit and
-    the PR-scoped reconciler agree on what "already landed" means (#858).
-    Returns None when containment cannot be determined, which fails closed.
-    """
-    if not head_sha or not ref:
-        return None
-    return is_head_ancestor_of_ref(project_root, head_sha, ref)
-
-
 def _is_under_branches(project_root: str, path: str) -> bool:
     branches_root = os.path.join(os.path.abspath(project_root), "branches")
     return os.path.abspath(path or "").startswith(branches_root + os.sep)
@@ -631,30 +413,16 @@ def audit_branches_directory(
     active_issue_branches: set[str] | None = None,
     now: datetime | str | None = None,
     ttl_hours: float = DEFAULT_TTL_HOURS,
-    pr_index: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] | None = None,
-    leased_issue_numbers: set[int] | None = None,
-    live_session_paths: set[str] | None = None,
-    master_ref: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
     """Classify every session-owned worktree under ``branches/``.
 
     Read-only: shells out to git for discovery and dirty state, then applies
     the pure classifier. Returns per-worktree classifications, counts, the
     list of removable candidates, and the ``git worktree list`` proof.
-
-    ``pr_index`` (see :func:`build_pr_index`) supplies the authoritative PR
-    ownership used to link issue worktrees to their merged PR (#858).
-    ``master_ref`` is the ref a worktree head must be contained in before it
-    can be considered landed. Both are optional and their absence only ever
-    fails closed: without them no issue worktree becomes removable.
     """
     open_pr_branches = open_pr_branches or set()
     leased_branches = leased_branches or set()
     active_issue_branches = active_issue_branches or set()
-    leased_issue_numbers = leased_issue_numbers or set()
-    live_session_paths = {
-        os.path.abspath(p) for p in (live_session_paths or set()) if p
-    }
 
     worktrees: list[dict[str, Any]] = []
     for entry in list_worktrees(project_root):
@@ -665,42 +433,12 @@ def audit_branches_directory(
         )
         dirty_state = read_worktree_dirty(path)
         is_dirty = bool(dirty_state.get("dirty"))
-        head_sha = entry.get("head")
-        linkage = resolve_owning_pr(branch=branch, pr_index=pr_index)
         metadata = build_worktree_metadata(
-            path=path,
+            path=path, branch=branch, head_sha=entry.get("head")
-            branch=branch,
-            head_sha=head_sha,
-            pr_number=linkage.get("pr_number"),
         )
         has_open_pr = bool(branch) and branch in open_pr_branches
-        # A lease on issue N protects that issue's own work worktree. It must
+        has_active_lease = bool(branch) and branch in leased_branches
-        # not incidentally protect a baseline/review scratch tree that merely
-        # carries the same issue marker in its name, which would change the
-        # classification of worktrees this policy does not own.
-        has_active_lease = (bool(branch) and branch in leased_branches) or (
-            metadata["workflow_type"] == WORKFLOW_ISSUE_WORK
-            and metadata.get("issue_number") is not None
-            and metadata["issue_number"] in leased_issue_numbers
-        )
         has_active_lock = bool(branch) and branch in active_issue_branches
-        has_live_session = bool(path) and os.path.abspath(path) in live_session_paths
-        head_in_master = (
-            head_contained_in_ref(project_root, head_sha, master_ref)
-            if master_ref
-            else None
-        )
-        merged_pr_cleanup = assess_merged_pr_worktree_cleanup(
-            linkage=linkage,
-            head_sha=head_sha,
-            head_in_master=head_in_master,
-            is_dirty=is_dirty,
-            has_open_pr=has_open_pr,
-            has_active_lease=has_active_lease,
-            has_active_issue_lock=has_active_lock,
-            is_protected=is_protected,
-            has_live_session=has_live_session,
-        )
         ttl_expired = is_ttl_expired(
             last_used_at=metadata.get("last_used_at"), now=now, ttl_hours=ttl_hours
         )
@@ -714,8 +452,6 @@ def audit_branches_directory(
             branch_gone=branch is None and not entry.get("detached"),
             ttl_expired=ttl_expired,
             is_protected=is_protected,
-            merged_pr_cleanup=merged_pr_cleanup,
-            has_live_session=has_live_session,
         )
         metadata["cleanup_eligibility"] = classification
         worktrees.append(
@@ -727,10 +463,7 @@ def audit_branches_directory(
                 "has_open_pr": has_open_pr,
                 "has_active_lease": has_active_lease,
                 "has_active_issue_lock": has_active_lock,
-                "has_live_session": has_live_session,
                 "is_protected": is_protected,
-                "merged_pr_linkage": linkage,
-                "merged_pr_cleanup": merged_pr_cleanup,
                 "classification": classification,
                 "removable": is_removable(classification),
             }