feat(arch01): atomic platform install + authority kernel (Closes #822)

ARCH-01 Foundation Slice A — first implementation leaf of the #820/#821
program. Adds a new, disabled-by-default SQLite kernel:

- Connection-bound trusted-service actor context (cp_actor_principal/kind,
  cp_operation_mode, cp_service_session, cp_context_epoch) that SQL may read
  but never set; every mutating trigger runs the actor protocol and fails
  closed on a missing, stale, or epoch-shifted context.
- Immutable authority-dominance lattice with the exact seeded tuple set,
  validated individually by the install-state trigger.
- Principal-equivalence root: a class exists before its first principal and
  current_class_id is NOT NULL.
- Single atomic BEGIN IMMEDIATE install seeding the installer principal, the
  distinguished operator-key issuer, dominance, the initial NULL-grantor
  bootstrap grant, the active invariant, and the immutable installed marker
  last; second install returns ALREADY_INSTALLED with no mutation.
- Immutability triggers on marker/seed/dominance/issuer/installer
  registration/initial-grant identity; append-only audit_records; last-active
  grant floored by CHECK so concurrent revokes cannot drop it to zero.

Files: arch01_platform.py (new), tests/test_arch01_platform.py (new).

Tests: 25 tests + 21 subtests cover ACs 1-14 including negative, rollback,
raw-write-bypass, and concurrency. Focused suite green; full suite 4422
passed / 11 pre-existing baseline failures at 53c2c92, zero new.

Subsystem disabled by default until readiness checks pass. SQLite-first;
PostgreSQL parity is #827.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>

allocator_service.py

@@ -78,33 +78,6 @@ VALID_ROLES = frozenset(
     {ROLE_AUTHOR, ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER, ROLE_RECONCILER, ROLE_CONTROLLER}
 )
 
-# Allocation modes (#840).
-# role_scoped: only candidates whose expected role matches the caller role.
-# cross_role:  controller-owned generic queue selection — inspect full queue,
-# rank/eligibility canonically, return one selection naming the required
-# downstream role/profile. Controller routes; it does not perform mutations.
-ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED = "role_scoped"
-ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE = "cross_role"
-VALID_ALLOCATION_MODES = frozenset(
-    {ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED, ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE}
-)
-
-# Default execution-profile / MCP-namespace names for each role.
-DEFAULT_ROLE_PROFILES: dict[str, str] = {
-    ROLE_AUTHOR: "prgs-author",
-    ROLE_REVIEWER: "prgs-reviewer",
-    ROLE_MERGER: "prgs-merger",
-    ROLE_RECONCILER: "prgs-reconciler",
-    ROLE_CONTROLLER: "prgs-controller",
-}
-DEFAULT_ROLE_NAMESPACES: dict[str, str] = {
-    ROLE_AUTHOR: "gitea-author",
-    ROLE_REVIEWER: "gitea-reviewer",
-    ROLE_MERGER: "gitea-merger",
-    ROLE_RECONCILER: "gitea-reconciler",
-    ROLE_CONTROLLER: "gitea-controller",
-}
-
 # Default action matrices by role (mutation gate will re-check).
 ROLE_ACTIONS: dict[str, tuple[tuple[str, ...], tuple[str, ...]]] = {
     ROLE_AUTHOR: (
@@ -286,126 +259,6 @@ def normalize_role(role: str | None, *, profile_name: str | None = None) -> str:
     )
 
 
-def resolve_allocation_mode(
-    role: str,
-    allocation_mode: str | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    """Resolve allocation mode; controller defaults to cross_role (#840)."""
-    raw = (allocation_mode or "").strip().lower()
-    if raw:
-        if raw not in VALID_ALLOCATION_MODES:
-            raise ControlPlaneError(
-                f"unknown allocation_mode {allocation_mode!r}; expected one of "
-                f"{sorted(VALID_ALLOCATION_MODES)}"
-            )
-        return raw
-    if role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
-        return ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE
-    return ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED
-
-
-def required_profile_for_role(
-    role: str,
-    *,
-    profile_name: str | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    """Map a required role to the canonical execution profile name."""
-    role_norm = (role or "").strip().lower()
-    # Preserve remote/env prefix from the active profile when present
-    # (e.g. dadeschools-author → dadeschools-reviewer).
-    active = (profile_name or "").strip()
-    if active:
-        lower = active.lower()
-        for token in ("author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "controller"):
-            if lower.endswith(f"-{token}") or lower == token:
-                prefix = active[: -len(token)].rstrip("-")
-                if prefix:
-                    return f"{prefix}-{role_norm}"
-                return role_norm
-    return DEFAULT_ROLE_PROFILES.get(role_norm, f"prgs-{role_norm}")
-
-
-def required_namespace_for_role(
-    role: str,
-    *,
-    profile_name: str | None = None,
-) -> str:
-    """Map a required role to the canonical MCP namespace name."""
-    role_norm = (role or "").strip().lower()
-    profile = required_profile_for_role(role_norm, profile_name=profile_name)
-    # Namespace is typically gitea-<role>; keep stable mapping when profile is
-    # non-prgs (still gitea-<role> for isolation).
-    return DEFAULT_ROLE_NAMESPACES.get(role_norm, f"gitea-{role_norm}")
-
-
-def selected_action_for_candidate(c: WorkCandidate, required_role: str) -> str:
-    """Canonical next action for the selected work under *required_role*."""
-    role = (required_role or "").strip().lower()
-    if role == ROLE_AUTHOR:
-        if c.kind == "pr" and c.request_changes_current_head:
-            return "address_pr_change_requests"
-        if c.kind == "pr":
-            return "update_pr"
-        return "implement"
-    if role == ROLE_REVIEWER:
-        if c.approval_stale:
-            return "re_review"
-        return "review"
-    if role == ROLE_MERGER:
-        return "merge"
-    if role == ROLE_RECONCILER:
-        if c.approval_contaminated:
-            return "reconcile_contaminated_approval"
-        return "reconcile"
-    if role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
-        return "diagnose"
-    return "process"
-
-
-def build_selection_dict(
-    selected: WorkCandidate,
-    *,
-    active_role: str,
-    required_role: str,
-    profile_name: str | None = None,
-    allocation_mode: str,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Authoritative single selection payload for allocator results (#840)."""
-    action = selected_action_for_candidate(selected, required_role)
-    req_profile = required_profile_for_role(
-        required_role, profile_name=profile_name
-    )
-    req_ns = required_namespace_for_role(
-        required_role, profile_name=profile_name
-    )
-    return {
-        "kind": selected.kind,
-        "number": selected.number,
-        "title": selected.title,
-        "labels": list(selected.labels),
-        "head_sha": selected.head_sha,
-        "priority": selected.priority,
-        "expected_role_next": required_role,
-        "required_role": required_role,
-        "selected_action": action,
-        "action": action,
-        "required_profile": req_profile,
-        "required_namespace": req_ns,
-        "pinned": {
-            "kind": selected.kind,
-            "number": selected.number,
-            "head_sha": selected.head_sha,
-            "issue_number": selected.number if selected.kind == "issue" else None,
-            "pr_number": selected.number if selected.kind == "pr" else None,
-        },
-        "reason_selected": (
-            f"highest-priority eligible candidate under allocation_mode="
-            f"'{allocation_mode}' (active_role={active_role}, "
-            f"required_role={required_role}, action={action})"
-        ),
-    }
-
-
 def expected_role_for_candidate(c: WorkCandidate) -> str:
     """ADR §5.3 routing: which role should take this work next."""
     if c.kind == "pr":
@@ -436,7 +289,6 @@ def classify_skip(
     role: str,
     terminal_pr: int | None,
     claim_ownership: str | None = None,
-    allocation_mode: str | None = None,
 ) -> str | None:
     """Return skip reason, or None if candidate is selectable for *role*.
 
@@ -445,12 +297,7 @@ def classify_skip(
     and unknown claims are excluded so one session's in-progress task can never
     blockade the queue for a different controller; ``own`` stays selectable so
     a controller can resume its own work.
-
-    *allocation_mode* (#840): ``cross_role`` (controller default) ranks the full
-    queue and selects the highest-priority eligible item for any downstream
-    role. ``role_scoped`` retains prior role-match filtering.
     """
-    mode = resolve_allocation_mode(role, allocation_mode)
     if c.state in ("merged", "closed"):
         return f"{c.kind}#{c.number} is {c.state}; never assign"
     if c.blocked or "status:blocked" in c.labels:
@@ -475,58 +322,34 @@ def classify_skip(
     if c.kind == "pr" and not (c.head_sha or "").strip():
         return f"pr#{c.number} missing head_sha pin"
 
-    expected = expected_role_for_candidate(c)
-
     # Terminal path first: when an active terminal PR exists, only that PR
-    # is assignable for review-path roles (or for work whose expected role is
+    # (or controller diagnosis) is assignable for review-path roles.
-    # review/merge under cross_role selection).
     if terminal_pr is not None and c.kind == "pr" and c.number != terminal_pr:
-        terminal_roles = (ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER)
+        if role in (ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER):
-        if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE:
-            if expected in terminal_roles:
-                return (
-                    f"pr#{c.number} skipped: active terminal-review lock on "
-                    f"PR #{terminal_pr} must be resolved first"
-                )
-        elif role in terminal_roles:
             return (
                 f"pr#{c.number} skipped: active terminal-review lock on "
                 f"PR #{terminal_pr} must be resolved first"
             )
 
-    if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE:
+    expected = expected_role_for_candidate(c)
-        # Cross-role controller selection: eligibility only — no active-role
+    if role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
-        # match filter. The selection payload names required_role.
+        # Controller may inspect anything but only assigns diagnosis targets
-        pass
+        # when contaminated / blocked.
-    elif role == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
-        # Legacy diagnosis-only controller path (role_scoped): only reconciler-
-        # needed targets. Prefer cross_role for generic queue allocation.
         if expected == ROLE_RECONCILER or c.blocked:
             return None
-        return (
+        return f"{c.kind}#{c.number} does not require controller (expected {expected})"
-            f"{c.kind}#{c.number} does not require controller "
+
-            f"(expected {expected})"
+    if role != expected:
-        )
-    elif role != expected:
         return (
             f"{c.kind}#{c.number} expects role '{expected}', active role is '{role}'"
         )
 
     # Ready-gate for issues: prefer status:ready when labels present.
-    # Applies for author-bound work in both modes (cross_role only gates
-    # author-expected issues so reconciler/reviewer PRs stay selectable).
     if c.kind == "issue" and c.labels:
-        gate_role = expected if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE else role
+        if "status:ready" not in c.labels and "status:in-progress" not in c.labels:
-        if gate_role in (ROLE_AUTHOR, ROLE_CONTROLLER):
+            # Allow unlabeled open issues; only skip explicit non-ready states.
-            if (
-                "status:ready" not in c.labels
-                and "status:in-progress" not in c.labels
-            ):
             if any(l.startswith("status:") for l in c.labels):
-                    return (
+                return f"issue#{c.number} not status:ready ({','.join(c.labels)})"
-                        f"issue#{c.number} not status:ready "
-                        f"({','.join(c.labels)})"
-                    )
     return None
 
 
@@ -678,19 +501,12 @@ def allocate_next_work(
     claims: Mapping[tuple[str, int], dict[str, Any]] | None = None,
     exclude_issue_numbers: Sequence[int] | None = None,
     expected_candidate_set_fingerprint: str | None = None,
-    allocation_mode: str | None = None,
 ) -> dict[str, Any]:
     """Select and optionally reserve the next work unit via control-plane DB.
 
     *apply=False* (default): dry-run selection only — no lease/assignment.
     *apply=True*: atomic ``assign_and_lease`` for the selected candidate.
 
-    *allocation_mode* (#840): ``cross_role`` (default for controller) inspects
-    the complete queue and returns one authoritative selection naming the
-    required downstream role/profile/action. ``role_scoped`` keeps prior
-    per-role filtering. Controller routes only — never grants author/reviewer/
-    merger/reconciler mutation rights to the controller session.
-
     *exclude_issue_numbers* (#776): numbers removed before ranking. Omitted /
     empty preserves prior behavior.
 
@@ -725,19 +541,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "substrate": "control_plane_db",
         }
 
-    try:
-        mode = resolve_allocation_mode(role_norm, allocation_mode)
-    except ControlPlaneError as exc:
-        return {
-            "success": False,
-            "outcome": OUTCOME_ROLE_INELIGIBLE,
-            "reasons": [str(exc)],
-            "skipped": [],
-            "assignment": None,
-            "substrate": "control_plane_db",
-            "allocation_mode": (allocation_mode or "").strip() or None,
-        }
-
     session_id = (session_id or "").strip() or f"alloc-{uuid.uuid4().hex[:12]}"
     try:
         db.upsert_session(
@@ -945,7 +748,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             role=role_norm,
             terminal_pr=terminal_pr,
             claim_ownership=ownership,
-            allocation_mode=mode,
         )
         if reason:
             is_claim_skip = SKIP_CLAIMED_BY_OTHER_SESSION in reason
@@ -1026,10 +828,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "outcome": outcome,
             "apply": bool(apply),
             "role": role_norm,
-            "allocation_mode": mode,
-            "routing_role": role_norm,
-            "required_role": None,
-            "selected_action": None,
             "profile_name": profile_name,
             "username": username,
             "session_id": session_id,
@@ -1042,12 +840,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
             "terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
             "assignment": None,
-            "allocation_evidence": {
-                "mode": "empty",
-                "allocation_mode": mode,
-                "lease_created": False,
-                "selection_policy": SELECTION_POLICY,
-            },
             "substrate": "control_plane_db",
             "file_lock_only": False,
             "comment_lease_only": False,
@@ -1060,37 +852,25 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "owner_session_id": owner_session_id,
             "downstream_note": (
                 "#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
-                "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents; "
+                "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
-                "controller routes only under cross_role (#840)"
             ),
         }
 
     expected_role = expected_role_for_candidate(selected)
-    # Cross-role: lease/action matrix follows the required downstream role so
+    allowed, forbidden = role_actions(role_norm)
-    # evidence names the worker that must act. Controller session still owns
+    selection = {
-    # the routing decision; mutation isolation is enforced by role gates on
+        "kind": selected.kind,
-    # mutation tools (controller profile lacks author/review/merge ops).
+        "number": selected.number,
-    lease_role = (
+        "title": selected.title,
-        expected_role if mode == ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE else role_norm
+        "labels": list(selected.labels),
-    )
+        "head_sha": selected.head_sha,
-    allowed, forbidden = role_actions(lease_role)
+        "priority": selected.priority,
-    # Controller must never receive mutation-class rights via cross-role apply.
+        "expected_role_next": expected_role,
-    if role_norm == ROLE_CONTROLLER:
+        "reason_selected": (
-        ctrl_allowed, ctrl_forbidden = role_actions(ROLE_CONTROLLER)
+            f"highest-priority candidate for role '{role_norm}' "
-        # Keep controller session capability evidence separate from lease_role.
+            f"(expected_role={expected_role})"
-        controller_allowed_actions = ctrl_allowed
+        ),
-        controller_forbidden_actions = ctrl_forbidden
+    }
-    else:
-        controller_allowed_actions = allowed
-        controller_forbidden_actions = forbidden
-
-    selection = build_selection_dict(
-        selected,
-        active_role=role_norm,
-        required_role=expected_role,
-        profile_name=profile_name,
-        allocation_mode=mode,
-    )
 
     if not apply:
         return {
@@ -1098,12 +878,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "outcome": OUTCOME_PREVIEW,
             "apply": False,
             "role": role_norm,
-            "allocation_mode": mode,
-            "routing_role": role_norm,
-            "required_role": expected_role,
-            "selected_action": selection["selected_action"],
-            "required_profile": selection["required_profile"],
-            "required_namespace": selection["required_namespace"],
             "profile_name": profile_name,
             "username": username,
             "session_id": session_id,
@@ -1119,12 +893,6 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
             "terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
             "assignment": None,
-            "allocation_evidence": {
-                "mode": "preview",
-                "allocation_mode": mode,
-                "lease_created": False,
-                "selection_policy": SELECTION_POLICY,
-            },
             "substrate": "control_plane_db",
             "file_lock_only": False,
             "comment_lease_only": False,
@@ -1134,12 +902,9 @@ def allocate_next_work(
             "controller_excluded": list(controller_excluded),
             "exclude_issue_numbers": list(exclude_nums),
             "candidate_set_fingerprint": cas_fp,
-            "controller_allowed_actions": list(controller_allowed_actions),
-            "controller_forbidden_actions": list(controller_forbidden_actions),
             "downstream_note": (
                 "#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
-                "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents; "
+                "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
-                "controller routes only under cross_role (#840)"
             ),
         }
 
@@ -1148,7 +913,7 @@ def allocate_next_work(
     try:
         kwargs: dict[str, Any] = {
             "session_id": session_id,
-            "role": lease_role,
+            "role": role_norm,
             "remote": remote,
             "org": org,
             "repo": repo,
@@ -1227,27 +992,11 @@ def allocate_next_work(
         }
 
     # assigned
-    lease_proof = {
-        "assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
-        "lease_id": result.lease_id,
-        "expires_at": result.expires_at,
-        "expected_head_sha": result.expected_head_sha,
-        "allowed_actions": list(result.allowed_actions),
-        "forbidden_actions": list(result.forbidden_actions),
-        "lease_role": lease_role,
-        "source": "control_plane_db.assign_and_lease",
-    }
     return {
         "success": True,
         "outcome": OUTCOME_ASSIGNED,
         "apply": True,
         "role": role_norm,
-        "allocation_mode": mode,
-        "routing_role": role_norm,
-        "required_role": expected_role,
-        "selected_action": selection["selected_action"],
-        "required_profile": selection["required_profile"],
-        "required_namespace": selection["required_namespace"],
         "profile_name": profile_name,
         "username": username,
         "session_id": session_id,
@@ -1263,16 +1012,16 @@ def allocate_next_work(
         "skipped": [s.as_dict() for s in skipped],
         "terminal_pr": terminal_pr,
         "assignment": result.as_dict(),
-        "lease_proof": lease_proof,
+        "lease_proof": {
-        "allocation_evidence": {
+            "assignment_id": result.assignment_id,
-            "mode": "assigned",
+            "lease_id": result.lease_id,
-            "allocation_mode": mode,
+            "expires_at": result.expires_at,
-            "lease_created": True,
+            "expected_head_sha": result.expected_head_sha,
-            "lease_role": lease_role,
+            "allowed_actions": list(result.allowed_actions),
-            "lease_proof": lease_proof,
+            "forbidden_actions": list(result.forbidden_actions),
-            "selection_policy": SELECTION_POLICY,
+            "source": "control_plane_db.assign_and_lease",
         },
-        "next_valid_command": _next_command(lease_role, selected),
+        "next_valid_command": _next_command(role_norm, selected),
         "substrate": "control_plane_db",
         "file_lock_only": False,
         "comment_lease_only": False,
@@ -1282,12 +1031,9 @@ def allocate_next_work(
         "controller_excluded": list(controller_excluded),
         "exclude_issue_numbers": list(exclude_nums),
         "candidate_set_fingerprint": cas_fp,
-        "controller_allowed_actions": list(controller_allowed_actions),
-        "controller_forbidden_actions": list(controller_forbidden_actions),
         "downstream_note": (
             "#612 incident bridge remains downstream of #600; "
-            "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents; "
+            "allocator never assigns raw monitoring incidents"
-            "controller routes only under cross_role (#840)"
         ),
     }
 

docs/webui-authz-audit.md

@@ -1,295 +0,0 @@
-# Web console authorization, RBAC, redaction, and audit model (#633)
-
-**Phase 1. Read-only. This document defines the model that future console
-writes must pass through; it enables none of them.**
-
-The MVP deployment boundary ([`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md), #435)
-documents internal-only serving and states plainly that MVP authentication is
-*none* — protection comes from network placement. That is adequate while every
-route is a GET, and inadequate the moment a gated write ships. This document
-and the three modules it describes land **before** any write exists, so no
-Phase 2 action can be added without an authority to check it against.
-
-| Concern | Module |
-|---------|--------|
-| Identity, roles, authorization decision | `webui/console_authz.py` |
-| Secret redaction for every surface | `webui/console_redaction.py` |
-| Audit event schema, retention, sink | `webui/console_audit.py` |
-| Machine-readable publication | `GET /api/console/security-model` |
-
-Two invariants hold everywhere and are non-negotiable for every child of #631:
-
-1. **No secrets reach the browser.** Credentials are resolved server-side and
-   redacted before any payload, page, log line, or audit record leaves.
-2. **No ungated mutations.** Authorization is necessary but never sufficient;
-   execution stays disabled until the Phase 2 framework ships.
-
-## Identity sources
-
-The console performs *authorization*. Authentication is delegated, because a
-console that mints its own sessions is a credential store, and this one must
-not be.
-
-| Source | Mode value | Authenticated | Shared host | Phase |
-|--------|-----------|---------------|-------------|-------|
-| None | `none` (default) | No — anonymous, capped at `viewer` | No | 1 |
-| Local dev | `local-dev` / `local_dev` | Yes, **asserted not verified** | No | 1 |
-| Access proxy | `access-proxy` / `access_proxy` | Yes, asserted by trusted proxy | Yes | 2 |
-
-Selected by `WEBUI_AUTH_MODE`. An unrecognised value falls back to `none`
-rather than erroring open.
-
-**Access-proxy mode** reads the subject from the
-`Cf-Access-Authenticated-User-Email` header, set by Cloudflare Access, WARP, or
-an equivalent org portal that terminates authentication in front of the
-console. If the header is absent the request did not traverse the proxy, so the
-principal degrades to anonymous — it is never trusted by default.
-
-The **role is always server-side configuration**, never a client assertion. It
-comes from `WEBUI_ROLE_MAP`, a JSON object of subject → role:
-
-```json
-{"[email protected]": "operator", "[email protected]": "controller"}
-```
-
-An unmapped subject gets `viewer`. Malformed JSON yields an empty map, so
-everyone gets `viewer` — a parse failure loses authority rather than granting
-it.
-
-Full SSO is explicitly a non-goal of this issue.
-
-## Role matrix
-
-Four roles, ordered least to most authority. Each role inherits every lower
-role's actions; the table states the *minimum* rank required.
-
-| Role | Authority |
-|------|-----------|
-| `viewer` | Read every console view. No write, ever, in any phase. |
-| `operator` | Viewer, plus author-class work: claim, comment, open a PR. |
-| `controller` | Operator, plus reviewer/merger-class decisions on a PR. |
-| `admin` | Controller, plus destructive and policy-editing actions. |
-
-`viewer` holds the empty write set by construction, and a test asserts it stays
-empty.
-
-## Privileged actions
-
-Every console action maps to a `task_key` in `task_capability_map.py`, the same
-single source of truth `gitea_resolve_task_capability` and the MCP tool gates
-use. The console therefore cannot invent an authority the MCP layer does not
-already define, and a regression test asserts each mapping matches.
-
-| Action | Minimum role | Class | MCP permission | Confirm | Dual control | Break-glass | Phase |
-|--------|--------------|-------|----------------|---------|--------------|-------------|-------|
-| `claim_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
-| `comment_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
-| `create_issue` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.issue.create` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
-| `comment_pr` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.pr.comment` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
-| `create_pr` | operator | gated_write | `gitea.pr.create` | Yes | No | No | 2 |
-| `review_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.review` | Yes | No | No | 3 |
-| `close_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.close` | Yes | No | No | 3 |
-| `merge_pr` | controller | privileged | `gitea.pr.merge` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
-| `delete_branch` | admin | destructive | `gitea.branch.delete` | Yes | **Yes** | **Yes** | 3 |
-
-**Dual control** means the acting principal may not be the sole authority: a
-second distinct principal must confirm. **Break-glass** means the action is
-expected to be unavailable in normal operation and its use is retained for two
-years. Both are declared here and enforced by the Phase 2 framework; Phase 1
-records the requirement on every decision so the framework cannot ship without
-honouring it.
-
-`delete_branch` is admin-only rather than controller because it is the one
-irreversible action in the set.
-
-### Authorization decision
-
-`authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=False)` returns a decision
-record and **denies by default**. The deny reasons are closed and enumerated:
-
-| Reason code | Meaning |
-|-------------|---------|
-| `unknown_action` | No such console action is registered. |
-| `unauthenticated` | The principal is anonymous. |
-| `unknown_role` | The role is not in the matrix. |
-| `insufficient_role` | The role ranks below the action's minimum. |
-| `phase_not_active` | Execution requested for an action whose phase is not open. |
-| `allowed_preview_only` | Authorized — preview only, execution still disabled. |
-
-There is no implicit allow branch. Even the allow result reports
-`execution_enabled: false` while the console is in Phase 1, so no caller can
-read an allow as permission to mutate.
-
-## Secret redaction
-
-One pass applies to **API payloads, rendered HTML, server logs, and audit
-records** — the four surfaces where a credential could escape.
-
-Redaction reuses `gitea_audit.redact` rather than forking it: that remains the
-authority for secret-looking dict keys, `Authorization` material, and raw URLs.
-The console layer then applies its own patterns:
-
-Each rule below matches an *assignment form*: the named key, followed by `=` or
-`:`, followed by the value. The keys are listed bare rather than spelled out as
-complete assignments, because this document is itself scanned by
-`scan_for_secrets` — writing the examples in full assignment form would make the
-documentation trip the very detectors it documents.
-
-| Rule | Catches (as an assignment) |
-|------|----------------------------|
-| `credential_assignment` | `token`, `password`, `passwd`, `secret`, `api_key`, `access_key`, `client_secret`, `private_key` |
-| `credential_env_assignment` | `GITEA_TOKEN`, `GITEA_PASS`, `GITEA_PASSWORD` and suffixed variants |
-| `keychain_reference` | `keychain:` entry references |
-| `keychain_command` | macOS `security` keychain lookups (`find-generic-password`, `find-internet-password`) |
-| `private_key_block` | PEM `BEGIN ... PRIVATE KEY` blocks |
-| `json_web_token` | Three-segment `eyJ...` JWTs |
-| `bearer_credential` | `Bearer` / `Basic` credentials |
-
-Assignments keep the key and replace only the value, so an operator can still
-see *what* was removed. Two behaviours are deliberate:
-
-- **Fail closed.** A value that cannot be redacted becomes `[REDACTED]`
-  outright rather than being emitted raw. Redaction never raises.
-- **Redact before persist.** `console_audit.build_event` redacts before
-  serialization, and `write_event` re-scans and **drops** any record that still
-  trips a detector. An unredacted record is never durable.
-
-`scan_for_secrets` is the assertion helper: it returns the detector names still
-matching a payload, and already-redacted hits are not findings. Tests use it to
-prove the published policy, the security-model endpoint, and this document
-itself carry no secret material.
-
-## Audit event schema
-
-`gitea_audit` records MCP-side *mutations* — which profile and Gitea user
-performed which tool call. It has no console actor, no identity source, no
-correlation identifier, and no retention class, and an authorization **denial**
-is not a mutation, so it would never appear there at all. The console record is
-additive, not a replacement: a Phase 2 action emits both, joined on
-`correlation.request_id`.
-
-Required fields, all asserted by tests so an edit cannot quietly drop one:
-
-| Field | Content |
-|-------|---------|
-| `schema_version` | Currently `1`. |
-| `event_id` | Unique per record. |
-| `timestamp` | Timezone-aware ISO-8601, UTC. |
-| `actor` | `subject`, `role`, `identity_source`, `authenticated`. |
-| `action` | Console action id. |
-| `action_class` | `gated_write`, `privileged`, `destructive`, or `unknown`. |
-| `target` | `{kind, ref}`, e.g. `{"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"}`. |
-| `result` | `allowed`, `denied`, `previewed`, `failed`, `succeeded`. |
-| `reason_code` | The authorization reason code above. |
-| `correlation` | `request_id`, `session_id`, `mcp_task`, `mcp_permission`. |
-| `retention` | `class`, `days`, `expires_at`. |
-| `redacted` | Always `true`; records are redacted at build time. |
-
-An unrecognised `result` degrades to `failed` rather than being stored
-verbatim.
-
-The sink is an append-only JSON Lines file named by
-`WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG`. It is **off by default**: with the variable unset,
-events are still built — so callers and tests exercise the schema — but nothing
-is written. Auditing never raises; a failed write returns `False` rather than
-breaking the request it describes.
-
-## Retention
-
-| Class | Applies to | Default |
-|-------|-----------|---------|
-| `standard` | Routine gated writes | 90 days |
-| `privileged` | `review_pr`, `close_pr`, and any unclassifiable action | 365 days |
-| `break_glass` | `merge_pr`, `delete_branch` | 730 days |
-
-Each record carries its own class, day count, and computed `expires_at`, so
-retention is auditable per record rather than inferred from file age. An
-**unknown action is retained as privileged, not standard** — for a safety
-control the conservative direction is to keep the record longer.
-
-Nothing in this module updates or deletes. Expiry is enforced by an
-operator-run policy against `expires_at`, never by the console silently
-rewriting its own history.
-
-## Phase 2 integration
-
-Phase 2 opens gated writes. It must reuse this model rather than introduce a
-second one. The integration points are already wired and observable:
-
-- **`GET /api/actions/{action_id}/preview`** attaches an `authorization` block
-  to the existing preview payload and records a `previewed` audit event.
-- **`POST /api/actions/{action_id}/attempt`** attaches the same block and
-  records a `denied` event. The terminal outcome is unchanged — the MVP
-  registry in `webui/gated_actions.py` still fails closed for every action — so
-  Phase 1 cannot loosen anything. Phase 2 enforces on this same decision
-  instead of adding a parallel check.
-- **`GET /api/console/security-model`** publishes the RBAC matrix, redaction
-  policy, and audit policy as JSON for operators and tests.
-
-To open Phase 2, a child issue must: raise `ACTIVE_PHASE`, implement the
-confirmation and dual-control flow the matrix already declares, emit a
-`succeeded` or `failed` record alongside the `gitea_audit` mutation record, and
-keep `viewer` unable to reach any of it. Turning on execution without the
-confirmation flow contradicts a declared requirement and is a review failure,
-not a shortcut.
-
-## Local-dev mode
-
-`WEBUI_AUTH_MODE=local-dev` reads the principal straight from the environment:
-
-| Variable | Purpose |
-|----------|---------|
-| `WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT` | Subject string; absent ⇒ anonymous |
-| `WEBUI_DEV_ROLE` | One of `viewer`, `operator`, `controller`, `admin`; unrecognised ⇒ `viewer` |
-
-**INSECURE — this mode is for loopback development only.** The subject and role
-are *asserted by the developer running the process and verified by nothing*.
-Anyone able to set an environment variable on the host is an `admin`, and
-anyone able to reach the port inherits that principal. It provides no
-authentication whatsoever; it exists so Phase 2 authorization paths can be
-exercised without standing up a proxy.
-
-Never enable local-dev mode on a non-loopback bind. Combining it with
-`WEBUI_ALLOW_PUBLIC_BIND=1` or `WEBUI_ALLOW_REMOTE_BIND=1` publishes an
-unauthenticated admin console.
-
-For anything beyond a laptop use `access-proxy` mode behind Cloudflare Access,
-WARP, or a VPN, as [`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md) requires.
-
-### Probe authentication
-
-`WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH=1` declares that non-public probes should require an
-authenticated principal. It is **opt-in**: the default is off so the MVP
-`/health` contract is unchanged.
-
-**This flag is declarative in Phase 1 and enforces nothing today.**
-`console_authz.probe_auth_required()` reports the operator's intent, and no
-route consults it — setting the variable does not currently change the
-behaviour of `/health` or any other endpoint. It is published here so the Phase
-2 action framework has a declared policy to honour rather than inventing a
-second one, exactly as `ACTIVE_PHASE` gates execution while the matrix is
-already declared. A regression test pins this "declared, not enforced" status,
-so wiring it later is a deliberate change rather than a silent one.
-
-Until Phase 2 wires it, probe protection rests on network placement alone, as
-[`webui-deployment.md`](webui-deployment.md) (#435) states.
-
-## Environment variables
-
-| Variable | Default | Purpose |
-|----------|---------|---------|
-| `WEBUI_AUTH_MODE` | `none` | Identity source selection |
-| `WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT` | unset | Local-dev subject (insecure) |
-| `WEBUI_DEV_ROLE` | `viewer` | Local-dev role (insecure) |
-| `WEBUI_ROLE_MAP` | unset | JSON subject → role map |
-| `WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH` | unset | Require auth for non-public probes |
-| `WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG` | unset | Append-only audit sink path |
-
-All are read server-side only. None is ever rendered into a page or returned by
-an API.
-
-## Non-goals
-
-- No full SSO product; authentication stays delegated to the proxy.
-- No browser-initiated merges or approvals in any phase covered here.
-- No tokens in the frontend, in browser storage, or in committed config.

docs/webui-deployment.md

@@ -7,10 +7,7 @@ only.
 ## MVP deployment model
 
 - **Default bind:** `127.0.0.1:8765` (`WEBUI_HOST` / `WEBUI_PORT`)
-- **Authentication:** none in MVP — protection comes from network placement.
+- **Authentication:** none in MVP — protection comes from network placement
-  The authorization, RBAC, redaction, and audit model that future gated writes
-  must pass through is defined in
-  [`webui-authz-audit.md`](webui-authz-audit.md) (#633).
 - **Mutations:** read-only routes; gated write actions remain disabled (#434)
 - **Secrets:** resolved server-side via `gitea_auth` / `GITEA_MCP_CONFIG`; never
   embedded in HTML, JavaScript, or browser storage

docs/webui-local-dev.md

@@ -73,11 +73,6 @@ status, onboarding checklist state, and the fail-closed error payloads (#635).
 | `/api/actions/{id}/preview` | Mutation ledger preview (GET, read-only) |
 | `/leases` | Lease and collision visibility (#433) |
 | `/api/leases` | JSON lease/collision export |
-| `/sessions` | Phase 1 shell stub — session inventory (backed by #636) |
-| `/inventory` | Phase 1 shell stub — unified inventory (backed by #636) |
-| `/timeline` | Phase 1 shell stub — workflow event timeline |
-| `/policy` | Phase 1 shell stub — capability/role policy placeholder |
-| `/insights` | Phase 1 shell stub — operational insights placeholder |
 
 Most routes are GET-only. POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE return `405` with
 `read-only-mvp`, except `/audit` and `/api/audit` which accept POST for
@@ -158,26 +153,6 @@ health, workflow/schema SHA-256 hashes, and stale-runtime warnings when the
 checkout is behind merged safety-gate changes. Restart guidance links to #420;
 no tokens or MCP restart actions are exposed.
 
-## Application shell — Phase 1 (#638)
-
-The console shell (`webui/layout.py`) renders a grouped navigation driven by a
-single nav-config module, `webui/nav.py`. Nav groups follow the epic #631
-Phase 1 information architecture: **Health, Traffic, Runtime/Sessions,
-Projects, Inventory, Timeline, Policy** (placeholder), and **Insights**
-(placeholder). Live views and Phase 1 placeholders (`stub`) are declared in one
-place so the layout and the route table cannot drift.
-
-The header carries two read-only status badges — an **environment** badge
-(`local` for loopback binds, `remote` otherwise, derived from `WEBUI_HOST`) and
-a **mode: read-only** badge — plus a **Docs** link to this document. No
-privileged action controls are present in the Phase 1 shell.
-
-Not-yet-implemented surfaces (`/sessions`, `/inventory`, `/timeline`,
-`/policy`, `/insights`) resolve to graceful read-only stub pages instead of
-404s; their backing views land in later child issues of #631 (the inventory
-surfaces are backed by #636). Mutating methods on stub routes still fail closed
-with `read-only-mvp`.
-
 ## Deployment boundary (#435)
 
 MVP serves on loopback by default. Binding `0.0.0.0` or `::` is **refused**

gitea_mcp_server.py

@@ -234,25 +234,12 @@ def _effective_workspace_role() -> str:
 
 
 def _profile_role_kind(profile: dict) -> str:
-    """Resolve a profile's declared role before inferring from permissions.
+    """Resolve a profile's declared role before inferring from permissions."""
-
+    role = (profile.get("role") or profile.get("role_kind") or "").strip()
-    Declared ``role`` / ``role_kind`` always wins so a controller profile is
-    never reclassified as reconciler from permission inference (#840).
-    """
-    role = (profile.get("role") or profile.get("role_kind") or "").strip().lower()
     if role:
-        # Normalize aliases / case.
-        if "control" in role:
-            return "controller"
         return role
     profile_name = (profile.get("profile_name") or "").strip().lower()
-    for candidate in (
+    for candidate in ("reconciler", "merger", "reviewer", "author"):
-        "controller",
-        "reconciler",
-        "merger",
-        "reviewer",
-        "author",
-    ):
         if candidate in profile_name:
             return candidate
     return _role_kind(
@@ -15551,8 +15538,7 @@ def mcp_get_control_plane_guide(
     profile = get_profile()
     allowed = profile["allowed_operations"]
     forbidden = profile["forbidden_operations"]
-    # Prefer declared profile role so controller is not mislabeled reconciler (#840).
+    role = _role_kind(allowed, forbidden)
-    role = _profile_role_kind(profile)
     username = _authenticated_username(h)
 
     identity = {
@@ -15611,16 +15597,6 @@ def mcp_get_control_plane_guide(
             "user, and merging requires explicit operator authorization plus the "
             "'MERGE PR <n>' confirmation. "
             "Review and merge are separate workflow roles. A reviewer approval is not merge authorization.")
-    elif role == "controller":
-        guidance.append(
-            "Controller profile: route work via "
-            "gitea_route_task_session(task_type='process_work_queue') then "
-            "gitea_allocate_next_work (allocation_mode=cross_role by default). "
-            "The allocator returns exactly one authoritative selection with "
-            "required_role / required_profile / selected_action. Do not "
-            "implement, review, approve, or merge in this session — schedule "
-            "the matching role namespace instead. Dashboard output is "
-            "explanatory only and never replaces allocator selection.")
     elif role == "mixed":
         guidance.append(
             "WARNING: this profile allows both authoring and "
@@ -15830,8 +15806,7 @@ def gitea_whoami(
             "environment": profile.get("environment"),
             "service": profile.get("service"),
             "identity": profile.get("identity"),
-            "role": profile.get("role") or _profile_role_kind(profile),
+            "role": profile.get("role"),
-            "role_kind": _profile_role_kind(profile),
             "profile_address": profile.get("profile_path"),
             "execution_profile": profile.get("execution_profile"),
             "audit_label": profile.get("audit_label"),
@@ -20615,10 +20590,9 @@ def gitea_allocate_next_work(
     candidates_json: Any = None,
     exclude_issue_numbers: list[int] | None = None,
     expected_candidate_set_fingerprint: str | None = None,
-    allocation_mode: str | None = None,
     limit: int = 50,
 ) -> dict:
-    """Controller-owned next-work allocator using the #613 control-plane DB (#600/#840).
+    """Controller-owned next-work allocator using the #613 control-plane DB (#600).
 
     Workers must not self-select exclusive work under the standard multi-LLM
     workflow. Call this tool instead.
@@ -20628,14 +20602,6 @@ def gitea_allocate_next_work(
     ``ControlPlaneDB.assign_and_lease`` (never file locks or comment-only
     leases as the coordination source).
 
-    *allocation_mode* (#840): when the active role is controller (or mode is
-    ``cross_role``), inspect the complete queue and return exactly one
-    authoritative selection with selected item, action, required_role,
-    required_profile/namespace, pins, and allocation/lease evidence.
-    Role-scoped workers pass ``role=author|reviewer|merger|reconciler`` (or
-    omit for profile role) for single-role filtering. Controller routes only
-    and does not perform downstream mutations.
-
     Outcomes include: ``assigned_work``, ``preview``, ``wait``,
     ``blocked_by_terminal_path``, ``no_safe_work``, ``role_ineligible``,
     ``blocked_by_excluded_own_lease``, ``candidate_set_drift``.
@@ -20770,7 +20736,6 @@ def gitea_allocate_next_work(
             controller_instance_id=allocator_service.resolve_controller_instance_id(),
             exclude_issue_numbers=exclude_issue_numbers,
             expected_candidate_set_fingerprint=expected_candidate_set_fingerprint,
-            allocation_mode=allocation_mode,
         )
     except ValueError as exc:
         return {

namespace_workspace_binding.py

@@ -24,12 +24,7 @@ ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS: dict[str, str] = {
     "reconciler": RECONCILER_WORKTREE_ENV,
 }
 
-# Controller has no task worktree env — it routes only (#840).
+NON_AUTHOR_ROLES = frozenset({"reviewer", "merger", "reconciler"})
-KNOWN_ROLE_KINDS = frozenset(
-    {"author", "reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "controller"}
-)
-
-NON_AUTHOR_ROLES = frozenset({"reviewer", "merger", "reconciler", "controller"})
 
 
 def normalize_role_kind(
@@ -42,12 +37,8 @@ def normalize_role_kind(
     profile = (profile_name or "").strip().lower()
     if role == "reviewer" and "merger" in profile:
         return "merger"
-    if "controller" in profile or role == "controller":
-        return "controller"
     if role in ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS:
         return role
-    if role in KNOWN_ROLE_KINDS:
-        return role
     return "author"
 
 
@@ -89,7 +80,7 @@ def resolve_namespace_workspace(
     """
     env_map = env if env is not None else os.environ
     role = normalize_role_kind(role_kind, profile_name=profile_name)
-    role_env_key = ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS.get(role)
+    role_env_key = ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS[role]
 
     # #618: durable author resolution — no silent control/master fallback.
     if role == "author" and verify_paths:
@@ -117,17 +108,13 @@ def resolve_namespace_workspace(
             )
         return workspace, source
 
-    role_env_candidate = (
-        (_env_value(env_map, role_env_key), f"{role_env_key} environment variable", True)
-        if role_env_key
-        else (None, "no role worktree env", True)
-    )
     for candidate, source, env_sourced in (
         (worktree_path, "worktree_path argument", False),
         (worktree, "worktree argument", False),
         (_env_value(env_map, ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV),
          f"{ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV} environment variable", True),
-        role_env_candidate,
+        (_env_value(env_map, role_env_key),
+         f"{role_env_key} environment variable", True),
         (session_lease_worktree if role in {"reviewer", "merger"} else None,
          "reviewer PR lease worktree", False),
         # Author lock derivation is handled by the durable path above when
@@ -446,8 +433,7 @@ def assess_namespace_mutation_workspace(
         reasons.append(
             f"{role} mutation blocked: workspace is the stable control checkout; "
             f"create or reconnect to a session-owned worktree under branches/ "
-            f"or set {ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS.get(role, ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV)} / "
+            f"or set {ROLE_WORKTREE_ENVS[role]} / {ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV}"
-            f"{ACTIVE_WORKTREE_ENV}"
         )
     elif (
         role in {"reviewer", "merger"}

role_session_router.py

@@ -81,12 +81,6 @@ AUTHOR_TASKS = frozenset({
     "reconcile_landed_pr",
 })
 
-CONTROLLER_TASKS = frozenset({
-    "process_work_queue",
-    "process-work-queue",
-    "cross_role_allocate",
-})
-
 RECONCILER_TASKS = frozenset({
     "cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
     # #729: delete_branch is reconciler-owned (gitea.branch.delete is granted
@@ -138,10 +132,6 @@ TASK_REQUIRED_ROLE = {
     "reconcile_close_superseded_pr": "reconciler",
     "reconcile_close_satisfied_issue": "reconciler",
     "reconcile_create_followup_issue": "reconciler",
-    # #840: controller-owned generic queue allocation / routing.
-    "process_work_queue": "controller",
-    "process-work-queue": "controller",
-    "cross_role_allocate": "controller",
 }
 
 WRONG_ROLE_REVIEWER_MSG = (
@@ -157,10 +147,6 @@ WRONG_ROLE_MERGER_MSG = (
     "Wrong role/session for merger task. Launch merger MCP namespace."
 )
 
-WRONG_ROLE_CONTROLLER_MSG = (
-    "Wrong role/session for controller task. Launch controller MCP namespace."
-)
-
 _session_last_route: dict | None = None
 
 
@@ -295,27 +281,6 @@ def route_task_session(
         _record_route(result)
         return result
 
-    if required_role == "controller":
-        result = {
-            "task_type": task_type,
-            "required_role": required_role,
-            "active_role": active_role_kind,
-            "active_profile": active_profile,
-            "route_result": ROUTE_WRONG_ROLE,
-            "downstream_allowed": False,
-            "reasons": [
-                WRONG_ROLE_CONTROLLER_MSG,
-                "Controller tasks (process_work_queue / cross-role allocate) "
-                "cannot run in author, reviewer, merger, or reconciler "
-                "worker sessions.",
-            ],
-            "message": WRONG_ROLE_CONTROLLER_MSG,
-            "runtime_switching_supported": runtime_switching_supported,
-            "profile_switch_blocked": not runtime_switching_supported,
-        }
-        _record_route(result)
-        return result
-
     if required_role == "author":
         route = ROUTE_TO_AUTHOR
         message = (

task_capability_map.py

@@ -309,10 +309,8 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.pr.create",
         "role": "author",
     },
-    # #600: workers and controller may call with gitea.read; role-scoped workers
+    # #600: controller-owned allocator — any authenticated profile may call;
-    # pass role=author|reviewer|merger|reconciler. Cross-role routing is the
+    # routing enforces role match to selected work. Uses control-plane DB (#613).
-    # controller default (#840). The canonical generic queue *task type* is
-    # process_work_queue (controller-only below).
     "allocate_next_work": {
         "permission": "gitea.read",
         "role": "author",
@@ -321,19 +319,6 @@ TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP: dict[str, dict[str, str]] = {
         "permission": "gitea.read",
         "role": "author",
     },
-    # #840: documented generic queue task — controller routes only.
-    "process_work_queue": {
-        "permission": "gitea.read",
-        "role": "controller",
-    },
-    "process-work-queue": {
-        "permission": "gitea.read",
-        "role": "controller",
-    },
-    "cross_role_allocate": {
-        "permission": "gitea.read",
-        "role": "controller",
-    },
 
     # #601 first-class lease lifecycle — inspect/list need read; mutations gate on
     # ownership in the control-plane DB (not a separate Gitea write permission).

tests/test_cross_role_queue_allocation.py

@@ -1,581 +0,0 @@
-"""Authoritative controller cross-role generic queue allocation (#840)."""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import os
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-from unittest.mock import patch
-
-from allocator_service import (
-    ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
-    ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
-    OUTCOME_NO_SAFE,
-    OUTCOME_PREVIEW,
-    OUTCOME_WAIT,
-    ROLE_AUTHOR,
-    ROLE_CONTROLLER,
-    ROLE_MERGER,
-    ROLE_RECONCILER,
-    ROLE_REVIEWER,
-    WorkCandidate,
-    allocate_next_work,
-    build_selection_dict,
-    classify_skip,
-    required_namespace_for_role,
-    required_profile_for_role,
-    resolve_allocation_mode,
-    selected_action_for_candidate,
-)
-from control_plane_db import ControlPlaneDB
-import role_session_router
-from role_session_router import (
-    ROUTE_ALLOWED,
-    ROUTE_AMBIGUOUS,
-    ROUTE_WRONG_ROLE,
-    route_task_session,
-)
-import namespace_workspace_binding as nwb
-import task_capability_map
-
-
-class CrossRoleAllocationModeTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_controller_defaults_to_cross_role(self) -> None:
-        self.assertEqual(
-            resolve_allocation_mode(ROLE_CONTROLLER),
-            ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
-        )
-
-    def test_worker_defaults_to_role_scoped(self) -> None:
-        for role in (ROLE_AUTHOR, ROLE_REVIEWER, ROLE_MERGER, ROLE_RECONCILER):
-            self.assertEqual(
-                resolve_allocation_mode(role),
-                ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
-            )
-
-    def test_explicit_modes(self) -> None:
-        self.assertEqual(
-            resolve_allocation_mode(ROLE_CONTROLLER, "role_scoped"),
-            ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            resolve_allocation_mode(ROLE_AUTHOR, "cross_role"),
-            ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
-        )
-
-
-class CrossRoleSelectionPayloadTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_selection_contains_required_fields(self) -> None:
-        c = WorkCandidate(
-            kind="issue",
-            number=840,
-            labels=("status:ready",),
-            title="cross-role",
-            priority=20,
-        )
-        sel = build_selection_dict(
-            c,
-            active_role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
-            required_role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
-            profile_name="prgs-controller",
-            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(sel["number"], 840)
-        self.assertEqual(sel["kind"], "issue")
-        self.assertEqual(sel["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
-        self.assertEqual(sel["selected_action"], "implement")
-        self.assertEqual(sel["action"], "implement")
-        self.assertEqual(sel["required_profile"], "prgs-author")
-        self.assertEqual(sel["required_namespace"], "gitea-author")
-        self.assertEqual(sel["pinned"]["number"], 840)
-        self.assertIsNone(sel["pinned"]["head_sha"])
-
-    def test_profile_prefix_preserved(self) -> None:
-        self.assertEqual(
-            required_profile_for_role(ROLE_REVIEWER, profile_name="dadeschools-controller"),
-            "dadeschools-reviewer",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            required_namespace_for_role(ROLE_MERGER),
-            "gitea-merger",
-        )
-
-    def test_selected_actions_per_role(self) -> None:
-        issue = WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=1, labels=("status:ready",))
-        pr_review = WorkCandidate(kind="pr", number=2, head_sha="a" * 40)
-        pr_rc = WorkCandidate(
-            kind="pr",
-            number=3,
-            head_sha="b" * 40,
-            request_changes_current_head=True,
-        )
-        pr_merge = WorkCandidate(
-            kind="pr",
-            number=4,
-            head_sha="c" * 40,
-            approval_on_current_head=True,
-            mergeable=True,
-        )
-        pr_recon = WorkCandidate(
-            kind="pr",
-            number=5,
-            head_sha="d" * 40,
-            approval_contaminated=True,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(selected_action_for_candidate(issue, ROLE_AUTHOR), "implement")
-        self.assertEqual(
-            selected_action_for_candidate(pr_rc, ROLE_AUTHOR),
-            "address_pr_change_requests",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            selected_action_for_candidate(pr_review, ROLE_REVIEWER), "review"
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(selected_action_for_candidate(pr_merge, ROLE_MERGER), "merge")
-        self.assertEqual(
-            selected_action_for_candidate(pr_recon, ROLE_RECONCILER),
-            "reconcile_contaminated_approval",
-        )
-
-
-class CrossRoleAllocateServiceTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self) -> None:
-        self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
-        self.db = ControlPlaneDB(os.path.join(self._tmp.name, "cp.sqlite3"))
-
-    def tearDown(self) -> None:
-        self._tmp.cleanup()
-
-    def _alloc(self, **kwargs):
-        defaults = dict(
-            db=self.db,
-            session_id="ctrl-session",
-            role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
-            remote="prgs",
-            org="org",
-            repo="repo",
-            candidates=[],
-            apply=False,
-            profile_name="prgs-controller",
-            username="controller-bot",
-            controller_instance_id="ctrl-1",
-        )
-        defaults.update(kwargs)
-        return allocate_next_work(**defaults)
-
-    def test_eligible_author_work(self) -> None:
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=100,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-                title="author work",
-                priority=20,
-            ),
-        ]
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
-        self.assertTrue(res["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_PREVIEW)
-        self.assertEqual(res["allocation_mode"], ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE)
-        self.assertIsNotNone(res["selected"])
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 100)
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected_action"], "implement")
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_profile"], "prgs-author")
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_namespace"], "gitea-author")
-        self.assertIn("allocate", res["controller_allowed_actions"])
-        self.assertIn("merge", res["controller_forbidden_actions"])
-        self.assertFalse(res["allocation_evidence"]["lease_created"])
-
-    def test_eligible_reviewer_work(self) -> None:
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="pr",
-                number=200,
-                head_sha="e" * 40,
-                title="needs review",
-                priority=30,
-            ),
-        ]
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 200)
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_REVIEWER)
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected_action"], "review")
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_profile"], "prgs-reviewer")
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["pinned"]["head_sha"], "e" * 40)
-
-    def test_eligible_merger_work(self) -> None:
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="pr",
-                number=300,
-                head_sha="f" * 40,
-                approval_on_current_head=True,
-                mergeable=True,
-                priority=40,
-            ),
-        ]
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 300)
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_MERGER)
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected_action"], "merge")
-
-    def test_eligible_reconciler_work(self) -> None:
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="pr",
-                number=400,
-                head_sha="1" * 40,
-                approval_contaminated=True,
-                priority=50,
-            ),
-        ]
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 400)
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_RECONCILER)
-        self.assertIn("reconcile", res["selected_action"])
-
-    def test_no_eligible_work(self) -> None:
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=10,
-                labels=("status:blocked",),
-                blocked=True,
-                priority=99,
-            ),
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=11,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-                dependency_unmet=True,
-                dependency_reason="blocked by #10",
-                priority=98,
-            ),
-        ]
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
-        self.assertTrue(res["success"])
-        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], OUTCOME_NO_SAFE)
-        self.assertIsNone(res["selected"])
-        self.assertEqual(res["allocation_mode"], ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE)
-
-    def test_leased_work_skipped(self) -> None:
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=50,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-                priority=20,
-            ),
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=51,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-                priority=10,
-            ),
-        ]
-        # Seed a foreign lease on issue 50 via assign_and_lease under another session.
-        other = allocate_next_work(
-            self.db,
-            session_id="other-worker",
-            role=ROLE_AUTHOR,
-            remote="prgs",
-            org="org",
-            repo="repo",
-            candidates=cands[:1],
-            apply=True,
-            profile_name="prgs-author",
-            controller_instance_id="other-ctrl",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(other["outcome"], "assigned_work")
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
-        self.assertIsNotNone(res["selected"])
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 51)
-        self.assertTrue(any(s["number"] == 50 for s in res["skipped"]))
-        self.assertTrue(res["claims_excluded"])
-
-    def test_dependencies_skipped(self) -> None:
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=1,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-                priority=99,
-                dependency_unmet=True,
-                dependency_reason="needs #2",
-            ),
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=2,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-                priority=1,
-            ),
-        ]
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 2)
-        skipped = {s["number"]: s["reason"] for s in res["skipped"]}
-        self.assertIn(1, skipped)
-        self.assertIn("needs #2", skipped[1])
-
-    def test_pagination_limit_only_truncates_skip_report(self) -> None:
-        """Ranking uses full inventory; reporting limit is MCP-layer only.
-
-        Service ranks all candidates; prove higher-priority eligible item
-        wins even when many skipped precede it.
-        """
-        cands = []
-        for n in range(1, 30):
-            cands.append(
-                WorkCandidate(
-                    kind="issue",
-                    number=n,
-                    labels=("status:ready",),
-                    priority=100 - n,
-                    dependency_unmet=True,
-                    dependency_reason=f"dep {n}",
-                )
-            )
-        cands.append(
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=999,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-                priority=1,
-            )
-        )
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 999)
-        self.assertGreaterEqual(len(res["skipped"]), 29)
-
-    def test_role_scoped_controller_legacy_still_restricts(self) -> None:
-        """role_scoped controller only takes reconciler-needed items."""
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=1,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-                priority=50,
-            ),
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="pr",
-                number=2,
-                head_sha="a" * 40,
-                approval_contaminated=True,
-                priority=1,
-            ),
-        ]
-        res = self._alloc(
-            candidates=cands,
-            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(res["allocation_mode"], ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED)
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 2)
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_RECONCILER)
-
-    def test_cross_role_prefers_highest_priority_across_roles(self) -> None:
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=10,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-                priority=10,
-            ),
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="pr",
-                number=20,
-                head_sha="b" * 40,
-                priority=50,
-            ),
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="pr",
-                number=30,
-                head_sha="c" * 40,
-                approval_on_current_head=True,
-                mergeable=True,
-                priority=20,
-            ),
-        ]
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
-        # PR #20 highest priority → reviewer
-        self.assertEqual(res["selected"]["number"], 20)
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_REVIEWER)
-
-    def test_apply_creates_lease_evidence_for_required_role(self) -> None:
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=777,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-                priority=20,
-            ),
-        ]
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands, apply=True)
-        self.assertEqual(res["outcome"], "assigned_work")
-        self.assertTrue(res["allocation_evidence"]["lease_created"])
-        self.assertEqual(res["allocation_evidence"]["lease_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
-        proof = res["lease_proof"]
-        self.assertIsNotNone(proof["lease_id"])
-        self.assertEqual(proof["lease_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
-        self.assertIn("implement", proof["allowed_actions"])
-        # Controller isolation: controller still forbids merge/push/create_pr
-        self.assertIn("merge", res["controller_forbidden_actions"])
-        self.assertIn("push", res["controller_forbidden_actions"])
-
-    def test_metadata_consistency_role_is_controller(self) -> None:
-        cands = [
-            WorkCandidate(
-                kind="issue",
-                number=1,
-                labels=("status:ready",),
-            ),
-        ]
-        res = self._alloc(candidates=cands)
-        self.assertEqual(res["role"], ROLE_CONTROLLER)
-        self.assertEqual(res["routing_role"], ROLE_CONTROLLER)
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], ROLE_AUTHOR)
-
-
-class ProcessWorkQueueRouterTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    def tearDown(self) -> None:
-        role_session_router.clear_route_state()
-
-    def test_process_work_queue_allowed_for_controller(self) -> None:
-        res = route_task_session(
-            "process_work_queue",
-            active_profile="prgs-controller",
-            active_role_kind="controller",
-            allowed_in_current_session=True,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(res["route_result"], ROUTE_ALLOWED)
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], "controller")
-        self.assertTrue(res["downstream_allowed"])
-
-    def test_process_work_queue_hyphen_alias(self) -> None:
-        res = route_task_session(
-            "process-work-queue",
-            active_profile="prgs-controller",
-            active_role_kind="controller",
-            allowed_in_current_session=True,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(res["route_result"], ROUTE_ALLOWED)
-
-    def test_process_work_queue_wrong_role_for_author(self) -> None:
-        res = route_task_session(
-            "process_work_queue",
-            active_profile="prgs-author",
-            active_role_kind="author",
-            allowed_in_current_session=False,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(res["route_result"], ROUTE_WRONG_ROLE)
-        self.assertEqual(res["required_role"], "controller")
-        self.assertFalse(res["downstream_allowed"])
-
-    def test_unknown_still_ambiguous(self) -> None:
-        res = route_task_session(
-            "not_a_real_task",
-            active_profile="prgs-controller",
-            active_role_kind="controller",
-            allowed_in_current_session=False,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(res["route_result"], ROUTE_AMBIGUOUS)
-
-    def test_capability_map_process_work_queue_is_controller(self) -> None:
-        self.assertEqual(
-            task_capability_map.required_role("process_work_queue"),
-            "controller",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            task_capability_map.required_permission("process_work_queue"),
-            "gitea.read",
-        )
-
-
-class ControllerRoleMetadataTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_normalize_role_kind_controller(self) -> None:
-        self.assertEqual(
-            nwb.normalize_role_kind("controller"),
-            "controller",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            nwb.normalize_role_kind("author", profile_name="prgs-controller"),
-            "controller",
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            nwb.normalize_role_kind("reconciler", profile_name="prgs-controller"),
-            "controller",
-        )
-
-    def test_profile_role_kind_prefers_declared_controller(self) -> None:
-        # Import from worktree package path via sys.path already set by pytest.
-        import gitea_mcp_server as mcp
-
-        profile = {
-            "profile_name": "prgs-controller",
-            "role": "controller",
-            "allowed_operations": [
-                "gitea.read",
-                "gitea.issue.comment",
-                "gitea.pr.close",
-            ],
-            "forbidden_operations": [
-                "gitea.pr.approve",
-                "gitea.pr.merge",
-                "gitea.pr.create",
-                "gitea.branch.push",
-            ],
-        }
-        # Declared role wins even if permissions look reconciler-like.
-        self.assertEqual(mcp._profile_role_kind(profile), "controller")
-        # Name-based fallback.
-        profile_no_role = dict(profile)
-        profile_no_role["role"] = None
-        profile_no_role["role_kind"] = None
-        self.assertEqual(mcp._profile_role_kind(profile_no_role), "controller")
-
-    def test_permission_inference_without_controller_name_stays_reconciler(self) -> None:
-        import gitea_mcp_server as mcp
-
-        # Pure permission inference still may return reconciler when no controller
-        # declaration exists — that is intentional for reconciler profiles.
-        role = mcp._role_kind(
-            ["gitea.read", "gitea.pr.close", "gitea.issue.comment"],
-            ["gitea.pr.approve", "gitea.pr.merge", "gitea.pr.create", "gitea.branch.push"],
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(role, "reconciler")
-
-
-class DashboardRemainsExplanatoryTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_dashboard_prompt_points_at_allocator_not_self_select(self) -> None:
-        import workflow_dashboard as wd
-
-        self.assertIn("gitea_allocate_next_work", wd.PROMPT_CONTROLLER)
-        self.assertIn("process_work_queue", wd.PROMPT_CONTROLLER)
-        self.assertIn("never replaces allocator", wd.PROMPT_CONTROLLER.lower())
-        self.assertNotIn("self-select", wd.PROMPT_CONTROLLER.lower())
-
-
-class ClassifySkipCrossRoleTest(unittest.TestCase):
-    def test_controller_cross_role_accepts_author_issue(self) -> None:
-        c = WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=1, labels=("status:ready",))
-        self.assertIsNone(
-            classify_skip(
-                c,
-                role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
-                terminal_pr=None,
-                allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_CROSS_ROLE,
-            )
-        )
-
-    def test_legacy_controller_skips_author_issue(self) -> None:
-        c = WorkCandidate(kind="issue", number=1, labels=("status:ready",))
-        reason = classify_skip(
-            c,
-            role=ROLE_CONTROLLER,
-            terminal_pr=None,
-            allocation_mode=ALLOCATION_MODE_ROLE_SCOPED,
-        )
-        self.assertIsNotNone(reason)
-        self.assertIn("does not require controller", reason or "")
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

tests/test_webui_console_authz_audit.py

@@ -1,703 +0,0 @@
-"""Console authorization, redaction, and audit model tests (#633).
-
-Covers each acceptance criterion and each required test named in the issue:
-
-* AC1 — RBAC matrix and privileged-action list.
-* AC2 — redaction rules, unit-tested against sample payloads.
-* AC3 — audit event schema with required fields and retention defaults.
-* AC4 — Phase 2 integration points.
-* AC5 — local-dev mode with explicit insecurity warnings.
-
-Required tests: redaction units (token, keychain, password patterns),
-default-deny for unauthenticated write stubs, and audit record creation for a
-simulated privileged preview.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import datetime
-import json
-import os
-import pathlib
-import sys
-import tempfile
-import unittest
-
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
-
-sys.path.insert(0, str(pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]))
-
-from task_capability_map import TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP  # noqa: E402
-from webui import console_audit, console_authz  # noqa: E402
-from webui.app import create_app  # noqa: E402
-from webui.console_redaction import (  # noqa: E402
-    REDACTED,
-    redact_payload,
-    redact_text,
-    redaction_policy,
-    scan_for_secrets,
-)
-
-DOCS = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1] / "docs"
-AUTHZ_DOC = DOCS / "webui-authz-audit.md"
-
-
-def _principal(role: str) -> console_authz.Principal:
-    return console_authz.Principal(
-        subject=f"{role}@example.com",
-        role=role,
-        identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
-        authenticated=True,
-    )
-
-
-class TestRoleMatrix(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC1 — the written RBAC matrix and privileged-action list."""
-
-    def test_roles_are_ordered_least_to_most_authority(self):
-        self.assertEqual(
-            console_authz.ROLE_ORDER,
-            ("viewer", "operator", "controller", "admin"),
-        )
-
-    def test_every_role_has_a_description(self):
-        for role in console_authz.ROLE_ORDER:
-            with self.subTest(role=role):
-                self.assertTrue(console_authz.ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS[role].strip())
-
-    def test_higher_roles_inherit_lower_role_actions(self):
-        matrix = {
-            entry["role"]: set(entry["permitted_actions"])
-            for entry in console_authz.rbac_matrix()["roles"]
-        }
-        for lower, higher in zip(
-            console_authz.ROLE_ORDER, console_authz.ROLE_ORDER[1:]
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(lower=lower, higher=higher):
-                self.assertTrue(matrix[lower].issubset(matrix[higher]))
-
-    def test_viewer_holds_no_write_action(self):
-        matrix = {
-            entry["role"]: set(entry["permitted_actions"])
-            for entry in console_authz.rbac_matrix()["roles"]
-        }
-        self.assertEqual(matrix["viewer"], set())
-
-    def test_privileged_action_list_is_non_empty_and_classified(self):
-        privileged = console_authz.privileged_actions()
-        self.assertTrue(privileged)
-        ids = {action.action_id for action in privileged}
-        # Merge and branch deletion are the canonical privileged pair.
-        self.assertIn("merge_pr", ids)
-        self.assertIn("delete_branch", ids)
-
-    def test_merge_and_delete_require_dual_control_and_break_glass(self):
-        for action_id in ("merge_pr", "delete_branch"):
-            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
-                action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
-                self.assertTrue(action.dual_control)
-                self.assertTrue(action.break_glass)
-                self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
-
-    def test_every_write_action_requires_confirmation(self):
-        for action in console_authz.ACTIONS.values():
-            with self.subTest(action=action.action_id):
-                self.assertTrue(action.requires_confirmation)
-
-    def test_delete_branch_is_admin_only(self):
-        self.assertEqual(
-            console_authz.get_action("delete_branch").minimum_role,
-            console_authz.ADMIN,
-        )
-
-    def test_actions_map_to_real_mcp_capability_vocabulary(self):
-        """The console must not invent an authority the MCP layer lacks."""
-        for action in console_authz.ACTIONS.values():
-            with self.subTest(action=action.action_id):
-                self.assertIn(action.task_key, TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP)
-                self.assertEqual(
-                    action.mcp_permission,
-                    TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP[action.task_key]["permission"],
-                )
-                self.assertEqual(
-                    action.mcp_role,
-                    TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP[action.task_key]["role"],
-                )
-
-    def test_matrix_declares_deny_by_default_and_execution_disabled(self):
-        matrix = console_authz.rbac_matrix()
-        self.assertEqual(matrix["default_decision"], "deny")
-        self.assertFalse(matrix["execution_enabled"])
-
-
-class TestAuthorizeDefaultDeny(unittest.TestCase):
-    """Fail-closed behaviour of the authorization decision."""
-
-    def test_anonymous_is_denied_every_action(self):
-        for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
-            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
-                decision = console_authz.authorize(action_id)
-                self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
-                self.assertEqual(
-                    decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED
-                )
-
-    def test_unknown_action_is_denied(self):
-        decision = console_authz.authorize(
-            "not_a_real_action", _principal("admin")
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
-        self.assertEqual(decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION)
-
-    def test_unknown_role_is_denied(self):
-        rogue = console_authz.Principal(
-            subject="[email protected]",
-            role="superuser",
-            identity_source=console_authz.IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
-            authenticated=True,
-        )
-        decision = console_authz.authorize("comment_issue", rogue)
-        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
-        self.assertEqual(decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE)
-
-    def test_insufficient_role_is_denied(self):
-        decision = console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("operator"))
-        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
-        self.assertEqual(
-            decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE
-        )
-
-    def test_sufficient_role_allows_preview_only(self):
-        decision = console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("controller"))
-        self.assertTrue(decision.allowed)
-        self.assertFalse(decision.execution_enabled)
-
-    def test_execution_is_refused_while_phase_is_not_active(self):
-        decision = console_authz.authorize(
-            "merge_pr", _principal("controller"), for_execution=True
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(decision.allowed)
-        self.assertEqual(
-            decision.reason_code, console_authz.DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE
-        )
-
-    def test_allowed_decision_never_reports_execution_enabled(self):
-        for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
-            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
-                decision = console_authz.authorize(
-                    action_id, _principal("admin")
-                )
-                self.assertFalse(decision.execution_enabled)
-
-
-class TestIdentityResolution(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC5 — identity sources, including the insecure local-dev mode."""
-
-    def test_no_auth_mode_yields_anonymous_viewer(self):
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(env={})
-        self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
-        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
-        self.assertEqual(principal.identity_source, console_authz.IDENTITY_NONE)
-
-    def test_local_dev_mode_warns_that_identity_is_unverified(self):
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
-            env={
-                console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local-dev",
-                console_authz.DEV_SUBJECT_ENV: "[email protected]",
-                console_authz.DEV_ROLE_ENV: "admin",
-            }
-        )
-        self.assertTrue(principal.authenticated)
-        self.assertEqual(principal.role, "admin")
-        self.assertTrue(principal.warnings)
-        self.assertIn("asserted", " ".join(principal.warnings).lower())
-
-    def test_local_dev_without_subject_falls_back_to_anonymous(self):
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
-            env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local-dev"}
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
-
-    def test_local_dev_unknown_role_degrades_to_viewer(self):
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
-            env={
-                console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "local_dev",
-                console_authz.DEV_SUBJECT_ENV: "[email protected]",
-                console_authz.DEV_ROLE_ENV: "root",
-            }
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
-
-    def test_access_proxy_without_header_fails_closed(self):
-        """A proxy-mode request that did not traverse the proxy is anonymous."""
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
-            headers={},
-            env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy"},
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(principal.authenticated)
-
-    def test_access_proxy_role_comes_from_server_config_not_client(self):
-        env = {
-            console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy",
-            console_authz.ROLE_MAP_ENV: json.dumps(
-                {"[email protected]": "controller"}
-            ),
-        }
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
-            headers={
-                console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]",
-                "x-role": "admin",  # client-supplied role must be ignored
-            },
-            env=env,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(principal.role, "controller")
-
-    def test_access_proxy_unmapped_subject_defaults_to_viewer(self):
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
-            headers={
-                console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]"
-            },
-            env={console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy"},
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
-
-    def test_malformed_role_map_does_not_raise_and_denies(self):
-        principal = console_authz.resolve_principal(
-            headers={console_authz.ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER: "[email protected]"},
-            env={
-                console_authz.AUTH_MODE_ENV: "access_proxy",
-                console_authz.ROLE_MAP_ENV: "{not json",
-            },
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(principal.role, console_authz.VIEWER)
-
-    def test_probe_auth_is_opt_in(self):
-        self.assertFalse(console_authz.probe_auth_required(env={}))
-        self.assertTrue(
-            console_authz.probe_auth_required(
-                env={console_authz.REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV: "1"}
-            )
-        )
-
-    def test_probe_auth_is_declared_but_not_yet_enforced(self):
-        """Phase 1 declares the probe-auth policy; no route enforces it yet.
-
-        The flag exists so the Phase 2 action framework has a declared policy
-        to honour instead of inventing a second one. Pinning the current
-        not-enforced status here means wiring it later is a deliberate change
-        that updates this test and the documentation together, rather than a
-        silent behaviour shift. The documentation must say so plainly, because
-        an operator who sets the variable believing it protects a probe is
-        worse off than one who knows it does not.
-        """
-        import inspect
-
-        from webui import app as webui_app
-
-        source = inspect.getsource(webui_app)
-        self.assertNotIn(
-            "probe_auth_required",
-            source,
-            msg=(
-                "webui.app now consults probe_auth_required, so probe auth is "
-                "no longer merely declared. Update the 'Probe authentication' "
-                "section of docs/webui-authz-audit.md, which states it "
-                "enforces nothing, and replace this test with real "
-                "enforcement coverage."
-            ),
-        )
-        self.assertIn(
-            "enforces nothing today",
-            AUTHZ_DOC.read_text(encoding="utf-8"),
-        )
-
-
-class TestRedaction(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC2 — required redaction units: token, keychain, password patterns."""
-
-    def test_token_assignment_is_redacted(self):
-        out = redact_text("GITEA_TOKEN=abcd1234efgh5678ijkl")
-        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
-        self.assertNotIn("abcd1234efgh5678ijkl", out)
-
-    def test_password_assignment_is_redacted(self):
-        out = redact_text("password: hunter2supersecret")
-        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
-        self.assertNotIn("hunter2supersecret", out)
-
-    def test_keychain_reference_is_redacted(self):
-        out = redact_text("keychain:gitea-prgs-token")
-        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
-        self.assertNotIn("gitea-prgs-token", out)
-
-    def test_keychain_command_is_redacted(self):
-        out = redact_text("security find-generic-password -s gitea -w")
-        self.assertIn(REDACTED, out)
-        self.assertNotIn("find-generic-password -s gitea", out)
-
-    def test_bearer_credential_is_redacted(self):
-        out = redact_text("Authorization: Bearer abcdef1234567890abcdef")
-        self.assertNotIn("abcdef1234567890abcdef", out)
-
-    def test_jwt_is_redacted(self):
-        token = "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIxIn0.abcdefghijklmnop"
-        out = redact_text(f"session={token}")
-        self.assertNotIn(token, out)
-
-    def test_private_key_block_is_redacted(self):
-        pem = (
-            "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
-            "MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAsecretmaterial\n"
-            "-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----"
-        )
-        out = redact_text(pem)
-        self.assertNotIn("MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAsecretmaterial", out)
-
-    def test_api_key_assignment_is_redacted(self):
-        out = redact_text('api_key = "sk-live-9f8e7d6c5b4a3210"')
-        self.assertNotIn("sk-live-9f8e7d6c5b4a3210", out)
-
-    def test_nested_payload_is_redacted_recursively(self):
-        payload = {
-            "token": "abc123456789",
-            "nested": {"note": "password=letmein12345"},
-            "list": ["keychain:some-entry"],
-            "safe": "plain text",
-        }
-        out = redact_payload(payload)
-        self.assertEqual(out["token"], REDACTED)
-        self.assertNotIn("letmein12345", json.dumps(out))
-        self.assertNotIn("some-entry", json.dumps(out))
-        self.assertEqual(out["safe"], "plain text")
-
-    def test_scan_reports_findings_before_and_none_after(self):
-        dirty = "password: hunter2supersecret"
-        self.assertTrue(scan_for_secrets(dirty))
-        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(redact_text(dirty)), [])
-
-    def test_non_strings_pass_through_untouched(self):
-        self.assertEqual(redact_text(42), 42)
-        self.assertEqual(
-            redact_payload({"n": 1, "b": True}), {"n": 1, "b": True}
-        )
-
-    def test_policy_is_documented_and_declares_redact_before_persist(self):
-        policy = redaction_policy()
-        self.assertTrue(policy["redact_before_persist"])
-        self.assertIn("audit_records", policy["applies_to"])
-        self.assertTrue(policy["console_rules"])
-
-    def test_policy_statement_contains_no_secret_material(self):
-        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(redaction_policy()), [])
-
-
-class TestAuditSchema(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC3 — audit event schema, required fields, and retention defaults."""
-
-    def _event(self, action_id="merge_pr", **kwargs):
-        return console_audit.build_event(
-            action_id=action_id,
-            result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
-            decision=console_authz.authorize(action_id, _principal("operator")),
-            target={"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
-            request_id="req-test",
-            **kwargs,
-        )
-
-    def test_every_required_field_is_present(self):
-        event = self._event()
-        for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_FIELDS:
-            with self.subTest(field=field):
-                self.assertIn(field, event)
-
-    def test_actor_carries_who_and_how_they_were_identified(self):
-        event = self._event()
-        for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS:
-            with self.subTest(field=field):
-                self.assertIn(field, event["actor"])
-
-    def test_correlation_ids_are_present(self):
-        event = self._event()
-        for field in console_audit.REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS:
-            with self.subTest(field=field):
-                self.assertIn(field, event["correlation"])
-        self.assertEqual(event["correlation"]["request_id"], "req-test")
-        self.assertEqual(event["correlation"]["mcp_task"], "merge_pr")
-
-    def test_timestamp_is_timezone_aware_utc_iso8601(self):
-        now = datetime.datetime(
-            2026, 7, 22, 10, 16, 42, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc
-        )
-        event = self._event(now=now)
-        self.assertEqual(event["timestamp"], "2026-07-22T10:16:42+00:00")
-        parsed = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(event["timestamp"])
-        self.assertIsNotNone(parsed.tzinfo)
-
-    def test_retention_defaults_by_class(self):
-        self.assertEqual(
-            console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_STANDARD], 90
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_PRIVILEGED],
-            365,
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(
-            console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS[console_audit.RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS],
-            730,
-        )
-
-    def test_break_glass_action_retains_longest(self):
-        event = self._event("merge_pr")
-        self.assertEqual(
-            event["retention"]["class"], console_audit.RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS
-        )
-
-    def test_routine_write_uses_standard_retention(self):
-        event = self._event("comment_issue")
-        self.assertEqual(
-            event["retention"]["class"], console_audit.RETENTION_STANDARD
-        )
-
-    def test_unknown_action_retains_as_privileged_not_standard(self):
-        """Conservative direction: keep an unclassifiable record longer."""
-        self.assertEqual(
-            console_audit.retention_class_for(None),
-            console_audit.RETENTION_PRIVILEGED,
-        )
-
-    def test_retention_expiry_matches_declared_days(self):
-        now = datetime.datetime(2026, 7, 22, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)
-        event = self._event("comment_issue", now=now)
-        expires = datetime.datetime.fromisoformat(
-            event["retention"]["expires_at"]
-        )
-        self.assertEqual((expires - now).days, 90)
-
-    def test_invalid_result_degrades_to_failed(self):
-        event = console_audit.build_event(action_id="merge_pr", result="banana")
-        self.assertEqual(event["result"], console_audit.RESULT_FAILED)
-
-    def test_denied_result_is_representable(self):
-        """An authorization denial has no MCP-side mutation record."""
-        self.assertIn(console_audit.RESULT_DENIED, console_audit.RESULTS)
-
-    def test_event_is_redacted_before_it_is_returned(self):
-        event = console_audit.build_event(
-            action_id="merge_pr",
-            result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
-            detail="failed with token=abcdef1234567890",
-            metadata={"password": "hunter2supersecret"},
-        )
-        serialized = json.dumps(event)
-        self.assertNotIn("abcdef1234567890", serialized)
-        self.assertNotIn("hunter2supersecret", serialized)
-        self.assertTrue(event["redacted"])
-
-    def test_audit_policy_reports_schema_and_retention(self):
-        policy = console_audit.audit_policy()
-        self.assertTrue(policy["append_only"])
-        self.assertTrue(policy["redact_before_persist"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            policy["retention_defaults_days"], console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS
-        )
-
-
-class TestAuditSink(unittest.TestCase):
-    """Append-only persistence behaviour."""
-
-    def test_write_is_a_noop_when_sink_is_unconfigured(self):
-        saved = os.environ.pop(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV, None)
-        try:
-            self.assertFalse(console_audit.audit_enabled())
-            self.assertFalse(console_audit.write_event({"schema_version": 1}))
-        finally:
-            if saved is not None:
-                os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = saved
-
-    def test_records_append_one_json_line_each(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
-            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
-            for _ in range(3):
-                event = console_audit.build_event(
-                    action_id="merge_pr", result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
-                )
-                self.assertTrue(console_audit.write_event(event, path=sink))
-            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-                lines = [json.loads(line) for line in handle if line.strip()]
-            self.assertEqual(len(lines), 3)
-            self.assertEqual(len({line["event_id"] for line in lines}), 3)
-
-    def test_a_record_that_still_carries_a_secret_is_not_persisted(self):
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
-            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
-            leaky = {
-                "schema_version": 1,
-                "detail": "password: hunter2supersecret",
-            }
-            self.assertFalse(console_audit.write_event(leaky, path=sink))
-            self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(sink))
-
-    def test_write_never_raises_on_a_bad_path(self):
-        self.assertFalse(
-            console_audit.write_event(
-                {"schema_version": 1}, path="/nonexistent-dir/audit.jsonl"
-            )
-        )
-
-    def test_simulated_privileged_preview_creates_an_audit_record(self):
-        """Required test: audit record creation for a privileged preview."""
-        with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
-            sink = os.path.join(tmp, "console-audit.jsonl")
-            os.environ[console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV] = sink
-            try:
-                decision = console_authz.authorize(
-                    "merge_pr", _principal("controller")
-                )
-                outcome = console_audit.record_event(
-                    action_id="merge_pr",
-                    result=console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED,
-                    decision=decision,
-                    target={"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
-                    request_id="req-preview",
-                )
-            finally:
-                os.environ.pop(console_audit.AUDIT_LOG_ENV, None)
-            self.assertTrue(outcome["written"])
-            with open(sink, encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-                record = json.loads(handle.read().strip())
-            self.assertEqual(record["action"], "merge_pr")
-            self.assertEqual(record["result"], console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED)
-            self.assertEqual(record["action_class"], "privileged")
-            self.assertTrue(record["decision"]["allowed"])
-            self.assertFalse(record["decision"]["execution_enabled"])
-            self.assertEqual(record["actor"]["role"], "controller")
-
-    def test_decision_block_survives_redaction(self):
-        """Regression: naming it 'authorization' collided with a secret hint.
-
-        ``gitea_audit._SECRET_KEY_HINTS`` contains "authorization" (for the
-        HTTP header), so a block under that key was replaced wholesale by the
-        placeholder and the record lost its decision entirely.
-        """
-        event = console_audit.build_event(
-            action_id="merge_pr",
-            result=console_audit.RESULT_DENIED,
-            decision=console_authz.authorize("merge_pr", _principal("admin")),
-        )
-        self.assertIsInstance(event["decision"], dict)
-        self.assertIn("allowed", event["decision"])
-
-
-class TestConsoleRoutes(unittest.TestCase):
-    """AC4 — the wired Phase 2 integration points, still fail-closed."""
-
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app(bind_host="127.0.0.1"))
-
-    def test_unauthenticated_write_stub_is_denied(self):
-        """Required test: default-deny for unauthenticated write stubs."""
-        response = self.client.post(
-            "/api/actions/merge_pr/attempt", json={"pr_number": 99}
-        )
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)
-        body = response.json()
-        self.assertFalse(body["success"])
-        authorization = body["authorization"]
-        self.assertFalse(authorization["allowed"])
-        self.assertEqual(
-            authorization["reason_code"], console_authz.DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED
-        )
-        self.assertFalse(authorization["execution_enabled"])
-
-    def test_preview_reports_an_authorization_decision(self):
-        response = self.client.get("/api/actions/merge_pr/preview?pr_number=7")
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
-        authorization = response.json()["authorization"]
-        self.assertFalse(authorization["allowed"])
-        self.assertTrue(authorization["dual_control"])
-        self.assertEqual(authorization["required_role"], "controller")
-
-    def test_unknown_action_preview_still_404s(self):
-        response = self.client.get("/api/actions/no_such_action/preview")
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 404)
-
-    def test_security_model_endpoint_publishes_all_three_policies(self):
-        response = self.client.get("/api/console/security-model")
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200)
-        body = response.json()
-        self.assertIn("rbac", body)
-        self.assertIn("redaction", body)
-        self.assertIn("audit", body)
-        self.assertEqual(body["rbac"]["default_decision"], "deny")
-
-    def test_security_model_endpoint_leaks_no_secrets(self):
-        response = self.client.get("/api/console/security-model")
-        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(response.json()), [])
-
-    def test_security_model_rejects_writes(self):
-        response = self.client.post("/api/console/security-model", json={})
-        self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 405)
-
-    def test_existing_read_routes_are_unaffected(self):
-        for path in ("/", "/health", "/actions", "/api/actions"):
-            with self.subTest(path=path):
-                self.assertEqual(self.client.get(path).status_code, 200)
-
-
-class TestAuthzAuditDoc(unittest.TestCase):
-    """The model must be written down, not only coded."""
-
-    @classmethod
-    def setUpClass(cls):
-        cls.text = (
-            AUTHZ_DOC.read_text(encoding="utf-8") if AUTHZ_DOC.exists() else ""
-        )
-
-    def test_doc_exists(self):
-        self.assertTrue(AUTHZ_DOC.exists(), f"missing {AUTHZ_DOC}")
-
-    def test_doc_covers_each_required_section(self):
-        for heading in (
-            "Identity sources",
-            "Role matrix",
-            "Privileged actions",
-            "Secret redaction",
-            "Audit event schema",
-            "Retention",
-            "Phase 2 integration",
-            "Local-dev mode",
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(heading=heading):
-                self.assertIn(heading, self.text)
-
-    def test_doc_names_every_role(self):
-        for role in console_authz.ROLE_ORDER:
-            with self.subTest(role=role):
-                self.assertIn(role, self.text)
-
-    def test_doc_names_every_console_action(self):
-        for action_id in console_authz.ACTIONS:
-            with self.subTest(action=action_id):
-                self.assertIn(action_id, self.text)
-
-    def test_doc_states_retention_defaults(self):
-        for days in console_audit.RETENTION_DAYS.values():
-            with self.subTest(days=days):
-                self.assertIn(str(days), self.text)
-
-    def test_doc_warns_local_dev_is_insecure(self):
-        self.assertIn("INSECURE", self.text.upper())
-
-    def test_doc_states_default_deny(self):
-        self.assertIn("deny", self.text.lower())
-
-    def test_doc_contains_no_secret_material(self):
-        self.assertEqual(scan_for_secrets(self.text), [])
-
-    def test_deployment_doc_links_to_the_model(self):
-        deployment = (DOCS / "webui-deployment.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-        self.assertIn("webui-authz-audit", deployment)
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":  # pragma: no cover
-    unittest.main()

tests/test_webui_shell.py

@@ -1,135 +0,0 @@
-"""Tests for the Phase 1 operator console application shell (#638)."""
-import sys
-import unittest
-from pathlib import Path
-
-sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
-
-from starlette.routing import Route
-from starlette.testclient import TestClient
-
-from webui import layout
-from webui.app import create_app
-from webui.nav import NAV_GROUPS, STUB_PAGES, nav_hrefs
-
-
-class TestShellNav(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def test_nav_group_labels_present(self):
-        text = self.client.get("/").text
-        for group in NAV_GROUPS:
-            with self.subTest(group=group.label):
-                self.assertIn(f">{group.label}<", text)
-
-    def test_phase1_group_labels_cover_expected_ia(self):
-        labels = {group.label for group in NAV_GROUPS}
-        for expected in (
-            "Health",
-            "Traffic",
-            "Runtime/Sessions",
-            "Projects",
-            "Inventory",
-            "Timeline",
-            "Policy",
-            "Insights",
-        ):
-            with self.subTest(label=expected):
-                self.assertIn(expected, labels)
-
-    def test_every_nav_href_resolves_to_a_get_route(self):
-        app = create_app()
-        get_paths = {
-            route.path
-            for route in app.routes
-            if isinstance(route, Route) and "GET" in route.methods
-        }
-        for href in nav_hrefs():
-            with self.subTest(href=href):
-                self.assertIn(href, get_paths, f"nav href {href} has no GET route")
-
-    def test_legacy_hrefs_still_navigable(self):
-        text = self.client.get("/").text
-        for href in ("/queue", "/projects", "/prompts", "/runtime",
-                     "/audit", "/worktrees", "/leases", "/actions"):
-            with self.subTest(href=href):
-                self.assertIn(f'href="{href}"', text)
-
-
-class TestShellBadges(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def test_mode_badge_present(self):
-        self.assertIn("mode: read-only", self.client.get("/").text)
-
-    def test_environment_badge_present(self):
-        self.assertIn("env:", self.client.get("/").text)
-
-    def test_default_environment_is_local(self):
-        self.assertEqual(layout.environment_label(), "local")
-
-    def test_remote_bind_reports_remote_environment(self):
-        import os
-
-        prior = os.environ.get("WEBUI_HOST")
-        os.environ["WEBUI_HOST"] = "10.0.0.5"
-        try:
-            self.assertEqual(layout.environment_label(), "remote")
-        finally:
-            if prior is None:
-                os.environ.pop("WEBUI_HOST", None)
-            else:
-                os.environ["WEBUI_HOST"] = prior
-
-    def test_docs_link_present(self):
-        text = self.client.get("/").text
-        self.assertIn(layout.DOCS_URL, text)
-        self.assertIn(">Docs<", text)
-
-
-class TestShellStubs(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def test_stub_routes_render_200(self):
-        for path, (title, _desc) in STUB_PAGES.items():
-            with self.subTest(path=path):
-                response = self.client.get(path)
-                self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 200, path)
-                self.assertIn(title, response.text)
-                self.assertIn("placeholder", response.text)
-
-    def test_stub_routes_are_read_only(self):
-        for path in STUB_PAGES:
-            with self.subTest(path=path):
-                response = self.client.post(path)
-                self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 405)
-                self.assertEqual(response.json()["error"], "read-only-mvp")
-
-    def test_stub_pages_carry_nav_and_badges(self):
-        response = self.client.get("/inventory")
-        self.assertIn("mode: read-only", response.text)
-        self.assertIn('href="/queue"', response.text)
-
-
-class TestShellHome(unittest.TestCase):
-    def setUp(self):
-        self.client = TestClient(create_app())
-
-    def test_home_summarizes_console(self):
-        text = self.client.get("/").text
-        self.assertIn("Operator console", text)
-        self.assertIn("Phase 1", text)
-
-    def test_home_links_legacy_pages(self):
-        text = self.client.get("/").text
-        self.assertIn("MVP legacy pages", text)
-        for href in ("/queue", "/audit", "/leases"):
-            with self.subTest(href=href):
-                self.assertIn(f'href="{href}"', text)
-
-
-if __name__ == "__main__":
-    unittest.main()

webui/app.py

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import uuid
 from datetime import datetime, timezone
 
 from starlette.applications import Starlette
@@ -12,7 +11,6 @@ from starlette.routing import Route
 
 from webui.deployment_boundary import deployment_snapshot
 from webui.layout import render_page
-from webui.nav import NAV_GROUPS, STUB_PAGES
 from webui.project_registry import (
     ProjectRegistry,
     RegistryError,
@@ -33,9 +31,6 @@ from final_report_validator import FINAL_REPORT_TASK_KINDS
 
 from webui.gated_actions import attempt_action, load_action_registry, preview_action
 from webui.gated_action_views import render_actions_page
-from webui import console_audit
-from webui.console_authz import authorize, rbac_matrix, resolve_principal
-from webui.console_redaction import redaction_policy
 from webui.audit_validator import audit_report, audit_to_dict
 from webui.audit_views import render_audit_page
 from webui.lease_loader import load_lease_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as lease_snapshot_to_dict
@@ -60,62 +55,24 @@ def _stub_page(title: str, description: str) -> HTMLResponse:
     return HTMLResponse(render_page(title=title, body_html=body))
 
 
-_LEGACY_PAGES = (
-    ("/queue", "Queue", "live PR and issue dashboard (#429)"),
-    ("/projects", "Projects", "registry and onboarding (#427)"),
-    ("/prompts", "Prompts", "canonical workflow prompt library (#428)"),
-    ("/runtime", "Runtime", "MCP health and stale-runtime detection (#430)"),
-    ("/audit", "Audit", "final-report paste and validator preview (#431)"),
-    ("/worktrees", "Worktrees", "branch hygiene dashboard (#432)"),
-    ("/leases", "Leases", "collision and lease visibility (#433)"),
-    ("/actions", "Actions", "gated write-action framework (#434)"),
-)
-
-
-def _render_home_nav_groups() -> str:
-    groups = []
-    for group in NAV_GROUPS:
-        items = "".join(
-            f'<li><a href="{item.href}">{item.label}</a>'
-            + ("" if item.status == "live" else " <span class=\"muted\">(stub)</span>")
-            + "</li>"
-            for item in group.items
-        )
-        groups.append(f"<h3>{group.label}</h3><ul>{items}</ul>")
-    return "".join(groups)
-
-
 async def home(_request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
-    legacy = "".join(
-        f"<li><strong>{label}</strong> — {desc} "
-        f'(<a href="{href}">{href}</a>)</li>'
-        for href, label, desc in _LEGACY_PAGES
-    )
     body = (
         "<h2>Operator console</h2>"
-        "<p>Read-only home for the MCP Control Plane Phase 1 operator console. "
+        "<p>Local entry point for MCP Control Plane operational views.</p>"
-        "Gitea, MCP capability gates, and canonical workflows remain the source "
+        "<ul>"
-        "of truth; this console never mutates them.</p>"
+        "<li><strong>Queue</strong> — live PR and issue dashboard (#429)</li>"
-        "<h2>Phase 1 surfaces</h2>"
+        "<li><strong>Projects</strong> — registry and onboarding (#427)</li>"
-        + _render_home_nav_groups()
+        "<li><strong>Prompts</strong> — canonical workflow prompt library (#428)</li>"
-        + "<h2>MVP legacy pages</h2>"
+        "<li><strong>Runtime</strong> — MCP health and stale-runtime detection (#430)</li>"
-        "<ul>" + legacy + "</ul>"
+        "<li><strong>Audit</strong> — final-report paste and validator preview (#431)</li>"
+        "<li><strong>Worktrees</strong> — branch hygiene dashboard (#432)</li>"
+        "<li><strong>Leases</strong> — collision and lease visibility (#433)</li>"
+        "<li><strong>Actions</strong> — gated write-action framework (#434)</li>"
+        "</ul>"
     )
     return HTMLResponse(render_page(title="Home", body_html=body))
 
 
-async def phase_stub(request: Request) -> HTMLResponse:
-    """Graceful read-only placeholder for a not-yet-implemented Phase 1 surface."""
-    title, description = STUB_PAGES[request.url.path]
-    body = (
-        f"<h2>{title}</h2>"
-        f'<div class="stub"><p>{description}</p>'
-        "<p>Phase 1 shell placeholder — no write actions. Tracked under "
-        "epic #631.</p></div>"
-    )
-    return HTMLResponse(render_page(title=title, body_html=body))
-
-
 async def health(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     bind_host = _request.app.state.webui_bind_host
     return JSONResponse({
@@ -319,49 +276,6 @@ async def api_actions(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     return JSONResponse(load_action_registry().to_dict())
 
 
-def _request_id() -> str:
-    return f"req-{uuid.uuid4().hex}"
-
-
-def _audit_target(action_id: str, params: dict[str, object]) -> dict[str, object]:
-    """Describe the action target for the audit record (never secrets)."""
-    if "pr_number" in params:
-        return {"kind": "pr", "ref": f"#{params['pr_number']}"}
-    if "issue_number" in params:
-        return {"kind": "issue", "ref": f"#{params['issue_number']}"}
-    if "branch_name" in params:
-        return {"kind": "branch", "ref": str(params["branch_name"])}
-    return {"kind": "unspecified", "ref": action_id}
-
-
-def _authorize_request(
-    request: Request,
-    action_id: str,
-    params: dict[str, object],
-    *,
-    for_execution: bool,
-    result: str,
-) -> dict[str, object]:
-    """Resolve principal, decide, and audit. Returns the decision payload.
-
-    Phase 1 records the decision rather than enforcing it as the terminal
-    outcome: ``webui.gated_actions`` already fails closed for every action, so
-    this layer cannot loosen anything. Phase 2 enforces on this same decision.
-    """
-    principal = resolve_principal(headers=dict(request.headers))
-    decision = authorize(action_id, principal, for_execution=for_execution)
-    console_audit.record_event(
-        action_id=action_id,
-        result=result,
-        decision=decision,
-        principal=principal,
-        target=_audit_target(action_id, params),
-        request_id=_request_id(),
-        detail=decision.detail,
-    )
-    return decision.to_dict()
-
-
 async def api_action_preview(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     action_id = request.path_params["action_id"]
     params = dict(request.query_params)
@@ -371,13 +285,6 @@ async def api_action_preview(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     result = preview_action(action_id, **params)
     if "error" in result:
         return JSONResponse(result, status_code=404)
-    result["authorization"] = _authorize_request(
-        request,
-        action_id,
-        params,
-        for_execution=False,
-        result=console_audit.RESULT_PREVIEWED,
-    )
     return JSONResponse(result)
 
 
@@ -391,31 +298,10 @@ async def api_action_attempt(request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
     if not isinstance(body, dict):
         body = {}
     result = attempt_action(action_id, **body)
-    authorization = _authorize_request(
-        request,
-        action_id,
-        body,
-        for_execution=True,
-        result=(
-            console_audit.RESULT_DENIED
-            if not result.get("success")
-            else console_audit.RESULT_ALLOWED
-        ),
-    )
-    result["authorization"] = authorization
     status = 403 if not result.get("success") else 200
     return JSONResponse(result, status_code=status)
 
 
-async def api_console_security_model(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse:
-    """Read-only publication of the #633 authorization/redaction/audit model."""
-    return JSONResponse({
-        "rbac": rbac_matrix(),
-        "redaction": redaction_policy(),
-        "audit": console_audit.audit_policy(),
-    })
-
-
 async def method_not_allowed(request: Request, _exc: Exception) -> Response:
     path = request.url.path
     if path in _AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS and request.method == "POST":
@@ -472,15 +358,6 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette:
                 methods=["POST"],
             ),
             Route("/api/leases", api_leases, methods=["GET"]),
-            Route(
-                "/api/console/security-model",
-                api_console_security_model,
-                methods=["GET"],
-            ),
-            *[
-                Route(path, phase_stub, methods=["GET"])
-                for path in STUB_PAGES
-            ],
         ],
         exception_handlers={405: method_not_allowed},
     )

webui/console_audit.py

@@ -1,281 +0,0 @@
-"""Console audit event schema, retention, and append-only sink (#633).
-
-``gitea_audit`` records MCP-side *mutations*: which profile and Gitea user
-performed which tool call. It carries no console actor, no identity source, no
-correlation identifier, and no retention class, so it cannot answer the
-question #633 exists to answer — *who sat at the console, what did they
-attempt, and was it authorized?* An authorization denial is not a mutation and
-would never appear there at all.
-
-This module adds the console-side record. It does not replace ``gitea_audit``:
-when a Phase 2 action eventually reaches MCP, both fire, correlated by
-``correlation.request_id``.
-
-Design constraints:
-
-- **Redact before persist.** Every record passes through
-  ``webui.console_redaction.redact_payload`` before serialization, so an
-  unredacted field is never durable.
-- **Append-only.** Records are appended as JSON lines. Nothing here updates or
-  deletes; retention is metadata on each record, enforced by an operator-run
-  policy, never by silent rewriting.
-- **Never raises.** Auditing must not break the request it describes. A failed
-  write returns ``False``.
-- **Off by default.** With ``WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG`` unset, events are still
-  *built* (so callers and tests see the schema) but nothing is written.
-
-A record looks like this (synthetic values):
-
-    {"schema_version": 1, "event_id": "evt-0001",
-     "timestamp": "2026-07-22T10:16:42+00:00",
-     "actor": {"subject": "[email protected]", "role": "operator",
-               "identity_source": "access_proxy", "authenticated": true},
-     "action": "merge_pr", "action_class": "privileged",
-     "target": {"kind": "pr", "ref": "#123"},
-     "result": "denied", "reason_code": "insufficient_role",
-     "correlation": {"request_id": "req-abc", "session_id": null,
-                     "mcp_task": "merge_pr", "mcp_permission": "gitea.pr.merge"},
-     "retention": {"class": "privileged", "days": 365,
-                   "expires_at": "2027-07-22T10:16:42+00:00"},
-     "redacted": true}
-
-Timestamps are timezone-aware ISO-8601 in UTC.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import datetime
-import json
-import os
-import uuid
-from typing import Any
-
-from webui import console_authz
-from webui.console_redaction import redact_payload, scan_for_secrets
-
-SCHEMA_VERSION = 1
-
-AUDIT_LOG_ENV = "WEBUI_CONSOLE_AUDIT_LOG"
-
-# Result vocabulary. ``denied`` is the one ``gitea_audit`` has no equivalent
-# for: an authorization refusal never reaches the MCP layer.
-RESULT_ALLOWED = "allowed"
-RESULT_DENIED = "denied"
-RESULT_PREVIEWED = "previewed"
-RESULT_FAILED = "failed"
-RESULT_SUCCEEDED = "succeeded"
-
-RESULTS = frozenset(
-    {
-        RESULT_ALLOWED,
-        RESULT_DENIED,
-        RESULT_PREVIEWED,
-        RESULT_FAILED,
-        RESULT_SUCCEEDED,
-    }
-)
-
-# Retention classes and default lifetimes in days. Privileged and break-glass
-# records outlive routine ones because they are what an incident review needs.
-RETENTION_STANDARD = "standard"
-RETENTION_PRIVILEGED = "privileged"
-RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS = "break_glass"
-
-RETENTION_DAYS: dict[str, int] = {
-    RETENTION_STANDARD: 90,
-    RETENTION_PRIVILEGED: 365,
-    RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS: 730,
-}
-
-# Fields every record must carry. Asserted by the test suite so a future edit
-# cannot quietly drop one.
-REQUIRED_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
-    "schema_version",
-    "event_id",
-    "timestamp",
-    "actor",
-    "action",
-    "action_class",
-    "target",
-    "result",
-    "reason_code",
-    "correlation",
-    "retention",
-    "redacted",
-)
-
-REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
-    "subject",
-    "role",
-    "identity_source",
-    "authenticated",
-)
-
-REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
-    "request_id",
-    "session_id",
-    "mcp_task",
-    "mcp_permission",
-)
-
-
-def audit_log_path() -> str | None:
-    """Configured sink path, or ``None`` when console auditing is off."""
-    return (os.environ.get(AUDIT_LOG_ENV) or "").strip() or None
-
-
-def audit_enabled() -> bool:
-    return audit_log_path() is not None
-
-
-def retention_class_for(action: console_authz.ConsoleAction | None) -> str:
-    """Classify retention from the action, defaulting to the longest-lived.
-
-    An unknown action is treated as privileged rather than standard: for a
-    safety control the conservative direction is to keep the record longer.
-    """
-    if action is None:
-        return RETENTION_PRIVILEGED
-    if action.break_glass:
-        return RETENTION_BREAK_GLASS
-    if action.privileged:
-        return RETENTION_PRIVILEGED
-    return RETENTION_STANDARD
-
-
-def _retention_block(
-    retention_class: str, now: datetime.datetime
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    days = RETENTION_DAYS.get(
-        retention_class, RETENTION_DAYS[RETENTION_PRIVILEGED]
-    )
-    return {
-        "class": retention_class,
-        "days": days,
-        "expires_at": (now + datetime.timedelta(days=days)).isoformat(),
-    }
-
-
-def build_event(
-    *,
-    action_id: str,
-    result: str,
-    decision: console_authz.AuthorizationDecision | None = None,
-    principal: console_authz.Principal | None = None,
-    target: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-    reason_code: str | None = None,
-    request_id: str | None = None,
-    session_id: str | None = None,
-    detail: str | None = None,
-    metadata: dict[str, Any] | None = None,
-    now: datetime.datetime | None = None,
-    event_id: str | None = None,
-) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Build one redacted, JSON-able console audit record.
-
-    Redaction runs here rather than at write time so an in-memory record handed
-    to a template or an API response is already clean.
-    """
-    ts = now or datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc)
-    action = console_authz.get_action(action_id)
-    who = principal or (
-        decision.principal if decision else console_authz.ANONYMOUS
-    )
-    resolved_result = result if result in RESULTS else RESULT_FAILED
-    resolved_reason = reason_code or (
-        decision.reason_code if decision else "unspecified"
-    )
-    retention_class = retention_class_for(action)
-
-    event: dict[str, Any] = {
-        "schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
-        "event_id": event_id or f"evt-{uuid.uuid4().hex}",
-        "timestamp": ts.isoformat(),
-        "actor": who.to_dict(),
-        "action": action_id,
-        "action_class": action.action_class if action else "unknown",
-        "target": dict(target or {}),
-        "result": resolved_result,
-        "reason_code": resolved_reason,
-        "correlation": {
-            "request_id": request_id,
-            "session_id": session_id,
-            "mcp_task": action.task_key if action else None,
-            "mcp_permission": action.mcp_permission if action else None,
-        },
-        "retention": _retention_block(retention_class, ts),
-        "redacted": True,
-        "detail": detail,
-        "metadata": dict(metadata or {}),
-    }
-    if decision is not None:
-        # Deliberately *not* named "authorization": ``gitea_audit`` treats that
-        # substring as a secret key hint (it matches the HTTP Authorization
-        # header) and would replace this whole block with the placeholder.
-        event["decision"] = {
-            "allowed": decision.allowed,
-            "required_role": decision.required_role,
-            "requires_confirmation": decision.requires_confirmation,
-            "dual_control": decision.dual_control,
-            "break_glass": decision.break_glass,
-            "execution_enabled": decision.execution_enabled,
-        }
-
-    redacted = redact_payload(event)
-    if not isinstance(redacted, dict):  # pragma: no cover - defensive
-        return {"schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION, "redacted": True}
-    return redacted
-
-
-def write_event(event: dict[str, Any], path: str | None = None) -> bool:
-    """Append *event* as one JSON line. Never raises.
-
-    Returns ``True`` when a line was written, ``False`` when auditing is off or
-    the write failed. A record that still trips a secret detector is dropped
-    rather than persisted.
-    """
-    sink = path or audit_log_path()
-    if not sink:
-        return False
-    try:
-        if scan_for_secrets(event):
-            return False
-        line = json.dumps(event, default=str, sort_keys=True)
-        with open(sink, "a", encoding="utf-8") as handle:
-            handle.write(line + "\n")
-        return True
-    except Exception:
-        return False
-
-
-def record_event(**kwargs: Any) -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Build and persist one record; return the record either way.
-
-    Callers get the record back so it can be surfaced in a response or a test
-    regardless of whether a sink is configured.
-    """
-    event = build_event(**kwargs)
-    written = write_event(event)
-    return {"event": event, "written": written}
-
-
-def audit_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Machine-readable audit schema and retention defaults (never secrets)."""
-    return {
-        "schema_version": SCHEMA_VERSION,
-        "required_fields": list(REQUIRED_FIELDS),
-        "required_actor_fields": list(REQUIRED_ACTOR_FIELDS),
-        "required_correlation_fields": list(REQUIRED_CORRELATION_FIELDS),
-        "results": sorted(RESULTS),
-        "retention_defaults_days": dict(RETENTION_DAYS),
-        "sink_env": AUDIT_LOG_ENV,
-        "enabled": audit_enabled(),
-        "append_only": True,
-        "redact_before_persist": True,
-        "timestamp_format": "ISO-8601, timezone-aware, UTC",
-        "relationship_to_mcp_audit": (
-            "webui.console_audit records console intent and authorization "
-            "outcomes; gitea_audit records MCP mutations. A Phase 2 action "
-            "emits both, correlated by correlation.request_id."
-        ),
-    }

webui/console_authz.py

@@ -1,537 +0,0 @@
-"""Console authorization and RBAC model (#633, Phase 1).
-
-The read-only MVP (#426–#436) ships with no authentication: protection comes
-from network placement alone (#435). That is adequate while every route is a
-GET, and inadequate the moment Phase 2 wires a gated write. This module is the
-authorization model those writes must go through, landed *before* any of them
-exists so no write can be added without an authority to check against.
-
-Phase 1 scope is the model itself: identity resolution, the role matrix, the
-privileged-action list, and a fail-closed :func:`authorize`. It deliberately
-does **not** enable any write. ``webui.gated_actions`` stays globally disabled,
-so an allow decision here is necessary but never sufficient.
-
-Two invariants hold for every caller:
-
-- **Default deny.** An unrecognised action, an unknown role, or an absent
-  principal denies. There is no implicit allow branch and no "unless" clause.
-- **Authorization is not execution.** :func:`authorize` returns a decision
-  record. It never calls MCP, never mutates, and never consults credentials.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import os
-from dataclasses import asdict, dataclass, field
-from typing import Any
-
-from task_capability_map import required_permission, required_role
-
-# --- Roles ------------------------------------------------------------------
-# Ordered least to most authority. Higher ranks inherit every lower rank's
-# permitted actions; the matrix below is expressed as a minimum required rank.
-VIEWER = "viewer"
-OPERATOR = "operator"
-CONTROLLER = "controller"
-ADMIN = "admin"
-
-ROLE_ORDER: tuple[str, ...] = (VIEWER, OPERATOR, CONTROLLER, ADMIN)
-_ROLE_RANK: dict[str, int] = {role: idx for idx, role in enumerate(ROLE_ORDER)}
-
-ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS: dict[str, str] = {
-    VIEWER: "Read every console view. No write, ever, in any phase.",
-    OPERATOR: "Viewer, plus author-class work: claim, comment, open a PR.",
-    CONTROLLER: "Operator, plus reviewer/merger-class decisions on a PR.",
-    ADMIN: "Controller, plus destructive and policy-editing actions.",
-}
-
-# --- Identity sources -------------------------------------------------------
-IDENTITY_NONE = "none"
-IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV = "local_dev"
-IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY = "access_proxy"
-
-IDENTITY_SOURCES: dict[str, dict[str, Any]] = {
-    IDENTITY_NONE: {
-        "description": (
-            "No authentication configured. Every request is anonymous and "
-            "capped at viewer. This is the MVP default and the only mode "
-            "whose safety rests entirely on network placement (#435)."
-        ),
-        "authenticated": False,
-        "safe_for_shared_host": False,
-        "phase_available": 1,
-    },
-    IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV: {
-        "description": (
-            "Developer-supplied principal read from the environment. INSECURE: "
-            "the subject and role are asserted, never verified. Loopback only."
-        ),
-        "authenticated": True,
-        "safe_for_shared_host": False,
-        "phase_available": 1,
-    },
-    IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY: {
-        "description": (
-            "Subject asserted by a trusted access proxy (Cloudflare Access, "
-            "WARP, or an org VPN portal) via a verified request header. The "
-            "proxy performs authentication; the console performs authorization."
-        ),
-        "authenticated": True,
-        "safe_for_shared_host": True,
-        "phase_available": 2,
-    },
-}
-
-# Environment configuration. All are read server-side and never rendered.
-AUTH_MODE_ENV = "WEBUI_AUTH_MODE"
-DEV_SUBJECT_ENV = "WEBUI_DEV_SUBJECT"
-DEV_ROLE_ENV = "WEBUI_DEV_ROLE"
-ROLE_MAP_ENV = "WEBUI_ROLE_MAP"
-REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV = "WEBUI_REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH"
-ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER = "cf-access-authenticated-user-email"
-
-# --- Action classes ---------------------------------------------------------
-CLASS_READ = "read"
-CLASS_WRITE = "gated_write"
-CLASS_PRIVILEGED = "privileged"
-CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE = "destructive"
-
-# --- Privileged action list -------------------------------------------------
-# ``task_key`` ties each console action back to ``task_capability_map``, so the
-# console cannot invent an authority the MCP layer does not already define.
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class ConsoleAction:
-    """One console action and the authority required to invoke it."""
-
-    action_id: str
-    task_key: str
-    action_class: str
-    minimum_role: str
-    requires_confirmation: bool
-    dual_control: bool
-    break_glass: bool
-    phase: int
-    summary: str
-
-    @property
-    def mcp_permission(self) -> str:
-        return required_permission(self.task_key)
-
-    @property
-    def mcp_role(self) -> str:
-        return required_role(self.task_key)
-
-    @property
-    def privileged(self) -> bool:
-        return self.action_class in {CLASS_PRIVILEGED, CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE}
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        data = asdict(self)
-        data["mcp_permission"] = self.mcp_permission
-        data["mcp_role"] = self.mcp_role
-        data["privileged"] = self.privileged
-        return data
-
-
-_ACTION_SPECS: tuple[ConsoleAction, ...] = (
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="claim_issue",
-        task_key="claim_issue",
-        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
-        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=2,
-        summary="Apply status:in-progress to an issue.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="comment_issue",
-        task_key="comment_issue",
-        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
-        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=2,
-        summary="Post an issue comment.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="create_issue",
-        task_key="create_issue",
-        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
-        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=2,
-        summary="Open a new tracking issue.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="comment_pr",
-        task_key="comment_pr",
-        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
-        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=2,
-        summary="Post a PR thread comment.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="create_pr",
-        task_key="create_pr",
-        action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
-        minimum_role=OPERATOR,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=2,
-        summary="Open a PR from a locked feature branch.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="review_pr",
-        task_key="review_pr",
-        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
-        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=3,
-        summary="Submit an approve / request-changes verdict.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="close_pr",
-        task_key="close_pr",
-        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
-        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=False,
-        break_glass=False,
-        phase=3,
-        summary="Close a pull request without merging.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="merge_pr",
-        task_key="merge_pr",
-        action_class=CLASS_PRIVILEGED,
-        minimum_role=CONTROLLER,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=True,
-        break_glass=True,
-        phase=3,
-        summary="Merge an approved pull request.",
-    ),
-    ConsoleAction(
-        action_id="delete_branch",
-        task_key="delete_branch",
-        action_class=CLASS_DESTRUCTIVE,
-        minimum_role=ADMIN,
-        requires_confirmation=True,
-        dual_control=True,
-        break_glass=True,
-        phase=3,
-        summary="Remove a remote feature branch.",
-    ),
-)
-
-ACTIONS: dict[str, ConsoleAction] = {a.action_id: a for a in _ACTION_SPECS}
-
-
-def privileged_actions() -> tuple[ConsoleAction, ...]:
-    """Actions requiring dual control, break-glass, or controller+ authority."""
-    return tuple(a for a in _ACTION_SPECS if a.privileged)
-
-
-def get_action(action_id: str) -> ConsoleAction | None:
-    return ACTIONS.get(action_id)
-
-
-# --- Principals -------------------------------------------------------------
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class Principal:
-    """Who is making a request, and how strongly that is known."""
-
-    subject: str
-    role: str
-    identity_source: str
-    authenticated: bool
-    warnings: tuple[str, ...] = field(default_factory=tuple)
-
-    @property
-    def rank(self) -> int:
-        return _ROLE_RANK.get(self.role, -1)
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "subject": self.subject,
-            "role": self.role,
-            "identity_source": self.identity_source,
-            "authenticated": self.authenticated,
-            "warnings": list(self.warnings),
-        }
-
-
-ANONYMOUS = Principal(
-    subject="anonymous",
-    role=VIEWER,
-    identity_source=IDENTITY_NONE,
-    authenticated=False,
-    warnings=("No authentication configured; capped at viewer.",),
-)
-
-
-def auth_mode(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> str:
-    """Resolve the configured identity source, defaulting to ``none``."""
-    source = env if env is not None else os.environ
-    raw = (source.get(AUTH_MODE_ENV) or "").strip().lower().replace("-", "_")
-    if raw in IDENTITY_SOURCES:
-        return raw
-    return IDENTITY_NONE
-
-
-def _role_map(env: dict[str, str]) -> dict[str, str]:
-    """Parse ``WEBUI_ROLE_MAP`` (JSON subject→role). Invalid config yields {}."""
-    raw = (env.get(ROLE_MAP_ENV) or "").strip()
-    if not raw:
-        return {}
-    try:
-        parsed = json.loads(raw)
-    except Exception:
-        return {}
-    if not isinstance(parsed, dict):
-        return {}
-    return {
-        str(k): str(v).strip().lower()
-        for k, v in parsed.items()
-        if str(v).strip().lower() in _ROLE_RANK
-    }
-
-
-def resolve_principal(
-    headers: dict[str, str] | None = None,
-    env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
-) -> Principal:
-    """Resolve the requesting principal. Unknown or unconfigured → anonymous.
-
-    Never raises and never trusts a client-supplied role: the role always comes
-    from server-side configuration keyed by the resolved subject.
-    """
-    source_env = dict(env) if env is not None else dict(os.environ)
-    lowered = {str(k).lower(): str(v) for k, v in (headers or {}).items()}
-    mode = auth_mode(source_env)
-
-    if mode == IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV:
-        subject = (source_env.get(DEV_SUBJECT_ENV) or "").strip()
-        if not subject:
-            return ANONYMOUS
-        role = (source_env.get(DEV_ROLE_ENV) or VIEWER).strip().lower()
-        if role not in _ROLE_RANK:
-            role = VIEWER
-        return Principal(
-            subject=subject,
-            role=role,
-            identity_source=IDENTITY_LOCAL_DEV,
-            authenticated=True,
-            warnings=(
-                "local-dev identity is asserted, not verified; never use "
-                "outside loopback.",
-            ),
-        )
-
-    if mode == IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY:
-        subject = (lowered.get(ACCESS_SUBJECT_HEADER) or "").strip()
-        if not subject:
-            # Proxy mode with no proxy header means the request did not
-            # traverse the proxy. Fail closed rather than trust it.
-            return ANONYMOUS
-        role = _role_map(source_env).get(subject, VIEWER)
-        return Principal(
-            subject=subject,
-            role=role,
-            identity_source=IDENTITY_ACCESS_PROXY,
-            authenticated=True,
-        )
-
-    return ANONYMOUS
-
-
-def probe_auth_required(env: dict[str, str] | None = None) -> bool:
-    """Whether non-public probes must be authenticated. Default False.
-
-    #633 requires the console to *fail closed on missing auth for non-public
-    health probes if configured*. The default stays off so the MVP ``/health``
-    contract is unchanged; an operator opts in explicitly.
-    """
-    source = env if env is not None else os.environ
-    return (source.get(REQUIRE_PROBE_AUTH_ENV) or "").strip().lower() in {
-        "1",
-        "true",
-        "yes",
-    }
-
-
-# --- Authorization ----------------------------------------------------------
-
-DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION = "unknown_action"
-DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED = "unauthenticated"
-DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE = "insufficient_role"
-DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE = "unknown_role"
-DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE = "phase_not_active"
-ALLOW_PREVIEW = "allowed_preview_only"
-
-# Phase 1 is the only active console phase. Phase 2 opens gated writes and is
-# gated on this model landing; nothing here enables it.
-ACTIVE_PHASE = 1
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class AuthorizationDecision:
-    """Result of an authorization check. Never an execution grant."""
-
-    allowed: bool
-    reason_code: str
-    detail: str
-    action_id: str
-    principal: Principal
-    required_role: str | None = None
-    action_class: str | None = None
-    requires_confirmation: bool = False
-    dual_control: bool = False
-    break_glass: bool = False
-    execution_enabled: bool = False
-
-    def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
-        return {
-            "allowed": self.allowed,
-            "reason_code": self.reason_code,
-            "detail": self.detail,
-            "action_id": self.action_id,
-            "principal": self.principal.to_dict(),
-            "required_role": self.required_role,
-            "action_class": self.action_class,
-            "requires_confirmation": self.requires_confirmation,
-            "dual_control": self.dual_control,
-            "break_glass": self.break_glass,
-            "execution_enabled": self.execution_enabled,
-            "active_phase": ACTIVE_PHASE,
-        }
-
-
-def authorize(
-    action_id: str,
-    principal: Principal | None = None,
-    *,
-    for_execution: bool = False,
-) -> AuthorizationDecision:
-    """Decide whether *principal* may invoke *action_id*. Deny by default.
-
-    ``for_execution`` distinguishes a read-only preview from a real invocation.
-    Even an allowed decision reports ``execution_enabled=False`` while the
-    console is in Phase 1, so no caller can read an allow as permission to
-    mutate.
-    """
-    who = principal if principal is not None else ANONYMOUS
-    action = get_action(action_id)
-
-    if action is None:
-        return AuthorizationDecision(
-            allowed=False,
-            reason_code=DENY_UNKNOWN_ACTION,
-            detail=f"No console action registered as {action_id!r}.",
-            action_id=action_id,
-            principal=who,
-        )
-
-    base: dict[str, Any] = {
-        "action_id": action_id,
-        "principal": who,
-        "required_role": action.minimum_role,
-        "action_class": action.action_class,
-        "requires_confirmation": action.requires_confirmation,
-        "dual_control": action.dual_control,
-        "break_glass": action.break_glass,
-        "execution_enabled": False,
-    }
-
-    if not who.authenticated:
-        return AuthorizationDecision(
-            allowed=False,
-            reason_code=DENY_UNAUTHENTICATED,
-            detail=(
-                "Write actions require an authenticated principal; this "
-                "request is anonymous."
-            ),
-            **base,
-        )
-
-    if who.rank < 0:
-        return AuthorizationDecision(
-            allowed=False,
-            reason_code=DENY_UNKNOWN_ROLE,
-            detail=f"Role {who.role!r} is not in the console role matrix.",
-            **base,
-        )
-
-    if who.rank < _ROLE_RANK[action.minimum_role]:
-        return AuthorizationDecision(
-            allowed=False,
-            reason_code=DENY_INSUFFICIENT_ROLE,
-            detail=(
-                f"Action {action_id!r} requires {action.minimum_role!r}; "
-                f"principal holds {who.role!r}."
-            ),
-            **base,
-        )
-
-    if for_execution and action.phase > ACTIVE_PHASE:
-        return AuthorizationDecision(
-            allowed=False,
-            reason_code=DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE,
-            detail=(
-                f"Action {action_id!r} belongs to phase {action.phase}; the "
-                f"console is in phase {ACTIVE_PHASE}. Execution is not wired."
-            ),
-            **base,
-        )
-
-    return AuthorizationDecision(
-        allowed=True,
-        reason_code=ALLOW_PREVIEW,
-        detail=(
-            "Principal holds the required role. Preview only — execution "
-            "remains disabled until the Phase 2 action framework ships."
-        ),
-        **base,
-    )
-
-
-def rbac_matrix() -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Machine-readable RBAC matrix and privileged-action list."""
-    return {
-        "model_version": 1,
-        "active_phase": ACTIVE_PHASE,
-        "roles": [
-            {
-                "role": role,
-                "rank": _ROLE_RANK[role],
-                "description": ROLE_DESCRIPTIONS[role],
-                "permitted_actions": sorted(
-                    a.action_id
-                    for a in _ACTION_SPECS
-                    if _ROLE_RANK[role] >= _ROLE_RANK[a.minimum_role]
-                ),
-            }
-            for role in ROLE_ORDER
-        ],
-        "identity_sources": IDENTITY_SOURCES,
-        "actions": [a.to_dict() for a in _ACTION_SPECS],
-        "privileged_actions": [a.action_id for a in privileged_actions()],
-        "default_decision": "deny",
-        "execution_enabled": False,
-    }

webui/console_redaction.py

@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
-"""Secret redaction policy for every console surface (#633).
-
-The MVP already redacts MCP-side mutation records through ``gitea_audit``.
-This module is the console-facing policy: one redaction pass applied to API
-payloads, rendered HTML, log lines, and audit records *before* they leave the
-server or reach persistent storage.
-
-Design constraints:
-
-- **Reuse, never fork.** ``gitea_audit.redact`` remains the authority for
-  secret-looking dict keys, ``Authorization`` material, and raw URLs. This
-  module runs that pass first and then applies console-specific patterns for
-  keychain references, key/value assignments, private-key blocks, and JWTs.
-- **Never raises.** Redaction is a safety control; a malformed payload must
-  degrade to a redacted placeholder rather than propagate an exception.
-- **Redact before persist.** ``webui.console_audit`` calls this module before
-  writing, so an unredacted record is never durable.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-import json
-import re
-from typing import Any
-
-import gitea_audit
-
-REDACTED = gitea_audit.REDACTED
-
-# Console-specific patterns applied after the shared ``gitea_audit`` pass.
-# Each keeps the identifying key so an operator can still tell *what* was
-# removed, and replaces only the secret run itself.
-_KEYCHAIN_REF = re.compile(r"(?i)\bkeychain:[\w.\-/@]+")
-_KEYCHAIN_CMD = re.compile(
-    r"(?i)\bsecurity\s+find-(?:generic|internet)-password\b[^\n]*"
-)
-_ASSIGNMENT = re.compile(
-    r"(?i)\b(token|password|passwd|secret|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?key|"
-    r"client[_-]?secret|private[_-]?key)\b(\s*[:=]\s*)"
-    r"(\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|\S+)"
-)
-_ENV_ASSIGNMENT = re.compile(
-    r"(?i)\b(GITEA_(?:TOKEN|PASS|PASSWORD)[A-Z0-9_]*)(\s*=\s*)"
-    r"(\"[^\"]*\"|'[^']*'|\S+)"
-)
-_PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK = re.compile(
-    r"-----BEGIN [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----.*?-----END [A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----",
-    re.S,
-)
-_JWT = re.compile(
-    r"\beyJ[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\.[A-Za-z0-9_\-]{8,}\b"
-)
-
-# Shapes that mean a payload still carries a secret. ``scan_for_secrets`` uses
-# these to assert a surface is clean.
-_DETECTORS: tuple[tuple[str, re.Pattern[str]], ...] = (
-    ("keychain_reference", _KEYCHAIN_REF),
-    ("keychain_command", _KEYCHAIN_CMD),
-    ("credential_assignment", _ASSIGNMENT),
-    ("credential_env_assignment", _ENV_ASSIGNMENT),
-    ("private_key_block", _PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK),
-    ("json_web_token", _JWT),
-    ("bearer_credential", re.compile(r"(?i)\b(?:bearer|basic)\s+\S{8,}")),
-)
-
-
-def _mask_assignment(match: re.Match[str]) -> str:
-    """Keep the key and separator, replace the value."""
-    return f"{match.group(1)}{match.group(2)}{REDACTED}"
-
-
-def redact_text(text: Any) -> Any:
-    """Redact secret material from a single string.
-
-    Non-strings are returned unchanged so this is safe to map over mixed
-    payloads. Runs the shared ``gitea_audit`` pass first, then the
-    console-specific patterns.
-    """
-    if not isinstance(text, str) or not text:
-        return text
-    try:
-        out = gitea_audit.redact(text)
-        if not isinstance(out, str):  # defensive; redact() returns str for str
-            return REDACTED
-        out = _PRIVATE_KEY_BLOCK.sub(f"{REDACTED}_PRIVATE_KEY", out)
-        out = _ENV_ASSIGNMENT.sub(_mask_assignment, out)
-        out = _ASSIGNMENT.sub(_mask_assignment, out)
-        out = _KEYCHAIN_CMD.sub(f"{REDACTED}_KEYCHAIN_COMMAND", out)
-        out = _KEYCHAIN_REF.sub(f"{REDACTED}_KEYCHAIN_REF", out)
-        out = _JWT.sub(f"{REDACTED}_JWT", out)
-        return out
-    except Exception:
-        # Fail closed: an unredactable string is dropped rather than emitted raw.
-        return REDACTED
-
-
-def redact_payload(value: Any) -> Any:
-    """Recursively redact a JSON-able payload for any console surface.
-
-    Secret-looking dict keys are replaced wholesale by the shared
-    ``gitea_audit`` policy; every remaining string is run through
-    :func:`redact_text`.
-    """
-    try:
-        shared = gitea_audit.redact(value)
-    except Exception:
-        return REDACTED
-    return _walk(shared)
-
-
-def _walk(value: Any) -> Any:
-    if isinstance(value, dict):
-        return {k: _walk(v) for k, v in value.items()}
-    if isinstance(value, (list, tuple)):
-        return [_walk(v) for v in value]
-    if isinstance(value, str):
-        return redact_text(value)
-    return value
-
-
-def scan_for_secrets(value: Any) -> list[str]:
-    """Return detector names that still match *value* after serialization.
-
-    Used to assert an outbound payload or rendered page is clean. An empty
-    list means no known secret shape was found. Already-redacted hits are not
-    findings.
-    """
-    if isinstance(value, str):
-        text = value
-    else:
-        try:
-            text = json.dumps(value, default=str)
-        except Exception:
-            text = str(value)
-    findings: list[str] = []
-    for name, pattern in _DETECTORS:
-        for match in pattern.finditer(text):
-            if REDACTED in match.group(0):
-                continue
-            findings.append(name)
-            break
-    return findings
-
-
-def redaction_policy() -> dict[str, Any]:
-    """Machine-readable statement of the redaction rules (never secrets)."""
-    return {
-        "policy_version": 1,
-        "applies_to": [
-            "json_api_responses",
-            "rendered_html",
-            "server_logs",
-            "audit_records",
-        ],
-        "ordering": "shared gitea_audit pass, then console patterns",
-        "redact_before_persist": True,
-        "shared_rules": {
-            "source": "gitea_audit.redact",
-            "secret_key_hints": list(gitea_audit._SECRET_KEY_HINTS),
-            "secret_value_prefixes": list(gitea_audit._SECRET_VALUE_PREFIXES),
-            "urls": "credentials, secret query parameters, and real hosts redacted",
-        },
-        "console_rules": [
-            {"name": name, "pattern": pattern.pattern}
-            for name, pattern in _DETECTORS
-        ],
-        "placeholder": REDACTED,
-        "failure_mode": "fail closed — unredactable values become the placeholder",
-    }

webui/layout.py

@@ -2,66 +2,28 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
-import os
+NAV_ITEMS = (
-
+    ("/", "Home"),
-from webui.nav import NAV_GROUPS
+    ("/queue", "Queue"),
+    ("/projects", "Projects"),
+    ("/prompts", "Prompts"),
+    ("/runtime", "Runtime"),
+    ("/audit", "Audit"),
+    ("/worktrees", "Worktrees"),
+    ("/leases", "Leases"),
+    ("/actions", "Actions"),
+)
 
 MVP_NOTICE = (
     "Read-only MVP — Gitea, MCP tools, and canonical workflows remain the "
     "source of truth. No mutation endpoints."
 )
 
-# Canonical docs entry point surfaced from the shell header (#638).
-DOCS_URL = (
-    "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools/src/branch/"
-    "master/docs/webui-local-dev.md"
-)
-
-_LOCAL_HOSTS = frozenset({"", "127.0.0.1", "localhost", "::1"})
-
-
-def environment_label() -> str:
-    """Classify the serving environment as ``local`` or ``remote`` (#638).
-
-    Derived from the same ``WEBUI_HOST`` default the app binds to; loopback
-    hosts are ``local``, anything else is ``remote``. Read-only signal only.
-    """
-    host = (os.environ.get("WEBUI_HOST", "127.0.0.1") or "").strip().lower()
-    return "local" if host in _LOCAL_HOSTS else "remote"
-
-
-def _render_nav() -> str:
-    groups_html = []
-    for group in NAV_GROUPS:
-        links = "".join(
-            f'<a href="{item.href}"'
-            + (' class="nav-stub"' if item.status == "stub" else "")
-            + f'>{item.label}</a>'
-            for item in group.items
-        )
-        groups_html.append(
-            '<div class="nav-group">'
-            f'<span class="nav-group-label">{group.label}</span>'
-            f'<span class="nav-group-links">{links}</span>'
-            "</div>"
-        )
-    return "".join(groups_html)
-
-
-def _render_badges() -> str:
-    env = environment_label()
-    return (
-        '<div class="header-badges">'
-        f'<span class="badge env-badge env-{env}">env: {env}</span>'
-        '<span class="badge mode-badge">mode: read-only</span>'
-        f'<a class="badge docs-link" href="{DOCS_URL}">Docs</a>'
-        "</div>"
-    )
-
 
 def render_page(*, title: str, body_html: str, extra_head: str = "") -> str:
-    nav_links = _render_nav()
+    nav_links = "".join(
-    header_badges = _render_badges()
+        f'<a href="{href}">{label}</a>' for href, label in NAV_ITEMS
+    )
     return f"""<!DOCTYPE html>
 <html lang="en">
 <head>
@@ -91,58 +53,21 @@ def render_page(*, title: str, body_html: str, extra_head: str = "") -> str:
       padding: 0.75rem 1.25rem;
     }}
     header h1 {{
-      margin: 0;
+      margin: 0 0 0.5rem;
       font-size: 1.1rem;
       font-weight: 600;
     }}
-    .header-top {{
-      display: flex;
-      flex-wrap: wrap;
-      align-items: center;
-      justify-content: space-between;
-      gap: 0.5rem 1rem;
-      margin-bottom: 0.6rem;
-    }}
-    .header-badges {{ display: inline-flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 0.4rem; }}
-    .env-badge.env-local {{ color: #8fd19e; border-color: #3d6b4a; }}
-    .env-badge.env-remote {{ color: #e0c27a; border-color: #6b5730; }}
-    .mode-badge {{ color: #9ec8f0; border-color: #3d5f7a; }}
-    a.docs-link {{
-      color: var(--accent);
-      border-color: var(--accent);
-      text-decoration: none;
-      text-transform: none;
-    }}
-    a.docs-link:hover {{ filter: brightness(1.12); }}
     nav {{
       display: flex;
       flex-wrap: wrap;
-      gap: 0.5rem 1.25rem;
+      gap: 0.75rem 1rem;
     }}
-    .nav-group {{
-      display: flex;
-      flex-direction: column;
-      gap: 0.15rem;
-    }}
-    .nav-group-label {{
-      font-size: 0.68rem;
-      text-transform: uppercase;
-      letter-spacing: 0.04em;
-      color: var(--muted);
-    }}
-    .nav-group-links {{ display: inline-flex; flex-wrap: wrap; gap: 0.6rem; }}
     nav a {{
       color: var(--accent);
       text-decoration: none;
       font-size: 0.9rem;
     }}
     nav a:hover {{ text-decoration: underline; }}
-    nav a.nav-stub {{ color: var(--muted); }}
-    nav a.nav-stub::after {{
-      content: " ·stub";
-      font-size: 0.7rem;
-      color: var(--muted);
-    }}
     main {{
       max-width: 52rem;
       margin: 0 auto;
@@ -241,10 +166,7 @@ def render_page(*, title: str, body_html: str, extra_head: str = "") -> str:
 </head>
 <body>
   <header>
-    <div class="header-top">
     <h1>MCP Control Plane</h1>
-      {header_badges}
-    </div>
     <nav>{nav_links}</nav>
   </header>
   <main>

webui/nav.py

@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-"""Navigation IA for the Phase 1 operator console shell (#638).
-
-Single source of truth for the console navigation so ``webui/layout.py`` and
-the ``webui/app.py`` route table stay aligned with epic #631. Read-only: every
-destination is a GET view or a Phase 1 placeholder. No mutation links.
-
-Nav groups follow the #631 Phase 1 information architecture: Health, Traffic,
-Runtime/Sessions, Projects, Inventory, Timeline, Policy (placeholder), and
-Insights (placeholder). Later-phase surfaces are declared as ``stub`` items and
-backed by ``STUB_PAGES`` so their nav links resolve to a graceful placeholder
-instead of a 404.
-"""
-
-from __future__ import annotations
-
-from dataclasses import dataclass
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class NavItem:
-    """A single navigation destination.
-
-    ``status`` is ``"live"`` for implemented views and ``"stub"`` for Phase 1
-    placeholders whose backing view lands in a later child issue.
-    """
-
-    href: str
-    label: str
-    status: str = "live"
-
-
-@dataclass(frozen=True)
-class NavGroup:
-    label: str
-    items: tuple[NavItem, ...]
-
-
-NAV_GROUPS: tuple[NavGroup, ...] = (
-    NavGroup("Health", (
-        NavItem("/health", "Liveness"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Traffic", (
-        NavItem("/queue", "Queue"),
-        NavItem("/leases", "Leases"),
-        NavItem("/actions", "Actions"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Runtime/Sessions", (
-        NavItem("/runtime", "Runtime health"),
-        NavItem("/sessions", "Sessions", "stub"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Projects", (
-        NavItem("/projects", "Projects"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Inventory", (
-        NavItem("/inventory", "Inventory", "stub"),
-        NavItem("/worktrees", "Worktrees"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Timeline", (
-        NavItem("/timeline", "Timeline", "stub"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Policy", (
-        NavItem("/policy", "Policy", "stub"),
-        NavItem("/prompts", "Prompts"),
-    )),
-    NavGroup("Insights", (
-        NavItem("/insights", "Insights", "stub"),
-        NavItem("/audit", "Audit"),
-    )),
-)
-
-
-# Phase 1 placeholder destinations whose backing views land in later child
-# issues of epic #631. Each maps a path to (title, description). Routes are
-# registered so nav links resolve to a graceful, read-only stub page.
-STUB_PAGES: dict[str, tuple[str, str]] = {
-    "/sessions": (
-        "Sessions",
-        "Active session, capability, and role inventory. Backed by the unified "
-        "inventory API (#636) once it lands.",
-    ),
-    "/inventory": (
-        "Inventory",
-        "Unified sessions, leases, locks, namespaces, and worktree inventory. "
-        "Backed by the Phase 1 inventory API (#636).",
-    ),
-    "/timeline": (
-        "Timeline",
-        "Workflow event timeline across issues and PRs. A later Phase 1 surface.",
-    ),
-    "/policy": (
-        "Policy",
-        "Capability and role policy surface. Placeholder until a later phase.",
-    ),
-    "/insights": (
-        "Insights",
-        "Aggregate operational insights and trends. Placeholder until a later "
-        "phase.",
-    ),
-}
-
-
-def iter_nav_items():
-    """Yield every ``NavItem`` across all groups in declared order."""
-    for group in NAV_GROUPS:
-        for item in group.items:
-            yield item
-
-
-def nav_hrefs() -> tuple[str, ...]:
-    """Return every navigation href in declared order."""
-    return tuple(item.href for item in iter_nav_items())

workflow_dashboard.py

@@ -65,11 +65,9 @@ PROMPT_RECONCILER = (
     "reconciliation (already-landed / post-merge cleanup). Do not approve or merge."
 )
 PROMPT_CONTROLLER = (
-    "CONTROLLER session: call gitea_route_task_session(task_type='process_work_queue') "
+    "CONTROLLER session: inspect gitea_workflow_dashboard + control-plane leases, "
-    "then gitea_allocate_next_work (cross_role default) for {remote}/{org}/{repo}; "
+    "diagnose blocked/terminal-locked items for {remote}/{org}/{repo}, and schedule "
-    "use the returned required_role/profile/action to schedule exactly one downstream "
+    "exactly one fresh role-scoped cycle. Do not implement, review, or merge in-band."
-    "role cycle. Dashboard is explanatory only and never replaces allocator selection. "
-    "Do not implement, review, approve, or merge in-band."
 )
 PROMPT_IDLE = (
     "IDLE: no safe assignable work for role '{role}' on {remote}/{org}/{repo}. "