Add a read-only MCP tool that decides whether the current authenticated
identity + active runtime profile is eligible to review, approve,
request_changes, or merge a specific PR. Evaluation only — it never
reviews, approves, requests changes, merges, or mutates anything.
Inspects: authenticated username (/user), active profile metadata
(allowed/forbidden operations), and PR facts (author, state, head SHA,
mergeability). Returns {eligible, requested_action, authenticated_user,
profile_name, pr_author, pr_state, head_sha, mergeable, reasons}.
Fail-closed rules:
- unknown action / unknown remote -> not eligible
- action not in allowed ops, or in forbidden ops -> not eligible
- identity undetermined -> not eligible
- authenticated user == PR author -> cannot approve/merge
- PR not open -> not eligible
- merge requires a positive mergeable signal
No token/auth-header exposure. No review/approve/request-changes
mutation. No merge mutation. No multi-token switching. No
Jenkins/Ops/GlitchTip/Release/deploy behavior.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a read-only MCP tool that reports the active runtime execution
profile so an LLM can inspect what the current process is configured to
do before deciding whether to attempt an action later.
- gitea_get_profile: returns profile_name, allowed/forbidden operation
categories, audit_label, token_source_name (a NAME, never a value),
base_url, remote, resolved server, and — optionally — the verified
authenticated username. Identity resolution fails soft and marks
identity_status (verified/unknown/unavailable/not_resolved); the
profile config is always returned. Never mutates Gitea.
- gitea_auth.get_profile(): extended with forbidden_operations,
audit_label, token_source_name from env (non-secret metadata).
- .env.example / README: document the new optional metadata vars and
the discovery tool.
- tests: metadata parsing, verified/unavailable/unknown identity paths,
skip-identity, and secret-redaction.
Read-only. No token exposure. No multi-token switching. No PR
eligibility, review, or merge workflow. No Jenkins/Ops/GlitchTip/
Release/deploy behavior.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Allow the same MCP server to run as separate MCP entries, each with its
own token and profile name, so roles stay task-scoped (the profile is
the role, not the LLM).
- gitea_auth.get_profile(): reads GITEA_PROFILE_NAME,
GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS, GITEA_BASE_URL as non-secret metadata.
Never reads/returns/logs the token.
- gitea_whoami now surfaces the safe profile metadata (name + allowed
operations) alongside identity; token still never exposed.
- .env.example: placeholder-only template for a runtime profile.
- .gitignore: track .env.example while keeping real .env* ignored.
- README: document multiple env-configured MCP entries.
- tests: profile defaults/parsing, token-never-included, whoami surfaces
profile without leaking token.
One token + one profile per process. No multi-token switching in a
single runtime. No approve/merge/eligibility workflow. No
Jenkins/Ops/GlitchTip/Release/deploy behavior. No real secrets.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a read-only MCP tool that calls Gitea's authenticated-user
endpoint (GET /api/v1/user) and returns safe identity metadata only:
username, display name, user id, email, server, and remote.
This lets future review/merge workflows prove which Gitea account the
MCP server is authenticated as, so self-review/self-merge can be
detected before acting — the blocker discovered during PR #8 dogfooding.
- Never returns the token, Authorization header, password, or secrets.
- Fails closed with a clear error if identity cannot be determined.
- No mutation; no profile switching; no review/approve/merge behavior.
Tests: identity mapping, secret-redaction, fail-closed, unknown-remote.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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