Failed subagent runs left throwaway helpers (_encode_commit_payload.py,
_emit_payload.py) in the shared working tree, polluting git status and
tripping gitea_lock_issue / pre-flight purity gates.
Add an 'Agent temp artifact cleanup' runbook section requiring deletion
of _encode_*/_emit_*/_inline_* helpers when the MCP commit completes or
aborts, prefer scratchpad payload preparation, and document the cleanup
checklist. Back it with .gitignore patterns so strays cannot block
issue locks for later sessions, and pin both with doc-contract tests
(including a repo-root scan asserting the artifacts stay removed).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Support the canonical contexts-shape version 2 config (contexts / profiles /
projects / rules) alongside the existing environments shape and v1:
- Require a boolean 'enabled' on every context, profile, service, and
project. Disabled entries are surfaced in audits but fail closed at
selection/resolution — never a silent fallback to another profile,
service, or credential source.
- Resolve the active identity from GITEA_MCP_PROFILE via the existing
select_profile path; profile base_url falls back to the context's enabled
gitea block.
- Add resolve_service() and project_for_path() for context service and
project-to-context resolution (internal use; fail closed on disabled).
- get_auth_header now propagates ConfigError when GITEA_MCP_CONFIG is set
instead of silently degrading to Basic auth.
- Hide endpoint URLs and keychain ids from normal LLM-facing output:
gitea_whoami / gitea_get_profile report logical names and auth status
only; new gitea_audit_config tool reports enabled/disabled state and safe
one-line service summaries. The GITEA_MCP_REVEAL_ENDPOINTS opt-in (and
'python3 gitea_config.py audit --reveal-endpoints' locally) restores
endpoints and auth source names for admin diagnostics; token values are
never printed on any path.
- Ship gitea-mcp.v2-contexts.example.json (synthetic values) and validate
it in tests.
Implements #120
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <[email protected]>
Let one MCP server select among named Gitea runtime profiles from a JSON file
instead of editing code or juggling many .env files:
GITEA_MCP_CONFIG=/path/to/gitea-mcp.json
GITEA_MCP_PROFILE=dev
- New gitea_config.py: load/validate the JSON, select the named profile, and
resolve its token by env-var reference. Profiles supply base_url,
profile_name, token_env, owner/repo, allowed/forbidden operations, and audit
label.
- gitea_auth.get_profile() now overlays env over the selected JSON profile:
explicit env vars win, the JSON profile fills only what env leaves unset.
- gitea_auth.get_auth_header() gains a JSON token_env fallback after explicit
env tokens (env still wins).
Security / safety:
- Tokens are referenced by env-var NAME (token_env); an inline "token" is
rejected and never echoed. The value is never stored in or returned as
profile metadata.
- Fail-safe errors: missing file / invalid JSON / unknown or unset selected
profile raise a clear ConfigError that never prints file contents or tokens
(JSONDecodeError context is suppressed so the raw file text can't surface).
- No network calls during config parsing.
- Real config files are gitignored (gitea-mcp*.json), example kept.
Backwards compatible: with GITEA_MCP_CONFIG unset, behaviour is exactly the
prior env-only behaviour (all existing get_profile/get_auth_header tests pass
unchanged).
Docs: README JSON-profiles section + env table rows, .env.example placeholders,
gitea-mcp.example.json.
Tests: tests/test_config.py (22 cases) — env-only, selection, multiple
profiles, env-override precedence, missing file, invalid JSON, missing/unset
profile, inline-token rejection + redaction, and no-network-during-parse.
Refs #10. Note: issue #19 (env-based profiles) was already implemented and
closed; this JSON-file capability is adjacent new scope tracked under the
roadmap rather than reopening #19.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Allow the same MCP server to run as separate MCP entries, each with its
own token and profile name, so roles stay task-scoped (the profile is
the role, not the LLM).
- gitea_auth.get_profile(): reads GITEA_PROFILE_NAME,
GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS, GITEA_BASE_URL as non-secret metadata.
Never reads/returns/logs the token.
- gitea_whoami now surfaces the safe profile metadata (name + allowed
operations) alongside identity; token still never exposed.
- .env.example: placeholder-only template for a runtime profile.
- .gitignore: track .env.example while keeping real .env* ignored.
- README: document multiple env-configured MCP entries.
- tests: profile defaults/parsing, token-never-included, whoami surfaces
profile without leaking token.
One token + one profile per process. No multi-token switching in a
single runtime. No approve/merge/eligibility workflow. No
Jenkins/Ops/GlitchTip/Release/deploy behavior. No real secrets.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
sysadminandClaude Opus 4.8