Two surfaces reported different provenance for one process.
`gitea_get_runtime_context` read the live environment and reported
`client_managed`; `mcp_namespace_health.classify_namespace_probe` derived
provenance from `_safe_env_summary()`, whose `SAFE_ENV_KEYS` allowlist never
contained `GITEA_CLIENT_MANAGED`, `GITEA_MCP_CLIENT_MANAGED`, or
`GITEA_SERVER_PROVENANCE`. That lookup could only ever miss, so the health
surface was structurally incapable of returning anything but `manual_launch`.
Neither model could name which client or which session owned a runtime, so a
healthy daemon serving a second client was indistinguishable from a duplicate,
and the profile-wide duplicate scan walled the whole fleet.
Introduce `mcp_worker_identity` as the one authority, splitting two claims the
old code ran together:
* launch provenance — was this hand-launched from a terminal? Answered from the
environment, which is legitimate because the launcher sets it. Preserves the
#686 wall unchanged.
* session ownership — which live client session owns this runtime now? Answered
only from a live attachment record; no environment flag can establish it.
The module provides collision-resistant worker identities
(`<llm-name>-<UTC-timestamp>-<short-sha>`), an atomic SQLite registry with
fencing epochs, heartbeat-based liveness, generation takeover that supersedes
only a non-live claimant, cohort classification, and failure scoping.
Behaviour changes:
* Registering an existing worker identity fails closed; it is never replaced,
adopted, or merged with. The caller mints a different identity instead.
* A generation held by a live session cannot be claimed by a second one. A
generation whose claimant is not live is taken over with a higher fencing
epoch, so stale ownership cannot permanently strand a healthy daemon.
* A superseded session presenting an old epoch is refused and performs no write.
* Liveness comes from heartbeat freshness; a live PID cannot resurrect an
expired record, and a dead PID withdraws liveness.
* Workers sharing a role or profile no longer trigger a profile-wide duplicate
block, provided each carries a distinct identity. Processes with no identity
evidence remain classified as duplicates, so the #686 wall still holds.
* Runtime failures are scoped to a worker identity or generation, never to a
profile or the fleet.
* Reconnect guidance no longer defaults to Codex. An unidentified client gets
host-agnostic steps; `gitea_request_mcp_reconnect(client=...)` defaults to
resolving the client from the live attachment record.
* `resolve_bound_remote` keeps a bound namespace on its remote instead of
falling through to the `dadeschools` library default.
Absence of proof is now reported as `unproven` rather than asserted as
`manual_launch`. Both still fail closed — `is_client_managed` is unchanged, so
nothing previously refused is now permitted — but remediation names the proof
that is actually missing instead of describing a terminal launch it cannot
evidence. The #686 test is updated for that vocabulary and keeps every
wall-preserving assertion.
Threat-model anchors and their citations in docs/remote-mcp/threat-model.md are
restamped for the line movement in gitea_mcp_server.py.
Tests: tests/test_issue_948_client_session_provenance.py adds 43 cases covering
Codex/Gemini/Antigravity/Claude attachment, same-client new session, cross-client
takeover after a session ends, two live conflicting sessions, stale records,
missing attachment proof, environment flags without attachment, mixed
generations, duplicate cohorts, the hardcoded-client regression, explicit PRGS
selection, default-remote host drift, cross-surface agreement, and fail-closed
handling without false reconnect loops. Synthetic identifiers throughout.
Full suite from a branches/ worktree: 28F/5953P/6S at head vs 28F/5910P/6S at
merge base 8eada1fb, identical failing ID sets.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <[email protected]>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01F6Vomtndpq2gSBa88Tfcwy
Add gitea_request_mcp_reconnect as a report-only callable surface so Codex
and other agent hosts can request host/IDE reconnect with typed blockers
and exact UI steps. Never kills processes or edits config.
Co-Authored-By: Grok 4.5 <[email protected]>
sysadminandClaude Opus 5
jcwalker3andGrok 4.5