`runtime_recovery_guard._SEGMENT_SPLIT_RE` claimed to split a compound command
line "on shell separators", but omitted the background-job separator `&`, and no
caller stripped a subshell wrapper before tokenising. `_analyse_kill_segment`
only inspects the first command token of a segment, so in both forms the kill
verb never reached the classifier.
Measured against the previous implementation at 35e94e10:
sleep 1 & pkill -f mcp_server.py -> process_kill False, contamination False
(pkill -f mcp_server.py) -> process_kill False, contamination False
Changes:
- Add `&` to `_SEGMENT_SPLIT_RE` as `(?:\|\||&&|[|;&\n])`; the two-character
logical forms stay first so `&&` and `||` are consumed whole.
- Add `_strip_subshell()` and apply it in `_split_segments()`, removing leading
`(` and trailing `)` (including nested wrappers) before tokenising.
Both forms now classify as contamination with reason class `manual_daemon_kill`,
and the record tool writes a durable marker for each. Direct-command behaviour is
unchanged. The contamination model, gated-task set, marker lifecycle, and
reconciler-only clearing path are untouched.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
A session that ran `pkill -f mcp_server.py`, waited for the IDE to respawn
the daemons, and then closed an issue left no trace distinguishing that
closure from one performed over a sanctioned runtime. Detection existed only
as advisory strings (`native_mcp_preference.classify_command_path`,
`review_workflow_boundary`) and never failed closed on the mutations that
followed.
Adds `runtime_recovery_guard.py`, mirroring the #671 stable-branch
contamination model so the two cannot drift apart: classification of
kill/pkill/killall commands and known-pid kills, a durable
`runtime_recovery_contamination` marker, a fail-closed pre-flight gate over
the shared review/merge/close/completion task set, and reconciler-only
clearing. `comment_issue` and `lock_issue` stay allowed so a contaminated
worker can still post its audit comment and hand off. The marker is
recovery-critical, so contamination cannot expire into cleanliness with the
session-state TTL.
Read-only inspection (`ps aux | grep mcp_server`), sanctioned reconnects,
and process management unrelated to the daemons are never flagged; a bare
`kill` of an unknown pid is reported as ambiguous rather than contaminating,
so ordinary subprocess work is not false-blocked. A pattern broad enough to
sweep unrelated namespaces (`pkill -f python`) is contamination even when it
never names MCP.
Operator-authorized host maintenance stays permitted, but the authorization
is read from GITEA_OPERATOR_DAEMON_MAINTENANCE_AUTHORIZATION in the process
environment only and never from a tool argument, so a session cannot
authorize itself.
Final-report rules reject clean-session claims and require the contaminated
recovery to be surfaced. Two tools are registered (inventory 112 to 114) and
the sanctioned-versus-forbidden contrast is documented in the namespace
recovery doc and the workflow skill.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
jcwalker3andClaude Opus 4.8