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Merge branch 'master' into chore/issue-63-v1.1.0

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Jason Walker
2026-07-02 15:21:22 -04:00
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README.md
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@@ -381,8 +381,15 @@ python3 -m pytest tests/ -v
| `test_python_cli.py` | `close_issue.py` + `mark_issue.py` CLI validation | | `test_python_cli.py` | `close_issue.py` + `mark_issue.py` CLI validation |
| `test_mirror_refs.py` | Flags, safety defaults, local integration tests | | `test_mirror_refs.py` | Flags, safety defaults, local integration tests |
(Core suites — the table is non-exhaustive; see `tests/` for the full set.)
All tests mock network and keychain access — no real API calls are made. All tests mock network and keychain access — no real API calls are made.
For how to write tests — mocking the API/auth safely, testing profile and
self-review/self-merge gates, no-secret regression expectations, and unit vs.
integration guidance — see
[`docs/developer-testing-guidelines.md`](docs/developer-testing-guidelines.md).
## Troubleshooting ## Troubleshooting
### macOS: `com.apple.provenance` blocks Python execution (#3) ### macOS: `com.apple.provenance` blocks Python execution (#3)
docs/architecture/jenkins-job-mapping-design.md
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# Jenkins Repo/Branch/PR → Job Mapping — Design Notes
- **Status:** Design (implementation-ready notes; **no implementation in this repo**)
- **Issue:** #77 (parent: #72 read-only tools design; umbrella: #75; boundary: ADR-0001, #71)
- **Related docs:** [`jenkins-readonly-build-status-design.md`](jenkins-readonly-build-status-design.md)
- **Date:** 2026-07-02
## 1. Purpose
The #72 tool set addresses Jenkins jobs by **explicit fully-qualified job
path**. This document designs the layer above it: how a *(repository, branch,
PR)* tuple — the vocabulary of Gitea workflows — resolves deterministically to
a Jenkins job path, so an LLM can ask "did the build for `Gitea-Tools`
`master` pass?" without knowing Jenkins internals.
Hard constraints inherited from #72 / ADR-0001:
- **No silent guessing of job names.** Unmapped input returns an explicit
"no mapping" result — never a fuzzy match, never a constructed-and-probed
name.
- **Read-only.** Mapping introduces no Jenkins write actions.
- Lives in the **`jenkins-mcp`** boundary; no Gitea credentials involved.
## 2. Mapping format
Declarative, versioned config (TOML or JSON — match whatever config format
`jenkins-mcp` adopts; illustrated here as TOML):
```toml
version = 1
[[mapping]]
# Source side (what the caller supplies)
repo = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools" # org/repo, exact
# Target side (where it lives in Jenkins)
job = "scaled-tech/gitea-tools" # foldered job path
type = "multibranch" # "multibranch" | "single" | "parameterized-view"
[[mapping]]
repo = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Timesheet"
branch = "master" # optional: branch-specific override
job = "scaled-tech/timesheet-master"
type = "single"
```
Field semantics:
| Field | Required | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| `repo` | yes | Exact `org/repo` (case-insensitive compare, stored canonical) |
| `branch` | no | Exact branch name this entry pins; absent = all branches |
| `job` | yes | Fully-qualified Jenkins job path, folders `/`-joined |
| `type` | yes | How branch/PR resolves under the job (§3) |
Rules:
- **Exact matching only** on `repo` and `branch`. No globs in v1 (globs invite
accidental over-matching; add later behind an explicit `pattern = true` flag
if ever needed).
- Unknown `type` or malformed entry ⇒ config load fails closed with a clear
error naming the entry — a broken mapping file must not half-load.
- Duplicate `(repo, branch)` keys ⇒ load error (ambiguity is refused, not
resolved).
## 3. Resolution semantics by job type
Given caller input `(repo, branch?, pr?)`:
- **`multibranch`** — branch job addressed as `<job>/<url-encoded-branch>`
(e.g. `feature/x` → `feature%2Fx`). PRs addressed as `<job>/PR-<number>`
(Jenkins multibranch PR-discovery naming). Both per #72 §8.
- **`single`** — the job path is used as-is; `branch`/`pr` input beyond the
entry's pinned branch is a **no-mapping** result (a single job cannot answer
for arbitrary branches).
- **`parameterized-view`** — read-only variant for jobs that encode branch as
a build parameter: resolution returns the base job path plus a
`branch_param` filter hint the status tools may apply client-side when
scanning recent builds. It never triggers anything (read-only rule).
## 4. Precedence
Most-specific entry wins, evaluated in this order:
1. `(repo, branch)` exact entry — branch-pinned override.
2. `(repo)` entry — repo-wide (multibranch typical).
3. Nothing → **no mapping** (§5).
PR input resolves through the same chain: a PR belongs to its **base repo**'s
mapping; forks never introduce their own mapping (a fork's head repo is not
consulted — CI runs live under the base repo's job). If the base repo is
unmapped, the PR is unmapped.
Ties are impossible by construction (duplicate keys refused at load).
## 5. No-match behavior
```json
{
"mapped": false,
"repo": "org/unknown-repo",
"branch": "master",
"error": "no Jenkins job mapping for this repo/branch",
"hint": "add an entry to the jenkins-mcp mapping config"
}
```
- Deterministic, explicit, machine-checkable (`mapped: false`).
- **Never** falls back to name construction ("repo name probably equals job
name"), never probes Jenkins for candidates, never string-similarity ranks.
- The hint names the config, not a guessed job.
## 6. Where the mapping config lives
- **In the `jenkins-mcp` package/deployment** (e.g. `jenkins-mcp/mapping.toml`),
version-controlled next to the server that consumes it — *not* in Gitea-Tools
and *not* in per-user env vars (mappings are shared team facts, not
credentials).
- Path overridable via env (`JENKINS_MCP_MAPPING_FILE`) for tests/containers.
- Contains **no secrets** — job paths and repo names only — so it is safe to
commit and review like any other config.
- Reloaded at server start; a hot-reload tool is out of scope (restart is the
documented path).
## 7. Exposed tool surface (read-only)
One addition to the #72 tool set:
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `jenkins_resolve_job` | `(repo, branch?, pr?)` → `{mapped, job, addressed_path, type}` or the §5 no-match result. Pure config lookup — **no Jenkins API call at all.** |
Status tools (`jenkins_latest_build` etc.) accept either an explicit job path
(as designed in #72) **or** `(repo, branch)` which they resolve via the same
mapping layer first. Resolution failure surfaces the §5 payload rather than
querying Jenkins.
## 8. Testing strategy (mocked; for the implementing package)
Config-layer tests (no network at all):
- Exact-match hit: repo-wide and branch-pinned entries.
- Precedence: branch-pinned beats repo-wide.
- Multibranch encoding: `feature/x` → `<job>/feature%2Fx`; PR → `<job>/PR-7`.
- `single` type with non-pinned branch ⇒ no-mapping.
- Fork PR resolves through base repo; unmapped base ⇒ no-mapping.
- Unknown repo/branch ⇒ §5 payload, and **no Jenkins client call**
(`mock_api.assert_not_called()`).
- Malformed config / duplicate keys / unknown type ⇒ load fails closed with
entry-naming error.
- No-secret check: mapping load/error paths never touch or print credentials.
Integration with mocked Jenkins API (per #72 §9): resolved path is used
verbatim in the GET URL; no write verbs anywhere.
## 9. Standalone-worthiness and readiness
#77 was split from #72 on the condition it stays "standalone only if mapping
is nontrivial." The precedence rules, fork/PR semantics, three job types, and
fail-closed config loading above are the nontrivial part; this document is the
justification.
Ready to implement in `jenkins-mcp` when #72's readiness checklist clears
(ADR-0001 owner decision #1; profile schema per #76 or hand-rolled
`jenkins-readonly`). Nothing here unlocks build triggers, deploys, or
parameterized launches.
docs/architecture/jenkins-readonly-build-status-design.md
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# Jenkins Read-Only Build Status Tools — Design Notes
- **Status:** Design (implementation-ready notes; **no implementation in this repo**)
- **Issue:** #72 (parent umbrella: #75; boundary decision: ADR-0001, #71)
- **Related:** #77 (repo/branch/PR → job mapping, designed separately)
- **Date:** 2026-07-02
## 1. Purpose and scope
Define the minimum **read-only** Jenkins MCP tool set that lets an LLM answer:
*"Did the latest build for this project/branch succeed or fail?"* — plus enough
detail (build URL, number, timing, result) to report or investigate.
Phase 1 is **strictly read-only**, per ADR-0001
([`adr-0001-mcp-control-plane-boundaries.md`](adr-0001-mcp-control-plane-boundaries.md)):
- **Excluded: build triggers.**
- **Excluded: deploy triggers.**
- **Excluded: parameterized job launches.**
- Excluded: job creation/deletion/config changes, queue manipulation, node
management — any Jenkins mutation whatsoever.
## 2. Boundary placement
These tools belong to the **`jenkins-mcp`** package/server of the MCP Control
Plane — **never** inside `gitea-mcp` (`mcp_server.py` in this repo).
Consequences (from `tool-boundaries.md`, `credential-isolation.md`, ADR-0001):
- `jenkins-mcp` runs as its own server process with its own `.env`.
- **Jenkins credentials never enter the Gitea MCP runtime**, and Gitea
credentials never enter `jenkins-mcp`.
- This document lands in this repo only because the repo currently hosts the
Control Plane's architecture docs; the code ships elsewhere (owner decision
#1 of ADR-0001).
## 3. Minimum read-only tool set
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `jenkins_whoami` | Verify authenticated Jenkins identity + active profile (mirror of `gitea_whoami`; fail-closed identity proof before anything else) |
| `jenkins_list_jobs` | List visible jobs (supports folder paths), with pagination bounds |
| `jenkins_latest_build` | The primary question: latest build of a job (or job+branch for multibranch) → status summary |
| `jenkins_build_status` | Status of a specific build number (job, number) |
| `jenkins_get_build` | Full safe detail of a build (fields in §4) |
| `jenkins_console_tail` | Bounded, redacted tail of a build's console log (§6) — optional, approval-gated addition |
All tools are `GET`-only against the Jenkins JSON API (`/api/json`,
`.../lastBuild/api/json`, `.../consoleText`). No tool issues POST/PUT/DELETE.
## 4. Return payloads (safe fields)
`jenkins_latest_build` / `jenkins_build_status` / `jenkins_get_build` return:
| Field | Source | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `job` | request | Fully-qualified job path (folders joined with `/`) |
| `build_number` | `number` | int |
| `result` | `result` | `SUCCESS` / `FAILURE` / `UNSTABLE` / `ABORTED` / `NOT_BUILT`; `null` → `IN_PROGRESS` when `building=true` |
| `building` | `building` | bool |
| `url` | `url` | Build URL |
| `branch` | multibranch job name / SCM action | Best-effort; omitted when unknown |
| `timestamp` | `timestamp` | ISO-8601 UTC (converted from epoch ms) |
| `duration_seconds` | `duration` | 0/omitted while building |
| `commit_sha` | SCM build action | Best-effort; omitted when unknown |
Rules: no raw Jenkins payload passthrough (allowlist projection only); no
`Authorization` header, token, or crumb material in any output or error
(reuse the shared redaction approach of `safety-model.md` §3 / `gitea_audit`).
## 5. Failure behavior (fail closed, clear, safe)
| Condition | Behavior |
|---|---|
| Unknown job | Explicit `{"found": false, "job": "<path>", "error": "job not found"}` — never guess or fuzzy-match a job name (hard rule; see also #77) |
| Jenkins unreachable (DNS/timeout/conn refused) | Clear `"network error contacting Jenkins: <redacted reason>"`; no retry storm — mirror `gitea_auth.api_request` timeout + failure conversion |
| 502/503/504 | Explicit "Jenkins upstream unavailable" |
| 401/403 | "Jenkins auth failed / insufficient permissions" — **without** echoing credentials or the request's auth material |
| Malformed JSON | "malformed JSON response from Jenkins" (no raw-body dump) |
| Missing profile/creds | Fail closed before any network call (§7) |
## 6. Console tail safety (`jenkins_console_tail`)
Console logs are the highest-risk surface (secrets, tokens, internal hosts
routinely leak into build logs). If included at all (owner may defer it):
- **Bounded:** hard server-side cap (default: last 200 lines AND ≤ 64 KiB,
whichever is smaller; caller may request less, never more).
- **Redacted:** pass through the shared secret redactor (token/`Basic`/`Bearer`/
password/key-value patterns) before returning; redaction failure ⇒ return an
error, never the raw text.
- **Default off:** summary fields (`result`, failing stage if cheaply available)
are preferred; the tail requires an explicit `allowed_operations` entry
(`jenkins.console.read`) distinct from plain `jenkins.build.read`.
## 7. Credentials and profile requirements
Follows the per-service profile model (`gitea-execution-profiles.md`, extended
by #76):
- Env/config: `JENKINS_URL`, `JENKINS_USER`, `JENKINS_TOKEN_SOURCE_NAME`
(name-of-secret only — value resolved at runtime, never logged/committed).
- Profile: e.g. `jenkins-readonly` with namespaced
`allowed_operations: ["jenkins.read", "jenkins.build.read"]`
(+ `jenkins.console.read` only if the tail tool is approved);
`forbidden_operations: ["jenkins.build.trigger", "jenkins.deploy", "jenkins.job.configure"]`
as belt-and-braces even though no mutating tool exists.
- Missing URL/user/token/profile ⇒ **fail closed** with a clear message.
- Since every tool is read-only, no confirmation gates are needed — but
identity (`jenkins_whoami`) must still work so workflows can prove which
Jenkins account they act as.
## 8. Job addressing and mapping
Tools accept an explicit fully-qualified job path (folder-aware:
`folder/subfolder/job`). How a *repo/branch/PR* resolves to that job path is
**out of scope here** and designed in **#77**, with these fixed constraints:
- No silent guessing of job names — unmapped input returns an explicit
"no mapping" result.
- Multibranch pipelines address a branch job as `<job>/<branch>` with proper
URL-encoding of branch names (e.g. `feature%2Fx`).
## 9. Testing strategy (for the implementing package)
Mocked-Jenkins unit tests only (no live Jenkins in unit CI), mirroring this
repo's conventions (`docs/developer-testing-guidelines.md`):
- Patch the HTTP client; assert method is always `GET` and URL shape is correct
(folders, multibranch encoding).
- Success projections: field allowlist exactly as §4; unknown fields dropped.
- `result=null + building=true` ⇒ `IN_PROGRESS`.
- Unknown job ⇒ found:false, no fuzzy match, no API retry.
- Timeout/DNS/5xx/malformed-JSON ⇒ safe errors, no secret/credential leakage
(explicit no-token-in-error assertions).
- Console tail: cap enforcement (lines and bytes), redaction applied, redaction
failure ⇒ error not raw text, gated behind `jenkins.console.read`.
- Profile gate: missing/insufficient profile ⇒ no network call
(`mock_api.assert_not_called()` pattern).
## 10. Implementation-readiness checklist
Ready to implement in `jenkins-mcp` once:
1. ADR-0001 owner decision #1 (where `jenkins-mcp` lives) is made.
2. #76 profile schema exists (or a minimal `jenkins-readonly` profile is
hand-rolled to the same rules).
3. #77 mapping design is accepted (or tools ship path-addressed only, mapping
deferred).
Explicitly **not** unlocked by this document: build triggers, deploys,
parameterized launches, any Jenkins code in `mcp_server.py`.
docs/developer-testing-guidelines.md
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# Developer Testing Guidelines
How to write and run tests for Gitea-Tools. This guide reflects the current
repository behavior and the safety model documented in
[`safety-model.md`](safety-model.md),
[`credential-isolation.md`](credential-isolation.md), and
[`gitea-execution-profiles.md`](gitea-execution-profiles.md).
Core principle: **tests never make real network calls and never touch real
credentials.** Every test mocks the HTTP client and the keychain/auth lookup.
---
## 1. Standard test commands
The test suite needs the project virtualenv (it provides the MCP SDK):
```bash
# From the repository root
source venv/bin/activate
python3 -m pytest tests/ -q
```
Or invoke the venv interpreter directly without activating:
```bash
./venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/ -q
```
Use `-q` for a compact summary and `-v` to see individual test names.
### Run the full suite
```bash
./venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/ -q
```
### Run targeted tests
```bash
# One file
./venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_mcp_server.py -q
# One class
./venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_merge_pr.py::TestMergeDisabled -q
# One test, by node id
./venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/test_review_pr.py::TestAPIPayload::test_payload_fields_and_workflow -q
# By keyword expression
./venv/bin/python -m pytest tests/ -q -k "merge and fails_closed"
```
---
## 2. Syntax and formatting checks
These are fast and belong in any pre-PR loop:
```bash
# Byte-compile the main modules (catches syntax errors)
python3 -m py_compile mcp_server.py
python3 -m py_compile manage_labels.py
# Lint shell scripts without executing them
bash -n scripts/clear-provenance
# Detect stray conflict markers and whitespace errors in the diff
git diff --check
```
Run `git diff --check` before every commit; it flags leftover merge-conflict
markers and trailing-whitespace/whitespace-error lines.
---
## 3. How to add an MCP tool test
MCP tools live in `mcp_server.py` and are exercised in
`tests/test_mcp_server.py`. Tests call the underlying tool function directly
with the network layer and auth mocked. The established pattern:
```python
from unittest.mock import patch, MagicMock
FAKE_AUTH = "Basic ZmFrZTpmYWtl" # not a real credential
class TestCreateIssue(unittest.TestCase):
@patch("mcp_server.api_request")
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
def test_creates_issue(self, _auth, mock_api):
mock_api.return_value = {"number": 1, "html_url": "https://gitea.example.com/issues/1"}
result = mcp_server.gitea_create_issue(title="Add tests", remote="prgs")
# Assert on the request the tool would have made
mock_api.assert_called_once()
method, url = mock_api.call_args[0][0], mock_api.call_args[0][1]
self.assertEqual(method, "POST")
self.assertIn("/issues", url)
```
Checklist when adding a tool test:
* Patch `mcp_server.api_request` — never hit the network.
* Patch `mcp_server.get_auth_header` to return a fake header — never read the
keychain.
* Assert on the **method, URL, and payload** the tool builds, and on the shape
of the returned payload.
* Cover both `dadeschools` and `prgs` remotes when the tool takes `remote`, and
confirm the correct host/org/repo are used.
* Cover the error path (e.g. `api_request` raising) and confirm the tool
surfaces a clear message without leaking secrets.
---
## 4. How to mock API requests safely
* **Always patch `mcp_server.api_request`** (or `gitea_auth.api_request` for the
CLI/auth-level tests). No test should open a socket.
* **Always patch the auth lookup** (`get_auth_header` / `get_credentials`) and
return an obviously fake value. Do not put a real token or password in a test,
a fixture, or an environment file.
* Prefer asserting on `mock_api.call_args` (method/URL/payload) over asserting on
a real response body.
* For keychain behavior specifically, see `tests/test_credentials.py`, which
mocks the `git credential fill` subprocess (`Popen`) and the environment.
---
## 5. How to test profile / allowed-operation failures
The execution-profile model (see
[`gitea-execution-profiles.md`](gitea-execution-profiles.md)) enforces that a
tool may only perform operations in its profile's `allowed_operations`, and that
`forbidden_operations` always override `allowed_operations`. Mutating tools must
**fail closed** when the active profile does not permit the operation.
When adding or changing a gated tool, add tests that:
* Configure a profile whose `allowed_operations` does **not** include the
requested operation, and assert the tool refuses **without** calling
`api_request` (assert `mock_api.assert_not_called()`).
* Configure a profile where the operation is in **both** allowed and forbidden,
and assert forbidden wins (still refused).
* Confirm the refusal message names the missing operation and does not include
any secret material.
* Confirm the happy path (operation allowed) still reaches `api_request`.
The guiding assertion is: **no mutation path may reach `api_request` unless the
profile/allowed-operation check passed first.**
---
## 6. How to test self-review / self-merge gates
Author-cannot-review and author-cannot-merge are hard safety gates. The merge
path is gated (`gitea_merge_pr`), the legacy review wrapper fails closed on
`merge=True`, and `gitea_submit_pr_review` never merges. Existing coverage lives
in `tests/test_merge_pr.py` and `tests/test_review_pr.py`.
Patterns to follow (see those files for concrete examples):
* **Self-merge blocked:** authenticated user == PR author → the tool returns a
refusal and **never calls the merge endpoint** (`mock_api.assert_not_called()`
or assert no `POST .../merge`).
* **Fail-closed inputs:** missing confirmation string, or an unexpected
`expected_head_sha`/changed-file set → refuse before any API call.
* **Legacy wrapper:** `merge=True` on the review wrapper fails closed and points
to the gated workflow, with no API call
(`test_merge_flag_fails_closed_without_api_call`).
* **Self-approval blocked:** authenticated user == PR author → `approve` /
`request_changes` refused.
Every new gate should have a test proving the mutating endpoint is **not**
reached when the gate should block.
---
## 7. No-secret / no-token regression expectations
Secrets must never appear in logs, tool return values, audit records, or test
output (see [`safety-model.md`](safety-model.md) §3). The audit module
(`gitea_audit.py`) redacts secret-like keys and value prefixes; see
`tests/test_audit.py`.
Expectations for new tests:
* Assert that token/authorization/password fields are replaced with
`gitea_audit.REDACTED` in any structured output or audit record
(`test_redacts_secret_keys`, `test_redacts_nested_and_lists`).
* Assert that credential-looking substrings in free-text (error messages,
reasons) are redacted (`test_redacts_credential_value_prefixes`,
`test_metadata_and_reason_redacted`).
* Never commit a real token/password, even in a fixture. Use obviously fake
values (e.g. `FAKE_AUTH` above).
* When a tool returns identity/profile metadata, assert it contains the
non-secret fields (username, profile name) and **not** the token.
There is no third-party secret scanner wired into this repo today; secret safety
is enforced by `gitea_audit.redact` plus the regression tests above. A quick
manual sweep before a PR:
```bash
# Look for accidentally committed credentials in the diff
git diff --cached | grep -nEi "authorization: (basic|bearer)|password|token=[A-Za-z0-9]" || echo "clean"
```
---
## 8. Unit tests vs. future Docker integration tests
* **Unit tests (today, default):** fast, fully mocked, no network, no keychain.
This is where the vast majority of coverage lives and where new tests should
go. They must stay fast and must not require credentials.
* **Docker/local-Gitea integration tests (planned, see #66):** opt-in and
skipped by default, gated behind an explicit environment variable and run
against a pinned, disposable Gitea container. They validate real API behavior
(pagination, permissions, label/PR-review endpoints, error payloads) that
mocks cannot prove. They must not require production credentials and must not
leak tokens.
Rule of thumb: prove **logic and request-shaping** with unit tests; reserve
integration tests for **real-server compatibility**. Do not convert unit tests
into network tests.
---
## 9. Read-only vs. mutating tool expectations
* **Read-only tools** (e.g. `gitea_whoami`, `gitea_view_*`, `gitea_list_*`,
`gitea_get_profile`): test that they never issue a mutating HTTP method and
never require a mutation gate. Assert the request method is `GET`.
* **Mutating tools** (create/edit/close/label, review, merge, mirror): test that
they (a) pass the profile/allowed-operation gate, (b) honor confirmation and
self-action gates, (c) emit an audit record with the authenticated identity
and outcome, and (d) fail closed — no `api_request` call — when any gate fails.
Keep this split explicit in test names and assertions so a reviewer can see, per
tool, which category it belongs to and which gates it must respect.
docs/llm-agent-sha.md
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# LLM-Agent-SHA — Opaque Agent Attribution (Phase 0)
Convention for attributing work to a specific LLM session/workstream across
issues, branches, PRs, and review handoffs, without exposing a human or model
identity. Approved by the owner decision on issue #86
(`#issuecomment-1354`); this document implements **Phase 0 only**.
## The one rule that matters
`LLM-Agent-SHA` is **informational attribution metadata only**. It must never
be used for authentication, authorization, review eligibility, merge
eligibility, profile permissions, or any other security decision.
The security gates remain, unchanged:
- the **authenticated Gitea user** (self-review/self-merge protection),
- the **active MCP profile** and its `allowed_operations`
(see [`gitea-execution-profiles.md`](gitea-execution-profiles.md)),
- the fail-closed eligibility checks in `gitea_check_pr_eligibility`.
Two sessions with different `LLM-Agent-SHA` values that authenticate as the
same Gitea user are **the same actor** for review/merge safety. A different
SHA never unlocks self-review or self-merge. `tests/test_llm_agent_sha.py`
proves the eligibility logic never consults the SHA.
## Format
```text
LLM-Agent-SHA: llm-<12 lowercase hex chars>
```
Validation regex:
```text
^llm-[0-9a-f]{12}$
```
Examples: `llm-8f3a9c2d6b41`, `llm-41d0e7aa9f2c`, `llm-b7c93d441a08`.
### Generation
Generate 48 random bits, e.g. `python3 -c "import secrets; print('llm-' +
secrets.token_hex(6))"`, or hash a non-secret session UUID. An
operator-provided opaque ID is also fine.
Do **not** derive the value from any of:
- a Gitea token or other secret,
- an email address or username,
- a machine hostname or private filesystem path,
- a model or provider name,
- conversation contents.
The SHA must contain no model name, provider name, human name, email,
hostname, token, private path, or conversation-derived content. It is safe to
include in PR bodies, issue comments, and audit logs — and only there.
## Lifetime
Canonical lifetime is **per PR/workstream**: pick one SHA when starting an
issue and keep it through the branch, PR, and handoff for that workstream. A
per-session SHA is acceptable when the session maps cleanly to one
workstream. Do not reuse a SHA across unrelated workstreams.
## Placement
Phase 0 uses **visible markdown metadata blocks** (not hidden HTML
comments). Include the block in PR bodies and review handoffs; keep it out of
ordinary comments unless attribution is genuinely useful there.
**Never put the SHA in branch or worktree names.** Branches stay
issue-linked and human-readable (`docs/issue-86-llm-agent-sha-phase0`), per
the branch standard.
### Handoff metadata block (implementer → PR body / handoff report)
```markdown
LLM Handoff Metadata:
- LLM-Agent-SHA: llm-8f3a9c2d6b41
- LLM-Role: implementer
- Authenticated-Gitea-User: jcwalker3
- MCP-Profile: gitea-default
- Branch: docs/example-branch
- Worktree: branches/docs-example-branch
- Self-review allowed: no
```
### Review metadata block (reviewer → review comment)
```markdown
Review Metadata:
- LLM-Agent-SHA: llm-41d0e7aa9f2c
- LLM-Role: reviewer
- Authenticated-Gitea-User: sysadmin
- MCP-Profile: prgs-reviewer
- Eligibility: passed
```
## Same SHA vs same user vs same profile
Reviewers and operators must keep three distinct identities straight:
| Comparison | Meaning | Effect on eligibility |
|---|---|---|
| same `LLM-Agent-SHA` | same LLM session/workstream wrote both artifacts | **none — attribution only** |
| same authenticated Gitea user | same Gitea actor | **blocks** self-review / self-merge, regardless of SHA |
| same MCP profile | same capability set | governs `allowed_operations` (what actions are permitted at all) |
Concretely: an implementer session (`llm-8f3a…`, user `jcwalker3`) and a
would-be reviewer session (`llm-41d0…`, also user `jcwalker3`) have different
SHAs but the **same Gitea user** — the reviewer session is still the PR
author to Gitea and must not review, approve, or merge. Review handoffs
require a genuinely different authenticated user (e.g. `sysadmin` /
`prgs-reviewer`).
## Phase 0 scope (and what is deferred)
Phase 0 is documentation, handoff/review templates, and negative tests only.
Deferred to later owner-approved phases; none of this exists yet:
- launcher-enforced SHA generation,
- `LLM_AGENT_SHA` / `LLM_AGENT_ROLE` environment injection,
- `gitea_whoami` returning SHA/role,
- automatic PR body injection by MCP tools,
- audit schema changes requiring the SHA,
- release/orchestrator lineage tracking.
MCP tools neither read nor emit the SHA. Setting an `LLM_AGENT_SHA`
environment variable has no effect on any tool; the negative tests assert
eligibility results are byte-identical with and without it.
## Related documents
- [`llm-workflow-runbooks.md`](llm-workflow-runbooks.md) — the runbooks whose
handoffs carry these blocks
- [`gitea-execution-profiles.md`](gitea-execution-profiles.md) — profiles and
`allowed_operations` (the real permission gate)
- [`safety-model.md`](safety-model.md) — audit, redaction, confirmation gates
docs/llm-workflow-runbooks.md
+20 -2
View File
@@ -45,6 +45,18 @@ Use any eligible reviewer profile to review PR #N.
Use any eligible merger profile to merge PR #N if checks pass. Use any eligible merger profile to merge PR #N if checks pass.
``` ```
### Attribution: `LLM-Agent-SHA` (metadata only)
Sessions may attribute their work with an opaque `LLM-Agent-SHA`
(`llm-<12 lowercase hex>`, e.g. `llm-8f3a9c2d6b41`) in PR-body and
review-handoff metadata blocks — see
[`llm-agent-sha.md`](llm-agent-sha.md) for the full convention. It is
**attribution only**: eligibility is decided solely by the authenticated
Gitea user and the profile's allowed operations. Two sessions with different
SHAs under the same Gitea user are the same actor — a different SHA never
permits self-review or self-merge. Keep the SHA out of branch and worktree
names.
## Prerequisites: canonical config + thin launchers ## Prerequisites: canonical config + thin launchers
Runtime profiles live in **one canonical JSON file**, referenced by every LLM Runtime profiles live in **one canonical JSON file**, referenced by every LLM
@@ -274,7 +286,8 @@ touching anything.
`fix/...` / `docs/...`); `cd` into that worktree; implement narrowly; add or `fix/...` / `docs/...`); `cd` into that worktree; implement narrowly; add or
update tests if behavior changes; run the full suite; commit with an update tests if behavior changes; run the full suite; commit with an
issue-linked message; open a PR to `master`. **Do not** review or merge your issue-linked message; open a PR to `master`. **Do not** review or merge your
own PR. own PR. Include an `LLM Handoff Metadata` block (with `LLM-Agent-SHA`) in
the PR body — see [`llm-agent-sha.md`](llm-agent-sha.md).
- **Prompt:** `Use an author profile to implement issue #N and open a PR to - **Prompt:** `Use an author profile to implement issue #N and open a PR to
master. Do not self-review or self-merge.` master. Do not self-review or self-merge.`
@@ -285,7 +298,11 @@ touching anything.
- **Steps:** confirm identity + eligibility (menu eligibility check or - **Steps:** confirm identity + eligibility (menu eligibility check or
`gitea_check_pr_eligibility`); read the diff; confirm scope matches the linked `gitea_check_pr_eligibility`); read the diff; confirm scope matches the linked
issue; post the review (`comment` / `request_changes` / `approve`) via the issue; post the review (`comment` / `request_changes` / `approve`) via the
gated review tool. Pin the reviewed head SHA where supported. gated review tool. Pin the reviewed head SHA where supported. Include a
`Review Metadata` block (with your own `LLM-Agent-SHA`) in the review —
and remember: a different `LLM-Agent-SHA` does **not** make you a different
actor; only a different authenticated Gitea user does
([`llm-agent-sha.md`](llm-agent-sha.md)).
- **Prompt:** `Use any eligible reviewer profile to review PR #N. Approve only - **Prompt:** `Use any eligible reviewer profile to review PR #N. Approve only
if scope matches issue #M and checks pass; otherwise request changes.` if scope matches issue #M and checks pass; otherwise request changes.`
@@ -391,6 +408,7 @@ scripts/release-tag v0.4.0 --notes-file /tmp/release-notes.md --push
- [`../skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md`](../skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md) — portable cross-project LLM workflow skill. - [`../skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md`](../skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md) — portable cross-project LLM workflow skill.
- [`gitea-execution-profiles.md`](gitea-execution-profiles.md) — the profile model. - [`gitea-execution-profiles.md`](gitea-execution-profiles.md) — the profile model.
- [`llm-agent-sha.md`](llm-agent-sha.md) — opaque agent attribution metadata (never an eligibility input).
- [`safety-model.md`](safety-model.md) — trust boundaries and audit logging. - [`safety-model.md`](safety-model.md) — trust boundaries and audit logging.
- [`tool-boundaries.md`](tool-boundaries.md) — per-tool allowed operations. - [`tool-boundaries.md`](tool-boundaries.md) — per-tool allowed operations.
- [`credential-isolation.md`](credential-isolation.md) — credential handling. - [`credential-isolation.md`](credential-isolation.md) — credential handling.
gitea_auth.py
+120 -7
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ import datetime
import subprocess import subprocess
import urllib.request import urllib.request
import urllib.error import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
from email.utils import parsedate_to_datetime from email.utils import parsedate_to_datetime
from dotenv import dotenv_values, load_dotenv from dotenv import dotenv_values, load_dotenv
@@ -188,6 +189,39 @@ DEFAULT_MAX_RETRIES = _env_int("GITEA_MAX_RETRIES", 3)
DEFAULT_BASE_DELAY = _env_float("GITEA_RETRY_BASE_DELAY", 1.0) # seconds DEFAULT_BASE_DELAY = _env_float("GITEA_RETRY_BASE_DELAY", 1.0) # seconds
DEFAULT_MAX_DELAY = _env_float("GITEA_RETRY_MAX_DELAY", 60.0) # seconds DEFAULT_MAX_DELAY = _env_float("GITEA_RETRY_MAX_DELAY", 60.0) # seconds
# Per-request socket timeout (seconds). Overridable via environment.
DEFAULT_HTTP_TIMEOUT = _env_float("GITEA_HTTP_TIMEOUT", 30.0)
def _redact(text):
"""Best-effort strip of credential-like substrings from error text.
Reuses the audit module's redactor so error messages never surface tokens,
Basic/Bearer headers, or password-like values. Falls back to the plain
string if the audit helper is unavailable.
"""
try:
from gitea_audit import _redact_str
return _redact_str(str(text))
except Exception:
return str(text)
def _add_query(url, **params):
"""Return *url* with the given query parameters added or overridden.
Preserves any existing query string on *url* (e.g. ``?state=open``) so
pagination params can be layered on top of an already-filtered endpoint.
"""
parts = urllib.parse.urlsplit(url)
query = dict(urllib.parse.parse_qsl(parts.query, keep_blank_values=True))
for key, value in params.items():
query[str(key)] = str(value)
new_query = urllib.parse.urlencode(query)
return urllib.parse.urlunsplit(
(parts.scheme, parts.netloc, parts.path, new_query, parts.fragment)
)
def parse_retry_after(value, now=None): def parse_retry_after(value, now=None):
"""Parse a ``Retry-After`` header into a non-negative delay in seconds. """Parse a ``Retry-After`` header into a non-negative delay in seconds.
@@ -239,16 +273,31 @@ def backoff_delay(attempt, base=DEFAULT_BASE_DELAY, cap=DEFAULT_MAX_DELAY, rand=
def api_request(method, url, auth_header, payload=None, *, def api_request(method, url, auth_header, payload=None, *,
max_retries=None, base_delay=None, max_delay=None, max_retries=None, base_delay=None, max_delay=None,
timeout=None,
sleep_func=time.sleep, rand_func=random.random, sleep_func=time.sleep, rand_func=random.random,
now_func=time.time): now_func=time.time):
"""Make an authenticated JSON request to the Gitea API. """Make an authenticated JSON request to the Gitea API.
Returns parsed JSON on success, raises ``RuntimeError`` on HTTP errors. Returns parsed JSON on success (or ``None`` for an empty body), and raises
``RuntimeError`` on failure.
On HTTP 429 the request is retried up to *max_retries* times: honoring a On HTTP 429 the request is retried up to *max_retries* times: honoring a
valid ``Retry-After`` header (seconds or HTTP-date) when present, otherwise valid ``Retry-After`` header (seconds or HTTP-date) when present, otherwise
using capped jittered exponential backoff. Non-429 errors and successful using capped jittered exponential backoff. Successful responses are
responses are unchanged. The ``*_func`` parameters are injection points for unchanged.
All failures are converted to a ``RuntimeError`` with a clear, secret
-redacted message (no raw stack traces or credential material):
- Non-429 HTTP errors surface the status code and a redacted response body.
502/503/504 upstream errors get an explicit "Gitea upstream unavailable"
message.
- Timeouts and network/DNS failures (``URLError`` / ``TimeoutError``) surface
a generic "network error contacting Gitea" message.
- A malformed (non-JSON) success body surfaces a "malformed JSON response"
message rather than a raw decode error.
The ``*_func`` parameters and ``timeout`` are injection points for
deterministic testing. deterministic testing.
""" """
if max_retries is None: if max_retries is None:
@@ -257,6 +306,8 @@ def api_request(method, url, auth_header, payload=None, *,
base_delay = DEFAULT_BASE_DELAY base_delay = DEFAULT_BASE_DELAY
if max_delay is None: if max_delay is None:
max_delay = DEFAULT_MAX_DELAY max_delay = DEFAULT_MAX_DELAY
if timeout is None:
timeout = DEFAULT_HTTP_TIMEOUT
data = json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8") if payload is not None else None data = json.dumps(payload).encode("utf-8") if payload is not None else None
req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, method=method) req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, method=method)
@@ -267,9 +318,8 @@ def api_request(method, url, auth_header, payload=None, *,
attempt = 0 attempt = 0
while True: while True:
try: try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req) as resp: with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp:
body = resp.read().decode("utf-8") body = resp.read().decode("utf-8")
return json.loads(body) if body else None
except urllib.error.HTTPError as e: except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
if e.code == 429 and attempt < max_retries: if e.code == 429 and attempt < max_retries:
header = e.headers.get("Retry-After") if e.headers else None header = e.headers.get("Retry-After") if e.headers else None
@@ -279,8 +329,71 @@ def api_request(method, url, auth_header, payload=None, *,
attempt += 1 attempt += 1
sleep_func(delay) sleep_func(delay)
continue continue
error_body = e.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace") try:
raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {e.code}: {error_body}") from e error_body = e.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
except Exception:
error_body = ""
detail = _redact(error_body).strip()
if e.code in (502, 503, 504):
msg = f"HTTP {e.code}: Gitea upstream unavailable"
raise RuntimeError(f"{msg}: {detail}" if detail else msg) from e
raise RuntimeError(f"HTTP {e.code}: {detail}") from e
except (urllib.error.URLError, TimeoutError) as e:
reason = getattr(e, "reason", e)
raise RuntimeError(
f"network error contacting Gitea: {_redact(reason)}"
) from e
if not body:
return None
try:
return json.loads(body)
except ValueError as e:
raise RuntimeError("malformed JSON response from Gitea") from e
def api_get_all(url, auth_header, *, limit=None, page_size=50, max_pages=100,
**kwargs):
"""Fetch a paginated Gitea collection, following page-based pagination.
Issues successive ``GET`` requests with ``page`` and ``limit`` (per-page)
query parameters, accumulating list items until one of:
- a page returns fewer items than the page size (the last page),
- an empty or ``None`` page is returned (also treated as the end — this is
how missing/malformed pagination metadata degrades safely),
- *limit* total items have been collected, or
- *max_pages* pages have been fetched (a safety cap against runaway loops).
Pagination relies on the *length of each returned page*, not on
``X-Total-Count`` / ``Link`` headers, so it tolerates missing or malformed
pagination metadata. Returns a list (possibly empty). Raises ``RuntimeError``
(via :func:`api_request`) on network/HTTP/malformed failures, or if a page is
not a JSON list. Extra ``kwargs`` pass through to :func:`api_request`.
"""
if page_size < 1:
page_size = 1
if page_size > 50:
page_size = 50 # Gitea caps per-page results at 50
if limit is not None and limit < page_size:
page_size = max(1, limit)
results = []
for page in range(1, max_pages + 1):
page_url = _add_query(url, page=page, limit=page_size)
data = api_request("GET", page_url, auth_header, **kwargs)
if data is None:
break
if not isinstance(data, list):
raise RuntimeError(
f"expected a list page from Gitea, got {type(data).__name__}"
)
results.extend(data)
if limit is not None and len(results) >= limit:
return results[:limit]
if len(data) < page_size:
break
return results
def repo_api_url(host, org, repo): def repo_api_url(host, org, repo):
mcp_server.py
+6 -5
View File
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ from gitea_auth import ( # noqa: E402
get_credentials, get_credentials,
get_auth_header, get_auth_header,
api_request, api_request,
api_get_all,
repo_api_url, repo_api_url,
get_profile, get_profile,
) )
@@ -384,7 +385,7 @@ def gitea_list_prs(
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo) h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
auth = _auth(h) auth = _auth(h)
url = f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/pulls?state={state}" url = f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/pulls?state={state}"
prs = api_request("GET", url, auth) or [] prs = api_get_all(url, auth)
return [ return [
{ {
"number": pr["number"], "number": pr["number"],
@@ -1266,7 +1267,7 @@ def gitea_list_issues(
Args: Args:
state: Filter by state — 'open', 'closed', or 'all'. state: Filter by state — 'open', 'closed', or 'all'.
label: Filter by label name (e.g. 'important'). label: Filter by label name (e.g. 'important').
limit: Max number of issues to return (default: 50). limit: Max number of issues to return across all pages (default: 50).
remote: Known instance — 'dadeschools' or 'prgs'. remote: Known instance — 'dadeschools' or 'prgs'.
host: Override the Gitea host. host: Override the Gitea host.
org: Override the owner/organization. org: Override the owner/organization.
@@ -1277,11 +1278,11 @@ def gitea_list_issues(
""" """
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo) h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
auth = _auth(h) auth = _auth(h)
params = f"state={state}&limit={limit}&type=issues" params = f"state={state}&type=issues"
if label: if label:
params += f"&labels={label}" params += f"&labels={label}"
url = f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/issues?{params}" url = f"{repo_api_url(h, o, r)}/issues?{params}"
issues = api_request("GET", url, auth) issues = api_get_all(url, auth, limit=limit)
return [ return [
{ {
"number": i["number"], "number": i["number"],
@@ -1554,7 +1555,7 @@ def gitea_list_labels(
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo) h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
auth = _auth(h) auth = _auth(h)
base = repo_api_url(h, o, r) base = repo_api_url(h, o, r)
return api_request("GET", f"{base}/labels?limit=100", auth) return api_get_all(f"{base}/labels", auth)
@mcp.tool() @mcp.tool()
skills/llm-project-workflow/templates/review-pr.md
+10
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,8 @@ Task: review PR #<pr> for issue #<n>.
Rules (llm-project-workflow): Rules (llm-project-workflow):
- Review in a SEPARATE detached review worktree, never the author's folder. - Review in a SEPARATE detached review worktree, never the author's folder.
- You must NOT be the PR author. If the authenticated user == PR author, stop. - You must NOT be the PR author. If the authenticated user == PR author, stop.
A different LLM-Agent-SHA does NOT make you a different actor — only a
different authenticated Gitea user does (docs/llm-agent-sha.md).
- Do not merge if any check fails. - Do not merge if any check fails.
Steps: Steps:
@@ -21,6 +23,14 @@ Steps:
6. Run the test suite; note results. 6. Run the test suite; note results.
7. Post the review verdict: approve only if scope is clean and checks pass; 7. Post the review verdict: approve only if scope is clean and checks pass;
otherwise request changes with specifics. Never merge from this review step. otherwise request changes with specifics. Never merge from this review step.
Include a "Review Metadata" block (attribution only — docs/llm-agent-sha.md):
Review Metadata:
- LLM-Agent-SHA: llm-<12 lowercase hex, e.g. llm-41d0e7aa9f2c>
- LLM-Role: reviewer
- Authenticated-Gitea-User: <whoami result>
- MCP-Profile: <profile name>
- Eligibility: passed/failed
Handoff: reviewer identity, PR author, scope verdict, checks + results, decision. Handoff: reviewer identity, PR author, scope verdict, checks + results, decision.
``` ```
skills/llm-project-workflow/templates/start-issue.md
+11
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,17 @@ Steps:
6. Checks: run the test suite, compile/lint changed files, git diff --check, 6. Checks: run the test suite, compile/lint changed files, git diff --check,
and scan the diff for secrets. and scan the diff for secrets.
7. Commit (issue-linked message), push the branch, open a PR to master. 7. Commit (issue-linked message), push the branch, open a PR to master.
Include an "LLM Handoff Metadata" block in the PR body (attribution only;
never an eligibility input — docs/llm-agent-sha.md):
LLM Handoff Metadata:
- LLM-Agent-SHA: llm-<12 lowercase hex, e.g. llm-8f3a9c2d6b41>
- LLM-Role: implementer
- Authenticated-Gitea-User: <whoami result>
- MCP-Profile: <profile name>
- Branch: <branch>
- Worktree: <worktree path>
- Self-review allowed: no
8. Stop before review/merge — you are the author. 8. Stop before review/merge — you are the author.
Handoff: issue #, branch, worktree path, files changed, checks + results, PR URL. Handoff: issue #, branch, worktree path, files changed, checks + results, PR URL.
tests/test_api_reliability.py
+205
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,205 @@
"""Unit coverage for shared API pagination and failure handling (#67).
Covers gitea_auth.api_request failure conversion (timeouts, DNS/network,
502/503, malformed error payloads, malformed success JSON, no-secret leakage,
preserved success + 429 behavior) and gitea_auth.api_get_all pagination
(single/multi page, missing/malformed metadata, limit cap, max_pages, query
handling). Everything is mocked — no real network calls are made.
"""
import io
import unittest
import urllib.error
from unittest.mock import patch
import gitea_auth
import gitea_audit
FAKE_AUTH = "Basic ZmFrZTpmYWtl" # not a real credential
URL = "https://gitea.example.com/api/v1/repos/o/r/issues"
class FakeResp:
"""Minimal context-manager stand-in for a urlopen response."""
def __init__(self, body):
self._body = body.encode("utf-8") if isinstance(body, str) else body
def read(self):
return self._body
def __enter__(self):
return self
def __exit__(self, *exc):
return False
def http_error(code, body="", headers=None):
return urllib.error.HTTPError(
url=URL, code=code, msg="err",
hdrs=headers or {}, fp=io.BytesIO(body.encode("utf-8")),
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# api_request — success path preserved
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestApiRequestSuccess(unittest.TestCase):
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
def test_success_returns_parsed_json(self, mock_open):
mock_open.return_value = FakeResp('{"number": 1, "title": "ok"}')
self.assertEqual(
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH),
{"number": 1, "title": "ok"},
)
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
def test_empty_body_returns_none(self, mock_open):
mock_open.return_value = FakeResp("")
self.assertIsNone(gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH))
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
def test_429_then_success_still_retries(self, mock_open):
mock_open.side_effect = [http_error(429), FakeResp('{"ok": true}')]
calls = []
result = gitea_auth.api_request(
"GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH,
sleep_func=lambda d: calls.append(d), rand_func=lambda: 0.0,
)
self.assertEqual(result, {"ok": True})
self.assertEqual(len(calls), 1) # slept once between the two attempts
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# api_request — failure handling
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestApiRequestFailures(unittest.TestCase):
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
def test_timeout_converted_to_runtimeerror(self, mock_open):
mock_open.side_effect = TimeoutError("timed out")
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
self.assertIn("network error contacting Gitea", str(ctx.exception))
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
def test_dns_network_failure_converted(self, mock_open):
mock_open.side_effect = urllib.error.URLError("Name or service not known")
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
self.assertIn("network error contacting Gitea", str(ctx.exception))
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
def test_502_upstream_message(self, mock_open):
mock_open.side_effect = http_error(502, "bad gateway")
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
msg = str(ctx.exception)
self.assertIn("HTTP 502", msg)
self.assertIn("upstream unavailable", msg)
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
def test_503_upstream_message(self, mock_open):
mock_open.side_effect = http_error(503, "")
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
self.assertIn("HTTP 503", str(ctx.exception))
self.assertIn("upstream unavailable", str(ctx.exception))
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
def test_malformed_error_payload_does_not_crash(self, mock_open):
# Non-JSON garbage error body must still yield a clean RuntimeError.
mock_open.side_effect = http_error(500, "<html>garbage</html>")
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
self.assertIn("HTTP 500", str(ctx.exception))
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
def test_malformed_success_json_raises_clean_error(self, mock_open):
mock_open.return_value = FakeResp("not json{")
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
self.assertIn("malformed JSON response", str(ctx.exception))
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
def test_no_secret_leak_in_error_body(self, mock_open):
mock_open.side_effect = http_error(
400, "failed: token supersecret123 rejected")
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
msg = str(ctx.exception)
self.assertNotIn("supersecret123", msg)
self.assertIn(gitea_audit.REDACTED, msg)
@patch("gitea_auth.urllib.request.urlopen")
def test_auth_header_never_in_error(self, mock_open):
mock_open.side_effect = http_error(400, "bad request")
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
gitea_auth.api_request("GET", URL, FAKE_AUTH)
self.assertNotIn(FAKE_AUTH, str(ctx.exception))
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# api_get_all — pagination
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestApiGetAll(unittest.TestCase):
@patch("gitea_auth.api_request")
def test_single_page(self, mock_req):
mock_req.return_value = [{"id": 1}, {"id": 2}] # short page (< page_size)
result = gitea_auth.api_get_all(URL, FAKE_AUTH, page_size=50)
self.assertEqual(result, [{"id": 1}, {"id": 2}])
self.assertEqual(mock_req.call_count, 1)
@patch("gitea_auth.api_request")
def test_multi_page(self, mock_req):
mock_req.side_effect = [
[{"id": 1}, {"id": 2}], # full page
[{"id": 3}, {"id": 4}], # full page
[{"id": 5}], # short page -> stop
]
result = gitea_auth.api_get_all(URL, FAKE_AUTH, page_size=2)
self.assertEqual([r["id"] for r in result], [1, 2, 3, 4, 5])
self.assertEqual(mock_req.call_count, 3)
@patch("gitea_auth.api_request")
def test_missing_metadata_none_page_ends(self, mock_req):
mock_req.return_value = None # empty/malformed metadata -> treated as end
self.assertEqual(gitea_auth.api_get_all(URL, FAKE_AUTH), [])
self.assertEqual(mock_req.call_count, 1)
@patch("gitea_auth.api_request")
def test_malformed_metadata_non_list_raises(self, mock_req):
mock_req.return_value = {"message": "not a list"}
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as ctx:
gitea_auth.api_get_all(URL, FAKE_AUTH)
self.assertIn("expected a list page", str(ctx.exception))
@patch("gitea_auth.api_request")
def test_limit_caps_results(self, mock_req):
mock_req.side_effect = [[{"id": 1}, {"id": 2}], [{"id": 3}, {"id": 4}]]
result = gitea_auth.api_get_all(URL, FAKE_AUTH, page_size=2, limit=3)
self.assertEqual([r["id"] for r in result], [1, 2, 3])
@patch("gitea_auth.api_request")
def test_max_pages_safety_cap(self, mock_req):
mock_req.side_effect = [
[{"id": 1}, {"id": 2}], [{"id": 3}, {"id": 4}], [{"id": 5}, {"id": 6}],
]
result = gitea_auth.api_get_all(URL, FAKE_AUTH, page_size=2, max_pages=2)
self.assertEqual(len(result), 4)
self.assertEqual(mock_req.call_count, 2)
@patch("gitea_auth.api_request")
def test_query_params_appended_and_preserved(self, mock_req):
mock_req.return_value = [] # first (empty) page ends immediately
gitea_auth.api_get_all(URL + "?state=open", FAKE_AUTH, page_size=2)
called_url = mock_req.call_args[0][1]
self.assertIn("state=open", called_url)
self.assertIn("page=1", called_url)
self.assertIn("limit=2", called_url)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
tests/test_llm_agent_sha.py
+195
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
"""Negative tests for LLM-Agent-SHA attribution (#86, Phase 0).
``LLM-Agent-SHA`` (docs/llm-agent-sha.md) is attribution metadata ONLY. These
tests prove it can never bypass the review/merge safety gates:
1. Same Gitea user + different LLM-Agent-SHA still fails self-review/approval.
2. Same Gitea user + different LLM-Agent-SHA still fails self-merge.
3. The eligibility logic does not consult SHA metadata at all — results are
identical with no SHA, one SHA, or a different SHA in the environment, and
no gate accepts an agent-SHA input.
Phase 0 adds no SHA support to any MCP tool; the environment variables set
here (``LLM_AGENT_SHA`` / ``LLM_AGENT_ROLE``) simulate a future launcher and
must be ignored by every gate.
"""
import inspect
import os
import re
import sys
import unittest
from unittest.mock import patch
sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
from mcp_server import ( # noqa: E402
gitea_check_pr_eligibility,
gitea_merge_pr,
gitea_review_pr,
gitea_submit_pr_review,
)
FAKE_AUTH = "Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"
SHA_PATTERN = re.compile(r"^llm-[0-9a-f]{12}$")
# Two distinct, well-formed agent SHAs "belonging" to the same Gitea user.
SHA_IMPLEMENTER = "llm-8f3a9c2d6b41"
SHA_WOULD_BE_REVIEWER = "llm-41d0e7aa9f2c"
def _pr(author, state="open", sha="abc123", mergeable=True):
return {
"user": {"login": author},
"state": state,
"head": {"sha": sha},
"mergeable": mergeable,
}
class TestShaFormatConvention(unittest.TestCase):
"""The documented format: llm-<12 lowercase hex>, nothing identifying."""
def test_documented_examples_are_valid(self):
for value in (SHA_IMPLEMENTER, SHA_WOULD_BE_REVIEWER, "llm-b7c93d441a08"):
self.assertRegex(value, SHA_PATTERN)
def test_identifying_or_malformed_values_are_rejected(self):
for bad in (
"llm-8F3A9C2D6B41", # uppercase
"llm-8f3a9c2d6b4", # too short
"llm-8f3a9c2d6b411", # too long
"llm-opus4", # model name, not hex
"claude-8f3a9c2d6b41", # provider prefix
"jcwalker3", # username
"llm-user@example.com", # email
"8f3a9c2d6b41", # missing prefix
"",
):
self.assertNotRegex(bad, SHA_PATTERN)
class TestShaCannotBypassSelfReview(unittest.TestCase):
"""Scenario: user A (SHA 1) authored the PR; user A (SHA 2) tries to act."""
def _env(self, agent_sha, role):
# Reviewer-capable profile + a simulated launcher-injected agent SHA.
return {
"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
"GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve,merge",
"LLM_AGENT_SHA": agent_sha,
"LLM_AGENT_ROLE": role,
}
@patch("mcp_server.api_request")
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
def test_same_user_different_sha_cannot_approve(self, _auth, mock_api):
mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "jcwalker3"}, _pr("jcwalker3")]
env = self._env(SHA_WOULD_BE_REVIEWER, "reviewer")
with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
r = gitea_check_pr_eligibility(pr_number=9, action="approve", remote="prgs")
self.assertFalse(r["eligible"])
self.assertIn("authenticated user is PR author", r["reasons"])
@patch("mcp_server.api_request")
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
def test_same_user_different_sha_cannot_merge(self, _auth, mock_api):
mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "jcwalker3"}, _pr("jcwalker3")]
env = self._env(SHA_WOULD_BE_REVIEWER, "merger")
with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
r = gitea_check_pr_eligibility(pr_number=9, action="merge", remote="prgs")
self.assertFalse(r["eligible"])
self.assertIn("authenticated user is PR author", r["reasons"])
@patch("mcp_server.api_request")
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
def test_gated_merge_tool_refuses_self_merge_despite_sha(self, _auth, mock_api):
# Even the fully-confirmed gated merge path must refuse: correct
# confirmation string, mergeable PR, merge-capable profile — but the
# authenticated user is the PR author, whatever the agent SHA says.
mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "jcwalker3"}, _pr("jcwalker3")]
env = self._env(SHA_WOULD_BE_REVIEWER, "merger")
with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
r = gitea_merge_pr(
pr_number=9, confirmation="MERGE PR 9", remote="prgs")
self.assertFalse(r.get("performed"))
for call in mock_api.call_args_list:
method, url = call.args[0], call.args[1]
self.assertFalse(
method == "POST" and url.endswith("/merge"),
f"self-merge mutation reached the API: {method} {url}",
)
@patch("mcp_server.api_request")
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
def test_review_tool_refuses_self_approval_despite_sha(self, _auth, mock_api):
mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "jcwalker3"}, _pr("jcwalker3")]
env = self._env(SHA_WOULD_BE_REVIEWER, "reviewer")
with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
r = gitea_review_pr(
pr_number=9, event="APPROVE", body="self approve", merge=False,
remote="prgs")
self.assertFalse(r["success"])
self.assertIn("authenticated user is PR author", r["message"])
for call in mock_api.call_args_list:
method, url = call.args[0], call.args[1]
self.assertFalse(
method == "POST" and url.endswith("/reviews"),
f"self-review mutation reached the API: {method} {url}",
)
class TestEligibilityNeverConsultsSha(unittest.TestCase):
"""The gates have no SHA input: not via env, not via parameters."""
def _run_eligibility(self, extra_env):
env = {
"GITEA_PROFILE_NAME": "gitea-reviewer",
"GITEA_ALLOWED_OPERATIONS": "read,review,approve",
}
env.update(extra_env)
with patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH), \
patch("mcp_server.api_request") as mock_api:
mock_api.side_effect = [{"login": "reviewer-bot"}, _pr("author-bot")]
with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
return gitea_check_pr_eligibility(
pr_number=5, action="approve", remote="prgs")
def test_result_identical_with_without_and_across_shas(self):
baseline = self._run_eligibility({})
with_one = self._run_eligibility(
{"LLM_AGENT_SHA": SHA_IMPLEMENTER, "LLM_AGENT_ROLE": "implementer"})
with_other = self._run_eligibility(
{"LLM_AGENT_SHA": SHA_WOULD_BE_REVIEWER, "LLM_AGENT_ROLE": "reviewer"})
self.assertEqual(baseline, with_one)
self.assertEqual(baseline, with_other)
self.assertTrue(baseline["eligible"]) # sanity: a real decision ran
def test_eligibility_result_carries_no_agent_sha(self):
r = self._run_eligibility(
{"LLM_AGENT_SHA": SHA_IMPLEMENTER, "LLM_AGENT_ROLE": "implementer"})
blob = repr(r)
self.assertNotIn(SHA_IMPLEMENTER, blob)
self.assertNotIn("LLM_AGENT", blob)
def test_gate_functions_accept_no_agent_sha_parameter(self):
for fn in (gitea_check_pr_eligibility, gitea_merge_pr,
gitea_review_pr, gitea_submit_pr_review):
for param in inspect.signature(fn).parameters:
lowered = param.lower()
self.assertNotIn("agent", lowered,
f"{fn.__name__} accepts agent param {param!r}")
self.assertNotIn("llm", lowered,
f"{fn.__name__} accepts llm param {param!r}")
def test_gate_sources_never_read_agent_sha(self):
# Phase 0 guarantee: no gate reads LLM_AGENT_* metadata at all.
for fn in (gitea_check_pr_eligibility, gitea_merge_pr,
gitea_review_pr, gitea_submit_pr_review):
src = inspect.getsource(fn)
self.assertNotIn("LLM_AGENT", src,
f"{fn.__name__} reads LLM_AGENT metadata")
self.assertNotIn("agent_sha", src,
f"{fn.__name__} consults an agent SHA")
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
tests/test_mcp_server.py
+6 -6
View File
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ class TestCloseIssue(unittest.TestCase):
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestListIssues(unittest.TestCase): class TestListIssues(unittest.TestCase):
@patch("mcp_server.api_request") @patch("mcp_server.api_get_all")
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH) @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
def test_returns_formatted_list(self, _auth, mock_api): def test_returns_formatted_list(self, _auth, mock_api):
mock_api.return_value = [ mock_api.return_value = [
@@ -124,20 +124,20 @@ class TestListIssues(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual(result[0]["assignee"], "alice") self.assertEqual(result[0]["assignee"], "alice")
self.assertEqual(result[1]["assignee"], "") self.assertEqual(result[1]["assignee"], "")
@patch("mcp_server.api_request") @patch("mcp_server.api_get_all")
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH) @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
def test_passes_label_filter(self, _auth, mock_api): def test_passes_label_filter(self, _auth, mock_api):
mock_api.return_value = [] mock_api.return_value = []
gitea_list_issues(label="important") gitea_list_issues(label="important")
url = mock_api.call_args[0][1] url = mock_api.call_args[0][0]
self.assertIn("labels=important", url) self.assertIn("labels=important", url)
@patch("mcp_server.api_request") @patch("mcp_server.api_get_all")
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH) @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
def test_passes_state_filter(self, _auth, mock_api): def test_passes_state_filter(self, _auth, mock_api):
mock_api.return_value = [] mock_api.return_value = []
gitea_list_issues(state="closed") gitea_list_issues(state="closed")
url = mock_api.call_args[0][1] url = mock_api.call_args[0][0]
self.assertIn("state=closed", url) self.assertIn("state=closed", url)
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ class TestMirrorRefs(unittest.TestCase):
# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestListPRs(unittest.TestCase): class TestListPRs(unittest.TestCase):
@patch("mcp_server.api_request") @patch("mcp_server.api_get_all")
@patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH) @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
def test_list_prs(self, _auth, mock_api): def test_list_prs(self, _auth, mock_api):
mock_api.return_value = [ mock_api.return_value = [