diff --git a/canonical_thread_handoff.py b/canonical_thread_handoff.py index aa0a85b..6d262c2 100644 --- a/canonical_thread_handoff.py +++ b/canonical_thread_handoff.py @@ -46,6 +46,17 @@ _FIELD_RE = re.compile( ) +def is_known_cth_type(value: str | None) -> bool: + """True when *value* is a declared member of the :data:`CTH_TYPES` contract. + + ``CTH_TYPES`` is the single authority for what a CTH type may be. The + heading a comment carries is free text, so a *read* path that turns a parsed + type into something durable — a serialized field, a routing decision — must + check membership here rather than trust the parse or keep a list of its own. + """ + return (value or "").strip() in CTH_TYPES + + def format_cth_body( *, cth_type: str, @@ -60,7 +71,7 @@ def format_cth_body( ) -> str: """Render a canonical CTH comment body.""" normalized_type = (cth_type or "").strip() - if normalized_type not in CTH_TYPES: + if not is_known_cth_type(normalized_type): raise ValueError( f"unknown CTH type '{cth_type}'; expected one of {sorted(CTH_TYPES)}" ) @@ -101,6 +112,12 @@ def parse_cth_comment(body: str) -> dict[str, Any] | None: fields[key] = match.group(2).strip() return { "cth_type": cth_type, + # The heading capture is unconstrained free text, so the parse states + # whether it satisfies the CTH_TYPES contract instead of leaving every + # reader to decide (or forget). Parsing stays total — an unknown type is + # still parsed and reported, never raised on — but a reader that turns + # the type into a durable value can now tell the two apart. + "cth_type_known": is_known_cth_type(cth_type), "fields": fields, "raw_body": text, } @@ -119,7 +136,7 @@ def assess_cth_comment(body: str) -> dict[str, Any]: } cth_type = parsed.get("cth_type") or "" - if cth_type not in CTH_TYPES: + if not is_known_cth_type(cth_type): reasons.append( f"unknown CTH type '{cth_type}'; expected one of {sorted(CTH_TYPES)}" ) diff --git a/docs/webui-local-dev.md b/docs/webui-local-dev.md index a1e2c9c..a41aa10 100644 --- a/docs/webui-local-dev.md +++ b/docs/webui-local-dev.md @@ -349,6 +349,108 @@ health, workflow/schema SHA-256 hashes, and stale-runtime warnings when the checkout is behind merged safety-gate changes. Restart guidance links to #420; no tokens or MCP restart actions are exposed. +## Workflow-event timeline (#637) + +`GET /api/v1/timeline` is a read-only, versioned aggregation of workflow +events from every available source into one normalised, filterable stream. It +is the model layer for the Phase 1 timeline console view (a later child issue +of #631); this issue ships the schema, adapters, and read API only. + +### Schema (versioned) + +`webui/timeline.py` declares `TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION` (currently `1`) and the +frozen `WorkflowEvent` record. Every response carries `schema_version` so a +consumer can branch on shape. One event: + +```json +{ + "source": "control_plane", + "event_type": "lease.renew", + "event_key": "cp:1421", + "timestamp": "2026-07-23T02:00:00Z", + "actor": null, + "role": null, + "issue_number": 637, + "pr_number": null, + "session_id": null, + "tool_name": null, + "decision": null, + "message": "lease renewed", + "correlation_id": "issue#637", + "evidence_refs": [], + "sensitive": true +} +``` + +`event_key` is stable and unique per source (`cp:`, +`cth:::`), so pagination and dedup are deterministic. + +### Sources and field authority + +| Source | Adapter | Authority | +|---|---|---| +| Control-plane `events` ⋈ `work_items` | `adapt_cp_events` | `event_type`, `message`, `timestamp`, issue/PR scope come from the CP database, read through a `mode=ro` URI (never creates the DB or runs migrations) | +| Gitea Canonical Thread Handoff comments | `adapt_cth_comments` | `actor`, `role` (next owner), `decision`, `evidence_refs`, `timestamp` come from the parsed CTH comment body (`canonical_thread_handoff`) | + +Handoff comments are thread-scoped: they are only read when the request filters +by a single `issue` or `pr`. Otherwise the handoff source reports `not run` +with a reason — it is never rendered as empty-and-healthy. Each source degrades +independently: an unavailable control-plane DB or a failed comment fetch is a +`sources[]` entry with `ok:false` and a `reason`, never a dropped timeline. + +### Query parameters + +`issue`, `pr`, `session` (conjunctive filters); `limit` (default 50, max 500) +and `offset` for pagination; `remote`, `org`, `repo` to override the default +registry-project scope. Events sort ascending by +`(timestamp, source_rank, event_key)`; missing timestamps sort last. + +### Filter authority, and refusing what cannot be answered + +A filter dimension is only meaningful for a source whose records carry it. +Each source declares its own support in `_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT` and reports it +per response as `supported_filters` / `unsupported_filters`: + +| Source | issue | pr | session | +|---|---|---|---| +| `control_plane` | yes | yes | **no** — the `events` table is `(event_id, work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at)` and records no session | +| `gitea_handoff` | yes | yes | yes — a CTH comment declares its own `Session:` field | + +`session_id` is read only from that declared CTH field. It is never inferred +from a work item, an actor, or message text, and a value that is +redaction-altering or bare-secret-shaped is dropped rather than emitted. + +When **no source that ran** can carry a requested dimension, the request is +refused rather than answered: the response is `422` with `ok:false` and a +structured `error` naming `unsupported_filters` and the per-source reason. A +`200` with zero events would tell an operator that no such activity exists, +which is a stronger — and false — claim than "this cannot be answered here". +A source that *can* answer the dimension and simply matched nothing still +returns `200` with `ok:true` and an empty page. + +### Redaction + +Every free-text field (event messages, decision/proof text, roles, actors) is +passed through the console redaction policy (`webui.console_redaction`, backed +by `gitea_audit.redact`) before it leaves the module, failing closed to the +placeholder. No unredacted tool arguments or secrets are ever emitted, and a +generation error never drops raw data to a caller or a log. + +Redaction also runs *before* any structured value is derived from free text. +`evidence_refs` are extracted from already-redacted proof/decision text, and a +commit reference is recognised only where the text declares one (`commit`, +`head`, `base`, `sha`, …). An undeclared 40-character hex run has the exact +shape of a Gitea access token, so it is never lifted out of prose into a +structured field. Every reference is then independently revalidated against an +allowed shape and a second redaction pass immediately before serialization; +anything unproven is dropped and the event is flagged `sensitive`. + +### Tests + +```bash +pytest tests/test_webui_timeline.py -q +``` + ## Tests ```bash diff --git a/tests/test_webui_timeline.py b/tests/test_webui_timeline.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..39c7ea5 --- /dev/null +++ b/tests/test_webui_timeline.py @@ -0,0 +1,1021 @@ +"""Tests for the workflow-event timeline model and read API (#637). + +Covers the acceptance criteria: versioned schema, adaptation of control-plane +events and Gitea handoff comments, filter by issue/PR/session, redaction of +secret-like payloads, and stable pagination. +""" +import json +import os +import sqlite3 +import sys +import unittest +from pathlib import Path + +sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent)) + +from starlette.testclient import TestClient + +import control_plane_db +from canonical_thread_handoff import ( + CTH_TYPES, + MARKER, + format_cth_body, + is_known_cth_type, + parse_cth_comment, +) +from webui import timeline +from webui.app import create_app + + +def _seed_db(path: str) -> None: + """Create a control-plane DB and seed scoped work_items + events.""" + # Constructing ControlPlaneDB runs the schema migration once. + control_plane_db.ControlPlaneDB(db_path=path) + conn = sqlite3.connect(path) + try: + conn.execute( + "INSERT INTO work_items(remote, org, repo, kind, number, state, updated_at) " + "VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?)", + ("prgs", "Scaled-Tech-Consulting", "Gitea-Tools", "issue", 637, "open", "2026-07-23T00:00:00Z"), + ) + issue_wid = conn.execute("SELECT last_insert_rowid()").fetchone()[0] + conn.execute( + "INSERT INTO work_items(remote, org, repo, kind, number, state, updated_at) " + "VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?)", + ("prgs", "Scaled-Tech-Consulting", "Gitea-Tools", "pr", 813, "open", "2026-07-23T00:00:00Z"), + ) + pr_wid = conn.execute("SELECT last_insert_rowid()").fetchone()[0] + # A work item for a different repo — must never appear in prgs/Gitea-Tools scope. + conn.execute( + "INSERT INTO work_items(remote, org, repo, kind, number, state, updated_at) " + "VALUES (?,?,?,?,?,?,?)", + ("dadeschools", "Other", "Elsewhere", "issue", 1, "open", "2026-07-23T00:00:00Z"), + ) + other_wid = conn.execute("SELECT last_insert_rowid()").fetchone()[0] + + rows = [ + (issue_wid, "allocation", "assigned author work", "2026-07-23T01:00:00Z"), + (issue_wid, "lease.renew", "token=ghs_ABCDEF1234567890abcdef lease renewed", "2026-07-23T02:00:00Z"), + (pr_wid, "pr.opened", "PR opened for review", "2026-07-23T03:00:00Z"), + (other_wid, "allocation", "off-scope event", "2026-07-23T04:00:00Z"), + ] + conn.executemany( + "INSERT INTO events(work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at) VALUES (?,?,?,?)", + rows, + ) + conn.commit() + finally: + conn.close() + + +class TestSchema(unittest.TestCase): + def test_schema_is_versioned(self): + self.assertIsInstance(timeline.TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION, int) + self.assertGreaterEqual(timeline.TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION, 1) + + def test_event_to_dict_shape(self): + ev = timeline.WorkflowEvent( + source=timeline.SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE, + event_type="allocation", + event_key="cp:1", + timestamp="2026-07-23T01:00:00Z", + issue_number=637, + ) + d = ev.to_dict() + for key in ( + "source", "event_type", "event_key", "timestamp", "actor", "role", + "issue_number", "pr_number", "session_id", "tool_name", "decision", + "message", "correlation_id", "evidence_refs", "sensitive", + ): + self.assertIn(key, d) + self.assertEqual(d["evidence_refs"], []) + + +class TestCpAdapter(unittest.TestCase): + def test_issue_and_pr_mapping(self): + rows = [ + {"event_id": 1, "event_type": "allocation", "message": "x", "created_at": "2026-07-23T01:00:00Z", "kind": "issue", "number": 637}, + {"event_id": 2, "event_type": "pr.opened", "message": "y", "created_at": "2026-07-23T02:00:00Z", "kind": "pr", "number": 813}, + ] + events = timeline.adapt_cp_events(rows) + self.assertEqual(len(events), 2) + self.assertEqual(events[0].issue_number, 637) + self.assertIsNone(events[0].pr_number) + self.assertEqual(events[0].correlation_id, "issue#637") + self.assertIsNone(events[1].issue_number) + self.assertEqual(events[1].pr_number, 813) + + def test_malformed_rows_skipped(self): + rows = [ + {"event_id": None, "event_type": "x", "kind": "issue", "number": 1}, + {"event_id": 5, "event_type": "", "kind": "issue", "number": 1}, + {"event_id": 6, "event_type": "ok", "message": "m", "created_at": None, "kind": "issue", "number": 1}, + ] + events = timeline.adapt_cp_events(rows) + self.assertEqual(len(events), 1) + self.assertIsNone(events[0].timestamp) + + def test_sensitive_event_flagged(self): + rows = [{"event_id": 1, "event_type": "lease.renew", "message": "m", "created_at": "2026-07-23T01:00:00Z", "kind": "issue", "number": 1}] + events = timeline.adapt_cp_events(rows) + self.assertTrue(events[0].sensitive) + + +class TestCthAdapter(unittest.TestCase): + def test_cth_comment_becomes_event(self): + body = format_cth_body( + cth_type="Author Handoff", + status="ready", + next_owner="reviewer", + decision="implement timeline", + proof="commit abc1234 closes #637", + next_action="review PR", + ready_to_paste_prompt="Review PR #900 as reviewer", + ) + comments = [{"id": 42, "body": body, "created_at": "2026-07-23T05:00:00Z", "user": {"login": "jcwalker3"}}] + events = timeline.adapt_cth_comments(comments, kind="issue", number=637) + self.assertEqual(len(events), 1) + ev = events[0] + self.assertEqual(ev.source, timeline.SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF) + self.assertEqual(ev.event_type, "handoff:Author Handoff") + self.assertEqual(ev.actor, "jcwalker3") + self.assertEqual(ev.issue_number, 637) + self.assertEqual(ev.event_key, "cth:issue:637:42") + self.assertIn("#637", ev.evidence_refs) + self.assertIn("abc1234", ev.evidence_refs) + + def test_non_cth_comment_ignored(self): + comments = [{"id": 1, "body": "just a normal comment", "created_at": "2026-07-23T05:00:00Z", "user": {"login": "x"}}] + self.assertEqual(timeline.adapt_cth_comments(comments, kind="issue", number=1), []) + + +class TestRedaction(unittest.TestCase): + def test_cp_message_redacted(self): + rows = [{"event_id": 1, "event_type": "lease", "message": "token=ghs_ABCDEF1234567890abcdef here", "created_at": "2026-07-23T01:00:00Z", "kind": "issue", "number": 1}] + events = timeline.adapt_cp_events(rows) + self.assertNotIn("ghs_ABCDEF1234567890abcdef", events[0].message or "") + + def test_handoff_decision_redacted(self): + body = format_cth_body( + cth_type="Blocker", + status="blocked", + next_owner="author", + decision="password=SuperSecret123! must rotate", + proof="none", + next_action="rotate", + ready_to_paste_prompt="Rotate the credential and retry", + ) + comments = [{"id": 7, "body": body, "created_at": "2026-07-23T05:00:00Z", "user": {"login": "x"}}] + events = timeline.adapt_cth_comments(comments, kind="issue", number=1) + self.assertNotIn("SuperSecret123!", events[0].decision or "") + + +class TestFilterSortPaginate(unittest.TestCase): + def _events(self): + return [ + timeline.WorkflowEvent(source="control_plane", event_type="a", event_key="cp:3", timestamp="2026-07-23T03:00:00Z", pr_number=813), + timeline.WorkflowEvent(source="control_plane", event_type="b", event_key="cp:1", timestamp="2026-07-23T01:00:00Z", issue_number=637), + timeline.WorkflowEvent(source="control_plane", event_type="c", event_key="cp:2", timestamp="2026-07-23T02:00:00Z", issue_number=637, session_id="sess-1"), + ] + + def test_filter_by_issue(self): + out = timeline.filter_events(self._events(), issue=637) + self.assertEqual({e.event_key for e in out}, {"cp:1", "cp:2"}) + + def test_filter_by_pr(self): + out = timeline.filter_events(self._events(), pr=813) + self.assertEqual([e.event_key for e in out], ["cp:3"]) + + def test_filter_by_session(self): + out = timeline.filter_events(self._events(), session="sess-1") + self.assertEqual([e.event_key for e in out], ["cp:2"]) + + def test_stable_sort_ascending(self): + out = timeline.sort_events(self._events()) + self.assertEqual([e.event_key for e in out], ["cp:1", "cp:2", "cp:3"]) + + def test_missing_timestamp_sorts_last(self): + evs = self._events() + [ + timeline.WorkflowEvent(source="control_plane", event_type="z", event_key="cp:9", timestamp=None) + ] + out = timeline.sort_events(evs) + self.assertEqual(out[-1].event_key, "cp:9") + + def test_pagination_windows_and_next_offset(self): + evs = timeline.sort_events(self._events()) + page1 = timeline.paginate(evs, limit=2, offset=0) + self.assertEqual(len(page1.events), 2) + self.assertEqual(page1.total, 3) + self.assertEqual(page1.next_offset, 2) + page2 = timeline.paginate(evs, limit=2, offset=2) + self.assertEqual(len(page2.events), 1) + self.assertIsNone(page2.next_offset) + + def test_pagination_bounds_coerced(self): + evs = self._events() + page = timeline.paginate(evs, limit=-5, offset=-3) + self.assertGreaterEqual(page.limit, 1) + self.assertEqual(page.offset, 0) + + +class TestCpReader(unittest.TestCase): + def test_reads_scoped_events_only(self): + import tempfile + + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: + db = os.path.join(tmp, "cp.sqlite3") + _seed_db(db) + events, status = timeline.read_cp_events( + remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools", db_path=db + ) + self.assertTrue(status.ok) + # 3 scoped events; the dadeschools/Other event is excluded. + self.assertEqual(len(events), 3) + self.assertTrue(all(e.source == "control_plane" for e in events)) + # Redaction applied to the token-bearing message. + joined = " ".join(e.message or "" for e in events) + self.assertNotIn("ghs_ABCDEF1234567890abcdef", joined) + + def test_missing_db_degrades(self): + events, status = timeline.read_cp_events( + remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools", + db_path="/nonexistent/path/to/cp.sqlite3", + ) + self.assertEqual(events, []) + self.assertFalse(status.ok) + self.assertIsNotNone(status.reason) + + +class TestLoadTimeline(unittest.TestCase): + def test_handoff_not_run_without_thread_filter(self): + import tempfile + + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: + db = os.path.join(tmp, "cp.sqlite3") + _seed_db(db) + snap = timeline.load_timeline( + remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools", db_path=db + ) + d = snap.to_dict() + handoff = [s for s in d["sources"] if s["name"] == "gitea_handoff"][0] + self.assertFalse(handoff["ok"]) + self.assertIn("thread-scoped", handoff["reason"]) + self.assertEqual(d["schema_version"], timeline.TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION) + + def test_handoff_included_via_injected_source(self): + import tempfile + + body = format_cth_body( + cth_type="Author Handoff", status="ready", next_owner="reviewer", + decision="d", proof="#637", next_action="review", ready_to_paste_prompt="Review PR #1 now", + ) + + def source(kind, number): + return [{"id": 1, "body": body, "created_at": "2026-07-23T09:00:00Z", "user": {"login": "jcwalker3"}}] + + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: + db = os.path.join(tmp, "cp.sqlite3") + _seed_db(db) + snap = timeline.load_timeline( + remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools", + issue=637, db_path=db, comment_source=source, + ) + d = snap.to_dict() + handoff = [s for s in d["sources"] if s["name"] == "gitea_handoff"][0] + self.assertTrue(handoff["ok"]) + self.assertEqual(handoff["count"], 1) + # Both a CP event and the handoff event for issue 637 appear, sorted. + kinds = {e["source"] for e in d["events"]} + self.assertEqual(kinds, {"control_plane", "gitea_handoff"}) + + def test_failing_comment_source_degrades_only_handoff(self): + import tempfile + + def boom(kind, number): + raise RuntimeError("network down") + + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: + db = os.path.join(tmp, "cp.sqlite3") + _seed_db(db) + snap = timeline.load_timeline( + remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools", + issue=637, db_path=db, comment_source=boom, + ) + d = snap.to_dict() + cp = [s for s in d["sources"] if s["name"] == "control_plane"][0] + handoff = [s for s in d["sources"] if s["name"] == "gitea_handoff"][0] + self.assertTrue(cp["ok"]) + self.assertFalse(handoff["ok"]) + self.assertIn("network down", handoff["reason"]) + + +# A fabricated 40-character lowercase hex value with the shape of a Gitea +# personal access token. Never a real credential — its only job is to prove it +# cannot reach any part of a serialized timeline payload. +SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX = "a3f9c17be44d2058e6b17c9d0f5321ab77c4e9d1" + + +def _cth_comment(comment_id, *, created_at, session=None, decision="d", proof="none", **kw): + """Build one real CTH comment record, optionally declaring a session.""" + extra = {"Session": session} if session is not None else None + body = format_cth_body( + cth_type=kw.pop("cth_type", "Author Handoff"), + status=kw.pop("status", "ready"), + next_owner=kw.pop("next_owner", "reviewer"), + decision=decision, + proof=proof, + next_action=kw.pop("next_action", "review"), + ready_to_paste_prompt=kw.pop("ready_to_paste_prompt", "Review PR #1 now"), + extra_fields=extra, + ) + return { + "id": comment_id, + "body": body, + "created_at": created_at, + "user": {"login": kw.pop("login", "jcwalker3")}, + } + + +class TestSessionFilterThroughAdapter(unittest.TestCase): + """F1: the session dimension must be real, or explicitly refused. + + These drive the filter through the CTH adapter and the composed + ``load_timeline``/API path, never through a hand-built ``WorkflowEvent``. + """ + + def _source(self, comments): + return lambda kind, number: list(comments) + + def test_adapter_populates_declared_session(self): + events = timeline.adapt_cth_comments( + [_cth_comment(1, created_at="2026-07-23T05:00:00Z", session="sess-alpha")], + kind="issue", + number=637, + ) + self.assertEqual(len(events), 1) + self.assertEqual(events[0].session_id, "sess-alpha") + + def test_session_filter_matches_through_adapter(self): + import tempfile + + comments = [ + _cth_comment(1, created_at="2026-07-23T09:00:00Z", session="sess-alpha"), + _cth_comment(2, created_at="2026-07-23T08:00:00Z", session="sess-alpha"), + _cth_comment(3, created_at="2026-07-23T10:00:00Z", session="sess-beta"), + ] + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: + db = os.path.join(tmp, "cp.sqlite3") + _seed_db(db) + snap = timeline.load_timeline( + remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools", + issue=637, session="sess-alpha", db_path=db, + comment_source=self._source(comments), + ) + d = snap.to_dict() + self.assertTrue(d["ok"]) + self.assertIsNone(d["error"]) + keys = [e["event_key"] for e in d["events"]] + # Only the two sess-alpha events, still in ascending timestamp order. + self.assertEqual(keys, ["cth:issue:637:2", "cth:issue:637:1"]) + self.assertTrue(all(e["session_id"] == "sess-alpha" for e in d["events"])) + self.assertEqual(d["pagination"]["total"], 2) + + def test_session_filter_paginates_and_keeps_order(self): + import tempfile + + comments = [ + _cth_comment(i, created_at=f"2026-07-23T0{i}:00:00Z", session="sess-alpha") + for i in range(1, 4) + ] + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: + db = os.path.join(tmp, "cp.sqlite3") + _seed_db(db) + kwargs = dict( + remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools", + issue=637, session="sess-alpha", db_path=db, + comment_source=self._source(comments), + ) + page1 = timeline.load_timeline(limit=2, offset=0, **kwargs).to_dict() + page2 = timeline.load_timeline(limit=2, offset=2, **kwargs).to_dict() + self.assertEqual( + [e["event_key"] for e in page1["events"]], + ["cth:issue:637:1", "cth:issue:637:2"], + ) + self.assertEqual(page1["pagination"]["next_offset"], 2) + self.assertEqual([e["event_key"] for e in page2["events"]], ["cth:issue:637:3"]) + self.assertIsNone(page2["pagination"]["next_offset"]) + + def test_unknown_session_is_honestly_empty_when_supported(self): + """A source that *can* answer the dimension may legitimately match nothing.""" + import tempfile + + comments = [_cth_comment(1, created_at="2026-07-23T09:00:00Z", session="sess-alpha")] + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: + db = os.path.join(tmp, "cp.sqlite3") + _seed_db(db) + d = timeline.load_timeline( + remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools", + issue=637, session="sess-nope", db_path=db, + comment_source=self._source(comments), + ).to_dict() + self.assertTrue(d["ok"]) + self.assertEqual(d["events"], []) + + def test_session_filter_refused_when_no_source_can_answer(self): + """The F1 defect: an empty-and-healthy page for an unanswerable filter.""" + import tempfile + + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: + db = os.path.join(tmp, "cp.sqlite3") + _seed_db(db) + d = timeline.load_timeline( + remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools", + issue=637, session="sess-alpha", db_path=db, comment_source=None, + ).to_dict() + self.assertFalse(d["ok"]) + self.assertEqual(d["error"]["code"], "filter_not_supported") + self.assertEqual(d["error"]["unsupported_filters"], ["session"]) + self.assertEqual(d["events"], []) + self.assertEqual(d["pagination"]["total"], 0) + # The refusal states which source could not answer, and why. + explained = {r["source"] for r in d["error"]["sources"]} + self.assertEqual(explained, {"control_plane", "gitea_handoff"}) + + def test_control_plane_declares_session_unsupported(self): + import tempfile + + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: + db = os.path.join(tmp, "cp.sqlite3") + _seed_db(db) + d = timeline.load_timeline( + remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools", + issue=637, session="sess-alpha", db_path=db, + comment_source=self._source([]), + ).to_dict() + cp = [s for s in d["sources"] if s["name"] == "control_plane"][0] + handoff = [s for s in d["sources"] if s["name"] == "gitea_handoff"][0] + self.assertNotIn("session", cp["supported_filters"]) + self.assertEqual(cp["unsupported_filters"], ["session"]) + self.assertIn("session", handoff["supported_filters"]) + self.assertEqual(handoff["unsupported_filters"], []) + + def test_secret_shaped_session_value_is_dropped(self): + events = timeline.adapt_cth_comments( + [_cth_comment(1, created_at="2026-07-23T05:00:00Z", session=SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX)], + kind="issue", + number=637, + ) + self.assertIsNone(events[0].session_id) + self.assertNotIn(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, json.dumps(events[0].to_dict())) + + +class TestEvidenceRefRedaction(unittest.TestCase): + """F2: evidence_refs must not be a hole in the redaction boundary.""" + + def _refs_for(self, *, proof="none", decision="d"): + events = timeline.adapt_cth_comments( + [_cth_comment(1, created_at="2026-07-23T05:00:00Z", proof=proof, decision=decision)], + kind="issue", + number=637, + ) + self.assertEqual(len(events), 1) + return events[0] + + def test_assigned_secret_never_reaches_evidence_refs(self): + ev = self._refs_for(proof=f"authenticated with token={SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX}") + self.assertNotIn(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, ev.evidence_refs) + self.assertNotIn(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, json.dumps(ev.to_dict())) + + def test_bare_secret_shaped_value_never_reaches_evidence_refs(self): + # An undeclared hex run in proof text is not evidence of anything, and + # proof itself is never serialized — so the value has no way out. + ev = self._refs_for(proof=f"proof {SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX}", decision="rotate the credential") + self.assertNotIn(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, ev.evidence_refs) + self.assertNotIn(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, json.dumps(ev.to_dict())) + + def test_secret_absent_from_complete_serialized_payload(self): + import tempfile + + comments = [ + _cth_comment( + 1, + created_at="2026-07-23T09:00:00Z", + proof=f"lease token={SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX} and bare {SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX}", + decision=f"rotate api_key={SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX}", + ) + ] + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: + db = os.path.join(tmp, "cp.sqlite3") + _seed_db(db) + snap = timeline.load_timeline( + remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools", + issue=637, db_path=db, comment_source=lambda k, n: comments, + ) + payload = json.dumps(snap.to_dict()) + self.assertNotIn(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, payload) + # And the surface is clean by the redaction policy's own detectors. + from webui import console_redaction + + self.assertEqual(console_redaction.scan_for_secrets(snap.to_dict()), []) + + def test_legitimate_references_still_usable(self): + head = "4f3a464a1c455b6ecaaae9b6eef496c8f8ed451a" + ev = self._refs_for( + proof=f"closes #637, PR #849, commit abc1234, at head {head}", + decision="none", + ) + for token in ("#637", "#849", "abc1234", head): + self.assertIn(token, ev.evidence_refs) + + def test_undeclared_hex_words_are_not_references(self): + ev = self._refs_for(proof="the record was defaced and the facade decayed") + self.assertEqual(ev.evidence_refs, ()) + + def test_refs_revalidated_independently_before_serialization(self): + """Extraction is not trusted: the validator drops anything unproven.""" + safe, dropped = timeline._validated_evidence_refs( + ["#637", "abc1234", "not-a-ref", f"token={SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX}", ""] + ) + self.assertEqual(safe, ("#637", "abc1234")) + self.assertTrue(dropped) + self.assertNotIn(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, json.dumps(list(safe))) + + def test_clean_event_is_not_marked_sensitive(self): + ev = self._refs_for(proof="closes #637") + self.assertEqual(ev.evidence_refs, ("#637",)) + self.assertFalse(ev.sensitive) + + +class TestTimelineApi(unittest.TestCase): + def setUp(self): + self._prev_db = os.environ.get(control_plane_db.DB_PATH_ENV) + self._prev_offline = os.environ.get("WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE") + import tempfile + + self._tmpdir = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() + self._db = os.path.join(self._tmpdir.name, "cp.sqlite3") + _seed_db(self._db) + os.environ[control_plane_db.DB_PATH_ENV] = self._db + os.environ["WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE"] = "1" + self.client = TestClient(create_app()) + + def tearDown(self): + if self._prev_db is None: + os.environ.pop(control_plane_db.DB_PATH_ENV, None) + else: + os.environ[control_plane_db.DB_PATH_ENV] = self._prev_db + if self._prev_offline is None: + os.environ.pop("WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE", None) + else: + os.environ["WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE"] = self._prev_offline + self._tmpdir.cleanup() + + def test_api_returns_timeline(self): + resp = self.client.get("/api/v1/timeline") + self.assertEqual(resp.status_code, 200) + body = resp.json() + self.assertEqual(body["schema_version"], timeline.TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION) + self.assertIn("events", body) + self.assertIn("pagination", body) + self.assertGreaterEqual(body["pagination"]["total"], 1) + + def test_api_filter_by_issue(self): + resp = self.client.get("/api/v1/timeline?issue=637") + self.assertEqual(resp.status_code, 200) + events = resp.json()["events"] + self.assertTrue(events) + self.assertTrue(all(e["issue_number"] == 637 for e in events)) + + def test_api_pagination(self): + resp = self.client.get("/api/v1/timeline?limit=1&offset=0") + self.assertEqual(resp.status_code, 200) + pg = resp.json()["pagination"] + self.assertEqual(pg["limit"], 1) + self.assertEqual(len(resp.json()["events"]), 1) + if pg["total"] > 1: + self.assertTrue(pg["has_more"]) + + def test_api_is_read_only(self): + resp = self.client.post("/api/v1/timeline") + self.assertIn(resp.status_code, (404, 405)) + + def test_api_no_secret_leak(self): + resp = self.client.get("/api/v1/timeline?issue=637") + self.assertNotIn("ghs_ABCDEF1234567890abcdef", resp.text) + + def test_api_refuses_unanswerable_session_filter(self): + """No handoff source is configured offline, so nothing can carry a session.""" + resp = self.client.get("/api/v1/timeline?issue=637&session=sess-alpha") + self.assertEqual(resp.status_code, 422) + body = resp.json() + self.assertFalse(body["ok"]) + self.assertEqual(body["error"]["code"], "filter_not_supported") + self.assertEqual(body["error"]["unsupported_filters"], ["session"]) + self.assertEqual(body["events"], []) + self.assertEqual(body["pagination"]["total"], 0) + + def test_api_unfiltered_read_stays_ok(self): + body = self.client.get("/api/v1/timeline?issue=637").json() + self.assertTrue(body["ok"]) + self.assertIsNone(body["error"]) + + +def _seed_event(path: str, *, event_type: str, message: str, created_at: str) -> None: + """Append one control-plane event with a caller-chosen ``event_type``. + + The ``events`` table stores whatever a producer writes, so this seeds the + adapter the way a hostile or buggy producer would. + """ + conn = sqlite3.connect(path) + try: + wid = conn.execute( + "SELECT work_item_id FROM work_items WHERE kind='issue' AND number=637" + ).fetchone()[0] + conn.execute( + "INSERT INTO events(work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at) VALUES (?,?,?,?)", + (wid, event_type, message, created_at), + ) + conn.commit() + finally: + conn.close() + + +def _raw_cth_body(heading: str, **fields) -> str: + """Build a CTH comment with an arbitrary heading. + + ``format_cth_body`` refuses an undeclared type, which is exactly the write + path already covered. The read path must cope with a body that never went + through it, so this writes the marker and heading directly. + """ + lines = [MARKER, f"## CTH: {heading}", ""] + base = { + "Status": "ready", + "Next owner": "reviewer", + "Current blocker": "none", + "Decision": "d", + "Proof": "none", + "Next action": "review", + "Ready-to-paste prompt": "Review PR #1 now", + } + base.update(fields) + lines.extend(f"{key}: {value}" for key, value in base.items()) + return "\n".join(lines) + + +class TestEventTypeBoundary(unittest.TestCase): + """F2 residual: event_type must cross the same boundary as every other field. + + The canary is seeded through ``event_type`` *only*, with a benign message, + so message redaction cannot be what makes these pass. Each case inspects + ``event_type`` explicitly and then the complete serialized payload. + """ + + # ---- control-plane stored event_type ---------------------------------- # + + def test_cp_event_type_canary_never_serialized(self): + rows = [{ + "event_id": 1, + "event_type": SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, + "message": "deploy completed", # benign: no redaction happens here + "created_at": "2026-07-23T01:00:00Z", + "kind": "issue", + "number": 637, + }] + events = timeline.adapt_cp_events(rows) + self.assertEqual(len(events), 1) + ev = events[0] + # The field itself, inspected directly. + self.assertNotIn(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, ev.event_type) + self.assertEqual(ev.event_type, timeline.UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE) + # Message redaction is provably not what saved us: it is untouched. + self.assertEqual(ev.message, "deploy completed") + # And nowhere in the serialized record. + self.assertNotIn(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, json.dumps(ev.to_dict())) + # An unsafe value is a visible fact, not a silent substitution. + self.assertTrue(ev.sensitive) + + def test_cp_same_canary_in_message_and_event_type(self): + """The decisive case: one record, one value, two fields, one verdict.""" + rows = [{ + "event_id": 2, + "event_type": SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, + "message": f"deploy token={SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX}", + "created_at": "2026-07-23T01:00:00Z", + "kind": "issue", + "number": 637, + }] + ev = timeline.adapt_cp_events(rows)[0] + self.assertNotIn(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, ev.message or "") + self.assertNotIn(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, ev.event_type) + self.assertNotIn(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, json.dumps(ev.to_dict())) + + def test_cp_unsafe_event_type_is_not_rewritten_as_a_valid_one(self): + """A refused value must not be disguised as some other real event type.""" + rows = [{ + "event_id": 3, + "event_type": SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, + "message": "m", + "created_at": "2026-07-23T01:00:00Z", + "kind": "issue", + "number": 637, + }] + ev = timeline.adapt_cp_events(rows)[0] + for legitimate in ("allocation", "pr.opened", "lease.renew", "assigned"): + self.assertNotEqual(ev.event_type, legitimate) + + def test_cp_assigned_secret_in_event_type_refused(self): + rows = [{ + "event_id": 4, + "event_type": f"token={SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX}", + "message": "m", + "created_at": "2026-07-23T01:00:00Z", + "kind": "issue", + "number": 637, + }] + ev = timeline.adapt_cp_events(rows)[0] + self.assertEqual(ev.event_type, timeline.UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE) + self.assertNotIn(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, json.dumps(ev.to_dict())) + + def test_cp_legitimate_event_types_preserved(self): + """Every real producer type in this repo must survive untouched.""" + legitimate = [ + "allocation", "pr.opened", "lease.renew", "assigned", + "lease_released", "lease_expired", "lease_abandoned", + "lease_adopted", "dependency_edge_state_change", + ] + rows = [ + { + "event_id": i, + "event_type": name, + "message": "m", + "created_at": "2026-07-23T01:00:00Z", + "kind": "issue", + "number": 637, + } + for i, name in enumerate(legitimate, start=1) + ] + events = timeline.adapt_cp_events(rows) + self.assertEqual([e.event_type for e in events], legitimate) + + def test_cp_malformed_event_type_shapes_refused(self): + for bad in ("has space", "1leading-digit", "x" * 200, "semi;colon", "new\nline"): + with self.subTest(event_type=bad): + rows = [{ + "event_id": 1, + "event_type": bad, + "message": "m", + "created_at": "2026-07-23T01:00:00Z", + "kind": "issue", + "number": 637, + }] + events = timeline.adapt_cp_events(rows) + self.assertEqual(events[0].event_type, timeline.UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE) + self.assertNotIn(bad, json.dumps(events[0].to_dict())) + + # ---- CTH heading event_type ------------------------------------------- # + + def test_cth_heading_canary_never_serialized(self): + comments = [{ + "id": 11, + "body": _raw_cth_body(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX), + "created_at": "2026-07-23T05:00:00Z", + "user": {"login": "jcwalker3"}, + }] + events = timeline.adapt_cth_comments(comments, kind="issue", number=637) + self.assertEqual(len(events), 1) + ev = events[0] + self.assertNotIn(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, ev.event_type) + self.assertEqual(ev.event_type, timeline.UNKNOWN_HANDOFF_EVENT_TYPE) + # No message redaction is doing the work here — the message is benign. + self.assertEqual(ev.message, "review") + self.assertNotIn(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, json.dumps(ev.to_dict())) + self.assertTrue(ev.sensitive) + + def test_cth_assigned_secret_heading_refused(self): + comments = [{ + "id": 12, + "body": _raw_cth_body(f"token={SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX}"), + "created_at": "2026-07-23T05:00:00Z", + "user": {"login": "jcwalker3"}, + }] + ev = timeline.adapt_cth_comments(comments, kind="issue", number=637)[0] + self.assertEqual(ev.event_type, timeline.UNKNOWN_HANDOFF_EVENT_TYPE) + self.assertNotIn(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, json.dumps(ev.to_dict())) + + def test_cth_unknown_and_whitespace_headings_normalized(self): + for heading in ("Totally Made Up", "Author Handoff", "author handoff"): + with self.subTest(heading=heading): + comments = [{ + "id": 13, + "body": _raw_cth_body(heading), + "created_at": "2026-07-23T05:00:00Z", + "user": {"login": "x"}, + }] + events = timeline.adapt_cth_comments(comments, kind="issue", number=637) + self.assertEqual(len(events), 1) + self.assertEqual(events[0].event_type, timeline.UNKNOWN_HANDOFF_EVENT_TYPE) + + def test_cth_declared_types_all_preserved(self): + """Point 5: no legitimate declared type is lost to the new check.""" + for cth_type in sorted(CTH_TYPES): + with self.subTest(cth_type=cth_type): + comments = [{ + "id": 14, + "body": _raw_cth_body(cth_type), + "created_at": "2026-07-23T05:00:00Z", + "user": {"login": "x"}, + }] + ev = timeline.adapt_cth_comments(comments, kind="issue", number=637)[0] + self.assertEqual(ev.event_type, f"handoff:{cth_type}") + self.assertFalse(ev.sensitive) + + def test_cth_surrounding_whitespace_still_matches_contract(self): + comments = [{ + "id": 15, + "body": _raw_cth_body(" Author Handoff "), + "created_at": "2026-07-23T05:00:00Z", + "user": {"login": "x"}, + }] + ev = timeline.adapt_cth_comments(comments, kind="issue", number=637)[0] + self.assertEqual(ev.event_type, "handoff:Author Handoff") + + # ---- complete serialized payload, both paths -------------------------- # + + def _payload_clean(self, snapshot): + payload = json.dumps(snapshot.to_dict()) + self.assertNotIn(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, payload) + from webui import console_redaction + + self.assertEqual(console_redaction.scan_for_secrets(snapshot.to_dict()), []) + return snapshot.to_dict() + + def test_canary_absent_from_full_payload_via_cp_event_type(self): + import tempfile + + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: + db = os.path.join(tmp, "cp.sqlite3") + _seed_db(db) + _seed_event( + db, + event_type=SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, + message="routine deploy", + created_at="2026-07-23T06:00:00Z", + ) + snap = timeline.load_timeline( + remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools", + issue=637, db_path=db, comment_source=lambda k, n: [], + ) + d = self._payload_clean(snap) + types = [e["event_type"] for e in d["events"]] + self.assertIn(timeline.UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE, types) + # The legitimate seeded types are still present and unchanged. + self.assertIn("allocation", types) + + def test_canary_absent_from_full_payload_via_cth_heading(self): + import tempfile + + comments = [{ + "id": 21, + "body": _raw_cth_body(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX), + "created_at": "2026-07-23T09:00:00Z", + "user": {"login": "jcwalker3"}, + }] + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: + db = os.path.join(tmp, "cp.sqlite3") + _seed_db(db) + snap = timeline.load_timeline( + remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools", + issue=637, db_path=db, comment_source=lambda k, n: comments, + ) + d = self._payload_clean(snap) + self.assertIn( + timeline.UNKNOWN_HANDOFF_EVENT_TYPE, + [e["event_type"] for e in d["events"]], + ) + + def test_canary_absent_when_seeded_through_both_paths_at_once(self): + import tempfile + + comments = [{ + "id": 22, + "body": _raw_cth_body(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX), + "created_at": "2026-07-23T09:00:00Z", + "user": {"login": "jcwalker3"}, + }] + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: + db = os.path.join(tmp, "cp.sqlite3") + _seed_db(db) + _seed_event( + db, + event_type=SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, + message=f"deploy token={SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX}", + created_at="2026-07-23T06:00:00Z", + ) + snap = timeline.load_timeline( + remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools", + issue=637, db_path=db, comment_source=lambda k, n: comments, + ) + self._payload_clean(snap) + + +class TestSerializedFieldAudit(unittest.TestCase): + """The remaining externally influenced strings that reach the payload.""" + + def test_event_key_ids_must_be_plain_identifiers(self): + rows = [ + {"event_id": SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, "event_type": "allocation", + "message": "m", "created_at": "2026-07-23T01:00:00Z", + "kind": "issue", "number": 637}, + {"event_id": 8, "event_type": "allocation", "message": "m", + "created_at": "2026-07-23T01:00:00Z", "kind": "issue", "number": 637}, + ] + events = timeline.adapt_cp_events(rows) + self.assertEqual([e.event_key for e in events], ["cp:8"]) + + def test_comment_id_must_be_a_plain_identifier(self): + comments = [{ + "id": SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, + "body": _raw_cth_body("Author Handoff"), + "created_at": "2026-07-23T05:00:00Z", + "user": {"login": "x"}, + }] + self.assertEqual(timeline.adapt_cth_comments(comments, kind="issue", number=637), []) + + def test_adapter_refuses_a_scope_it_cannot_express(self): + comments = [{ + "id": 1, + "body": _raw_cth_body("Author Handoff"), + "created_at": "2026-07-23T05:00:00Z", + "user": {"login": "x"}, + }] + self.assertEqual( + timeline.adapt_cth_comments(comments, kind="issue", number=SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX), + [], + ) + self.assertEqual( + timeline.adapt_cth_comments(comments, kind=SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, number=1), + [], + ) + + def test_source_failure_reason_is_redacted(self): + def boom(kind, number): + raise RuntimeError(f"auth failed with token={SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX}") + + import tempfile + + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: + db = os.path.join(tmp, "cp.sqlite3") + _seed_db(db) + snap = timeline.load_timeline( + remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools", + issue=637, db_path=db, comment_source=boom, + ) + d = snap.to_dict() + handoff = [s for s in d["sources"] if s["name"] == "gitea_handoff"][0] + self.assertFalse(handoff["ok"]) + self.assertIn("handoff source failed", handoff["reason"]) + self.assertNotIn(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, json.dumps(d)) + + def test_echoed_scope_and_filters_are_guarded(self): + import tempfile + + with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp: + db = os.path.join(tmp, "cp.sqlite3") + _seed_db(db) + d = timeline.load_timeline( + remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools", + issue=637, session=SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, db_path=db, + comment_source=lambda k, n: [], + ).to_dict() + self.assertNotIn(SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, json.dumps(d)) + # Ordinary scope values are untouched, so the echo stays useful. + self.assertEqual( + d["scope"], + {"remote": "prgs", "org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting", "repo": "Gitea-Tools"}, + ) + self.assertEqual(d["filters"]["issue"], 637) + + +class TestCthTypeContract(unittest.TestCase): + """The contract has one authority; the read path consults it.""" + + def test_declared_types_are_known(self): + for cth_type in CTH_TYPES: + self.assertTrue(is_known_cth_type(cth_type)) + + def test_undeclared_types_are_not_known(self): + for value in ("", None, "Made Up", SYNTHETIC_SECRET_40_HEX, "author handoff"): + self.assertFalse(is_known_cth_type(value)) + + def test_parse_reports_contract_membership(self): + known = parse_cth_comment(_raw_cth_body("Author Handoff")) + self.assertTrue(known["cth_type_known"]) + self.assertEqual(known["cth_type"], "Author Handoff") + unknown = parse_cth_comment(_raw_cth_body("Not A Real Type")) + # Parsing stays total: the type is still reported, just not endorsed. + self.assertEqual(unknown["cth_type"], "Not A Real Type") + self.assertFalse(unknown["cth_type_known"]) + + +if __name__ == "__main__": + unittest.main() diff --git a/webui/app.py b/webui/app.py index 142a492..f5147b5 100644 --- a/webui/app.py +++ b/webui/app.py @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ from webui.worktree_scanner import load_hygiene_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as wo from webui.worktree_views import render_worktrees_page from webui.runtime_health import load_runtime_snapshot, snapshot_to_dict as runtime_snapshot_to_dict from webui.runtime_views import render_runtime_page +from webui.timeline import load_timeline, snapshot_to_dict as timeline_snapshot_to_dict from webui.system_health import ( API_PATH as SYSTEM_HEALTH_API_PATH, load_system_health, @@ -468,6 +469,104 @@ async def api_console_security_model(_request: Request) -> JSONResponse: }) +def _query_int(request: Request, key: str) -> int | None: + """Parse an optional integer query parameter; None when absent/invalid.""" + raw = request.query_params.get(key) + if raw is None or not str(raw).strip(): + return None + try: + return int(str(raw).strip()) + except (TypeError, ValueError): + return None + + +def _derive_remote(host: str) -> str: + """Map a Gitea host to its known short remote name (control-plane scope key).""" + text = (host or "").lower() + if "prgs" in text: + return "prgs" + if "dadeschools" in text: + return "dadeschools" + return text.split(".")[0] if text else "" + + +def _timeline_comment_source(host: str, org: str, repo: str): + """Build a fail-soft CTH-comment fetcher for one repo, or None when offline. + + Returns a callable ``(kind, number) -> list[comment]``. Credentials or + network failures raise inside the callable so ``load_timeline`` degrades the + handoff source rather than the whole timeline. Offline test mode yields no + live source so the handoff section reports ``not run``. + """ + import os + + from gitea_auth import api_fetch_page, get_auth_header, repo_api_url + + offline = (os.environ.get("WEBUI_TEST_OFFLINE") or "").strip().lower() in {"1", "true", "yes"} + if offline: + return None + auth = get_auth_header(host) + if not auth: + return None + + def _fetch(kind: str, number: int) -> list: + segment = "pulls" if kind == "pr" else "issues" + url = f"{repo_api_url(host, org, repo)}/{segment}/{int(number)}/comments" + comments: list = [] + page = 1 + while page <= 20: + raw, meta = api_fetch_page(url, auth, page=page, limit=50) + comments.extend(raw) + if bool(meta["is_final_page"]): + break + page += 1 + return comments + + return _fetch + + +async def api_v1_timeline(request: Request) -> JSONResponse: + """Read-only workflow-event timeline (#637). Filter by issue/PR/session.""" + from webui.queue_loader import _host_from_url # host normalisation helper + + registry, error = _load_project_registry() + if error is not None: + return JSONResponse(error.to_dict(), status_code=500) + project = registry.projects[0] if registry.projects else None + + org = request.query_params.get("org") or (project.gitea_owner if project else "") + repo = request.query_params.get("repo") or (project.repo_name if project else "") + host = _host_from_url(project.remote_host) if project else "" + remote = request.query_params.get("remote") or _derive_remote(host) + + if not (remote and org and repo): + return JSONResponse( + { + "error": "timeline_scope_unresolved", + "detail": "no project in registry and no remote/org/repo query params provided", + }, + status_code=400, + ) + + comment_source = _timeline_comment_source(host, org, repo) if (host and org and repo) else None + + snapshot = load_timeline( + remote=remote, + org=org, + repo=repo, + issue=_query_int(request, "issue"), + pr=_query_int(request, "pr"), + session=(request.query_params.get("session") or None), + limit=_query_int(request, "limit"), + offset=_query_int(request, "offset"), + comment_source=comment_source, + ) + # A filter no surviving source can carry is refused, not answered empty: + # a 200 with zero events would tell the operator no such activity exists. + status_code = 200 if snapshot.ok else 422 + return JSONResponse(timeline_snapshot_to_dict(snapshot), status_code=status_code) + + async def method_not_allowed(request: Request, _exc: Exception) -> Response: path = request.url.path if path in _AUDIT_MUTATION_PATHS and request.method == "POST": @@ -508,6 +607,7 @@ def create_app(*, bind_host: str | None = None) -> Starlette: Route("/api/prompts", api_prompts, methods=["GET"]), Route("/runtime", runtime, methods=["GET"]), Route("/api/runtime", api_runtime, methods=["GET"]), + Route("/api/v1/timeline", api_v1_timeline, methods=["GET"]), Route("/audit", audit, methods=["GET", "POST"]), Route("/api/audit", api_audit, methods=["GET", "POST"]), Route("/worktrees", worktrees, methods=["GET"]), diff --git a/webui/timeline.py b/webui/timeline.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ec8284 --- /dev/null +++ b/webui/timeline.py @@ -0,0 +1,906 @@ +"""Workflow-event and conversation timeline model (#637, Phase 1). + +Operators cannot browse a unified timeline of workflow events, decisions, +tool calls, and handoffs: the evidence is scattered across control-plane +events, Gitea canonical handoff comments, and local logs. This module defines +one durable, versioned event schema and per-source adapters that normalise +those scattered records into a single ``WorkflowEvent`` stream, plus a +read-only query layer (filter by issue / PR / session, stable ordering, +pagination) that the ``/api/v1/timeline`` route serves. + +Design rules honoured here: + +- **Read-only.** Sources are read; nothing is mutated. The control-plane + database is opened through a ``mode=ro`` URI so a missing or unwritable DB + degrades to a reason instead of creating directories or running migrations. +- **Fail-soft per source.** An unavailable source degrades to a status with a + reason rather than raising, and a source that could not run is never + rendered as an empty-and-healthy timeline. +- **Answerable filters only.** Each source declares which filter dimensions it + can actually answer. A filter dimension no source that ran can carry is + refused with an explicit reason rather than silently matching nothing: an + empty page from an unanswerable filter reads to an operator as "no such + activity", which is a different — and false — statement. +- **Redaction at the boundary, fail closed.** Every free-text field (event + messages, redacted tool arguments, decision/proof text) is run through the + console redaction policy before it leaves this module, and *before* any + structured value is derived from it — evidence references are extracted from + redacted text, then independently revalidated before serialization. An + unredactable value becomes the placeholder, and a value that cannot be proven + safe is dropped — an unredacted payload is never emitted, and a generation + error never drops raw data to a caller or a log. +- **Stable ordering.** Events sort by ``(timestamp, source_rank, event_key)`` + with a deterministic tiebreak, so pagination is stable across calls and + events with equal or missing timestamps keep a fixed order. + +Non-goals (from the issue): no full chat replay, no mutation of historical +events, no unredacted tool-argument storage. +""" + +from __future__ import annotations + +import re +import sqlite3 +from dataclasses import dataclass, replace +from datetime import datetime, timezone +from typing import Any, Callable, Iterable + +import control_plane_db +from webui import console_redaction + +# The schema is versioned so consumers can branch on shape. Bump on any +# breaking change to WorkflowEvent's serialized form. +TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION = 1 + +# Known event sources and their deterministic ordering rank. When two events +# carry the same timestamp, the source rank breaks the tie before the +# per-source event key, so a control-plane event and a handoff comment minted +# in the same second always sort in a fixed order. +SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE = "control_plane" +SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF = "gitea_handoff" +_SOURCE_RANK = { + SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE: 0, + SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF: 1, +} + +# The filter dimensions the query layer accepts. +FILTER_ISSUE = "issue" +FILTER_PR = "pr" +FILTER_SESSION = "session" + +# Which dimensions each source can actually answer. This is a property of the +# underlying records, not of the query code: the control-plane ``events`` table +# is (event_id, work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at) and carries no +# session identity at all, so no control-plane event can ever match a session +# filter. A CTH handoff comment can declare its session as a field, so the +# handoff source answers all three. Filtering on a dimension the surviving +# sources cannot carry is refused in ``load_timeline`` rather than answered +# with an empty page. +_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT: dict[str, tuple[str, ...]] = { + SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE: (FILTER_ISSUE, FILTER_PR), + SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF: (FILTER_ISSUE, FILTER_PR, FILTER_SESSION), +} + +# Why a source cannot answer a dimension, for the refusal reason an operator reads. +_SOURCE_FILTER_LIMITS: dict[tuple[str, str], str] = { + (SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE, FILTER_SESSION): ( + "control-plane events carry no session identity " + "(the events table has no session column)" + ), +} + +# A timestamp far in the future so events with no parseable timestamp sort +# last (after everything real) instead of first, without raising. +_MISSING_TS_SORT = "9999-12-31T23:59:59Z" + + +def _parse_ts(value: str | None) -> str | None: + """Normalise a timestamp to ``...Z`` UTC, or None when unparseable.""" + if not value: + return None + text = str(value).strip() + if not text: + return None + candidate = text[:-1] + "+00:00" if text.endswith("Z") else text + try: + parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(candidate) + except ValueError: + return None + if parsed.tzinfo is None: + parsed = parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc) + return parsed.astimezone(timezone.utc).replace(microsecond=0).isoformat().replace("+00:00", "Z") + + +def _redact(value: Any) -> Any: + """Redact a single free-text field, failing closed to the placeholder.""" + if value is None: + return None + return console_redaction.redact_text(str(value)) + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class WorkflowEvent: + """One normalised timeline event. + + Every field is optional except ``source``/``event_type``/``event_key`` + because sources carry different subsets. The class is frozen so an adapted + event is an immutable record; a consumer that needs a variant builds a new + one rather than mutating history. + """ + + source: str + event_type: str + event_key: str + timestamp: str | None = None + actor: str | None = None + role: str | None = None + issue_number: int | None = None + pr_number: int | None = None + session_id: str | None = None + tool_name: str | None = None + decision: str | None = None + message: str | None = None + correlation_id: str | None = None + evidence_refs: tuple[str, ...] = () + sensitive: bool = False + + def sort_key(self) -> tuple[str, int, str]: + return ( + self.timestamp or _MISSING_TS_SORT, + _SOURCE_RANK.get(self.source, 99), + self.event_key, + ) + + def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]: + return { + "source": self.source, + "event_type": self.event_type, + "event_key": self.event_key, + "timestamp": self.timestamp, + "actor": self.actor, + "role": self.role, + "issue_number": self.issue_number, + "pr_number": self.pr_number, + "session_id": self.session_id, + "tool_name": self.tool_name, + "decision": self.decision, + "message": self.message, + "correlation_id": self.correlation_id, + "evidence_refs": list(self.evidence_refs), + "sensitive": self.sensitive, + } + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Adapters — pure functions from a source's raw records to WorkflowEvents. # +# Each is total: a malformed record is skipped, never raised on. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + +# Event types whose payload is treated as sensitive and always redaction-hard +# (they can carry lease/session provenance or tool arguments). +_SENSITIVE_EVENT_HINTS = ("lease", "capability", "token", "auth", "secret") + +# Reference tokens (issue/PR/comment ids) and SHAs parsed out of proof text. +_EVIDENCE_REF_RE = re.compile(r"(?:#|PR\s*#?|issue\s*#?|comment\s*#?)(\d+)", re.IGNORECASE) + +# A commit reference is only recognised when the text *declares* it as one. +# A bare lowercase hex run is not evidence of anything: at 40 characters it is +# exactly the shape of a Gitea personal access token, and at 7 it also matches +# ordinary words such as "defaced". Requiring an anchoring keyword keeps real +# references ("commit abc1234", "at head a209756...", "base caaae9b6") usable +# while refusing to lift an undeclared secret-shaped run out of free text. +_SHA_RE = re.compile( + r"(?i:\b(?:commit|sha|head|base|parent|revision|rev|merge[- ]base)\b[\s:=@#]*)" + r"([0-9a-f]{7,40})\b" +) + +# Shapes a serialized evidence reference is allowed to take. Anything else is +# dropped rather than emitted. +_REF_ISSUE_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^#[0-9]{1,9}$") +_REF_SHA_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{7,40}$") + +# A long undelimited hex run with no declaring context is treated as credential +# material wherever it appears, never as an identifier. +_BARE_SECRET_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[0-9a-f]{32,}$") + +# An event type reads like an identifier, but a stored one is externally +# influenced: any producer that writes the control-plane ``events`` table +# chooses the string. It reaches ``to_dict`` verbatim, so it is validated here +# rather than trusted because of where it came from. +_CP_EVENT_TYPE_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9._:+-]{0,63}$") + +# Emitted in place of a value that cannot be proven safe. Deliberately not a +# plausible workflow type: an unsafe value is refused, never quietly rewritten +# into a different valid-looking one that would misdescribe the record. +UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE = "unsafe:redacted" + +# Emitted for a CTH heading that is not a declared member of ``CTH_TYPES``. The +# contract is enforced on write (``format_cth_body``) and on assess; the read +# path the timeline uses enforces it too rather than assuming it was. +UNKNOWN_HANDOFF_EVENT_TYPE = "handoff:unrecognized" + +# A source record id is a plain integer in both sources it comes from: the +# control-plane ``events`` primary key and a Gitea comment id. ``event_key`` is +# serialized verbatim and is the pagination tiebreak, so anything else is +# refused rather than interpolated into it. +_RECORD_ID_SHAPE = re.compile(r"^[0-9]{1,19}$") + + +def _kind_to_numbers(kind: str | None, number: int | None) -> tuple[int | None, int | None]: + """Map a control-plane work-item (kind, number) to (issue_no, pr_no).""" + if number is None: + return (None, None) + if kind == "pr": + return (None, int(number)) + if kind == "issue": + return (int(number), None) + return (None, None) + + +def _correlation_for(kind: str | None, number: int | None) -> str | None: + if number is None or kind not in ("issue", "pr"): + return None + return f"{kind}#{number}" + + +def _extract_evidence_refs(*texts: str | None) -> tuple[str, ...]: + """Extract issue/PR and declared-commit references from **redacted** text. + + Callers must pass text that has already been through :func:`_redact`; this + function derives a structured field from its input, so extracting ahead of + redaction would republish whatever redaction was about to remove. Every + reference is revalidated by :func:`_validated_evidence_refs` before it is + serialized. + """ + refs: list[str] = [] + for text in texts: + if not text: + continue + for match in _EVIDENCE_REF_RE.finditer(text): + token = f"#{match.group(1)}" + if token not in refs: + refs.append(token) + for match in _SHA_RE.finditer(text): + token = match.group(1) + if token not in refs: + refs.append(token) + return tuple(refs) + + +def _validated_evidence_refs(refs: Iterable[str]) -> tuple[tuple[str, ...], bool]: + """Independently revalidate references immediately before serialization. + + Extraction is not trusted on its own. A reference survives only when it has + a known reference shape and is unchanged by a second redaction pass — a + value the redaction policy would alter is credential material that must not + be emitted as a structured field. A full 40-character SHA stays usable + because extraction only accepts a hex run the source text explicitly + declared as a commit. Returns ``(safe_refs, dropped_any)``; ``dropped_any`` + marks the event sensitive so the drop is visible rather than silent. + """ + safe: list[str] = [] + dropped = False + for ref in refs or (): + try: + token = str(ref).strip() + if not token: + continue + recognised = bool(_REF_ISSUE_SHAPE.match(token) or _REF_SHA_SHAPE.match(token)) + if not recognised: + dropped = True + continue + if _redact(token) != token: + dropped = True + continue + if token not in safe: + safe.append(token) + except Exception: + # Fail closed: a reference that cannot be proven safe is dropped. + dropped = True + continue + return (tuple(safe), dropped) + + +def _safe_session_id(value: Any) -> str | None: + """Return a session identifier only when it is safe to emit. + + The value is authoritative source data — a session the record names for + itself — but it is still free text. It is dropped when redaction alters it + or when it is a bare secret-shaped hex run, so a credential parked in a + session field can never reach the payload or be echoed back by a filter. + """ + if value is None: + return None + text = str(value).strip() + if not text: + return None + if _BARE_SECRET_SHAPE.match(text): + return None + return text if _redact(text) == text else None + + +def _safe_record_id(value: Any) -> str | None: + """Return a source record id only when it is a plain numeric identifier. + + ``event_key`` is serialized verbatim and is the deterministic pagination + tiebreak, so an id is interpolated into it only when it has the shape both + real sources actually produce. A record whose identity cannot be trusted is + refused by the caller rather than keyed on. + """ + if value is None or isinstance(value, bool): + return None + if isinstance(value, int): + return str(value) + text = str(value).strip() + return text if _RECORD_ID_SHAPE.match(text) else None + + +def _safe_cp_event_type(value: Any) -> tuple[str, bool]: + """Validate a stored control-plane event type. Returns ``(type, unsafe)``. + + The stored value is externally influenced — whichever producer wrote the + ``events`` row chose the string — and ``to_dict`` serializes it verbatim, so + it passes a boundary of its own instead of relying on the one ``message`` + passes. A value survives only when it is an ordinary identifier, is not a + bare secret-shaped hex run, and is unchanged by a redaction pass. Anything + else fails closed to :data:`UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE`: the record stays visible as + an audit entry, but the value itself is never republished — not verbatim, + not partially sanitized, and not rewritten into some other valid-looking + type that would misdescribe what happened. + """ + text = ("" if value is None else str(value)).strip() + if not text: + return ("", False) + if _BARE_SECRET_SHAPE.match(text): + return (UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE, True) + if not _CP_EVENT_TYPE_SHAPE.match(text): + return (UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE, True) + if _redact(text) != text: + return (UNSAFE_EVENT_TYPE, True) + return (text, False) + + +def _safe_echo(value: Any) -> Any: + """Guard a scalar that is echoed back rather than derived from a record. + + Query scope and filter values are caller-supplied and are reflected in the + response so an operator can see what was asked. Reflection is still + emission: a value redaction would alter, or a bare secret-shaped hex run, is + replaced by the placeholder instead of being echoed verbatim. Ordinary + scope and filter values pass through untouched. + """ + if value is None or isinstance(value, (int, bool)): + return value + text = str(value) + if _BARE_SECRET_SHAPE.match(text.strip()): + return console_redaction.REDACTED + return _redact(text) + + +def adapt_cp_events(rows: Iterable[dict[str, Any]]) -> list[WorkflowEvent]: + """Adapt control-plane ``events`` rows (joined to work_items) into events. + + Each row is expected to carry ``event_id``, ``event_type``, ``message``, + ``created_at`` and the joined work-item ``kind``/``number``. Rows missing + an id or type are skipped so a partially written table never raises. + """ + events: list[WorkflowEvent] = [] + for row in rows or []: + try: + event_id = _safe_record_id(row.get("event_id")) + raw_event_type = (row.get("event_type") or "").strip() + if event_id is None or not raw_event_type: + continue + # The stored type is source data, not a trusted constant: validate + # it before it is serialized, exactly as `message` below is redacted + # before it is serialized. + event_type, event_type_unsafe = _safe_cp_event_type(raw_event_type) + kind = row.get("kind") + number = row.get("number") + issue_no, pr_no = _kind_to_numbers(kind, number) + sensitive = event_type_unsafe or any( + hint in raw_event_type.lower() for hint in _SENSITIVE_EVENT_HINTS + ) + events.append( + WorkflowEvent( + source=SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE, + event_type=event_type, + event_key=f"cp:{event_id}", + timestamp=_parse_ts(row.get("created_at")), + issue_number=issue_no, + pr_number=pr_no, + # No session_id: the control-plane events table is + # (event_id, work_item_id, event_type, message, created_at) + # and records no session. Inventing one from the work item + # or the message text would be a guess, so this source + # declares the session dimension unsupported instead + # (_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT) and the query layer refuses a + # session filter it cannot honestly answer. + message=_redact(row.get("message")), + correlation_id=_correlation_for(kind, number), + sensitive=sensitive, + ) + ) + except Exception: + # A single malformed row must not sink the whole adaptation. + continue + return events + + +def adapt_cth_comments( + comments: Iterable[dict[str, Any]], + *, + kind: str, + number: int, +) -> list[WorkflowEvent]: + """Adapt Gitea Canonical Thread Handoff (CTH) comments into events. + + Only comments that parse as a CTH (``canonical_thread_handoff.parse_cth_comment``) + become events; ordinary comments are ignored. ``kind``/``number`` scope the + events to the issue or PR the comments belong to. + """ + # Imported lazily so this module has no import-time dependency on the + # handoff parser when only the control-plane adapter is used. + from canonical_thread_handoff import is_known_cth_type, parse_cth_comment + + # ``kind``/``number`` are interpolated into event_key and correlation_id, so + # they are normalised once here. A scope this adapter cannot express is + # refused outright rather than serialized into an identifier. + kind = (kind or "").strip().lower() + if kind not in ("issue", "pr"): + return [] + try: + number = int(number) + except (TypeError, ValueError): + return [] + + issue_no, pr_no = _kind_to_numbers(kind, number) + correlation = _correlation_for(kind, number) + events: list[WorkflowEvent] = [] + for comment in comments or []: + try: + body = comment.get("body") or "" + parsed = parse_cth_comment(body) + if not parsed: + continue + fields = parsed.get("fields") or {} + cth_type = parsed.get("cth_type") or "" + comment_id = _safe_record_id(comment.get("id")) + if comment_id is None: + continue + # The CTH heading is free text: the parser accepts whatever follows + # "## CTH:", and only the write and assess paths check it against + # the contract. Check it here too — an unrecognised heading is + # reported as such rather than serialized into event_type, so + # arbitrary, malformed, or secret-shaped heading content has no way + # through. Declared types are preserved exactly. + cth_type_known = is_known_cth_type(cth_type) + # Redaction runs first, and every derived value is taken from the + # redacted text — deriving evidence refs from the raw proof would + # re-emit exactly what redaction was about to remove. + decision = _redact(fields.get("decision")) + proof = _redact(fields.get("proof")) + next_action = _redact(fields.get("next action")) + refs, refs_dropped = _validated_evidence_refs( + _extract_evidence_refs(proof, decision) + ) + events.append( + WorkflowEvent( + source=SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF, + event_type=( + f"handoff:{cth_type.strip()}" + if cth_type_known + else UNKNOWN_HANDOFF_EVENT_TYPE + ), + event_key=f"cth:{kind}:{number}:{comment_id}", + timestamp=_parse_ts(comment.get("created_at")), + actor=_redact((comment.get("user") or {}).get("login")), + role=_redact(fields.get("next owner")), + issue_number=issue_no, + pr_number=pr_no, + # A CTH names its own session when the producer records one; + # it is read from that declared field, never inferred from + # unrelated text. + session_id=_safe_session_id(fields.get("session")), + decision=decision, + message=next_action or _redact(fields.get("status")), + correlation_id=correlation, + evidence_refs=refs, + sensitive=refs_dropped or not cth_type_known, + ) + ) + except Exception: + continue + return events + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Read-only control-plane event source. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + +_CP_EVENTS_QUERY = """ +SELECT e.event_id AS event_id, + e.event_type AS event_type, + e.message AS message, + e.created_at AS created_at, + w.kind AS kind, + w.number AS number +FROM events e +JOIN work_items w ON e.work_item_id = w.work_item_id +WHERE w.remote = ? AND w.org = ? AND w.repo = ? +""" + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class SourceStatus: + """Fail-soft status for one timeline source. + + ``supported_filters`` states which filter dimensions this source's records + can carry; ``unsupported_filters`` names the requested dimensions it cannot, + so an operator can see *why* a source contributed nothing rather than being + left to read an empty list as an absence of activity. + """ + + name: str + ok: bool + reason: str | None = None + count: int = 0 + supported_filters: tuple[str, ...] = () + unsupported_filters: tuple[str, ...] = () + + def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]: + return { + "name": self.name, + "ok": self.ok, + "reason": self.reason, + "count": self.count, + "supported_filters": list(self.supported_filters), + "unsupported_filters": list(self.unsupported_filters), + } + + +def _cp_status(*, ok: bool, reason: str | None = None, count: int = 0) -> SourceStatus: + return SourceStatus( + SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE, + ok=ok, + # A failure reason is serialized like any other field and is often an + # exception string carrying a path or a transport error, so it crosses + # the redaction boundary too. Static reasons pass through unchanged. + reason=_redact(reason), + count=count, + supported_filters=_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT[SOURCE_CONTROL_PLANE], + ) + + +def _handoff_status(*, ok: bool, reason: str | None = None, count: int = 0) -> SourceStatus: + return SourceStatus( + SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF, + ok=ok, + # Same boundary as the control-plane status: this reason can quote an + # error raised by a live authenticated fetch. + reason=_redact(reason), + count=count, + supported_filters=_SOURCE_FILTER_SUPPORT[SOURCE_GITEA_HANDOFF], + ) + + +def read_cp_events( + *, + remote: str, + org: str, + repo: str, + db_path: str | None = None, +) -> tuple[list[WorkflowEvent], SourceStatus]: + """Read scoped control-plane events read-only. Never creates the DB. + + Opens the SQLite file through a ``mode=ro`` URI: a health/timeline read + must never create directories or run the schema migration that + ``ControlPlaneDB()`` performs on construction. A missing or unreadable DB + degrades to a status with a reason. + """ + path = (db_path or control_plane_db.default_db_path()).strip() + conn: sqlite3.Connection | None = None + try: + conn = sqlite3.connect(f"file:{path}?mode=ro", uri=True) + conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row + cursor = conn.execute(_CP_EVENTS_QUERY, (remote, org, repo)) + rows = [dict(r) for r in cursor.fetchall()] + except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc: + return ([], _cp_status(ok=False, reason=f"control-plane DB unavailable: {exc}")) + except sqlite3.Error as exc: + return ([], _cp_status(ok=False, reason=f"control-plane read failed: {exc}")) + finally: + if conn is not None: + conn.close() + events = adapt_cp_events(rows) + return (events, _cp_status(ok=True, count=len(events))) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Filter, sort, paginate. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + + +def filter_events( + events: Iterable[WorkflowEvent], + *, + issue: int | None = None, + pr: int | None = None, + session: str | None = None, +) -> list[WorkflowEvent]: + """Filter events by issue number, PR number, and/or session id. + + Filters are conjunctive. A filter that names a dimension an event does not + carry excludes that event (an issue filter excludes PR-only events). + """ + out: list[WorkflowEvent] = [] + for ev in events: + if issue is not None and ev.issue_number != issue: + continue + if pr is not None and ev.pr_number != pr: + continue + if session is not None and ev.session_id != session: + continue + out.append(ev) + return out + + +def sort_events(events: Iterable[WorkflowEvent]) -> list[WorkflowEvent]: + """Return events in stable timeline order (ascending).""" + return sorted(events, key=lambda ev: ev.sort_key()) + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class TimelinePage: + """One page of the sorted, filtered timeline.""" + + events: tuple[WorkflowEvent, ...] + total: int + limit: int + offset: int + + @property + def next_offset(self) -> int | None: + nxt = self.offset + len(self.events) + return nxt if nxt < self.total else None + + def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]: + return { + "events": [ev.to_dict() for ev in self.events], + "pagination": { + "total": self.total, + "limit": self.limit, + "offset": self.offset, + "returned": len(self.events), + "next_offset": self.next_offset, + "has_more": self.next_offset is not None, + }, + } + + +_MAX_LIMIT = 500 +_DEFAULT_LIMIT = 50 + + +def _coerce_bounds(limit: int | None, offset: int | None) -> tuple[int, int]: + try: + lim = int(limit) if limit is not None else _DEFAULT_LIMIT + except (TypeError, ValueError): + lim = _DEFAULT_LIMIT + try: + off = int(offset) if offset is not None else 0 + except (TypeError, ValueError): + off = 0 + lim = max(1, min(lim, _MAX_LIMIT)) + off = max(0, off) + return (lim, off) + + +def paginate(events: list[WorkflowEvent], *, limit: int | None, offset: int | None) -> TimelinePage: + lim, off = _coerce_bounds(limit, offset) + window = events[off : off + lim] + return TimelinePage(events=tuple(window), total=len(events), limit=lim, offset=off) + + +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # +# Composition — load_timeline aggregates all sources, fail-soft. # +# --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # + +# A comment source is a callable that, given (kind, number), returns the raw +# Gitea comment list for that issue/PR. The route supplies a live fail-soft +# fetcher; tests supply a fixture. When None, the handoff source is reported as +# not-run (never silently empty-and-healthy). +CommentSource = Callable[[str, int], list[dict[str, Any]]] + + +@dataclass(frozen=True) +class TimelineSnapshot: + """One answered timeline query. + + ``ok`` is False when the query could not be answered as asked — currently + when a requested filter dimension no surviving source can carry was + supplied. The page is then empty *and* the snapshot says so, because an + ``ok`` empty page is a claim that no such activity exists. + """ + + schema_version: int + remote: str + org: str + repo: str + filters: dict[str, Any] + page: TimelinePage + sources: tuple[SourceStatus, ...] + ok: bool = True + error: dict[str, Any] | None = None + + def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]: + return { + "ok": self.ok, + "error": self.error, + "schema_version": self.schema_version, + # Scope and filters are echoed caller input, not derived record + # data. Reflecting a value is still emitting it, so both cross the + # same boundary; ordinary scope and filter values are unchanged. + "scope": { + "remote": _safe_echo(self.remote), + "org": _safe_echo(self.org), + "repo": _safe_echo(self.repo), + }, + "filters": {key: _safe_echo(value) for key, value in self.filters.items()}, + "sources": [s.to_dict() for s in self.sources], + **self.page.to_dict(), + } + + +def _unanswerable_reasons( + statuses: Iterable[SourceStatus], unanswerable: Iterable[str] +) -> list[dict[str, str]]: + """Explain, per source, why each unanswerable dimension went unanswered.""" + out: list[dict[str, str]] = [] + for status in statuses: + for dim in unanswerable: + if dim not in status.supported_filters: + reason = _SOURCE_FILTER_LIMITS.get( + (status.name, dim), f"this source's records carry no {dim} identity" + ) + elif not status.ok: + reason = ( + f"this source can carry {dim} but did not run: " + f"{status.reason or 'unavailable'}" + ) + else: + continue + out.append({"source": status.name, "filter": dim, "reason": reason}) + return out + + +def load_timeline( + *, + remote: str, + org: str, + repo: str, + issue: int | None = None, + pr: int | None = None, + session: str | None = None, + limit: int | None = None, + offset: int | None = None, + db_path: str | None = None, + comment_source: CommentSource | None = None, +) -> TimelineSnapshot: + """Aggregate every timeline source into one filtered, paginated snapshot. + + Sources are read independently and fail soft: an unavailable source + contributes a ``SourceStatus`` with ``ok=False`` and a reason, and never + collapses the whole timeline. The handoff source only runs when a specific + issue or PR is requested (a handoff comment belongs to one thread) and a + ``comment_source`` is available; otherwise it is reported as ``not run`` + rather than as an empty-and-healthy source. + + A filter dimension that no surviving source can carry — a ``session`` + filter when the only source that ran is the control plane, whose events + record no session — is refused with ``ok=False`` and a structured error + instead of being answered with an empty page. + """ + all_events: list[WorkflowEvent] = [] + statuses: list[SourceStatus] = [] + + cp_events, cp_status = read_cp_events(remote=remote, org=org, repo=repo, db_path=db_path) + all_events.extend(cp_events) + statuses.append(cp_status) + + # Gitea handoff comments are thread-scoped: only fetch when the caller + # narrowed to one issue or PR, and only when a source was provided. + handoff_target: tuple[str, int] | None = None + if pr is not None: + handoff_target = ("pr", pr) + elif issue is not None: + handoff_target = ("issue", issue) + + if handoff_target is None: + statuses.append( + _handoff_status( + ok=False, + reason="not run: handoff comments are thread-scoped; filter by issue or pr to include them", + ) + ) + elif comment_source is None: + statuses.append( + _handoff_status( + ok=False, + reason="not run: no comment source configured for this timeline read", + ) + ) + else: + kind, number = handoff_target + try: + comments = comment_source(kind, number) or [] + handoff_events = adapt_cth_comments(comments, kind=kind, number=number) + all_events.extend(handoff_events) + statuses.append(_handoff_status(ok=True, count=len(handoff_events))) + except Exception as exc: # fail soft: a fetch/parse error degrades this source only + statuses.append(_handoff_status(ok=False, reason=f"handoff source failed: {exc}")) + + requested = tuple( + name + for name, value in ((FILTER_ISSUE, issue), (FILTER_PR, pr), (FILTER_SESSION, session)) + if value is not None + ) + statuses = [ + replace( + status, + unsupported_filters=tuple( + dim for dim in requested if dim not in status.supported_filters + ), + ) + for status in statuses + ] + filters = {"issue": issue, "pr": pr, "session": session} + + # A dimension is answerable only if a source that actually ran can carry it. + # If none can, refuse: an empty page would assert "no such activity", which + # is a claim this timeline is not in a position to make. + answerable: set[str] = set() + for status in statuses: + if status.ok: + answerable.update(status.supported_filters) + unanswerable = tuple(dim for dim in requested if dim not in answerable) + + if unanswerable: + return TimelineSnapshot( + schema_version=TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION, + remote=remote, + org=org, + repo=repo, + filters=filters, + page=paginate([], limit=limit, offset=offset), + sources=tuple(statuses), + ok=False, + error={ + "code": "filter_not_supported", + "unsupported_filters": list(unanswerable), + "detail": ( + "no timeline source that ran can answer " + + ", ".join(f"'{dim}'" for dim in unanswerable) + + "; the result is refused rather than returned empty" + ), + "sources": _unanswerable_reasons(statuses, unanswerable), + }, + ) + + filtered = filter_events(all_events, issue=issue, pr=pr, session=session) + ordered = sort_events(filtered) + page = paginate(ordered, limit=limit, offset=offset) + + return TimelineSnapshot( + schema_version=TIMELINE_SCHEMA_VERSION, + remote=remote, + org=org, + repo=repo, + filters=filters, + page=page, + sources=tuple(statuses), + ) + + +def snapshot_to_dict(snapshot: TimelineSnapshot) -> dict[str, Any]: + return snapshot.to_dict()