Merge master into feat/issue-663-restart-classes (resolve #886 conflict)

Brings PR #886 up to date with master @ 2f4dec8323
(8 commits behind), resolving the single conflicted file.

Conflict: gitea_mcp_server.py, both hunks inside gitea_request_mcp_restart.
Both sides were purely additive to the same tool, so both are kept in full:

- Branch side (#663, restart classes): parameters restart_class,
  target_session_id, target_role, target_connector; payload keys
  controller_approval_authorized, requester_role, requester_permissions.
- Master side (#661 via PR #882, drain-proof hard gate): parameters
  drain_proof_json, request_break_glass; the explanatory comment describing
  the apply-path hard gate and break-glass authorization.

No behaviour from either side was dropped, reordered, or reimplemented. Every
parameter from both sides is already consumed by the auto-merged function body
(restart_class and the three target_* arguments flow into the coordinator call;
drain_proof_json and request_break_glass drive the dry_run=False hard gate), so
the union is the only resolution that keeps the merged function coherent.

Validation on the merged tree:

  python -m pytest tests/test_drain_proof.py tests/test_restart_classes.py \
    tests/test_restart_coordinator.py tests/test_mcp_restart_paths.py \
    tests/test_mcp_restart_governance_docs.py tests/test_webui_sanctioned_restart.py \
    tests/test_issue_662_post_restart_reconcile.py -q
  # 165 passed, 68 subtests passed

py_compile on gitea_mcp_server.py passes and no conflict markers remain.

Closes #663

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-25 01:16:09 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
3 changed files with 1980 additions and 8 deletions
+907
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@@ -0,0 +1,907 @@
"""Tests for the pre-restart drain proof and hard gate (#661).
Covers the acceptance criteria:
1. Restart apply without a proof fails closed.
2. A successful drain produces a verifiable proof.
3. An open unsafe mutation makes the proof fail (multi-session fixture).
4. Pass / fail / expired verification paths.
Plus the security posture: forged/tampered proofs are rejected, break-glass is
the only bypass and is never silent, a stale blast-radius fingerprint rejects a
proof, and no per-process secret ever leaks into a serialized artifact.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import unittest
from datetime import datetime, timedelta, timezone
import drain_proof as dp
import restart_coordinator as rc
NOW = datetime(2026, 7, 24, 6, 0, 0, tzinfo=timezone.utc)
SECRET = b"unit-test-drain-proof-secret-0123456789abcdef"
def _live_pid() -> int:
return os.getpid()
def _clean_drain_state() -> dict:
"""Every drain action succeeded, no sessions outstanding."""
return {
"assignments_stopped": True,
"checkpoints_complete": True,
"handoffs_verified": True,
"leases_handled": True,
"acks": {}, # no other live sessions to acknowledge
"ack_timeout_policy_applied": False,
}
def _safe_report() -> dict:
"""Impact report with no other live work: a restart here is safe."""
report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
{"sessions": [], "leases": [], "inventory_complete": True},
now=NOW,
requesting_session_id="prgs-controller-1-req",
)
return report.as_dict()
def _unsafe_mutation_report() -> dict:
"""Multi-session report: a second session holds a live author mutation."""
sessions = [
{
"session_id": "prgs-controller-1-req",
"role": "controller",
"profile": "prgs-controller",
"pid": _live_pid(),
"status": "active",
"last_heartbeat_at": NOW.isoformat(),
},
{
"session_id": "prgs-author-99",
"role": "author",
"profile": "prgs-author",
"pid": _live_pid(),
"status": "active",
"last_heartbeat_at": NOW.isoformat(),
},
]
leases = [
{
"lease_id": "lease-mut",
"session_id": "prgs-author-99",
"role": "author",
"phase": "implementing",
"work_kind": "issue",
"work_number": 661,
"worktree_path": "branches/issue-661",
"freshness": {"freshness": "active"},
}
]
report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
{"sessions": sessions, "leases": leases, "inventory_complete": True},
now=NOW,
requesting_session_id="prgs-controller-1-req",
)
return report.as_dict()
class BuildDrainProofTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_clean_drain_produces_verifiable_clean_proof(self):
"""AC#2: a successful drain produces a verifiable proof."""
proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
impact_report=_safe_report(),
drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
requesting_session_id="prgs-controller-1-req",
now=NOW,
secret=SECRET,
)
self.assertTrue(proof.clean)
self.assertEqual(proof.failed_checks, [])
self.assertEqual(
{c.name for c in proof.checks}, set(dp.REQUIRED_CHECKS)
)
result = dp.verify_drain_proof(
proof.as_dict(), now=NOW, secret=SECRET
)
self.assertTrue(result.valid, result.reasons)
self.assertFalse(result.expired)
self.assertFalse(result.tampered)
def test_open_mutation_makes_proof_unclean(self):
"""AC#3: an unsafe mutation still in flight fails the proof."""
proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
impact_report=_unsafe_mutation_report(),
drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
now=NOW,
secret=SECRET,
)
self.assertFalse(proof.clean)
self.assertIn(dp.CHECK_NO_INFLIGHT_MUTATIONS, proof.failed_checks)
# Leases-handled also fails: the report still shows a disruptive lease.
self.assertIn(dp.CHECK_LEASES_HANDLED, proof.failed_checks)
result = dp.verify_drain_proof(proof.as_dict(), now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
self.assertFalse(result.valid)
def test_incomplete_inventory_fails_no_mutations_check(self):
proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
impact_report={"inventory_complete": False},
drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
now=NOW,
secret=SECRET,
)
self.assertFalse(proof.clean)
self.assertIn(dp.CHECK_NO_INFLIGHT_MUTATIONS, proof.failed_checks)
def test_missing_checkpoint_flag_fails_closed(self):
state = _clean_drain_state()
del state["checkpoints_complete"]
proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
impact_report=_safe_report(), drain_state=state, now=NOW, secret=SECRET
)
self.assertFalse(proof.clean)
self.assertIn(dp.CHECK_CHECKPOINTS_COMPLETE, proof.failed_checks)
def test_non_true_flags_fail_closed(self):
"""A truthy-but-not-True value (e.g. the string 'yes') must not pass."""
state = _clean_drain_state()
state["assignments_stopped"] = "yes"
proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
impact_report=_safe_report(), drain_state=state, now=NOW, secret=SECRET
)
self.assertIn(dp.CHECK_ASSIGNMENTS_STOPPED, proof.failed_checks)
def test_ack_timeout_policy_satisfies_ack_check(self):
state = _clean_drain_state()
state["acks"] = {"prgs-author-99": "pending"}
state["ack_timeout_policy_applied"] = True
proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
impact_report=_safe_report(), drain_state=state, now=NOW, secret=SECRET
)
names = {c.name: c.passed for c in proof.checks}
self.assertTrue(names[dp.CHECK_ACKS_OR_TIMEOUT])
def test_outstanding_acks_without_timeout_fail(self):
state = _clean_drain_state()
state["acks"] = {"prgs-author-99": "pending"}
state["ack_timeout_policy_applied"] = False
proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
impact_report=_safe_report(), drain_state=state, now=NOW, secret=SECRET
)
self.assertIn(dp.CHECK_ACKS_OR_TIMEOUT, proof.failed_checks)
def test_all_acked_satisfies_ack_check(self):
state = _clean_drain_state()
state["acks"] = {"prgs-author-99": "acked", "prgs-author-2": "acknowledged"}
proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
impact_report=_safe_report(), drain_state=state, now=NOW, secret=SECRET
)
names = {c.name: c.passed for c in proof.checks}
self.assertTrue(names[dp.CHECK_ACKS_OR_TIMEOUT])
class VerifyDrainProofTests(unittest.TestCase):
def _clean_proof_dict(self) -> dict:
return dp.build_drain_proof(
impact_report=_safe_report(),
drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
now=NOW,
secret=SECRET,
).as_dict()
def test_missing_proof_is_invalid(self):
result = dp.verify_drain_proof(None, now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
self.assertFalse(result.valid)
self.assertIsNone(result.proof_id)
def test_expired_proof_is_invalid(self):
"""AC#4: an expired proof fails verification."""
proof = self._clean_proof_dict()
later = NOW + timedelta(seconds=dp.DEFAULT_PROOF_TTL_SECONDS + 1)
result = dp.verify_drain_proof(proof, now=later, secret=SECRET)
self.assertFalse(result.valid)
self.assertTrue(result.expired)
def test_proof_valid_just_before_expiry(self):
proof = self._clean_proof_dict()
almost = NOW + timedelta(seconds=dp.DEFAULT_PROOF_TTL_SECONDS - 1)
result = dp.verify_drain_proof(proof, now=almost, secret=SECRET)
self.assertTrue(result.valid, result.reasons)
def test_wrong_secret_rejected(self):
"""A proof minted in a prior process (different secret) will not verify."""
proof = self._clean_proof_dict()
result = dp.verify_drain_proof(proof, now=NOW, secret=b"other-secret")
self.assertFalse(result.valid)
self.assertTrue(result.tampered)
def test_flipping_clean_flag_is_detected(self):
"""Forging clean=True on an unclean proof breaks the signature."""
unclean = dp.build_drain_proof(
impact_report=_unsafe_mutation_report(),
drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
now=NOW,
secret=SECRET,
).as_dict()
self.assertFalse(unclean["clean"])
unclean["clean"] = True # forge
result = dp.verify_drain_proof(unclean, now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
self.assertFalse(result.valid)
self.assertTrue(result.tampered)
def test_tampering_a_check_is_detected(self):
unclean = dp.build_drain_proof(
impact_report=_unsafe_mutation_report(),
drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
now=NOW,
secret=SECRET,
).as_dict()
for c in unclean["checks"]:
if c["name"] == dp.CHECK_NO_INFLIGHT_MUTATIONS:
c["passed"] = True # forge the failing check to pass
result = dp.verify_drain_proof(unclean, now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
self.assertFalse(result.valid)
self.assertTrue(result.tampered)
def test_missing_required_check_rejected(self):
proof = self._clean_proof_dict()
proof["checks"] = [
c for c in proof["checks"] if c["name"] != dp.CHECK_HANDOFFS_OK
]
result = dp.verify_drain_proof(proof, now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
self.assertFalse(result.valid)
def test_stale_fingerprint_rejected(self):
proof = self._clean_proof_dict()
result = dp.verify_drain_proof(
proof,
now=NOW,
secret=SECRET,
expected_impact_fingerprint="deadbeef",
)
self.assertFalse(result.valid)
def test_matching_fingerprint_accepted(self):
report = _safe_report()
proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
impact_report=report,
drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
now=NOW,
secret=SECRET,
).as_dict()
fp = dp.impact_fingerprint(report)
result = dp.verify_drain_proof(
proof, now=NOW, secret=SECRET, expected_impact_fingerprint=fp
)
self.assertTrue(result.valid, result.reasons)
class GateApplyRestartTests(unittest.TestCase):
def _clean_proof_dict(self) -> dict:
return dp.build_drain_proof(
impact_report=_safe_report(),
drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
now=NOW,
secret=SECRET,
).as_dict()
def test_apply_without_proof_denied(self):
"""AC#1: restart apply without a proof fails closed + raises incident."""
decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(proof=None, now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
self.assertFalse(decision.allow)
self.assertEqual(decision.verdict, dp.GATE_DENY)
self.assertIsNotNone(decision.incident)
self.assertEqual(
decision.incident["kind"], "restart_drain_gate_denied"
)
def test_apply_with_valid_proof_allowed(self):
decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(
proof=self._clean_proof_dict(), now=NOW, secret=SECRET
)
self.assertTrue(decision.allow)
self.assertEqual(decision.verdict, dp.GATE_ALLOW)
self.assertIsNone(decision.incident)
def test_apply_with_expired_proof_denied_with_incident(self):
later = NOW + timedelta(seconds=dp.DEFAULT_PROOF_TTL_SECONDS + 5)
decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(
proof=self._clean_proof_dict(), now=later, secret=SECRET
)
self.assertFalse(decision.allow)
self.assertIsNotNone(decision.incident)
def test_apply_with_unclean_proof_denied(self):
"""AC#3 at the gate: an unsafe-mutation proof is denied."""
unclean = dp.build_drain_proof(
impact_report=_unsafe_mutation_report(),
drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
now=NOW,
secret=SECRET,
).as_dict()
decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(proof=unclean, now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
self.assertFalse(decision.allow)
self.assertIsNotNone(decision.incident)
def test_break_glass_allows_without_proof_but_records_bypass(self):
decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(
proof=None, now=NOW, secret=SECRET, break_glass=True
)
self.assertTrue(decision.allow)
self.assertEqual(decision.verdict, dp.GATE_BREAK_GLASS)
self.assertTrue(decision.break_glass)
self.assertIsNone(decision.incident)
self.assertTrue(decision.audit_record["break_glass"])
def test_denied_gate_carries_stale_fingerprint_reason(self):
decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(
proof=self._clean_proof_dict(),
now=NOW,
secret=SECRET,
expected_impact_fingerprint="not-the-fingerprint",
)
self.assertFalse(decision.allow)
class SecretHygieneTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_secret_never_serialized(self):
proof = dp.build_drain_proof(
impact_report=_safe_report(),
drain_state=_clean_drain_state(),
now=NOW,
secret=SECRET,
)
blob = dp._canonical(proof.as_dict())
self.assertNotIn(SECRET.decode(), blob)
# The signature is a hex digest, not the raw secret.
self.assertNotIn(SECRET.hex(), blob)
def test_incident_descriptor_has_no_secret(self):
decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(proof=None, now=NOW, secret=SECRET)
blob = dp._canonical(decision.incident)
self.assertNotIn(SECRET.decode(), blob)
def _drained_report_with_live_sessions(count: int) -> dict:
"""Report with ``count`` other live sessions but nothing in flight.
Every other checklist item passes against this report, so a failure
isolates the acknowledgement check rather than tripping on mutations.
"""
sessions = [
{
"session_id": "prgs-controller-1-req",
"role": "controller",
"profile": "prgs-controller",
"pid": _live_pid(),
"status": "active",
"last_heartbeat_at": NOW.isoformat(),
}
]
for index in range(count):
sessions.append(
{
"session_id": f"prgs-author-{index}",
"role": "author",
"profile": "prgs-author",
"pid": _live_pid(),
"status": "active",
"last_heartbeat_at": NOW.isoformat(),
}
)
report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
{"sessions": sessions, "leases": [], "inventory_complete": True},
now=NOW,
requesting_session_id="prgs-controller-1-req",
)
return report.as_dict()
class AcknowledgementFailClosedTests(unittest.TestCase):
"""Acknowledgement evidence must fail closed unless explicitly verified.
Regression cover for the reviewed fail-open on PR #882: an absent ``acks``
key collapsed to ``{}`` and was read as "no other live sessions required to
acknowledge", so a proof minted clean and the restart gate allowed while the
impact report still showed other live sessions.
"""
def _state(self, **overrides) -> dict:
state = _clean_drain_state()
state.pop("acks", None)
state["ack_timeout_policy_applied"] = False
state.update(overrides)
return state
def _acks_check(self, proof) -> dp.DrainCheck:
return next(c for c in proof.checks if c.name == dp.CHECK_ACKS_OR_TIMEOUT)
def _build(self, report: dict, state: dict):
return dp.build_drain_proof(
impact_report=report, drain_state=state, now=NOW, secret=SECRET
)
def assertAcksFailClosed(self, report: dict, state: dict) -> None:
proof = self._build(report, state)
self.assertFalse(self._acks_check(proof).passed)
self.assertIn(dp.CHECK_ACKS_OR_TIMEOUT, proof.failed_checks)
self.assertFalse(proof.clean)
# --- missing / null / empty / malformed ------------------------------
def test_missing_acks_key_with_live_sessions_fails_closed(self):
"""The exact reviewed defect: absent key, three other live sessions."""
report = _drained_report_with_live_sessions(3)
self.assertEqual(report["counts"]["sessions_live_other"], 3)
state = self._state()
self.assertNotIn("acks", state)
proof = self._build(report, state)
check = self._acks_check(proof)
self.assertFalse(check.passed)
self.assertNotIn("no other live sessions", check.detail)
self.assertIn("fail closed", check.detail)
self.assertFalse(proof.clean)
self.assertEqual(proof.failed_checks, [dp.CHECK_ACKS_OR_TIMEOUT])
def test_none_acks_with_live_sessions_fails_closed(self):
self.assertAcksFailClosed(
_drained_report_with_live_sessions(2), self._state(acks=None)
)
def test_empty_acks_with_live_sessions_fails_closed(self):
self.assertAcksFailClosed(
_drained_report_with_live_sessions(1), self._state(acks={})
)
def test_malformed_acks_fail_closed(self):
for malformed in ([], "ack", 7, ("ack",), True):
with self.subTest(malformed=malformed):
self.assertAcksFailClosed(
_drained_report_with_live_sessions(1),
self._state(acks=malformed),
)
# --- stale / unproven values -----------------------------------------
def test_stale_or_unproven_ack_values_fail_closed(self):
for value in ("pending", "stale", "unknown", "", None, True, 1, NOW):
with self.subTest(value=value):
self.assertAcksFailClosed(
_drained_report_with_live_sessions(1),
self._state(acks={"prgs-author-0": value}),
)
def test_partial_coverage_fails_closed(self):
"""Fewer acknowledgements than the report's live-session count."""
self.assertAcksFailClosed(
_drained_report_with_live_sessions(3),
self._state(acks={"prgs-author-0": "ack"}),
)
def test_one_unacked_entry_among_many_fails_closed(self):
self.assertAcksFailClosed(
_drained_report_with_live_sessions(2),
self._state(acks={"prgs-author-0": "ack", "prgs-author-1": "pending"}),
)
def test_unproven_live_session_count_fails_closed(self):
"""A missing or malformed count cannot prove nobody had to acknowledge."""
malformed_counts = (
None,
{},
{"sessions_live_other": None},
{"sessions_live_other": "3"},
{"sessions_live_other": -1},
{"sessions_live_other": True},
)
for counts in malformed_counts:
with self.subTest(counts=counts):
report = _drained_report_with_live_sessions(0)
if counts is None:
report.pop("counts", None)
else:
report["counts"] = counts
self.assertAcksFailClosed(report, self._state())
# --- valid evidence still passes -------------------------------------
def test_complete_valid_acks_pass(self):
report = _drained_report_with_live_sessions(2)
state = self._state(
acks={"prgs-author-0": "ack", "prgs-author-1": "acknowledged"}
)
proof = self._build(report, state)
self.assertTrue(self._acks_check(proof).passed)
self.assertTrue(proof.clean)
self.assertEqual(proof.failed_checks, [])
def test_no_other_live_sessions_still_passes(self):
"""Intended behavior retained: zero live sessions needs no acks."""
report = _drained_report_with_live_sessions(0)
self.assertEqual(report["counts"]["sessions_live_other"], 0)
proof = self._build(report, self._state())
check = self._acks_check(proof)
self.assertTrue(check.passed)
self.assertIn("sessions_live_other=0", check.detail)
self.assertTrue(proof.clean)
# --- timeout policy cannot become a second fail-open ------------------
def test_unproven_timeout_policy_cannot_open_the_gate(self):
for value in (None, "true", "yes", 1, "True", [], {}):
with self.subTest(value=value):
self.assertAcksFailClosed(
_drained_report_with_live_sessions(2),
self._state(ack_timeout_policy_applied=value),
)
def test_explicit_timeout_policy_permits(self):
proof = self._build(
_drained_report_with_live_sessions(2),
self._state(ack_timeout_policy_applied=True),
)
check = self._acks_check(proof)
self.assertTrue(check.passed)
self.assertIn("timeout policy", check.detail)
self.assertTrue(proof.clean)
# --- the gate itself must deny ---------------------------------------
def test_failed_ack_check_denies_the_restart_gate(self):
report = _drained_report_with_live_sessions(3)
proof = self._build(report, self._state())
self.assertFalse(proof.clean)
decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(
proof=proof.as_dict(),
now=NOW,
secret=SECRET,
expected_impact_fingerprint=dp.impact_fingerprint(report),
)
self.assertFalse(decision.allow)
self.assertEqual(decision.verdict, dp.GATE_DENY)
self.assertIsNotNone(decision.incident)
def test_unclean_ack_proof_fails_verification(self):
report = _drained_report_with_live_sessions(3)
proof = self._build(report, self._state())
result = dp.verify_drain_proof(
proof.as_dict(),
now=NOW,
secret=SECRET,
expected_impact_fingerprint=dp.impact_fingerprint(report),
)
self.assertFalse(result.valid)
self.assertFalse(result.clean)
def _identity_report(*, requester: str, others: tuple[str, ...]) -> dict:
"""Report with explicitly named requester and other live sessions.
Unlike :func:`_drained_report_with_live_sessions`, the session ids are
chosen by the caller so a test can supply acknowledgements for the *wrong*
identities while keeping the count correct.
"""
sessions = [
{
"session_id": requester,
"role": "controller",
"profile": "prgs-controller",
"pid": _live_pid(),
"status": "active",
"last_heartbeat_at": NOW.isoformat(),
}
]
for session_id in others:
sessions.append(
{
"session_id": session_id,
"role": "author",
"profile": "prgs-author",
"pid": _live_pid(),
"status": "active",
"last_heartbeat_at": NOW.isoformat(),
}
)
report = rc.evaluate_restart_impact(
{"sessions": sessions, "leases": [], "inventory_complete": True},
now=NOW,
requesting_session_id=requester,
)
return report.as_dict()
class AcknowledgementIdentityBindingTests(unittest.TestCase):
"""Acknowledgement coverage must be bound to session identity, not counted.
Regression cover for the second reviewed fail-open on PR #882 (review 582,
blocker B1): coverage compared ``acked_count`` against
``counts.sessions_live_other``, so acknowledgements supplied for the
requesting session and for ids that do not exist satisfied the obligations
of the live sessions that never answered. The required identities are
carried by the report itself — ``ack_state`` keys and ``affected_sessions``
filtered on ``live and not is_requester`` — and only an acknowledgement
keyed by one of those ids may count for it.
"""
def _state(self, **overrides) -> dict:
state = _clean_drain_state()
state.pop("acks", None)
state["ack_timeout_policy_applied"] = False
state.update(overrides)
return state
def _acks_check(self, proof) -> dp.DrainCheck:
return next(c for c in proof.checks if c.name == dp.CHECK_ACKS_OR_TIMEOUT)
def _build(self, report: dict, state: dict):
return dp.build_drain_proof(
impact_report=report, drain_state=state, now=NOW, secret=SECRET
)
def assertAcksFailClosed(self, report: dict, state: dict) -> dp.DrainCheck:
"""Failure must propagate through the check, the proof, and the gate."""
proof = self._build(report, state)
check = self._acks_check(proof)
self.assertFalse(check.passed)
self.assertFalse(proof.clean)
self.assertIn(dp.CHECK_ACKS_OR_TIMEOUT, proof.failed_checks)
decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(
proof=proof.as_dict(),
now=NOW,
secret=SECRET,
expected_impact_fingerprint=dp.impact_fingerprint(report),
)
self.assertEqual(decision.verdict, dp.GATE_DENY)
self.assertFalse(decision.allow)
return check
# --- the reviewer's exact reproduction --------------------------------
def test_requester_plus_unknown_id_cannot_satisfy_two_live_sessions(self):
"""Review 582 B1 verbatim: requester + a nonexistent session.
``sessions_live_other=2`` with ``ack_state`` naming ``other-0`` and
``other-1``; the drain state supplies an acknowledgement from the
requesting session itself and from a session that does not exist. The
count matches, the identities do not.
"""
report = _identity_report(requester="req", others=("other-0", "other-1"))
self.assertEqual(report["counts"]["sessions_live_other"], 2)
self.assertEqual(
report["ack_state"], {"other-0": "pending", "other-1": "pending"}
)
state = self._state(acks={"req": "ack", "totally-bogus-session": "ack"})
check = self.assertAcksFailClosed(report, state)
self.assertIn("other-0", check.detail)
self.assertIn("other-1", check.detail)
self.assertIn("fail closed", check.detail)
# --- wrong / unknown / requester identities ---------------------------
def test_sufficient_count_of_wrong_ids_fails_closed(self):
"""Right cardinality, wrong identities: two acks, neither required."""
report = _identity_report(requester="req", others=("other-0", "other-1"))
state = self._state(acks={"ghost-a": "ack", "ghost-b": "ack"})
check = self.assertAcksFailClosed(report, state)
self.assertIn("do not count", check.detail)
def test_more_acks_than_required_still_fails_on_wrong_ids(self):
"""Coverage cannot be bought with volume: five acks, none required."""
report = _identity_report(requester="req", others=("other-0", "other-1"))
state = self._state(acks={f"ghost-{i}": "acknowledged" for i in range(5)})
self.assertAcksFailClosed(report, state)
def test_partial_identity_match_fails_closed(self):
"""One required id acknowledged, the rest padded with unknown ids."""
report = _identity_report(
requester="req", others=("other-0", "other-1", "other-2")
)
state = self._state(
acks={"other-0": "ack", "ghost-1": "ack", "ghost-2": "ack"}
)
check = self.assertAcksFailClosed(report, state)
self.assertIn("other-1", check.detail)
self.assertIn("other-2", check.detail)
def test_requester_ack_never_satisfies_another_sessions_obligation(self):
"""The requester is excluded from the required set and stays excluded."""
report = _identity_report(requester="req", others=("other-0",))
requester_rows = [s for s in report["affected_sessions"] if s["is_requester"]]
self.assertEqual([s["session_id"] for s in requester_rows], ["req"])
self.assertNotIn("req", report["ack_state"])
check = self.assertAcksFailClosed(report, self._state(acks={"req": "ack"}))
self.assertIn("other-0", check.detail)
def test_fabricated_ids_do_not_count_toward_coverage(self):
report = _identity_report(requester="req", others=("other-0",))
for bogus in ("", " ", "other-0 extra", "OTHER-0", "other-01", "0"):
with self.subTest(bogus=bogus):
self.assertAcksFailClosed(report, self._state(acks={bogus: "ack"}))
# --- per-session state must be explicitly valid ------------------------
def test_unproven_per_session_states_fail_closed(self):
"""A required id present but not explicitly acknowledged fails closed."""
report = _identity_report(requester="req", others=("other-0", "other-1"))
for value in ("pending", "stale", "unknown", "", None, True, 1, NOW):
with self.subTest(value=value):
self.assertAcksFailClosed(
report,
self._state(acks={"other-0": "ack", "other-1": value}),
)
def test_report_ack_state_placeholder_is_never_read_as_an_ack(self):
"""``ack_state`` values are the report's own placeholders, not evidence."""
report = _identity_report(requester="req", others=("other-0",))
report["ack_state"] = {"other-0": "ack"}
self.assertAcksFailClosed(report, self._state())
# --- missing / malformed / contradictory identity evidence -------------
def test_missing_identity_evidence_fails_closed(self):
report = _identity_report(requester="req", others=("other-0",))
report.pop("ack_state", None)
report.pop("affected_sessions", None)
check = self.assertAcksFailClosed(report, self._state(acks={"other-0": "ack"}))
self.assertIn("no session-identity evidence", check.detail)
def test_malformed_ack_state_fails_closed(self):
for malformed in ([], "other-0", 7, None, ("other-0",)):
with self.subTest(malformed=malformed):
report = _identity_report(requester="req", others=("other-0",))
report["ack_state"] = malformed
self.assertAcksFailClosed(
report, self._state(acks={"other-0": "ack"})
)
def test_non_string_ack_state_key_fails_closed(self):
report = _identity_report(requester="req", others=("other-0",))
report["ack_state"] = {7: "pending"}
self.assertAcksFailClosed(report, self._state(acks={"other-0": "ack"}))
def test_malformed_affected_sessions_fails_closed(self):
for malformed in ("sessions", 7, {"session_id": "other-0"}, [None], [7]):
with self.subTest(malformed=malformed):
report = _identity_report(requester="req", others=("other-0",))
report.pop("ack_state", None)
report["affected_sessions"] = malformed
self.assertAcksFailClosed(
report, self._state(acks={"other-0": "ack"})
)
def test_affected_sessions_without_explicit_booleans_fails_closed(self):
"""``live``/``is_requester`` must be real booleans, never inferred."""
report = _identity_report(requester="req", others=("other-0",))
report.pop("ack_state", None)
for row in report["affected_sessions"]:
if row["session_id"] == "other-0":
row["is_requester"] = "false"
self.assertAcksFailClosed(report, self._state(acks={"other-0": "ack"}))
def test_affected_sessions_missing_live_flag_fails_closed(self):
report = _identity_report(requester="req", others=("other-0",))
report.pop("ack_state", None)
for row in report["affected_sessions"]:
row.pop("live", None)
self.assertAcksFailClosed(report, self._state(acks={"other-0": "ack"}))
def test_contradictory_ack_state_and_affected_sessions_fails_closed(self):
"""Both views present and disagreeing is unresolvable, not a tie-break."""
report = _identity_report(requester="req", others=("other-0", "other-1"))
report["ack_state"] = {"other-0": "pending", "other-9": "pending"}
check = self.assertAcksFailClosed(
report, self._state(acks={"other-0": "ack", "other-9": "ack"})
)
self.assertIn("contradicts itself", check.detail)
def test_identity_count_mismatch_fails_closed(self):
"""Identity evidence that cannot be reconciled with the count denies."""
report = _identity_report(requester="req", others=("other-0", "other-1"))
report["counts"] = dict(report["counts"], sessions_live_other=1)
check = self.assertAcksFailClosed(
report, self._state(acks={"other-0": "ack", "other-1": "ack"})
)
self.assertIn("cannot be reconciled", check.detail)
def test_broken_identity_evidence_outranks_timeout_policy(self):
"""The sanctioned timeout path cannot paper over an unreadable report."""
report = _identity_report(requester="req", others=("other-0",))
report["ack_state"] = "not-a-mapping"
self.assertAcksFailClosed(report, self._state(ack_timeout_policy_applied=True))
# --- legitimate success is preserved -----------------------------------
def test_every_required_session_acknowledged_passes(self):
report = _identity_report(
requester="req", others=("other-0", "other-1", "other-2")
)
state = self._state(
acks={
"other-0": "ack",
"other-1": "acked",
"other-2": "acknowledged",
}
)
proof = self._build(report, state)
check = self._acks_check(proof)
self.assertTrue(check.passed)
self.assertTrue(proof.clean)
self.assertEqual(proof.failed_checks, [])
self.assertIn("acknowledged by identity", check.detail)
decision = dp.gate_apply_restart(
proof=proof.as_dict(),
now=NOW,
secret=SECRET,
expected_impact_fingerprint=dp.impact_fingerprint(report),
)
self.assertEqual(decision.verdict, dp.GATE_ALLOW)
self.assertTrue(decision.allow)
def test_required_session_ack_tolerates_surrounding_whitespace(self):
report = _identity_report(requester="req", others=("other-0",))
proof = self._build(report, self._state(acks={" other-0 ": " ACK "}))
self.assertTrue(self._acks_check(proof).passed)
self.assertTrue(proof.clean)
def test_no_other_live_sessions_still_passes_with_identity_evidence(self):
report = _identity_report(requester="req", others=())
self.assertEqual(report["counts"]["sessions_live_other"], 0)
self.assertEqual(report["ack_state"], {})
proof = self._build(report, self._state())
check = self._acks_check(proof)
self.assertTrue(check.passed)
self.assertIn("sessions_live_other=0", check.detail)
self.assertTrue(proof.clean)
def test_explicit_timeout_policy_retains_intended_behavior(self):
"""Valid, correctly typed timeout evidence still permits the check."""
report = _identity_report(requester="req", others=("other-0", "other-1"))
proof = self._build(report, self._state(ack_timeout_policy_applied=True))
check = self._acks_check(proof)
self.assertTrue(check.passed)
self.assertIn("timeout policy", check.detail)
self.assertTrue(proof.clean)
def test_timeout_policy_still_strictly_typed_under_identity_binding(self):
report = _identity_report(requester="req", others=("other-0",))
for value in (None, "true", "True", 1, [], {}):
with self.subTest(value=value):
self.assertAcksFailClosed(
report, self._state(ack_timeout_policy_applied=value)
)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()