Merge pull request 'feat: add read-only gitea_whoami authenticated-user lookup (#11)' (#20) from feature/11-gitea-authenticated-user-lookup into master

Reviewed-on: #20

README.md

@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ Any MCP-compatible agent (Antigravity, Claude Code, etc.) can call these tools n
 | `gitea_close_issue` | Close an issue by number |
 | `gitea_list_issues` | List issues with state/label filters |
 | `gitea_view_issue` | Get full details of a single issue |
+| `gitea_whoami` | Read-only: identify the authenticated Gitea account (safe metadata only) |
 | `gitea_mark_issue` | Claim/release an issue (start/done) |
 | `gitea_list_labels` | List all available labels in a repository |
 | `gitea_create_label` | Create a new label with custom color |

mcp_server.py

@@ -595,6 +595,53 @@ def gitea_view_issue(
     }
 
 
+@mcp.tool()
+def gitea_whoami(
+    remote: str = "dadeschools",
+    host: str | None = None,
+) -> dict:
+    """Look up the Gitea account the MCP server is authenticated as.
+
+    Read-only. Calls Gitea's authenticated-user endpoint (GET /api/v1/user)
+    with the configured token and returns safe identity metadata only. Use
+    this to prove which account a mutating workflow (e.g. review/merge) would
+    act as, so self-review/self-merge can be detected before acting.
+
+    Never returns the token, Authorization header, password, or any other
+    secret material. Fails closed with a clear error if the identity cannot
+    be determined.
+
+    Args:
+        remote: Known instance — 'dadeschools' or 'prgs'.
+        host: Override the Gitea host.
+
+    Returns:
+        dict with 'authenticated', 'username', 'display_name', 'user_id',
+        'email', 'server', and 'remote'.
+    """
+    if remote not in REMOTES:
+        raise ValueError(f"Unknown remote '{remote}'. Choose from: {list(REMOTES)}")
+    h = host or REMOTES[remote]["host"]
+    auth = _auth(h)
+    url = f"https://{h}/api/v1/user"
+    data = api_request("GET", url, auth)
+    if not data or not data.get("login"):
+        # Fail closed: never assume an identity we could not verify.
+        raise RuntimeError(
+            f"Could not determine the authenticated Gitea identity for {h}. "
+            "Verify the configured token is valid for this instance."
+        )
+    return {
+        "authenticated": True,
+        "username": data.get("login"),
+        "display_name": data.get("full_name") or None,
+        "user_id": data.get("id"),
+        "email": data.get("email") or None,
+        "server": f"https://{h}",
+        "remote": remote,
+    }
+
+
 @mcp.tool()
 def gitea_mark_issue(
     issue_number: int,

tests/test_mcp_server.py

@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ from mcp_server import (  # noqa: E402
     gitea_edit_pr,
     gitea_get_file,
     gitea_commit_files,
+    gitea_whoami,
 )
 
 FAKE_AUTH = "Basic dGVzdDp0ZXN0"
@@ -466,5 +467,52 @@ class TestCommitFiles(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual(payload["files"], files)
 
 
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# Whoami (authenticated-user identity lookup)
+# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+class TestWhoami(unittest.TestCase):
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
+    def test_returns_safe_identity(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        mock_api.return_value = {
+            "id": 42,
+            "login": "reviewer-bot",
+            "full_name": "Reviewer Bot",
+            "email": "reviewer@example.com",
+        }
+        result = gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
+        self.assertTrue(result["authenticated"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["username"], "reviewer-bot")
+        self.assertEqual(result["display_name"], "Reviewer Bot")
+        self.assertEqual(result["user_id"], 42)
+        self.assertEqual(result["server"], "https://gitea.prgs.cc")
+        self.assertEqual(result["remote"], "prgs")
+        # Read-only: GET against the authenticated-user endpoint.
+        call_args = mock_api.call_args
+        self.assertEqual(call_args[0][0], "GET")
+        self.assertTrue(call_args[0][1].endswith("/api/v1/user"))
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
+    def test_never_exposes_secrets(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        mock_api.return_value = {"id": 1, "login": "someone"}
+        result = gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
+        blob = repr(result).lower()
+        for secret in ("token", "authorization", "basic ", "password", FAKE_AUTH.lower()):
+            self.assertNotIn(secret, blob)
+
+    @patch("mcp_server.api_request")
+    @patch("mcp_server.get_auth_header", return_value=FAKE_AUTH)
+    def test_fails_closed_without_login(self, _auth, mock_api):
+        mock_api.return_value = {"id": 1}  # no 'login'
+        with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError):
+            gitea_whoami(remote="prgs")
+
+    def test_rejects_unknown_remote(self):
+        with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
+            gitea_whoami(remote="nope")
+
+
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()