Merge master into feat/issue-204

author_proofs.py

@@ -0,0 +1,217 @@
+"""Fail-closed branch-identity proofs for author workflows (#177).
+
+Author-side counterpart of the reviewer proofs in ``review_proofs.py``
+(#173). During the #173 implementation itself, a commit landed on local
+``master`` because the shared checkout's branch moved mid-session (origin
+incident of #177). These helpers turn that from an after-the-fact repair
+into a fail-closed gate: an author workflow must prove its local git state
+before staging, committing, or pushing.
+
+The helpers are pure (no git calls): the workflow gathers the raw facts
+(``git branch --show-current``, ``git rev-parse HEAD``, the push refspec,
+the branch named in the issue claim) and passes them in, so the same logic
+works from prompts, harness assertions, and tests. Shared-worktree branch
+switches by other sessions are treated as expected events to detect, not
+exceptional ones. Nothing here weakens the review/merge/permission gates.
+"""
+
+PROTECTED_BRANCHES = frozenset(
+    {"master", "main", "develop", "development", "dev"}
+)
+
+
+def _clean(name):
+    return (name or "").strip()
+
+
+def verify_branch_for_commit(current_branch, intended_branch):
+    """Required behavior 1: prove the branch before staging/committing.
+
+    Proven only when both names are present, the intended branch is not a
+    protected branch, and the current branch equals the intended one (which
+    also rules out being on any protected branch). Returns {'proven',
+    'block', 'reasons', 'current_branch', 'intended_branch'}.
+    """
+    reasons = []
+    current = _clean(current_branch)
+    intended = _clean(intended_branch)
+
+    if not current:
+        reasons.append(
+            "current branch unknown (detached HEAD or state not read); "
+            "fail closed"
+        )
+    if not intended:
+        reasons.append("intended feature branch not stated; fail closed")
+    if intended and intended in PROTECTED_BRANCHES:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"intended branch '{intended}' is a protected branch; author "
+            "work must target a feature branch"
+        )
+    if current and current in PROTECTED_BRANCHES:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"current branch '{current}' is a protected branch; committing "
+            "here is blocked"
+        )
+    if current and intended and current != intended:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"current branch '{current}' is not the intended feature branch "
+            f"'{intended}'; stop before staging/committing"
+        )
+
+    proven = not reasons
+    return {
+        "proven": proven,
+        "block": not proven,
+        "reasons": reasons,
+        "current_branch": current or None,
+        "intended_branch": intended or None,
+    }
+
+
+def detect_branch_drift(branch_at_validation, head_at_validation,
+                        current_branch, current_head):
+    """Required behaviors 2–3: stop when branch or HEAD moved mid-session.
+
+    Compares the branch name and HEAD SHA captured at validation time with
+    the state observed immediately before commit/push. Any difference —
+    including an external branch switch in a shared worktree — is drift and
+    blocks until reconciled. Missing state fails closed.
+    """
+    reasons = []
+    branch_then = _clean(branch_at_validation)
+    branch_now = _clean(current_branch)
+    head_then = _clean(head_at_validation).lower()
+    head_now = _clean(current_head).lower()
+
+    if not branch_then or not head_then:
+        reasons.append("validation-time branch/HEAD not recorded; fail closed")
+    if not branch_now or not head_now:
+        reasons.append("current branch/HEAD not read; fail closed")
+
+    if branch_then and branch_now and branch_then != branch_now:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"branch changed from '{branch_then}' to '{branch_now}' since "
+            "validation — possible external branch switch in a shared "
+            "worktree; stop and reconcile before committing"
+        )
+    if head_then and head_now and head_then != head_now:
+        reasons.append(
+            "HEAD moved since validation; re-validate on the current HEAD "
+            "before committing"
+        )
+
+    drifted = bool(reasons)
+    return {"drifted": drifted, "block": drifted, "reasons": reasons}
+
+
+def verify_push_target(current_branch, remote_target_branch, intended_branch):
+    """Acceptance: a push needs local, remote, and intended branches to match.
+
+    Proven only when all three names are present, equal, and not a
+    protected branch — a feature-branch workflow never pushes a protected
+    branch, and never pushes to a refspec other than its own branch.
+    """
+    reasons = []
+    current = _clean(current_branch)
+    remote_target = _clean(remote_target_branch)
+    intended = _clean(intended_branch)
+
+    if not current:
+        reasons.append("current branch unknown; fail closed")
+    if not remote_target:
+        reasons.append("remote target branch not stated; fail closed")
+    if not intended:
+        reasons.append("intended feature branch not stated; fail closed")
+
+    for label, name in (("current", current), ("remote target", remote_target),
+                        ("intended", intended)):
+        if name and name in PROTECTED_BRANCHES:
+            reasons.append(
+                f"{label} branch '{name}' is a protected branch; author "
+                "pushes to protected branches are blocked"
+            )
+
+    if current and remote_target and current != remote_target:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"push target '{remote_target}' does not match the local branch "
+            f"'{current}'"
+        )
+    if current and intended and current != intended:
+        reasons.append(
+            f"local branch '{current}' does not match the intended feature "
+            f"branch '{intended}'"
+        )
+
+    proven = not reasons
+    return {
+        "proven": proven,
+        "block": not proven,
+        "reasons": reasons,
+    }
+
+
+def assess_protected_branch_commit(commit_branch, pushed=False,
+                                   repair_reported=True):
+    """Required behavior 4: handle an accidental protected-branch commit.
+
+    If a commit landed on a protected branch: it must never be pushed, a
+    repair is required, and the repair must be *reported* — silently
+    continuing after (or without) repair is a violation, as is having
+    pushed the accident.
+    """
+    branch = _clean(commit_branch)
+    accident = branch in PROTECTED_BRANCHES
+
+    violations = []
+    if accident:
+        if pushed:
+            violations.append(
+                f"accidental commit on protected branch '{branch}' was "
+                "pushed; protected-branch pushes are forbidden"
+            )
+        if not repair_reported:
+            violations.append(
+                "protected-branch commit repair was not reported; the "
+                "workflow must surface the accident and the repair steps, "
+                "never silently continue"
+            )
+
+    return {
+        "accident": accident,
+        "must_not_push": accident,
+        "repair_required": accident,
+        "violations": violations,
+    }
+
+
+def build_commit_push_report(commit_proof, drift, push_proof, accident=None):
+    """Acceptance: final report carries branch proof before commit and push.
+
+    Combines the individual proofs; any failed proof, detected drift, or
+    accident violation makes the status 'blocked' — the workflow stops and
+    reports instead of continuing.
+    """
+    accident = accident or {"accident": False, "violations": []}
+    violations = list(accident.get("violations", []))
+
+    blocked = (
+        not commit_proof.get("proven")
+        or drift.get("drifted")
+        or not push_proof.get("proven")
+        or bool(violations)
+    )
+
+    return {
+        "status": "blocked" if blocked else "ok",
+        "branch_proof_before_commit": bool(commit_proof.get("proven")),
+        "branch_proof_before_push": bool(push_proof.get("proven")),
+        "drift_detected": bool(drift.get("drifted")),
+        "protected_branch_accident": bool(accident.get("accident")),
+        "violations": violations,
+        "reasons": (
+            list(commit_proof.get("reasons", []))
+            + list(drift.get("reasons", []))
+            + list(push_proof.get("reasons", []))
+        ),
+    }

mcp_server.py

@@ -2492,26 +2492,26 @@ _PROJECT_SKILLS = {
             "committed.",
         ],
     },
-    "jenkins-readonly": {
+    "jenkins-mcp": {
         "description": "Read-only Jenkins CI inspection (jobs, builds, "
-                       "logs). Actual server name: jenkins-mcp (see mcp-control-plane).",
+                       "logs).",
         "when_to_use": "Checking CI state once Jenkins MCP tools exist.",
         "required_operations": ["jenkins.read"],
         "status": "designed-not-implemented",
-        "notes": "Server code exists in mcp-control-plane as jenkins-mcp (read tools + gated trigger); registration pending (#55); docs in Gitea-Tools use historical name. Report SKIPPED if not connected. Do not substitute shell/API. Trigger requires dedicated profile (see #56).",
+        "notes": "Server code exists in mcp-control-plane as jenkins-mcp (read tools + gated trigger); registration pending. To register for discoverability in clients (Codex/Gemini/Grok/etc.): add to client MCP config under the jenkins-mcp name, reconnect/reload the client session after registration. Report SKIPPED if not connected. Do not substitute shell/API. Trigger requires dedicated profile (see #56).",
         "steps": [
             "Confirm a Jenkins MCP server is connected (jenkins-mcp); if not, report "
             "SKIPPED.",
             "Use read-only operations only; never trigger unless using dedicated profile + confirmation.",
         ],
     },
-    "glitchtip-readonly": {
+    "glitchtip-mcp": {
-        "description": "Read-only GlitchTip error/event inspection. Actual server name: glitchtip-mcp (see mcp-control-plane).",
+        "description": "Read-only GlitchTip error/event inspection.",
         "when_to_use": "Investigating reported errors once GlitchTip MCP "
                        "tools exist.",
         "required_operations": ["glitchtip.read"],
         "status": "designed-not-implemented",
-        "notes": "Server code exists in mcp-control-plane as glitchtip-mcp (read-only tools); registration pending (#55); filing orchestrator is partial in mcp-control-plane (see #57). Report SKIPPED if not connected. Filing to Gitea is separate orchestrator, not in this server.",
+        "notes": "Server code exists in mcp-control-plane as glitchtip-mcp (read-only tools); registration pending. To register for discoverability in clients (Codex/Gemini/Grok/etc.): add to client MCP config under the glitchtip-mcp name, reconnect/reload the client session after registration. Filing orchestrator is partial in mcp-control-plane (see #57). Report SKIPPED if not connected. Filing to Gitea is separate orchestrator, not in this server.",
         "steps": [
             "Confirm a GlitchTip MCP server is connected (glitchtip-mcp); if not, report "
             "SKIPPED.",

review_proofs.py

@@ -330,9 +330,97 @@ def assess_self_review_contamination(reviewer_identity, pr_author,
     }
 
 
+def assess_role_boundary(proof):
+    """Assess reviewer/author role separation for blind queue workflows.
+
+    Issue #175 blocks a reviewer queue task from silently becoming author
+    implementation work. The workflow may use both namespaces only when that
+    mixed use is explicit, justified, and non-mutating; author mutations after
+    a reviewer queue task require an explicit operator authorization.
+
+    *proof* keys:
+    ``task_role`` ('reviewer' or 'author'), ``task_kind`` (for example
+    'blind_pr_queue_review'), ``reviewer_namespace_used``,
+    ``author_namespace_used``, ``author_mutations`` (list), ``review_mutations``
+    (list), ``operator_authorized_author_work``, ``mixed_namespace_justification``,
+    ``scratch_evidence_claimed``, and ``scratch_evidence_durable``.
+    """
+    proof = proof or {}
+    task_role = (proof.get("task_role") or "").strip().lower()
+    task_kind = (proof.get("task_kind") or "").strip().lower()
+    author_mutations = list(proof.get("author_mutations") or [])
+    review_mutations = list(proof.get("review_mutations") or [])
+    reviewer_used = bool(proof.get("reviewer_namespace_used"))
+    author_used = bool(proof.get("author_namespace_used"))
+    authorized = bool(proof.get("operator_authorized_author_work"))
+    mixed_justification = (
+        proof.get("mixed_namespace_justification") or ""
+    ).strip()
+    scratch_claimed = bool(proof.get("scratch_evidence_claimed"))
+    scratch_durable = bool(proof.get("scratch_evidence_durable"))
+
+    reasons = []
+    violations = []
+
+    if task_role not in {"reviewer", "author"}:
+        reasons.append("task role missing or unknown; role boundary unproven")
+
+    if task_role == "reviewer":
+        if author_mutations and not authorized:
+            violations.append(
+                "reviewer task performed author mutations without explicit "
+                "operator authorization"
+            )
+        if author_used and not mixed_justification:
+            reasons.append(
+                "reviewer task used author namespace without an explicit "
+                "justification"
+            )
+        if task_kind == "blind_pr_queue_review" and author_mutations:
+            if not authorized:
+                violations.append(
+                    "blind PR queue review silently pivoted into author "
+                    "implementation"
+                )
+    elif task_role == "author":
+        if review_mutations:
+            violations.append(
+                "author task performed reviewer-only mutations"
+            )
+
+    if reviewer_used and author_used and not mixed_justification:
+        reasons.append(
+            "mixed reviewer+author namespace use was not reported as a "
+            "role-boundary event"
+        )
+
+    if scratch_claimed and not scratch_durable:
+        reasons.append(
+            "scratch-only notes were claimed as durable evidence"
+        )
+
+    if violations:
+        status = "violation"
+        safe_next_action = "stop; report role-boundary violation"
+    elif reasons:
+        status = "warning"
+        safe_next_action = "downgrade final report; do not claim A-level proof"
+    else:
+        status = "clean"
+        safe_next_action = "proceed"
+
+    return {
+        "status": status,
+        "clean": status == "clean",
+        "reasons": reasons,
+        "violations": violations,
+        "safe_next_action": safe_next_action,
+    }
+
+
 def build_final_report(checkout_proof, inventory, validation, contamination,
                        identity_eligible, merge_performed,
-                       issue_status_verified):
+                       issue_status_verified, role_boundary=None):
     """Required behavior 6 + acceptance criteria: one report, distinct proofs.
 
     Combines the individual proof verdicts into the final-report fields the
@@ -348,6 +436,12 @@ def build_final_report(checkout_proof, inventory, validation, contamination,
     checkout_proven = bool(checkout_proof.get("proven"))
     validation_claimable = bool(validation.get("claimable"))
     validation_strong = validation.get("verdict") == "strong"
+    role_boundary = role_boundary or {
+        "status": "warning",
+        "reasons": ["role-boundary proof missing"],
+        "violations": [],
+    }
+    role_status = role_boundary.get("status", "warning")
 
     downgrade_reasons = []
     if not identity_eligible:
@@ -367,6 +461,9 @@ def build_final_report(checkout_proof, inventory, validation, contamination,
         downgrade_reasons.append(
             f"session contamination status is '{contamination_status}'"
         )
+    if role_status != "clean":
+        downgrade_reasons.append(f"role boundary status is '{role_status}'")
+        downgrade_reasons.extend(role_boundary.get("reasons", []))
     if not issue_status_verified:
         downgrade_reasons.append("linked issue status not verified")
 
@@ -374,6 +471,7 @@ def build_final_report(checkout_proof, inventory, validation, contamination,
         identity_eligible
         and checkout_proven
         and contamination_status == "clean"
+        and role_status == "clean"
         and validation_claimable
         and validation.get("verdict") != "invalid"
     )
@@ -384,6 +482,7 @@ def build_final_report(checkout_proof, inventory, validation, contamination,
             "merge was performed/claimed although the proofs did not allow "
             "one; this run is blocked, not graded"
         )
+    violations.extend(role_boundary.get("violations", []))
 
     if violations:
         grade = "blocked"
@@ -400,6 +499,7 @@ def build_final_report(checkout_proof, inventory, validation, contamination,
         "pr_author_distinct_from_reviewer":
             contamination_status in ("clean",),
         "session_contamination": contamination_status,
+        "role_boundary": role_status,
         "inventory_complete": bool(inventory.get("complete")),
         "validated_on_pinned_head": checkout_proven and validation_claimable,
         "validation_passed":
@@ -562,3 +662,97 @@ def assess_controller_handoff(report_text, role=None):
         "missing_fields": [],
         "reasons": [],
     }
+
+
+# ── PR Inventory Trust Gate (Issue #194) ──────────────────────────────────────
+#
+# A reviewer agent may not convert an empty PR list response into a definitive
+# "no open PRs" conclusion unless the inventory result is independently proven
+# trustworthy.
+
+def pr_inventory_trust_gate(
+    list_prs_response: list | None,
+    remote: str | None = None,
+    org: str | None = None,
+    repo: str | None = None,
+    state: str | None = None,
+    authenticated_profile: dict | None = None,
+    local_remote_url: str | None = None,
+    user_context: str | None = None,
+    corroboration_open_pr_counter: int | None = None,
+    has_finality_metadata: bool = False,
+) -> dict:
+    """Evaluate whether an empty PR list is trusted or untrusted.
+
+    Returns a dict with 'status', 'reasons', and 'corroborated'.
+    """
+    if list_prs_response is None or not isinstance(list_prs_response, list):
+        return {
+            "status": "inventory_error",
+            "reasons": ["PR list response is invalid (not a list or None)"],
+            "corroborated": False,
+        }
+
+    if len(list_prs_response) > 0:
+        return {
+            "status": "trusted_nonempty",
+            "reasons": [],
+            "corroborated": False,
+        }
+
+    reasons = []
+
+    # 1. Exact remote, owner, repo, and state filter resolved correctly
+    if not remote or remote not in ("dadeschools", "prgs"):
+        reasons.append("remote instance is invalid or unresolved")
+    if not org or not org.strip():
+        reasons.append("owner/org is invalid or unresolved")
+    if not repo or not repo.strip():
+        reasons.append("repository name is invalid or unresolved")
+    if state != "open":
+        reasons.append("state filter is not 'open'")
+
+    # 2. Authenticated profile permission check
+    if not authenticated_profile or not isinstance(authenticated_profile, dict):
+        reasons.append("authenticated profile is missing or invalid")
+    else:
+        allowed = authenticated_profile.get("allowed_operations") or []
+        if "gitea.read" not in allowed and "read" not in allowed:
+            reasons.append("authenticated profile lacks read permissions")
+
+    # 3. Pagination/finality metadata or independent read path corroboration
+    corroborated = False
+    if has_finality_metadata:
+        corroborated = True
+    elif corroboration_open_pr_counter == 0:
+        corroborated = True
+    else:
+        reasons.append("pagination finality not proven and open_pr_counter corroboration is missing or non-zero")
+
+    # 4. Local checkout remote URL matching the target repo
+    if not local_remote_url or not isinstance(local_remote_url, str):
+        reasons.append("local checkout remote URL is missing or invalid")
+    else:
+        expected = f"{org}/{repo}".lower()
+        if expected not in local_remote_url.lower():
+            reasons.append(f"local remote URL does not match target repository '{org}/{repo}'")
+
+    # 5. User context check (indicators that PRs should exist)
+    if user_context and isinstance(user_context, str):
+        indicators = ["pr #", "pull request #", "open pr", "pr queue"]
+        found = [ind for ind in indicators if ind in user_context.lower()]
+        if found:
+            reasons.append(f"user context indicates open PRs should exist (matched: {', '.join(found)})")
+
+    if reasons:
+        return {
+            "status": "untrusted_empty",
+            "reasons": reasons,
+            "corroborated": corroborated,
+        }
+
+    return {
+        "status": "trusted_empty",
+        "reasons": [],
+        "corroborated": corroborated,
+    }

skills/llm-project-workflow/SKILL.md

@@ -150,12 +150,33 @@ Worktree folder = branch with `/` replaced by `-`
 6. Implement the narrow scope only — no unrelated refactors or formatting churn.
 7. Add/update focused tests when behavior changes.
 8. Run the checks (tests, compile/lint, `git diff --check`, secret scan).
-9. Commit with an issue-linked message.
+   Record the branch name and `HEAD` SHA at validation time — the drift
-10. Push the branch.
+   check in step 9 compares against exactly this state.
-11. Open a PR to `master`.
+9. **Branch proof before commit (#177):** prove and state, immediately
-12. **If you are the author, stop before review/merge.**
+   before staging/committing (`author_proofs.verify_branch_for_commit`,
-13. **Normal issue work must not directly push to `master`.** PR content should be merged through the forge PR merge mechanism.
+   `author_proofs.detect_branch_drift`):
-14. Direct push to `master` is allowed only as a documented recovery exception. If used, the final report must include:
+   - current branch (`git branch --show-current`) equals the intended
+     feature branch from the issue claim
+   - current branch is not `master`, `main`, `develop`, `development`, or
+     `dev`
+   - branch and `HEAD` have not changed since validation (step 8) — in a
+     shared checkout another session may switch branches mid-session;
+     treat that as expected and **stop before committing** when detected
+   If any check fails, stop and reconcile; do not commit.
+10. Commit with an issue-linked message.
+11. **Branch proof before push (#177):** prove that the local branch, the
+    push target branch, and the intended issue branch all match, and that
+    none of them is a protected branch
+    (`author_proofs.verify_push_target`). If a commit accidentally landed
+    on a protected branch, do **not** push: report the accident and the
+    exact repair steps (`author_proofs.assess_protected_branch_commit`) —
+    never silently continue after a repair.
+12. Push the branch.
+13. Open a PR to `master`. The final report must include the branch proofs
+    from steps 9 and 11 (`author_proofs.build_commit_push_report`).
+14. **If you are the author, stop before review/merge.**
+15. **Normal issue work must not directly push to `master`.** PR content should be merged through the forge PR merge mechanism.
+16. Direct push to `master` is allowed only as a documented recovery exception. If used, the final report must include:
     - why the PR merge path could not be used
     - exact commits pushed
     - PR metadata state
@@ -196,19 +217,27 @@ Worktree folder = branch with `/` replaced by `-`
    Both configured repos must be reported with state filter, pagination proof,
    and open-PR count (`review_proofs.assess_inventory_completeness` and
    `resolve_repos_from_user_reference`).
-7. Inspect the full diff; confirm scope matches the linked issue; flag unrelated files.
+7. **Role-boundary proof (#175):** a reviewer queue task must not silently
-8. Run the tests. Validation reporting must include the exact command and
+   become author implementation. If no eligible PR exists, stop with the
+   queue report. Do not claim issues, create branches, commit, push, or open
+   PRs unless the operator explicitly retasks the run as author work. Mixed
+   reviewer+author namespace use must be reported with a justification, and
+   scratch-only notes are not durable evidence unless posted or committed
+   intentionally (`review_proofs.assess_role_boundary`).
+8. Inspect the full diff; confirm scope matches the linked issue; flag unrelated files.
+9. Run the tests. Validation reporting must include the exact command and
    exact results: pass/fail, counts of tests passed/skipped/failed, any
    ignored paths and why they are safe to ignore, and whether the command
    differs from the repository's canonical validation command. Only claim a
    validation result after the command has completed and its output has
    been read (`review_proofs.assess_validation_report`).
-9. **Do not merge if checks fail. Do not merge if the reviewer is the author.**
+10. **Do not merge if checks fail. Do not merge if the reviewer is the author.**
-10. The final report must distinguish (`review_proofs.build_final_report`):
+11. The final report must distinguish (`review_proofs.build_final_report`):
     identity eligible; PR author different from reviewer; session
-    contamination absent (with evidence); validation performed on the pinned
+    contamination absent (with evidence); role boundary clean; validation
-    head; merge performed; issue status verified. If any proof is missing,
+    performed on the pinned head; merge performed; issue status verified. If
-    stop or downgrade the result instead of merging confidently.
+    any proof is missing, stop or downgrade the result instead of merging
+    confidently.
 
 ## G. Merge / cleanup workflow
 

skills/llm-project-workflow/templates/review-pr.md

@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ Rules (llm-project-workflow):
 - You must NOT be the PR author. If the authenticated user == PR author, stop.
   A different LLM-Agent-SHA does NOT make you a different actor — only a
   different authenticated Gitea user does (docs/llm-agent-sha.md).
+- Do not pivot from a reviewer queue task into author implementation unless
+  the operator explicitly retasks the run. If author namespace was used, the
+  final report must justify why; author mutations after reviewer queue work
+  without explicit authorization are a role-boundary violation.
 - Do not merge if any check fails.
 
 Steps:
@@ -39,6 +43,10 @@ Steps:
    cannot evidence whether this session authored/touched the PR branch,
    report contamination as UNKNOWN (not contaminated, not clean) and choose
    another PR or stop.
+   Role-boundary claims must also be evidence-backed (#175): report whether
+   reviewer namespace, author namespace, author mutations, or review mutations
+   occurred. Use `review_proofs.assess_role_boundary`; if it is not clean,
+   downgrade or stop instead of claiming an A-level run.
 5. scripts/worktree-review <pr-head-branch>          # detached, branches/review-*
    cd branches/review-<pr-head-branch-slug>
 6. Checkout proof (#173) — prove and state, before any diff review or

skills/llm-project-workflow/templates/start-issue.md

@@ -26,8 +26,19 @@ Steps:
    cd branches/<type>-issue-<n>-<slug>
 6. Implement the narrow scope only; add/update focused tests if behavior changes.
 7. Checks: run the test suite, compile/lint changed files, git diff --check,
-   and scan the diff for secrets.
+   and scan the diff for secrets. Record the branch name and HEAD SHA at
-8. Commit (issue-linked message), push the branch, open a PR to master.
+   validation time.
+8. Branch proof before commit (#177) — prove and state:
+   - git branch --show-current == the intended issue branch from step 5
+   - the branch is NOT master/main/develop/development/dev
+   - branch and HEAD unchanged since step 7 (another session can switch a
+     shared checkout mid-session; if drift is detected, STOP and reconcile
+     before committing)
+   If a commit accidentally lands on a protected branch: do NOT push;
+   report the accident and the exact repair steps — never silently continue.
+9. Commit (issue-linked message). Branch proof before push (#177): local
+   branch == push target branch == intended issue branch, none protected.
+   Then push the branch and open a PR to master.
    *The PR body MUST use closing keywords like `Closes #N` or `Fixes #N` to close the issue; do NOT use `Implements #N` or `Refs #N` for closing, as Gitea will not auto-close it.*
    Include an "LLM Handoff Metadata" block in the PR body (attribution only;
    never an eligibility input — docs/llm-agent-sha.md):
@@ -40,7 +51,7 @@ Steps:
    - Branch: <branch>
    - Worktree: <worktree path>
    - Self-review allowed: no
-9. Stop before review/merge — you are the author.
+10. Stop before review/merge — you are the author.
 
 Handoff: end with a section titled exactly `Controller Handoff` per SKILL.md
 §K (compact; long form only on the high-risk triggers), including the author

tests/test_author_proofs.py

@@ -0,0 +1,234 @@
+"""Tests for author-side branch-identity proofs (Issue #177).
+
+Issue #177 (author-side counterpart of the #173 reviewer proofs) requires
+author workflows to *prove* local git state before staging, committing, or
+pushing, instead of discovering drift after the fact:
+
+1. The current branch equals the intended feature branch and is never a
+   protected branch (master/main/develop/development/dev).
+2. Branch or HEAD drift between validation and commit — including external
+   branch switches in a shared worktree — stops the workflow.
+3. A push requires local branch, remote target branch, and intended issue
+   branch to all match.
+4. An accidental commit on a protected branch must not be pushed and its
+   repair must be reported, never silently continued.
+
+These are the harness assertions from the issue's Required behavior 5.
+"""
+import sys
+import unittest
+
+sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent))
+
+from author_proofs import (  # noqa: E402
+    PROTECTED_BRANCHES,
+    assess_protected_branch_commit,
+    build_commit_push_report,
+    detect_branch_drift,
+    verify_branch_for_commit,
+    verify_push_target,
+)
+
+FEATURE = "feat/issue-177-branch-drift-proofs"
+HEAD_1 = "64dc334a92685b7b6a1fdb7ffe363f02a69f5dbd"
+HEAD_2 = "ccc5ef79dfe629853e144763238593bd808d57e0"
+
+
+class TestProtectedBranches(unittest.TestCase):
+    def test_known_protected_names(self):
+        for name in ("master", "main", "develop", "development", "dev"):
+            self.assertIn(name, PROTECTED_BRANCHES)
+
+
+class TestVerifyBranchForCommit(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Required behavior 1: prove the branch before staging/committing."""
+
+    def test_on_intended_feature_branch_is_proven(self):
+        proof = verify_branch_for_commit(FEATURE, FEATURE)
+        self.assertTrue(proof["proven"])
+        self.assertFalse(proof["block"])
+
+    def test_commit_attempted_while_on_master_is_blocked(self):
+        # Harness assertion (behavior 5, bullet 1).
+        proof = verify_branch_for_commit("master", FEATURE)
+        self.assertFalse(proof["proven"])
+        self.assertTrue(proof["block"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("master" in r for r in proof["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_every_protected_branch_is_blocked_as_current(self):
+        for name in PROTECTED_BRANCHES:
+            proof = verify_branch_for_commit(name, FEATURE)
+            self.assertTrue(proof["block"], name)
+
+    def test_intended_branch_may_not_be_protected(self):
+        proof = verify_branch_for_commit("master", "master")
+        self.assertFalse(proof["proven"])
+        self.assertTrue(proof["block"])
+
+    def test_wrong_feature_branch_is_blocked(self):
+        proof = verify_branch_for_commit("feat/issue-178-other-work", FEATURE)
+        self.assertFalse(proof["proven"])
+        self.assertTrue(proof["block"])
+
+    def test_missing_current_branch_fails_closed(self):
+        proof = verify_branch_for_commit("", FEATURE)
+        self.assertTrue(proof["block"])
+
+    def test_missing_intended_branch_fails_closed(self):
+        proof = verify_branch_for_commit(FEATURE, None)
+        self.assertTrue(proof["block"])
+
+
+class TestBranchDrift(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Required behaviors 2 + 3: drift between validation and commit stops
+    the workflow."""
+
+    def test_no_drift_when_branch_and_head_unchanged(self):
+        drift = detect_branch_drift(FEATURE, HEAD_1, FEATURE, HEAD_1)
+        self.assertFalse(drift["drifted"])
+        self.assertFalse(drift["block"])
+
+    def test_branch_drift_between_validation_and_commit_is_blocked(self):
+        # Harness assertion (behavior 5, bullet 2).
+        drift = detect_branch_drift(FEATURE, HEAD_1, "feat/other", HEAD_1)
+        self.assertTrue(drift["drifted"])
+        self.assertTrue(drift["block"])
+
+    def test_shared_worktree_branch_switch_is_detected(self):
+        # Harness assertion (behavior 5, bullet 4): an external session
+        # switching the shared checkout to another branch (e.g. master)
+        # must be detected as drift, not treated as exceptional noise.
+        drift = detect_branch_drift(FEATURE, HEAD_1, "master", HEAD_1)
+        self.assertTrue(drift["drifted"])
+        self.assertTrue(drift["block"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("switch" in r.lower() for r in drift["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_head_moved_since_validation_is_blocked(self):
+        drift = detect_branch_drift(FEATURE, HEAD_1, FEATURE, HEAD_2)
+        self.assertTrue(drift["drifted"])
+        self.assertTrue(drift["block"])
+        self.assertTrue(any("HEAD" in r for r in drift["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_missing_state_fails_closed(self):
+        drift = detect_branch_drift(FEATURE, HEAD_1, FEATURE, None)
+        self.assertTrue(drift["drifted"])
+        self.assertTrue(drift["block"])
+
+
+class TestVerifyPushTarget(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Required behavior 1 (push leg) + acceptance: push needs proof that
+    local, remote, and intended branches all match."""
+
+    def test_matching_local_remote_and_intended_is_proven(self):
+        proof = verify_push_target(FEATURE, FEATURE, FEATURE)
+        self.assertTrue(proof["proven"])
+        self.assertFalse(proof["block"])
+
+    def test_push_target_mismatch_is_blocked(self):
+        # Harness assertion (behavior 5, bullet 3).
+        proof = verify_push_target(FEATURE, "feat/issue-178-other-work", FEATURE)
+        self.assertFalse(proof["proven"])
+        self.assertTrue(proof["block"])
+
+    def test_local_branch_differs_from_intended_is_blocked(self):
+        proof = verify_push_target("feat/other", FEATURE, FEATURE)
+        self.assertTrue(proof["block"])
+
+    def test_pushing_a_protected_branch_is_blocked(self):
+        proof = verify_push_target("master", "master", "master")
+        self.assertFalse(proof["proven"])
+        self.assertTrue(proof["block"])
+
+    def test_missing_remote_target_fails_closed(self):
+        proof = verify_push_target(FEATURE, "", FEATURE)
+        self.assertTrue(proof["block"])
+
+
+class TestProtectedBranchAccident(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Required behavior 4: accidental protected-branch commits must not be
+    pushed and their repair must be reported."""
+
+    def test_feature_branch_commit_is_not_an_accident(self):
+        result = assess_protected_branch_commit(FEATURE)
+        self.assertFalse(result["accident"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["violations"], [])
+
+    def test_commit_on_master_is_an_accident_and_must_not_push(self):
+        result = assess_protected_branch_commit(
+            "master", pushed=False, repair_reported=True
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(result["accident"])
+        self.assertTrue(result["must_not_push"])
+        self.assertEqual(result["violations"], [])
+        self.assertTrue(result["repair_required"])
+
+    def test_pushing_the_accident_is_a_violation(self):
+        result = assess_protected_branch_commit(
+            "master", pushed=True, repair_reported=True
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(any("push" in v.lower() for v in result["violations"]))
+
+    def test_silent_repair_is_a_violation(self):
+        # Harness assertion (behavior 5, bullet 5): the repair path must not
+        # silently continue without reporting.
+        result = assess_protected_branch_commit(
+            "master", pushed=False, repair_reported=False
+        )
+        self.assertTrue(any("report" in v.lower() for v in result["violations"]))
+
+
+class TestCommitPushReport(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Acceptance criteria: the final report includes branch proof before
+    commit and before push, and blocks instead of continuing."""
+
+    def _report(self, **overrides):
+        kwargs = {
+            "commit_proof": verify_branch_for_commit(FEATURE, FEATURE),
+            "drift": detect_branch_drift(FEATURE, HEAD_1, FEATURE, HEAD_1),
+            "push_proof": verify_push_target(FEATURE, FEATURE, FEATURE),
+            "accident": assess_protected_branch_commit(FEATURE),
+        }
+        kwargs.update(overrides)
+        return build_commit_push_report(**kwargs)
+
+    def test_fully_proven_report_is_ok(self):
+        report = self._report()
+        self.assertEqual(report["status"], "ok")
+        self.assertTrue(report["branch_proof_before_commit"])
+        self.assertTrue(report["branch_proof_before_push"])
+        self.assertFalse(report["drift_detected"])
+        self.assertEqual(report["violations"], [])
+
+    def test_commit_proof_failure_blocks(self):
+        report = self._report(
+            commit_proof=verify_branch_for_commit("master", FEATURE)
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(report["status"], "blocked")
+        self.assertFalse(report["branch_proof_before_commit"])
+
+    def test_drift_blocks(self):
+        report = self._report(
+            drift=detect_branch_drift(FEATURE, HEAD_1, "master", HEAD_1)
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(report["status"], "blocked")
+        self.assertTrue(report["drift_detected"])
+
+    def test_push_proof_failure_blocks(self):
+        report = self._report(
+            push_proof=verify_push_target(FEATURE, "feat/other", FEATURE)
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(report["status"], "blocked")
+        self.assertFalse(report["branch_proof_before_push"])
+
+    def test_accident_violations_block(self):
+        report = self._report(
+            accident=assess_protected_branch_commit(
+                "master", pushed=False, repair_reported=False
+            )
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(report["status"], "blocked")
+        self.assertTrue(report["violations"])
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    unittest.main()

tests/test_operator_guide.py

@@ -46,8 +46,8 @@ EXPECTED_SKILLS = [
     "gitea-resolve-task-capability",
     "profile-switching",
     "redaction-security-review",
-    "jenkins-readonly",
+    "jenkins-mcp",
-    "glitchtip-readonly",
+    "glitchtip-mcp",
     "release-operator",
 ]
 
@@ -234,8 +234,8 @@ class TestProjectSkills(GuideTestBase):
         with patch.dict(os.environ, AUTHOR_ENV, clear=True):
             r = mcp_list_project_skills()
         by_name = {s["name"]: s for s in r["skills"]}
-        self.assertNotEqual(by_name["jenkins-readonly"]["status"], "available")
+        self.assertNotEqual(by_name["jenkins-mcp"]["status"], "available")
-        self.assertNotEqual(by_name["glitchtip-readonly"]["status"], "available")
+        self.assertNotEqual(by_name["glitchtip-mcp"]["status"], "available")
 
     def test_no_urls_in_registry(self):
         with patch.dict(os.environ, AUTHOR_ENV, clear=True):
@@ -245,6 +245,17 @@ class TestProjectSkills(GuideTestBase):
         self.assertNotIn("http://", blob)
         self.assertNotIn("keychain:", blob)
 
+    def test_enabled_but_no_usable_tools_negative_assertion(self):
+        """Negative assertion for 'enabled but no usable tools' (per issue #146)."""
+        with patch.dict(os.environ, AUTHOR_ENV, clear=True):
+            r = mcp_list_project_skills()
+        by_name = {s["name"]: s for s in r["skills"]}
+        # jenkins-mcp is designed-not-implemented; even if "enabled" in config,
+        # it should not be usable/available to current profile without tools.
+        self.assertIn("jenkins-mcp", by_name)
+        self.assertEqual(by_name["jenkins-mcp"]["status"], "designed-not-implemented")
+        self.assertFalse(by_name["jenkins-mcp"].get("available_to_current_profile", False))
+
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # mcp_get_skill_guide

tests/test_review_proofs.py

@@ -23,9 +23,11 @@ sys.path.insert(0, str(__import__("pathlib").Path(__file__).resolve().parent.par
 from review_proofs import (  # noqa: E402
     assess_controller_handoff,
     assess_inventory_completeness,
+    assess_role_boundary,
     assess_self_review_contamination,
     assess_validation_report,
     build_final_report,
+    pr_inventory_trust_gate,
     resolve_repos_from_user_reference,
     verify_pinned_head_checkout,
 )
@@ -99,6 +101,21 @@ def _good_contamination():
     )
 
 
+def _good_role_boundary():
+    return assess_role_boundary(
+        {
+            "task_role": "reviewer",
+            "task_kind": "blind_pr_queue_review",
+            "reviewer_namespace_used": True,
+            "author_namespace_used": False,
+            "author_mutations": [],
+            "review_mutations": [],
+            "operator_authorized_author_work": False,
+            "scratch_evidence_claimed": False,
+        }
+    )
+
+
 class TestCheckoutProof(unittest.TestCase):
     """Required behavior 1 + 2: prove HEAD == pinned PR head or stop."""
 
@@ -368,6 +385,74 @@ class TestSelfReviewContamination(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertEqual(result["status"], "unknown")
 
 
+class TestRoleBoundary(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Issue #175: reviewer queue tasks must not pivot into author work."""
+
+    def test_reviewer_queue_without_author_mutations_is_clean(self):
+        result = _good_role_boundary()
+        self.assertEqual(result["status"], "clean")
+        self.assertEqual(result["violations"], [])
+
+    def test_reviewer_queue_author_mutation_without_authorization_violates(self):
+        result = assess_role_boundary(
+            {
+                "task_role": "reviewer",
+                "task_kind": "blind_pr_queue_review",
+                "reviewer_namespace_used": True,
+                "author_namespace_used": True,
+                "author_mutations": ["claim issue #171", "push branch"],
+                "operator_authorized_author_work": False,
+                "mixed_namespace_justification": (
+                    "author namespace was used for implementation"
+                ),
+            }
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(result["status"], "violation")
+        self.assertTrue(any("pivot" in r for r in result["violations"]))
+
+    def test_mixed_namespace_use_without_justification_is_warning(self):
+        result = assess_role_boundary(
+            {
+                "task_role": "reviewer",
+                "task_kind": "blind_pr_queue_review",
+                "reviewer_namespace_used": True,
+                "author_namespace_used": True,
+                "author_mutations": [],
+            }
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(result["status"], "warning")
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("mixed" in r.lower() for r in result["reasons"])
+        )
+
+    def test_author_task_cannot_perform_review_mutations(self):
+        result = assess_role_boundary(
+            {
+                "task_role": "author",
+                "reviewer_namespace_used": False,
+                "author_namespace_used": True,
+                "review_mutations": ["approve PR"],
+            }
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(result["status"], "violation")
+        self.assertTrue(
+            any("reviewer-only" in r for r in result["violations"])
+        )
+
+    def test_scratch_only_notes_are_not_durable_evidence(self):
+        result = assess_role_boundary(
+            {
+                "task_role": "reviewer",
+                "task_kind": "blind_pr_queue_review",
+                "reviewer_namespace_used": True,
+                "scratch_evidence_claimed": True,
+                "scratch_evidence_durable": False,
+            }
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(result["status"], "warning")
+        self.assertTrue(any("scratch-only" in r for r in result["reasons"]))
+
+
 class TestFinalReport(unittest.TestCase):
     """Required behavior 6 + acceptance criteria: the report must
     distinguish each proof, and only a fully proven run earns an "A"."""
@@ -381,6 +466,7 @@ class TestFinalReport(unittest.TestCase):
             "identity_eligible": True,
             "merge_performed": False,
             "issue_status_verified": True,
+            "role_boundary": _good_role_boundary(),
         }
         kwargs.update(overrides)
         return build_final_report(**kwargs)
@@ -393,6 +479,7 @@ class TestFinalReport(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertTrue(report["identity_eligible"])
         self.assertTrue(report["pr_author_distinct_from_reviewer"])
         self.assertEqual(report["session_contamination"], "clean")
+        self.assertEqual(report["role_boundary"], "clean")
         self.assertTrue(report["validated_on_pinned_head"])
         self.assertFalse(report["merge_performed"])
         self.assertTrue(report["issue_status_verified"])
@@ -465,6 +552,37 @@ class TestFinalReport(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertNotEqual(report["grade"], "A")
         self.assertFalse(report["merge_allowed"])
 
+    def test_missing_role_boundary_downgrades_and_blocks_merge(self):
+        kwargs = {
+            "checkout_proof": _good_checkout(),
+            "inventory": _good_inventory(),
+            "validation": _good_validation(),
+            "contamination": _good_contamination(),
+            "identity_eligible": True,
+            "merge_performed": False,
+            "issue_status_verified": True,
+        }
+        report = build_final_report(**kwargs)
+        self.assertNotEqual(report["grade"], "A")
+        self.assertFalse(report["merge_allowed"])
+        self.assertEqual(report["role_boundary"], "warning")
+
+    def test_role_boundary_violation_blocks_report(self):
+        boundary = assess_role_boundary(
+            {
+                "task_role": "reviewer",
+                "task_kind": "blind_pr_queue_review",
+                "reviewer_namespace_used": True,
+                "author_namespace_used": True,
+                "author_mutations": ["create PR"],
+                "operator_authorized_author_work": False,
+                "mixed_namespace_justification": "implementation pivot",
+            }
+        )
+        report = self._report(role_boundary=boundary)
+        self.assertEqual(report["grade"], "blocked")
+        self.assertFalse(report["merge_allowed"])
+
 
 class TestStdoutIsolation(unittest.TestCase):
     """Regression test for #178: tests must not close or corrupt stdout/stderr
@@ -713,5 +831,87 @@ class TestControllerHandoff(unittest.TestCase):
         self.assertIn("issue #182", skill)
 
 
+class TestPRInventoryTrustGate(unittest.TestCase):
+    """Issue #194: unit tests for the PR inventory trust gate."""
+
+    def setUp(self):
+        self.profile = {
+            "profile_name": "prgs-reviewer",
+            "allowed_operations": ["read", "gitea.read", "gitea.pr.approve"],
+        }
+        self.local_url = "https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools.git"
+
+    def test_trusted_nonempty(self):
+        res = pr_inventory_trust_gate([{"number": 1}])
+        self.assertEqual(res["status"], "trusted_nonempty")
+        self.assertFalse(res["corroborated"])
+
+    def test_inventory_error_none_or_not_list(self):
+        self.assertEqual(pr_inventory_trust_gate(None)["status"], "inventory_error")
+        self.assertEqual(pr_inventory_trust_gate("not a list")["status"], "inventory_error")
+
+    def test_untrusted_empty_no_pagination_or_corroboration(self):
+        res = pr_inventory_trust_gate(
+            [], remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            state="open", authenticated_profile=self.profile,
+            local_remote_url=self.local_url, user_context=None,
+            corroboration_open_pr_counter=None, has_finality_metadata=False
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["status"], "untrusted_empty")
+        self.assertIn("pagination finality not proven and open_pr_counter corroboration is missing or non-zero", res["reasons"])
+
+    def test_untrusted_empty_profile_permission_mismatch(self):
+        bad_profile = {"profile_name": "prgs-bad", "allowed_operations": ["write"]}
+        res = pr_inventory_trust_gate(
+            [], remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            state="open", authenticated_profile=bad_profile,
+            local_remote_url=self.local_url, user_context=None,
+            corroboration_open_pr_counter=0, has_finality_metadata=False
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["status"], "untrusted_empty")
+        self.assertIn("authenticated profile lacks read permissions", res["reasons"])
+
+    def test_untrusted_empty_remote_url_mismatch(self):
+        bad_url = "https://gitea.prgs.cc/other-org/other-repo.git"
+        res = pr_inventory_trust_gate(
+            [], remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            state="open", authenticated_profile=self.profile,
+            local_remote_url=bad_url, user_context=None,
+            corroboration_open_pr_counter=0, has_finality_metadata=False
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["status"], "untrusted_empty")
+        self.assertIn("local remote URL does not match target repository 'Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools'", res["reasons"])
+
+    def test_untrusted_empty_user_context_indicates_prs(self):
+        res = pr_inventory_trust_gate(
+            [], remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            state="open", authenticated_profile=self.profile,
+            local_remote_url=self.local_url, user_context="please check open PR #181",
+            corroboration_open_pr_counter=0, has_finality_metadata=False
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["status"], "untrusted_empty")
+        self.assertTrue(any("user context indicates open PRs should exist" in r for r in res["reasons"]))
+
+    def test_trusted_empty_with_corroboration(self):
+        res = pr_inventory_trust_gate(
+            [], remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            state="open", authenticated_profile=self.profile,
+            local_remote_url=self.local_url, user_context=None,
+            corroboration_open_pr_counter=0, has_finality_metadata=False
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["status"], "trusted_empty")
+        self.assertTrue(res["corroborated"])
+
+    def test_trusted_empty_with_finality_metadata(self):
+        res = pr_inventory_trust_gate(
+            [], remote="prgs", org="Scaled-Tech-Consulting", repo="Gitea-Tools",
+            state="open", authenticated_profile=self.profile,
+            local_remote_url=self.local_url, user_context=None,
+            corroboration_open_pr_counter=None, has_finality_metadata=True
+        )
+        self.assertEqual(res["status"], "trusted_empty")
+        self.assertTrue(res["corroborated"])
+
+
 if __name__ == "__main__":
     unittest.main()