fix(mcp): enforce role capability invariants (Closes #723)

This commit is contained in:
2026-07-19 23:21:54 -04:00
parent fcf6981b1b
commit 4b8a9219d8
5 changed files with 561 additions and 64 deletions
+122 -63
View File
@@ -701,6 +701,19 @@ def _clear_preflight_capability_state() -> None:
_preflight_reviewer_violation_files = []
def _clear_resolved_capability_stamp() -> None:
"""Clear the task/role stamp without manufacturing capability proof.
A fresh resolver attempt invalidates the prior stamp immediately. The
new role/task is recorded only after the current attempt is permitted, so
denial or an unexpected exception cannot leave stale authority behind.
"""
global _preflight_resolved_role, _preflight_resolved_task
_preflight_resolved_role = None
_preflight_resolved_task = None
def _invalidate_preflight_identity_state() -> None:
"""Fail closed when whoami cannot prove the configured identity."""
global _preflight_whoami_called, _preflight_whoami_violation
@@ -5239,13 +5252,6 @@ def _evaluate_pr_review_submission(
worktree_path: str | None = None,
) -> dict:
"""Shared gate chain for live submit and dry-run review tools."""
_verify_role_mutation_workspace(
remote,
worktree_path=worktree_path,
task="review_pr",
org=org,
repo=repo,
)
action = (action or "").strip().lower()
workflow_blockers = _review_workflow_load_gate_reasons() if live else []
result = {
@@ -5263,6 +5269,21 @@ def _evaluate_pr_review_submission(
"reasons": [],
}
reasons = result["reasons"]
try:
_verify_role_mutation_workspace(
remote,
worktree_path=worktree_path,
task="review_pr",
org=org,
repo=repo,
)
except RuntimeError as exc:
result["blocker_kind"] = "workspace_role_binding"
reasons.append(
"workspace/role binding failed (fail closed, #723): "
f"{_redact(str(exc))}"
)
return result
if workflow_blockers:
reasons.extend(workflow_blockers)
reasons.extend(review_workflow_load.recovery_handoff_without_replay())
@@ -12084,14 +12105,31 @@ def gitea_adopt_merger_pr_lease(
"permission_report": _permission_block_report("gitea.pr.merge"),
}
# task=adopt_merger_pr_lease so verify_preflight_purity runs shared #604 anti-stomp.
_verify_role_mutation_workspace(
remote,
worktree=worktree,
task="adopt_merger_pr_lease",
org=org,
repo=repo,
)
# task=adopt_merger_pr_lease so verify_preflight_purity runs shared #604
# anti-stomp. A role/workspace rejection is an expected guarded outcome,
# not an opaque MCP internal_error (#723).
try:
_verify_role_mutation_workspace(
remote,
worktree=worktree,
task="adopt_merger_pr_lease",
org=org,
repo=repo,
)
except RuntimeError as exc:
return {
"success": False,
"adopted": False,
"pr_number": pr_number,
"blocker_kind": "workspace_role_binding",
"reasons": [
"workspace/role binding failed (fail closed, #723): "
f"{_redact(str(exc))}"
],
"active_lease": None,
"expected_head_sha": expected_head_sha,
"live_head_sha": None,
}
h, o, r = _resolve(remote, host, org, repo)
auth = _auth(h)
profile = get_profile()
@@ -14306,11 +14344,15 @@ def _matching_configured_profiles(
config: dict | None,
required_permission: str,
remote: str | None = None,
required_role_kind: str | None = None,
) -> list[str]:
"""Profile names that allow *required_permission* (redacted metadata only).
#714: when *remote* is provided, only profiles bound to that remote's host
are returned a dadeschools request never lists prgs profiles.
are returned a dadeschools request never lists prgs profiles. For a
role-exclusive task, a profile that declares a role must also declare the
required role (#723); undeclared legacy profiles retain permission-only
compatibility.
"""
if not config or "profiles" not in config:
return []
@@ -14348,7 +14390,15 @@ def _matching_configured_profiles(
ok, _ = gitea_config.check_operation(
required_permission, p_allowed_n, p_forbidden_n
)
if ok:
declared_role = (
p_data.get("role") or p_data.get("role_kind") or ""
).strip()
role_allowed = (
required_role_kind is None
or not declared_role
or declared_role == required_role_kind
)
if ok and role_allowed:
matches.append(p_name)
return sorted(matches)
@@ -14358,8 +14408,15 @@ def _build_runtime_task_capabilities(
forbidden: list[str],
config: dict | None,
remote: str | None = None,
active_role_kind: str | None = None,
) -> dict:
"""Per-task capability summary for role-aware runtime context (#139, #714)."""
"""Per-task capability summary for role-aware runtime context.
A declared active role produces a ``role_filtered`` view consistent with
the resolver. Callers that deliberately omit the role receive the legacy
``permission_only`` view, labeled as such rather than implying stronger
authority (#723).
"""
task_entries = []
flags: dict[str, bool] = {}
flag_keys = {
@@ -14372,18 +14429,36 @@ def _build_runtime_task_capabilities(
"close_issue": "can_close_issues",
"reconcile_already_landed_pr": "can_reconcile_already_landed_prs",
}
role_filter_applied = active_role_kind is not None
for task in _RUNTIME_CAPABILITY_TASKS:
permission = task_capability_map.required_permission(task)
allowed_here, _ = gitea_config.check_operation(
required_role_kind = task_capability_map.required_role(task)
role_exclusive = task in task_capability_map.ROLE_EXCLUSIVE_TASKS
permission_allowed, _ = gitea_config.check_operation(
permission, allowed, forbidden
)
role_allowed = (
not role_exclusive
or not role_filter_applied
or active_role_kind == required_role_kind
)
allowed_here = permission_allowed and role_allowed
entry = {
"task": task,
"required_permission": permission,
"required_role_kind": task_capability_map.required_role(task),
"required_role_kind": required_role_kind,
"role_exclusive": role_exclusive,
"capability_view": (
"role_filtered" if role_filter_applied else "permission_only"
),
"allowed_in_current_session": allowed_here,
"matching_configured_profiles": _matching_configured_profiles(
config, permission, remote=remote
config,
permission,
remote=remote,
required_role_kind=(
required_role_kind if role_exclusive else None
),
),
}
task_entries.append(entry)
@@ -14847,7 +14922,11 @@ def gitea_get_runtime_context(
# #714: filter matching profiles by requested remote when building capability summary
session_capabilities = _build_runtime_task_capabilities(
allowed, forbidden, config, remote=remote if remote in REMOTES else None
allowed,
forbidden,
config,
remote=remote if remote in REMOTES else None,
active_role_kind=_profile_role_kind(profile),
)
preflight = assess_preflight_status(worktree_path)
@@ -17307,6 +17386,10 @@ def gitea_resolve_task_capability(
host: Optional override for the Gitea host.
"""
TASK_MAP = task_capability_map.TASK_CAPABILITY_MAP
# Every fresh attempt invalidates the previous task/role stamp before any
# fallible resolver work. Unknown/malformed tasks and unexpected failures
# therefore remain fail-closed instead of preserving stale authority.
_clear_resolved_capability_stamp()
if task not in TASK_MAP:
# #723: structured fail-closed unknown_task (never raise into internal_error).
@@ -17356,36 +17439,7 @@ def gitea_resolve_task_capability(
required_permission = task_capability_map.required_permission(task)
required_role = task_capability_map.required_role(task)
role_exclusive_tasks = {
"acquire_reviewer_pr_lease",
"gitea_acquire_reviewer_pr_lease",
"review_pr",
"approve_pr",
"request_changes_pr",
"blind_pr_queue_review",
"pr_queue_cleanup",
"pr-queue-cleanup",
"merge_pr",
"acquire_merger_pr_lease",
"gitea_acquire_merger_pr_lease",
"adopt_merger_pr_lease",
"gitea_adopt_merger_pr_lease",
"release_merger_pr_lease",
"gitea_release_merger_pr_lease",
"create_branch",
"push_branch",
"create_pr",
"commit_files",
"gitea_commit_files",
"address_pr_change_requests",
"update_pr_branch_by_merge",
"gitea_update_pr_branch_by_merge",
"delete_branch",
"cleanup_merged_pr_branch",
"reconciliation_cleanup",
"work_issue",
"work-issue",
}
role_exclusive_tasks = task_capability_map.ROLE_EXCLUSIVE_TASKS
infra_assessment = role_session_router.assess_infra_stop(PROJECT_ROOT)
if required_role == "reviewer":
@@ -17483,7 +17537,9 @@ def gitea_resolve_task_capability(
blocked_result["stale_binding_recovery"] = stale_binding
return blocked_result
record_preflight_check("capability", required_role, resolved_task=task)
# Record the purity baseline now, but do not record a role/task authority
# stamp until the final allow decision is known (#723).
record_preflight_check("capability")
# #714: never auto-switch profiles during capability resolution.
profile = get_profile()
@@ -17556,17 +17612,13 @@ def gitea_resolve_task_capability(
# Matching profiles: same remote/host only (#714) — advisory, never activated.
matching_profiles = _matching_configured_profiles(
config, required_permission, remote=remote
config,
required_permission,
remote=remote,
required_role_kind=(
required_role if task in role_exclusive_tasks else None
),
)
# Role filter for exclusive tasks
if config and "profiles" in config and task in role_exclusive_tasks:
filtered = []
for p_name in matching_profiles:
p_data = (config.get("profiles") or {}).get(p_name) or {}
p_role = (p_data.get("role") or "").strip()
if not p_role or p_role == required_role:
filtered.append(p_name)
matching_profiles = filtered
configured = len(matching_profiles) > 0
available_in_session = allowed_in_current_session
@@ -17781,6 +17833,13 @@ def gitea_resolve_task_capability(
# A denied or stale resolver result is diagnostic evidence, never a
# consumable capability token for a later mutation (#763).
_clear_preflight_capability_state()
else:
# Stamp only after every resolver gate and fallible bookkeeping step
# has completed. A denied, stale, malformed, or unexpectedly failing
# attempt therefore cannot transiently authorize a later mutation.
record_preflight_check(
"capability", required_role, resolved_task=task
)
return result