fix(runtime): reject unsupported repository-authority modes (#973 B10)

assess_canonical_repository_root declared a public `mode` keyword defaulting
to "validation" and documented exactly two supported values, but never checked
the argument against an allowlist. Both dispatch points were permissive:

* the configured-root path tested `mode == "derivation"` and routed every other
  value into a catch-all `else`, so an unsupported mode silently received
  validation semantics; and
* the single-repository default path tested `mode == "validation"`, so an
  unsupported mode skipped the identity comparison entirely and was strictly
  weaker than validation, not an alias of it.

Measured at the previous head: mode="invalid_mode" with require_binding=True
and matching expected/observed identities returned proven=True, block=False
with no reasons; on the unconfigured path an unsupported mode returned
proven=True where mode="validation" returned proven=False for identical inputs.
Empty string and None behaved like any other unsupported value, and no
assessment ever emitted a mode-specific rejection.

Add an explicit two-value allowlist (SUPPORTED_MODES) and refuse every other
explicitly supplied value — unknown strings, misspellings, case and whitespace
variants, the empty string, None, and non-strings — as the first act of the
function, before any candidate-root existence check, path or symlink
resolution, git top-level discovery, remote-URL or repository-identity
discovery, and before any expected-versus-observed comparison or
validation/derivation behaviour. The refusal reports proven=False,
block=True, a mode-specific reason naming the offending value, and
reason_code=DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE, following the existing
webui.sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE convention. No repository identity
is resolved through a refused mode: resolved_slug and canonical_repo_root are
both None.

Omission continues to select validation, so the documented default is
unchanged. Unsupported modes are refused rather than normalized onto a
supported mode. No mode is exposed through MCP request parameters, environment
variables, repository configuration, session input, or any public reviewer,
merger, issue, PR or lease API; the only production call sites remain an
omitted mode (validation) and the hardcoded "derivation" literal.

resolve_namespace_mutation_context keeps the install checkout as the canonical
root when an assessment resolves none, so a refused mode cannot bind a root
derived through an undefined mode while roots_aligned and the carried
assessment stay fail-closed.

Regressions in tests/test_issue_973_b10_mode_contract.py cover invalid modes
with missing, matching and conflicting identities, empty string, explicit None,
representative non-strings, misspellings and whitespace variants, omission
defaulting to validation, explicit validation and derivation behaviour, the
single-repository default path differential, rejection ordering (both spied and
mock-free), the absence of any request/environment/configuration injection
surface, and fail-closed reviewer, merger, mutation-context and final
mutation-authorization behaviour through the production paths.

Closes #973

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-29 17:52:32 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent a6c7d1491e
commit 34968475c7
3 changed files with 839 additions and 5 deletions
+89 -4
View File
@@ -37,6 +37,48 @@ CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV = "GITEA_CANONICAL_REPOSITORY_ROOT"
# Candidate git remote names probed when deriving repository identity. # Candidate git remote names probed when deriving repository identity.
_IDENTITY_REMOTE_CANDIDATES = ("prgs", "origin", "dadeschools", "mdcps") _IDENTITY_REMOTE_CANDIDATES = ("prgs", "origin", "dadeschools", "mdcps")
# Repository-authority modes (#973 B10). Exactly two values are supported.
# ``mode`` selects how repository authority is established, so an unrecognised
# value must never be normalised onto one of these: aliasing a trusted mode is
# precisely the defect. Omitting the argument keeps the documented safe default,
# ``validation``.
MODE_VALIDATION = "validation"
MODE_DERIVATION = "derivation"
SUPPORTED_MODES: tuple[str, ...] = (MODE_VALIDATION, MODE_DERIVATION)
# Reason code emitted when an unsupported mode is refused. Mirrors the existing
# ``webui.sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE`` convention so callers and tests
# can assert the refusal cause rather than string-matching prose.
DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE = "unknown_mode"
def unsupported_mode_reason(mode: object) -> str | None:
"""Precise rejection reason for *mode*, or None when *mode* is supported.
Only the two documented string values are accepted, compared exactly — no
stripping, no case folding — so misspellings and whitespace variants are
refused rather than coerced. An empty string, ``None``, and any non-string
are all *explicitly supplied* unsupported values and are refused on the same
footing; none of them is normalised to a supported mode. Omitting the
argument entirely never reaches here with an unsupported value because the
parameter default is ``"validation"``.
"""
if isinstance(mode, str) and mode in SUPPORTED_MODES:
return None
supported = ", ".join(repr(m) for m in SUPPORTED_MODES)
if not isinstance(mode, str):
return (
f"unsupported repository-authority mode {mode!r} of type "
f"{type(mode).__name__}: only {supported} are supported; the mode "
"is refused before any repository assessment and no repository "
"identity was resolved through it (fail closed)"
)
return (
f"unsupported repository-authority mode {mode!r}: only {supported} are "
"supported; the mode is refused before any repository assessment and no "
"repository identity was resolved through it (fail closed)"
)
def configured_canonical_root( def configured_canonical_root(
profile: Mapping | None, profile: Mapping | None,
@@ -141,14 +183,41 @@ def assess_canonical_repository_root(
``configured`` (whether a cross-repo binding was declared), ``configured`` (whether a cross-repo binding was declared),
``resolved_slug`` and ``source``. ``resolved_slug`` and ``source``.
*mode*: *mode* accepts exactly the two values in :data:`SUPPORTED_MODES`:
- ``"validation"`` (default): an independently trusted expected repository - ``"validation"`` (default): an independently trusted expected repository
slug is known (or required). Candidate root's observed identity must match. slug is known (or required). Candidate root's observed identity must match.
Unprovable or missing expected identity fails closed when *require_binding* is True. Unprovable or missing expected identity fails closed when *require_binding* is True.
- ``"derivation"``: caller is deriving the canonical repository identity. - ``"derivation"``: caller is deriving the canonical repository identity.
No expected slug exists yet by design. Derivation succeeds if the configured No expected slug exists yet by design. Derivation succeeds if the configured
root exists, is a git repository, and carries a resolvable git remote identity. root exists, is a git repository, and carries a resolvable git remote identity.
Every other explicitly supplied value — unknown strings, misspellings, the
empty string, ``None``, and non-strings — is refused with ``proven`` False,
``block`` True, and ``reason_code`` :data:`DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE` (#973 B10).
Omitting *mode* entirely keeps the documented ``"validation"`` default.
""" """
# #973 B10: refuse an unsupported repository-authority mode as the very first
# act, before any candidate-root existence check, path or symlink resolution,
# git top-level discovery, remote-URL or repository-identity discovery, and
# before any expected-versus-observed comparison or validation/derivation
# behaviour. An unsupported mode previously fell into the catch-all ``else``
# on the configured-root path (silently receiving validation semantics) and
# skipped the identity comparison entirely on the single-repository default
# path (strictly weaker than validation), so matching identities could return
# ``proven`` True. No repository identity may be resolved through a mode the
# contract does not define.
mode_reason = unsupported_mode_reason(mode)
if mode_reason is not None:
return _assessment(
proven=False,
reasons=[mode_reason],
configured=bool((configured_value or "").strip()),
canonical_repo_root=None,
resolved_slug=None,
source=source,
reason_code=DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE,
)
process_root = os.path.realpath(process_project_root) process_root = os.path.realpath(process_project_root)
declared = (configured_value or "").strip() declared = (configured_value or "").strip()
@@ -170,7 +239,10 @@ def assess_canonical_repository_root(
derived = resolve_repo_toplevel(process_root) or process_root derived = resolve_repo_toplevel(process_root) or process_root
resolved_slug = repository_identity_slug(derived, remote=remote) resolved_slug = repository_identity_slug(derived, remote=remote)
reasons: list[str] = [] reasons: list[str] = []
if mode == "validation" and expected_slug: # #973 B10: the allowlist above guarantees *mode* is one of the two
# supported values here, so an unsupported value can no longer skip this
# identity comparison and end up strictly weaker than validation.
if mode == MODE_VALIDATION and expected_slug:
expected = expected_slug.strip() expected = expected_slug.strip()
if resolved_slug and resolved_slug.lower() != expected.lower(): if resolved_slug and resolved_slug.lower() != expected.lower():
reasons.append( reasons.append(
@@ -224,13 +296,16 @@ def assess_canonical_repository_root(
resolved_slug = repository_identity_slug(toplevel, remote=remote) resolved_slug = repository_identity_slug(toplevel, remote=remote)
reasons: list[str] = [] reasons: list[str] = []
if mode == "derivation": if mode == MODE_DERIVATION:
if not resolved_slug: if not resolved_slug:
reasons.append( reasons.append(
f"configured canonical repository root '{toplevel}' has no resolvable " f"configured canonical repository root '{toplevel}' has no resolvable "
"git remote identity (fail closed)" "git remote identity (fail closed)"
) )
else: else:
# #973 B10: MODE_VALIDATION only. This arm is no longer a catch-all — the
# allowlist above admits no third value, so an unsupported mode can no
# longer silently receive validation semantics here.
expected = (expected_slug or "").strip() or None expected = (expected_slug or "").strip() or None
if expected: if expected:
if resolved_slug and resolved_slug.lower() != expected.lower(): if resolved_slug and resolved_slug.lower() != expected.lower():
@@ -282,10 +357,19 @@ def _assessment(
proven: bool, proven: bool,
reasons: list[str], reasons: list[str],
configured: bool, configured: bool,
canonical_repo_root: str, canonical_repo_root: str | None,
resolved_slug: str | None, resolved_slug: str | None,
source: str | None, source: str | None,
reason_code: str | None = None,
) -> dict: ) -> dict:
"""Build the assessment payload.
``canonical_repo_root`` is None only when the assessment refused to resolve
one at all — today exactly the unsupported-mode refusal (#973 B10), which
must not derive a trusted repository identity through an undefined mode.
``reason_code`` is a machine-checkable refusal cause; None for every
ordinary (non-coded) outcome.
"""
return { return {
"proven": proven, "proven": proven,
"block": not proven, "block": not proven,
@@ -294,4 +378,5 @@ def _assessment(
"canonical_repo_root": canonical_repo_root, "canonical_repo_root": canonical_repo_root,
"resolved_slug": resolved_slug, "resolved_slug": resolved_slug,
"source": source, "source": source,
"reason_code": reason_code,
} }
+11 -1
View File
@@ -249,7 +249,16 @@ def resolve_namespace_mutation_context(
remote=remote, remote=remote,
require_binding=True, require_binding=True,
) )
canonical_root = crr_assessment["canonical_repo_root"] # #973 B10: a refused repository-authority mode deliberately resolves no
# canonical root, so downstream guards keep evaluating the install
# checkout rather than an identity derived through an undefined mode.
# ``roots_aligned`` still follows ``proven`` and stays False, and the
# refusal (with its reason_code) rides along in
# ``canonical_root_assessment`` — this is a fail-closed fallback, never a
# normalisation of the mode.
canonical_root = crr_assessment["canonical_repo_root"] or amw.resolve_canonical_repo_root(
process_root, process_root
)
roots_aligned = crr_assessment["proven"] roots_aligned = crr_assessment["proven"]
else: else:
crr_assessment = { crr_assessment = {
@@ -260,6 +269,7 @@ def resolve_namespace_mutation_context(
"canonical_repo_root": amw.resolve_canonical_repo_root(process_root, process_root), "canonical_repo_root": amw.resolve_canonical_repo_root(process_root, process_root),
"resolved_slug": None, "resolved_slug": None,
"source": None, "source": None,
"reason_code": None,
} }
canonical_root = crr_assessment["canonical_repo_root"] canonical_root = crr_assessment["canonical_repo_root"]
roots_aligned = (canonical_root == process_root) roots_aligned = (canonical_root == process_root)
+739
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,739 @@
"""Regression tests for Issue #973 blocker B10: repository-authority mode contract.
Before this repair ``assess_canonical_repository_root`` never checked its
``mode`` argument against an allowlist. Both dispatch points were permissive:
* the configured-root path tested ``mode == "derivation"`` and sent every other
value into a catch-all ``else``, so an unsupported mode silently received
*validation* semantics, and
* the single-repository default path tested ``mode == "validation"``, so an
unsupported mode skipped the identity comparison entirely and was strictly
*weaker* than validation.
The measured consequence was that ``mode="invalid_mode"`` with matching expected
and observed identities returned ``proven: True`` / ``block: False`` with no
reasons, and that an unsupported mode passed on the default path where
``"validation"`` correctly blocked.
These tests exercise the production module directly with real git repositories —
no patched stand-in for the function under test — and drive the production
enforcement and mutation-context consumers rather than only the intermediate
assessment.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import ast
import inspect
import os
import subprocess
import tempfile
import unittest
from unittest.mock import patch
import canonical_repository_root as crr
import gitea_config
import gitea_mcp_server as mcp_server
import namespace_workspace_binding as nwb
import stable_control_runtime
INSTALL_SLUG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools"
TARGET_SLUG = "Scaled-Tech-Consulting/mcp-control-plane"
FOREIGN_SLUG = "Someone-Else/Evil-Repo"
# Explicitly supplied values that must all be refused. Omission is *not* in this
# list: omitting the argument keeps the documented ``"validation"`` default.
UNSUPPORTED_STRING_MODES = (
"invalid_mode",
"",
"validaton", # misspelling
"derivaton", # misspelling
"Validation", # case variant
"DERIVATION", # case variant
" validation", # leading whitespace
"validation ", # trailing whitespace
"derivation\n", # trailing newline
"validation,derivation",
)
UNSUPPORTED_NON_STRING_MODES = (
None,
0,
1,
True,
False,
3.14,
[],
["validation"],
{},
{"mode": "validation"},
("validation",),
object(),
)
def _init_repo(path: str, remote_url: str, *, user: str = "Test User") -> None:
os.makedirs(path, exist_ok=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-b", "master"], cwd=path, check=True,
capture_output=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.email", "[email protected]"], cwd=path,
check=True, capture_output=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "config", "user.name", user], cwd=path, check=True,
capture_output=True)
with open(os.path.join(path, "README.md"), "w") as handle:
handle.write(f"{os.path.basename(path)}\n")
subprocess.run(["git", "add", "README.md"], cwd=path, check=True,
capture_output=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "commit", "-m", "initial"], cwd=path, check=True,
capture_output=True)
subprocess.run(["git", "remote", "add", "prgs", remote_url], cwd=path,
check=True, capture_output=True)
class _CanonicalRootFixture(unittest.TestCase):
"""Real install / target / foreign git repositories, as in the #973 suite."""
def setUp(self):
self._tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.tmp_dir = os.path.realpath(self._tmp.name)
self.install_root = os.path.join(self.tmp_dir, "Gitea-Tools")
_init_repo(
self.install_root,
"https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/Gitea-Tools.git",
)
self.target_root = os.path.join(self.tmp_dir, "mcp-control-plane")
_init_repo(
self.target_root,
"https://gitea.prgs.cc/Scaled-Tech-Consulting/mcp-control-plane.git",
)
self.evil_root = os.path.join(self.tmp_dir, "Evil-Repo")
_init_repo(
self.evil_root,
"https://gitea.prgs.cc/Someone-Else/Evil-Repo.git",
user="Evil User",
)
self.target_branches = os.path.join(self.target_root, "branches")
self.target_worktree = os.path.join(self.target_branches, "rev-pr-99")
subprocess.run(
["git", "worktree", "add", "-b", "rev-pr-99", self.target_worktree],
cwd=self.target_root, check=True, capture_output=True,
)
def tearDown(self):
self._tmp.cleanup()
def assertRefusedForMode(self, assessment: dict, mode) -> None:
"""Assert a fail-closed refusal attributable to *mode* and nothing else."""
self.assertFalse(assessment["proven"], assessment)
self.assertTrue(assessment["block"], assessment)
self.assertEqual(assessment["reason_code"], crr.DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE, assessment)
self.assertEqual(len(assessment["reasons"]), 1, assessment)
reason = assessment["reasons"][0]
self.assertIn("unsupported repository-authority mode", reason)
self.assertIn(repr(mode), reason)
# No trusted repository identity may be derived through an invalid mode.
self.assertIsNone(assessment["resolved_slug"], assessment)
self.assertIsNone(assessment["canonical_repo_root"], assessment)
class TestB10UnsupportedModeIsRejected(_CanonicalRootFixture):
"""Direct assessment tests for invalid-mode parsing."""
def test_invalid_string_with_missing_expected_identity(self):
"""G1: blocks for the mode, not incidentally for a missing identity."""
assessment = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
configured_value=self.target_root,
source="env",
expected_slug=None,
process_project_root=self.install_root,
remote="prgs",
require_binding=True,
mode="invalid_mode",
)
self.assertRefusedForMode(assessment, "invalid_mode")
self.assertFalse(
any("unprovable or missing" in r for r in assessment["reasons"]),
"must block because the mode is unsupported, not because the expected "
"identity happened to be missing",
)
def test_invalid_string_with_matching_identities(self):
"""G2: the contract violation — matching identities used to return proven."""
assessment = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
configured_value=self.target_root,
source="env",
expected_slug=TARGET_SLUG,
process_project_root=self.install_root,
remote="prgs",
require_binding=True,
mode="invalid_mode",
)
self.assertRefusedForMode(assessment, "invalid_mode")
def test_invalid_string_with_conflicting_identities(self):
"""G3: refused for the mode, not for the incidental identity mismatch."""
assessment = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
configured_value=self.evil_root,
source="env",
expected_slug=INSTALL_SLUG,
process_project_root=self.install_root,
remote="prgs",
require_binding=True,
mode="invalid_mode",
)
self.assertRefusedForMode(assessment, "invalid_mode")
self.assertFalse(
any("identity mismatch" in r for r in assessment["reasons"]),
"the identity comparison must not have run at all",
)
def test_empty_string_mode(self):
"""G4a: an explicitly supplied empty string is an unsupported value."""
assessment = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
configured_value=self.target_root,
source="env",
expected_slug=TARGET_SLUG,
process_project_root=self.install_root,
remote="prgs",
require_binding=True,
mode="",
)
self.assertRefusedForMode(assessment, "")
def test_explicit_none_mode(self):
"""G4b: explicit None is refused; it is not treated as omission."""
assessment = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
configured_value=self.target_root,
source="env",
expected_slug=TARGET_SLUG,
process_project_root=self.install_root,
remote="prgs",
require_binding=True,
mode=None,
)
self.assertRefusedForMode(assessment, None)
self.assertIn("of type NoneType", assessment["reasons"][0])
def test_representative_non_string_modes(self):
for mode in UNSUPPORTED_NON_STRING_MODES:
with self.subTest(mode=repr(mode)):
assessment = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
configured_value=self.target_root,
source="env",
expected_slug=TARGET_SLUG,
process_project_root=self.install_root,
remote="prgs",
require_binding=True,
mode=mode,
)
self.assertRefusedForMode(assessment, mode)
self.assertIn(
f"of type {type(mode).__name__}", assessment["reasons"][0]
)
def test_unknown_strings_misspellings_and_whitespace_variants(self):
for mode in UNSUPPORTED_STRING_MODES:
with self.subTest(mode=repr(mode)):
assessment = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
configured_value=self.target_root,
source="env",
expected_slug=TARGET_SLUG,
process_project_root=self.install_root,
remote="prgs",
require_binding=True,
mode=mode,
)
self.assertRefusedForMode(assessment, mode)
def test_supported_modes_are_exactly_two(self):
self.assertEqual(
crr.SUPPORTED_MODES, ("validation", "derivation")
)
self.assertIsNone(crr.unsupported_mode_reason("validation"))
self.assertIsNone(crr.unsupported_mode_reason("derivation"))
self.assertIsNotNone(crr.unsupported_mode_reason("invalid_mode"))
class TestB10SupportedModesUnchanged(_CanonicalRootFixture):
"""The repair must not disturb the two documented modes."""
def test_omitted_mode_defaults_to_validation(self):
"""G4c/G4d: omission still selects validation, proven by both outcomes."""
matching = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
configured_value=self.target_root,
source="env",
expected_slug=TARGET_SLUG,
process_project_root=self.install_root,
remote="prgs",
require_binding=True,
)
self.assertTrue(matching["proven"], matching)
self.assertFalse(matching["block"], matching)
self.assertIsNone(matching["reason_code"], matching)
self.assertEqual(matching["resolved_slug"], TARGET_SLUG)
conflicting = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
configured_value=self.evil_root,
source="env",
expected_slug=INSTALL_SLUG,
process_project_root=self.install_root,
remote="prgs",
require_binding=True,
)
self.assertFalse(conflicting["proven"], conflicting)
self.assertTrue(conflicting["block"], conflicting)
self.assertIsNone(conflicting["reason_code"], conflicting)
self.assertTrue(
any("identity mismatch" in r for r in conflicting["reasons"]),
"omission must behave exactly like explicit validation",
)
def test_explicit_validation_retains_strict_behavior(self):
"""G5a/G5b/G5c."""
ok = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
configured_value=self.target_root, source="env",
expected_slug=TARGET_SLUG, process_project_root=self.install_root,
remote="prgs", require_binding=True, mode="validation",
)
self.assertTrue(ok["proven"], ok)
mismatch = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
configured_value=self.evil_root, source="env",
expected_slug=INSTALL_SLUG, process_project_root=self.install_root,
remote="prgs", require_binding=True, mode="validation",
)
self.assertTrue(mismatch["block"], mismatch)
self.assertTrue(any("identity mismatch" in r for r in mismatch["reasons"]))
unprovable = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
configured_value=self.target_root, source="env",
expected_slug=None, process_project_root=self.install_root,
remote="prgs", require_binding=True, mode="validation",
)
self.assertTrue(unprovable["block"], unprovable)
self.assertTrue(
any("unprovable or missing" in r for r in unprovable["reasons"])
)
def test_explicit_derivation_retains_trusted_derivation(self):
"""G5d: derivation still resolves identity with no expected slug."""
derived = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
configured_value=self.target_root, source="env",
expected_slug=None, process_project_root=self.install_root,
remote="prgs", require_binding=True, mode="derivation",
)
self.assertTrue(derived["proven"], derived)
self.assertFalse(derived["block"], derived)
self.assertIsNone(derived["reason_code"], derived)
self.assertEqual(derived["resolved_slug"], TARGET_SLUG)
def test_derivation_without_resolvable_remote_still_fails_closed(self):
no_remote = os.path.join(self.tmp_dir, "no-remote-target")
os.makedirs(no_remote)
subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-b", "master"], cwd=no_remote, check=True,
capture_output=True)
assessment = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
configured_value=no_remote, source="env", expected_slug=None,
process_project_root=self.install_root, remote="prgs",
require_binding=True, mode="derivation",
)
self.assertTrue(assessment["block"], assessment)
self.assertTrue(
any("no resolvable" in r for r in assessment["reasons"]), assessment
)
class TestB10SingleRepositoryDefaultPath(_CanonicalRootFixture):
"""G6: on the unconfigured path an invalid mode used to be weaker than validation."""
def _assess(self, mode_kwargs: dict) -> dict:
return crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
configured_value=None,
source=None,
expected_slug=FOREIGN_SLUG,
process_project_root=self.install_root,
remote="prgs",
require_binding=False,
**mode_kwargs,
)
def test_validation_blocks_a_foreign_expected_identity(self):
"""G6b: the reference behaviour the invalid mode must not undercut."""
got = self._assess({"mode": "validation"})
self.assertFalse(got["proven"], got)
self.assertTrue(got["block"], got)
self.assertTrue(any("identity mismatch" in r for r in got["reasons"]))
def test_invalid_mode_no_longer_passes_where_validation_blocks(self):
"""G6a: identical inputs, only the mode differs — must not fail open."""
invalid = self._assess({"mode": "invalid_mode"})
self.assertRefusedForMode(invalid, "invalid_mode")
validation = self._assess({"mode": "validation"})
self.assertEqual(
invalid["proven"], validation["proven"],
"an unsupported mode must never be more permissive than validation",
)
self.assertTrue(invalid["block"] and validation["block"])
def test_empty_string_mode_on_default_path(self):
"""G6c."""
self.assertRefusedForMode(self._assess({"mode": ""}), "")
def test_omitted_mode_on_default_path_still_validates(self):
got = self._assess({})
self.assertFalse(got["proven"], got)
self.assertTrue(any("identity mismatch" in r for r in got["reasons"]), got)
class TestB10RejectionOrdering(_CanonicalRootFixture):
"""Refusal must precede every form of candidate-root or Git inspection."""
def test_no_git_or_identity_discovery_runs_for_an_unsupported_mode(self):
with patch.object(crr, "resolve_repo_toplevel") as toplevel, \
patch.object(crr, "repository_identity_slug") as identity:
assessment = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
configured_value=self.target_root,
source="env",
expected_slug=TARGET_SLUG,
process_project_root=self.install_root,
remote="prgs",
require_binding=True,
mode="invalid_mode",
)
self.assertRefusedForMode(assessment, "invalid_mode")
toplevel.assert_not_called()
identity.assert_not_called()
def test_the_same_spies_do_fire_for_a_supported_mode(self):
"""Control: proves the previous test's assertions are not vacuous."""
with patch.object(crr, "resolve_repo_toplevel",
wraps=crr.resolve_repo_toplevel) as toplevel, \
patch.object(crr, "repository_identity_slug",
wraps=crr.repository_identity_slug) as identity:
crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
configured_value=self.target_root,
source="env",
expected_slug=TARGET_SLUG,
process_project_root=self.install_root,
remote="prgs",
require_binding=True,
mode="validation",
)
toplevel.assert_called()
identity.assert_called()
def test_nonexistent_candidate_root_still_reports_the_mode_refusal(self):
"""No mocks: the existence check cannot have run before the refusal."""
nonexistent = os.path.join(self.tmp_dir, "no-such-repository")
assessment = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
configured_value=nonexistent,
source="env",
expected_slug=TARGET_SLUG,
process_project_root=self.install_root,
remote="prgs",
require_binding=True,
mode="invalid_mode",
)
self.assertRefusedForMode(assessment, "invalid_mode")
self.assertFalse(
any("does not exist" in r for r in assessment["reasons"]), assessment
)
def test_symlinked_candidate_root_is_not_resolved_for_an_unsupported_mode(self):
link = os.path.join(self.tmp_dir, "target-alias")
os.symlink(self.target_root, link)
assessment = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root(
configured_value=link,
source="env",
expected_slug=TARGET_SLUG,
process_project_root=self.install_root,
remote="prgs",
require_binding=True,
mode="invalid_mode",
)
self.assertRefusedForMode(assessment, "invalid_mode")
# The refusal payload must not leak a resolved path for the candidate.
self.assertIsNone(assessment["canonical_repo_root"], assessment)
class TestB10NoModeInjectionSurface(unittest.TestCase):
"""``mode`` must not be reachable from requests, environment, or config."""
PRODUCTION_MODULES = ("gitea_mcp_server.py", "namespace_workspace_binding.py")
def _repo_root(self) -> str:
return os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
def test_production_call_sites_only_pass_allowlisted_literal_modes(self):
"""Valid hardcoded modes reach the correct path; nothing else is passed."""
seen: list[tuple[str, str | None]] = []
for name in self.PRODUCTION_MODULES:
path = os.path.join(self._repo_root(), name)
with open(path) as handle:
tree = ast.parse(handle.read())
for node in ast.walk(tree):
if not isinstance(node, ast.Call):
continue
func = node.func
called = (
func.attr if isinstance(func, ast.Attribute)
else getattr(func, "id", None)
)
if called != "assess_canonical_repository_root":
continue
supplied = [k for k in node.keywords if k.arg == "mode"]
if not supplied:
seen.append((name, None))
continue
value = supplied[0].value
self.assertIsInstance(
value, ast.Constant,
f"{name}: mode must be a literal, never a variable or expression",
)
self.assertIn(
value.value, crr.SUPPORTED_MODES,
f"{name}: unsupported mode literal {value.value!r}",
)
seen.append((name, value.value))
self.assertTrue(seen, "expected production call sites to be found")
# Both documented modes are exercised by production, and omission is used.
self.assertIn(None, [mode for _, mode in seen])
self.assertIn("derivation", [mode for _, mode in seen])
def test_no_public_entry_point_exposes_a_mode_parameter(self):
for func in (
nwb.resolve_namespace_mutation_context,
nwb.assess_namespace_mutation_workspace,
mcp_server._resolve_namespace_mutation_context,
mcp_server._enforce_canonical_repository_root,
mcp_server._canonical_repository_slug,
mcp_server._trusted_session_repository,
mcp_server._resolve_expected_repository_slug,
):
with self.subTest(func=func.__name__):
self.assertNotIn("mode", inspect.signature(func).parameters)
def test_no_environment_key_selects_a_repository_authority_mode(self):
for key in gitea_config.RECOGNIZED_GITEA_ENV_KEYS:
self.assertNotIn(
"CANONICAL_REPOSITORY_MODE", key.upper(),
f"{key} would expose a repository-authority mode selector",
)
# An invented mode-ish variable is simply not consumed by crr.
env = {
"GITEA_CANONICAL_REPOSITORY_ROOT": "/some/path",
"GITEA_CANONICAL_REPOSITORY_MODE": "invalid_mode",
}
value, source = crr.configured_canonical_root(None, env)
self.assertEqual(value, "/some/path")
self.assertNotIn("mode", (source or "").lower())
self.assertIn(
"GITEA_CANONICAL_REPOSITORY_MODE",
gitea_config.get_unconsumed_gitea_env_overrides(env),
"an unknown GITEA_* key must still be rejected as unrecognised",
)
def test_repository_configuration_carries_no_mode_field(self):
profile = {
"canonical_repository_root": "/some/path",
"mode": "invalid_mode",
}
value, source = crr.configured_canonical_root(profile, {})
self.assertEqual(value, "/some/path")
self.assertEqual(source, "profile canonical_repository_root")
class TestB10ProductionEnforcementPaths(_CanonicalRootFixture):
"""Production enforcement, mutation-context, reviewer and merger consumers."""
def _force_invalid_mode(self):
"""Simulate a future call site threading an unsupported mode.
The real ``assess_canonical_repository_root`` still executes — only the
caller-side argument is substituted — so the refusal under test is
produced by production code, not by a stand-in. No caller-controlled
``mode`` parameter is added to any production signature to achieve this.
"""
real = crr.assess_canonical_repository_root
def _wrapper(**kwargs):
kwargs["mode"] = "invalid_mode"
return real(**kwargs)
return patch.object(crr, "assess_canonical_repository_root", _wrapper)
def test_mutation_context_fails_closed_under_a_refused_mode(self):
with self._force_invalid_mode():
ctx = nwb.resolve_namespace_mutation_context(
role_kind="reviewer",
worktree_path=self.target_worktree,
process_project_root=self.install_root,
env={},
configured_canonical_root=self.target_root,
expected_slug=TARGET_SLUG,
remote="prgs",
)
assessment = ctx["canonical_root_assessment"]
self.assertFalse(ctx["roots_aligned"], ctx)
self.assertTrue(assessment["block"], assessment)
self.assertEqual(assessment["reason_code"], crr.DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE)
self.assertIsNone(assessment["resolved_slug"])
# The refused mode must not yield the candidate root as canonical.
self.assertNotEqual(ctx["canonical_repo_root"], self.target_root)
self.assertEqual(ctx["canonical_repo_root"], self.install_root)
def test_mutation_context_unchanged_for_the_supported_default(self):
ctx = nwb.resolve_namespace_mutation_context(
role_kind="reviewer",
worktree_path=self.target_worktree,
process_project_root=self.install_root,
env={},
configured_canonical_root=self.target_root,
expected_slug=TARGET_SLUG,
remote="prgs",
)
self.assertTrue(ctx["roots_aligned"], ctx)
self.assertEqual(ctx["canonical_repo_root"], self.target_root)
self.assertIsNone(ctx["canonical_root_assessment"]["reason_code"])
def test_reviewer_and_merger_authorization_fails_closed_under_a_refused_mode(self):
for role in ("reviewer", "merger"):
with self.subTest(role=role), self._force_invalid_mode():
assessment = nwb.assess_namespace_mutation_workspace(
role_kind=role,
worktree_path=self.target_worktree,
worktree=None,
process_project_root=self.install_root,
env={},
configured_canonical_root=self.target_root,
expected_slug=TARGET_SLUG,
remote="prgs",
)
self.assertTrue(assessment["block"], assessment)
self.assertTrue(
any("unsupported repository-authority mode" in r
for r in assessment["reasons"]),
assessment,
)
def test_reviewer_and_merger_authorization_unchanged_for_supported_modes(self):
for role in ("reviewer", "merger"):
with self.subTest(role=role):
assessment = nwb.assess_namespace_mutation_workspace(
role_kind=role,
worktree_path=self.target_worktree,
worktree=None,
process_project_root=self.install_root,
env={},
configured_canonical_root=self.target_root,
expected_slug=TARGET_SLUG,
remote="prgs",
)
self.assertFalse(assessment["block"], assessment)
def test_final_mutation_gate_blocks_when_the_mode_refusal_unaligns_roots(self):
with self._force_invalid_mode():
ctx = nwb.resolve_namespace_mutation_context(
role_kind="reviewer",
worktree_path=self.target_worktree,
process_project_root=self.install_root,
env={},
configured_canonical_root=self.target_root,
expected_slug=TARGET_SLUG,
remote="prgs",
)
report = stable_control_runtime.build_runtime_report(
process_root=self.install_root,
checkout_branch="master",
runtime_head="abcdef123456",
active_task_workspace=ctx["workspace_path"],
canonical_repository_root=ctx["canonical_repo_root"],
workspace_roots_aligned=ctx["roots_aligned"],
)
gate = stable_control_runtime.assess_runtime_mutation_gate(report)
self.assertTrue(gate["block"], gate)
def test_enforce_canonical_repository_root_uses_the_validation_default(self):
"""B8 boundary intact: a foreign configured root raises through production."""
with patch.object(mcp_server, "PROJECT_ROOT", self.install_root), \
patch.object(mcp_server, "_configured_canonical_root",
return_value=(self.evil_root, "env")), \
patch.object(mcp_server.session_ctx, "get_session_context",
return_value=None):
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as raised:
mcp_server._enforce_canonical_repository_root(remote="prgs")
self.assertIn("identity mismatch", str(raised.exception))
def test_enforce_canonical_repository_root_refuses_a_threaded_invalid_mode(self):
bound = {"org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
"repository": "mcp-control-plane", "remote": "prgs"}
with patch.object(mcp_server, "PROJECT_ROOT", self.install_root), \
patch.object(mcp_server, "_configured_canonical_root",
return_value=(self.target_root, "env")), \
patch.object(mcp_server.session_ctx, "get_session_context",
return_value=bound), \
self._force_invalid_mode():
with self.assertRaises(RuntimeError) as raised:
mcp_server._enforce_canonical_repository_root(remote="prgs")
self.assertIn("unsupported repository-authority mode", str(raised.exception))
def test_enforce_canonical_repository_root_passes_for_a_valid_binding(self):
bound = {"org": "Scaled-Tech-Consulting",
"repository": "mcp-control-plane", "remote": "prgs"}
with patch.object(mcp_server, "PROJECT_ROOT", self.install_root), \
patch.object(mcp_server, "_configured_canonical_root",
return_value=(self.target_root, "env")), \
patch.object(mcp_server.session_ctx, "get_session_context",
return_value=bound), \
patch.object(mcp_server.session_ctx, "assess_session_context",
return_value={"block": False, "reasons": []}), \
patch.object(mcp_server, "get_profile",
return_value={"profile_name": "prgs-reviewer"}):
mcp_server._enforce_canonical_repository_root(remote="prgs")
def test_canonical_repository_slug_derivation_unbroken(self):
"""B9 boundary intact: legitimate cross-repository derivation still works."""
profile = {
"profile_name": "prgs-author",
"allowed_repositories": [TARGET_SLUG],
"canonical_repository_root": self.target_root,
}
with patch.object(mcp_server, "PROJECT_ROOT", self.install_root), \
patch.object(mcp_server.session_ctx, "get_session_context",
return_value=None):
slug, reasons = mcp_server._canonical_repository_slug(profile, "prgs")
self.assertEqual(slug, TARGET_SLUG, reasons)
self.assertEqual(reasons, [])
def test_canonical_repository_slug_fails_closed_under_a_refused_mode(self):
profile = {
"profile_name": "prgs-author",
"allowed_repositories": [TARGET_SLUG],
"canonical_repository_root": self.target_root,
}
with patch.object(mcp_server, "PROJECT_ROOT", self.install_root), \
patch.object(mcp_server.session_ctx, "get_session_context",
return_value=None), \
self._force_invalid_mode():
slug, reasons = mcp_server._canonical_repository_slug(profile, "prgs")
self.assertIsNone(slug)
self.assertTrue(
any("unsupported repository-authority mode" in r for r in reasons),
reasons,
)
result = mcp_server._trusted_session_repository(
profile, "prgs", for_mutation=True
)
self.assertIsNone(result["org"])
self.assertIsNone(result["repository"])
self.assertTrue(result["reasons"])
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()