fix(runtime): reject unsupported repository-authority modes (#973 B10)

assess_canonical_repository_root declared a public `mode` keyword defaulting
to "validation" and documented exactly two supported values, but never checked
the argument against an allowlist. Both dispatch points were permissive:

* the configured-root path tested `mode == "derivation"` and routed every other
  value into a catch-all `else`, so an unsupported mode silently received
  validation semantics; and
* the single-repository default path tested `mode == "validation"`, so an
  unsupported mode skipped the identity comparison entirely and was strictly
  weaker than validation, not an alias of it.

Measured at the previous head: mode="invalid_mode" with require_binding=True
and matching expected/observed identities returned proven=True, block=False
with no reasons; on the unconfigured path an unsupported mode returned
proven=True where mode="validation" returned proven=False for identical inputs.
Empty string and None behaved like any other unsupported value, and no
assessment ever emitted a mode-specific rejection.

Add an explicit two-value allowlist (SUPPORTED_MODES) and refuse every other
explicitly supplied value — unknown strings, misspellings, case and whitespace
variants, the empty string, None, and non-strings — as the first act of the
function, before any candidate-root existence check, path or symlink
resolution, git top-level discovery, remote-URL or repository-identity
discovery, and before any expected-versus-observed comparison or
validation/derivation behaviour. The refusal reports proven=False,
block=True, a mode-specific reason naming the offending value, and
reason_code=DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE, following the existing
webui.sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE convention. No repository identity
is resolved through a refused mode: resolved_slug and canonical_repo_root are
both None.

Omission continues to select validation, so the documented default is
unchanged. Unsupported modes are refused rather than normalized onto a
supported mode. No mode is exposed through MCP request parameters, environment
variables, repository configuration, session input, or any public reviewer,
merger, issue, PR or lease API; the only production call sites remain an
omitted mode (validation) and the hardcoded "derivation" literal.

resolve_namespace_mutation_context keeps the install checkout as the canonical
root when an assessment resolves none, so a refused mode cannot bind a root
derived through an undefined mode while roots_aligned and the carried
assessment stay fail-closed.

Regressions in tests/test_issue_973_b10_mode_contract.py cover invalid modes
with missing, matching and conflicting identities, empty string, explicit None,
representative non-strings, misspellings and whitespace variants, omission
defaulting to validation, explicit validation and derivation behaviour, the
single-repository default path differential, rejection ordering (both spied and
mock-free), the absence of any request/environment/configuration injection
surface, and fail-closed reviewer, merger, mutation-context and final
mutation-authorization behaviour through the production paths.

Closes #973

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-29 17:52:32 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent a6c7d1491e
commit 34968475c7
3 changed files with 839 additions and 5 deletions
+89 -4
View File
@@ -37,6 +37,48 @@ CANONICAL_ROOT_ENV = "GITEA_CANONICAL_REPOSITORY_ROOT"
# Candidate git remote names probed when deriving repository identity.
_IDENTITY_REMOTE_CANDIDATES = ("prgs", "origin", "dadeschools", "mdcps")
# Repository-authority modes (#973 B10). Exactly two values are supported.
# ``mode`` selects how repository authority is established, so an unrecognised
# value must never be normalised onto one of these: aliasing a trusted mode is
# precisely the defect. Omitting the argument keeps the documented safe default,
# ``validation``.
MODE_VALIDATION = "validation"
MODE_DERIVATION = "derivation"
SUPPORTED_MODES: tuple[str, ...] = (MODE_VALIDATION, MODE_DERIVATION)
# Reason code emitted when an unsupported mode is refused. Mirrors the existing
# ``webui.sanctioned_restart.DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE`` convention so callers and tests
# can assert the refusal cause rather than string-matching prose.
DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE = "unknown_mode"
def unsupported_mode_reason(mode: object) -> str | None:
"""Precise rejection reason for *mode*, or None when *mode* is supported.
Only the two documented string values are accepted, compared exactly — no
stripping, no case folding — so misspellings and whitespace variants are
refused rather than coerced. An empty string, ``None``, and any non-string
are all *explicitly supplied* unsupported values and are refused on the same
footing; none of them is normalised to a supported mode. Omitting the
argument entirely never reaches here with an unsupported value because the
parameter default is ``"validation"``.
"""
if isinstance(mode, str) and mode in SUPPORTED_MODES:
return None
supported = ", ".join(repr(m) for m in SUPPORTED_MODES)
if not isinstance(mode, str):
return (
f"unsupported repository-authority mode {mode!r} of type "
f"{type(mode).__name__}: only {supported} are supported; the mode "
"is refused before any repository assessment and no repository "
"identity was resolved through it (fail closed)"
)
return (
f"unsupported repository-authority mode {mode!r}: only {supported} are "
"supported; the mode is refused before any repository assessment and no "
"repository identity was resolved through it (fail closed)"
)
def configured_canonical_root(
profile: Mapping | None,
@@ -141,14 +183,41 @@ def assess_canonical_repository_root(
``configured`` (whether a cross-repo binding was declared),
``resolved_slug`` and ``source``.
*mode*:
*mode* accepts exactly the two values in :data:`SUPPORTED_MODES`:
- ``"validation"`` (default): an independently trusted expected repository
slug is known (or required). Candidate root's observed identity must match.
Unprovable or missing expected identity fails closed when *require_binding* is True.
- ``"derivation"``: caller is deriving the canonical repository identity.
No expected slug exists yet by design. Derivation succeeds if the configured
root exists, is a git repository, and carries a resolvable git remote identity.
Every other explicitly supplied value — unknown strings, misspellings, the
empty string, ``None``, and non-strings — is refused with ``proven`` False,
``block`` True, and ``reason_code`` :data:`DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE` (#973 B10).
Omitting *mode* entirely keeps the documented ``"validation"`` default.
"""
# #973 B10: refuse an unsupported repository-authority mode as the very first
# act, before any candidate-root existence check, path or symlink resolution,
# git top-level discovery, remote-URL or repository-identity discovery, and
# before any expected-versus-observed comparison or validation/derivation
# behaviour. An unsupported mode previously fell into the catch-all ``else``
# on the configured-root path (silently receiving validation semantics) and
# skipped the identity comparison entirely on the single-repository default
# path (strictly weaker than validation), so matching identities could return
# ``proven`` True. No repository identity may be resolved through a mode the
# contract does not define.
mode_reason = unsupported_mode_reason(mode)
if mode_reason is not None:
return _assessment(
proven=False,
reasons=[mode_reason],
configured=bool((configured_value or "").strip()),
canonical_repo_root=None,
resolved_slug=None,
source=source,
reason_code=DENY_UNKNOWN_MODE,
)
process_root = os.path.realpath(process_project_root)
declared = (configured_value or "").strip()
@@ -170,7 +239,10 @@ def assess_canonical_repository_root(
derived = resolve_repo_toplevel(process_root) or process_root
resolved_slug = repository_identity_slug(derived, remote=remote)
reasons: list[str] = []
if mode == "validation" and expected_slug:
# #973 B10: the allowlist above guarantees *mode* is one of the two
# supported values here, so an unsupported value can no longer skip this
# identity comparison and end up strictly weaker than validation.
if mode == MODE_VALIDATION and expected_slug:
expected = expected_slug.strip()
if resolved_slug and resolved_slug.lower() != expected.lower():
reasons.append(
@@ -224,13 +296,16 @@ def assess_canonical_repository_root(
resolved_slug = repository_identity_slug(toplevel, remote=remote)
reasons: list[str] = []
if mode == "derivation":
if mode == MODE_DERIVATION:
if not resolved_slug:
reasons.append(
f"configured canonical repository root '{toplevel}' has no resolvable "
"git remote identity (fail closed)"
)
else:
# #973 B10: MODE_VALIDATION only. This arm is no longer a catch-all — the
# allowlist above admits no third value, so an unsupported mode can no
# longer silently receive validation semantics here.
expected = (expected_slug or "").strip() or None
if expected:
if resolved_slug and resolved_slug.lower() != expected.lower():
@@ -282,10 +357,19 @@ def _assessment(
proven: bool,
reasons: list[str],
configured: bool,
canonical_repo_root: str,
canonical_repo_root: str | None,
resolved_slug: str | None,
source: str | None,
reason_code: str | None = None,
) -> dict:
"""Build the assessment payload.
``canonical_repo_root`` is None only when the assessment refused to resolve
one at all — today exactly the unsupported-mode refusal (#973 B10), which
must not derive a trusted repository identity through an undefined mode.
``reason_code`` is a machine-checkable refusal cause; None for every
ordinary (non-coded) outcome.
"""
return {
"proven": proven,
"block": not proven,
@@ -294,4 +378,5 @@ def _assessment(
"canonical_repo_root": canonical_repo_root,
"resolved_slug": resolved_slug,
"source": source,
"reason_code": reason_code,
}