fix(webui): authority-aware ownership + redacted contamination text (#641)
Addresses the two blockers from the PR #898 review ata81db754. B1 - degraded ownership inventory was rendered as affirmative absence. _build_session_rows read the sessions/leases/locks sections without consulting their status, so a session row emitted lease_ids=() and worktree_paths=() whether the session genuinely held nothing or the lease store simply could not be read. The renderer printed both as "none" and "unbound", contradicting the ownership_authority_complete invariant documented on InventorySnapshot. SessionRow now carries lease_authority and worktree_authority. A worktree binding is correlated through lease work numbers, so it is unproven when either the leases or the locks section fails to read -- this covers the narrow variant where locks hold real worktree paths but a degraded leases section leaves work_numbers empty. The renderer emits "unknown (inventory <status>)" with an authority-unproven badge instead of none/unbound, the card names the unreadable sections, and an empty session list from an unreadable sessions section no longer reads as "no sessions recorded". snapshot_to_dict exports ownership_authority_complete, ownership_section_status, and per-row lease_authority / worktree_authority so /api/sessions consumers can distinguish the two cases. B2 - contamination payload strings bypassed redaction. _inspect_contamination copied command_summary, session_id, role and reason_class out of the marker payload with only str(), while every inventory-sourced field on the same page arrives through webui.inventory.scrub(). The write-time redactor stable_branch_push_guard.redact_command is a narrow denylist that leaves absolute $HOME paths, -H 'X-Api-Key: <value>', --password <value>, and PRIVATE_KEY=<value> intact, and this is the first web surface to render command_summary at all. Adds webui.inventory.scrub_text(), which collapses $HOME and redacts credential-shaped tokens and URL userinfo anywhere inside a string rather than only at its start, and routes the marker payload through it. scrub() and every existing caller are untouched. The command_summary field is kept: it is the #630 evidence naming which daemon was killed. The module docstring claiming absolute paths were already collapsed is corrected. Also: removes the locks_by_session_hint dead loop and its discard (N1), adds the missing trailing newline to webui/runtime_views.py (N4), drops an unused dataclasses.field import, and documents both honesty rules in docs/webui-local-dev.md. Tests: tests/test_webui_sessions_view.py grows from 12 to 26 cases, covering degraded and unavailable ownership sections in both the HTML and JSON paths, the locks-readable/leases-degraded variant, a guard against over-correcting clean inventory into "unknown", the previously untested expired-lease flag, HTML escaping of hostile values in clean and degraded renders, and each secret class the write-time denylist misses. The STATUS_UNAVAILABLE import that was present but unused is now exercised. Validation, from the issue worktree with venv/bin/python (Python 3.14.5, pytest 9.1.1): pytest tests/test_webui_sessions_view.py tests/test_webui_*.py -q -> 512 passed, 376 subtests (was 498 / 372; +14 new tests) pytest tests/test_issue_854_semantic_container_exclusion.py -q -> 13 passed, 8 subtests 13-file runtime/health/inventory/restart set -> 1 failed, 223 passed; the single failure is test_runtime_clarity.py::TestRuntimeClarity:: test_activate_profile_succeeds_when_enabled, the identical test and assertion the reviewer recorded on master at7af40fb5, so it is baseline-equivalent and not introduced here. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -76,6 +76,35 @@ _CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE = re.compile(
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)
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_REDACTED = "[redacted]"
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#: Credential-shaped *name* as it appears inside a free-form command line. This
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#: is deliberately broader than :data:`_CREDENTIAL_KEY_RE` — it also matches a
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#: bare ``key`` component, so ``PRIVATE_KEY=`` is caught. Over-redacting a
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#: displayed string is safe; under-redacting one is not.
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_TEXT_CREDENTIAL_NAME = (
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r"[A-Za-z0-9_.\-]*"
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r"(?:token|secret|password|passwd|key|authorization|bearer|credential)"
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r"[A-Za-z0-9_.\-]*"
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)
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#: A value following such a name: single-quoted, double-quoted, or bare. The
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#: bare form stops at a quote so an enclosing quote survives the redaction.
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_TEXT_CREDENTIAL_VALUE = r"'[^']*'|\"[^\"]*\"|[^\s'\"]+"
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_TEXT_CREDENTIAL_FLAG_RE = re.compile(
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rf"(?P<key>(?<![\w\-])--?{_TEXT_CREDENTIAL_NAME})"
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rf"(?P<sep>[=\s]+)"
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rf"(?P<value>{_TEXT_CREDENTIAL_VALUE})",
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re.IGNORECASE,
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)
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_TEXT_CREDENTIAL_ASSIGN_RE = re.compile(
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rf"(?P<key>(?<![\w\-]){_TEXT_CREDENTIAL_NAME})"
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rf"(?P<sep>\s*[:=]\s*)"
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rf"(?P<value>{_TEXT_CREDENTIAL_VALUE})",
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re.IGNORECASE,
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)
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_TEXT_URL_USERINFO_RE = re.compile(
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r"(?P<scheme>\b[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9+.\-]*://)[^\s/@]+@"
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)
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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class InventorySection:
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@@ -225,6 +254,42 @@ def scrub(value: Any, *, key: str | None = None) -> Any:
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return repr(value)
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def collapse_home(text: str) -> str:
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"""Collapse every ``$HOME`` occurrence *inside* a string, not just a prefix."""
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home = os.path.expanduser("~")
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if not home or home == "/":
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return text
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return text.replace(home, "~")
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def scrub_text(value: Any) -> Any:
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"""Redact a free-form text blob such as a recorded command line.
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:func:`scrub` keys off structured field *names* and whole-value prefixes,
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which is right for inventory records but blind to a secret embedded in the
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middle of a sentence. This collapses ``$HOME`` and redacts credential-shaped
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tokens and URL userinfo *anywhere* in the string, so operator-supplied text
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rendered verbatim — contamination ``command_summary`` (#630) above all — is
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held to the same standard as every other field on the page.
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Returns ``None`` unchanged so callers can keep "absent" distinct from "".
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"""
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if value is None:
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return None
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text = value if isinstance(value, str) else str(value)
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text = collapse_home(text)
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text = _TEXT_URL_USERINFO_RE.sub(
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lambda m: f"{m.group('scheme')}{_REDACTED}@", text
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)
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text = _TEXT_CREDENTIAL_FLAG_RE.sub(
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lambda m: f"{m.group('key')}{m.group('sep')}{_REDACTED}", text
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)
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text = _TEXT_CREDENTIAL_ASSIGN_RE.sub(
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lambda m: f"{m.group('key')}{m.group('sep')}{_REDACTED}", text
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)
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return text
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# ── control-plane database (read-only) ───────────────────────────────────────
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@@ -91,4 +91,4 @@ def render_runtime_page(snapshot: RuntimeSnapshot) -> str:
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"<p class='muted'>This page does not expose tokens or perform MCP restarts. "
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"Correlated sessions, worktree bindings, and contamination markers: "
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"<a href='/sessions'>/sessions</a> (#641).</p>"
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)
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)
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+105
-16
@@ -12,18 +12,30 @@ Sources:
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and collision signals from the control-plane DB + filesystem.
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* :mod:`mcp_session_state` — durable contamination markers (inspect only).
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Secrets are never read. Absolute paths are collapsed by inventory redaction.
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Secrets are never read. Inventory-sourced values arrive already redacted by
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:func:`webui.inventory.scrub`; free-form marker text this module loads itself is
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put through :func:`webui.inventory.scrub_text`, which collapses ``$HOME`` and
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redacts credential-shaped tokens *inside* a string rather than only at its start.
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Ownership columns are authority-aware. A lease or lock section that could not be
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read renders as ``unknown``, never as ``none`` or ``unbound``: a lease the reader
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could not load is not an absent lease (see
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:attr:`webui.inventory.InventorySnapshot.ownership_authority_complete`).
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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from dataclasses import dataclass, field
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from dataclasses import dataclass
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from typing import Any, Callable
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import mcp_session_state
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from webui.inventory import (
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OWNERSHIP_SECTIONS,
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STATUS_OK,
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InventorySection,
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InventorySnapshot,
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load_inventory_snapshot,
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scrub_text,
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snapshot_to_dict as inventory_snapshot_to_dict,
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)
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from webui.runtime_health import (
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@@ -61,6 +73,29 @@ _CONTAMINATION_KINDS: tuple[str, ...] = (
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mcp_session_state.KIND_STABLE_BRANCH_CONTAMINATION,
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)
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#: Status recorded on a row when the backing inventory section is absent
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#: entirely — distinct from a section that reported itself degraded.
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AUTHORITY_MISSING = "missing"
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def _section_status(section: InventorySection | None) -> str:
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"""Status of an ownership section, treating an absent section as missing."""
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if section is None:
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return AUTHORITY_MISSING
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return section.status
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def _combined_authority(*statuses: str) -> str:
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"""Worst status of the sections a derived column depends on.
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A column proved from two sections is only trustworthy when *both* read
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cleanly, so the first non-``ok`` status wins.
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"""
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for status in statuses:
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if status != STATUS_OK:
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return status
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return STATUS_OK
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@dataclass(frozen=True)
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class ContaminationMarker:
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@@ -109,6 +144,17 @@ class SessionRow:
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worktree_paths: tuple[str, ...] = ()
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stale_flags: tuple[str, ...] = ()
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contamination_flags: tuple[str, ...] = ()
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#: Status of the section backing ``lease_ids``/``work_refs``. While this is
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#: not ``ok`` those tuples mean "could not be read", never "none held".
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lease_authority: str = STATUS_OK
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#: Worst status across the sections backing ``worktree_paths`` (locks are
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#: correlated through lease work numbers, so both must read cleanly).
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worktree_authority: str = STATUS_OK
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@property
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def ownership_authority_complete(self) -> bool:
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"""True only when this row's ownership columns are provable."""
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return self.lease_authority == STATUS_OK and self.worktree_authority == STATUS_OK
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def to_dict(self) -> dict[str, Any]:
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return {
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@@ -128,6 +174,18 @@ class SessionRow:
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"contamination_flags": list(self.contamination_flags),
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"is_stale": bool(self.stale_flags),
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"is_contaminated": bool(self.contamination_flags),
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"lease_authority": self.lease_authority,
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"worktree_authority": self.worktree_authority,
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"lease_authority_complete": self.lease_authority == STATUS_OK,
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"worktree_authority_complete": self.worktree_authority == STATUS_OK,
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"ownership_authority_complete": self.ownership_authority_complete,
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"ownership_note": (
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"Lease and worktree columns are proved from sections that read "
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"cleanly."
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if self.ownership_authority_complete
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else "An ownership source could not be read; empty lease_ids or "
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"worktree_paths on this row mean unknown, not unowned."
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),
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}
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@@ -154,6 +212,19 @@ class SessionViewSnapshot:
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def active_contamination(self) -> tuple[ContaminationMarker, ...]:
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return tuple(m for m in self.contamination_markers if m.to_dict()["active"])
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@property
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def ownership_authority_complete(self) -> bool:
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"""False while any ownership section is degraded, absent, or unavailable."""
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return self.inventory.ownership_authority_complete
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@property
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def ownership_section_status(self) -> dict[str, str]:
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"""Per-section status for the three ownership-bearing sections."""
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return {
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name: _section_status(self.inventory.section(name))
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for name in OWNERSHIP_SECTIONS
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}
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def _inspect_contamination(
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kind: str,
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@@ -180,7 +251,7 @@ def _inspect_contamination(
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role = None
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command_summary = None
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cleared = False
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summary = str(envelope.get("summary") or "")
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summary = scrub_text(str(envelope.get("summary") or ""))
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if envelope.get("on_disk") and envelope.get("has_payload"):
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try:
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@@ -194,20 +265,25 @@ def _inspect_contamination(
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command_summary = payload.get("command_summary") or payload.get("detail")
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cleared = bool(payload.get("cleared_by_reconciler"))
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if not summary:
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summary = (
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summary = scrub_text(
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f"{kind}: {reason_class or 'present'}"
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+ (" (cleared)" if cleared else "")
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)
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# Marker payloads are operator-supplied free text and are the one thing on
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# this page that does not arrive through inventory scrubbing. The write-time
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# redactor is a narrow denylist, so redact again at the display boundary:
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# it leaves $HOME paths, `-H 'X-Api-Key: …'`, `--password …`, and
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# `PRIVATE_KEY=…` intact. The field itself stays — it is #630 evidence.
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return ContaminationMarker(
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kind=kind,
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on_disk=bool(envelope.get("on_disk")),
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has_payload=bool(envelope.get("has_payload")),
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summary=summary or f"{kind}: not present",
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reason_class=str(reason_class) if reason_class else None,
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session_id=str(session_id) if session_id else None,
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role=str(role) if role else None,
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command_summary=str(command_summary) if command_summary else None,
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reason_class=scrub_text(str(reason_class)) if reason_class else None,
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session_id=scrub_text(str(session_id)) if session_id else None,
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role=scrub_text(str(role)) if role else None,
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command_summary=scrub_text(str(command_summary)) if command_summary else None,
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cleared=cleared,
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)
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@@ -232,18 +308,21 @@ def _build_session_rows(
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leases_section = inventory.section("leases")
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locks_section = inventory.section("locks")
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# Ownership columns may only assert absence when their source read cleanly.
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lease_authority = _section_status(leases_section)
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# Locks carry claimant profile/username, not control-plane session ids, so a
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# worktree binding is correlated through lease work numbers: it depends on
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# the locks *and* the leases section.
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worktree_authority = _combined_authority(
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lease_authority, _section_status(locks_section)
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)
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leases_by_session: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] = {}
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for lease in (leases_section.items if leases_section else ()):
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sid = str(lease.get("session_id") or "")
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if sid:
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leases_by_session.setdefault(sid, []).append(lease)
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locks_by_session_hint: dict[str, list[dict[str, Any]]] = {}
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for lock in (locks_section.items if locks_section else ()):
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# Locks carry claimant profile/username, not control-plane session ids.
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# Correlate later by matching lease work_number ↔ lock issue_number.
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pass
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active_markers = [m for m in contamination if m.to_dict()["active"]]
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marker_session_ids = {
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m.session_id for m in active_markers if m.session_id
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@@ -324,11 +403,11 @@ def _build_session_rows(
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worktree_paths=tuple(worktree_paths),
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stale_flags=tuple(dict.fromkeys(stale_flags)),
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contamination_flags=tuple(dict.fromkeys(contamination_flags)),
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lease_authority=lease_authority,
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worktree_authority=worktree_authority,
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)
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)
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# Silence unused variable for the locks_by_session_hint placeholder path.
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_ = locks_by_session_hint
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return tuple(rows)
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@@ -415,6 +494,16 @@ def snapshot_to_dict(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> dict[str, Any]:
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"stale": snapshot.stale_session_count,
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"contaminated": snapshot.contaminated_session_count,
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},
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"ownership_authority_complete": snapshot.ownership_authority_complete,
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"ownership_section_status": snapshot.ownership_section_status,
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"ownership_note": (
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"Every ownership source read cleanly; a session with no lease and no "
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"worktree path genuinely holds neither."
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if snapshot.ownership_authority_complete
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else "An ownership source is degraded or unavailable. Empty lease_ids "
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"and worktree_paths mean unknown, not unowned; consult each row's "
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"lease_authority and worktree_authority."
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),
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"contamination_markers": [
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marker.to_dict() for marker in snapshot.contamination_markers
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],
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+78
-19
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
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from html import escape
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from typing import Sequence
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from webui.inventory import STATUS_OK
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from webui.layout import render_page
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from webui.session_loader import (
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ContaminationMarker,
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@@ -29,6 +30,19 @@ def _flags(flags: Sequence[str], *, css: str) -> str:
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return " ".join(_badge(flag, css) for flag in flags)
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def _unproven_cell(status: str) -> str:
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"""Render an ownership column whose backing inventory section failed to read.
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Never "none" and never "unbound": an unreadable source proves nothing about
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ownership, and claiming otherwise is the exact failure the
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``ownership_authority_complete`` invariant exists to prevent.
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"""
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return (
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f'<span class="muted">unknown (inventory {escape(status)})</span><br>'
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f'{_badge("authority unproven", "badge-health-degraded")}'
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)
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def _runtime_banner(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> str:
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runtime = snapshot.runtime
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stale = runtime.stale_runtime_warning
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@@ -73,15 +87,37 @@ def _summary_bar(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> str:
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contaminated = snapshot.contaminated_session_count
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active_markers = len(snapshot.active_contamination)
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inv_status = snapshot.inventory.status
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authority_complete = snapshot.ownership_authority_complete
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authority_text = "complete" if authority_complete else "incomplete"
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authority_css = "badge-health-ok" if authority_complete else "badge-health-degraded"
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return f"""<div class="health-card" style="display:flex; flex-wrap:wrap; gap:1rem; align-items:center;">
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<div><strong>Sessions:</strong> <span class="badge badge-health-ok">{total}</span></div>
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<div><strong>Stale:</strong> <span class="badge badge-stale">{stale}</span></div>
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<div><strong>Contaminated:</strong> <span class="badge badge-blocked">{contaminated}</span></div>
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<div><strong>Active markers:</strong> <span class="badge badge-health-unproven">{active_markers}</span></div>
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<div><strong>Inventory:</strong> <span class="badge badge-health-skipped">{escape(inv_status)}</span></div>
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<div><strong>Ownership authority:</strong> <span class="badge {authority_css}">{authority_text}</span></div>
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</div>"""
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def _ownership_caveat(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> str:
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"""Name the unreadable ownership sections, or render nothing when all read."""
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if snapshot.ownership_authority_complete:
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return ""
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degraded = ", ".join(
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f"{name}: {status}"
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for name, status in snapshot.ownership_section_status.items()
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if status != STATUS_OK
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)
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return (
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'<div class="health-card health-stale">'
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"<strong>Ownership authority incomplete:</strong> "
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f"{escape(degraded)}. Columns marked <em>unknown</em> could not be read. "
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"No session below may be treated as holding no lease or no worktree "
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"binding — absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.</div>"
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)
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|
||||
def _render_session_row(row: SessionRow) -> str:
|
||||
pid = "—" if row.pid is None else str(row.pid)
|
||||
pid_alive = "—" if row.pid_alive is None else ("alive" if row.pid_alive else "dead")
|
||||
@@ -90,21 +126,33 @@ def _render_session_row(row: SessionRow) -> str:
|
||||
if row.pid_alive is True
|
||||
else ("badge-blocked" if row.pid_alive is False else "badge-health-skipped")
|
||||
)
|
||||
leases = (
|
||||
", ".join(f"<code>{escape(lid)}</code>" for lid in row.lease_ids)
|
||||
if row.lease_ids
|
||||
else '<span class="muted">none</span>'
|
||||
)
|
||||
work = (
|
||||
", ".join(escape(ref) for ref in row.work_refs)
|
||||
if row.work_refs
|
||||
else '<span class="muted">—</span>'
|
||||
)
|
||||
worktrees = (
|
||||
"<br>".join(f"<code>{escape(path)}</code>" for path in row.worktree_paths)
|
||||
if row.worktree_paths
|
||||
else '<span class="muted">unbound</span>'
|
||||
)
|
||||
# An empty tuple only means "holds none" when its source read cleanly.
|
||||
if row.lease_authority != STATUS_OK:
|
||||
lease_cell = _unproven_cell(row.lease_authority)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
leases = (
|
||||
", ".join(f"<code>{escape(lid)}</code>" for lid in row.lease_ids)
|
||||
if row.lease_ids
|
||||
else '<span class="muted">none</span>'
|
||||
)
|
||||
work = (
|
||||
", ".join(escape(ref) for ref in row.work_refs)
|
||||
if row.work_refs
|
||||
else '<span class="muted">—</span>'
|
||||
)
|
||||
lease_cell = (
|
||||
f'{leases}<div class="muted" style="font-size:0.82rem; '
|
||||
f'margin-top:0.2rem;">{work}</div>'
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
if row.worktree_authority != STATUS_OK:
|
||||
worktrees = _unproven_cell(row.worktree_authority)
|
||||
else:
|
||||
worktrees = (
|
||||
"<br>".join(f"<code>{escape(path)}</code>" for path in row.worktree_paths)
|
||||
if row.worktree_paths
|
||||
else '<span class="muted">unbound</span>'
|
||||
)
|
||||
return f"""<tr>
|
||||
<td><code>{escape(row.session_id)}</code></td>
|
||||
<td>
|
||||
@@ -116,15 +164,24 @@ def _render_session_row(row: SessionRow) -> str:
|
||||
{_badge(pid_alive, pid_css)}
|
||||
</td>
|
||||
<td>{escape(str(row.status or "—"))}<div class="muted" style="font-size:0.82rem;">{escape(str(row.last_heartbeat_at or ""))}</div></td>
|
||||
<td>{leases}<div class="muted" style="font-size:0.82rem; margin-top:0.2rem;">{work}</div></td>
|
||||
<td>{lease_cell}</td>
|
||||
<td>{worktrees}</td>
|
||||
<td>{_flags(row.stale_flags, css="badge-stale")}</td>
|
||||
<td>{_flags(row.contamination_flags, css="badge-blocked")}</td>
|
||||
</tr>"""
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _sessions_table(rows: Sequence[SessionRow]) -> str:
|
||||
def _sessions_table(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> str:
|
||||
rows: Sequence[SessionRow] = snapshot.sessions
|
||||
if not rows:
|
||||
sessions_status = snapshot.ownership_section_status.get("sessions", STATUS_OK)
|
||||
if sessions_status != STATUS_OK:
|
||||
return (
|
||||
'<p class="muted">Session inventory is '
|
||||
f"<strong>{escape(sessions_status)}</strong> — the session list "
|
||||
"could not be read. This is not evidence that no sessions "
|
||||
"exist.</p>"
|
||||
)
|
||||
return (
|
||||
'<p class="muted">No control-plane sessions recorded. Inventory may '
|
||||
"be unavailable, or no MCP workers have registered yet.</p>"
|
||||
@@ -329,8 +386,10 @@ def render_sessions_page(snapshot: SessionViewSnapshot) -> str:
|
||||
<div class="prompt-card">
|
||||
<h3>Sessions</h3>
|
||||
<p class="muted">Control-plane sessions correlated with leases and worktree bindings.
|
||||
Stale and contamination flags are fail-soft: absence of a marker is not proof of cleanliness when inventory is degraded.</p>
|
||||
{_sessions_table(snapshot.sessions)}
|
||||
Stale and contamination flags are fail-soft: absence of a marker is not proof of cleanliness when inventory is degraded.
|
||||
Lease and worktree columns read <em>unknown (inventory …)</em> when their source could not be loaded.</p>
|
||||
{_ownership_caveat(snapshot)}
|
||||
{_sessions_table(snapshot)}
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
|
||||
{_namespaces_section(snapshot)}
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user