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# GlitchTip Read-Only Error/Event Tools — Design Notes
- **Status:** Design (implementation-ready notes; **no implementation in this repo**)
- **Issue:** #73 (umbrella: #75; boundary decision: ADR-0001, #71)
- **Related:** #74 (GlitchTip→Gitea filing workflow — composes these read tools),
#78 (dedup/linking, child of #74), #76 (per-service profile schema)
- **Date:** 2026-07-02
## 1. Purpose and scope
Define the minimum **read-only** GlitchTip MCP tool set that lets an LLM answer:
*"What unresolved errors does project X have (by environment/release), and what
is this specific error?"* — with privacy-safe output suitable for LLM context,
issue bodies, and audit logs.
Strictly read-only, per ADR-0001:
- **No mutation tools** — no resolving/ignoring/assigning issues, no comment
posting, no project/team/key administration, no deletes.
- **No automatic GlitchTip→Gitea filing** (that is #74's *orchestrated,
explicitly-invoked* workflow; it composes these read tools and Gitea write
tools — never one dual-credential server).
- **This server never holds Gitea write credentials.**
## 2. Boundary placement (namespace pending)
These tools belong to the GlitchTip observability boundary of the MCP Control
Plane — `glitchtip-mcp` (ADR-0001's recommendation), `observability-mcp`, or
folded into `ops-mcp`. **ADR-0001 open owner decision #2 picks the name; this
design does not assume it.** Tool names below use the `glitchtip_` prefix for
readability and rename mechanically with the decision.
Fixed regardless of the name (per `tool-boundaries.md`,
`credential-isolation.md`):
- Own server process, own `.env`, GlitchTip credentials only.
- No Gitea, Jenkins, or Ops tokens in this runtime; no GlitchTip token
anywhere else.
## 3. API surface note (Sentry compatibility)
GlitchTip implements a Sentry-compatible REST API (`/api/0/...` — organizations,
projects, issues, events). The design targets **GlitchTip's documented subset**
only; Sentry-only endpoints must not be assumed. The implementation should pin
against a tested GlitchTip version and treat missing endpoints/fields as
degraded-but-safe (omit field, never crash).
## 4. Minimum read-only tool set
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `glitchtip_whoami` | Verify authenticated identity + active profile (mirror of `gitea_whoami`; fail-closed identity proof) |
| `glitchtip_list_projects` | Projects visible to the token (org-scoped), with pagination bounds |
| `glitchtip_list_unresolved` | Unresolved issues for a project, filterable (§6), sorted by last-seen |
| `glitchtip_get_issue` | Safe detail of one issue (fields §5) |
| `glitchtip_recent_events` | Recent events for an issue (summaries only, §5) |
| `glitchtip_search` | Issue search within a project (query + filters §6) |
All tools are `GET`-only. No tool issues PUT/POST/DELETE.
## 5. Privacy: field-level allowlist (the core rule)
Error events routinely contain PII and secrets (request bodies, cookies,
headers, tokens, user emails/IPs, local variables). Therefore: **allowlist
projection only — raw event/issue payloads are never passed through.**
### Issue-level safe fields (`glitchtip_list_unresolved`, `glitchtip_get_issue`, `glitchtip_search`)
| Field | Notes |
|---|---|
| `issue_id` | GlitchTip issue ID (dedup key for #78) |
| `fingerprint` | When available (dedup key for #78) |
| `title` / `culprit` | Error type + short message/transaction — redactor-passed |
| `project` | Slug |
| `level` | error/warning/… |
| `status` | unresolved/… |
| `environment` | When filtered/available |
| `release` | Version string |
| `first_seen` / `last_seen` | ISO-8601 UTC |
| `event_count` / `user_count` | Numbers only — never user identities |
| `permalink` | GlitchTip web URL (the "link, not dump" principle) |
### Event-level safe fields (`glitchtip_recent_events`)
`event_id`, `timestamp`, `level`, `environment`, `release`, redactor-passed
`message`, and a **stack summary** only: top N (default 5) frames as
`module/filename:function:line` — in-app frames preferred.
### Redact / omit — never returned
Request headers; cookies; auth/session fields; user emails, usernames, IPs;
request/form bodies; query strings; local variables; full raw stack frames
(source context lines); SDK/device metadata beyond platform name; breadcrumbs;
any `extra`/`context` blobs.
Full raw frames or request context require a **separate, explicitly approved**
operation (`glitchtip.event.read_raw`) that is absent from default profiles —
same pattern as `jenkins.console.read` in the #72 design. Even then, output
passes the shared secret redactor; redaction failure ⇒ error, never raw text.
**Default output = fingerprint / release / summary + permalink.** The
permalink carries the human to the full data in GlitchTip's own UI, where its
access control applies — the MCP layer does not re-serve raw payloads.
## 6. Filtering and pagination
Filters (all optional, combinable): `project` (required for issue/event
queries), `environment`, `release`, `fingerprint`, free-text `query`
(GlitchTip search syntax, e.g. `is:unresolved`).
Pagination: cursor-based per the API. Bounds: per-page cap 50; default overall
cap 100 items; hard cap `max_pages` (default 10) against runaway loops —
mirroring `gitea_auth.api_get_all`. Truncation is **explicit** in the return
(`"truncated": true`) — never silent.
## 7. Credentials and profile requirements
Per-service profile model (`gitea-execution-profiles.md`, extended by #76):
- Env/config: `GLITCHTIP_URL`, `GLITCHTIP_ORG`, `GLITCHTIP_TOKEN_SOURCE_NAME`
(secret **name** only; value resolved at runtime, never logged/committed).
- Profile: e.g. `glitchtip-readonly` with namespaced
`allowed_operations: ["glitchtip.read", "glitchtip.event.read"]`
(+ `glitchtip.event.read_raw` only with explicit approval);
`forbidden_operations: ["glitchtip.issue.mutate", "glitchtip.admin"]`
belt-and-braces though no mutating tool exists.
- Missing URL/org/token/profile ⇒ **fail closed** before any network call.
- Read-only ⇒ no confirmation gates; identity (`glitchtip_whoami`) must work so
workflows can prove which account they read as.
## 8. Failure behavior (fail closed, clear, safe)
| Condition | Behavior |
|---|---|
| Unknown project/issue | Explicit `{"found": false, ...}` — no fuzzy matching |
| GlitchTip unreachable (DNS/timeout) | `"network error contacting GlitchTip: <redacted reason>"` — mirror `gitea_auth.api_request` conversion |
| 502/503/504 | "GlitchTip upstream unavailable" |
| 401/403 | "GlitchTip auth failed / insufficient permissions" — no credential echo |
| 429 | Honor Retry-After with capped jittered backoff (as `gitea_auth`) |
| Malformed JSON | "malformed JSON response from GlitchTip" — no raw-body dump |
| Missing profile/creds | Fail closed before any network call (§7) |
All error text passes the shared secret redactor.
## 9. Testing strategy (mocked; for the implementing package)
Mocked-GlitchTip unit tests only, per `docs/developer-testing-guidelines.md`:
- Assert method is always `GET`; URL/filter/cursor shape correct.
- **Projection tests:** response fixtures containing emails, IPs, cookies,
headers, request bodies, locals, full frames ⇒ none appear in output
(explicit negative assertions per §5's redact list).
- Stack summary: top-N frame cap enforced; source-context lines absent.
- Pagination: per-page/overall/max-pages caps; explicit `truncated` flag.
- Filters: environment/release/fingerprint/query passed through correctly.
- Failure matrix of §8 incl. no-token-in-error assertions.
- Profile gate: missing/insufficient profile ⇒ no network call
(`mock_api.assert_not_called()` pattern).
- `read_raw` op absent ⇒ raw-frame request refused without an API call.
## 10. Implementation-readiness checklist
Ready to implement once:
1. ADR-0001 owner decision #2 (namespace/placement) is made — mechanical
rename of the `glitchtip_` prefix if needed.
2. ADR-0001 owner decision #1 (repo home) is made.
3. #76 profile schema exists (or a minimal `glitchtip-readonly` profile is
hand-rolled to the same rules).
4. A pinned GlitchTip version is chosen for API-subset testing (§3).
Explicitly **not** unlocked by this document: any GlitchTip mutation, any
automatic Gitea filing (#74 designs that as a gated, explicitly-invoked
orchestrated workflow), any Gitea credentials in this boundary.
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# Multi-Service MCP Profile and Configuration Model
- **Status:** Design (no implementation in this repo yet)
- **Issue:** #76 (parent umbrella: #75; boundary decision: ADR-0001, #71)
- **Date:** 2026-07-02
## 1. Purpose and Scope
Extend the existing Gitea execution-profile model (`docs/gitea-execution-profiles.md`) into a generic **per-service** MCP profile/config model. This supports integrating Jenkins and GlitchTip into the MCP Control Plane while strictly preserving isolation and fail-closed safety.
**Crucial Constraints:**
* The shared profile/config model is a **schema / library**, **not a shared credential pool**.
* Tokens remain **service-local**; profiles are **per service**.
* Orchestrators **must not** directly hold every service credential.
## 2. Profile Schema (Per Service)
The schema reuses the proven Gitea field model, adapted per service.
```json
{
"profile_name": "readonly-metrics",
"service": "glitchtip",
"token_source_name": "GLITCHTIP_API_TOKEN_READONLY",
"allowed_operations": [
"glitchtip.event.read",
"glitchtip.issue.read"
],
"forbidden_operations": [
"glitchtip.issue.resolve",
"glitchtip.issue.delete"
]
}
```
### Schema Rules
* `allowed_operations` are **namespaced** (e.g., `gitea.issue.create`, `jenkins.build.read`, `glitchtip.event.read`).
* `forbidden_operations`, if present, **always override** `allowed_operations`.
* `token_source_name` records the source **name only, never the value**. Tokens must never be printed, logged, or included in telemetry.
## 3. Fail-Closed Behavior
The model enforces strict fail-closed constraints before any network call occurs:
* **Missing Profile:** If a requested profile is undefined for the target service, the operation fails immediately.
* **Missing Credentials:** If the `token_source_name` cannot be resolved to a valid token at runtime, the operation fails immediately without retrying or prompting.
## 4. Environment Overrides
Profiles can be dynamically overridden or injected via environment variables, following the established hierarchy:
1. **Explicit Environment Variable:** (Highest precedence) e.g., `MCP_GLITCHTIP_TOKEN` overrides any JSON profile.
2. **Profile Mapping in JSON:** Resolved via `token_source_name` (e.g., `GLITCHTIP_API_TOKEN_READONLY`) mapping to an environment variable or secret store.
3. **No Auth:** Fails closed.
## 5. Audit Logging
To maintain accountability across multi-service workflows, all mutating actions must include the audit identity and source:
* The audit log must record the `profile_name`, the orchestrator source (e.g., `sysadmin`, `jenkins-mcp`), and the action taken.
* The audit system must sanitize all output to ensure tokens are stripped (see `safety-model.md`).
## 6. Backward Compatibility
The existing Gitea profile behavior (`gitea_whoami`, etc.) remains strictly backward compatible. The generic profile library will parse existing Gitea profile objects without requiring them to migrate their schemas, defaulting the `service` attribute to `gitea`.
## 7. Implementation Boundary
Per the namespace decisions in #71 and #75, this generic model belongs in the `common` package or library. It will be imported by `gitea-mcp` (this repo), `jenkins-mcp`, and `glitchtip-mcp` without forcing a monolithic architecture.
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## Separate Credentials ## Separate Credentials
Even though multiple MCP servers share the same monorepo, they **must** have separate credentials and runtimes. Even though multiple MCP servers share the same monorepo, they **must** have separate credentials and runtimes.
- **No Shared Environments**: Each MCP server (`gitea-mcp`, `jenkins-mcp`, `ops-mcp`, etc.) must be instantiated as an independent service with its own dedicated `.env` configuration file. - **No Shared Environments**: Each MCP server (`gitea-mcp`, `jenkins-mcp`, `glitchtip-mcp`, `ops-mcp`, etc.) must be instantiated as an independent service with its own dedicated `.env` configuration file.
- **Strict Isolation**: A server will only have access to the credentials required for its specific trust boundary. For instance, `gitea-mcp` has no access to Jenkins or Ops authentication tokens. - **Strict Isolation**: A server will only have access to the credentials required for its specific trust boundary. For instance, `gitea-mcp` has no access to Jenkins or Ops authentication tokens.
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# Label Taxonomy
This document catalogs the issue labels used for MCP workflows, including Jenkins and GlitchTip (observability).
> **Approval Required:** Do not create or apply new labels in `manage_labels.py` without explicit owner approval of this document.
## Existing Labels
* **`jenkins`**
* Description: Jenkins integration
* Color: `d93f0b`
* Use: Used to mark issues, PRs, or tasks that involve the `jenkins-mcp` boundaries, CI/CD designs, or build failures.
* **`glitchtip`**
* Description: GlitchTip integration
* Color: `b60205`
* Use: Used to mark issues related to the `glitchtip-mcp` boundary and observability integration.
## Proposed / Missing Labels
* **`observability`**
* Proposed Description: Observability, metrics, and monitoring tasks
* Proposed Color: `5319e7`
* Use: Broader than GlitchTip alone; covers logging, metrics, traces, and general observability pipeline improvements.
* **`source:glitchtip`**
* Proposed Description: Issue filed automatically by GlitchTip orchestration
* Proposed Color: `b60205`
* Use: Applied automatically by the orchestrator when a GlitchTip error event is converted into a Gitea issue.
* **`status:triage`**
* Proposed Description: Issue needs human or orchestrator triage
* Proposed Color: `fbca04`
* Use: Used for incoming issues (especially automated ones like `source:glitchtip`) that have not yet been evaluated for priority or resolution.
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- System and application logs - System and application logs
- Tool return values/outputs - Tool return values/outputs
- Any form of persistent storage or console output - Any form of persistent storage or console output
## 4. Read-Only First Policy
By default, MCP servers (such as `jenkins-mcp` and `ops-mcp`) operate in a **read-only** mode. Mutation capabilities are deny-by-default and fail-closed.
## 5. Mutation Gating
Any mutating action (e.g., Gitea issue creation from GlitchTip, or Jenkins builds) must be explicitly allowed by the execution profile.
- **Jenkins build triggers** are explicitly deferred for phase 1.
- **GlitchTip to Gitea issue filing** is documented as a gated, orchestrated workflow, not a direct unprompted automatic action.
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This document defines the strict boundaries between the different MCP server packages within the monorepo. This document defines the strict boundaries between the different MCP server packages within the monorepo.
The project is named **MCP Control Plane** and lives in the `mcp-control-plane` repository. It groups the following packages: `common`, `gitea-mcp`, `jenkins-mcp`, `ops-mcp`, and `release-mcp`. The project is named **MCP Control Plane** and lives in the `mcp-control-plane` repository. It groups the following packages: `common`, `gitea-mcp`, `jenkins-mcp`, `glitchtip-mcp`, `ops-mcp`, and `release-mcp`.
## 1. Architectural Philosophy ## 1. Architectural Philosophy
- **One MCP Server per Trust Boundary**: While the packages share a monorepo, their runtime services must remain entirely separate. There is no single "everything" server. - **One MCP Server per Trust Boundary**: While the packages share a monorepo, their runtime services must remain entirely separate. There is no single "everything" server.
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## 2. Package-Specific Boundaries ## 2. Package-Specific Boundaries
- **gitea-mcp**: Restricted to source-control and work-item capabilities (issues, PRs, comments). This package **must not** have Jenkins or Ops credentials, nor can it execute deploy operations. - **gitea-mcp**: Restricted to source-control and work-item capabilities (issues, PRs, comments). This package **must not** have Jenkins or Ops credentials, nor can it execute deploy operations.
- **jenkins-mcp**: Focused on CI/CD capabilities. This package **must not** have Ops credentials unless explicitly configured for a specific, isolated pipeline later. - **jenkins-mcp**: Focused on CI/CD capabilities. This package **must not** have Ops credentials unless explicitly configured for a specific, isolated pipeline later.
- **glitchtip-mcp**: Dedicated to observability and error reporting. This package **must not** have Gitea write credentials or Jenkins deploy capabilities.
- **ops-mcp**: Dedicated to live environment and host checks. In its initial state, this package starts as strictly read-only (e.g., health checks, status checks, log reading). - **ops-mcp**: Dedicated to live environment and host checks. In its initial state, this package starts as strictly read-only (e.g., health checks, status checks, log reading).