merge(master): resolve #903 conflicts with #643 request initiation

Keep #644 recovery console actions and #643 initiate_workflow side by side
in console_authz and authz audit docs after merging latest master.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
2026-07-25 18:03:04 -04:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
11 changed files with 3261 additions and 42 deletions
+72 -9
View File
@@ -115,6 +115,12 @@ class ConsoleAction:
break_glass: bool
phase: int
summary: str
# Opt-in switch for an action whose execution path is genuinely wired
# ahead of its phase becoming globally active (#643). Naming a variable
# here enables nothing on its own: the variable must also be set in the
# environment. An action that leaves this ``None`` can only execute once
# ACTIVE_PHASE reaches its phase, exactly as before.
execution_env_flag: str | None = None
@property
def mcp_permission(self) -> str:
@@ -277,7 +283,7 @@ _ACTION_SPECS: tuple[ConsoleAction, ...] = (
phase=2,
summary="Restart one MCP namespace via the host supervisor.",
),
# #644: Phase 2 recovery controls & playbooks.
# #644: Phase 2 recovery controls & playbooks.
ConsoleAction(
action_id="system.clear_stale_binding",
task_key="clear_stale_binding",
@@ -311,6 +317,27 @@ _ACTION_SPECS: tuple[ConsoleAction, ...] = (
phase=2,
summary="Run reconciler cleanup for merged or superseded PR branches.",
),
# #643: submit a work request — desired role, issue/PR, intent — and let
# the allocator reserve it. This is the one Phase 2 action whose execution
# path is actually implemented (``webui.request_service``), so it carries
# the opt-in flag; it stays denied until an operator sets that variable.
# Authority is operator-class because the outcome is a claim, not a Gitea
# verdict: initiating reviewer or merger *work* does not grant the right
# to approve or merge, which stays with the MCP role profile.
ConsoleAction(
action_id="initiate_workflow",
task_key="allocate_next_work",
action_class=CLASS_WRITE,
minimum_role=OPERATOR,
requires_confirmation=True,
dual_control=False,
break_glass=False,
phase=2,
summary=(
"Preview and initiate allocator-owned workflow work for a role."
),
execution_env_flag="WEBUI_REQUESTS_EXECUTION",
),
)
ACTIONS: dict[str, ConsoleAction] = {a.action_id: a for a in _ACTION_SPECS}
@@ -464,6 +491,33 @@ ALLOW_PREVIEW = "allowed_preview_only"
# gated on this model landing; nothing here enables it.
ACTIVE_PHASE = 1
_TRUTHY = frozenset({"1", "true", "yes", "on"})
def execution_wired(
action: ConsoleAction | None, env: dict[str, str] | None = None
) -> bool:
"""Whether *action* has a live execution path right now.
Two ways to be wired, and only two. The action's phase is active, or the
action declares an opt-in environment variable *and* that variable is set.
Everything else — including every action that never declares a flag — is
unwired, so the default across the registry stays deny.
Bumping ``ACTIVE_PHASE`` would enable execution for every action of that
phase at once. The per-action flag exists so a single implemented action
can go live without dragging its unimplemented phase-mates with it.
"""
if action is None:
return False
if action.phase <= ACTIVE_PHASE:
return True
flag = (action.execution_env_flag or "").strip()
if not flag:
return False
source = env if env is not None else os.environ
return (source.get(flag) or "").strip().lower() in _TRUTHY
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class AuthorizationDecision:
@@ -503,16 +557,19 @@ def authorize(
principal: Principal | None = None,
*,
for_execution: bool = False,
env: dict[str, str] | None = None,
) -> AuthorizationDecision:
"""Decide whether *principal* may invoke *action_id*. Deny by default.
``for_execution`` distinguishes a read-only preview from a real invocation.
Even an allowed decision reports ``execution_enabled=False`` while the
console is in Phase 1, so no caller can read an allow as permission to
mutate.
``execution_enabled`` reports whether the action has a live execution path
at all (:func:`execution_wired`) — for every action without an explicit
opt-in flag that stays ``False`` while the console is in Phase 1, so no
caller can read an allow as permission to mutate.
"""
who = principal if principal is not None else ANONYMOUS
action = get_action(action_id)
wired = execution_wired(action, env)
if action is None:
return AuthorizationDecision(
@@ -531,7 +588,7 @@ def authorize(
"requires_confirmation": action.requires_confirmation,
"dual_control": action.dual_control,
"break_glass": action.break_glass,
"execution_enabled": False,
"execution_enabled": wired,
}
if not who.authenticated:
@@ -564,13 +621,19 @@ def authorize(
**base,
)
if for_execution and action.phase > ACTIVE_PHASE:
if for_execution and not wired:
return AuthorizationDecision(
allowed=False,
reason_code=DENY_PHASE_NOT_ACTIVE,
detail=(
f"Action {action_id!r} belongs to phase {action.phase}; the "
f"console is in phase {ACTIVE_PHASE}. Execution is not wired."
f"console is in phase {ACTIVE_PHASE}"
+ (
f" and {action.execution_env_flag} is not set"
if action.execution_env_flag
else ""
)
+ ". Execution is not wired."
),
**base,
)
@@ -579,8 +642,8 @@ def authorize(
allowed=True,
reason_code=ALLOW_PREVIEW,
detail=(
"Principal holds the required role. Preview only — execution "
"remains disabled until the Phase 2 action framework ships."
"Principal holds the required role. Execution proceeds only for an "
"action with a wired execution path; everything else is preview."
),
**base,
)